Nationals Generic 1NC

First Off
A. Interpretation:

In the US context, economic engagement must include conditional carrots and
sticks.
Helweg, Professor of Public Policy @ SMU, 2000 (Diana, Economic Strategy and
National Security, p. 145)

Secretary of State Madeline K. Albright has argued that a U.S. policy of economic engagement
with a country does not mean endorsement of its regime. In fact, the U.S. version of
engagement is different from countries, such as France and Japan, which often practice a
policy of unlimited economic engagement based on the rationale that unfettered trade and
investment best promotes democratic values for the targeted nation, and financial success for
themselves. By contrast, U.S.-"style" engagement must be coupled with a range of policy tools
that includes the targeted use of economic restrictions. In other words, it is a variation of the
traditional carrot and stick approach rather than one or the other.


B. VIOLATION: The affirmative engages [Cuba, Mexico, or Venezuela] without
attempting to directly manipulate the country with an incentive.

C. STANDARDS:

A. Predictable Limits: The methods of economic engagement are
functionally limitless. Key to fairness

B. Neg Ground and Research: Only our interp gives meaning to
engagement and cultivates educational debate providing both sides
with the best ground.

D.Topicality is a VOTING ISSUE for fairness and education.

Second Off
A) Interp: 1AC plan text must specify its agent
Government power is divided into 3 branches
Rotunda, professor of law at the University of Illinois, 2001 [Richard, 18 Const. Commentary
319, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE, AND MORRISON, l/n,
(m7,06)]
No one denies the importance of the Constitution's federalist principles. Its state/federal division of authority protects liberty -
both by restricting the burdens that government can impose from a distance and by facilitating citizen participation in government
that is closer to home. n8 Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, agreed. The "Framers crafted the federal system of
government so that the people's rights would be secured by the division of power." n9 The Framers of our Constitution anticipated
that a self-interested "federal majority" would consistently seek to impose more federal control over the people and the states. n10
Hence, they created a federal structure designed to protect freedom by dispersing and limiting federal power. They instituted
federalism [*321] chiefly to protect individuals, that is, the people, not the "states qua states." n11 The Framers sought to
protect liberty by creating a central government of enumerated powers. They divided power between the state and federal
governments, and they further divided power within the federal government by splitting it among the three
branches of government, and they further divided the legislative power (the power that the Framers most feared) by splitting
it between two Houses of Congress. n12

a) Makes the plan conditional They can change their plan after hearing our
strategy.

b) Kills 1NC Strategy Not only are our DA links hurt, but the ability to have a
competitive CP is lost because textual competition is the key basis for the
community.

Third Off
Russian resurgence into Latin America is growing
Wells 4-26-13 (Miriam, Wells is a journalist who has previously worked for BBC Radio News and for Human Rights Watch. She has worked for InSight Crime since
2012, specializes in Latin American Reporting, Should Russian Anti-Drug Aid to LatAm Worry the US? 2013 http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/should-russian-drug-
aid-latam-worry-us)
Russian involvement in Latin America has been growing for several years, particularly in left-leaning countries, a
harkback to the Soviet era which has led some to suggest the alliances are more about geopolitics than
fighting drug trafficking. However, anti-drugs cooperation also has major economic benefits to
Russia, particularly in terms of arms sales, which have soared in the last 10 years. In 2009 Russia took the United
States' place as the main supplier of arms to Latin America for the first time, with sales totalling $5.4 billion. Russian
arms sales to Latin America grew 900 percent between 2004 and 2009, according to Russian newspaper Pravda.
"We are getting back forgotten, old Soviet markets, like Peru, for example," Russia's director of Military Sales
Services, Alexander Fomin, said last month. Ties between Latin America and Russia began to deepen in earnest in
2008 when then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev carried out a Latin American tour in his first year in office, visiting Peru,
Brazil, Venezuela and Cuba. One Russian diplomat claimed that cooperation "could be broader than in the Soviet era," and
hinted at broader strategic motives by stating that "Latin America has already ceased to be
the United States' backyard." Since then, Moscow has signed far-reaching defense, energy and trade
agreements with countries such as Ecuador, Bolivia and Brazil, and Russia-Brazil bilateral trade is predicted to increase to $10
billion annually in the next three years.
Russia conducts its foreign policy in terms of zero sum influence with the US
these conflicts spill over and destroy relations
Blank 2011 (Steven, Professor of Russian National Security Studies at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College Russias Second Wind in Latin
America, Perspectives on the Americas A Series of Opinion Pieces by Leading Commentators on the Region August 18 https://www6.miami.edu/hemispheric-
policy/Perspectives_on_the_Americas/Blank-Latam2011-FINAL.pdf)
Indeed, Russian policy is not driven by Latin Americas views, but by classical desires for profit and
influence, mainly at the expense of the United States, and a visceral anti-Americanism. Analysts like
Fedor Lukyanov, Vladimir Shlapentokh and Leonid Radzhikhovky all attest to the virtually obsessive anti-Americanism that
drives much of Russian foreign policy.3 Indeed, powerful people like Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin, Premier Vladimir
Putins right-hand man, apparently want to conduct a Latin American policy of anti-Americanism and
destabilization regardless of the consequences. Sechin reportedly promoted economic deals
and arms sales to Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua, and the formation among these three of an
alliance as Moscow considers the formation of such a union a worthy response to U.S.
activity in the former Soviet Union and the placement of missile defenses in Poland and the
Czech Republic.4 Not surprisingly Sechin advised Putin that Moscow should upgrade its relations with
these countries in particular, and with Latin America in general.5 As Deputy Prime Minister, Sechin appears to have encouraged Venezuelan president Hugo Chvez
to develop a nuclear program and Sechin negotiated the transfer of nuclear technology and weapons to Venezuela. In July 2009 he arranged a deal with Cuba that allowed
Russia to conduct deep-water drilling in the Gulf of Mexico.6 Whereas in the previous thrust into Latin America, Moscow
focused primarily, though not exclusively, on reliable friends like Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua, to whom it
either sold a lot of arms or gave considerable economic and energy assistance, today Moscow fully appreciates Brazils dominant position in Latin America, has
cemented bilateral and multilateral ties with it through the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) organization, and
devotes its primary attention on Brazil, while not neglecting other targets of opportunity. Putin has called Brazil a strategic partner for Russia and cited bilateral cooperation in
the energy sector, as well as in nuclear energy, space, metals, biotechnologies and telecommunications.7 Beyond that, Russia has long sought entre into Brazils arms market
and it continues to do so vigorously. Whereas earlier Moscow wanted to show Washington that Moscow could
play in Latin America too, now Moscows broader primary objective is support for Russias
goal of a multipolar world that constrains U.S. power and forces Washington to heed
Moscows voice before acting. Thus Russias new activity builds upon previous policy statements by leading officials. Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov said that Latin America and Russia are natural partners, not because of Latin Americas
economic growth, but because of the congruence between Latin governments foreign policies
and Russias support of a multipolar world.8 Similarly Putin also stated that Latin America is becoming a
noticeable link in the chain of the multipolar world that is forming we will pay more and
more attention to this vector of our economic and foreign policy.9

Destruction of Russian relations causes nuclear terrorism, and destroys
hegemony.
Cohen 2011 Ph.D., professor of Russian studies at New York University and Professor of Politics Emeritus at Princeton University (Stephen, Obama's Russia
'Reset': Another Lost Opportunity? http://www.thenation.com/article/161063/obamas-russia-reset-another-lost-opportunity?page=full)
An enduring existential reality has been lost in Washingtons postcold war illusions and the fog of
subsequent US wars: the road to American national security still runs through Moscow. Despite the Soviet breakup twenty years
ago, only Russia still possesses devices of mass destruction capable of destroying the United States and
tempting international terrorists for years to come. Russia also remains the worlds largest territorial country, a crucial
Eurasian frontline in the conflict between Western and Islamic civilizations, with a vastly
disproportionate share of the planets essential resources including oil, natural gas, iron ore,
nickel, gold, timber, fertile land and fresh water. In addition, Moscows military and diplomatic reach
can still thwart, or abet, vital US interests around the globe, from Afghanistan, Iran, China and
North Korea to Europe and Latin America. In short, without an expansive cooperative
relationship with Russia, there can be no real US national security. And yet, when President Obama took office in January 2009,
relations between Washington and Moscow were so bad that some close observers, myself included, characterized them as a new cold war. Almost all cooperation, even decades-long agreements regulating
nuclear weapons, had been displaced by increasingly acrimonious conflicts. Indeed, the relationship had led to a military confrontation potentially as dangerous as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The Georgian-
Russian War of August 2008 was also a proxy American-Russian war, the Georgian forces having been supplied and trained by Washington. What happened to the strategic partnership and friendship between
post-Soviet Moscow and Washington promised by leaders on both sides after 1991? For more than a decade, the American political and media establishments have maintained that such a relationship was
achieved by President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s but destroyed by the antidemocratic and neo-imperialist agenda of Vladimir Putin, who succeeded Yeltsin in 2000. In
reality, the historic opportunity for a postcold war partnership was lost in Washington, not
Moscow, when the Clinton administration, in the early 1990s, adopted an approach based on
the false premise that Russia, having lost the cold war, could be treated as a defeated
nation. (The cold war actually ended through negotiations sometime between 1988 and 1990, well before the end of Soviet Russia in December 1991, as all the leading participantsSoviet President
Mikhail Gorbachev, President Ronald Reagan and President George H.W. Bushagreed.) The result was the Clinton administrations triumphalist, winner-take-all approach, including an intrusive crusade to
dictate Russias internal political and economic development; broken strategic promises, most importantly Bushs assurance to Gorbachev in 1990 that NATO would not expand eastward beyond a reunited
Germany; and double-standard policies impinging on Russia (along with sermons) that presumed Moscow no longer had any legitimate security concerns abroad apart from those of the United States, even in its
own neighborhood. The backlash came with Putin, but it would have come with any Kremlin leader more self-confident, more sober and less reliant on Washington than was Yeltsin. Nor did Washingtons
triumphalism end with Clinton or Yeltsin. Following the events of September 11, 2001, to take the most ramifying
example, Putins Kremlin gave the George W. Bush administration more assistance in its anti-
Taliban war in Afghanistan, including in intelligence and combat, than did any NATO ally. In
return, Putin expected the long-denied US-Russian partnership. Instead, the Bush White
House soon expanded NATO all the way to Russias borders and withdrew unilaterally from
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which Moscow regarded as the bedrock of its nuclear security. Those deceptions have not been forgotten in Moscow. Now
Russias political class, alarmed by the deterioration of the countrys essential infrastructures since 1991, is
locked in a struggle over the nations futureone with profound consequences for its foreign
policies. One side, associated with Putins handpicked successor as president, Dmitri Medvedev, is calling for a
democratic transformation that would rely on modernizing alliances with the West. The
other side, which includes ultra-nationalists and neo-Stalinists, insists that only Russias traditional state-
imposed methods, or modernization without Westernization, are possible. As evidence, they point to
NATOs encirclement of Russia and other US perfidies. The choice of modernizing
alternatives will be made in Moscow, not, as US policy-makers once thought, in Washington, but American policy will be a
crucial factor. In the centuries-long struggle between reform and reaction in Russia, anti-
authoritarian forces have had a political chance only when relations with the West were
improving. In this regard, Washington still plays the leading Western role, for better or worse.



Fourth Off
Chinas expanding into Latin America---US influence is key to crowd them out
Dowd 12 (Alan, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, Crisis in the
America's, http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas)
Focused on military operations in the Middle East, nuclear threats in Iran and North Korea, and the global threat of terrorism, U.S.
policymakers have neglected a growing challenge right here in the Western Hemisphere: the
expanding influence and reach of China. Eyeing energy resources to keep its economy humming, China is engaged
in a flurry of investing and spending in Latin America. In Costa Rica, China is funding a $1.24-billion upgrade of the
countrys oil refinery; bankrolling an $83-million soccer stadium; backing infrastructure and telecommunications improvements; and pouring millions
into a new police academy. In Colombia, China is planning a massive dry canal to link the countrys Pacific and Atlantic coasts by rail. At either
terminus, there will be Chinese ports; in between, there will be Chinese assembly facilities, logistics operations and distribution plants; and on the
Pacific side, there will be dedicated berths to ship Colombian coal outbound to China. In mid-January, a Chinese-built oil rig arrived in Cuba to begin
drilling in Cubas swath of the Gulf of Mexico. Reuters reports that Spanish, Russian, Malaysian and Norwegian firms will use the rig to extract Cuban oil.
For now, China is focusing on onshore oil extraction in Cuba. New offshore discoveries will soon catapult Brazil into a top-five global oil producer. With
some 38 billion barrels of recoverable oil off its coast, Brazil expects to pump 4.9 million barrels per day by 2020, as the Washington Times reports, and
China has used generous loans to position itself as the prime beneficiary of Brazilian oil. Chinas state-run oil and banking giants have inked technology-
transfer, chemical, energy and real-estate deals with Brazil. Plus, as the Times details, China came to the rescue of Brazils main oil company when it
sought financing for its massive drilling plans, pouring $10 billion into the project. A study in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) adds that Beijing plunked down
$3.1 billion for a slice of Brazils vast offshore oil fields. The JFQ study reveals just how deep and wide Beijing is spreading its financial influence in Latin
America: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela; a $16.3-billion commitment to develop Venezuelan oil reserves; $1 billion for Ecuadoran oil; $4.4 billion to
develop Peruvian mines; $10 billion to help Argentina modernize its rail system; $3.1 billion to purchase Argentinas petroleum company outright. The
New York Times adds that Beijing has lent Ecuador $1 billion to build a hydroelectric plant. There is good and bad to Beijings increased interest and
investment in the Western Hemisphere. Investment fuels development, and much of Latin America is happily accelerating development in the
economic, trade, technology and infrastructure spheres. But Chinas riches come with strings. For instance, in exchange for
Chinese development funds and loans, Venezuela agreed to increase oil shipments to China from 380,000 barrels per
day to one million barrels per day. Its worth noting that the Congressional Research Service has reported concerns in Washington that Hugo Chavez
might try to supplant his U.S. market with China. Given that Venezuela pumps an average of 1.5 million barrels of oil per day for the U.S.or about 11
percent of net oil importsthe results would be devastating for the U.S. That brings us to the security dimension of
Chinas checkbook diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere. Officials with the U.S. Southern Command conceded as early as 2006 that
Beijing had approached every country in our area of responsibility and provided military
exchanges, aid or training to Ecuador, Jamaica, Bolivia, Cuba, Chile and Venezuela. The JFQ study adds that China has an
important and growing presence in the regions military institutions. Most Latin American nations, including Mexico, send
officers to professional military education courses in the PRC. In Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia, Beijing has begun to sell sophisticated
hardwaresuch as radars and K-8 and MA-60 aircraft. The JFQ report concludes, ominously, that Chinese defense firms are likely to leverage their
experience and a growing track record for their goods to expand their market share in the region, with the secondary consequence being that those
purchasers will become more reliant on the associated Chinese logistics, maintenance, and training infrastructures that support those products. Put it
all together, and the southern flank of the United States is exposed to a range of new security challenges. To be sure, much of this is a function of
Chinas desire to secure oil markets. But theres more at work here than Chinas thirst for oil. Like a global chess match, China is probing Latin America
and sending a message that just as Washington has trade and military ties in Chinas neighborhood, China is developing trade and
military ties in Americas neighborhood. This is a direct challenge to U.S. primacy in the regiona challenge that must be
answered. First, Washington needs to relearn an obvious truththat Chinas rulers do not share Americas valuesand needs to shape and conduct
its China policy in that context. Beijing has no respect for human rights. Recall that in China, an estimated 3-5 million people are rotting away in laogai
slave-labor camps, many of them guilty of political dissent or religious activity; democracy activists are rounded up and imprisoned; freedom of
speech and religion and assembly do not exist; and internal security forces are given shoot-to-kill orders in dealing with unarmed citizens. Indeed,
Beijing viewed the Arab Spring uprisings not as an impetus for political reform, but as reason to launch its harshest crackdown on dissent in at least a
decade, according to Director of National Intelligence James Clapper. In short, the ends always justify the means in Beijing. And that makes all the
difference when it comes to foreign and defense policy. As Reagan counseled during the Cold War, There is no true international security without
respect for human rights. Second, the U.S. must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and
instead must reengage in its own neighborhood economically, politically and militarily. That means no more
allowing trade dealsand the partners counting on themto languish. Plans for a hemispheric free trade zone have faltered and
foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in limbo for years, before President
Obama finally signed them into law in 2011. Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy. The Wall Street Journal
reports that due to political wrangling in Washington, the State Department position focused on the Western Hemisphere has been staffed by an
interim for nearly a year, while six Western Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay, Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados)
remain empty. Reengagement means reversing plans to slash defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China has a deep
respect for U.S. military power. We cannot overstate how important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the midst of
massive military retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last. Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good
model to follow might be whats happening in Chinas backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security
partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps its time to do the same in Latin America. We should
remember that many Latin American countriesfrom Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chileborder the
Pacific. Given Beijings actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into
the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, all of this needs to be part of a
revived Monroe Doctrine. Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas, this Monroe Doctrine
2.0 would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes Chinas efforts to conduct trade in the Americas
but discourages any claims of controlimplied or explicitby China over territories, properties
or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorably
upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere. In short, what it was true in the 19th
and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.
The plan limits Chinas influence in the region restarts U.S. Latin Ties
Pham 10
[Dr. J. Peter Pham is senior vice president of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy
and the incoming editor of American Foreign Policy Interests., Chinas Strategic Penetration of
Latin America: What It Means for U.S. Interests, 2010, American Foreign Policy Interests, 32:
363381]

All of this led to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton telling an audience of Foreign Service officers during a town hall meeting at the State
Department last year that she found the gains that China was making in Latin America quite disturbing.
She went on to add, I mean they are building very strong economic and political connections.... I dont
think thats in our interest.85 How then, in the face of Chinas growing commercial and political
relationships across the region, might American interests be secured and, indeed, advanced ? First, U.S.
policymakers need to acknowledge that Americas Latin American and Caribbean neighbors
matter to the United States not only for its traditional security interest in limiting the influence of outside powers in
the Americas but also because globalization has accelerated the momentum for the increased integration of all of the nations in the Western
Hemisphere and regional cooperation is required to meet a whole host of transnational challenges ranging from spurring economic growth to illegal
immigration to narcotics trafficking to environmental issues. Hence it is in the interests of the United States to renew
relations with the countries to its south by developing and articulating a comprehensive strategy that clearly puts to
rest the legacy of benign neglect of the region. Second, rather than lament the passing of an era when the United States
unilaterally dictated the terms of engagement with its Latin American neighbors, the fact that the region is shaping its
future far more than it shaped its past86 ought to be welcomed. Engaging Latin American governments
and peoples on mutually agreeable terms is by far a more sustainable foundation for what ought to be the goals
of U.S. policy in the region: the stability, security, and, ultimately, prosperity of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. When the
trends to greater ownership by the countries of the region of their own individual destinies are added to the limitations that the current fiscal crisis and
the burdens of other challenges impose upon U.S. policy, it becomes apparent that American interests are best advanced by more modest expectations
and better targeting of available resources. In its engagements with its Latin American and Caribbean neighbors, the United States should privilege
building institutional capacity over the mere provision of aid. Third, despite Chinas efforts to secure access to Latin Americas natural resources and
markets, the region remains an important source of energy and other commodities for the United States as well as a major market for American goods
and services. About 25 percent of U.S. energy imports come from Central and South American countries and the region buys 20 percent of all of U.S.
exports, more than the European Union. Thanks to proximity as well as longstanding familiarity, U.S. businesses still have a
comparative advantage over overseas competitors in the markets of the Western Hemisphere.87 Thus the
administration must recommit itself to building on those solid foundations to reinforce and expand Americas economic
ties with its neighbors to the south. In his 2010 State of the Union address, President Obama singled out Colombia and Panama
as key partners with which he promised to strengthen trade relations.88 Yet absent proactive White House leadership, the
free trade agreements with those two countries have still not been ratified, while the North American Free Trade
Agreement that came into force under President Bill Clinton was undermined by last years enactment of a measure canceling a pilot program that
allowed carefully screened Mexican trucks to carry cargo in the United States. Movement to repeal U.S. tariffs on Brazilian ethanol and to settle a
dispute over cotton subsidies with the South American giantwould not only promote trade but would also clear the air between Washington and
Brasilia, especially since the World Trade Organization has already ruled the subsidies illegal and, in a rare move, authorized the imposition of punitive
sanctions against American products.89

Chinese influence in the region key to the global economy and regime stability
preventing US influence key
Ellis 11
[R. Evan, Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense
Studies at the National Defense University.Chinese Soft Power in Latin America, 1st quarter
2011, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf]

Access to Latin American Markets. Latin American markets are becoming increasingly valuable for Chinese
companies because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export base at a time when economic
growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe. The region has also proven an
effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated, higher value added products in sectors seen as
strategic, such as automobiles, appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding access for its products through
free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating markets in Latin American countries wi th existing manufacturing
sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC has often had to overcome resistance by organized and often politically
well-connected established interests in those nations. In doing so, the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key
groups of businesspeople and government officials in those nations have played a key role in the political
will to overcome the resistance . In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador to Venezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of
the few people in the country who could call President Chvez on the telephone and get an instant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese
company. Protection of Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the Region. At times, China has applied more explicit pressures
to induce Latin America to keep its markets open to Chinese goods. It has specifically protested measures by the
Argentine and Mexican governments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China began enforcing a
longstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14 China has also used its
economic weight to help secure major projects on preferential terms. In the course of negotiating a $1.7 billion loan deal for the Coco Coda Sinclair
Hydroelectric plant in Ecuador, the ability of the Chinese bidder SinoHidro to self-finance 85 percent of the projects through Chinese banks helped it to
work around the traditional Ecuadorian requirement that the project have a local partner. Later, the Ecuadorian government publicly and bitterly broke
off negotiations with the Chinese, only to return to the bargaining table 2 months later after failing to find satisfactory alternatives. In Venezuela, the
Chvez government agreed, for example, to accept half of the $20 billion loaned to it by the PRC in Chinese currency, and to use part of that currency
to buy 229,000 consumer appliances from the Chinese manufacturer Haier for resale to the Venezuelan people. In another deal, the PRC loaned
Venezuela $300 million to start a regional airline, but as part of the deal, required Venezuela to purchase the planes from a Chinese company.15
Protection of Chinese Nationals. As with the United States and other Western countries, as China becomes more involved in business and other
operations in Latin America, an increasing number of its nationals will be vulnerable to hazards common to the region, such as kidnapping, crime,
protests, and related problems. The heightened presence of Chinese petroleum companies in the northern jungle region of Ecuador, for example, has
been associated with a series of problems, including the takeover of an oilfield operated by the Andes petroleum consortium in Tarapoa in November
2006, and protests in Orellana related to a labor dispute with the Chinese company Petroriental in 2007 that resulted in the death of more than 35
police officers and forced the declaration of a national state of emergency. In 2004, ethnic Chinese shopkeepers in Valencia and Maracay, Venezuela,
became the focus of violent protests associated with the Venezuelan recall referendum. As such incidents increase, the PRC will need to
rely increasingly on a combination of goodwill and fear to deter action against its personnel, as well as its influence
with governments of the region , to resolve such problems when they occur.The rise of China
is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of
which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the
PRC leadership see the countrys sustained growth and development , and thus the stability of the
regime , threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or block
global institutions from supporting Chinese interests . In Latin America, Chinas attainment of
observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional
institutions, and to keep them from being used against Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has
leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade
agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading
block (the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.
Econ decline causes war
ROYAL 10 Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense
[Jedediah Royal, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in Economics of War and
Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215]

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict.
Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and
defence behaviour of interdependent stales. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels.
Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level. Pollins (20081 advances Modclski and Thompson's (1996) work on
leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of
a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next.
As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative
power (see also Gilpin. 19SJ) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of
miscalculation (Fcaron. 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead
to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining
power (Werner. 1999). Separately. Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles
impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections
between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000)
theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic
conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states arc likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so
long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline,
particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict
increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could
potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by
interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external
armed conflict at a national level. Mom berg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between
internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write.
The linkage, between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually
reinforcing. Economic conflict lends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour.
Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and
external conflicts self-reinforce each other (Hlomhen? & Hess. 2(102. p. X9> Economic decline has also
been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blombcrg. Hess. & Wee ra pan a, 2004). which
has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally
reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing
unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to
fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DcRoucn
(1995), and Blombcrg. Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force arc at
least indirecti) correlated. Gelpi (1997). Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that Ihe tendency towards
diversionary tactics arc greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally
more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing
that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked lo an
increase in the use of force. In summary, rcccni economic scholarship positively correlates economic
integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science
scholarship links economic decline with external conflict al systemic, dyadic and national levels.' This implied
connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and
deserves more attention.
Goes global
Kaminski 7
(Antoni Z., Professor Institute of Political Studies, World Order: The Mechanics of Threats (Central European Perspective), Polish
Quarterly of International Affairs, 1, p. 58)
As already argued, the economic advance of China has taken place with relatively few corresponding changes in the political system,
although the operation of political and economic institutions has seen some major changes. Still, tools are missing that would allow
the establishment of political and legal foundations for the modem economy, or they are too weak. The tools are efficient public
administration, the rule of law, clearly defined ownership rights, efficient banking system, etc. For these reasons, many experts
fear an economic crisis in China. Considering the importance of the state for the development of the global economy, the
crisis would have serious global repercussions. Its political ramifications could be no less dramatic owing to the
special position the military occupies in the Chinese political system, and the existence of many potential vexed issues in East Asia
(disputes over islands in the China Sea and the Pacific). A potential hotbed of conflict is also Taiwan's
status. Economic recession and the related destabilization of internal policies could lead to a political, or
even military crisis. The likelihood of the global escalation of the conflict is high, as the interests of
Russia, China, Japan, Australia and, first and foremost, the US clash in the region.

Fifth Off

We affirm the entirety of the 1AC, but reject their use of preemptive
argumentation
Preemption has become the doctrine of war. Any event can be simulated as a
threat to the existing order, justifying complete destruction of our knowledge
production in this academic space Their politics uses unknown possibilities as
justifications for changes in the present- these threats are virtual and are unable to be
contested
Massumi 5 (Brian, professor in the Communication Department at the Universit de Montral,
Fear (The Spectrum Said), Positions, 13.1, TBC 6/29/10 Project Muse p. 35-6, axheyd)

The necessity for a pragmatics of uncertainty to which the color system alerts us is related to
a change in the nature of the object of power. The formlessness and contentlessness of its
exercise in no way means that power no longer has an object. It means that the object of
power is correspondingly formless and contentless: post 9/11, governmentality has molded
itself to threat. A threat is unknowable. If it were known in its specics, it wouldnt be a
threat. It would be a situationas when they say on television police shows, we have a
situationand a situation can be handled. A threat is only a threat if it retains an
indeterminacy. If it has a form, it is not a substantial form, but a time form: a futurity. The
threat as such is nothing yetjust a looming. It is a form of futurity yet has the capacity to
ll the present without presenting itself. Its future looming casts a present shadow, and that
shadow is fear. Threat is the future cause of a change in the present. A future cause is not
actually a cause; it is a virtual cause, or quasicause. Threat is a futurity with a virtual power to
affect the present quasicausally. When a governmental mechanism makes threat its business,
it is taking this virtuality as its object and adopting quasicausality as its mode of operation. That
quasicausal operation goes by the name of security. It expresses itself in signs of alert. Since its
object is virtual, the only actual leverage the security operation can have is on threats back-cast
presence, its pre-effect of fear. Threat, understood as a quasicause, would qualify
philosophically as a species of final cause.Oneof the reasons that its causality is quasi is that
there is a paradoxical reciprocity between it and its effect. There is a kind of simultaneity
between the quasicause and its effect, even though they belong to different times. Threat is
the cause of fear in the sense that it triggers and conditions fears occurrence, but without
the fear it effects, the threat would have no handle on actual existence, remaining purely
virtual. The causality is bidirectional, operating immediately on both poles, in a kind of time-
slip through which a futurity is made directly present in an effective expression that brings it
into the present without it ceasing to be a futurity. Although they are in different tenses,
present and future, and in different ontological modes, actual and virtual, fear and threat are of
a piece: they are indissociable dimensions of the same event. The event, in its holding both
tenses together in its own immediacy, is transtemporal. Since its transtemporality holds a
passage between the virtual and the actual, it is a processareal transformation that is
effected in an interval smaller than the smallest perceivable, in an instantaneous looping
between presence and futurity. Since it is in that smaller-than-smallest of intervals, it is
perhaps best characterized as infra-temporal rather than transtemporal.

Point 6 isnt just a preempt
We dont endorse gendered language
These two lines were outlined as preemptive arguments to counter a G-lang K
or alt cause on case arguments
The opposite of the recognition of infinite alterity is a controlling attempt to
break down and understand everything. The notion of judging and demonizing
an individual leads to impersonal domination and tyranny
Wild, professor of philosophy, 80 Professor of Philosophy at Yale University (John, Ph.D.
from the University of Chicago, professor and chair of philosophy at Northwestern University,
2/29/80, Introduction to Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, book written by
Emmanuel Levinas, Springer, pp. 15-19, http://m.friendfeed-
media.com/48926eed43741a4e07a8241b7ee87bd55b666514)

Hegel and his followers have also seen the accidental biases and eccentricities that make the personal freedom of the
individual unreliable and open to criticism. They have therefore attacked the personal existence, which Levinas calls
"the inner life," as capricious and subjective, and have defended those objective rational systems
and social organizations which subordinate, or even repress, the individual. Levinas grants that they
have dominated the course of human history. He points out, however, that while this view may have
weakened the influence of individual fantasies and delusions, it has led to forms of social
suppression and tyranny which are even worse. Must we always choose one or the other of
these evils? Anarchy on the one hand and tyranny on the other? In politics, in education, in every phase of
our cultural life, are we not constantly presented with alternatives of this kind? One may say that a main argument of
this book is the working out of a third way between the horns of this recurrent dilemma. Totalitarian
thinking accepts vision rather than language as its model. It aims to gain an all-inclusive,
panoramic view of all things, including the other, in a neutral, impersonal light like the
Hegelian Geist (Spirit), or the Heideggerian Being. It sees the dangers of an uncontrolled,
individual freedom, and puts itself forth as the only rational answer to anarchy. To be free is the
same as to be rational, and to be rational is to give oneself over to the total system that is developing
in world history. Since the essential self is also rational, the development of this system will
coincide with the interests of the self. All otherness will be absorbed in this total system of
harmony and order . According to Levinas, however, there is another way, not yet fully
explored, which he is suggesting in this book. It cannot be identified with subjective anarchism since it takes
account of the other and his criticism. But it also differs from the holistic thinking of traditional philosophy in the
following ways. Instead of referring to the panoramic sense of vision as its model for
understanding, it refers to language where there is always room for the diversity of dialogue,
and for further growth through the dynamics of question and answer. This other-regarding way of thought rejects
the traditional assumption that reason has no plural , and asks why we should not recognize
what our lived experience shows us, that reason has many centers, and approaches the truth
in many different ways . Instead of building great systems in which the singular diversities of
things and persons are passed over and diluted, this way of thinking prefers to start with the
careful analysis of the peculiar features of each being in its otherness , and only then to clarify
its relations with other things in the light of its peculiar and distinctive features. This other-
oriented mode of speaking and thinking will pay less attention to things as they appear to the
separated self, and more attention to the search for what they are in themselves, in their radical
otherness, even though this is less certain and always more difficult to find. This will mean less interest in
conceptual constructions and a greater readiness to listen and learn from experience. It will
not think of knowing , in the sense of gathering, as the primary aim of [hu]man[ity] from
which action will follow as a matter of course, but rather of action and of the achievement of
justice and peace as prior to speaking and thinking . The basic difference is between a mode
of thought which tries to gather all things around the mind , or self, of the thinker, and an
externally oriented mode which attempts to pentrate into what is radically other than the
mind that is thinking it. This difference emerges with peculiar clarity in the case of my
meeting with the other person. I may either decide to remain within myself, assimilating the
other and trying to make use of him, or I may take the risk of going out of my way and trying
to speak and to give to him. This does not fulfill a need. I can satisfy my needs more adequately by keeping to myself and
the members of the in-group with which I am identified. And yet it is the expression of a desire, as Levinas calls
it, for that which transcends me and my self-centered categories. This desire is never
satisfied , but it seems insatiable, and feeds on itself. By communicating with the other, I
enter into a relation with him which does not necessarily lead to my dependence on him. Nor
does he become dependent on me. He can absolve himself from this relation with his integrity
intact. Hence Levinas calls it absolving, or absolute. And he finds many other relations of this kind, for example,
that of truth. In so far as I am related to another entity and share in its being, it must be really changed. But as classical metaphysics
pointed out, in so far as I discover the truth about something, it is absolved from this relation and remains unchanged. The same is
true of the idea of absolute perfection which is clearly radically other than what I am. But I can strive for such an other
without changing it, or losing my own integrity, just as I can respond to another person and
engage in dialogue without jeopardizing his or my own being. Levinas suggests that this may be the reason
for Platos well-known statement at Republic 509 that the good lies beyond being, and relates it to his own view that the
conclusions of our basic philosophical questions are to be found beyond metaphysics in ethics.
My way of existing conveys my final answer. As Levinas points out, one answer is given by the totalizers who are
satisfied with themselves and with the systems they can organize around themselves as they
already are. A very different answer is given by those who are dissatisfied, and who strive for
what is other than themselves, the infinitizers , as we may call them. The former seek for
power and control ; the latter for a higher quality of life. The former strive for order and
system; the latter for freedom and creative advance. This leads to the basic contrast which
is expressed in the title of the book, between totality on the one hand and infinity on the
other . Many examples of the former can be found in the history of our Western thought. The latter is largely unknown and
untried. It is this outwardly directed but self-centered totalistic thinking that organizes
[humans] men and things into power systems, and gives us control over nature and other
people . Hence it has dominated the course of human history. From this point of view, only
the neutral and impersonal, Being , for example, is important. "What is it?" is the most basic
question that requires an answer in terms of a context, a system. The real is something that
can be brought before the senses and the mind as an object. The acts of sensing, thinking,
existing, as they are lived through, are discounted as subjective . A priority is, therefore,
placed on objective thinking, and the objective. The group is more powerful, more inclusive,
and, therefore, more important than the individual . To be free is to sacrifice the arbitrary
inner self and to fit into a rationally grounded system. Inner feelings and thoughts cannot be observed. They
are private and unstable. So [humans] men are judged by what they do, their works that are visible
and remain. Since they endure, they can be judged by the group which also remains. They are
what they are judged to be by the ongoing course of history. Since this is the inclusive system, with nothing beyond, there is no
appeal from this judgment. It is final. As Hegel said, Die Weltgeschichte ist die Weltgericht. History itself is the final
judge of history. To the infinitizers on the other hand, this seems like a partial and biased
doctrine. Systematic thinking, no doubt, has its place. It is required for the establishment of those
power structures which satisfy necessary needs. But when absolutized in this way and applied
to free [humans] men, it constitutes violence , which is not merely found in temporary and
accidental displays of armed force , but in the permanent tyranny of power systems which
free [humans] men should resist. Slavery is the dominance of the neutral and impersonal over
the active and personal . In a living dialogue and even in a written monologue of many volumes it is more
important to find out who is speaking and why, than merely to know what is said. We do not
need to know the other person (or thing) as he [or she] is in himself, and we shall never know
him [or her] apart from acting with him. But unless we desire this, and go on trying, we shall
never escape from the subjectivism of our systems and the objects that they bring before us
to categorize and manipulate . We do not get rid of our thoughts and feelings by ignoring them or by any other means.
But we may seek to transcend them, first as individuals and only later, perhaps, as a group. The individual person
becomes free and responsible not by fitting into a system but rather by fighting against it and
by acting on his own. Those who are not limited to visible objects and who have some sense of
the inner life that is revealed in dialogue will not judge a [hu]man exclusively by his [or her] works. They will
recognize the alien factors that always intervene between the [hu]man himself and the objects he [or she] produces. They will also
be aware of the difference between those who judge and the other whom they are judging.
They will understand that the judgment of history is made by survivors on the works of the dead who are no
longer present to explain and defend them. They will see that this judgment is crude and subjective , varying with
the otherness of those who judge differently from place to place and from time to time. So
they will never accept it as final. They will seek rather to separate themselves from this course
of history to make judgments of their own with reference to a standard of perfection that is
radically other and transcendent. To this " idea of the infinite ," as Levinas calls it, an appeal
can be made. We are not bound to accept the status quo as right, and history itself is not the final judge of history.


Sixth Off
Human solutions to environmental problems reinforce human chauvinism
nature/culture binaries must be questioned before environmental degradation
can be confronted.
Lintott 11 Sheila Lintott. Fall 2011. Preservation, Passivity, and Pessimism. Ethics & the
Environment. 16:2. Pages 100-102.
Perhaps I am being too literal; perhaps Jordan is merely suggesting that seeing nature as something we can affectpositively and
negatively illustrates its dependence on us, which is conducive to our bonding with nature by cultivating a sense of responsibility
for our actions regarding it. Maybe seeing natures dependence on us can motivate us to act more responsibly in the way that
grasping his babys dependence and vulnerability can motivate a father to act responsibly toward the baby. Parents frequently are
touched by their childrens vulnerability in this way. However, nature simply is not vulnerable in this way. Nature
does not need us to survive; nature will continue long after us and would probably, in some sense,
be better off without us. Truth be told, we are the vulnerable, dependent ones in the human-
nature relationship. Restorationists sometimes seem reluctant to admit this. Some restorationists emphasize the
collaborative nature of their practice, seeing restoration ultimately as a way to (re-)enfranchise and (re)liberate nature. For example,
Trish Glazebrook describes the practice of restoration in the oil industry as follows: The actual practice of restoration in the
oil industry does not make nature at all, but rather involves providing the right conditions, and then allowing the
time for nature to heal itself. The process is more about patience than mastery and control (Glazebrook,
30). One sometimes finds evidence of such an attitude in the best versions of restoration; however, one should look carefully at the
sentiments expressed in public and professional debates on the topic and at how the practice actually plays out to discern whether
restoration is always as humble, collaborative, and patient as Glazebrooks recount makes it seem. For example, take Turners
excitement and optimism about restoration as a normative paradigm; it is, literally, otherworldly: If we are alone [i.e. if we are the
only intelligent life in the universe], then we carry a gigantic responsibility. We are the custodians of life in the
universe, and the only plausible vector by which life may propagate itself to other worlds. But
one day the long discipline of restoration may bear a strange and unexpected fruit, and an alien sun may shine on miles of blowing
prairie. (Turner, 203) I am sincerely taken aback by such a suggestion and do not detect any humility or collaboration in it. Perhaps a
few readers are thinking that colonizing other worlds is ethically unproblematic, so long as no persons or sentient beings are
colonized in the process. However, there are two things to note about this. First, the attitude expressed here is
compatible with a willingness to accept degradation as given and to simply move on and away
from it via technological meansan attitude that sees human life as the most important life
on this planet (and perhaps on others). This is not an attitude that is conducive to healthy human-nature
relationships. And this leads to another issue, if we deal with past mistakes by leaving them and moving
on to new venues, whats to stop humanity from continuing on in this mannerworld-
hopping, as it were? Add to this the fact that many astronomers now believe that in all probability we are not alone, that is,
that we do not represent the only intelligent life in the universe. If so, then dreams of colonizing other planets need
to be checked by the possibility that other beings may already inhabit those worlds. I find myself
here reminded of Val Plumwoods wise counsel against even contemplating colonizing distant planets before we can learn to live
well on this one. As she says, Perhaps the most important task for human beings is not to search the
stars to converse with cosmic beings but to learn to communicate with the other species that
share this planet with us (Plumwood 2002, 189). I find similar reasoning applicable to the debate over restoration and I
suggest that the most important task for human beings is not to seek greater mastery over nature to create nature anew (here or
elsewhere), but to learn to coexist peacefully with and to fully respect the nature that exists here and persists in each of us. I
partially agree with Jordan that the real challenge of environmentalism is not to preserve nature by protecting it from human
beings or rescuing it from their influence, but to provide the basis for a healthy relationship between nature and culture (Jordan
2000b, 208). My agreement is partial because, at this point in time, forging a healthy relationship between nature
and culture necessarily involves privileging the preservation and protection of nature from
human influence. Moreover, we also need to worry about the likely cultural uptake of the practice of restoration; that is, how
non-participants in the research and physical work of restoration, which will be the vast majority of people, are likely to interpret
and understand the process of restoration. Most likely participants will already be relatively virtuous concerning environmental
matters. Those most in need of character remediation might be aware of the projects but are far less likely to freely participate in
them. From the point of view of a non-participating observer, Robert Elliots feared replacement thesis might come alivethat is,
restoration projects might just provide what seem to be valid grounds to excuse the initial
degradation and even justify future degradation (Elliot 2000). A non-participating observer who has heard talk of,
for example, efforts to return wolves to Yellowstone Park might be impressed with the work and the science involved, and might
then find in restoration a source of optimism regardless of how she or other humans continue to behave. Given how the
shock and awe of war seems to impress the public, it is reasonable to worry that many could
interpret restoration as the human ability to pillage and then restore nature, giving us the
justification for consumerism in every corner of lifefrom big cars and big houses to big planes
flying us to remote locations for big vacations in restored nature that can be re-restored when
need be. Of course, this does not mean that restoration does justify degradation, but it might easily be interpreted that way. So,
restoration needs to be secondary to preservation unless we want to be satisfied with restored and re-restored nature, which will
ultimately leave us with nothing tangible on which to base restorations.

They also commercialize algae for humans and provide water banks whose sole purpose is
human sustenance. In the underview of the 1AC he also said individuals buy in to the water
banks.
These flawed methods of knowledge are the root cause of all social and
ecological crises and alienation; returning to ecocentrism is key
Nayeri 13(Kamran Nayeri, Researcher UC Berkeley Political Economist University of
California Political Economist South Bay Mobilization Peninsula Peace and Justice Center,
http://philosophersforchange.org/2013/10/29/economics-socialism-ecology-a-critical-outline-
part-2/)
Of course, it is important to analyze historical changes in the forms of alienation from nature and
society and specific forms of exploitation and oppression as well as resistance to them as
modes of production change. In particular, it is important to understand and underscore how the capitalist mode of
production has transformed and deepened the anthropocentric culture through the dynamics of capital accumulation, as it has
turned almost everything into commodities through self-expansion of value. Intrinsic value of everything is turned into exchange
value. Also, it is important to understand how the historical form of capital accumulation,
centered on fossil fuel-driven industrialization, has created the conditions for irrepressible
damage to the fabric of life on Earth and perhaps possible demise of our species. But none of
these could have come to be without the rise of class society based on anthropocentrism that
defines civilization. If the above argument is true in its broad outline then it follows that no social transformation
is radical ( getting to the root of the crisis ) unless it overcomes the 10,000 year old
anthropocentric culture. This challenges both the ecological and socialist movements that
aim to address the crisis of nature and crisis of society respectively. In other words, in todays globalized
capitalist world to be a consistent naturalist requires challenging the capitalist system as the enforcer of the anthropocentric culture
and to be a consistent socialist one has to be a naturalist because the root cause of the crisis of the capitalist system, like all other
class societies before it is the anthropocentric culture. To resolve the planetary crisis and the social crisis, it is
necessary to revive the intrinsic value of everything , including each human being, by ridding
our society and culture of values assigned to them by the market and this cannot be done unless
we return to ecocentrism and transcend the capitalist system.


Thus the alternative: reject the aff and and endorse deep ecology. This breaks
out of the anthropocentric mindset and allows the environment to flourish
Katz 2k (Eric, assoc. professor of philosophy at New Jersey Institute of Technology. Against
the inevitability of Anthropocentrism, in Beneath the Surface: Critical Essays in the Philosophy
of Deep Ecology, edited by Eric Katz, Andrew Light and David Rothenberg, p. 21)
Deep ecology values the ecospherethe ecological systems and the natural entities that
comprise the living and developing natural world. Deep ecology values the ecosphere in itself,
not merely for human purposes. Its chief practical concern is for the ecosphere to continue
to develop and flourish with a minimal amount of human interference, degradation, and
destruction. To accomplish this task, human social institutionseconomics, technology and
science, politics, education, philosophy, and religionmust be reoriented so that they can
exist in harmony with the developing processes and life-forms of the natural world.

On Case
Fiat Double Bind Turn
Either the harms of the 1AC are true and they cannot effect change before
extinction happens, or their impacts are constructed for alarmism which makes
them symbolic terrorists
Vote negative on presumption: state change is impossible. Political
methodology focused on creating change at the state level is a lost cause. There
are an infinite number of barriers between our agency and the actions that take
place in congress. Rather than begin politics with the question of voting and
particular bills, we must begin with decentralized individual tactics.
Gilbert 2009 (Jeremy, "Deleuzian Politics? A survey and Some Suggestions", New
Formations, EBSCO)
The key question which emerges here is one of the most vexed and contentious in the field of
studies of Deleuzian politics: namely, Deleuze and Guattaris attitude to democracy. While it is
quite possible to read in their work an advocacy of that plural radical democracy which Laclau
and Mouffe have also famously advocated,80 it is equally possible to read in Deleuze an
aristocratic distaste for democracy which he shares with Nietzsche and much of the
philosophical tradition. This is the reading offered by Phillipe Mengue, and it is not difficult to
understand his argument. Democracy necessarily implies government by majorities, and as we
have seen, majority is, for Deleuze and Guattari, a wholly negative term. Deleuzes express
distaste for opinion, for discussion, his consistent emphasis on the value of the new, the
creative and the different, all seem to bespeak an avant-gardism which is ultimately inimical
to any politics of popular sovereignty. On the other hand, as Paul Patton has argued in
response to Mengue,81 most of Deleuzes anti-democratic statements can easily be read as
expressions of distaste with the inadequacy of actually-existing liberal democracy, informed by
the desire for a becoming-democratic which would exceed the self-evident limitations of
current arrangements. Taking this further, I would argue that if any mode of self-government
emerges as implicitly desirable from the perspective developed by Deleuze and Guattari, then
it would clearly be one which was both democratic and pluralistic without being subject to the
existing limitations of representative liberal democracy. Deleuzes earlier work may
occasionally be characterised by a Nietzschean aristocratic tone. However, where he expresses
anti-democratic sentiments in his work with Guattari, these only ever seem to spring from a
commitment to that Marxian tradition which understands liberal democratic forms to be deeply
imbricated with processes of capitalist exploitation.82 When weighing up the legacy of this
tradition today, it is worth reflecting that the degradation of actually existing democracy
under neoliberal conditions in recent decades, especially in the years since the fall of the Berlin
wall, has lent much weight to the hypothesis that a democratic politics which has no anti-
capitalist dimension can only ultimately fail, as the individualisation of the social sphere and
the corporate control of politics progressively undermine the effectiveness of public
institutions.83 From such a perspective, the problems with existing forms of representative
democracy are several. Firstly, in ceding legislative sovereignty to elected bodies for several
years at a time, they rely on the artificial stabilisation of majorities of opinion along party lines
which do not actually express the complexity of popular desires in any meaningful way. While it
is clearly true that democracy as such necessarily demands the temporary organisation of
molarities for the purpose of taking collective decisions, the existing set of relationships
between individuals and parties does not enable these molarities to emerge with sufficient
intensity to effect major change: for example, despite the vehemence of anti-war opinion in
the UK in 2003, the government was effectively at liberty to pursue the invasion of Iraq, safe in
the knowledge that this intensity would disperse before the next general election. At the same
time, these relationships do not enable the emergence of sites of engagement and
deliberation which would enable new ideas and practices to emerge, simply delegating
political engagement to a class of professional politicians, journalists, and policy-specialists
whose job is not to innovate, invent and transform existing relations of power, but to
maintain them, and the arrangements which express them. Most crucially, they do not enable
the new forms of collective becoming which a more participatory, decentralised, molecular
democracy would facilitate, preventing any meaningful institutional expression of those new
forms of dynamic, mobile, cosmopolitan collectivity which globalisation makes possible.
Instead they seek to actualise that potential only in the politically ineffectual forms of a
universalised liberalism or banal forms of multiculturalism, two complementary grids which
are imposed upon global flows within the parameters of either the nation state or legalistic
supra-national institutions.84 The drive to find new forms of participative democracy which
characterises the leading-edge of contemporary socialist practice,85 and which has informed
not only the politics of the social forum movement86 but more broadly the entire history of
radical democratic demands (including, for example, the Chartists demand for annual
parliaments, or the Bolshevik cry for all power to the soviets), surely expresses just this desire
for democratic forms not stymied by the apparatuses of majority and individualisation
Their Politics leads to passivity
Antonio 95 (Nietzsches antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History; American
Journal of Sociology; Volume 101, No. 1; July 1995, jstor, azp)

According to Nietzsche, the "subject" is Socratic culture's most central, durable foundation. This
prototypic expression of ressentiment, master reification, and ultimate justification for slave
morality and mass discipline "separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a
neutral substratum . . . free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum;
there is no 'being' behind the doing, effecting, becoming; 'the doer' is merely a fiction added to
the deed" (Nietzsche 1969b, pp. 45-46). Leveling of Socratic culture's "objective" foundations
makes its "subjective" features all the more important. For example, the subject is a central
focus of the new human sciences, appearing prominently in its emphases on neutral
standpoints, motives as causes, and selves as entities, objects of inquiry, problems, and targets
of care (Nietzsche 1966, pp. 19-21; 1968a, pp. 47-54). Arguing that subjectified culture weakens
the personality, Nietzsche spoke of a "remarkable antithesis between an interior which fails to
correspond to any exterior and an exterior which fails to correspond to any interior" (Nietzsche
1983, pp. 78-79, 83). The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest
time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and
viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern
theorists saw differentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity,
Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations
overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrications to obtain advancement. They
look hesitantly to the opinion of others, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" They
are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being
anything but actors-"The role has actually become the character." This highly subjectified social
self or simulator suffers devastating inauthenticity. The powerful authority given the social
greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integrity, decisiveness,
spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes,
meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might
think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17).
Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows,"
"abstracts," or simulacra. One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in
the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A
representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?"
Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves
"prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33,
259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts
foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or
participate in enduring networks of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to
be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94).
Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One
thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest
news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do
anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a
constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in
continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising,
and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous
circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most mediocre
people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-
mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socrates, and praised their ability to redirect
ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new
simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors amplify the worst
inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, exploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing,
arrogant, all according to circumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the
masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more urgently one
covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father
confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and
overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment paves the way for a new type of tyrant
(Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).
Fem IR Turn
Security rhetoric promote an image of the state as necessary to maximize profit
creates a form of exclusion that makes their impacts inevitable
Tickner, feminist IR theorist and a distinguished scholar in residence at the School of
International Services, American University, 01
[J. Ann, Gendering World Politics, p. 48-52, MM]
Challenging the myth that wars are fought to protect women, children, and others
stereotypically viewed as vulnerable, feminists point to the high level of civilian casualties in
contemporary wars. Feminist scholarship has been particularly concerned with what goes on
during wars, especially the impact of war on women and civilians more generally. Whereas
conventional security studies has tended to look at causes and consequences of wars from a
top-down, or structural, perspective, feminists have generally taken a bottom-up approach,
analyzing the impact of war at the microlevel. By so doing, as well as adopting gender as a
category of analysis, feminists believe they can tell us something new about the causes of war
that is missing from both conventional and critical perspectives. By crossing what many
feminists believe to be mutually constitutive levels of analysis, we get a better understanding of
the interrelationship between all forms of violence and the extent to which unjust social
relations, including gender hierarchies, contribute to insecurity, broadly defined. Claiming that
the security-seeking behavior of states is described in gendered terms, feminists have pointed
to the masculinity of strategic discourse and how this may impact on understanding of and
prescriptions for security; it may also help to explain why womens voices have so often been
seen as inauthentic in matters of national security. Feminists have examined how states
legitimate their security-seeking behavior through appeals to types of hegemonic
masculinity. They are also investigating the extent to which state and national identities,
which can lead to conflict, are based on gendered constructions. The valorization of war
through its identification with a heroic kind of masculinity depends on a feminized, devalued
notion of peace seen as unattainable and unrealistic. Since feminists believe that gender is a
variable social construction, they claim that there is nothing inevitable about these gendered
distinctions; thus, their analyses often include the emancipatory goal of postulating a
different definition of security less dependent on binary and unequal gender hierarchies.
Casualties of War: Challenging the Myth of Protection Despite a widespread myth that wars are
fought, mostly by men, to protect vulnerable peoplea category to which women and
children are generally assignedwomen and children constitute a significant proportion of
casualties in recent wars. According to the United Nations Human Development Report, there
has been a sharp increase in the proportion of civilian casualties of warfrom about 10
percent at the beginning of the twentieth century to 90 percent at its close. Although the report
does not break down these casualties by sex, it claims that this increase makes women among
the worst sufferers, even though they constitute only 2 percent of the worlds regular army
personnel.46 The 1994 report of the Save the Children Fund reported that 1.5 million children
were killed in wars and 4 million seriously injured by bombs and land mines between 1984 and
1994.47 But there is another side to the changing pattern of war, and women should not be
seen only as victims; as civilian casualties increase, womens responsibilities rise. However, war
makes it harder for women to fulfill their reproductive and care giving tasks. For example, as
mothers, family providers, and caregivers, women are particularly penalized by economic
sanctions associated with military conflict, such as the boycott put in place by the United
Nations against Iraq after the Gulf War of 1991. In working to overcome these difficulties,
women often acquire new roles and a greater degree of independence independence that,
frequently, they must relinquish when the conflict is terminated. Women and children
constitute about 75 percent of the number of persons of concern to the United Nations
Commission on Refugees (about 21.5 million at the beginning of 1999). This population has
increased dramatically since 1970 (when it was 3 million), mainly due to military conflict,
particularly ethnic conflicts.48 In these types of conflicts, men often disappear, victims of state
oppression or ethnic cleansing, or go into hiding, leaving women as the sole family providers.
Sometimes these women may find themselves on both sides of the conflict, due to marriage and
conflicting family ties. When women are forced into refugee camps, their vulnerability increases.
Distribution of resources in camps is conducted in consultation with male leaders, and women
are often left out of the distribution process. These gender-biased processes are based on
liberal assumptions that refugee men are both the sole wage earners in families and actors in
the public sphere.49 Feminists have also drawn attention to issues of wartime rape. In the
Rwandan civil war, for example, more than 250,000 women were raped; as a result they were
stigmatized and cast out of their communities, their children being labeled devils children.
Not being classed as refugees, they have also been ignored by international efforts.50 In
northern Uganda, rebels abducted women to supply sexual services to fighters, resulting in a
spread of AIDS; frequently, after being raped, these women have no other source of
livelihood.51 As illustrated by the war in the former Yugoslavia, where it is estimated that
twenty thousand to thirty-five thousand women were raped in Bosnia and Herzgovina,52 rape is
not just an accident of war but often a systematic military strategy. In ethnic wars, rape is used
as a weapon to undermine the identity of entire communities. Cynthia Enloe has described
social structures in place around most U.S. Army overseas bases where women are often
kidnapped and sold into prostitution; the system of militarized sexual relations has required
explicit U.S. policymaking.53 More than one million women have served as sex providers for
U.S. military personnel since the Korean War. These women, and others like them, are
stigmatized by their own societies. In her study of prostitution around U.S. military bases in
South Korea in the 1970s, Katharine Moon shows how these person-to-person relations were
actually matters of security concern at the international level. Cleanup of prostitution camps
by the South Korean government, through policing of the sexual health and work conduct of
prostitutes, was part of its attempt to prevent withdrawal of U.S. troops that had begun under
the Nixon Doctrine of 1969. Thus, prostitution as it involved the military became a matter of
top-level U.S.-Korean security politics. Crossing levels of analysis, Moon demonstrates how the
weakness of the Korean state in terms of its wish to influence the U.S. government resulted in a
domestic policy of authoritarian, sexist control. In other words, national security translated
into social insecurity for these women .54 By looking at the effects of war on women, we can
gain a better understanding of the unequal gender relations that sustain military activities.
When we reveal social practices that support war and that are variable across societies, we find
that war is a cultural construction that depends on myths of protection; it is not inevitable, as
realists suggest. The evidence we now have about women in conflict situations severely strains
the protection myth; yet, such myths have been important in upholding the legitimacy of war
and the impossibility of peace. A deeper look into these gendered constructions can help us to
understand not only some of the causes of war but how certain ways of thinking about
security have been legitimized at the expense of others, both in the discipline of IR and in
political practice. National Security: A Gendered Discourse: Donna Haraway claims that all
scientific theories are embedded in particular kinds of stories, or what she terms fictions of
science.55 IR feminists, like some other critical theorists, particularly those concerned with
genealogy, have examined the stories on which realism and neorealism base their
prescriptions for states national-security behavior, looking for evidence of gender bias.
Feminist reanalysis of the so-called creation myths of international relations, on which realist
assumptions about states behavior are built, reveals stories built on male representations of
how individuals function in society. The parable of mans amoral, self-interested behavior in
the state of nature, made necessary by the lack of restraint on the behavior of others, is taken
by realists to be a universal model for explaining states behavior in the international system.
But, as Rebecca Grant asserts, this is a male, rather than a universal, model : were life to go on
in the state of nature for more than one generation, other activities such as childbirth and child
rearing, typically associated with women, must also have taken place. Grant also claims that
Rousseaus stag hunt, which realists have used to explain the security dilemma, ignores the
deeper social relations in which the activities of the hunters are embedded. When women are
absent from these foundational myths, a source of gender bias is created that extends into
international-relations theory.56 Feminists are also questioning the use of more scientifically
based rational-choice theory, based on the instrumentally rational behavior of individuals in the
marketplace that neorealists have used to explain states security-seeking behavior. According
to this model, states are unproblematically assumed to be instrumental profit maximizers
pursuing power and autonomy in an anarchic international system. Where international
cooperation exists, it is explained not in terms of community but, rather, in terms of enlightened
self-interest. Feminists suggest that rational-choice theory is based on a partial representation
of human behavior that, since women in the West have historically been confined to
reproductive activities, has been more typical of certain men.57 Characteristics such as self-
help, autonomy, and power maximizing that are prescribed by realists as security-enhancing
behavior are very similar to the hegemonic, masculine-gendered characteristics described in
chapter 1. The instrumentally competitive behavior of states, which results in power
balancing, is similar to equilibrium theory, or the market behavior of rational-economic man.
Therefore, it tends to privilege certain types of behaviors over others. While states do indeed
behave in these ways, these models offer us only a partial understanding of their behavior. As
other IR scholars, too, have pointed out, states engage in cooperative as well as conflictual
behavior; privileging these masculinist models tends to delegitimate other ways of behaving
and make them appear less realistic.

This rationality in international relations perpetuate structural violence
Blanchard 03 (Eric, PhD in Political Science from University of Southern California and
American Council of Learned Societies Faculty Fellow, Gender, International Relations, and the
Development of Feminist Security Theory, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Reed-POL-
240-2012-S1_IP/Syllabus/EReadings/05.1/05.1.zFurther_Blanchard2003Gender.pdf, pg. 1297-
98)
In Gender in International Relations, Tickner introduces an important theme of FST: the
recognition of structural violence, a term borrowed from peace research (Galtung 1971), which
she uses to designate the economic and environmental insecurity of individuals whose life
expectancy was reduced, not by the direct violence of war but by domestic and international
structures of political and economic oppression (Tickner 1992, 69). Peterson claims that a
feminist rethinking of security must first inquire into how structural violence comes to be
understood as natural and unproblematic and then work to politicize and reveal the
historically contingent nature of such structures (1992a, 49). While women have long been
peripheral to the decision-making processes of global capital, the international political
economy can render[s] women insecure through the gendered division of labor, the
discounting of work in the home, the dictates of structural adjustment programs, the ravages
of poverty, and the violence of sexual tourism and trafficking in womenall issues that
generally do not get the attention of orthodox practitioners of IR (see Pettman 1996). Likewise,
although the care of the environment, a transnational issue requiring collective action, is not a
priority of IR theories that privilege the power and instrumental rationality of nation-states,
Tickner contends that feminist configurations of security must take note of the need for global
economic restructuring and urge a shift from the exploitation of nature to the reproduction of
nature (1992). Such a global restructuring might start with the recognition that environmental
degradation is not gender neutral; women are affected disproportionately by environmental
insecurity, especially in developing countries where the link between poverty, womens status
(or lack thereof), imposed development policies, and environmental degradation is a complex
but intense one (Elliot 1996, 16).