Lifelines Risk Realities

Please Note:
The contact details given in this 1997 publication are no longer correct. Current
contact information (2010) is:
New Zealand Centre for Advanced Engineering
Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140, New Zealand
Phone: +64 3 364 2478
Fax: +63 3 364 2069
E-mail: info@caenz.com
Web: www.caenz.com
Centre for Advanced Engineering
University of Canterbury Christchurch New Zealand
A Multi-disciplinary Approach to the
Vulnerability of Lifelines to Natural Hazards
Risks
Realities
Report of the Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Group
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, transmitted, or otherwise disseminated, in
any form or by any means, except for the purposes of research or
private study, criticism or review, without the prior permission of the
Centre for Advanced Engineering.
ISBN 0-908993-12-9
First printing, November 1997
Copyright
1997 Centre for Advanced Engineering, Private Bag 4800,
University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand.
Project Manager
John Lamb, Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Group.
Editorial Services, Graphics and Book Design
Charles Hendtlass and na O'Grady, Centre for Advanced Engineering.
Cover
Photograph by Michael Provost Photography. View looking west from above Banks Peninsula showing: Lyttelton Port; the
Port Hills; the Estuary; the Sewage Treatment Works; the Central Business District of Christchurch; Christchurch Interna-
tional Airport; the Southern Alps.
Cover Design and Printing
Print City, Christchurch.
Disclaimer
It will be noted that the authorship of this document has been attributed to the many individuals and organisations involved in
its production. While all sections have been subject to review and final editing, the opinions expressed remain those of the
authors responsible and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Centre for Advanced Engineering.
This report by its nature is general in its application and subjective in its recommendations and is intended as an initial guide
only. While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the report, no liability whatsoever can be accepted for any error
or misprint.
Any persons concerned with any of the issues raised in this report should consult their professional advisers before undertaking
any action, and no liability whatsoever shall attach to any party associated with the report for any reliance that any person may
purport to place in the report.
Establishment
The Centre for Advanced Engineering was founded in
May 1987 to mark the centenary of the School of Engi-
neering at the University of Canterbury. It was estab-
lished by means of an appeal fund launched in conjunc-
tion with the centennial celebrations. To date approxi-
mately $2 million has been raised, contributed by 150
corporate donors and 750 individual donors. The earn-
ings from this capital sum assist in funding the activities
of the Centre. A 10th Anniversary Appeal has been
launched in 1997 to provide additional financial support
to the Centre in its ongoing projects.
Objective
The objective of the Centre is to enhance engineering
knowledge within New Zealand in identified areas judged
to be of national importance and to engage in technology
transfer of the latest research information available from
overseas. The Centre is not concerned with basic engi-
neering research but with the application of research
findings to engineering problems and practice.
The objective is achieved for each major project under-
taken by bringing together a selected group of practising
and research engineers and experts in the particular field
from both New Zealand and overseas to:
consolidate existing knowledge;
study advanced techniques;
develop approaches to particular problems in engi-
neering and technology;
promote excellence in engineering practice; and
disseminate findings through documentation and
public seminars.
A unique forum for co-operation among industry, the
engineering profession and university research engi-
neers is thus provided.
Function
The Centre is managed by a Board of Directors compris-
ing representatives from industry, the engineering pro-
fession and the University of Canterbury. Chairman of
the Board is Mr Brian Wood of Christchurch. The Board
selects the title for each project undertaken by the Centre
and approves the level of funding. A Steering Committee
is then appointed, initially to carry out detailed planning
for the project and then to provide overall direction. The
Steering Committee appoints Task Group Leaders and a
Project Manager.
Detailed work on the project is carried out on a voluntary
basis by the members appointed to each Task Group.
The Centre arranges to bring to New Zealand, at the
appropriate time, one or more Visiting Fellows to work
with members of the Task Groups, bringing to the project
the latest relevant information from overseas.
The Centre also undertakes a variety of smaller projects
and produces publications on engineering subjects of
current concern, and arranges lectures and seminars on
appropriate topics as the occasion arises.
Contact:
University of Canterbury
Private Bag 4800
Christchurch
New Zealand
Street Address: 39 Creyke Road
Christchurch 8004
Telephone: +64-3-364-2478
Fax: +64-3-364-2069
e-mail: j.blakeley@cae.canterbury.ac.nz
http: www.cae.canterbury.ac.nz
Executive Director: John P Blakeley
Projects Director: John L Lumsden
NOTE: Although the Christchurch Engineering Lifelines project has been based upon earlier
work in 1990/91 on the Wellington Case Study of Lifelines in Earthquakes, the Christchurch
project has been undertaken by a separate Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Group, not under
the general direction of the Centre for Advanced Engineering (CAE). John Lumsden, Projects
Director of CAE, has been on the Steering Committee of the Christchurch Group and CAE has
been responsible for the publication of this book.
B
i
Contents
Preface .................................................................................................................................................................... v
Project Team Participants ................................................................................................................................. vii
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................................................. ix
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................. xi
Photographs .................................................................................................................... following page xiii
Introduction...................................................................................................................................................... xxxi
1 Risk Assessment, Methodology, Vulnerability, Impact and Importance ........................................................ 1
2 Hazards to Engineering Lifelines in Christchurch
2.1 Seismic Hazards ........................................................................................................................................ 17
2.2 Earthquake Hazards ................................................................................................................................... 18
2.3 Waimakariri Flood Hazard ........................................................................................................................ 29
2.4 Local Flooding Hazard .............................................................................................................................. 30
2.5 Tsunami Hazard......................................................................................................................................... 31
2.6 Extreme Wind Storm Scenario .................................................................................................................. 34
2.7 Snowstorm Scenario .................................................................................................................................. 39
2.8 Slope Hazard and Damage to Services on Hills ........................................................................................ 45
3 Seismic Liquefaction and Lifelines
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 47
3.2 Fundamentals ............................................................................................................................................. 50
3.3 Level Ground Liquefaction ....................................................................................................................... 51
3.4 Christchurch Lifelines Study ..................................................................................................................... 57
3.5 Sustained Shear Stress ............................................................................................................................... 58
3.6 Counter Measures ...................................................................................................................................... 60
3.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................. 61
3.8 References ................................................................................................................................................. 62
3.9 Summary of Liquefaction Effects .............................................................................................................. 66
4 Civil Services
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 71
4.2 Land Drainage ........................................................................................................................................... 72
4.3 Sewer System ............................................................................................................................................ 79
4.4 Water Supply ............................................................................................................................................. 84
4.5 Petroleum Products .................................................................................................................................... 88
5 Electrical and Communications
5.1 Telecom New Zealand Limited ................................................................................................................. 91
5.2 New Zealand Fire Service Communications ........................................................................................... 110
5.3 New Zealand Police Communications .................................................................................................... 112
5.4 Trans Power (NZ) Limited Electrical System ......................................................................................... 115
5.5 Southpower Distribution Network........................................................................................................... 122
5.6 Broadcasting System ............................................................................................................................... 142
6 Transport
6.1 Christchurch Transport System ............................................................................................................... 147
6.2 Strategic Role of Transport System in Emergency ................................................................................. 147
6.3 Description of the Transport System....................................................................................................... 149
6.4 Vulnerability Earthquake .................................................................................................................... 156
ii
6.5 Mitigation Measures Earthquake ........................................................................................................ 164
6.6 Vulnerability Major Windstorm ......................................................................................................... 184
6.7 Vulnerability Major Snowstorm......................................................................................................... 185
6.8 Vulnerability Waimakariri River Flooding ........................................................................................ 187
6.9 Vulnerability Local Flood Hazard ...................................................................................................... 188
6.10 Vulnerability Tsunami ........................................................................................................................ 190
6.11 Vulnerability Slope Hazard ................................................................................................................ 191
6.12 Mitigation Measures Status of Measures ............................................................................................ 194
7 Emergency Buildings
7.1 Buildings Investigated ............................................................................................................................. 197
7.2 Building Services ..................................................................................................................................... 198
8 New Zealand Fire Service
8.1 Scenario ................................................................................................................................................... 207
8.2 NZFS Initial Reaction Plan...................................................................................................................... 208
8.3 Hazardous Substances Scenario Problems .............................................................................................. 208
9 New Zealand/Los Angeles Workshop
9.1 Lessons from the Northridge and Loma Prieta Earthquakes ................................................................... 219
9.2 Geotechnical Aspects .............................................................................................................................. 232
9.3 Transportation.......................................................................................................................................... 237
9.4 Water and Wastewater Utilities ............................................................................................................... 241
10 Interdependence .............................................................................................................................................. 247
11 Summary of Benefits and Work Undertaken or Proposed
11.1 Christchurch City Council Water Services .............................................................................................. 251
11.2 Christchurch City Council ....................................................................................................................... 254
11.3 Trans Power New Zealand Limited ......................................................................................................... 261
11.4 Southpower .............................................................................................................................................. 261
11.5 Telecom ................................................................................................................................................... 262
11.6 Christchurch International Airport Limited............................................................................................. 262
11.7 Lyttelton Port Company .......................................................................................................................... 263
11.8 Tranz Rail ................................................................................................................................................ 263
11.9 Transit New Zealand ............................................................................................................................... 263
11.10 Petroleum Products .................................................................................................................................. 263
11.11 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................... 263
12 Ferry Road/Ferrymead Liquefaction Investigations
12.1 Ferrymead Bridge .................................................................................................................................... 265
12.2 Ferry Road ............................................................................................................................................... 271
13 Continuing Work
13.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 275
13.2 Hazards .................................................................................................................................................... 275
13.3 Use of GIS ............................................................................................................................................... 277
13.4 Risk Balancing......................................................................................................................................... 278
13.5 Use of TCLEE Guide for Review of Vulnerabilities .............................................................................. 278
13.6 Underground Services Damage Research ............................................................................................... 280
13.7 Critical Areas and Critical Buildings ....................................................................................................... 280
13.8 Interdependencies .................................................................................................................................... 280
13.9 Combined Exercise/Response Plans ........................................................................................................ 281
13.10 Mutual Aid Agreements .......................................................................................................................... 281
13.11 Internet ..................................................................................................................................................... 281
13.12 Risk Management Seminar ...................................................................................................................... 281
13.13 Review Project with Social Scientist ....................................................................................................... 282
iii
13.14 Task Group Meetings .............................................................................................................................. 282
13.15 Promulgation ........................................................................................................................................... 282
13.16 National Forum........................................................................................................................................ 282
13.17 Summary.................................................................................................................................................. 282
Maps
Reference List for Colour Maps .............................................................................................................. 283
1: Location of Emergency Services and Major Contractors Yards with Seismic Hazard ........................... 284
2: Location of Emergency Services and Major Contractors Yards with Waimakariri
River Floodplain ...................................................................................................................................... 285
3: Location of Emergency Services and Major Contractors Yards with Local Rivers Floodplain ............. 286
4: Tsunami Hazard....................................................................................................................................... 287
5: Slope Hazard Zones for Hill Areas .......................................................................................................... 288
6: Transport System Network with Seismic Hazard.................................................................................... 289
7: Bridge Vulnerability ................................................................................................................................ 290
8: Slope Hazard Transport System Locality Plan ................................................................................... 291
9: Seismic Hazard and Telecom Cables ...................................................................................................... 292
10: Local Flooding Hazard and Telecom Cables .......................................................................................... 293
11: Tsunami Hazard and Telecom Cables ..................................................................................................... 294
12: Waimakariri Flooding Hazard and Telecom Cables ............................................................................... 295
13: Seismic Hazard and Fire Services ........................................................................................................... 296
14: Seismic Hazard and Police Radio Stations .............................................................................................. 297
15: Seismic Hazard and Electricity Network................................................................................................. 298
16: Electricity Network.................................................................................................................................. 299
17: Seismic Hazard and Broadcasting Services ............................................................................................. 300
18: Seismic Hazard and Stormwater System................................................................................................. 301
19: Foulwater Sewer and Pressure Mains with Seismic Hazard ................................................................... 302
20: Seismic Hazard and Water Services (Major Pipelines in Metropolitan Area) ........................................ 303
21: Seismic Hazard and Petroleum Products ................................................................................................. 304
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................................... 305
Project Team Participants Contact Details ............................................................................................... 309
iv
v
Preface
The Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Project has been widely accepted and
Christchurch is fortunate to have had the wide involvement of engineers and
managers from local authorities and utilities which serve metropolitan Christ-
church. There was tremendous enthusiasm in response to the approach from the
Regional Controller of Civil Defence, Mr John Lamb, himself a Civil Engineer,
to take part in the work (which is still ongoing). The aim of the project is to make
Christchurch better able to withstand the natural hazards which have the
potential to affect so many people.
The Lifelines work in New Zealand was initiated by the Centre for Advanced
Engineering which, in 1991, published the Project Report on pilot work
undertaken in the Wellington area. We are fortunate that the Centre for
Advanced Engineering is also based in Christchurch and is readily available for
ongoing consultation on Lifelines work; our appreciation is expressed to the
Centre for the publication of this book.
Although Christchurch is seriously threatened by a major earthquake originating from the main alpine fault, or
from other faults in the area closer to Christchurch, the public perception is of many threats to Christchurch from
other hazards. The most notable in the eyes of the public is the threat of flooding from the Waimakariri River on
whose floodplain Christchurch is situated. For this reason an assessment of the vulnerability to natural hazards
other than earthquakes was undertaken. The project highlighted our inadequate detailed knowledge on many of
the hazards, notwithstanding the considerable work which has been done and is ongoing, by the Regional Council
in identifying these hazards.
Lifeline engineering is ongoing work and I am very impressed with the considerable amount of mitigation work
undertaken as a result of the initial project (the public workshop was held in October 1994). I am confident that
the investigations and ongoing action in Christchurch means that it can serve as a model for many similar
investigations, not only in New Zealand, but in other places in the world.
I commend this book to readers in the hope that by studying the findings, they may be impressed by the enthusiasm
and commitment of all of those who are taking part in this valuable work in Christchurch and be inspired to
undertake similar projects in their own area.
Richard Johnson
Chairman, Canterbury Regional Council
(on behalf of all of the organisations involved in Engineering Lifelines in Christchurch)
vi
vii
Project Team Participants
STEERING COMMITTEE
Mr John Lamb
Project Manager
Mr Kevin OKane
Ministry of Civil Defence
Mr Brian Hasell
Ashburton District Council
Mr Allan Watson
Christchurch City Council
Mr Stephen Franklin
Telecom New Zealand Limited
Mr Mark Gordon
Mr John Lumsden
Mr Richard Keys
Otago Regional Council
Mr Ian McCahon
Soils & Foundations Limited
Mr Jim Williamson
Steering Committee members (1994)
Back row (l-r): Alan Watson, Stephen Franklin, Richard Keys, Mark Gordon, Gordon Hood
Front row (l-r) Jim Williamson, Brian Hasell, John Lamb, John Lumsden
Hazards Task Group
Mr Ian McCahon
Mr David Bell
Mr Tony Boyle
Canterbury Regional Council
Dr Ian Owens
Mr Derek Todd
Tonkin & Taylor
Mr John Weeber
Hazards Task Group Other
Advisors
Dr John Berrill
Dr Neil Cherry
Lincoln University
Mr Ken Couling
Dr Derek Goring
National Institute of Water & Atmos-
pheric Research
Dr Bob Kirk
Mr Mark Yetton
Geotech Consulting Limited
Civil Services Task Group
Mr Allan Watson
Mr Neil Bennett
SERCO
Mr Neville Stewart
Mr Mike Berry
Mr Ken Couling
Mr Allan Dowie
Shell NZ Limited
Mr Dave May
Mr Alan Marshall
Mr Bob Watts
Electrical & Communications
Networks Task Group
Mr Stephen Franklin
Mr Ray Basher
Transpower New Zealand Limited
Mr Peter Brash
Mr Roger Smithies
Telecom NZ Limited
Mr Russ Botting
Mr Bud Chapman
Communications Centres
Mr John Coleman
NZ Police Engineering Workshop
Mr Noel Maginnity
Radio Network
Mr John MacKenzie
Montgomery Watson Limited
Mr Grant Roberts
Lincrad Aerials
Mr John ODonnell
Southpower
A list of the Project Teams current contact details is shown at the end of the book (page 309)
viii
Transportation Task Group
Mr Mark Gordon
Mr David Bates
Transit NZ
Mr Tony Barnett
Mr John Robb
Mr Russell Herbert
Tranz Rail Limited
Mr Ken McAnergney
Christchurch International Airport
Limited
Mr Mike McGlinchey
Lyttelton Port Company Limited
Mr Neil McLennan
Mr John Reynolds
Opus International Consultants Limited
Mr Graeme Wilson
City Streets Unit
Fire Services Task Group
Mr Barry G J Shields
NZ Fire Services
Building Services Task Group
Mr Iain Drewett
Consulting Engineer
Mr Grant Wilkinson
Holmes Consulting Group Limited
A list of the Project Teams current contact details is shown at the
end of the book (page 309)
ix
Acknowledgements
The work of investigating the vulnerability of engineering lifelines in Christchurch to natural hazards has
involved many people and organisations, and appreciation is recorded as follows:
The members of the various Task Groups and particularly the Chairmen who were involved in many
investigations and meetings, much of which was in addition to their normal work and in their own time.
The more than 100 participants in the public workshop in October 1994 and, in particular, to Dr David
Hopkins, the Deputy Chairman of the Steering Committee of the Lifelines in Earthquakes, Wellington Case
Study, who was the Invited Reviewer.
Mr Ron Eguchi, Vice President of EQE International, a US-based consultancy that specialises in earthquake
engineering, who was the keynote speaker at the Workshop and who acted as a Visiting Fellow for the Project.
Mr David Brunsdon, the Project Manager of the Wellington Earthquake Lifelines Group, and Mr John Norton
who was the initial Project Manager for the Wellington Case Study. These people, together with other
members of the Task Groups of the Wellington Case Study, were very willing to provide information and
comment on the Christchurch work, which, as far as possible, was based on the Wellington study.
Mr John Lumsden, the Projects Director at the Centre for Advanced Engineering in Christchurch, who was
very supportive of the Christchurch Study as a Steering Committee member and who has had a continuing
interest in the Christchurch group. He, together with Charles Hendtlass and Una OGrady, has been
responsible for the publication of this book.
Mr Brian Hasell (the initial Steering Committee Chairman) of the Canterbury Regional Council who made
available the Council's resources for controlling the finances of the Project, meeting rooms, word processing
and general administration, and the Councillors and Staff of the Regional Council who have been very
supportive of the ongoing work.
The following major sponsors for their financial support of the Project:
Earthquake Commission;
Ministry of Civil Defence;
Christchurch City Council;
Telecom NZ Limited;
Southpower Limited;
Trans Power New Zealand Limited;
Transit New Zealand;
Christchurch International Airport Limited;
Canterbury Regional Council;
Banks Peninsula District Council;
Shell New Zealand Limited;
Centre for Advanced Engineering, University of Canterbury; and
AMI Insurance.
AMI Insurance sponsored the cost of the colour photographs and colour maps in this book.
x
xi
Executive Summary
Executive Summary
The results of an investigation into the vulnerability of
the infrastructure serving metropolitan Christchurch
(including Lyttelton) is the main content of this book.
The work was undertaken by the Christchurch Engi-
neering Lifelines Group whose objectives are:
To identify the vulnerability of engineering lifeline
services to damage from earthquakes, flooding,
tsunami and meteorological hazards.
To identify practical engineering strategies for re-
ducing the risk or impact of such damage and for
providing for reinstatement following such events.
To communicate the issues to people involved in
the management of these services and to raise the
awareness of the public to their importance.
An engineering lifelines investigation is about reduc-
ing exposure to risk from natural hazards, so risk
management is addressed. The techniques have much
to offer those responsible for reacting to emergencies
and dealing with the aftermath.
The engineering lifelines project considered a range of
natural hazards in the Christchurch area and the table
below shows the hazards and the annual exceedance
assessed for the scenarios used:
Hazard
% Probability of
exceedance
In 1 year In 50 years
Local flooding 0.1 5
Waimak flooding 0.2 10
Seismic 0.67 28
Wind 0.67 28
Tsunami 0.67 28
Snow 2.0 64
Slope hazard 0.67 28
Christchurch being partly located on a saturated, sand-
and silt-rich prograding coastline, is potentially at risk
from widespread liquefaction. The areas likely to be
affected are shown on the earthquake hazard map and
there is a detailed explanation of liquefaction, the
potential for it and methods of testing.
The Christchurch area is subject to two major sources
of flooding, one from the Waimakariri River and the
other from the local rivers. Maps showing the areas
likely to be flooded were produced. In addition, how-
ever, a tsunami involving a total water variation at the
open coast of 10 metres inclusive of tide (i.e. 5 metres
above and below msl) could potentially affect Christ-
church. The likely effects are described in detail. The
slope hazard on the Port Hills is reported, including
effects being likely as a result of extreme rainfall or
earthquake.
A severe windstorm and severe snowstorm were inves-
tigated although it was not possible to produce a hazard
map for these. The worst windstorm is likely to be a
nor-wester with gusts on the open plains of up to 110
knots with this being increased over hills.
The maximum snow depth on the plains of metropoli-
tan Christchurch is expected to be up to 30 cms with
approximately a metre on average on the Port Hills.
The various coloured maps showing the hazard and the
utility services investigated are on pages 283 to 304, at
the end of the book.
Four main task groups and two smaller ones were
established to undertake the detailed work of assess-
ment of the infrastructure of Christchurch. The main
task groups were: Hazards, Civil Services, Electrical
and Telecommunications and Transport. The smaller
task groups were Buildings and Fire.
The utility networks are described and for the purpose
of risk analysis, each network was broken up into
components, which were then assessed for their vul-
nerability to each hazard scenario. This was done by
overlaying electronically the networks over the haz-
ards map which was then examined to determine
importance, vulnerability and impact of damage.
In this study, officers with a day-to-day involvement
with the particular lifeline assessed both the vulner-
ability and importance of each element, and its depend-
ence on other services and recommended mitigation
measures for the particular hazard.
The vulnerability charts which were produced from the
risk analysis were then used for identification of the
need for, and priority of, mitigation measures. Any
measure which would reduce importance (e.g. by re-
dundancy), reduce vulnerability (e.g. by strengthen-
ing) and/or reduce impact (e.g. by alternatives or
contingency planning), would help to mitigate the
disaster. In many cases, the mitigation measures iden-
tified were very inexpensive, or could be easily inte-
grated with ongoing maintenance and replacement
programmes.
The analysis described above was carried out network
by network and then the consequences of interdepend-
ence assessed both in operation (if A fails, B fails), and
in response (need to fix A to get to B), as the interde-
pendence could be a critical factor.
xii
Risks and Realities
The work has served to open up the subject of the
performance of Christchurchs lifelines during severe
natural events and how the managers responsible for
those services are now ensuring that the work of
assessing and prioritising the many mitigating recom-
mendations is being pursued and appropriate measures
implemented.
The results of the analysis and recommended mitiga-
tion measures were considered in two workshops dur-
ing 1994 (March and October ), the October workshop
being organised over three days with an attendance of
over 100. The purpose of this workshop was to allow
peer review of the project.
That workshop was addressed by Mr Ron Eguchi, as
the keynote speaker. He is a Vice-President of EQE
International, a US-based consultancy that specialises
in earthquake engineering. Mr Eguchi, speaking about
the Wellington and Christchurch Projects, said I think
a lot of the ideas and concepts that are really being
developed by these two projects are very forward-
thinking and in fact in many respects they are much
more forward-thinking than a lot of programmes we
have in the US.
Members of the Wellington and Christchurch Lifelines
Groups had visited Los Angeles in August 1994 (fol-
lowing the Northridge Earthquake) and during a New
Zealand/Los Angeles workshop, members of the team
had met Mr Eguchi. The 1994 Wellington Lifelines
Group report contained a large section dealing with the
Northridge investigation and this book also reports on
the workshop from a Christchurch perspective. Al-
though some members of the group also went to Kobe
in August 1995 to learn from the lessons of the Great
Hanshin Earthquake, the results of this investigation
are not reported in this book, as it was adequately
reported in the 1995 report of the Wellington Earth-
quake Lifelines Group, to which members of the Christ-
church group contributed.
Some measure of the success of the work so far is the
extent to which budget provision has been made for the
various mitigation measures which have been identi-
fied. These are set out in Chapter 11, Summary of
Benefits and Work Undertaken or Proposed, and a
perusal of this list will show that the engineering
lifelines investigation undertaken during 1993 and
1994 was not just an academic exercise.
One of the areas in Christchurch most likely to be badly
affected by earthquakes, tsunami or flooding is the
Ferry Road/Ferrymead Bridge area and the investiga-
tions undertaken in this area as a critical area are
reported.
Twenty-one of the various hazard maps produced have
been reduced in size from the working A0 size. These
are included at the end of this publication.
A summary of the work undertaken is depicted in the
16 aerial photographs that follow, and which form part
of the Executive Summary.
xiii
Executive Summary
Photographs
The following sixteen photographs taken by Michael Provost Photography show some of the principal aspects of the
Christchurch investigation.
Some of the major components of the Christchurch infrastructure are identified (such as the airport, port, tunnels,
central city, sewage treatment works, etc.) together with the vulnerabilities assessed. Some mitigation measures are
mentioned as is some proposed and ongoing work.
Photo 1: Christchurch International Airport
Photo 2: The Port of Lyttelton
Photo 3: Lyttelton rail and road tunnels
Photo 4: Christchurch central city
Photo 5: Central city, showing the Avon River and the police station
Photo 6: Central city, looking southeast
Photo 7: The northeast central city
Photo 8: The Ferrymead Bridge
Photo 9: Clifton Hill
Photo 10: South Brighton Spit and Clifton Hill
Photo 11: View to the north-west over the sewage treatment ponds
Photo 12: Lower reaches of the Avon River
Photo 13: Southpower yard and Madras Street
Photo 14: The Trans Power Islington substation
Photo 15: Sugarloaf television transmission tower
Photo 16: August 1992 snow storm
xiv
Risks and Realities
Photo 1: Christchurch International Airport
This view, taken looking to the west over the technology park in the foreground, shows Memorial
Avenue leading to Christchurch International Airport.
Important communication linkages for air traffic control run between the Air Traffic Control building
(foreground) and the airport. Steps have been taken to provide diversity in the link. The airport itself
will be of major importance as the primary transport link to the outside world immediately following
an earthquake. Fortunately the Airport Authority employed consultants to assess vulnerability and
mitigation measures and much mitigation work has been done.
Although the majority of the engineering services to the airport are dependent on the city-wide
services, the water supply stands alone and has an emergency power plant.
The airport is on the flood plain of the Waimakariri river although the protection provided by the
extensive stopbank system should considerably lessen the likelihood of flooding from this source.
The Canterbury Regional Council proposes further work constructing a major stopbank to return any
floodwater to the river and this work was considered adequate so that no special work for the airport
(or Christchurch itself) has been recommended as a mitigation measure for flooding from this
source.
However it was discovered that the apron of the terminal buildings slopes towards them and an
exceptional localised heavy rainfall could cause problems to the emergency services located in the
basement area.
xv
Executive Summary
Photo 2: The Port of Lyttelton
This view, looking
to the west,
shows part of the
port at Lyttelton
wi th the l arge
building in the
foreground being
the Port Com-
pany building. A
roundabout can
be seen which is
in front of the road
tunnel portal and
just to the right of
the roundabout
can be seen three
levels rail and
two roads.
The Lyttelton Port
road and rail por-
tals can be seen
and the rail portal
is under the lower
of the two roads.
The major con-
cern is the failure
of the bridge walls
lining the inside of
the rail tunnel por-
tal and the possible collapse of the road structures above. Questions still revolve around who owns
this problem. On the road tunnel, damage to the ventilation structure is likely in an earthquake, and
there is potential for slips on to the roundabout.
The main port authority building is not likely to suffer damage, but jetties will probably be pulled away
from land. However, the Port has a response plan. The Cashin Quay, which is out of the photograph
to the right, is likely to suffer slip circle failure into the harbour but there are no mitigation measures
planned.
Just out of the photograph to the left is the bulk fuel installation serving the Christchurch area and
opinions differ on the propensity towards liquefaction or seaward slumping of the Lyttelton Tank
Farm.
Lyttelton has acknowledged the need for extensive work on its water and sewage pipelines and a
severe earthquake will undoubtedly cause considerable damage to the reticulation.
xvi
Risks and Realities
Photo 3: Lyttelton rail and road tunnels
This view, which is looking southeast, shows the Lyttelton rail tunnel portal on the left centre and
the portal of the road tunnel at the upper right.
In the earthquake event, the Tunnel Road skirting the Port Hills is likely to be blocked by slips, with
the ventilation tower at the Tunnel portal and its associated equipment being vulnerable and
requiring more assessment. With the bridges on Tunnel Road (Port Hills and Horotane Valley
underpasses) being vulnerable, the only other access to the Tunnel would be via Ferrymead Bridge
and Bridle Path Road, both of which are also vulnerable. The tunnels themselves are unlikely to
suffer major internal damage. Access to the rail tunnel is likely to be affected by embankment,
bridges and cuttings failures.
Access to the Port will be most important for the recovery stage from an emergency and even in the
response stage many supplies could come to Christchurch by sea if the access to the north of the
City is disrupted (which is most likely in a major earthquake).
Water supply to Lyttelton and a Telecom fibre cable also use the tunnels.
It is quite common for damage as a result of an earthquake to be magnified in a zone at the foot of
hills (possibly from the less compacted soils that have washed off the hills and reflection effects) and
a similar effect is expected in Christchurch.
xvii
Executive Summary
Photo 4: Christchurch central city
This view of the central city area looking southeast shows Colombo Street in the centre of the
photograph and the Square with the Cathedral visible almost in the centre.
Traffic control in the central city is largely controlled by traffic signals which are connected to
computers in the City Council offices. There are one-way signal linked streets, the overall impact
of loss of the system would be severe in traffic management terms. Also, within the central city the
full or partial collapse of vulnerable buildings would block access to much of Manchester Street, and
also parts of Lichfield Street and Tuam Street near centre, top of picture.
Although the bridges shown over the Avon River (the Avon river is shown flowing right to left in the
foreground) are unlikely to sustain much damage in a large earthquake, consolidation of the bridge
approaches could cause damage to services with consequent disruption to the central city area.
The Southpower building (mid left) was identified as likely to sustain considerable damage in an
earthquake in the area occupied by the control room and this has now been moved to a safer location
and the old part of the building demolished.
Basement flooding arising from a localised extreme rainfall event could cause difficulties in an
emergency as it is suspected that several of the central city buildings have electricity installations
and other standby plant located in basements. As a result of the lifelines investigation, one large
building now has sandbags stored on site.
xviii
Risks and Realities
Photo 5: Central city, showing the Avon River and the police station
This view looking south shows the Avon river with the Police building sign identifiable.
The police were involved in the investigation and several modifications were made to their
communication system as a result.
The road bridges over the Avon River are robust and require no further mitigation measures but
other services using them may be vulnerable if the approach fills consolidate.
Within the central city, the Avon river is relatively deeply entrenched and fortunately there is little
likelihood of flooding from the river. However it has to be remembered that in February 1868,
following a severe rainstorm in the back country, i.e. the foothills of the Southern Alps which are
part of the catchment of the Waimakariri river, floodwaters flowed through the central city when the
Waimakariri overflowed and joined the Avon. That was before the stopbanks had been established
along the Waimakariri and the operations of the modern day catchment authorities.
The people of Christchurch still perceive that the greatest threat to Christchurch is the Waimakariri
River. Although in the view of the Engineering Lifelines Project, an earthquake presents a larger
threat, flooding is still possible. If a flood occurs, its effects are much more likely to be greater in the
lower reaches, and in the small floods from rainfall affecting the catchment of the Avon River or other
local rivers.
xix
Executive Summary
Photo 6: Central city, looking southeast
In this view looking to the southeast, Colombo Street runs diagonally across the picture with the
railway line just visible across the top third. The major vulnerabilities to the transport system are the
overbridges on Moorhouse Avenue and Colombo Street over the railway. Both will suffer major
damage during an earthquake. Major expenditure on both bridges would be required and further
detailed investigation of these structures is programmed. Moorhouse Avenue is an important
primary route providing access around the city core.
Because of likely building debris on the streets after an earthquake, access may be difficult to the
Christchurch City Council Offices, which will have a vital role in response to an emergency. The CCC
building is midway between Colombo Street and Manchester Street, nearly halfway up the picture.
The building itself should be relatively undamaged and a programme is under way to seismically
restrain essential elements such as fittings and computers.
Fire fighting in high rise buildings may be affected by power failure if the booster pumps supplying
pressure to the upper storey sprinkler systems have no auxiliary power supply. Also, damage to the
city reticulation itself could leave viable sprinkler systems unable to operate, unless the building has
its own water storage. Backup power or water storage are not compulsory and vulnerability therefore
varies from building to building.
xx
Risks and Realities
This view, looking southeast, shows the Avon River with the Fire Service central fire station nearby
and the central business district in the background (the Southpower building is at the top centre just
to the right of the Manchester Street parking building).
The central fire station is a reminder that widespread damage coupled with power failure may limit
the availability of water for fire fighting. River water could be a viable alternative, but the practicalities
need more investigation. Equipment suitable for this duty must be available and means established
of protecting above-ground long, high-pressure hoses at road crossings, etc. The four bridge
crossings also bring to mind the adopted mitigation measure of providing water supply valving at
each end of bridge crossings. However it is not expected that the bridges themselves will be
extensively damaged.
It is expected that most damage to underground services will be from differential settlement,
particularly caused by backfill of excavated areas. In the case of bridges this is on the approaches,
but the effect may be caused simply by backfilled trenches from one service crossed by another
service at a different level. In buildings, the likely damage area for the services is where pipes enter
foundation walls.
Heavy winds can cause considerable disruption, as described in the scenario on page 34 and the
heavily treed banks of the Avon River would be of concern.
Photo 7: The northeast central city
xxi
Executive Summary
Photo 8: The Ferrymead Bridge
The Ferrymead Bridge is in the centre of the photograph.
The bridge is likely to suffer extensive damage in even a moderate earthquake. The damage,
including services breakdowns, will cause severe traffic disruption during restoration. Investigations
are in progress to strengthen the bridge and/or relocate services off the bridge. Damage to the
approaches and the liquefaction risk are currently being assessed in detail, but it would appear that
the foundation conditions are some of the worst in Christchurch. The hazard assessment reveals
that all of the land between the Heathcote River and the Estuary is likely to be subject to liquefaction
in a severe earthquake. All of the services crossing the bridge also pass through this land.
One long-term possibility could be a bridge connecting Rocking Horse Road (in photograph 10)
across the mouth of the estuary, possibly just for services. The mitigation measures are currently
the subject of a team investigation by members of all of the service authorities affected. This
investigation was commenced in 1996.
The Tunnel Road and tunnel portal can also be seen in the background . Both are important transport
routes as referred to in Photograph 3.
xxii
Risks and Realities
Photo 9: Clifton Hill
This view looking southwest shows Clifton Hill in the foreground with a cellular VHF site for Mount
Pleasant and Gebbies Pass
Earthquakes would be likely to severely affect road access to residential areas on Clifton Hill.
Foundations of structural crib walls could fail, resulting in loss of the road. Mitigation measures will
need to be investigated. The Main Road along the foreshore would also be subject to inundation
from a Tsunami with the resultant likelihood of damage to all of the engineering services along the
road.
All development east of the Ferrymead bridge is supplied with water from wells located west of the
bridge, leaving this area vulnerable. Duplication of the McCormacks Bay Reservoir has substantially
boosted storage in this area and investigation work is proceeding to strengthen the Ferrymead
crossing, one result of which will be the reduction in water supply vulnerability for this area.
The extent of seismic landslip will depend on the season and the water content of the surface layers.
An earthquake during the winter is likely to cause much more damage than one in the summer. An
engineering geologist accompanied a minibus load of representatives from the service authorities
on the main roads of the Port Hills, as the vulnerability of the various services was assessed in
relation to landslip and other seismically induced hazards.
xxiii
Executive Summary
Photo 10: South Brighton Spit and Clifton Hill
This view, looking towards the southeast, shows South Brighton Spit in the foreground with Clifton
Hill in the background.
The Main Road to Sumner around the base of the cliffs and estuary foreshore would be inundated
under a tsunami. It is anticipated that tsunami effects will cause inundation of properties on the Spit
and also of low-Iying land in McCormacks Bay, Redcliffs and Sumner.
Minor flooding occurs at present on the roadways from extreme tidal events, so that any rise in water
level will cause noticeable effects.
All of the services to the Spit area are dependent on Rocking Horse Road and access through South
Brighton. The Hazard Assessment reveals that there is possibility of liquefaction so that in any
severe earthquake at least one service is likely to be affected.
One of the possibilities to provide an alternative for services (and access) east of the Ferrymead
bridge is a new bridge from the end of the Spit across the mouth of the Estuary, but no site
investigation has been done . If the proposal is the subject of a detailed report, then that report will
have to deal with access for all services across the lower reaches of the Avon river and through
South Brighton. Unlike most of the rest of the city, there are few alternative routes available.
xxiv
Risks and Realities
Photo 11: View to the north-west over the sewage treatment ponds
This view, looking to the north-west, shows Dyers Road in the foreground where the road travels
across the sewage treatment ponds with the sewage plant in the background.
At the top of the picture is part of the eastern suburbs of Christchurch which the project identified
as being likely to be subject to liquefaction in the event of an earthquake.
Seismic damage to the embankments of the sewage treatment ponds in the form of slumping or
liquefaction is a threat, the extent of which has not yet been established. Although a cone
penetration test at the buildings of the sewage treatment plant revealed that liquefaction should not
be a problem at the location tested, it is likely that the embankments could be severely damaged.
Repair of internal embankments will be able to proceed independently of tidal effects, so attention
needs to focus on the vulnerability of the external embankments fronting the Estuary.
Only minor damage to the sewage treatment plant oxidation ponds is anticipated from tsunami
effects, due to the satisfactory elevation of the retaining embankments.
Dyers Road, a ring road which is an important arterial route, passes through the middle of these
pond areas. However, it does not warrant the planning of any mitigation measures at this stage
against possible subsidence risk.
xxv
Executive Summary
Photo 12: Lower reaches of the Avon River
This view, looking to the southeast, shows the lower reaches of the Avon River with the sea just
visible at the top of the picture, Pages Road bridge in the background and the Wainoni Road bridge
in the foreground.
Both bridges may suffer considerable damage. Mitigation measures being planned include a new
expressway bridge in the immediate foreground, and the likely replacement of the Pages Road
bridge within the next 10 years. The Pages Road bridge carries very significant Telecom cables
(fibre optic and 2000 pr. cable) and a large feeder watermain. High tide levels in the Lower Avon are
above surrounding residential land which is protected by stopbanking. There is concern that
stopbank damage through slumping or liquefaction will allow tidal water to flood into residential
areas.
A high tide and some flooding is of concern at any time, but the possible problems following an
earthquake which may cause slumping of the stopbanks and damage the pipework allowing
stormwater to discharge into the river will be of much greater concern. A solution to this problem is
still being sought and extensive testing is still required to determine how many, if any, banks may
be affected. Nearly all of the area has been identified in the hazard assessment as being likely to
be subject to liquefaction.
This area is also subject to possible flooding arising from the effects of extremely low barometric
pressure coinciding with snow and rainfall and in 1992 these effects occurred together.
Tsunami effects are also significant in this locality, including localised flooding close to the coast and
damage to or overtopping of stopbanks upstream caused by the passage of tidal bores.
xxvi
Risks and Realities
Photo 13: Southpower yard and Madras Street
This view, looking southeast, shows the Packe Street Southpower yard with Madras Street in the
foreground.
As a result of the project, Southpower have relocated emergency spares to a much more secure
area for storage which was identified in a detailed assessment of the buildings.
Most service authorities do not now carry a large amount of spares (fittings, pipes etc.) and the
modern storekeeping with just in time stores control will not assist in prompt repair in the event of
extensive damage following an earthquake. To minimise the effects of this, a project has been
initiated to arrange for mutual aid in advance. In California such arrangements are formalised in
contracts and many authorities now use similar materials and methods which will make mutual aid
much easier.
Madras Street is just one access road to the north not primary but parallel to the Cranford Street
primary route. Christchurch is fortunate in having a basic grid pattern of streets which provides
many alternatives in the event of one street being closed as a result of an emergency. Likewise, other
services generally have many alternatives and not services all located on one route down a valley,
which so often is the case in other cities. However, outside the area of the investigation, the city is
dependent on resources such as replacement spares being delivered from the main trunk railway
line or State Highways and, other than the airport and seaport, these are really the only two routes
into the city.
xxvii
Executive Summary
Photo 14: The Trans Power Islington substation
This view of the Trans Power Islington substation is looking east. This is on the south-western edge
of the city and is the major substation for Christchurch.
Trans Power have had a very responsible attitude to the minimisation of risk and already had
undertaken a seismic investigation of their installations. However, a walk over survey was done of
the transmission lines which lead from Islington to the east of the city to ascertain the stability of the
foundations. Trans Power New Zealand Limited has a policy in place with the objective of being able
to maintain power supplies during a MM IX intensity earthquake and to restore power supplies to
earthquake damaged areas within three days.
Wind, snow, electrical storm and flooding are other hazards that may impact on the continuous
supply of electricity. The Islington substation is on the edge of a possible flood flow from the
Waimakariri and it was determined that no insurmountable problems should arise from this source.
Notwithstanding the considerable work already done, Trans Power will continue to address the
issues raised and ensure adequate contingency plans are in place.
Subsequent to the Wellington Lifelines Study, a new national system of equipment spares and
inventory is in place and this will greatly assist the reinstatement operation.
It has to be borne in mind that the limitations on the extent of the lifelines project caused the
placement of artificial boundaries on the considerations, and Christchurch is dependent on many
services outside the metropolitan area. Eventually, Christchurch (and the rest of New Zealand) will
be much more able to withstand the effects of natural disasters when lifeline studies are carried out
nationwide.
xxviii
Risks and Realities
Photo 15: Sugarloaf television transmission tower
This view looking over the Port Hills to the north-east shows the Sugarloaf Tower, which is the major
transmission tower for television services in Christchurch.
A review, in conjunction with BCL, of the Sugarloaf transmission site was undertaken as a result of
the project. Very minor modifications were made to the fixings in the buildings, some of which had
not been seismically restrained and the communication to the public necessary following a disaster
should be much more secure. Similar checks were made to all masts on the Port Hills, with most
being found to be in secure locations, although access to them may be difficult following an
earthquake.
One of the specific mitigation measures identified for the broadcasting system was a review of the
overall robustness of each network and the establishment of a plan to manage with a reduced
system (i.e. a disaster response plan), but there have been many changes in staff since the project
and this may still need to be done.
One of the considerable advantages in having such a large group of people involved in the various
Task Groups is the establishment of the informal, first name contacts between the various
organisations which would be useful in an emergency. However, with the passing of time personnel
change and the contacts are lost. The continuing nature of the lifelines work will assist to some
degree, but it will be important to devise some method of keeping the contacts current.
xxix
Executive Summary
Photo 16: August 1992 snow storm
This photograph was taken during the aftermath of the August 1992 snow storm and illustrates the
havoc that can be caused to transport.
The depth of a snowfall will vary over the city and the worst effects are likely to be on the hills. Snow
could cut off road access throughout the whole city, possibly bringing down overhead power lines
and making access for public transport, emergency vehicles and the public very difficult. The citys
business sector would virtually come to a standstill because of the lack of transport. However,
disruption is unlikely to last more than a few days. The main mitigation measures are to prepare a
response plan and to place underground the services on key transport routes.
Snow causes problems with the difficulty for melt water to flow and get access to sumps. Snow can
block sumps and sometimes open waterways. Overhead lines carrying services can be brought
down by snow but one of the worst clean up problems may well be the foliage that has been brought
down. This was certainly the case in the 1992 snowfall.
The loss of electricity to essential services caused by snow will be felt very quickly by community
homes for the elderly and infirm as very few, if any, have emergency power available. Although the
project has attempted to be concerned with effects on engineering services only, it has to be borne
in mind that these services are for people, not just the services themselves.
Civil Defence can therefore usefully learn from the project and it is hoped that in the future more work
will be able to be done on investigating the best way to make the supply of services to essential
locations more secure. The interdependence of the various services also has yet to be further
investigated and mitigation measures put in place.
xxx
Risks and Realities
The Ambulance in the Valley
( ANON )
Twas a dangerous cliff, as they freely confessed,
Though to walk near its crest was so pleasant:
But over its terrible edge there had slipped
A duke, and full many a peasant.
The people said something would have to be done,
But their projects did not at all tally.
Some said Put a fence round the edge of the cliff,
Some, An ambulance down in the valley.
The lament of the crowd was profound and was loud,
As their tears overflowed with their pity:
But the cry for the ambulance carried the day
As it spread through the neighbouring city.
A collection was made, to accumulate aid,
And the dwellers in highway and alley
Gave dollars and cents - not to furnish a fence -
But an ambulance down in the valley.
For the cliff is all right if youre careful. they said:
And, if folks ever slip and are dropping,
It isnt the slipping that hurts them so much
As the shock down below - when theyre stopping.
So for years (we have heard), as these mishaps occurred
Quick forth would the rescuers sally,
To pick up the victims who fell from the cliff.
With the ambulance down in the valley.
Said one, in a plea, Its a marvel to me
That youd give so much attention
To repairing results than to curing the cause;
You had much better aim at prevention.
For the mischief, of course, should be stopped at its source:
Come, neighbours and friends, let us rally.
It is far better sense to rely on a fence
Than an ambulance down in the valley.
xxxi
Executive Summary
Introduction
This book has arisen out of the Christchurch Engineer-
ing Lifelines project and contains the report of the
workshop held in October 1994. It is believed to be the
first book of its kind to address the effects of a range of
natural hazards on emergency services using a multi-
disciplinary approach.
The initial work on the project was undertaken during
1993/94 and this followed on from the successful
major project of the Centre for Advanced Engineering
(Lifelines in Earthquakes - Wellington Case Study).
This Wellington-based project was a prototype for
New Zealand and developed methodologies which
were used, as far as was possible, in the Christchurch
work. However, unlike Wellington, where only the
effects of earthquakes were studied, the objectives of
the Christchurch Engineering Lifelines study were:
to identify the vulnerability of engineering lifeline
services to damage from earthquakes, flooding,
tsunami and meteorological hazards.
to identify practical engineering strategies for re-
ducing the risk or impact of such damage and for
providing for reinstatement following such events.
to communicate the issues to people involved in the
management of these services and to raise the
awareness of the public to their importance.
This book, then, also addresses many of the essential
elements of a lifelines investigation and will be of use
to other areas of New Zealand and in other countries.
Similar investigations have now commenced in Auck-
land and Otago regions, with many other areas consid-
ering being involved.
Lifelines are not only those resources that enable the
over-wrought to make contact in times of emotional
need, but also is the generic term used to describe all of
the engineering services that enable people to live with
the standard of living we have come to expect in New
Zealand. In other countries the term infrastructural
assets is being used.
A lifelines investigation is not an Emergency Services
or Civil Defence exercise (although Emergency Serv-
ices and Civil Defence will receive considerable ben-
efit from one), but is essentially an investigation under-
taken by the providers of the various services forming
the infrastructure that permits settlement of the towns
and cities in New Zealand. It involves a detailed,
structured investigation of the services, the hazards to
which they are vulnerable, the mitigation measures to
reduce the effect of hazardous events and considers the
dependence the various lifelines have upon each other.
It is one of the tools of risk management now made
possible because of modern technology and is really
only part of responsible asset management.
Notwithstanding all the investigation and mitigation
work carried out, it is inevitable that in a severe event
some damage to the infrastructure will occur. The work
undertaken and proposed will, however, make Christ-
church better able to withstand the effects of natural
hazards.
In this book the investigations focus on the Christ-
church Metropolitan area, including Lyttelton and the
Port, with a few extensions where damaged engineer-
ing installations close to the area would affect the
operation of the lifelines within Christchurch, e.g. a
repeater station in North Canterbury and the bridges on
nearby rivers.
Any investigation of the effects of hazards involves
consideration of risk management so the book incorpo-
rates a brief overview of the issues involved in consid-
ering risk. However, although in the Christchurch
work, high probability/high consequence risks, high
probability/low consequence risks, low probability/
high consequence risks and low probability/low conse-
quence risks were considered, it has to be borne in mind
that the physical work identified as desirable need not
be very costly. The book contains reference to much
simple work that has been undertaken at relatively low
cost.
The book does not deal with response planning in detail
although this is at present being undertaken in Christ-
church as a result of the lifelines project. Those mem-
bers of the team who were privileged to visit Northridge
and Kobe after earthquakes in those areas have no
doubt that response planning, at least in general terms,
is a very necessary for engineering lifelines as well as
emergency services.
Although much of the text of the book is based on the
situation pertaining in 1994, it has been updated to
1996 insofar as has been possible.
xxxii
Risks and Realities
Risk Assessment, Methodology, Vulnerability, Impact and Importance 1
Chapter 1
Risk Assessment, Methodology,
Vulnerability, Impact and Importance
much to offer those responsible for reacting to emer-
gencies and dealing with the aftermath.
Government Perspective
Governments interest in risk management in respect
of dealing with emergencies and natural disasters
began about ten years ago. With the transfer of respon-
sibility that occurred through the reforms in local
authorities in the 1980s, central government put in
place policies designed to encourage more effective
safety and loss prevention strategies. These were enun-
ciated, for example, in a set of principles developed for
the 1987 Recovery Plan for Natural Disasters which
placed considerable emphasis on risk management
and mitigation.
The essential idea was that central government would
accept shared responsibility for the restoration of
damage from natural disasters only if the local author-
ity concerned had done its part to minimise, mitigate,
and manage the risk to its assets. The expectation was
that local authorities would not simply provide insur-
ance cover, but would seek to protect life and property
by managing all the risks they faced. That is, they were
expected to take all reasonable steps to reduce the
possibility of adverse events occurring (or follow-on
secondary events), to put in place protection and
damage limitation measures that would reduce the
consequences, to examine the efficacy of response
mechanisms, and generally to improve the way that
emergencies and disasters were managed.
By obliging local authorities and other asset owners to
accept a share of the responsibility for restoring dam-
aged infrastructure, central governments intentions
were to transfer some of the risk, to limit its potential
financial exposure, and to shift the focus to loss preven-
tion and better overall risk management. As the own-
ers of the assets, local authorities are best placed to
identify local hazards and to implement strategies for
ameliorating the consequences of any disasters. The
outcome in the long run should be better protection of
public assets, a safer environment for employees and
society generally, less frequent interruption of essen-
This chapter attempts to set the work on engineering
lifelines in the context of risk management, and ini-
tially presents excerpts (in italics) from material pub-
lished by two acknowledged experts in risk manage-
ment Patrick Helm and Janet Gough. What follows
is a description of risk management considerations
discussed at the time of the project workshop in Octo-
ber 1994, the methodology and the project structure.
The various steps of the analysis are then described,
which should prove useful for any group embarking on
their own project. The way in which mitigation meas-
ure implementation was, and continues to be, under-
taken is then discussed.
In the June 1996 volume of Tephra, the magazine
published by the Ministry of Civil Defence, a compre-
hensive article dealing with Integrated Risk Manage-
ment for Natural and Technological Disasters was
written by Patrick Helm of the Department of Prime
Minister and Cabinet in Wellington. The article intro-
duces the concepts and principles of risk analysis and
outlines a practical risk management strategy. Al-
though the term lifelines is not used, its equivalent
term is infrastructure.
Patrick Helms article deals with disasters and their
consequences, not only lifelines. The relevant portions
of the article are set out below and very adequately
introduces the theme of this book. The issues raised and
the practical applications suggested are very similar to
that developed in the Christchurch Engineering Life-
lines Project.
Introduction
Risk assessment has been little used in New Zealand for
the management of emergencies and natural disasters.
At best, it has been regarded as a passive activity to
help insurance companies set premiums for coverage
of infrastructural damage.
Yet the techniques now becoming available for analys-
ing and quantifying risk can prevent or minimise
disasters, can improve safety, and can markedly re-
duce societal disruption following disasters. They have
2 Risks and Realities
different risk practitioners. This paper is most closely
aligned with the definitions used in the Australian/
New Zealand Standard Risk Management, AS/NZS
4360:1995.
Definitions
Risk Analysis
A systematic use of available information to determine
how often specified events may occur and the magni-
tude of their consequences.
Risk Assessment
The process used to determine risk management pri-
orities by evaluating and comparing level of risk against
predetermined standards, target risk levels or other
criteria.
Risk Management
The systematic application of management policies,
procedures and practices to the tasks of identifying,
analysing, assessing, treating and monitoring risk.
The essential idea is that it involves a formal, quanti-
tative evaluation of potential injury or loss over a
specified period of time, or the prospect of future mal-
performance of a safety or security system.
Approaches to Assessment
Risk techniques do not eliminate uncertainty, but help
put it in context. Provided there is some appreciation
of the degree of uncertainty innate of the factors in a
defined situation, risk assessment can make an impor-
tant contribution to reducing potential adverse effects.
In practice, there are usually no direct linear tech-
niques for assessing risk. Experts tend to gravitate
towards a conclusion through cyclical processes that
may involve several independent approaches. For ex-
ample:
With natural hazards such as flooding, there may
well be considerable local experience on which to
base extrapolation to more serious risks.
In some situations observed records and expert
views will be highly valuable.
In other situations where events are rarer (e.g.
tsunami) it may be instructive to draw on experi-
ence and practices elsewhere.
In general, using a variety of approaches will yield a
more robust assessment and help avoid problems of
systemic bias. It will also increase the likelihood of
tial community services, and a reduction in the finan-
cial impact of losses.
With time, however, some local authorities have started
to acknowledge the wider benefits of pro-active risk
strategies to eliminate or reduce potential losses. This
is an encouraging trend. But it has also revealed the
complexity of, and paucity of knowledge about, risk
assessment involving disaster potential in New Zea-
land.
Risk Assessment
In New Zealand, those responsible for dealing with
emergency and disaster situations have been slow to
adopt risk control techniques. This is partly ex-
plained by the public scepticism that has developed
over recent years in response to expert assur-
ances about risks over which individuals have no
control, or about which they hold different values
(e.g. nuclear safety, mad cow disease, etc.). But it is
also because the concept of risk can be difficult to
grasp, dealing as it does with chance and uncer-
tainty somewhere in the indeterminate future. At
first sight, risk analysis seems to lack the rigour of
some other disciplines and even as a process of
applied science it appears to have methodological
shortcomings.
Notwithstanding these perceptions, risk analysis
can be a powerful aid in decision-making involving
public safety or in dealing with potential emergen-
cies and disasters. It forms an overlay on the emer-
gency/disaster management process (i.e. the four
phases of Mitigation, Preparation, Response and
Recovery) which can help evaluate the contribution
of each phase to overall safety management. Risk
methodologies are useful not only for well-under-
stood situations where good empirical evidence and
statistics are available (bridge design, fire suppres-
sion, river control, etc.), but also for situations in
which there may be inadequate direct experience
(e.g. a large volcano, epidemics, or environmental
issues such as stratospheric ozone depletion).
Its particular strength for analysing situations of
uncertainty stems from the fact that it offers a
structured, systematic and consistent approach that
forces the analyst into understanding the total risk
picture. Provided that hazards are identified with
care and consistency, that causal models are ana-
lysed logically, and that data is subject to strict
quality control, the results of risk analysis will make
a practical contribution to public safety and loss
prevention. Risk assessment may be defined and
undertaken in many ways. Terminology varies among
exposing rogue conditions or interrelationships. For
effective risk management, these different techniques
should be utilised in ways that lead to a quantitative
outcome where possible. The better the quantitative
base, the better will be decision making, resource
allocation, mitigation success and, ultimately, public
safety or loss prevention.
Measuring Risk
Quantitative risk assessment combines three key ideas:
the chance of something going wrong;
the consequences if it does; and
the context within which the situation is set.
For any given set of circumstances, the level of Risk
may be calculated as the product of the Probability
of an event or adverse outcome (chance/likelihood/
frequency, expressed as occurrences per unit time) and
a measure of the Consequences of the event (dam-
age/detriment/severity, expressed numerically as a
specific value measure such as lives lost or financial
damage per event). In symbolic terms, we can write the
equation R = P x C.
It has to be stressed that this simple product is not
sufficient in itself to fully describe the real risk, but for
a given situation in which the terms may be specified
with reasonable accuracy, it provides an adequate
basis for comparing risks or making resource deci-
sions.
Tolerable Risk
Decisions on the appropriate level of investment for
dealing with natural and technological hazards de-
pend critically on judgements about the acceptability
of risk. Strictly speaking, no level of risk is accept-
able but, as a point of principle, risk can be consid-
ered tolerable when there are commensurate benefits.
Safety does not require all risk to be eliminated: rather,
that there be an appropriate balance among costs,
risks and benefits. As in any analysis of this type, there
will inevitably have to be value judgements made of
one kind or another: what level of risk will individuals
or society tolerate? What proportion of ratepayers
funds should be invested in mitigation? What criteria
should be applied?
In just the way that individuals tend to set themselves
personal thresholds of tolerable risk, so too communi-
ties have informal but real perceptions of societal risk
thresholds. Travellers the world over continue to fly in
jetplanes notwithstanding the fact that, occasionally,
accidents occur that kill 200 to 300 people at a time.
Society would probably not accept say, one jumbo jet
crash per week, but seems to tolerate one per year.
Clearly, when dealing with natural disasters in par-
ticular, it is not practicable to seek to achieve zero risk;
the investment to make life totally safe would be beyond
any government. This is more feasible when dealing
with technological hazards but, even here, economics,
risk acceptability, and the need for the technology have
to be balanced carefully. Risk management experts
recommend that, whenever feasible, those responsible
try to eliminate high severity risks that might occur in
a typical lifetime.
For any specific risk, they recommend trying to reduce
dangers to just below a level commensurate with
reasonable cost the As Low as Reasonably Prac-
ticable (ALARP) principle. (Too conservative an ap-
proach to safety can easily end up costing more than
the benefits.) A great deal of work has been done to try
to devise standards of tolerability, but as yet they have
not received universal acceptance. Desirably, risks
associated with all hazards, natural and technologi-
cal, should be reduced to the point where they are low
compared with levels that are widely accepted by the
community without concern.
Figure 1.1 brings together several different concepts
to do with the tolerability of risk. Derived from risk
guidelines developed in the United Kingdom, it depicts
risk thresholds in terms of local acceptability of deaths
from industrial and other accidents. Plotted as
exceedance or disasters involving a given number (N)
of fatalities. The Local Tolerability Line defines a
region which is characterised by both high frequencies
and severe consequences the Intolerable region.
The region between this line and the Local Scrutiny
INTOLERABLE
ALARP
REGION
NEGLIGIBLE
P
o
s
s
ib
ly

U
n
ju
s
t
if
ia
b
le

R
is
k
N
e
g
lig
ib
ility
L
in
e
L
o
c
a
l S
c
r
u
tin
y
L
in
e
L
o
c
a
l T
o
le
r
a
b
ility
L
in
e
10
-7
10
-6
10
-5
10
-4
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y

o
f

N

o
r

m
o
r
e

f
a
t
a
l
i
t
i
e
s
,

F
1 10 100 1,000 10,000
Number of Fatalities, N
Figure 1.1: Indicative frequency-fatalities curve
can be modified in many ways: by good safety engi-
neering, redundancy in design, self-regulation, fail-
safe mechanisms, defence-in-depth, and proper train-
ing, operations and maintenance, for example. In both
situations we should also put in place protective or
damage limitation measures, and other provisions
(preparation and response etc.), to reduce the unpleas-
ant effects should the event happen. The difficulty, of
course, is in deciding on the balance of effort that
should be applied to prevention (or reduction of like-
lihood) versus mitigation (e.g. containment, diversion,
protection) or to any other aspect of damage limitation
in the response and recovery phases. Low probability,
high consequence events present the greatest diffi-
culty. Some highly unlikely circumstances such as
meteorite impact are most efficaciously dealt with
simply by repairing the damage the do nothing
option.
Implementation Issues
In practice, the local authority risk manager has the
difficult task of controlling the risks from all public
hazards in ways that not only maintain community
safety, but minimise physical damage, and reduce
social and economic disruption. More than most, that
person must understand the big picture and avoid
excessive reliance on any one sector such as the
monitoring of developments, response or insurance.
Their task is to devise a management strategy that
ensures every facet of the risk management process is
understood, is operating well, and is in appropriate
balance. They need to anticipate potential weak points
since failure at a single point in the logic or practice of
a safety process may jeopardise the success of the
whole.
For example, where a known hazard exists (such as the
possibility of a river control system failing catastrophi-
cally) the risk manager has to understand the impor-
tance of each and every factor in the risk equation, and
the relative contribution each makes to saving lives
and minimising damage. The following are some of the
more significant considerations:
Know what can go seriously wrong, when, and with
what forewarning.
Examine ways to reduce the chance of it happen-
ing.
Put in place measures to contain the worst effects,
divert them away from communities, or otherwise
reduce the severity of the impact.
Anticipate what might go wrong with the mitigation
measures and any new risks they may introduce.
Line is a region of possibly unjustifiable risk. Be-
tween this latter line and the Negligibility Line is a
region which is judged to be tolerable but for which all
reasonably practicable steps should be taken to reduce
the hazard further. This is the ALARP region (As Low
As Reasonably Practicable). All combinations of fre-
quency and number of fatalities which fall below the
Negligibility Line are considered to be negligible.
Above a certain level, a risk is regarded as intolerable
and cannot be justified in any ordinary circumstances
(see Figure 1.2). Below such levels, an activity is
allowed to take place provided that the associated risks
have been made as low as reasonably practicable
(ALARP). In pursuing ALARP, account can be taken of
cost. It is, in principle, possible to apply formal cost-
benefit techniques to assist in making judgements of
this kind. [Source: The Tolerability of Risk from Nu-
clear Power Stations, Health and Safety Executive,
London, 1992.]
Management Strategies
The risk equation (R = P x C) points us to the two basic
strategies for managing risk: we can try to lower the
likelihood of an event happening; or we can try to
reduce the consequences by putting in place suitable
provisions for ameliorating the worst effects.
In practice we should do both. With natural hazards it
is often difficult to do anything about modifying the
likelihood of the primary event occurring, but we
should be aware of possible problems from closely
coupled systems and should aim to reduce the chances
of further adverse events being triggered (i.e. second-
ary events such as flooding leading to dam collapse).
By contrast, the likelihood of technological accidents
RISK
Unacceptable
region
The ALARP or
tolerability region
[Risk is undertaken only
if a benefit is desired]
Broad acceptable region
[no need for detailed working
to demonstrate ALARP]
Risk cannot be
justified except in
extraordinary
circumstances
Tolerable only if
risk reduction is
impracticable or
if its cost is grossly
disproportionate to the
improvement gained
Tolerable if cost of
reduction would exceed
the improvement gained
Necessary to maintain
assurance that risk
remains at this level
Negligible Risk
Figure 1.2: Risk tolerability levels
Test whether the warning time is sufficient to evacu-
ate people (and decide whether the warning system
and communications can be relied upon to work
properly).
Be familiar with all aspects of the response mecha-
nisms (who, how, when, how reliable, contact num-
bers, availability, alternates etc.).
Consider specific public education or training that
might improve the communitys reaction to the
warning.
Anticipate what might go wrong in the response
phase, and what new risks it might introduce.
Decide how the injured will be dealt with to mini-
mise further loss of life.
Develop plans for recovery (people, materials,
finance, insurance, etc.).
Look for opportunities to test and evaluate the
entire system (especially with small events), and
make adjustments.
Resource Allocation
An important corollary is that there is no point in
having any one step functioning excessively well. Each
step should yield an outcome of equivalent quality in
terms of its contribution to the overall safety process.
Anything else represents a less than optimum use of
resources. That is not to suggest that effort and re-
sources should be applied uniformly to each step, but
rather that each should receive support commensurate
with its importance or potential for improving the
outcome. Moreover, in complex situations involving
many variables and uncertainties the precision with
which the overall risk can be determined will be
dominated by the most uncertain or crudely known
factor.
Practical Application
It is not the intention of this paper to detail all of the
steps used in developing risk strategies. That will
depend on the risk being analysed. The process, how-
ever, typically involves three broad phases:
assessing the risks quantitatively;
applying reasonable and effective safety and loss
control measures; and
evaluating the effects of the overall risk manage-
ment programme.
These are set out in greater detail in Table 1.1, which
represents the processes that a local authority might
go through in doing a comprehensive risk study. For
the sake of clarity, the sequence has been broken into
five broad steps: analysis, estimation, evaluation, con-
trol and verification. Other approaches are possible
depending on the nature of the risk, but the process of
quantitative risk analysis would normally involve most
of the steps detailed.
In an ideal world, a local authority or other risk
manager would undertake a series of risk analyses
covering all the risks falling within their jurisdiction in
order to rank them in importance and to apportion
funding for mitigation. In practice, experience and
pragmatism would mean that only the most significant
risks would be subject to comprehensive analysis of
this type. The degree of analytical effort applied would
tend to reflect the scale of risk, potential benefit, and
familiarity with the hazard (e.g. expert judgement and
experience might be given greater weight than other
techniques in determining risks). But, regardless of the
degree of formal evaluation, there are unquestionable
benefits in knowing as much as possible about local
hazards and in improving the understanding of risk
and its control. Experience overseas has shown that
risk management is most effective when those respon-
sible for the risk fully accept ownership of the assess-
ment and control processes. In particular:
Local authorities need to fully understand their
local risks themselves. The practice of employing
external contractors does not encourage those with
the ultimate responsibility to gain the qualitative
insights necessary for informed management. And,
in-house knowledge is essential to understand the
implications for safety under unusual circumstances
or when elements of the hazard change with time.
Assessment should be specific to a category of risk
(e.g. flooding of a defined section of a lake or river)
or to a particular facility or hazard (e.g. hydro-dam
or volcano). Results from similar situations else-
where may be relevant, but considerable care is
needed in adapting from other experiences.
Risk management can not be done purely on the
basis of codes of practice or regulations. Risk
managers need to take responsibility for the total
risk situation, not merely demonstrate compliance
with general safety regulations.
Conclusion
Disasters can be difficult problems to address. They
are inevitably complex and characterised by high
levels of uncertainty. Typically they involve low prob-
abilities and high consequences, making them difficult
Table 1.1: Risk management strategy for natural and technological hazards
ANALYSE
Understand the context of the hazard, existing controls, and safety objectives.
Treat all aspects of the hazard and its management as an integrated system.
Identify sources of all hazards, vulnerabilities, threats and potential losses associated
with the event, activity or system.
Clarify potential problems, trigger mechanisms, and conditions of exposure.
Develop models, and establish relationships between cause and effect.
Analyse consequences of all possible outcomes, especially safety aspects.
Consider threats to life, property and environment separately.
Consider records, empirical evidence, experience elsewhere, and expert opinion.
ESTIMATE
Quantify all factors objectively, and determine uncertainty.
Carry out sensitivity analysis for the dynamic situation.
Consider physical limits and worst credible bounds (e.g. using statistical inference and
scientific postulation).
Define character and magnitude (size or severity) of consequences.
Estimate chance (likelihood or frequency) of event or condition.
Calculate component risks and overall risk using Probabilistic Risk Assessment.
EVALUATE
Determine significance of estimated risks (in absolute and comparative terms).
Consider acceptability (in terms of both individual and societal tolerance).
Study economic impact and funding options for response and recovery.
Examine costs and benefits of control for most serious risks.
Assess cost risk benefit balance.
Decide to accept, reduce, or transfer risk.
CONTROL
Minimise, Mitigate and Manage risks, i.e.: develop ameliorative measures that:
- lessen likelihood of event and/or consequent system failure;
- lower magnitude of consequences;
- provide resources for response and recovery.
Consider all possibilities for risk reduction:
- design for safety, using prevention, protection, and damage limitation;
- reduce uncertainty, monitor constantly, maintain and upgrade systems;
- set standards and apply quality control at all steps;
- develop defence-in-depth (layered response) to counteract small failures;
- reduce likelihood of human error or perversity (training and safety culture).
VERIFY
Test effectiveness of risk reduction strategies.
Obtain independent safety audit and inspection.
Establish incident reporting methods that include responses etc.
Establish feedback mechanisms to learn from experience, then re-prioritise.
Develop compliance programmes covering management, training and procedures.
Assess cumulative system risk across all stages (including any additional risk
introduced by intervention, i.e. mitigation, preparation, response and recovery).
Establish quality assurance mechanisms to have all parts optimally balanced.
Continually monitor, review and improve systems.
to analyse. The most serious events are (fortunately)
the least likely to happen, but this also means there is
often a lack of reliable data. Data that does exist may
be held anecdotally or in a variety of forms by different
agencies. And, not least, because of their potential to
affect people adversely, they can end up being the
subject of conflict or controversy.
The analytical techniques now becoming available for
interpreting situations of this type have much to offer
those responsible for public safety and loss prevention.
Risk management strategies of themselves cannot guar-
antee better performance because of both the role that
chance and uncertainty play, and the vagaries associ-
ated with human intervention. But the methodologies
used for assessing risk can contribute to understand-
ing where the most serious components lie. They can
point to the more promising control options, assist
policy development, and inform the allocation of re-
sources. Risk analysis is therefore going to be used
increasingly in the management of emergencies and
natural disasters in New Zealand. The message from
government is clear. Those responsible for public
safety and for managing infrastructural assets in New
Zealand are obliged to assume full responsibility for
managing the risks, i.e. to identify the hazards, to
assess the risks, and to take whatever precautions are
required. Support from central government is condi-
tional upon proper risk management having been
demonstrated. These are not matters that can be regu-
lated in Wellington. It is up to the local authorities or
asset owners to take responsibility for balancing the
costs, risks and benefits in the best interests of the
communities they serve.
Relevant Quotations
The following quotations are from Risk and Uncer-
tainty by Janet Gough (Information Paper No.10, Cen-
tre for Resource Management, July 1988).
Page 1
Risk is an important part of our everyday existence. We
continually expose ourselves or are exposed to risk
over which we may have little or no control. Our
perception of the risks we encounter varies according
to factors such as whether our exposure is voluntary or
involuntary, how much control we feel we have over the
risk, and whether or not we feel that the risk is fair.
Increased knowledge, as well as technological and
institutional changes are giving us greater control
over our environment and at the same time allowing us
to modify it at a much faster rate than previously. The
number of risks involved is increasing and as greater
knowledge does not necessarily reduce total uncer-
tainty, the magnitude of technological and environ-
mental risk is also increasing. Man is now able to
create his own catastrophic events, without the aid of
God.
Some of the types of risks we encounter as a society
include environmental, psychological, physical, future
oriented and political risk. It is noteworthy too that as
well as having varying perceptions as to the degree of
risk involved in a particular activity, individuals and
groups have different perceptions of the types of risks
involved.
People concerned with the study of risk include phi-
losophers, sociologists, business managers, econo-
mists, engineers and politicians. Of these, philoso-
phers, sociologists and economists are concerned pri-
marily with the characteristics of risk and choice under
uncertainty, engineers are concerned with quantifying
risk, while managers desire to manage and reduce risk.
Politicians and decision makers rely on information
obtained from the other groups to make decisions
which will in part reflect the risks involved and in part
be the result of other contributing factors.
Page 3
Risk-related problems tend to enter the public domain
when the magnitude of the potential outcome is so
great that it might have possible severe or even cata-
strophic consequences for large land or sea areas or
big population groups. These population groups may
be identified by geographic, demographic or other
social boundaries.
Page 6
The decision-making process begins with the decision
that a problem exists, and in any decision-making
process there will be a number of value elements about
which value judgements must be made. These judge-
ments are necessary because there is seldom a com-
monly accepted correct approach. Rowe (1977) di-
vides these value judgements into three groups:
(1) technical value judgements;
(2) social value judgements; and
(3) managerial value judgements.
Technical value judgements are important, since very
often the experts who make technical risk estimates
do not recognise that these estimates are in fact value
judgements because of the uncertainties and assump-
tions involved in their calculation. Social and manage-
rial value judgements are more readily accepted as
such because they are generally more open to scrutiny
by external observers.
Page 15
Statistical estimates of risk are used when there are
sound statistical data available for the particular event
being studied. In this way, we can make reasonable
estimates of the risk to the child from a mother smoking
during pregnancy (using long run average frequency
estimates). The difficulties arise when, for example:
(1) the historical data being used is not sufficiently
specific for the purpose for which it is being used;
(2) the data does not cover a sufficiently long period;
(3) the estimate obtained is applied to a different
population to that from which it was derived; or
(4) the probability of occurrence is very low.
Page 19
Fischhoff (in Covello et al., 1981) lists six reasons why
disagreements occur between the public and experts:
(1) the distinction between actual and perceived
risk is misconceived;
(2) lay people and experts are talking different lan-
guages;
(3) lay people and experts are solving different prob-
lems;
(4) debates over substance may disguise battles over
form and vice versa;
(5) lay people and experts disagree about what is
feasible; and
(6) lay people and experts see the facts differently.
Page 31
Fischhoff (1978) defines acceptable risk in the follow-
ing way: The acceptable level is the level which is
good enough, where good enough means that you
think the advantages of increased safety are not worth
the costs of reducing risk by restricting or otherwise
altering the activity.
Rowe (Goodman and Rowe, 1979) describes a set of
conditions which he suggests support the existence of
acceptable risk. They are:
risk which is perceived to be so small as to be
deemed negligible;
risk which is uncontrollable or unavoidable with-
out major disruption in lifestyle;
acceptable risk levels established by a credible
organisation with responsibility for health and
safety;
historical levels of risk which continue to be an
acceptable one; and
risk which is deemed worth the benefits by the risk
taker.
He refers to these as the threshold condition, the status
quo, the regulatory condition, the de facto condition
and the voluntary balance condition. These are exam-
ples of risks which we argue should be termed accepted
risks. We further contend that there is no such thing as
acceptable risk, but only accepted risk, and that this is
what is commonly meant by the term acceptable risk.
Risk management
considerations and the
community
The following discussion presents some issues of rel-
evance to risk management beyond those specifically
considered in the project work. To some degree, these
are implicit in what has been done, however there are
gaps in the work and these are recorded to qualify the
results to date and to flag areas for attention in any
future effort.
Risk acceptance criteria
In compiling mitigation measures, the project identi-
fied many things of modest cost that have already been
adopted. Other sensible measures can be phased in
through ongoing maintenance and replacement pro-
grammes, often with little or no extra cost. Where the
requirement is costly, however, and may have some
urgency, there is a need for a rational approach to
decision-making.
The following discussion describes how decisions
could be made regarding proposed mitigation meas-
ures in terms of the effects on the community of the
particular hazard scenarios considered. Largely, the
decision whether or not to invest in mitigation rests on
the level of risk that is acceptable to those affected. The
more risk that may be accepted, the less need there is
for mitigation.
The perceived magnitude of risk consequences, and
the probability of occurrence in relevant forward time
frames, will determine acceptability or non acceptabil-
ity to those affected.
In discussing the concept of risk, it is suggested that
people are concerned about effects that may realisti-
cally occur within their cognisant lifespan, say, 50
years. To the extent that peoples views can be ex-
tended to society as a whole we should consider impact
through loss of lifelines on that basis. So an imperative
Frequent
Reasonably
Probable
Remote
Extremely
Remote
Minor Major Critical Catastrophic
Increasing effect on community due to lifeline failure
Increasing
probability
Manage risk
Accept risk
Conditional
Figure 1.3: Risk acceptance criteria
for action is the likelihood or probability of the out-
come of concern occurring, or, more properly, being
exceeded within a 50 year period.
We therefore have the two-dimensional problem of
selecting hazards that occur often enough, and which
are severe enough in terms of the consequences of
lifelines failure that we should do something about
them.
Figure 1.3 illustrates this problem and proposes the
existence of decision spaces which may assist in differ-
entiating between acceptable risk and risk which may
require action.
Obviously, if a frequently recurring event (lifelines
failure) causes catastrophic effects in the community,
the risk of failure is unacceptable and action is indi-
cated. Conversely, if extremely rare occurrences result
in only minor impact, the risk of failure will be accept-
ably low and no action would be required. In the range
between these cases there will be a transition from
yes, we must act through ambivalence to no, we
dont need to act.
The assignment of hazards to decision spaces is de-
pendent upon the meaning of frequent, remote,
major, catastrophic, etc. Some definitions of terms
have been drafted and these are given below. These
definitions, and the perception of the hazards issues,
are then used to assign them to decision spaces.
Probability parameters definitions
Frequent
A 99.5% probability of the particular hazard scenario
being exceeded in a 50 year period. This is equivalent
to a one in ten year occurrence event.
Reasonably probable
Probability of exceedance greater than 50% and less
than 99.5% in a 50 year period.
Remote
Probability of exceedance greater than 5% and less
than 50% in a 50 year period.
Extremely remote
Probability of exceedance less than 5% in a 50 year
period. This is equivalent to a 1 in 1000 year event.
The problem with these definitions is that they place
the majority of our hazards in only two classes. They
do, however, reflect an intuitive understanding of the
terms, frequent and extremely remote in particu-
lar.
The return period of exceedance and the probability of
exceedance for identified hazard scenarios are given in
Table 1.2. The relationship between return period of
exceedance, and probability of exceedance for engi-
neering lifelines is discussed below.
Effects Parameters:
The effects of lifelines failures on the community may
be expressed in terms of inconvenience, economic
cost, threats to life and health, social impacts, and
threats to the natural environment. A significant factor
will be recovery time.
Hazard
Return Period of
exceedance
% Probability of
exceedance
(years) (indicative) In 1 year In 50 years
Local flooding 1000 0.1 5
Waimak flooding 500 0.2 10
Seismic 150 0.67 28
Wind 150 0.67 28
Tsunami 150 0.67 28
Snow 50? 2.0 64
Table 1.2: Probability and return period of exceedence for identified hazard scenarios
Minor effects
Temporary loss of one or more utility services, recov-
ered generally (may be residual local loss) in less than
one week with essential services restored in one to two
days. Loss of life would be unlikely, however there
may be freak accident scenarios. The well-being of
people on life support or equivalent systems may be
placed at temporary risk. Economic impact would be
generally low but could be selectively significant for
some businesses. Social impacts are largely of very
temporary inconvenience.
Major effects
Short-term loss of more than one service (could be
through interdependency), say, two to three weeks,
which would require importation of resources to re-
tain essential services. Possible loss of life, but low
numbers (single figures?). Some at-risk people may
die through loss of life support, etc. Social impact
would largely be one of sustained inconvenience with
associated stress and conflict. There would be a sig-
nificant impact on the local economy, but this would
be generally recoverable with local resources. There
may be some business failure.
Critical effects
Medium-term (three to six months) loss of more than
one service, which would require substantial assist-
ance and temporary provision for meeting population
needs (for example, evacuation, water delivery, tem-
porary field hospital facilities, etc.). There would be
moderate loss of life, say less than one hundred. Public
health would be a serious management issue, people
with marginal antecedent health likely to die. There
would be major social and economic impact on the
local community that would require large-scale relief
from outside the region. This would provide difficult
but manageable resourcing issues for central govern-
ment.
Catastrophic effects
Total loss of most lifeline services would occur requir-
ing major external support effort and emergency regu-
lation for many months. There would be significant
loss of life (one hundred to low thousands). There
would be major social impacts both locally and prob-
ably New Zealand wide. Serious health issues would
arise that could not be properly addressed. There would
be a devastating impact on the local economy with very
difficult consequences for the national economy.
On that basis the hazard scenarios could be plotted as
shown in Figure 1.4.
The outcome of this provisional evaluation is that only
seismic hazard is clearly out of the acceptable risk
category, but it is still not clearly of the definite action
required category in terms of fundamental commu-
nity needs. That is not to say that action is not relevant
to optimise the performance of utilities, or that co-
operation between utilities owners in prioritising miti-
gation and recovery action is not of social benefit.
We may be looking at fine tuning rather than a need for
a fundamental shift in policy in lifelines management.
Who defines acceptable risk
What is an acceptable level of risk depends upon who
is affected by the hazard. Each community of interest
will have different needs. Those concerned will in-
clude utility owners, utility operators, utility customers
and the community as a whole. The wider community
needs may be met to some extent by regulations (e.g.
the Building Act), however, in this case, regulations do
not fully cover the issues concerned. It is suggested that
the lifelines participants can represent the interests of
owners and operators reasonably well. The needs of
customers and the wider community (is there a differ-
ence?) is something else again.
In applying the above method to assessing acceptable
risk, the assignment of issues to decision spaces rests
Frequent
Reasonably
Probable
Remote
Extremely
Remote
Minor Major Critical Catastrophic
Increasing effect on community due to lifeline failure
Increasing
probability
Manage risk
Accept risk
Conditional
L
O
C
A
L

F
L
O
O
D
W
A
I
M
A
K

F
L
O
O
D
L
A
N
D
S
L
I
P
S
N
O
W
/
W
I
N
D
T
S
U
N
A
M
I
S
E
I
S
M
I
C
Figure 1.4 : Acceptability of lifelines hazards risk
heavily on the definition of terms and the individual
perceptions of anyone brave enough to use it. The
right decision would rely upon it being in accord
with wider community perceptions. Failure of our
system management will be signalled by adverse pub-
lic reaction. Of course the wider community would
have limited understanding of the effects of loss of
lifelines until the hazard actually occurs. In the mean-
time, the best we can do is use our collective experi-
ence, and the experience of others, and propose a
course of action given overt assumptions. This is what
is being done in this project. The community at large
should be consulted in some way to check the validity
of these assumptions, which would in turn require
public education to ensure consultation is informed.
This is a job for the utilities owners over time, with
appropriate technical input. However, it could also be
considered in any future lifelines efforts.
Hazard scenarios
The project used discrete hazard scenarios selected on
the basis of the knowledge and intuition of the hazards
task group, as moderated by other participants in the
project. There are some inherent difficulties in this
approach; in particular, the single scenario may leave
some surprises for us that a broader view may have
avoided, and the single scenario may not be the opti-
mum in terms of return on investment in mitigation.
By studying a range of scenarios the above difficulties
can be overcome to some extent.
A plot of potential damage rate against probability of
exceedance for a range of event scenarios typically
takes the form shown in Figure 1.5. The area under the
graph equates to the total unmitigated damage poten-
tial of all possible event scenarios for the period under
consideration.
In theory, mitigation can be optimised by designing to
a particular exceedance probability such that the dam-
age potential saved divided by (the cost of mitigation
plus the residual damage potential) is a maximum.
(The cost of mitigation depends on probability as well.)
This approach is routinely used for flood mitigation
decision making in New Zealand. Also, by considering
the full range of event scenarios, knowledge of the
effects of super design events will be of value to
preparedness and response planning, if not mitigation.
0 0.01 0.02 0.03
Probability of event scenario exceedence
in x (e.g. 1) years
P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l

d
a
m
a
g
e

r
a
t
e

(
e
.
g
.

$
)
Maximum credible damage
Residual damage potential
Damage saved by 100 year
standard mitigation
Figure 1.5: Hazard damage/probability
relationships
But an approach of this type would have required
immensely more work (on a component by component
basis) which could have been unsustainable in terms of
utilities support for the project. Moreover, an exhaus-
tive approach of this type would not be appropriate
given the high levels of uncertainty involved in our
knowledge of the hazards, and the network responses
to them.
It is therefore considered that the approach taken the
selection of a realistic scenario and mitigating its
effects is a reasonable first step. One thing that
would be of value for future study would be to put the
work in the perspective of possible super design events.
The historical experience in flood mitigation is that
design standards are regularly exceeded in nature and
it is now common practice to at least consider the
effects of maximum credible events, rare though they
may be.
Project Methodology
Introduction
Earthquakes and other natural hazards can damage the
utility networks that provide essential support to hu-
man life and well-being. Severe social consequences
can arise through network failures. Network owners
need to allow for appropriate levels of hazard mitiga-
tion in their asset management strategies. They also
need to consider how they will respond to disasters
when they occur and it is useful if network owners
collaborate in this. Resources can be shared in the
definition of hazards, and in working through their
implications. But, most importantly, in most cases
there is a high level of interdependency between life-
line services. Each lifeline generally needs the others
in some way. Collaboration in mitigation is therefore
essential if the best results are to be obtained.
A key function of the project was to provide hard
information to facilitate hazard mitigation measures
which meet the needs of each network and the lifelines
system as a whole.
It recognised that natural hazards form only part of the
overall concerns relating to network vulnerability.
Other hazards include human error in operation, defec-
tive plant, fire, chemical spills and sabotage. Budget
decision makers will also consider factors such as
operational costs, service demands, wear and tear, etc.
Often factors other than natural hazards will prevail in
the work and purchase programme, but even so it will
often be a simple matter and relatively inexpensive to
incorporate mitigation measures to avoid the worst
effects of hazardous events.
This section outlines the methodology adopted for the
project and places it in a context of risk management.
Limitations of the approach are discussed and sugges-
tions are made regarding any possible future work.
It is acknowledged that the methodology closely fol-
lows that adopted for the Wellington Earthquake Life-
lines Project (Centre for Advanced Engineering, 1991),
to which we are greatly indebted.
Risk management
In its pursuit of more resilient networks, any lifelines
project is essentially an exercise in risk management.
Because we have no uniquely defined problems in
front of us (an actual disaster) we have to deal in
possible disaster outcomes which we hope will bear
some resemblance to events when they do occur in the
future. Experience elsewhere, and our knowledge of
the Christchurch networks and likely hazards, was
combined to forecast, with no little uncertainty, what
can go wrong and from that what may be done to
prevent or mitigate it.
Risk is often expressed numerically as the product of
quantified outcomes (e.g. $ damage) and probability
of occurrence. Outcomes can then be compared and
the preferred one chosen.
As in most risk situations, the definition of natural
hazards risks to Christchurch lifelines is fraught with
uncertainty. Numerical methods of risk assessment
therefore have their limitations. They are, however, a
useful aid to decision making, as long as uncertainty
is taken into account.
The project used a broad-brush approach to quantify-
ing risk. This provided useful comparative informa-
tion, but it did not promote absolute figures for dam-
age which could be related to cost of mitigation.
Utilities operators need to do that for themselves. Risk
management may be considered to include the fol-
lowing steps:
definition of the system at risk, in this case a utility
network, and its components;
description of the hazards faced by the system, and
its vulnerability to those hazards, in this case
natural hazards;
description of the damage which may be sustained
by the system and its wider impacts;
identification of appropriate mitigation measures;
and
preparation and implementation of an action plan.
While the lifelines project broadly followed this proc-
ess, there are some areas of acknowledged weakness
which have been accepted for expediency, and prac-
ticality. These are discussed in Risk management
considerations and the community (page 8).
Project structure
Project participants were structured into task groups
firstly to identify the hazards and then representing
network types:
hazards;
civil services;
electrical and communication;
transport;
buildings; and
fire.
The hazards group defined the natural hazards to the
networks, such as seismic, flooding, tsunami, landslip,
etc., and provided ongoing advice as the networks task
groups worked through the detail of their assessments.
The networks task groups were responsible for de-
scribing the networks considered to be critical to deliv-
ery of lifeline services, and for working through the
risk management process to the action phase.
The project organisation is shown in Figure 1.6.
Hazard scenario selection
A disaster scenario was described for each natural
hazard under consideration. The approach taken was to
select a scenario which, on the one hand could be
considered to pose a significant hazard, but on the other
had some realistic probability of exceedance in for-
ward planning timeframes.
Wherever possible, the hazard was represented in a
hazards map, otherwise the hazard was described as a
scenario, e.g. wind and snow.
Some limitations of this approach are discussed in
Risk management considerations and the commu-
nity above (page 8).
Risk analysis
Each network was broken up into components, which
were then assessed for their vulnerability to each
hazard scenario. This was done by overlaying elec-
tronically the networks over the hazards map which
was then examined to determine importance, vulner-
ability and impact of damage.
A scale of 1 to 3 was used to define component
vulnerability: 3, 2, 1 corresponding to high, moderate,
or low probability or distribution of failure. (Probabil-
ity relates to components that are discrete elements,
distribution relates to components that are grouped
elements, (e.g. networks)). 0 indicates no suscepti-
bility to damage.
The consequences of failure of each network compo-
nent were then assessed, taking into account its impor-
tance to the network concerned, and the wider impact
of its being damaged.
Importance was ranked 1 to 5, with 5 being most
important. A components importance would be ranked
highly if it were essential to the function of the network
as a whole. It would be ranked low if it could be
bypassed.
Impact related to the degree of disruption caused or the
effort required to reinstate it. Impact was consequently
assessed for three timeframes:
immediately after the hazard event;
the period following the hazard event; and
the time for return to normality.
Immediately after the hazard event covers the period
for recovering a minimum emergency service by
backup, bypass or temporary repair.
The period following the event is the period to
restore a full service, albeit perhaps on a temporary
basis.
Steering Committee
Project Manager
Hazards
Civil
Services
Buildings Fire Transport
Electrical
Telecommunications
Figure 1.6: Project organisation chart
The return to normal period relates to full restoration
of reliable services.
Impact factors reflect the community needs for rein-
statement of services in the timeframes concerned, but
it should be noted that no survey of community needs
was undertaken. The rankings are based upon the task
groups perception of community needs.
The vulnerability, importance and impact rankings
were assembled on a vulnerability chart (see Figure
1.7).
Utility: Network:
Vulnerability to Hazard Impact of Damage
Component Element Comment
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e

1

-

5
G
r
o
u
n
d

S
h
a
k
e
L
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n
L
a
n
d
s
l
i
d
e
G
r
o
u
n
d

S
e
t
t
l
e
m
e
n
t
Z
o
n
e

B
o
u
n
d
a
r
y
D
u
r
i
n
g

E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e
I
m
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
l
y

A
f
t
e
r
P
e
r
i
o
d

F
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
R
e
t
u
r
n

t
o

N
o
r
m
a
l
i
t
y
Regional/Local
Vulnerability Chart: Define components and elements of network at Regional and District level
For each component: Assess importance 1 to 5 5 most important
Assess vulnerability on hazard map 1 to 3 3 most vulnerable
Assess impact of damage 1 to 3 3 most impact
Figure 1.7: Sample of vulnerability chart
Mitigation measures
The vulnerability charts were then used for identifica-
tion of the need for mitigation measures. Any measure
that would reduce importance (e.g. by redundancy),
reduce vulnerability (e.g. by strengthening), or reduce
impact (by alternatives or contingency planning), would
mitigate the impact of the disaster. The rankings pro-
vide a basis for prioritising action where budgets may
be a limiting factor. In many cases, however, mitiga-
tion measures identified were very inexpensive, or
could be easily integrated with ongoing maintenance
and replacement programmes.
An holistic approach embodying all opportunities for
mitigation will include strategies at the asset planning,
engineering and operational levels.
Utility service provision can be planned to encompass:
hazard awareness programmes;
planning for redundancy;
locating to avoid hazards;
review of alternatives for critical components; and
systems monitoring and response planning.
Engineering design and detailing can include:
hazard-wise layout and conceptual design;
hazard-wise design standards;
hazard-wise code levels;
hazard-wise procedures and practices;
hazard-wise detailing; and
special measures for critical components.
Each utilitys operations management can incorporate:
preparedness and response planning;
appropriate spares holdings;
equipment inventories;
rerouting options;
damage assessment; and
planning staff training and exercises.
Interdependence
The methodology described above was carried out
network by network. The interdependence of net-
works, both in operation (if A fails, B fails), and in
response (need to fix A to get to B) can be a critical
factor. It is no good for the wider community if indi-
vidual utilities go their own way in ignorance of the
impacts of other utilities on them, and vice versa.
Interdependencies are discussed further in Chapter 10.
Risk in Relation to Mitigation
The ultimate measure of the success of the whole
project was the extent to which budget provision was
made for the various mitigation measures that have
been identified. To assist in this it was necessary to
attempt to translate the technical assessments under-
taken into understandable information so that the deci-
sion-makers (which includes the public) can them-
selves have some conception of the risk involved and
the justification for any expenditure.
It is important that as a result of publicity regarding the
project, people do not become unnecessarily con-
cerned. It has to be remembered that the work was
essentially an engineering lifelines project, the result
of which will mean improved security of the engineer-
ing lifelines after some catastrophic event. It does not
attempt to address Civil Defence concerns. (Neverthe-
less the whole project will be of inestimable value to
Civil Defence in the event of an emergency.)
The public sometimes have such a perception of a risk
that, however unlikely the event is to occur, they are
prepared to pay for the mitigation of the hazard produc-
ing that risk. For example, the people of Christchurch
have always been concerned about flooding from the
Waimakariri and although it would appear the likeli-
hood of Christchurch flooding from the Waimakariri is
very much less than the risk from the other hazards
identified, the public of Christchurch still want the city
protected from the Waimakariri River flooding.
Reference to some of the quotations on pages 7 and 8
draws attention to the different way in which risks are
perceived by different people, and concern could be
expressed that those involved in the lifelines project
are mainly engineers or managers. Although these
people are decision-makers in their own right, most
ultimately report to Councils or Boards of Directors
whose members are most often non-engineers. It was
thus necessary to attempt to express the likelihood of
the various events and the justification for the mitiga-
tion measures in understandable terms for the decision-
makers, which include the Councils, Boards of Direc-
tors, and ultimately, of course, the public.
In endeavouring to tease out proposed mitigation meas-
ures in one of the Task Groups, one engineer made his
own value judgement to the effect that the (decision-
making body) would never give us funds for those sorts
of measures. It is a waste of time identifying
them. We are much better to recommend some-
thing that may be financially viable. In the
context of the lifelines analysis this should not
be the approach. Ultimately, someone has to
take the various recommended mitigation meas-
ures from the report and recommend their adop-
tion in an environment that at budget time was
almost inevitably one of pruning desirable
works. The person making those recommenda-
tions, who is part of the decision-making proc-
ess, has a very real responsibility to understand
what is involved and be best able to assist the
decision-makers.
The real test as to whether or not a community
is prepared to accept the risk occurs at budget
time, when the authorities decide whether or
not to allocate money for mitigation measures.
It is therefore most important that the decision-
makers have the risk assessment expressed in
understandable terms.
Budget needs by public authorities are assessed
often with little flexibility because of the fixed
charges that have to be met and the maintenance
requirements, so the spare money is very
small and there is a lot of competition for the
discretionary budget.
Some decisions may be made simply in a hard
commercial light and the impact of being unable to
operate a business for some time may warrant expendi-
ture that could be said to be in the form of an insurance.
However, in some cases there will not be a commercial
loss but a very great inconvenience and, in fact, even
danger to the public. It should be possible to distinguish
between these it is not simply an engineers decision
as to what work will be done.
In effect, the project drew to the attention of the
participants in the project the risks that existed. The
extent of investigation and funds allocated is left to the
individual authorities. Problems may arise when these
authorities take decisions that affect the interdepend-
ence of other lifelines. Interdependence issues must be
taken into account when budget allowance is made. It
is also important to regularly review progress on the
mitigation measures and this alone would justify a
continuing lifelines group.
Those involved in Civil Defence are aware of the
general motherhood status of Civil Defence in that
everybody agrees that it is necessary but very few do
anything actively about it. An engineering lifelines
investigation must not have that same status.
The investigation associated with this project was
technically very interesting but would have failed in its
objectives if the work on the project was not translated
into budget provision for mitigation measures to be
undertaken (see Chapter 11).
Hazards to Engineering Lifelines 17
Chapter 2
Hazards to Engineering Lifelines
in Christchurch
2.1 Hazards Considered
The Engineering Lifelines Project has considered a
number of natural hazards in the Christchurch Area.
These are: earthquake; flooding; tsunami; severe wind
storm; severe snow storm; and slope hazard.
Only one scenario for each hazard has been considered
for this study, mainly to keep the overall project to a
manageable size. Further work on Christchurch Life-
lines could include considering a number of scenarios
for each hazard to allow a more deliberated risk assess-
ment and mitigation programme to be made. However,
whether or not the increased certainty of the risks
involved justifies more detailed work in task groups is
questionable. More work on the seismic hazard risk is
definitely worthwhile.
Initially the hazards group intended to consider hazard
scenarios with the same return periods, but the prob-
abilities of the various hazard scenarios as produced
vary. The annual exceedance can be summarised as:
Hazard
% Probability of
exceedance
In 1 year In 50 years
Local flooding 0.1 5
Waimak flooding 0.2 10
Seismic 0.67 28
Wind 0.67 28
Tsunami 0.67 28
Snow 2.0 64
Slope hazard 0.67 28
The reason for these differences is entirely pragmatic
the Waimakariri Flood Hazard is non-existent for
less than a 500 year return period flood, and the local
flood and slope hazard have been based on studies
already carried out. To revise these studies for the 150-
year return period events would have required a level
of effort that was not considered warranted given the
budgetary and programme constraints for the lifelines
study.
The hazards have been presented in map form with
explanatory notes, wherever possible
1
. The wind and
snow hazards cannot be realistically mapped, and no
maps have been prepared for these storm events. The
explanatory notes and background information for
each hazard are presented in the following sections.
Earthquake hazard
The earthquake scenario is a generalised one applica-
ble to a range of earthquake magnitudes with epicen-
tres at various distances from the city. It is based on
recent work reviewing the seismic hazard in Christ-
church, and postulates the effects of a 150-year return
period earthquake. This return period was originally
selected as it corresponds to the return period incorpo-
rated into the structural loading codes, and is large
enough to cause very significant damage, but is not so
remote a probability as to be able to be discounted as
irrelevant.
Flooding hazard
Two flooding hazards were considered a breakout
of the Waimakariri River, and local flooding in the
immediate study area catchments. The Waimakariri
River event has been sourced directly from work
carried out for the Canterbury Regional Council
Waimakariri Floodplain Management Plan. It assumes
a 500-year return period flood, as lower return period
floods would not affect the city, and at this level of flow
there is only a 50% chance of breakout.
The local flooding hazard has been taken from
floodplain management studies by the Christchurch
City Council, which take a 1 in 500-year return period
flood in each of the Styx, Avon and Heathcote Rivers,
coinciding with extreme water levels in the Estuary
and Brooklands Lagoon, to give an overall return
period of about 1,000 years.
Tsunami hazard
The Tsunami event was assessed specifically for this
project and assumes a large remote seismic source.
The return period cannot be defined accurately, but can
be assumed to be in excess of 150 years.
The coloured maps illustrating the various hazards are on pages
283 - 304 and are presented with an overlay of various features (e.g.
emergency services and contractors yards) rather than showing the
hazard only. The working maps used by the Task Groups were
available at much larger scales.
1
Both the extreme wind storm, and severe snow storm
scenarios have been based on historical events, but
enhanced to an estimated 150-year return period.
Slope hazards
Slope hazard affects a relatively small proportion of
the study area, and significant problems with lifelines
on the hills is most likely to occur in conjunction with
earthquake or local flooding. This hazard has been
based on a study for planning and building consent
purposes carried out for the City Council, and is for a
triggering event of a 100-year return period rainstorm,
or 100- to 150-year return period earthquake.
Fire
Fire is a likely secondary effect of a major earthquake.
A scenario for the post-earthquake fire situation has
been assessed by the Fire Service, and is considered
separately to the earthquake in Section 7.2 (Building
Services) section.
Volcanic Activity
Volcanic activity is not regarded as being a hazard in
Canterbury, and has not been considered in the study.
2.2 Earthquake Hazards
Magnitude
These notes should be read in conjunction with seismic
hazard maps 1, 6, 9, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21
(page 284 et seq).
Christchurch is situated near the edge of a tectonically
active region, with active faults to the north and north-
west in Canterbury, and the Alpine Fault to the west.
These faults mark the boundary between the Indian
Plate to the north and west and the Pacific Plate to the
south and east, which are moving obliquely to each
other. Earthquakes occur as movement between the
plates is accommodated along the faults. The nearest
known active faults to Christchurch are the onshore
Ashley Fault 30 km to the north and the offshore
Pegasus Bay Fault about 30 km to the north east.
Known active faults in Canterbury are shown in Figure
2.1.
The maximum magnitude of earthquakes on the faults
has been assessed from geological evidence, and gen-
erally increases with distance away from Christchurch.
The maximum magnitude of earthquakes on the faults
closest to Christchurch is postulated at M6.6, those on
faults in the foothills region at about M7.5, and earth-
quakes on more distant faults at M8 or M8.5 on the
Alpine Fault. The magnitude, M, of an earthquake is
measured on the Richter Scale and relates to the energy
released by the earthquake at the epicentre, or source of
the earthquake. The effect of the earthquake decreases
with increasing distance from the epicentre. Hence any
one of the above earthquakes could produce a similar
level of shaking in Christchurch.
Intensity
The effects of an earthquake are measured on the
Modified Mercalli (MM) scale of felt intensity. This is
a descriptive scale which reflects the intensity of shak-
ing according to damage and felt effects. While the
magnitude of an earthquake event is a single measur-
able value, the intensity will vary according to distance
from the earthquake source and the ground and struc-
tural conditions of a particular location.
Local geology
The shaking intensity at a site is affected by the ground
conditions, with sites of deep soils generally showing
amplified motion compared with sites on rock. Christ-
church is situated over geologically recent deposits of
alluvial gravels laid down by the Waimakariri River,
and fine marine sediments deposited on the coastal
margin of the floodplain and in estuaries and lagoons.
The sediments are about 700 m deep, lying on 200 m to
300 m of volcanic rock overlying a greywacke base-
ment at about 1 km depth. To the south of the city the
sediments become shallower against the weathered
volcanic cone of Banks Peninsula. The Port Hills are
mantled with loess soils over the basalt rock.
For further information on the seismicity of the region,
and the geology of the region and the city, refer to
Brown and Weeber (1992) or Elder et al. (1991).
Earthquake scenario event
The earthquake event adopted for this study is a major
earthquake producing shaking intensities with a return
period of about 150 years. Shaking intensities of VIII
to IX on the Modified Mercalli Scale would be ex-
pected over most of the Christchurch area. Such shak-
ing would most likely be caused by a moderately-large
to large earthquake in the Canterbury foothills or North
Canterbury. A very large earthquake on the Alpine
Fault would also be likely to produce these shaking
intensities or greater. It is also conceivable that an
earthquake centred close to Christchurch under the
Canterbury Plains or Christchurch itself could produce
intensities of MM VIII.
The effects of any of those three possible earthquakes
will be similar, although the longer duration shaking
probable with the larger, more remote earthquakes
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
2
0
0
2
0
0
200
200
2
0
0
1
5
0
N
42
43
44
44
43
42
174 173174 172 171
171 170
50
+
P
E
G
A
S
U
S
C
A
N
Y
O
N
C
E
N
T
R
A
L
T
R
E
N
D
MOTUNAU
(IN
D
IS
PU
T
E
?
)
A
L
P
IN
E
F
A
U
L
T
W
A
IR
A
U
F
A
U
L
T
?
?
?
?
?
A
W
A
T
E
R
E
F
C
L
A
R
E
N
C
E
F
F
ID
G
IT F
H
O
P
E
F
E
L
L
IO
T
F
HU
N
D
A
L
E
E
F
K
A
I
W
A
R
A
F
J
O
L
L
IE
S
P
A
S
S
F
A
W
A
T
E
R
E
F
G
L
A
S
G
O
W
L
Y
E
L
L

F
W
H
I
T
E
C
K
F
C
LA
R
E
N
C
E
F
H
O
P
E
F
K
E
LLY F
B
R
U
C
E
F
Z
H
A
R
P
E
R
F
M
t
W
H
IT
E
F
E
S
K
F
T
O
R
LES
S
E
F
Z
PAS
S
PO
R
T
E
R
S
BENMORE
RAILWAY F
RAKAIA
GORGE
LAKE
HERON
FZ
OSTLER FZ
IR
IS
H
M
A
N
S
C
K
FOX'S
PEAK
FZ
PEG
ASU
S
B
A
Y
F
OMIHI
ASHLEY F
BALMORAL
F
G
R
E
Y
F
KA
K
A
P
O
F
Crustal seismicity 1942-1964
Crustal seismicity 1964-68
(magnitudes known accurately)
10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 (km)
1:1,000,000
1888 AMURI
M = 7 - 7.3
1901 CHEVIOT
M = 6.5 - 7.0
1869 NEW BRIGHTON
M = 5.7
1922
MOTUNAU
M = 6.7
Figure 2.1: Active faults within 200 km of Christchurch
such as the Alpine Fault would produce more damage
and more extensive liquefaction. There are few geo-
logical indications of surface fault traces either in the
Canterbury Plains or Banks Peninsula, and the likeli-
hood of any surface rupture in Christchurch is very
remote.
Because the most damaging earthquake shaking in
Christchurch will be from earthquakes at some dis-
tance, the pattern of seismic hazard will be similar for
earthquakes with a range of return periods. The same
areas susceptible to liquefaction at 150-year return
periods are also susceptible at 50- or 500-year return
period events, but clearly the proportion of these areas
that will liquefy and the extent of resultant damage will
be very different. This is different to cities such as
Wellington, where movement on an active fault within
the city will produce a different distribution of shaking
and hazard than would be produced from a remote
regional earthquake.
Only one scenario has therefore been adopted for the
study.
Appropriateness of the earthquake
scenario for the Christchurch lifeline
study
The Christchurch Lifeline Study has adopted a 150-
year return period earthquake of shaking intensities
VIII-IX over most of the Christchurch area. This
reflects primarily the conclusions of Elder et al. (1991).
This study first modelled the shaking intensities in the
bedrock under the city and then allowed for expected
amplification effects, particularly in the top 20 m of
young, soft sediment.
At the Lifelines workshop in October 1994, David
Dowrick and, to a lesser extent, Warwick Smith, who
are scientists with the Institute of Geological and
Nuclear Sciences (IGNS), disagreed with this intensity
scenario for the 150 year time period adopted.
Limited discussion followed which created uncer-
tainty as to the real extent of seismic hazard in Christ-
church. The principal issues raised are discussed
below.
Recorded seismicity record - problems
with predicting the frequency of future
events
Warwick Smith pointed out a mismatch within the
Hope Fault Seismic region of the Elder et al. model
between the occurrence of recorded small-to-medium
earthquakes since 1964 (when records began), and the
corresponding predicted return period of large earth-
quakes.
If the small events are used in isolation to predict the
frequency of the larger ones a much lower occurrence
of large events is predicted than that established from
geological studies. Cowan (1989) obtained reliable
recurrence data for large earthquakes of around magni-
tude 7 to 7.3 on this fault at approximately 130 year
intervals. The recorded seismicity since 1964 predicts
a much longer recurrence interval.
This same mismatch of record seismicity with reliable
geological evidence of larger events has been observed
where data is available in studies in California (Cop-
persmith and Schwartz, 1986). This has led to sugges-
tions that the traditional Gutenburg-Richter log rela-
tionship between the frequency of small and large
events may not be the most appropriate.
Geological studies effectively sample the activity of
large earthquakes over hundreds of years. Where this
information is available this is preferable to the use of
a short interval of 30 years of recorded small events to
predict the next 150 years.
This is particularly so given the good evidence sug-
gesting that the last 30 years have not been typical, but
instead may represent a relatively quiet period in the
seismic history of the area. Figure 2.1 shows the record
of historical earthquakes for the Canterbury area. Look-
ing at the frequency of these events it is obvious that the
period of 60 years from 1869 to 1929 was much more
active than the period since.
There is no way to know with confidence what number
of small earthquakes were occurring prior to 1929, but
it is reasonable to assume their activity was also greater.
Unfortunately the 30 years from 1964 definitely looks
quiet by comparison.
This phenomena has been earlier recognised by
Robinson (1979) who pointed out that the overall rate
of energy release for shallow earthquakes in New
Zealand from 1950-1977 is only about 12% of the
average rate for the longer period of 1840-1977.
In the 150 years of European settlement for which we
have records of large earthquake events, we have not
experienced earthquakes on the active faults most
critical for the Christchurch area.
Overshadowing the whole question of predicting the
recurrence interval of earthquakes in the central South
Island is the Alpine Fault and the associated problem of
the seismic gap (Adams, 1980). Once again, on this
fault, there appears to be a significant gap in the
expected small- and medium-seismicity normally ex-
pected adopting the Gutenberg-Richter model.
The limited geological work to date suggests a large
earthquake (of approximately Magnitude 8) occurs on
the central Alpine Fault at around 500 year intervals
with the last event approximately 550 years ago. If
correct, this raises the likelihood of an Alpine Fault
earthquake in the next 150 years. Apart from the direct
damage caused, this may in turn affect the activity of
the nearby active faults in the Canterbury foothills and
mountain areas in the years following a large Alpine
Fault event.
Dowrick views faults in these areas as being the most
capable of generating large earthquakes in Christ-
church. Unfortunately, with the exception of areas of
the Porters Pass fault, these faults have not been studied
in much detail. After discussion with University of
Canterbury geologists, Elder et al. adopted recurrence
intervals of 500 to 4000 years. In contrast, we under-
stand IGNS geologists prefer 2000 to 5000 years. In
either case the recurrence intervals are long and the
historical record is not long enough to adequately
define their activity.
Differences in the earthquake scenarios
For the reasons outlined above, the prediction of future
seismicity should be done with great caution and the
numerous unknowns involved demand a conservative
approach.
However, at present the difference in the various earth-
quake scenarios are not as great as might be expected.
Return periods for given intensities from the two Smith
and Berryman models and the Elder model are shown
in Table 2.1.
If the most recent Smith model is adopted, the 150 year
scenario would be MMVII to MMVIII whereas the
Elder et al. model predicts MMVIII to MMIX.
In effect, Smith and Berryman would suggest the
adopted scenario should have a 250-year plus return
period, not the 150 years used. But, most importantly,
there is no suggestion that shaking of this intensity will
not occur in the future.
A pragmatic alternative approach in selecting the ap-
propriate scenario is to say that we should expect in the
next 150 years an event at least as great, if not a little
greater, than that which the city has actually experi-
enced in its first 150 years.
MM
Smith &
Berryman
( 1983)
Elder et al Smith
( 1992)
Dowrick
( 1997)
VI 14 years 13 years 21 years 18 years
VII 48 years 35 years 70 years 85 years
VIII 160 years 120 years 250 years 650 years
IX 600 years 1200 years 980 years
Table 2.1: Earthquake return periods for
different models
In 1869, a relatively small magnitude earthquake,
estimated to have been around magnitude 6, had an
epicentre close to the city on an offshore active fault of
which there is nothing known. The resulting shaking
intensities have been estimated by Dibble Ansell and
Berrill (1980) to have been MMVII to MMVIII. On
this basis alone, an earthquake of at least MMVIII
seems a very reasonable scenario on which to plan.
Conclusion
The scale of lifelines projects requires much simplifi-
cation and the inevitable grappling with unknowns. It
is very hard to predict how a given lifeline service is
going to behave in any earthquake, let alone predict
which services, or sections of services, will fail in an
MMVIII event as opposed to a MMIX.
Work is planned over the next three years on the Alpine
Fault, and as part of this work the seismicity model and
predictions for the future shaking in the City will be
revisited. This may lead to some further revision of
statistical estimates, but it will make no significant
difference to the need to plan for the effects of a
damaging earthquake on lifelines in the future.
The differences between the predictions of future shak-
ing in Christchurch City are not important in the
lifelines context.
Current lifeline mitigation and planning strategies for
earthquakes are simply not sensitive enough to make
subtle differences in the order of one intensity unit
meaningful.
Earthquake effects
The main effects in Christchurch likely to be generated
by a major earthquake are discussed in the following
sections.
Earthquake shaking
The ground shaking in Christchurch during an earth-
quake will be markedly affected by the deep, relatively
soft sediment underlying the city and by variations in
the soil profile within the sediments, particularly in the
top 30 m. This creates major changes in the nature of
the earthquake shaking by modifying the ground accel-
eration, velocity and displacement at any frequency. In
many areas of the city, the earthquake vibrations will
be amplified. As a result, the overall average hazard for
the city increases when compared to areas on bedrock
(for example most of Banks Peninsula), by approxi-
mately 0 to 2 intensity units, or by 0 to 1 units when
compared to areas on average ground (comprising
shallow sediments).
Typical acceleration response spectra for Christchurch
are shown in Figure 2.2. This figure includes the
response spectra at bedrock, which will be similar to
the response spectra on much of the Port Hills, and the
elastic response spectra from NZS4203:1984 for com-
parison. Of particular note is the amplification at
longer periods.
(a)
(b)
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
Response Acceleration
S
p
e
c
t
r
a
l

A
c
c
e
l
e
r
a
t
i
o
n

(
g
)
B
D
F
5.0 percent damping
Return period = 150 yr
Ground profile...
Period (sec)
NZS 4203:1992
Deep soil site
z = 0.8
= 1.0
Bedrock spectra
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
Response Acceleration
S
p
e
c
t
r
a
l

A
c
c
e
l
e
r
a
t
i
o
n

(
g
)
A
C
E
5.0 percent damping
Return period = 150 yr
Ground profile...
Period (sec)
NZS 4203:1992
Deep soil site
z = 0.8
= 1.0
Bedrock spectra
Figure 2.2: Site specific response grouped
according to site stiffness (a) soft and (b) stiff
The variation in shaking across Christchurch is illus-
trated in Figures 2.3 and 2.4, which show the spectral
acceleration at 0.7 and 1.5 sec period respectively, at
points on a 0.5 km grid over the city. It can be seen that
amplification effects are pronounced to the north of the
central city and in scattered south western areas.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 are illustrative only, and the soil
profiles used at each grid node are frequently averaged
from sparse borehole data. The soil variation within
the Christchurch area is shown by two representative
soil type maps, Figure 2.5 (0 m to 2 m depth) and Figure
2.6 (2 m to 5 m depth). Figure 2.6 appears to show more
uniform soil conditions with depth, but this is a reflec-
tion of the smaller amount of borelog data available at
deeper depths and variability is not considered to
change markedly with depth. If it is important to know
the response spectra for a particular structure, a spe-
cific study for that site must be carried out.
Liquefaction of loose sand and silt soils
Christchurch, located near a saturated, sand- and silt-
rich coastline, is potentially at risk from widespread
liquefaction. This phenomenon occurs when the ten-
dency for loose granular materials to compact during
earthquake shaking results in a pore water pressure
increase, and reduction or total loss in soil strength.
The pore water pressure increase occurs over a number
of shaking cycles, and the extent of liquefaction is
greater for earthquakes of longer duration.
Liquefaction-induced soil deformation can occur as:
Flow failure, where ground on even very gentle
slopes moves laterally. In Christchurch this may
occur wherever lateral support to the soil is low,
such as along river banks or the edges of the
estuary.
Ejection of sand onto the ground surface.
Post liquefaction consolidation, with consequent
ground settlement.
Large ground oscillations.
Liquefaction is known to reoccur numerous times at
the same site liquefaction once does not secure a site
against future liquefaction. Damage from liquefaction
is commonly seen as:
flotation of buried structures (e.g. manholes and
large pipelines);
lateral spreading of ground on gentle slopes;
settlement of large areas due to consolidation and
liquefied soil being ejected through surface cracks;
and
(continued on page 26)
foundation failures as the liquefied soil loses its
shear strength and its ability to support foundation
loads.
Damage from liquefaction-induced lateral movement
is usually much more extensive and serious than from
any settlement and the magnitude of the movement is
much greater. Hence areas along river banks are
particularly susceptible. In Christchurch this includes
most of the lower Avon and Heathcote Rivers. The
Waimakariri upstream of the bridges has gravel banks
and liquefaction is not expected to occur.
The potential for liquefaction is so significant in Christ-
church that John Berrill gave a specific lecture on the
subject at the Workshop which is summarised in
Chapter 3.
Rockfill and slips on steeper hillsides
For Christchurch, damage by landslide on a significant
level is likely if the earthquake occurs in the two to four
month period of mid-winter to early spring when soil
moisture levels are high enough to reduce the apparent
cohesion of the loessial soils on the Port Hills. Local
sites may retain high moisture contents over much of
the year, and therefore be susceptible over longer
periods. During drier conditions, damage is likely to be
confined to shallow soil falls from steep batters, rockfall
from bluffs and cliffs and rockfall from higher up the
hillsides. The most vulnerable areas are generally at
the foot of the steep slopes adjoining the valleys and
flood plain.
(Refer to Section 2.8 Slope Hazard for further infor-
mation).
Hazard Zones
The areal extent of the inferred shaking effects are
shown on the seismic hazards map (see page 284 et
seq), as three ground shaking zones and two liquefac-
tion zones. The boundaries to these zones are approxi-
mate only, being based on sometimes very limited
information (see section on Map Limitations on page
26. For any site of particular importance a specific site
study is needed.
Ground shaking hazard zones
Zone 1
Zone 1 is the least hazardous zone and is underlain by
bedrock at shallow depths (generally less than 5 m) and
shows very low to low amplification of seismic waves.
Shaking intensity MM VII - VIII, and peak spectral
acceleration of 0.45 g at 0.2 sec period.
Typical damage is loose brickwork dislodged, some
Peak Spectral
Acceleration for
Upper Bound
Bedrock Spectrum
a
s
/g (T) at T = 0.7s
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
Transition Zone
Not Modelled
N
Figure 2.3: Peak spectral accelerations at 0.7 second period
Transition Zone
Not Modelled
Peak Spectral
Acceleration for
Upper Bound
Bedrock Spectrum
a
s
/g (T) at T = 0.7s
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
Transition Zone
Not Modelled
Peak Spectral
Acceleration for
Upper Bound
Bedrock Spectrum
a
s
/g (T) at T = 0.7s
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
Transition Zone
Not Modelled
Peak Spectral
Acceleration for
Upper Bound
Bedrock Spectrum
a
s
/g (T) at T = 0.7s
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
N
Figure 2.4: Peak spectral accelerations at 1.5 second period
F
P
P
F
M
X
X
X
M
P
M
M
F
P
M
M
P
X
X
X
F
C
M
M
M
C
F
M
X
M
F
F
X
C
X
X
C
F
X
X
C
F
M
F
M
P
X
F
M
M
P
P
M
P
X
F
X
M
M
F
F
X
X
X
X
X
F
X
F
X
P
X
X
X
X
X
F
M
M
F
P
F
M
X
P
P
M
M
F
P
M
F
C
F
M
X
F
X
X
C
F
F
C
C
C
M
M
X
F
C F
M
F
P
C
M
M
F
C
F
M
P
M
M
M
F
F
F
F
F
M
M
M
M
F
P
C
C
P
X
M M
M
M
P
M
F
M
F
F
X
F
X
X
X
X
M
P
X
P
X
X
M
M
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
M
M
X
X
X
F
F
M
F
F
F
F
X
M
M
X
F
F
M
M
M
F
M
C
X
F
M
P
M
P
F
M
F
M
C
M
F
X
C
C
X
X
X
X
X
X
C
C
X
X
X
X
M
C
F
M
F
X
C
M
F
F
C
X
X
M
C
F
X
X
F
X
M
F
M
X
F
M
F
M
C
M
C
P
C
F
X
F
F
M
C
C
M
F
X
C
M
M
P
X
X
F
M
X
X
X
X
F
C
C
M
M
F P
X
F
C
M C
P
M
F
M
F
X
X
P
P
X
F
M
X
F
P
M
X
X
X
M
F
M
F
X
X
F
X
X
F M
X
M
X
F
P
X
M
C
F
F
M
F
M
M C
P
P
C
M
C
F
C
C
F
P
C
C
X
F
M
F
F
X
X
C
F
X
X
X
X
X
F
F
X
C
M
X
F
F
M
M
F
P
C

P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
t
ly

G
R
A
V
E
L

-

g
r
a
v
e
lly

s
a
n
d

t
o

g
r
a
v
e
l
M

P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
t
ly

S
A
N
D

-

s
ilt
y

s
a
n
d

t
o

s
a
n
d
.

M
a
y

b
e

in
t
e
r
b
e
d
d
e
d

w
it
h

s
o
m
e

s
ilt

o
r

r
a
r
e

g
r
a
v
e
l
F

P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
t
ly

f
in
e

g
r
a
in
e
d

s
o
ils
.

C
L
A
Y
E
Y

S
I
L
T
S

t
o

S
A
N
D
Y

S
I
L
T
S
.

M
a
y

b
e

in
t
e
r
b
e
d
d
e
d

w
it
h

s
o
m
e

s
a
n
d

o
r

o
r
g
a
n
ic
s
P

P
E
A
T

o
r

h
ig
h
ly

o
r
g
a
n
ic

f
in
e

g
r
a
in
e
d

s
o
ils
X

F
I
L
L
N
S
u
m
n
e
r
0
1
2
k
m
Figure 2.5: Representative soil type map of Christchurch, 0 - 2 m depth
M
F
M
P
M
C
M
P
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
P
F
F
C
M
F
F
P
P
P
C
F
M
C
P
P
M
P
P
M
P
P
P
P
F
C
F
F
F
C
F
M
C
F
F
C
M
M
F
C
C
C
C
F
F
X
X
F
C
F
C
F
F
C
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
C
C
C
C
F
M
M
M
C
C
F
F
F
F
P
C
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
C
C
C
C
C
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
P
P
P
P
P
X
F
F
F
M
M
M
M
M
M
F
F
M
M
M
M
M
P
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
F
F
F
F
M
M
M
F
F
M
F
P
M
C
P
P
F
M
P
C

P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
t
ly

G
R
A
V
E
L

-

g
r
a
v
e
lly

s
a
n
d

t
o

g
r
a
v
e
l
M

P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
t
ly

S
A
N
D

-

s
ilt
y

s
a
n
d

t
o

s
a
n
d
.

M
a
y

b
e

in
t
e
r
b
e
d
d
e
d

w
it
h

s
o
m
e

s
ilt

o
r

r
a
r
e

g
r
a
v
e
l
F

P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
t
ly

f
in
e

g
r
a
in
e
d

s
o
ils
.

C
L
A
Y
E
Y

S
I
L
T
S

t
o

S
A
N
D
Y

S
I
L
T
S
.

M
a
y

b
e

in
t
e
r
b
e
d
d
e
d

w
it
h

s
o
m
e

s
a
n
d

o
r

o
r
g
a
n
ic
s
P

P
E
A
T

o
r

h
ig
h
ly

o
r
g
a
n
ic

f
in
e

g
r
a
in
e
d

s
o
ils
X

F
I
L
L
N
S
u
m
n
e
r
0
1
2
k
m
Figure 2.6: Representative soil type map of Christchurch, 2 - 5 m depth
chimneys brought down, stone walls cracked, some
brick veneers damaged, small slips and ground crack-
ing on steep ground. There is likely to be marked
variation within the zone due to topographic shielding
and focusing effects.
Zone 2
Zone 2 is underlain with sediments less than 50 m deep.
It represents a transition zone between the low ampli-
fication areas of zone 1 and the high amplification
areas of zone 3. Shaking intensity MM VIII. Peak
spectral accelerations are likely to be intermediate
between those of zone 1 and zone 3. (There has been
no study of any sites in this zone).
Damage could be intermediate between zones 1 and 3.
However, the 1994 Northridge earthquake produced
some concentrations of damage with severe shaking on
thinning wedges of alluvium at the edge of basins.
Zone 2A has the same shaking hazard as zone 2 but is
also underlain by soils highly susceptible to liquefac-
tion, whereas zone 2B has the same shaking hazard as
zone 2 but is also underlain by soils moderately suscep-
tible to liquefaction.
Zone 3
Zone 3 is underlain by more than 50 m and up to 800
m depth of sediments. High to very high amplification
of earthquake ground motion, relative to bedrock.
Shaking intensity MM VIII - IX, peak spectral accel-
eration 0.6 - 0.7 g at 0.2 - 1.0 sec period.
Typical damage includes: chimneys, monuments, tow-
ers and elevated towers may be twisted or brought down.
Panel walls can be thrown out of frame structures and
some brick veneers damaged. Frame houses not secured
to the foundations may move. Cracks may appear in wet
ground, some ground deformation possible.
Within zone 3 there will be areas of pronounced
amplification of earthquake ground motion, with shak-
ing intensity IX, and peak spectral acceleration of at
least 1 - 1.2 g at 0.2 - 0.4 sec period.
Typical damage includes: masonry buildings built
before 1935 likely to be seriously damaged with some
destroyed. Frame structures racked and distorted,
brick veneers fall, frame houses not secured to the
foundations shift off, damage to foundations xcommon.
Cracking of the ground conspicuous, damage to roads
and paths.
Zones 3A and 3B have the same shaking hazard as zone
3, but are underlain by soils that are respectively
highly, and moderately susceptible to liquefaction (see
below).
Liquefaction zones
Zone A high susceptibility
Underlain predominantly by sands between 2 m and
10 m depth. Generally water table within 1 m to 1.5 m
of the ground surface. Insitu densities unknown.
Twenty percent to 30% of zone A could liquefy.
Lateral spread of some river banks is likely. Ground
cracking, ejection of sand and water, and settlement of
the ground surface will occur in the areas most affected
by liquefaction. The pattern of liquefaction within
zone A is unknown, but will reflect depositional envi-
ronments, with previous estuarine areas as the most
affected.
Zone B moderate susceptibility
Underlain predominantly by silts and sandy silts be-
tween 2 m and 5 m or deeper depth. Water table
between 1 m and 2 m of the ground surface (10% to
15% of zone B could liquefy).
Liquefaction effects will generally be less pronounced
than for zone A. Lateral spread of river banks is likely
to be limited in extent. The comments re pattern of
liquefaction within zone A also apply to zone B.
Map Limitations
Mapping accuracy
The hazard map zone boundaries have been deter-
mined from geological maps of the area. These in turn
are derived largely from borelog information from
about 15,000 sites in the Christchurch area. Of these,
the majority are shallow (less than 3 m deep), and are
often concentrated in particular areas (e.g. the central
city). The boundaries between soil types is therefore
frequently ill-defined, particularly with increasing
depth. In places the boundaries can be moved two or
three hundred metres to either side, and still fit the
available data.
The accuracy of the hazard zone boundaries is even
less than for the soil type boundaries as these relate to
the complex 3-dimensional changes in soil types be-
neath the city. For any critical structure, a specific
site study is needed to determine the actual degree
of hazard.
Ground shaking zones
The area of zone 1 bedrock is clearly defined by
the toe of the Port Hills. While areas on the hills are
overlain with loess deposits up to 20 m thick in some
gullies and valleys, when compared to the flat areas the
shaking will be essentially that of bedrock. Amplifica-
tion of ground motion due to topographic focusing
effects has not been considered. However these usu-
ally localised effects can be pronounced.
Zone 2 is shown as a transition zone, somewhat arbi-
trarily taken as the area from the toe of the hills to where
the sediment reaches 50 m depth. The 50 m depth
contour on bedrock is approximate only, and is based
on only 18 well-logs between Halswell and Redcliffs
(Brown and Weeber 1992). No study has been at-
tempted to determine typical soil profiles, or amplifi-
cation effects in this zone.
Zone 3 essentially covers the whole of the flat area of
Christchurch. Amplification effects appear to be most
sensitive to the soil profile within 30 m of the surface.
Soil profiles are known to change quite abruptly within
this depth range (at least in the central city area where
the most data is available). Hence two nearby, or even
adjacent sites can have quite different response spec-
tra.
Liquefaction
The liquefaction zones are determined by soil type:
zone A (shown as zone 2A and 3A on the map to
distinguish the respective shaking zones) is the area
dominantly underlain by sand between 2 m and 5 m
depth or deeper, plus areas around known liquefiable
sites; zone B (shown as zones 2B and 3B on the map)
represents areas of predominantly silt to sandy silt
between 2 m and 5 m or deeper. The zones have been
terminated to the west where the water table exceeds
2 m in depth. The increased effective stress and
confining effect of the soil above the water table will
generally prevent any significant liquefaction in the
predominantly silt soils further to the west.
The zones are based solely on the soil type, and do not
show:
areas of other soils (i.e. gravels, deep peat layers)
within the zones that are not liquefiable;
some areas, such as the higher dune area in Linwood,
Bromley and Brighton, which have water tables at
some depth, and are unlikely to liquefy; and
density variations.
The relative density of the soils is the other prerequisite
for liquefiable soils. The insitu density of the soils will
vary markedly because of the range of environments
they were deposited in. In high energy environments,
such as steep river beds or a beach exposed to the open
sea, deposited sand is likely to be dense. In low energy
environments such as swamps, or estuary, the sands are
likely to be loose. There is very little information on
insitu densities over most of the city and it remains
largely conjecture as to the proportion of areas under-
lain with susceptible soil types that are also sufficiently
loose to liquefy. However, three-quarters of the 16
sites investigated by the University of Canterbury as
part of this project showed some liquefaction hazard,
typically within the 2 m to 3 m of soil immediately
below the water table.
As the zones are based only on documented soil type,
the actual distribution of liquefaction effects that are
likely to occur in an earthquake is largely conjecture
with our present level of knowledge. The suggested
20% to 30% of the area in zone A, and the 10% to 15%
area in zone B, is simply a subjective assessment.
Damage Assessment
Possible damage for the earthquake scenario is sum-
marised in a damage assessment chart for different
structures in the different hazard zones (Table 2.2).
Little information on damage ratios for structures other
than buildings has been found, and the proportion of
damage in the chart is necessarily somewhat subjec-
tive. It is based on a similar chart used in the Welling-
ton Lifelines Project, and information from the
Edgecumbe Earthquake.
References
Adams (1980). Paleoseismicity of the Alpine Fault
Seismic Gap, Geology (8), pp 72-76.
Brown and Weeber (1992). Geology of the Christ-
church Urban Area, Institute of Geological and
Nuclear Sciences Ltd.
Berrill, Davis, McCahon (1992). Christchurch seis-
mic hazard pilot study, Bulletin of the New
Zealand National Society for Earthquake Engi-
neering, Vol 26.
Cowan (1989) An Evaluation of the Late Quaternary
Displacements and Seismic Hazard associated
with the Hope and Kakapo Faults, unpublished
MSc thesis, University of Canterbury.
Dibble, Ansell and Berrill (1980). Report on a Study of
Seismic Risk for BP NZ Ltd Sites at Woolston
and Lyttelton.
Elder, McCahon and Yetton (1991). The Earthquake
Hazard in Christchurch, Research Report to
EQC, Soils and Foundations
Robinson (1979) Variation of energy release, rate of
occurrence and b-value of earthquakes in the
main seismic region, New Zealand, Physics of
the Earth & Planetary Interior, 18, 209-220.
Schwartz and Coppersmith (1986). Seismic hazards:
Zone 1
Liquefiable Sites
Zone 2
(Zones 2A/2B)
Zone 2 Zone 3
Liquefiable Sites
Zone 3
(Zones 3A/3B)
Shaking
Intensities
MM VII - VIII
0.45g
MM VIII
MM VIII - IX
0.6 - 0.7g
Areas of MMIX
1.2g
Structures
Well designed
structures minor
damage.
Non ductile
structures some
damage.
Well designed
structures minor
damage.
Non ductile
structures damaged.
Most damaged and
unserviceable,
unless specific
foundation design
Well designed structures
serviceable. Many non
seismically designed
structures damaged
and unserviceable.
Severe damage
likely unless specific
foundation design.
Fixings designed for
seismic loads
Equipment not fixed
or fittings not
designed for seismic
loads
20% failure likely
40% failure likely
30% failure likely
70% failure likely
40% failure likely
90% failure likely
70% failure likely
100% failure likely 90% failure likely
50% failure likely
In areas of higher
shaking some well
designed structures
damaged and
unserviceable.
Transport
Roading
Railway
Bridges
Structure
Abutments
Rockfall and small
slips on steep
batters.
Rockfall and small
slips on steep
batters, failure of
steep fills.
As for structures
above
Minor slumping
possible
Some damage to
kerbs. Some
distortion and
cracking of seal.
Some distortion of
rail lines
Some slumping Some slumping
Some distortion of
rail lines.
Slumping likely,
failures possible if
not piled.
Distortion of rail
lines, some
spreading of
embankments.
Damage to kerbs.
Distortion and
cracking of seal.
Some damage to
kerbs. Distortion
and cracking of seal.
Extensive damage to
kerbs. Sumps
damaged. Extensive
distortion and
cracking of seal.
Distortion of rail
lines. Spreading of
embankments.
Slumping likely
failures if not piled
In Ground
Pipework
Moderately ductile
pipes concrete with
rubber joints
Steel and cast iron
with rubber joints
No mains damage.
5% entries and
junctions fail.
Mains damage
possible. 10%
entries and
junctions fail.
Mains damage likely.
40% entries and
junctions fail.
50% entries and
junctions fail.
70% entries and
junctions fail. Verical
displacements
possible.
Low strength or
low ductility pipes
Earthenware with
rubber joints
Asbestos cement
Cast iron with lead
joints
Mains damage
possible. 10%
entries and
junctions fail.
40% entries and
junctions fail.
Mains damage
occurs. 70% of
entries and junctions
fail.
Mains damage
probable. 60%
fail.
Mains damage
occurs. 80%
fail.
Non-ductile pipes
Ceramic cement
packed joints
Brick
Mains damage
possible. 20%
entries and
junctions fail.
Mains damage
occurs
Mains damage
occurs
Mains damage Mains damage
Note: Pipe failure in
zone 1 may lead to
slope instability
Welded steel
Polyethylene
OK Should be OK Damage possible at
entry to structures
and at junctions.
Damage possible at
entry to structures
and at junctions.
Likely damage at
entry to structures
and at junctions.
Table 2.2: Damage assessment chart
new trends in analysis using geologic data, In
Active Geophysics, National Academy Press.
Smith and Berryman (1983). Revised estimates of
earthquake hazard in New Zealand. Bulletin
NZNSEE, Vol 16, No.4, pp 259-272.
Smith (1992). Estimates of Earthquake Hazard in New
Zealand, EQC, Wellington.
2.3 Waimakariri Flood Hazard
Background
In pre-European times the Waimakariri River flows
could discharge to the sea anywhere from Lake
Ellesmere to the Ashley River. In flowing over this
area the river would drop out material (silt, stones etc.)
it had been carrying. It was this mechanism that led to
the classic flood fan formation of the Canterbury
plains.
Streamland 73, a DSIR publication, had this to say on
the formation of fans:
A fan is a more-or-less symmetrical cone of shingle
often formed where mountain streams issue from steep
side-valleys to flow over more gently sloping surfaces.
When the slope of a stream decreases and its channel
becomes wider, the streams ability to carry shingle
decreases and the shingle is deposited. This build up of
deposit of shingle is called aggradation. Aggradation
occurs fastest near the head of the fan (at the apex of the
cone). In a fan left in its natural state, the depositing of
shingle in the main channel causes the stream every so
often to switch from one course to another. The stream
either creates a new channel or reoccupies an old
channel where it has flowed in the past. Water then
flows down an entirely different part of the fan, where
it may not have flowed for decades or even centuries.
This sudden switching occurs when the stream is in
flood and is termed an avulsion.
Aggradation on a fan is not a steady continuous proc-
ess. Most occurs during rare major storms when mas-
sive amounts of shingle are deposited in a short time,
mostly at the fan head. Then follow often long periods
when the stream cuts into these deposits at the fan head
and redistributes the material over the lower fan.
Because of the geometry of fans, any point below the
fan head is lower than the stream not far up the fan and
so is at risk from flooding. This may be brief inundation
of areas adjacent to the channel, while the stream is in
flood. But the more serious risk is the formation of a
new main channel, with flooding and the depositing of
shingle on a different part of the fan. The risk of being
overwhelmed by gravel and water generally decreases
further down the fan. However, the existence of old
channels will direct the course of future flooding if
water enters them, so that distance down a fan is not
always a protection against flooding or aggradation.
The particular topography of a fan will determine
which areas of the fan are at greatest risk.
This succinctly summarises the Waimakariri situation.
Historical flooding of the Waimakariri
River
At the time of European settlement, flooding from the
Waimakariri was a major problem. Between 1860 and
1870, the Provincial Government constructed various
works on the south side of the river aimed at cutting off
the southerly overflows.
In 1869, a river district was formed that directed the
construction of a number of groynes to block off
overflows to the basins of the Styx, Avon, Heathcote
and Halswell Rivers. Inevitably, those dwellers on the
north side of the river pointed out the inequity of this
situation and eventually, after much political furore,
the Waimakariri River Trust was set up in 1928 with
powers and responsibilities relating to both sides of the
river.
The Trust built a flood protection system to regulate the
lower 40 kms of the river by an extensive stopbank
system, together with diversions and other works to
provide a shorter, straighter course to the sea.
This system was upgraded extensively between 1960
and 1990. Apart from one serious breakout of
floodwaters in 1957 both schemes performed very
well. They failed, however, to prevent accumulation of
gravel in the lower reaches, a problem now largely
addressed by commercial extraction.
Floodplain Management Plan
The above schemes were built to contain floods up to
a specified size (the so-called 100 year flood). Dur-
ing the late 1980s and early 1990s, Canterbury Re-
gional Council and the community again addressed the
question of the Waimakariri flood hazard. As a further
response to the hazard, the Canterbury Regional Coun-
cil prepared a draft Waimakariri Floodplain Manage-
ment Plan.
A floodplain management plan is a document describ-
ing how an area of flood-prone land should be used and
managed to reduce its susceptibility to flooding for a
prescribed period of time. The aim of the plan was to
reduce the impact of flooding on the community by
minimising flood damage, which has the potential to
disrupt normal activity and cause damage to life, limb,
property, the environment as well as tangible and
intangible assets. Although the Canterbury Regional
Council has withdrawn the plan as a legal document, it
was of considerable use in the Lifelines Project.
The object was to quantify the hazard so that decisions
could sensibly be taken regarding possible responses
which are effective both in terms of cost and location.
Flood maps
The many and varied investigations carried out over a
period of three years resulted in the preparation of
flood maps, along with accompanying tables express-
ing the flood hazard in terms of depths, velocities,
durations, rates of rise and probabilities of occurrence.
The above relates the background to Map 2 (p 285).
In effect, the study area would not be affected by river
floods having a return period of less than 500 years.
Breakouts from lower return period floods would not
reach the city due to a combination of attenuation and
soakage to the west.
Map 2 is a composite map of four independent breakouts.
At the 500-year return period level, it is estimated there
would be only one break out. That is at Halkett, behind
McLeans Island, through the Crossbank or to the north
at Baynons. There is a 50% chance that the existing
protection system would cope adequately with such a
flood. The percentage chance of failure from the four
potential failure zones are indicated on the arrows
emanating from the potential failure points. Risk can
be obtained by the product of the chance of the flood
occurring (1:500) and the percentage chance of failure.
Average depths and velocities are shown on the map
for various locations. The design hydrographs are of
the order of 24 hours through the city.
2.4 Local Flooding Hazard
Background
The Christchurch urban area is drained by three rivers
the Avon, Heathcote and Styx Rivers whose
catchments are entirely within the administrative bound-
ary of Christchurch City.
Urban development has occurred on the rivers
floodplains since the beginning of European settle-
ment. It is, therefore, not surprising that flood damage
resulting from storm runoff from within each of the
three catchments has occurred on a number of occa-
sions. The most serious flood hazard occurs on the
lower tidal reaches of each of the three rivers when
storm runoff may coincide with extremely high water
levels downstream in the Avon/Heathcote Estuary and
Brooklands Lagoon.
Flood maps
The following text provides an explanatory back-
ground to the 1:35,000 scale Styx, Avon and Heathcote
Rivers Floodplains (Map 3) prepared for the Lifelines
Study.
The blue cross hatched areas indicated on the map for
the Styx, Avon and Heathcote Rivers indicates the area
expected to be inundated at the peak of a 0.2% Annual
Exceedence Probability (AEP) flood event on each of
the rivers coinciding with extreme high water levels
downstream in the Estuary and Lagoon. (A 0.2% AEP
event is the same as a 1 in 500 year return period event).
This extreme event was chosen for floodplain manage-
ment planning purposes and a reduced probability
overall of 0.1 % AEP (1 in 1,000 year return period)
was adopted because it is unlikely that extreme storm
runoff and extreme estuary water levels would occur
simultaenously.
Mapping of areas inundated along the margins of the
Styx and Heathcote Rivers has been based on compre-
hensive flood studies involving the development of
complex hydrological models of the catchments and
hydraulic models of the river channels. Water depth,
duration of flooding, velocity and frequency can be
provided at various locations along the river channels
and floodplains. A similar flood study has only just
begun on the Avon River and its catchments. The
inundated area indicated must be treated as preliminary
only and the other parameters are not available.
In each case the extreme event indicated on the map
represents a river flood resulting from prolonged rain-
fall within the catchment coinciding with an extreme
high tide level at the river mouth. This situation repli-
cates what occurred during the August 1992 snow
storm, but on a more extreme scale. Upstream catch-
ment development in line with projects made for the
new City Plan over the next 20 years have been
assumed. Existing channel conditions have been used
in the models.
The purpose of the flood studies is to facilitate floodplain
management planning jointly with the Canterbury
Regional Council. If the pattern of development within
the catchments is substantially different to that as-
sumed or if channel conditions or storage characteris-
tics are significantly altered in the implementation of
floodplain management measures, then the inundated
areas may change significantly and new maps will
need to be drawn.
Styx River Flooding
Discharge of the Styx River to Brooklands Lagoon is
controlled by a stopbank and tide gate located down-
stream of Kainga Road to prevent inundation of
Brooklands by extreme high tides.
In the extreme flood event modelled, flood runoff from
the catchment builds up behind the tide gates closed by
a higher downstream tide level. Approximately 360
hectares of rural land generally to the west of Lower
Styx Road is inundated to a shallow depth and 182
residential properties in Brooklands are also inundated
with floodwater over the floorboards of 48 houses. The
maximum depth of house flooding is 400 mm. The
depth of flooding on private properties and Lower Styx
Road is generally less than 1 metre.
Avon River Flooding
Residential areas along the margins of the Lower Avon
River are protected from flooding up to a level of
approximately RL 10.9 m by semi-continuous
stopbanking from Porritt Park to Bridge Street. During
the August 1992 storm the Avon River overtopped the
stopbanks at a number of relatively low points along
their length. It has been assumed that widespread
overtopping of the stopbank system could occur during
a more extreme event. The area indicated on Map 2 is
land below a level of approximately RL 11.0 m. Under
present conditions inundation of this entire area could
not occur simultaneously unless widespread failure of
the stopbanks occurred during the extreme storm.
It is likely that the detailed flood study underway will
indicate that a significantly smaller area is at risk of
inundation during an extreme event.
Heathcote River Flooding
The recently constructed Woolston Tidal Barrage is
closed under normal river flow conditions. In the event
of a flood the radial gates will open to pass floodwaters
through the Woolston Cut to the Estuary. In the
extreme flood modelled, 192 existing house floors
between Lincoln Road and Radley Road are expected
to be inundated. Depth of floodwater exceeds 1 m in
two cases and 500 mm in 44 cases.
The maximum main channel velocity is 1.4 m/s be-
tween Barrington and Colombo Streets. At local con-
strictions such as bridge approaches maximum veloci-
ties could be somewhat higher than this, but the mean
velocity of flood flows over roads and private lots
adjacent to the river will be much lower than 1.4 m/s.
The maximum depth of inundation on the floodplain is
1.8 m on Eastern Terrace near Birdwood Avenue.
Floodwater depths of between 1 m to 1.5 m can be
expected at various other locations on Eastern Terrace.
Elsewhere the flooding is shallower.
A number of bridges between Sparks Road and Opawa
Road are expected to be closed for a period of five to
thirteen hours due to the depth of floodwater across the
approaches. Shallow saltwater flooding is expected in
the Woolston industrial area. Historically, blockage of
the Sparks Road culvert by a barbecue table and partial
blockage of a bridge waterway by a motorcar jammed
under the bridge deck have occurred. Unpredictable
events such as these are likely to occur and accentuate
flooding problems and damage during an extreme
flood.
2.5 Tsunami Hazard
Tsunami event
Based on historical records, the most likely generating
source for a significant tsunami affecting Christchurch
is from a large seismic event centred on coastal South
America (such as those that occurred in 1868 and
1960). The tsunami event adopted for this study is from
this source.
Magnitude
The magnitude of the tsunami adopted involved a total
water level variation at the open coast of 10 m inclusive
of tide (i.e. 5 m above and below MSL). It was assumed
that these maximum water levels could enter Lyttelton
harbour but the level would be reduced to 3 m at the
entrance to the Avon-Heathcote estuary and the
Waimakariri River due to dissipation of energy in the
limited water depths on the ebb tide deltas.
At the Sumner Esplanade from Scarborough to Cave
Rock, the tsunami height is assumed to be reduced to
4 m due to shoaling in the shallow water at this location.
For a worst case scenario, the initial tsunami wave
coincided with a high spring tide when water levels in
the estuary and Brooklands lagoon would be at 1 m
above MSL, hence maximum water levels at both of
these locations would be 4 m above MSL.
A tsunami wave period of three hours was assumed,
with minimum time from peak to trough of one hour for
the first wave. Due to a falling tide, the second wave
would be 1 m lower than the first, the third wave
coinciding with low tide being 2 m lower than the first.
Sea conditions at the time of a tsunami were assumed
to be normal with swell heights of 1 m, and a swell
wave period of 8 seconds.
Return period
It is difficult to determine the return period for the
adopted event as the majority of the historical informa-
tion is anecdotal, and does not provide an accurate
assessment of magnitude. Data from de Lange and
Healy (1986) shows that Canterbury has received nine
tsunami in 142 years (1840 to 1982), and National Civil
Defence data shows that there has not been any tsunami
reported since this time. Since the adopted tsunami is
larger than the biggest recorded event, a minimum
return period of 150 years can be assumed. The actual
return period may in fact be much longer. It would be
of considerable benefit to more accurately establish the
return period of such a tsunami in order to determine
what level of planning response is appropriate to deal
with its potential effects.
Tsunami effects
From the adopted tsunami magnitude, wave breaker
and runup parameters were calculated for the Christ-
church beaches. It was found that at maximum tsunami
water levels, runup heights will exceed the 8 m RL
contour with large-scale overtopping occurring at sea-
walls and dune blowouts resulting in widespread inun-
dation. Theoretical water flows into the Avon-Heathcote
estuary and the Waimakariri River mouth were also
calculated along with inundation areas around the
margins of the estuary and Brooklands Lagoon.
The main effects possible in the Christchurch area are
summarised below.
Waimakariri River and Brooklands Lagoon
For an initial inflow duration of 30 minutes, approxi-
mately 8.91 x 10
6
m
3
of water will flow in through the
Waimakariri River mouth with maximum velocities in
the range of 7.5 m/s. It is estimated (Boyle pers comm.)
that 80% of this volume will travel up the main river
channel and 20% will flow into Brooklands Lagoon.
The southern stopbank on the lower 1.8 km of the
Waimakariri River will be overtopped resulting in
approximately 3.42 x 10
6
m
3
of water spilling onto land
to the south of the stopbanks. Some from the remaining
river flow will travel up the Kaiapoi River and some
into the Pines Beach area.
Along Brooklands Spit, dune overtopping will occur at
nine locations, including a 200 m long section at the
site of the old Waimakariri River mouth, resulting in an
additional 911,150 m
3
of water entering the lagoon. A
further 14,000 m
3
will be added from overtopping at
seven locations around Spencer Park.
The combined volume of inundation water into the
Brooklands Lagoon area from all sources will be in the
order of 6.13 x 10
6
m
3
which will affect all the land to
the south and west of Brooklands Lagoon which is
below the 2 m contour. This covers a total land area of
approximately 965 hectares, including the Spencer
Park camping ground and sewage pond, Brooklands
Village, the Lower Styx Road, and the area west of the
Styx River to Chaneys Plantation. Water depths over
these land areas will be up to 0.75 m deep.
Bottle Lake Forest to South Brighton Spit
At the Bottle Lake Forest and Waimairi Landfill
areas the isolated nature of blowouts and small vol-
umes of water overtopping (24,500 m
3
), should restrict
inundation to narrow track areas behind the foredune
and be largely insignificant. With the majority of water
entry points being along Bottle Lake Forest, the
Waimairi Landfill should not be affected by inunda-
tion.
At Waimairi Beach (Rothesay Rd to Pacific St),
overtopping will occur at six locations involving a
water volume of 65,300 m
3
. The majority of this
volume would enter via the blowout located at the
outfall pipe north of Larnach St. Along this section this
coast inundation should be limited to a narrow (200 m
to 250 m wide) area of approximately 28 hectares
behind the dunes which lies between the 3 m and 4 m
contour and is bounded on the landward side by a ridge
of higher older dunes. Inundation depths are calculated
to be approximately 0.2 m. A small amount of water
may also travel down Pacific St, but the inundation
areas and depths should be minimal.
At North Brighton, overtopping will occur at three
major locations (the surf club wall and dune lowering
at Effingham and Cygnet Streets), involving a water
volume of 366,600 m
3
. The resulting inundation will
cover approximately 135 hectares with general inun-
dation depths being in the order of 0.3 m. Since the
most significant overtopping will occur at the sea wall
around the North Brighton Surf club, the major flow
path will be west down Bowhill Road and south west
across the Rawhiti Domain.
Significant overtopping will occur along the New
Brighton foreshore, notably at the sea walls, involving
a total water volume of 1.202 x 10
6
m
3
. This will flow
overland to the Avon River spreading out to inundate
the total area from Lonsdale Street to Rodney Street
(63 hectares). Taking into account the effect of build-
ings, inundation depth will be 1.2 m and flow velocities
approximately 1 m/s hence it will take 10 minutes for
the water to travel the 600 m to the river.
Along the South Brighton coast (Rodney St to Cas-
pian St) there are nine locations which will be
overtopped involving a total water volume of 141,900
m
3
. Due to the large number of entry points, it is
assumed that the water flow will spread out to inundate
the total area of 193 hectares between the coast and the
Avon River. General inundation depths will be in the
order of 0.45 m, however at Jellicoe Rd local depths
could be up to 0.7 m due to higher discharges at this
location. Flow velocities will be approximately 0.13
m/s, hence will take 75 minutes for the water to travel
the 600 m to the river.
For South Brighton Spit, there are six locations be-
tween Caspian Street and Tern Street which will be
overtopped and all of the dune system south of Tern
Street. The water volume involved will be approxi-
mately 416,500 m
3
spreading out to inundate the total
81 hectares of the spit. Inundation depths will be in the
order of 0.55 m, however around Heron Street local
depths could be up to 1.0 m due to higher discharges at
this location. Flow velocities will be approximately
0.33 m/s, hence will take 12 minutes for the water to
travel the 250 m to the estuary.
Avon-Heathcote Estuary
For an initial inflow duration of 30 minutes, approxi-
mately 13.836 x 10
6
m
3
of water will flow through the
estuary mouth with maximum velocities in the range of
8 m/s. With the addition of water entering the estuary
overland from the South Brighton Spit, the total estu-
ary volume added by tsunami is approximately 14.084
x 10
6
m
3
.
Within the initial inflow duration of 30 minutes, the
tsunami will raise water levels right round the margins
of the estuary. The following inundation could occur:
Moncks Bay to McCormacks Bay: 86.8 hectares,
with maximum depths up to 1.8 m at Moncks Bay
and 1.2 m over the causeway at McCormacks Bay.
Ferrymead to Bromley: 210 hectares, at depths of
0.3 m.
Brighton spit and South Brighton: 190 hectares, at
depths of 1.0 m and maximum depths of up to 2.0
m at Tern Street. (Note that these areas are also
affected by beach overtopping).
There may also be some minor inundation at Bexley
and Woolston.
A worst case scenario for tsunami bore travel distances
and inundation up the Heathcote and Avon River
channels prepared by Barnett Consultants (1994) sug-
gests that some flooding may occur as far upstream as
Fitzgerald Avenue on the Avon River and as far up-
stream as Opawa Road on the Heathcote River. The
report also suggests that peak water levels in the rivers
may not occur until up to 10 hours after the tsunami
peak due to the river system not having time to fully
drain between successive tsunami peaks.
Water velocities leaving the estuary have been calcu-
lated to be up to 7m/s, which is approximately seven
times faster that normal tidal flows out of the estuary.
This very rapid outflow could result in scour of sea
walls along the Moncks Bay and Redcliffs foreshore
leading to possible wall failure with associated col-
lapse of the road network and services. Scouring could
also occur at the bridge abutments at Ferrymead and
Bridge streets. The estuary will be dry (below low
spring tide level) for approximately 45 minutes be-
tween the first and second tsunami waves.
Considerably more detailed investigations and model-
ling is required on tsunami effects in estuary and river
systems, but whether this is warrented or not depends
on a more accurate assessment of the return period of
the tsunami scenario.
Clifton and Sumner
The Sumner beach in front of Clifton Surf Club and
Cave Rock is very prone to tsunami inundation having
little dune protection and maximum beach heights only
3 m RL. For this 200 m of beach, overtopping volumes
may be as high as 459,000 m
3
all of which would flow
southeast into Sumner. The Sumner sea wall at a height
of 5 m RL affords some protection to the low lying land
behind, but will still be overtopped at maximum tsu-
nami levels. The total water volume entering the Sumner
area will be approximately 476,000 m
3
, which will
cover the 70 hectares of land below the 3 m contour to
an average depth of 0.7 m.
The road from Shag Rock to Clifton Surf club will
also suffer from inundation, receiving 22,500 m
3
of
water across its 400 m length in the 15 minutes of
maximum tsunami elevation.
Lyttelton
Due to the water depths in Lyttelton Harbour, it is
assumed that the tsunami will be able to maintain its
open coast height without breaking as it travels up the
inlet. Hence, at the port, the maximum tsunami height
of 5 m RL will be retained and all of the port area below
this contour will be affected by inundation. This equates
to 80 hectares, which effectively covers the total port
area with water depths between 1 m and 2 m for up to
30 minutes. Port facilities affected include wharves,
railway, marinas, graving dock and the bulk coal
facilities. Although there will be water through the tank
farm, the embankments around the individual tanks are
approximately 0.2 m to 0.3 m above the predicted
water level, hence should be safe from inundation.
There is also likely to be inundation of many low-lying
areas adjacent to pocket beaches within the harbour,
and damage to jetties and wharves. One particularly
badly affected location will be Teddington, where
despite a reduction in tsunami height due to shoaling in
shallow water, inundation is likely to cover the road to
Diamond Harbour and enter buildings.
There should not be any inundation of Lyttelton town-
ship. Maximum water level will be at least 1.2 m below
the top of the brick wall along the side of Norwich
Quay.
Hazard zones
The areal effects of the predicted inundation from the
first tsunami wave are shown on the tsunami hazard
Map 4. The zones are categorised depending on the
source of inundation. There has been no attempt to
categorise areas on depth of inundation.
Map limitations
Accuracy
It should be emphasised that due to a lack of data and
information on a tsunami of this size, many assump-
tions have had to be made in calculating the above
effects on beaches and structures, as well as the areas
and depths of inundation. The results of this study
should be considered as being only indicative of the
order of magnitude of effects from a tsunami of this
size. There is scope for considerable review, and re-
finement of the methods used and results obtained in
this study.
Second wave effects
The hazard maps only show areas predicted to be
affected by inundation in the initial tsunami wave.
However, it is likely that the second wave may cause
more flooding, although being 1 m lower in amplitude,
due to increased blowout size, damage to sea walls and
larger river mouth areas as a result of the first wave.
The extent of inundation from this second wave has not
been calculated or mapped.
References
Barnett Consultants (1994). Christchurch Tsunami
Study Draft Report. Prepared For Christchurch City
Council.
Cerc (1984). Shore Protection Manual, US Army
Corps Of Engineers.
Christchurch Press. Various Newspaper Articles On
The May 1960 Tsunami.
Christchurch Star. Various Newspaper Articles On
The May 1960 Tsunami.
de Lange, W P and T R Healy (1986). New Zealand
Tsunamis 1840-1982. N.Z. J. Geol & Geophvsics :29,
p 15-134.
Heath, R.A (1976). Response of several New Zealand
harbours to the 1960 Chilean tsunami, Bulletin Royal
Society of N.Z.: 15 p71-82.
Lyttelton Port Company. Tidal Levels For May 1960
and August 1960 Tsunamis.
2.6 Extreme Wind Storm
Scenario
Introduction
Severe wind storms in Canterbury are usually associ-
ated with northwesterly winds that have been acceler-
ated by the approach of a cold front from the south.
When a third factor, such as the development of a low
pressure system within the frontal airmass, is also
present, extremely severe winds are experienced, such
as occurred during the wind storm on 1 August 1975.
A second source of extreme winds is the passage of a
tropical cyclone such as Giselle (The Wahine Storm) in
April 1968. When ocean temperatures around New
Zealand are much higher than average and a tropical
cyclone enters the New Zealand region, it may not die
but can be maintained and even grow because of local
energy and topographic factors. Giselles centre pres-
sure dropped from 970 mb east of Cape Reinga to 965
mb over Napier. It then travelled down the east coast
about 150 km offshore, bringing storm force SE winds
to Cook Strait, Kaikoura and Canterbury. All the time
it was expected that the cyclone would turn eastwards
and move away from New Zealand. Instead, just SE of
Banks Peninsula, it made a right angle turn and moved
directly towards the Peninsula. This brought very
damaging SE winds to Christchurch and mid-Canter-
bury, along with heavy rains and surface flooding.
A 1-in-150 year scenario for this situation would
involve 80 knot to 85 knot (41 m/s to 44 m/s) wind
gusts, sustained over several hours, accompanied by a
1-in-50 to 1-in-100 year local flooding event for the
Avon and Heathcote catchments, accentuated by the
strong onshore SE winds and surges.
The most extreme wind events on their own, with a
return period of about 150 years, are likely to be
produced by pre-frontal northwesterly winds with nar-
rowing gaps between the isobars as the cold front
moves northeastwards across the South Island towards
a near stationary anticyclone over or to the east of the
North Island. In addition there is the localised develop-
ment of a low pressure system in the frontal airmass
along the east coast of the South Island, as in the 1st
August 1975 case.
Hence, the best information on which to base a scenario
of extreme winds over Canterbury is the 1st August
1975 storm whose winds caused widespread damage
with a maximum gust of 93 knots at Christchurch
Airport.
The 150 year return period wind storm
The 150 year return period wind storm in Canterbury
is expected to be produced by the combination of at
least three high wind factors occurring simultaneously:
a strong pressure gradient in advance of a rapidly
moving cold front from the south to south-south-
west;
a strong, near stationary anticyclone over or to the
east of the North Island; and
the formation of a depression on the advancing cold
front which further accelerates the pre-frontal wind,
probably in association with the influence of Banks
Peninsula and the lee trough.
The wind will be extremely gusty, as the extreme wind
sector is in the unstable norwest air. Gusts will mainly
be in the form of horizontal rolls of air moving at a
mean speed of 70 knots (36 m/s), with the forward roll
taking the gust speed up to 103 knots to 110 knots (53
m/s to 56.6 m/s), with lulls of around 50 knots (25.7 m/
s). These values apply to the open plains. In localised
places, speedup over hills or under the troughs of long
wavelength lee waves will accelerate the wind by 15%
to 30%.
The extreme wind band will progress northwards in
advance of the cold front, reaching a peak north of
Christchurch and reducing in intensity significantly as
it moves north of Kaikoura.
The scenario
It is not possible to produce a hazard map in the same
way as for the earthquake or flood hazards and there-
fore a scenario approach has been adopted.
The buildup
At noon on Monday a long range forecast for Canter-
bury is issued by Met. Service New Zealand (MSNZ):
Dry and settled weather with mild temperatures
today. Tuesday, northeasterlies, partly cloudy
with mild temperatures, norwesters develop-
ing inland. Wednesday widespread norwesters
with a late southerly change with showers.
Thursday, showers clearing and remaining cool.
Friday fine with increasing temperatures.
On Tuesday at 7 am the MSNZ forecast is:
Fine with afternoon noreasters, norwesters
inland reaching the coast at times. Tomorrow a
late southwesterly change with rain. Some thun-
derstorms are likely with the arrival of the cold
front.
On Wednesday 7 am MSNZ forecast is:
Norwesterly winds, gale force in the moun-
tains and in inland places, strong and gusty
elsewhere. Overnight thunderstorms with cold
southwesterly winds and showers tomorrow.
Clearing later in the day but remaining cold.
The actual winds during Wednesday were strong
noreasterlies in North Canterbury and Christchurch
with strong and gusty winds in Christchurch and over
most of the plains from Amuri to Timaru from late
afternoon. The anticyclone over the North Island slowed
to a stop and the cold front moved onto the southwest
of the South Island, with the wind flowing parallel to
the mountain ranges. The pressure gradient over the
South Island began to increase with the northward
progression of the front, which intensified.
At 6 pm Wednesday MSNZ issued a special weather
warning of gale to strong gale force winds along the
east coast of the South Island and strong gale force
winds in the mountains. The AA issues a warning that
cars with caravans and camper vans are not allowed on
the Lewis Pass, Arthurs Pass and Burkes Pass Roads
overnight. It is carried on local radio at 6.30 pm and
each hour thereafter, on Teletext from 7 pm onwards,
and is on CTV in the 7 pm News programme. TV1 and
TV3 carry gale warnings for Canterbury on their early
and late evening weather slots.
Overnight many people notice the warm evening and
mild late night conditions. Early in the evening the
wind speed drops, except in a band immediately to the
lee of the mountains where the primary lee wave
produces a stiff norwest wind with moderate gusti-
ness. With the hot overnight temperatures the people
of Canterbury generally find it hard to sleep. Dunedin
is battered by very strong winds at about 3 am. Several
trees are brought down taking power out over 25% of
the city.
Thursday
The duty weather forecaster in MSNZ upgrades the
gale warning to a storm force wind, issuing a new
special warning at 4 am to the Civil Defence HQ, the
media, Canterbury Regional Council and District and
City Councils, but no one is on duty except the radio
station announcers who include the storm warning in
weather bulletins from 5 am onwards, and the Duty
Officer at Civil Defence HQ, Wellington.
The Timaru District Civil Defence Officer was called
by Wellington Civil Defence HQ at 4.15 am, making
his way to the District Council by 4.35 am. He imme-
diately called the Duty Forecaster at MSNZ to confirm
the approach of the band of storm force winds. As he
drove to the Council he had to fight stronger wind gusts
than he could remember for some time and thought that
they were in for a good blow. Having talked to the
forecaster, he thought he had better call the Mayor but
hesitated until after 5 am when winds at Timaru had
risen to 35 knots, gusting to 50 knots. The mayor told
him to call again if things got worse because the MSNZ
often issued gale warnings which didnt turn out too
bad. Then he went back to bed and tried to sleep but
the warmth, the noise of the wind and the thought of
possible damage kept him awake.
The Regional Civil Defence Officer was called at his
home by Civil Defence HQ at 4.17 am, and informed
of the storm warnings and the power outage and
possible damage to Dunedin. He arrived at the CRC at
4.35 am and immediately checked the fax and read the
storm warning. He called Dunedin at 4.45 am and
Timaru at 4.55 am, confirming the power outage in
parts of Dunedin and the rising winds in Timaru.
0600 NZST
980
1020
985
990
995
1000
1005
1010
1015
L
Figure 2.3: Synoptic chart for 0600 NZST 1 August 1975
L
L
H
H
1
0
2
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
9
9
0
9
8
0
9
7
0
9
7
0
9
8
0
9
9
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
1
0
1
3
0
1
4
0
1
5
0
1
6
0
1
7
0
1
8
0
1
7
0

W
1
3
0
1
4
0
1
5
0
1
6
0
1
7
0

E
1
8
0
1
7
0
1
6
0
1
2
0
0

h
r
s

N
Z
S
T
J
u
l
y

3
1

1
9
7
5
Figure 2.4: Synoptic chart for 1200 NZST 1 August 1975
At 6.17 am, 6.25 am, 6.34 am and 6.37 am, accidents
occur on Highway 1 between Timaru and Ashburton as
trucks or cars are blown off the road. In one case a car
collided with a truck and the driver of the car is killed
while the truck driver and two of the other drivers are
badly injured.
Just before 7 am the storm force winds hit Ashburton.
Strong norwesters have been blowing most of the
night, with some old shelter trees being felled between
4 am and 7 am when the wind over a period of 30
minutes from 6.35 to 7.05 rose steadily to average 63
knots, gusting to 82 knots. Damage was occurring,
particularly in the vicinity of Highway 1 and in another
band about half way between Highway 1 and the
mountains because of the long wavelength lee waves
which had formed.
Around the band along Highway 1, dozens of grain
silos and hay barns were completely demolished and
hay was being blown with damaging force. Sheets of
aluminium roofing and corrugated iron from roofs and
sheds were being blown about. A power board lines-
man was killed by flying corrugated iron as he at-
tempted to restore power.
Effects in Christchurch
Between 7 am and 7.30 am, the people of Christchurch
began their day with very strong, gusty norwesterly
winds and unseasonably warm temperatures. Many
people were irritable because of their difficulty in
sleeping overnight. Almost all became aware of the
damage that had been caused in Dunedin and Timaru
as they listened to the 7 am or 7.30 am radio news
bulletins, which also carried storm force wind warn-
ings for Christchurch. Most people did not appreciate
the gravity of the situation. Having lived through many
gale force norwesters in their adult life without any
harm or damage, most early starting workers (7 am to
7.30 am) were on their way to, or were at, work.
Between 7 am and 7.30 am the strength of the band of
wind had increased even more as a low developed on
the cold front. This low deepened as it lifted over Banks
Peninsula. The advancing destructive wind band, de-
molished most of the pine plantations on either side of
Highway 1 from the Rakaia northwards. The strong
norwesters were also associated with extremely high
rainfalls in the Alps, with the mountain-fed rivers
rising very rapidly.
After 7.30 am large trees began to topple in many parts
of Christchurch, damaging dozens of houses and cars,
and blocking or obstructing many roads, as the mean
wind speeds rose steadily from 40 knots, gusting to 65
knots at 7.30 am, to 55 knots, gusting to 78 knots at 7.45
14
15
16
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
A
U
G
U
S
T

1
KNOTS
60
50
40
10
90
80
70
90
80
70
10
0
0
360
180
90
180
360 360
90 270
360
180
90
180
360
90 270
C
H
R
I
S
T
C
H
U
R
C
H
360
360
180
90
180
360 360
90 270
270
N
E
S
W E
S
W
N
N
E
S
N E
S
W
N
Wind direction Wind speed
Figure 2.5: Anemometer charts, Christchurch
Airport. Speed scale in knots (1 m/s = 2 knots)
The effects south of Christchurch
At 6 am, the band of high winds immediately ahead of
the cold front reach Timaru, with mean speeds of 50
knots, gusting to 75 knots, bringing down many trees
and taking out all of the power to the city, except the
hospital, radio station, and Timaru District Council,
which go onto emergency generators, and taking down
several key overhead telephone lines. The Telecom
microwave dish for the toll network is damaged and
blown out of line.
The mayor of Timaru is talking to the Civil Defence
Officer when the phone goes dead. He quickly goes
through to his car in the garage and uses his car phone
to re-establish contact. A fallen tree over his drive
prevents him from driving to the Council. At 6.15 am
the Timaru CDO calls the regional CDO on radio to
report the wind strength, power and phone outages and
house fires. Three houses are on fire where trees have
taken power lines down and the burning tree has
ignited the houses.
am. Many houses lost tiles or iron off their roofs during
this time, with a great deal of other wind blown debris.
At 7.38 am the first radio report said to definitely stay
home and stay inside.
Dozens of people have been injured trying to secure
flapping roof sheets, three people had been killed by
flying debris, 10 people were killed by trees falling on
their cars, with 35 people being seriously injured.
Ambulances couldnt reach a serious accident at 7.45
am because all approach roads were blocked with trees
and live power lines, and so four people died. Eight
people were killed by electrocution as live wires fell on
vehicles, and 12 people were burnt to death from house
fires.
By 8 am the wind speed over Christchurch has risen to
70 knots, gusting to 103 knots. Several aero-club
planes were badly damaged. A ship was blown away
from its mooring in Lyttelton Harbour and collided
with a tanker at the oil wharf, rupturing a 20,000 litre
oil tank which began leaking into the harbour. Dozens
of moored yachts and pleasure craft were blown off
their moorings and driven onto rocks and beaches
around Lyttelton and Akaroa harbours. Windows were
blown in on several commercial buildings throughout
the city. The power lines for the new tram were brought
down. Several homes along the Port Hills spurs lost
their roofs.
At 8.20 am the wind speed had dropped a little and a
Radio news reporter spoke to the Forecast Manager at
the Airport weather office who confirmed that the peak
of the storm was passed but that the wind were still
gusting to over 80 knots. At 8.30 am, the radio station
reported that the peak of the storm had passed. Many
people ventured outside at hearing this news and sev-
eral were injured and two people were killed by flying
corrugated iron. By 9 am the winds had turned to the
southwest, and dropped to 20 knots. The temperature
had dropped by 10C. The morning sun shone though
the partly cloudy sky as people carefully moved out-
side to survey the extensive city-wide damage. Hardly
a property was spared. Hundreds of trees in Hagley
Park were split, large branches broken off or were
completely uprooted.
The city was without power because of the overhead
lines being blown down and the line to Islington was
also down.
Effects north of Christchurch
The Benmore/Haywards line was brought down in
North Canterbury at about 8:30 am, knocking out the
supply to the North Island through the Cook Strait
cable.
Kaiapoi received similar damage to Christchurch, but
with fewer casualties because of the broadcasts of
problems in Christchurch. Rangiora, being further
inland, received minor damage. Coastal properties and
settlements, and inland places such as Hawarden and
Culverden experienced damaging winds. Kaikoura
lost several vessels and three roofs, but no one was
injured. Two motorists were killed by being blown off
the road in the Hundalees. Off the coast, a crewman
was badly injured on a fishing boat, which couldnt
attempt to come into the harbour until after the storm
had passed.
Extensive power loss due to fallen trees was experi-
enced throughout North Canterbury. Wind throw in the
Eyrewell, Ashley, Balmoral and Hamner forests was
widespread.
2.7 Snowstorm Scenario
Introduction
Because snowstorms are relatively rare events at low
elevations in New Zealand, snowfall magnitudes are
not routinely recorded at our meteorological stations.
The only records available relate to the number of days
on which snowfall occurred. In the Christchurch area
this averages between two and three per year for the last
100 years.
Even at higher elevations the number and continuity of
stations at which snow depth observations are recorded
is limited (Fitzharris et al. 1992). There are, however,
some case studies of conditions leading to heavy snow-
fall on the foothills and plains of the South Island and
useful information can be obtained from these. With
some exceptions (e.g. Harris 1981), relatively little has
been recorded about the impacts of heavy snowstorms,
though there may be information on file with local
authorities, power boards etc., which detail some of
these effects.
By far the two largest snowstorms to affect Christ-
church in the last 100 years have been in July 1945 and
August 1992. While the former was slightly larger than
the latter, there is less information available regarding
the 1945 event so it seems advisable to use the more
recent one as a basis for a scenario. The major argu-
ment against this approach is that while there was little
difference in the amounts measured at the Botanic
Gardens (28 cm versus 25 cm) the maximum reported
elsewhere in the city and on the plains was 18" (46 cm)
in 1945 and only 30 cm in 1992.
As for the wind section, it is not possible to produce a
hazard map.
Characteristics of low elevation
snowstorms in the South Island
Meteorological conditions producing heavy
snowfall
Neale and Thompson (1977) studied conditions bring-
ing heavy snowfall to low elevations in the South
Island by investigating ten storms for the years 1966 to
1975. Unfortunately few of these storms brought snow
to coastal areas in Canterbury. However, the general
features they discussed are indicative of synoptic con-
ditions which produce snowfall at low elevations.
Following studies in North America, Neale and
Thompson noted that two types of storms could be
recognised:
Warm advection storms often associated with a
quasi-stationary or warm front (usually accompa-
nied by north-west flow ahead of a trough in the
New Zealand case).
Vorticity advection storms which are characterised
by the presence of a low pressure system to consid-
erable elevation. At the surface, these storms fre-
quently have well developed and sometimes com-
plex depressions located near or to the east of
central New Zealand. The North American studies
defined the relative contribution of these advection
processes using a dense network of radiosonde
stations.
While this is not possible in New Zealand, Neale
and Thompson were able to classify storms accord-
ing to the dominant process using a combination of
upper air data and distinctive cloud patterns indica-
tive of vorticity advection on satellite images.
Arising out of these synoptic conditions, Neale and
Thompson identified four main factors contributing to
snowfall to low elevations:
ascending motion;
low temperatures in the lower troposphere (below
approximately 5 km);
abundant atmospheric moisture; and
persistence of these conditions at a given location
for a significant period (at least several hours) so
that snow can accumulate.
Because of the required combination of all of the four
factors, heavy snowfall to low elevations is difficult to
forecast; that is, the absence of one factor will contrib-
ute to a change of conditions and heavy snow will not
eventuate.
Snowstorm impacts
The impacts most commonly reported as a result of low
elevation storms are stock losses. However, damage to
buildings, other structures and power lines, and disrup-
tion to traffic and communications are clearly much
more important for urban areas. In addition, secondary
effects like snowmelt flooding need to be considered.
Snow loads and building codes.
Snow loads on structures are determined from the
product of snow depth and density. Snow densities can
be classified as shown in Table 2 .3. Because of our
warm moist maritime environment, New Zealand snow
densities are generally high. For instance, a density of
100 kgm
-3
is commonly used as an estimate for average
new snowfall in North America and Europe. In the
Craigieburn Range, new snow densities average about
130 kgm
-3
in windless conditions while stiff slabs with
densities up to 400 kgm
-3
may be deposited when high
winds occur.
However, most snow to low levels in Canterbury
occurs in relatively windless conditions. Nevertheless,
it is likely to have densities of over 200 kgm
-3
soon after
deposition. Chinn (1981) and Hughes (1974) reported
densities of about 300 kgm
-3
in new snow at low
elevations in Canterbury. As time passes and espe-
cially if warm temperatures and/or rain occur, density
will increase rapidly.
Type
Density (kgm
-3
)
Wild snow 10 30
New, immediately after falling in calm 50 70
Damp new snow 100 200
Settled snow 200 300
Wind packed snow soft slab 100 290
Wind packed snow hard slab 290 450
Firn 400 800
Glacier ice 917
Table 2.3: Snow-ice types and density
(Fitzharris et al. 1992)
The load is given by the equation:
L =
dg
1000
(1)
where L is snow load (kPa)
d is snow depth (m)
is snow density (kgm
-3
)
g is gravitational acceleration
(9.8ms
-2
)
For example, if snow depth and density are 0.5 m and
150 kgm
3
, the load is 0.74 kPa.
The building code for snow (NZSS 4203) divides New
Zealand into five zones. For the plains area of Christ-
church (zone 4) application of an elevation factor gives
a load of less than 0.5 kPa (Tyndall, pers. comm.).
Other impacts
Several other impacts other than direct vertical loading
arise from snowfall or snow in combination with other
factors.
(a) Surface conditions
In cities where snow is relatively rare, disruption to
traffic is common because suitable street clearing
machinery is not available in large quantities to clear
roads.
(b) Snow in combination with wind
Fortunately, windiness is not often associated with
heavy snow to low elevations in Canterbury (Harris
1981). When it does occur, snow or rime of suitable
cohesiveness will remain on structures or wires and
greatly amplify the force of wind. Rime is ice deposited
when supercooled water impacts and adheres to solid
objects and is fortunately uncommon at low elevations.
(c) Snowmelt flooding
Because snow to low elevations falls at temperatures
near 0C, rapid melting is possible. This may often be
associated with rain following snowfall and/or rain
preceding snowfall which will accentuate flood peaks
from the resulting melt.
Snowstorms in Christchurch
Seasonal occurrence
While the standard meteorological station is not help-
ful with regard to snow amounts, it does show that in
general snow on the plains in the Christchurch area is
restricted to the months of May to October and is most
common in June, July and August. Historical reports
also indicate that the most serious storms have oc-
curred in the June-August period.
Return Period and Magnitude
From newspaper reports, particularly of the 1945 storm
(which contained comparative data for earlier storms),
an approximate idea of return periods for storms can be
obtained as shown in Figure 2.6. This suggests that the
1992 storm has a return period of about 50 to 100 years.
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
5 10 15 20 30 40 5060 100 200
Return period (years)
A
n
n
u
a
l

m
a
x
i
m
u
m

s
n
o
w

d
e
p
t
h

(
c
m
)
?
1896
1901
1895
1918
1992
1945
Figure 2.6: Return period for Christchurch
snowstorms
The August 1992 Christchurch
snowstorm
Synoptic conditions
The August 1992 snowstorm (August 26-29), can be
classified as a vorticity advection type storm because
of the characteristic deep and complex low pressure
that developed over central New Zealand (Kingsland
1992) as shown in Figure 2.7.
In 24 hours on the 26 August, the low pressure system
initially located to the west of the North Island, deep-
ened rapidly from 1003 hPa to 979 hPa with a corre-
sponding increase in activity. Equally important was
the supply of cold air in the southerly flow that oc-
curred once the depression was positioned east of
central New Zealand from 28 August onwards. The
effects of this on temperature are clearly seen from
midnight through to noon on Friday 28 August (Figure
2.8).
Precipitation and snow distribution
For the period 26 - 28 August, 100 mm to 140 mm of
precipitation was recorded on the plains in the Christ-
church area (Figure 2.9(a)). At the Botanic Gardens, a
72 hour precipitation of 120 mm has a return period of
about five years (Griffiths and Pearson 1993) indicat-
ing that such a storm is not particularly unusual. How-
ever, the 24 hour total of 56.5 mm to 9 am on the 27th,
was the highest ever in August at the airport showing
that high precipitation is not common in the winter
months. On the Port Hills, precipitation totals of over
200 mm were measured.
Midday 24 August 1992 Midday 25 August 1992
Figure 2.7: Surface synoptic conditions August 24 - 29 1992
4 deg
3 deg
2 deg
1 deg
0 deg
6am 9am noon 3pm 6pm 9pm midnight 3am 6am 9am noon 3pm 6pm
Thursday Friday
11.30pm cold
air arrives over
Christchurch.
Heavy snow
starts
Noon
warmer air
arrives, snow
turns to rain.
Figure 2.8: Temperature variations during the
August 1992 snowstorm (Kingsland 1993)
The snowfall distribution (Fig 2.9(b)) shows two main
differences when compared with total precipitation.
Firstly, the maximum amounts on the plains were
significantly further east into the eastern suburbs. This
may represent a local circulation effect though more
probably reflects the coincidence of heavier precipita-
tion with the period of colder temperatures in that area.
It seems unlikely that a corridor of consistently heavier
snowfall is indicated. Secondly, the effect of elevation
on temperature and the consequent effect on precipita-
tion type is also clear. The influence of elevation on
total precipitation amounts is well known and in this
instance results in a ratio of 2:1 between the Summit
Road and plains area total precipitation amounts. For
well mixed air, a lapse of 0.65C for each 100 m
increase in elevation is expected so snow is increas-
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
km
Rainfall depth (mm)
Wed 26 Aug to
Fri 28 Aug 1992
100
100
100
120
140
1
6
0 1
4
0
1
8
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
2
0
0
1
8
0
1
6
0
Figure 2.9(a): Total precipitation in the
Christchurch area, 26 to 28 August 1992
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
km
17
Estimated snow depth (cm)
Fri 28 Aug 1992
37
47
57
12
17
22
27
Figure 2.9(b): Estimated snow depth in the Christchurch 1992 snowstorm
(Christchurch City Council)
ingly more likely for higher elevations. Consequently
the ratio of snowdepths between the Port Hills summit
and the plains area ranges as high as 5:1. However, the
snow on the plains probably attained greater densities
than that on the Port Hills. Anecdotal evidence indi-
cates that, as expected, there was greater drifting on the
hills with drifts of over 2 m reported.
This second effect would definitely have to be built
into a snowstorm scenario for the Christchurch area.
There is little basis to assume that any particular pattern
of snow depth will occur on the plains area except that
depths are likely to decrease near the coast because of
the influence of the sea on temperatures. However, as
the 1992 storm showed, significant depths were re-
corded quite near the coastline.
Forecasting the 1992 storm
During 1992, there was some criticism of MetServices
performance in forecasting low elevation snowstorms,
particularly in relation to the mid-July storm. This was
attributed to loss of personnel and appropriate mete-
orological observations arising from funding short-
ages. However, since then two developments have
occurred to improve the capability of forecasting low
elevation snowstorms in the South Island. Firstly, the
policy of centralising all forecasting staff in Welling-
ton has been partly reversed and a forecast office is now
maintained in Christchurch. Secondly, MetService, in
response to criticisms of its performance, has estab-
lished a network of snow observers which should allow
early verification when snow is forecast or warnings
when it is not.
Snow loads
The maximum snow depth recorded on the plains was
30 cm. Even if a conservatively low density of 200
kgm
-3
is used, equation (1) gives a load of 0.6 kPa
which suggests that the New Zealand standard may be
somewhat low for Christchurch as densities were un-
doubtedly higher, particularly once precipitation turned
to rain after noon on Friday August 28.
Impacts of the August 1992 snowstorm
Damage to buildings
The most spectacular failure was the collapse of the
roof of the skating rink in Opawa. Other smaller
damages occurred particularly as a result of snow creep
onto guttering but no widespread damage was re-
ported.
Power supplies
Lines and poles were down over significant areas of the
city especially in the hill suburbs. However, most
power supply was restored by midday on Friday 28
August. Power supply to the Sugarloaf transmitter was
lost and fuel for the emergency generator was soon
depleted. It took two days before this could be replen-
ished.
Surface conditions
Although many people heeded radio broadcasts sug-
gesting that they not try to go to work, many vehicles
became involved in mishaps as a result of attempting to
drive in difficult conditions.
Flooding
Surface flooding occurred to a limited degree but is not
investigated in detail here.
Conclusions
Because of the more readily available recent informa-
tion, it seems better to use the August 1992 storm as a
basis for a snowstorm scenario. However, further re-
search may reveal more information about the 1945
event.
There is little reason to suggest anything other than a
reasonably uniform snow depth of about 30 cm on the
plains of metropolitan Christchurch with an increase to
approximately a metre on average on the Port Hills.
More work is needed to enumerate the impacts of such
snowfalls.
Acknowledgements
Arthur Tyndall provided valuable insight into design
standards relating to snowfall in New Zealand and
Andrew Nichols (Christchurch City Council) provided
information on August 1992 precipitation and snow
depth.
References
Chinn, T J (1981). Snowfall variations, hazards and
snowmelt, p 1-21 in Mountain Lands Workshop,
Water and Science Centre, Christchurch, M.W.D.
Fitzharris, B B, I F Owens and T J Chinn (1992). Snow
and Glacier Hydrology, p. 75-94 in Mosley, M P (ed)
Waters of New Zealand, N.Z. Hydrological Society.
Griffiths, G A and C P Pearson (1993) Distribution of
high intensity rainfalls in metropolitan Christchurch,
N.Z. Journ. Hydrology, 31(1):5-22.
Harris, D W (1981). Incidence of wind and snow on
rural reticulation, Weather and Climate 1 (2): 53-60.
Hughes, J C (1973). The snow of August 1973,
Tussock Grasslands and Mountain Lands Institute
Review, 30:64-100.
Kingsland, S (1992). A study of the meteorological
conditions accompanying the August 1992 snowstorm,
unpub. report GEOG 614, Geography Dept., Univer-
sity of Canterbury.
Neale, A A and G Thompson (1977). Meteorological
conditions accompanying heavy snowfalls in southem
New Zealand, N.Z. Met. Serv. Tech. Info. Circ.,
155,18p.
2.8 Slope Hazard and Damage
to Services on Hills
Introduction
The slope hazard to lifelines in Christchurch is essen-
tially confined to the Port Hills, and is likely to be
significant only during a severe rainstorm or earth-
quake. This hazard map is therefore to be read in
conjunction with the earthquake or local flooding
hazard maps. The hazard information is based on a
slope hazard zoning project for the Christchurch City
Council recently completed by Soils and Foundations
Ltd. This work was based on aerial photographic
analysis and field observation and divided the selected
hill areas into three simple zones of low, moderate and
high risk. Each zone broadly corresponds to a level of
slope hazard and recommends various degrees of
site investigation for future subdivision or building.
For existing hill subdivisions, the information is useful
for PIMS (Project Information Memoranda) and LIMS
(Land Information Memoranda) applications.
The Map
No attempt was made in the map (Map 5, page 288) to
separate the various types of potential slope hazard
(e.g. soil landslides, rockfall or rockroll, tunnel erosion
etc.) because this sort of site specific information can
only be adequately addressed at the site investigation
stage. It also complicates the final map. However, the
three simple categories separate the difficult ground
from areas that are generally more stable and much
more straight forward.
In the absence of any other rational way to address the
risk posed to services by slope processes in the hills, the
slope hazard zoning map has been used to highlight
areas where damage to services may be more concen-
trated.
The difficulty in doing this reflects the difference in
vulnerability between houses and services. For exam-
ple, buried services well keyed into rock in the high risk
zone may not be vulnerable to damage from soil
sliding, debris flows or falling rock debris.
Conversely a stable low risk area for housing may
contain locally unstable cut road batters of no risk to
existing houses but close enough to threaten services.
However, in the absence of an actual examination of
the critical services corridors in the field, this map is the
best current method to carry out a desk study. (Note:
the studies undertaken by the Task Groups were based
on the map but supplemented by a drive-over of the
likely critical areas by minibus. Representatives of
each of the service authorities were on the bus which
stopped at critical areas and the likely situation was
discussed with the engineering geologist who was
responsible for the map preparation.) The estimates of
the real extent of damage in the three zones is of
necessity arbitrary and subjective.
The event
The triggering event is assumed to be a 1 in 100-year
local rainstorm coming late in a relatively wet winter
when soil ground water levels are already high. Alter-
natively a similar pattern of damage could result from
a 1 in 100- or 150-year earthquake occurring in later
winter.
Slope hazard zones with respect to
services
See Map 5, page 288.
Zone 1
Low risk. Likely damage to services negligible.
Zone 2
Moderate risk. Likely damage may affect 10% to 20%
of area, normally where zone 2 is closest to zone 3. A
similar proportion (10% to 20%) of roads and overhead
services could be affected. For buried services damage
is likely to occur only from undermining or deep-
seated failure reducing the extent of damage to 5% to
10% of service length.
Zone 3
High Risk. Likely damage may affect up to 40% of
area. A similar proportion of the length of roads and
overhead services could be affected. Once again buried
services are likely to suffer less damage, say 10% to
20% of the service length.
Seismic Liquefaction and Lifelines 47
Chapter 3
Seismic Liquefaction and Lifelines
Abstract
An overview of the liquefaction problem is presented,
with emphasis on effects on engineering lifelines. The
distinction is drawn between liquefaction flow failures
and deformation failures, corresponding in the labora-
tory to the difference in behaviour of loose and dense
sands in undrained tests. Methods for predicting level-
ground liquefaction potential using in-situ tests are
reviewed. The CPT test is favoured over the SPT. The
problem of flow failure versus cyclic mobility is dis-
cussed and an approach to estimating the stability of
dam slopes against flow failures is sketched in outline.
The success of the Newmark sliding-block method in
modelling deformation failures is noted. References
are given to studies of a number of other aspects of
liquefaction not covered in this review.
3.1 Introduction
Liquefaction of fine-grained, cohesionless soils has
been a major cause of damage in earthquakes. Lique-
faction damage has occurred either directly, through
failure of foundations, slopes and embankments, for
example, or indirectly through damage to lifelines.
Loss of water for fire fighting, leading to uncontrolled
spread of fire is a common example of indirect damage.
Although evidence of liquefaction can be found in
most major historical earthquakes, and research into
both its causes and effects had been pursued well
before 1964, it was the Niigata, Japan and Anchorage,
Alaska earthquakes of that year which compelled wide-
spread recognition of the importance of liquefaction
and gave impetus to the large amount of research that
followed and continues to the present day. Liquefac-
tion-induced damage to many different sorts of life-
lines in Kobe in the 1995 Hyogo-ken-Nambu Earth-
quake confirms the devastating potential of seismic
liquefaction.
It is instructive to review the effects of liquefaction at
Niigata and Anchorage. We see the same sorts of
damage occurring to greater or lesser extent in most
earthquakes with magnitude of 6 or more. The city of
Niigata is located on the west coast of Japan and is
founded on 30 m or so of alluvial sand deposited by the
Shinano River (Figure 3.1). The M7.5 earthquake of
information which was presented at the workshop and
extended it to describe in more detail some prediction
procedures with particular reference to tests that were
undertaken by the University of Canterbury as part of the
Lifelines Project. Over 30 tests are at present (1997) being
undertaken in critical areas so the explanation gives some
detail on the cone penetrometer test which is used.
The 1993 Wellington Lifelines Earthquake Group Report
Section 1.5 dealt with the consequences of liquefaction for
Lifelines and since this was of considerable use in the
Christchurch Project it has, with the permission of the
Wellington Earthquake Lifelines Group, been reproduced
in this section.
A team from the Wellington Earthquake Lifelines Group
and the Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Project went
to Kobe in August 1995 and those who saw the consider-
able damage caused to lifelines facilities as a result of
liquefaction during the 1995 Hyogoken-Nanbu (Kobe)
earthquake are well aware of the potential for very exten-
sive damage in eastern Christchurch.
With so much of the eastern side of Christchurch being
potentially subject to liquefaction, an understanding of
the potential effects of liquefaction on the various engi-
neering services is particularly important for Christ-
church.
At the Project Workshop, Dr John B. Berrill, Reader in
Civil Engineering at the University of Canterbury, gave a
presentation on liquefaction for the non-geotechnical
engineers dealing with the causes and effects of liquefac-
tion to help the engineer considering the likely effects on
a service located in a sandy deposit. The presentation
dealt with the gross mechanism of liquefaction, some
slides showing the effect, the soil conditions that are
necessary to provoke liquefaction, some of the methods of
predicting level ground liquefaction, and then what the
University of Canterbury did to help look at some key sites
in the lifelines network of Christchurch.
It has not been possible to include in this book the full text
of the presentation, or the slides presented, but Dr. Berrill
has, in the paper that follows, included much of the
16 June, with epicentre about 50 km offshore to the
north, caused extensive liquefaction in loose sands,
especially in low-lying fill and old river channel mate-
rial along the lower reaches of the Shinano River.
Damage included the settlement and tilting of build-
ings, with some structures settling by a metre or more
and tilting several degrees off vertical. In one case an
apartment building (Figure 3.2) tilted as much as 80 as
soil beneath its foundation liquefied. Lateral spreading
on shallow slopes of just a few degrees caused wide-
spread damage to buried services and to bridge and
building foundations. Light-weight buried structures
floated upwards in liquefied sands. Settlement re-
sulted in inundation of already low-lying areas, and the
ejected sand itself proved to be a great nuisance,
clogging pipes and hindering recovery operations.
Liquefaction was much less prevalent in the denser
dune sand along the shore.
Figure 3.2: Result of liquefaction-induced founda-
tion failure on apartment buildings at Niigata
Lateral displacement of the piers of the Showa Bridge
(Figure 3.3), for example, caused five simply sup-
ported spans to fall. Other bridges suffered less dra-
matic but nevertheless important damage. Lateral
spreading also caused severe damage to embankments
and to railway yards.
Figure 3.3: Effect of lateral spreading on the
Showa Bridge, Niigata, 1964.
Lateral spreading is probably the principal cause of
damage to lifelines. It may occur in slopes of a few
degrees or in level ground in the presence of a bank or
river channel. The mechanism is quite simple. Con-
sider the free-body diagram shown in Figure 3.4, in
which below the watertable we have liquefied soil
exerting a pressure of gz on the left hand side of the
body, where is bulk density of the soil and g is the
acceleration due to gravity. This is opposed on the
right hand end by a pressure distribution going as
w
gz,
where
w
is the density of water. Since the bulk density
0 1000 2000 m
Echigo Line
Shinanogawa
Bridge
Niigata St
Niigata City
S
h
in
a
n
o

R
iv
e
r
A
g
a
n
o

R
i
v
e
r
S
h
in
e
ts
u
L
in
e
Flooding Area
Damaged area
Area ravaged by fire
Collapse of quay wall
Coast sand dune
Remarks
Sekiya St
Hakusan St
Showa
Bridge
Figure 3.1: City of Niigata, Japan, which suffered widespread liquefaction damage in the Magnitude 7.5
earthquake of 1964. Epicentral distance was about 50 km (From Yamada, 1966)
Mechanism of lateral spreading of level river bank
Consider free body:
River channel
gz
z
= Bulk density 1.7t/m
3
w
= density of water = 1.0t/m
3
Liquefied soil
w
gz
Figure 3.4: Free-body diagram of soil mass undergoing lateral spreading. Out-of-balance forces towards
river channel drive lateral motion.
of soil is about twice that of water, there is an out-of-
balance force towards the channel, driving the lateral
spreading. Because of dilatancy effects, the soil prob-
ably stiffens and reliquefies a number of times during
the shaking; thus the spreading takes place in a series
of increments and its magnitude is limited.
Above the watertable, the soil is partially saturated, not
liquefied, and generally somewhat brittle. As it rafts
along on the underlying liquefied soil, it cracks into
blocks. Relative movement of these blocks is very
damaging to buried services, and the unliquefied crust
can impose large forces (in the limit, passive forces) on
piled foundations and other restrained structures.
In addition to lateral displacements, liquefaction usu-
ally results in ground settlement. To give an idea of the
magnitudes involved, let us consider the Landing Road
Bridge site at Whakatane, New Zealand, in the 1987
Edgecumbe earthquake. Here, the ground surface
settled by about 300 mm over an area about one km
long and about 300 m wide parallel to the river (Figure
3.5). Lateral movement at the left river bank was about
1.5 m. This movement was due to liquefaction of a
layer of very recent loose sand, 4 m thick, during the
quite modest magnitude 6.3 earthquake (Berrill and
Christensen, 1995). At the Showa Bridge in Niigata,
about 8 m of lateral displacement occurred. In larger
earthquakes, such as the Alaskan Earthquake, greater
settlements and spreading have been observed.
The M8.4 Alaska earthquake of 27 March, 1964 caused
several landslides in and around the city of Anchorage.
While there is some doubt about the role of liquefaction
in the large Turnagain Heights slide which occurred
principally in clay soil, there were several lateral spread-
ing failures that have been attributed to liquefaction of
sands as well as flow failures due to liquefaction, most
notably, the Potter Hill slide (Long, 1973). Numerous
bridges were damaged in the Alaska earthquake. The
class of bridges suffering the greatest damage were
those founded on piles driven into loose to medium-
dense fine sands and coarse silts. Here, lateral spread-
ing of foundation soils towards stream channels caused
displacements of abutments and pier structures, failure
of piles and settlements, often damaging the bridge
superstructure as well (Figure 3.6). Spreading of
approach fills was also common. Much of this damage
was attributed to liquefaction of fine sands (Ross et al.,
1973). Bridges on piles driven into medium or coarse
sands suffered considerably less damage, while those
structures founded directly on rock were hardly dam-
aged at all.
Figure 3.5: Landing Road Bridge, Whakatane,
New Zealand, looking downstream
Lateral spreading of the left bank extended 300
m back from the river channel. Horizontal dis-
placement was as much as 1.5 m; settlement
was about 300 mm. The buried bridge founda-
tions resisted the spreading, inducing passive
failure in the layer of unliquefied soil above the
watertable. Lateral forces of about 1 MN were
generated at each pier.
momentarily (twice) during a loading cycle. During
the remainder of the cycle effective confining stresses
are significant, and hence considerable strength re-
mains. These two different behaviours are illustrated
in Figure 3.8, taken from Ishihara (1985), showing the
results of undrained cyclic torsional shear tests on a
uniform, medium sand.
A very rapid build-up of excess pore pressure and
subsequent loss of strength, together with the develop-
ment of large strains are characteristics of seismic
liquefaction of loose sands. The behaviour of the dense
sand in which strain amplitudes build-up in small
increments, is termed cyclic mobility. In the field,
liquefaction of loose sands can lead to flow failures of
slopes and large displacements of foundations. Cyclic
mobility, on the other hand, results in limited soil
displacement, seen for example in the limited settle-
ment and deformation of some earth dams during
earthquakes.
Thus liquefaction problems (using the term liquefac-
tion in the broad sense) fall into two classes, depend-
ing on whether the soil is loose or dense. The seismic
behaviour of a soil mass also depends on whether or not
shear strength is required for static equilibrium. For
example, a sand deposit with a level ground surface
may loose its shear strength entirely yet still remain in
static equilibrium. On the other hand, some shear
strength is always required to maintain a slope or a
loaded foundation in static equilibrium.
The case of liquefaction of loose deposits in level
ground has been widely studied, and there are many
Figure 3.6: An effect of lateral spreading in the
Alaskan Earthquake of 1964
The damage seen in 1964 at Niigata and in Alaska, and
in most other earthquakes before and since, illustrates
the principal classes of liquefaction problem and brings
out the importance of soil density and particle grading.
3.2 Fundamentals
Let us review some fundamental concepts. Firstly,
under cyclic loading in shear, cohesionless materials
tend to decrease in volume [provided a small shear
strain threshold of about 0.01 percent is exceeded
(Dobry et al., 1980)]. This tendency to decrease in
volume is much greater in loose than in dense soils.
Nevertheless, it is also present in dense soils. When the
soil is saturated and drainage of pore water is pre-
vented, the tendency to volume decrease under cyclic
loading results instead in an increase in pore pressure.
In the laboratory, this effect can be obtained by carry-
ing out undrained tests on saturated samples of
cohesionless soil; in the field, drainage is impeded
naturally by the low permeability of fine-grained soils.
Thus cohesionless soils with low permeability, such as
fine sands and silts, exhibit pore pressure increase
under seismic loading, and are the most susceptible to
liquefaction. Ranges of most critical gradings, ob-
tained from field studies by Tsuchida and Hayashi
(1971), are shown in Figure 3.7.
With loose sands, laboratory tests show that pore
pressure increase occurs rapidly and that pore pressure
can approach effective confining pressure in a few
cycles of cyclic loading. In a dense specimen of the
same sand, many more cycles of a generally greater
amplitude are required to produce a condition of initial
liquefaction, where pore pressure u equals initial effec-
tive confining pressure
. Furthermore, with the

loose sand, u remains near
during subsequent cy-

cles of loading. Consequently, effective confining
stress, and hence strength, becomes and remains small.
On the other hand, in dense sand u approaches
only
Clay Silt Sand Gravel
Particle Size (mm)
Clay Silt Sand Gravel
Particle Size (mm)
100
75
50
25
0
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e

f
i
n
e
r

b
y

w
e
i
g
h
t
0.01 0.1 1.0 10
100
75
50
25
0
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e

f
i
n
e
r

b
y

w
e
i
g
h
t
0.01 0.1 1.0 10
For Soils of Uniform Grading
For Well Graded Soils
Very easily
liquefy
Easily liquefy
(A)
(B) (B)
(B) (B)
(A)
Easily liquefy
Very easily liquefy
Figure 3.7: Tsuchidas curves for grading ranges
of liquefiable soils (from Iwasaki, 1986)
procedures for estimating whether or not a particular
deposit is likely to liquefy in a given earthquake. Some
involve laboratory testing, others in situ testing.
The widely-used technique of Seed and Idriss (Seed
and Idriss, 1971; Seed et al. 1985) is an example of the
latter. Procedures for solution of other cases are not as
well established, and are still largely in the province of
research. For the case of flow failures in loose sands,
the work of Castro et al. (1985) and Dobry et al. (1984)
offer procedures for estimating whether or not a slope
is stable. Bartlett and Youd (1992) present a method
for estimating lateral spreading distances, and the work
of ORourke and Pease (1992) allows likely damage to
buried pipes to be estimated.
Tsuchidas (1970) grading curves point to the general
importance of geological considerations. Loose, fine-
grained sediments are deposited only under certain
geologic conditions, and resistance to liquefaction
increases with age, as weathering, cementation and,
certainly, other processes cause the fabric of a soil to
develop. Tinsley and Dupr (1992) find very clear
correlations between geologic history and liquefaction
effects in the Monterey Bay area during the 1989 Loma
Prieta earthquake. They note that laterally accreted
structures such as point-bar formations (e.g. at Landing
Road Bridge, Figure 3.5) are especially susceptibly to
liquefaction, and the effect of age was very evident,
with lateral spreading, for example, being restricted to
late Holocene deposits.
These basic aspects of the liquefaction problem are
discussed in more detail in the remainder of this chap-
ter, as is an outline of some of the methods of solution
proposed.
3.3 Level Ground Liquefaction
Although liquefaction of level ground does not cause
as great a threat to life and limb as do flow and bearing
capacity failures, it is responsible for very costly mate-
rial losses, chiefly through damage to buried pipelines,
but also through damage to pavements and other sur-
face works. The main surface manifestation of the
liquefaction of an underlying layer is the formation of
sand boils, in which sand and water are ejected through
fissures or circular vents, leaving shallow cones of
sand on the ground surface. Scott and Zuckerman
(1973) have studied the formation of sand boils in the
laboratory. Their experiments indicate that a layer of
finer grained soil overlying the liquefiable soil is
necessary for the formation of sand boils. The vent
itself is formed by the upwards enlargement of a cavity
which begins at the base of the upper layer as it unravels
Dense sand
0.4
0.6
0.2
0.4
0.6
5
3
5 3
d/
o
' = 0.717
D
r
= 75%
o
'= 98 kN/m
2
Torsional shear test
Fuji river sand
0.6
0.3
0
0.3
0.6
5
0
5
1.0
0.5
0
u
/
o
'
Y

(
%
)
d
/
o
'
d/
o
' = 0.717 D
r
= 75%
o
'= 98 kN/m
2
(b) Dense sand (relative density D
r
= 75%)
d
o
'
(%)
Stress-strain curve
(a) Loose sand (relative density D
r
= 47%)
0.2
0.1
0
0.1
0.2
10
5
0
5
10
1.0
0.5
0
u
/
o
'
Y

(
%
)
d
/
o
'
d/
o
' = 0.229
D
r
= 47%
o
'= 98 kN/m
2
k
o
= 1.0
Torsional shear
test
5
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.2
3 5
d/
o
' = 0.229
D
r
= 47%
o
'= 98 kN/m
2
Fuji river sand
d
o
'
(%)
Shear strain
Loose sand
7
0.4
3
Stress-strain curve
cyclic stress
ratio
shear strain
normalised
pore pressure
cyclic stress
ratio
shear strain
normalised
pore pressure
time
time
Shear strain
Cyclic stress
ratio
Cyclic stress
ratio
Figure 3.8: Results of cyclic torsional shear tests on (a) loose and (b) dense specimens of Fuji River sand
(From Ishihara, 1985)
in an unstable, localised fashion into the underlying
liquefied sand-water mixture. Once the vent has bro-
ken through to the surface, sand and water are ejected,
driven by the hydraulic gradient which is generated as
the liquefied layer carries the full weight of the over-
burden as a fluid pressure.
Florin and Ivanov (1961) noted from laboratory ex-
periments that, given uniform density, liquefaction
begins at the top of a layer and propagates downwards.
They also observed that the tendency to liquefaction
decreases with increasing overburden or confining
pressure. This observation has been made independ-
ently by Seed and Lee (1966) and by many other
researchers.
Both Scott and Zuckerman and Florin and Ivanov also
observed that subsequent solidification (the opposite
of liquefaction) begins at the bottom of the liquefied
layer and proceeds upwards, as particles settle out of
suspension. Scott and Zuckerman also observed that a
denser granular layer overlying a loose layer may be
induced to liquefy as support for its solid skeleton is
lost as the underlying layer liquefies, even though this
layer would not liquefy on its own. They term this
secondary liquefaction. Here, a liquefaction front
propagates upwards. Some of the Niigata foundation
failures have been attributed to secondary liquefaction,
provoked by the initial liquefaction of a deeper layer.
In general, an intact surface layer overlying a liquefied
stratum floats on a fluid of quite similar density to its
own. Therefore it has a tendency to sink to establish
equilibrium. Any departure from uniform density,
thickness or surface loading will tend to induce bend-
ing stress in the surface layer which, if brittle, may
crack. Fissures and cracks are commonly associated
with level-ground liquefaction, and are the cause of
great damage to buried pipes. Youd (1984) terms this
disruption ground oscillation (as blocks of cracked
surface material move relative to one another) and
states that ground oscillation together with lateral
spreading have caused more property damage in earth-
quakes this century than flow and bearing capacity
failures.
Prediction Procedures
Procedures for predicting the liquefaction potential of
level ground sites fall into two classes. Those based on
laboratory testing of field specimens, and those based
on in situ testing. Because of the difficulty of obtaining
undisturbed samples of cohesionless soils, methods
based on in situ test results have become more com-
mon, and we will focus on them. These methods are all,
to some degree, empirical.
Whether or not a site will liquefy in an earthquake
depends both on the strength of shaking (seismic
loading) at the site and on the state of the soil. The
seismic loading can be characterised in a local fashion
for example, by peak acceleration a
max
or modified
Mercalli intensity I at the site, or by a source descrip-
tion using, for example, magnitude M and epicentral
distance, r
e
. Liao, Veneziano and Whitman (1988)
have made a rigorous evaluation of both types of model
and conclude that in the study of a specific site, local
characterisation fits case history data better. But the
advantage is lost when the value of the local ground
motion parameter must be estimated separately by an
empirical attenuation expression. Thus, for regional
hazard mapping, say, it is better to go straight to a
source-type liquefaction model.
By tradition in the US, Japan, and many other seismic
countries, the state of cohesionless soils has been
characterised in situ by the Standard Penetration Test
(SPT). This is somewhat fortuitous, since the SPT N-
value (the blow count) is related to relative density
which, together with effective confining pressure, pro-
vides a measure of the tendency of the soil to dilate or
contract under shearing. However, the SPT has some
serious disadvantages especially in loose sands and
silts. These will be discussed later. Furthermore, a lack
of adequate standardisation has led to a wide range of
hammer efficiencies and to the need for corrections to
a reference efficiency, usually 60% (Seed et al., 1985).
Correction for overburden pressure is also required if
the N-value is to correspond to soil density.
Liao and Whitman (1986) review the overburden cor-
rection problem and recommend correcting the meas-
ured value of N to a value normalised to an effective
overburden pressure of 1 ton/sq.ft (100 kPa) by the
formula
N
1
=C
N
N (1)
where N
1
denotes the corrected value of N,
C
N
= 100 /
(2)
and where
is effective overburden stress in kPa.

Seeds Procedure
The first and still most widely-used procedure for
evaluating whether or not a site is likely to liquefy is
that of Seed and Idriss (1971), which has been modified
successively over the years. A local characterisation of
the earthquake loading is employed.
Seismic loading on the soil layer is characterised by an
average cyclic stress ratio
av
/
given by the expres-

sion:
av
=
a
max
g

o
r
d
C
M
0. 65
(3)
where
av
is equivalent average shear stress,
o
is total
overburden stress, a
max
/g is peak ground acceleration as
a fraction of g, r
d
is a factor to account for soil flexibil-
ity, and C
M
is a magnitude correction factor.
This expression is derived by considering the equilib-
rium of a rigid soil column under a horizontal accelera-
tion a
max
. The factor of 0.65 allows for an average shear
stress somewhat less than the peak stress correspond-
ing to peak acceleration. Allowance for flexible rather
than rigid response of the overlying soil mass is made
by the term r
d
, which is conveniently obtained, follow-
ing Japanese practice (Iwasaki, 1986), from the expres-
sion:
r
d
=(10. 015z) (4)
where z is depth in metres. The factor C
M
takes the
value unity for M = 7.5 (reflecting the procedures
origins in Niigata data); its value for other magnitudes
may be found from Table 3.1.
Earthquake
Magni tude
Number of
Representati ve
Cycles at 0.65
max
Correction
Factor
C
M
8.5 26 0.89
7.5 15 1.0
6.75 10 1.13
6.0 5-6 1.32
5.25 2-3 1.5
Table 3.1: Magnitude Correction Factor C
M
Originally, Seed and Idriss applied the C
M
factor at a
later stage; this chapter follows Liao et al. (1988) in
incorporating it in the loading expression, since it does
indeed represent a loading effect.
The soil is characterised by its SPT N-value, corrected
for overburden pressure using equation (1) and to a
hammer efficiency of 60%, using the information in
Table 3.2. The resulting corrected SPT blow count is
denoted by the symbol (N
1
)
60
.
The final step in the procedure is to check whether or
not the seismic loading given by equation (3) exceeds
a threshold value obtained for that soil state (N
1
)
60
. The
threshold value of
av
/
is found in the chart repro-

duced in Figure 3.9, derived empirically from liquefac-
tion case histories (Seed et al., 1985).
Figure 3.9 contains three curves, for different fines
contents. In their appraisal of liquefaction prediction
methods, Liao et al. (1988) investigated how well their
comprehensive set of case history data supports such a
marked influence of fines content. They conclude that
while the presence of more than a moderate percentage
of fines does have an effect on probability of liquefac-
tion, the effect is not nearly as marked as Figure 3.3
indicates. The data does not suggest a progressive
increase in resistance with increasing fines content. It
does, however, support a division into two classes:
clean sand and silty sand, with a fines content of 12%
as the dividing line. Liao et al. point out that the curves
for soils with fines in Figure 3.9 are based on laboratory
tests on specimens at constant relative density, D
r
, not
at constant (N
1
)
60
. The field data in terms of (N
1
)
60
does
not show such a strong effect. Liao et al. note further
that when seismic loading is represented by magnitude
and distance rather than peak acceleration at the site,
the uncertainties associated with attenuation over-
whelm the distinction between clean and silty soil.
Thus when a source characterization of the earthquake
is employed, it is not worth the trouble of distinguish-
ing between silty and clean sand deposits.
Country Hammer
Type
Hammer
Rel ease
Estimated
Rod Energy
(Percent)
Correction
Factor for
60 Percent
Rod Energy
Japan
a
Donut Free-fall 78 78/60 = 1.30
Donut Rope and pulley
with special throw
release
67 67/60 = 1.12
United
States
Safety
Donut
b
Rope and pulley
Rope and pulley
60
45
60/60 = 1.00
45/60 = 0.75
Argentina Donut Rope and pulley 45 45/60 = 0.75
China
Donut
Donut
Free-fall
c
Rope and pulley
60
50
60/60 = 1.00
50/60 = 0.83
a
Japanese SPT results have additional corrections for borehole diameter and frequency effects.
b
Prevalent method in the United States today.
c
Pilcon-type hammers develop an energy ratio of about 60 percent.
Table 3.2: Summary of Energy Ratios for Various SPT Procedures (from Seed et al., 1985)
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
10 20 30 40 50 0
Percent Fines = 35 15 5
C
y
c
l
i
c

s
t
r
e
s
s

r
a
t
i
o

c
a
u
s
i
n
g

l
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n
o
'
a
v
FINES CONTENT 5%
Modified Chinese Code Proposal (clay content = 5%)
Marginal
Liquefaction
No
Liquefaction Liquefaction
Pan-American data
Japanese data
Chinese data
(N
1
)
60
Corrected SPT blow count
17
29
37
23
10
20
31
20
12
50+
27
60
80
10
10
20
10
10
12
12
12
50
30
22
20
20
20
20
18
11
80
10
25
12
30
13
50+
20
27
75
75
60
10
52
50+
25
40
10
30
67
27
13
10
31
Figure 3.9: Relationship between Stress Ratios Causing Liquefaction and (N
1
)
60
Values, from Seed et al. (1985)
Finn (1992) raises a further point with regard to the
effect of fines. The greater liquefaction resistance for
silty sands implied in Figure 3.9, and observed by Liao
et al., is seen when comparisons are made at similar
values of (N
1
)
60
. However, Troncoso (1990) found that
cyclic strength decreased with increasing silt content
when he compared samples at constant void ratio.
Furthermore, Kuerbis and Vaid (1989) tested a particu-
lar sand at constant sand-skeleton void ratio. This
sand-skeleton could accommodate up to 20% fines.
They found that for fines contents of less than 20%, the
specimens had the same cyclic strength. Finn observes
that from another point of view, these results imply that
the penetration resistance of a silty sand is somewhat
less than that of a clean sand with the same cyclic
strength. Thus the presence of silt does not increase
liquefaction resistance; it simply reduces the SPT N
value. Ishihara (1993) has found that it requires the
addition of cohesive fines to truly increase liquefaction
resistance. He found that if the plasticity index, I
p
, is
less than about 12 there is no increase in resistance.
Energy Dissipation Approach
When good estimates of ground motion intensity are
not available for the site, it is more appropriate to use
a procedure based on magnitude and distance to the
earthquake source. One such model is that of Davis &
Berrill (1982), which performed well amongst a number
of procedures of that type tested by Liao et al. (1988).
The model is based on the suggestion of Nemat-Nasser
and Shokooh (1979) that pore pressure increase is
proportional to the density of seismic energy dissi-
pated.
Its derivation, which uses well-established results from
seismology and soil mechanics, and seeks to keep
empirical steps to a minimum, proceeds as follows.
Combining the expression of Gutenberg and Richter
(1954) for total radiated energy with a simple geomet-
ric spreading rule, yields the density of seismic energy
arriving at the site. Hardin (1965) found that energy
dissipation is proportional to ( )
1/2
. Using this result

and the assumption that u is proportional to the
density of dissipated energy yields the following ex-
pression for seismic pore pressure increase:
u=
(N
1
)10
1.5M
r
2
( )
1/ 2
(5)
where is an unknown function of the corrected SPT
value N
1
, characterising the state of the soil. The
function (N
1
) is then found from case history data
using linear discriminant theory to give the final result:
u=
450 10
1. 5M
r
2
(N
1
)
60
2
( )
1/ 2
(6)
Here, r is expressed in metres,
in kPa, and (N
1
)
60
is
substituted for N
1
which was used in the original
derivation. Its simple functional form makes equation
(6) particularly suited to probabilistic hazard analysis,
and an example is worked in the original paper. Liao
et al. (1988) observe that this model does not perform
well with respect to their data set for dense sands, and
caution against using it for N
1
> 20. Furthermore,
because of the simple 1/r
2
attenuation rule, it does not
work well in the near field of the earthquake source,
where the rupture cannot be idealized as a point source.
However the energy-dissipation approach has much
merit, and the authors are continuing to develop it
(Davis and Berrill, 1996).
Liao et al. themselves devised an expression for prob-
ability of liquefaction P
L
which employs the same
seismic loading term, namely:
10
1. 5M
r
e
2
( )
3/ 2
=
(7)
but which was calibrated to their larger and more
complete data set. Their expression is:
PL =1/ 1+ exp[12. 922 0.87213 n( ) +0. 21056(N1 )60 ] { }
e
e (8)
Here, r
e
is epicentral distance. They present a corre-
sponding expression in terms of hypocentral distance,
which fits the data a little better.
Remarks on the SPT and CPT
The shortcomings of the SPT for use in liquefaction
analyses have been discussed at length in the literature,
especially in connection with energy standardisation
(by Seed et al., 1985; Liao and Whitman, 1985, for
example). Apart from the problem of standardising
energy input, the test has two major difficulties when
employed in loose sands and silts. The first arises from
the discrete nature of the blow count. For a perfectly
executed test yielding a blow count of 5, for example,
the resolution of the discrete scale is no better than
10%. With N then raised to the power 2, as in equation
(6) for example, an even greater uncertainty is intro-
duced. The second objection comes from the difficulty
in obtaining a clean drill hole, without disturbing the
material in the test region at the bottom of the boring. It
has been the writers experience that even with careful
rotary boring with mud, it is often difficult to avoid
disturbance at the bottom of the hole. Even experi-
enced drillers operating under research conditions have
had difficulty in very loose sands. The writer is quite
sceptical of N-values of much less than 6.
These considerations, together with the problem of
energy standardisation, have led us at Canterbury Uni-
versity to adopt the cone penetration test (CPT) in our
studies of liquefaction sites in New Zealand. Not only
does the CPT offer more precision, but also it is
repeatable and gives a continuous measurement of soil
resistance rather than the discrete measurements of the
SPT, spaced at 1 m or greater centres. Some care is
required in interpreting cone resistance in thin layers
(Vreugdenhil et al., 1993) but generally, the CPT is a
robust test.
A cutaway drawing of a standard cone penetrometer is
shown in Figure 3.10 (the cross-sectional area of the
standard cone is 10 cm
2
, giving a diameter of 35.7 mm).
The basic cone has two instrumented sections: the 60
conical point and the sleeve immediately behind the
point. The load carried by each is expressed as a stress;
the cone resistance q
c
in the case of the point and sleeve
function f
s
in the case of the sleeve.
Cone resistance q
c
gives a measure of the overall
strength or, more fundamentally, density in the case of
cohesionless soils. Sleeve friction is more usefully
35.7 mm
Sleeve
Pore
pressure
filter
Cone
Sleeve friction
Cone resistance
Friction ratio
Pore pressure
parameter
R
f
=
f
s
q
c
B
q
=
u u
o
q
c
s
zo
f
s
=
sleeve force
sleeve area
q
c
=
cone force
projected area
Figure 3.10: Cone penetrometer, showing
instrumented conical point and sleeve and
pressure transducer
expressed as a friction ratio, R
f
= f
s
/q
c
. It serves as an
indicator of soil type. Cohesionless soils have a small
friction ratio of one or two percent or less; silts and
clays have friction ratios in the vicinity or exceeding
five percent, depending on the value of q
c
. Several
interpretation charts have been proposed (Meigh, 1987).
One simple one due to Robertson and Campanella is
shown in Figure 3.11.
Some penetrometers also have a pore pressure trans-
ducer, usually placed between the cone and the friction
sleeve. These cones are called piezocones and the test
denoted by CPTU rather than CPT. At the filter (Figure
3.10), the pore pressure u deviates from its hydrostatic
value u
o
depending on the type of soil, its permeability
and its density. Interpretation of excess pore pressure
u = u - u
o
is not yet perfected, but at very least it gives
a finer definition of strata interfaces than the other two
quantities (q
c
or f
s
). However, it is difficult to obtain
good hydraulic contact between the ground water and
the transducer; the necessary de-airing of the filter
circuit and maintaining saturation above the water
table is not simple, and adds considerably to the cost of
the test. For everyday use at the time of writing (1997)
the added complication of the CPTU is generally not
warranted.
Returning to the liquefaction problem, we note that
since there is a well established relationship between
them, CPT cone resistance values, q
c ,
can be converted
to SPT N-values for use in SPT-based procedures such
as the two described above. The q
c
-N correlation of
Robertson & Campanella (1985), shown in Figure
3.12, is widely used for this purpose.
Cone Penetration Methods
Some procedures originally based on SPT have been
converted to CPT using the q
c
-N relationship. Other
procedures have been formulated directly in terms of
q
c
, using CPT field data. These include the method of
Shibata and Teparaska (1988) and the well-known
Chinese method (Zhou, 1980). These procedures
benefit from the greater precision and sensitivity of the
CPT, but they do not fully exploit its potential to
estimate grain size and, in the case of the piezocone test
(CPTU), drainage conditions.
40
20
10
8
6
4
2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Sands
Silty
sands
Sandy silts
and silts
Clayey silts
and silty
clays
Clays
Peat
Friction ratio, R
f
(%)
C
o
n
e

r
e
s
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
,

q
c

(
M
N
/
m
2
)
Figure 3.11: Soil identification chart (after
Robertson and Campanella, 1985)
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
0.001 0.01 0.1 1.0
Mean Grain Size, D
50
, mm
R
a
t
i
o
,

q
c

/
N
CLAYEY SILTS
& SILTY CLAY
SANDY SILT
& SILT SILTY SAND SAND
q
c
, bars; N, blows/foot (1 bar = 100 kPa)
CLAY
10
12
9
11
8
5
4
12
7 6
11
9
9
12
13
4
2
5
3
9
11 10
7
15
1
12
13
14
4
8
5
4
9
16
13
Figure 3.12: Variation of q
c
/N with mean grain size (from Robertson and Campanella, 1985)
In an attempt to make better use of the diagnostic
capability of the piezocone, Dou and Berrill (1991,
1993) have employed the pattern recognition tech-
nique from information theory, together with case
history data, to develop a procedure for estimating the
probability of liquefaction, using all three CPTU meas-
urements. So far, the procedure has been implemented
using a fast mainframe computer and a limited set of
calibration data, to demonstrate its viability. With
Pentium computers and the larger set of piezocone data
now available, it should be possible to develop a
practical procedure for use in engineering practice.
3.4 Christchurch Lifelines
Study
As part of the Christchurch Engineering Lifelines
Study, estimates of liquefaction potential were made at
key sites (Figure 3.13) in the Christchurch lifelines
networks. The 16 sites examined represented principal
nodes in the networks, such as water and sewage
pumping stations, telephone exchanges and electrical
substations. Of the 16 sites, it was found that 12 might
liquefy in the scenario earthquake.
The analysis was a simple one, based on CPT testing to
characterise the site soils, and three published proce-
dures for estimating liquefaction potential. A typical
CPT log is shown in Figure 3.14a, together with plots
of threshold values of cone resistance q
c
for liquefac-
tion under the scenario earthquake (McCahon et al.,
1997) according to the three procedures (Zhou, 1980;
Shibata and Teparaska, 1988; Davis and Berrill, 1982).
Note the divergence between the results of the different
procedures, illustrating the uncertainty associated with
these simple models of a complex phenomenon. Nev-
ertheless, taken together they give a clear indication of
whether or not there is likely to be a problem at a
particular site.
In a study of various liquefaction models, Vreugdenhil
(1995) found that the criterion of Davis and Berrill is
the most likely to correctly predict liquefaction or not,
whereas the other two are more conservative. There-
fore, the following interpretation was adopted, illus-
trated in Figure 3.14b. If the cone resistance of the soil
falls below all three criteria, indicated by single cross-
hatching in Figure 3.14b, the layer is deemed to be
liquefiable in the scenario earthquake; if it fails the two
conservative criteria but not the third, it is deemed to be
AVON
D
U
D
LE
Y
CREEK
H
E
A
T
H
C
O
TE
RIVER
TRAVIS ROAD
P
A
G
E
S
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
D
Y
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
C
R
A
N
F
O
R
D
S
T
R
E
E
T
P
A
P
A
N
U
I
R
O
A
D
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
D
ESTUARY
BLENHEIM ROAD
WINTERS ROAD
RICCARTON RD
H
A
R
E
W
O
O
D
R
O
A
D
F
E
R
R
Y
RO
AD
IN
N
E
S
R
O
A
D
KEY
SHAKING ZONES
ZONE 1
ZONE 2
ZONE 3
Bedrock at shallow depth
Sediments less than 50m deep
Sediments 50-800m depth
LIQUEFACTION ZONES
ZONE 2A
ZONE 2B
ZONE 3A
ZONE 3B
Predominantly sands 2-10m
depth
Predominantly silts and
sandy silts 2-5m depth
Predominantly sands 2-10m
depth
Predominantly silts and sandy
silts 2-5m depth
CPT probes: likely to liquefy
CPT probes: non-liquefiable
CPT probes: liquefaction uncertain
0 1 2
Figure 3.13: Plan of Christchurch, showing the 16 key sites studied for liquefaction potential, as part of the
Engineering Lifelines Project. Note that 12 of the 16 sites might liquefy under the scenario earthquake
at some risk but not necessarily liquefiable under the
present scenario earthquake.
Note that the lines in Figure 3.14a showing the three
liquefaction criteria are not continuous. If the combi-
nation of cone resistance and friction ratio, R
f
, in a
given stratum show that the soil is too fine to liquefy
according to the criterion of Robertson and Campanella
(1985), then the line is not plotted in that layer. Thus,
even though the measured q
c
falls below the criteria, the
soil at that depth is deemed not susceptible to liquefac-
tion.
Although the study was a fairly broad-brush one, both
in the density of sites and in the sophistication of the
analysis, for a modest cost it gave a good general
picture of the city-wide liquefaction hazard, of regions
(and geologic formations) in which further investiga-
tions should be made, as well as showing up hazard to
particular sites.
The study has prompted utility owners to commission
a number of more detailed investigations of both the
hazard and possible strengthening works. Further
information about this study may be found in the report
by Guilhem and Berrill (1993).
3.5 Sustained Shear Stress
In the case of level-ground liquefaction discussed
above, shear strength is not required for static equilib-
rium. But in most other cases (retaining-wall backfill
is a possible exception), the soil mass must resist
sustained shear stresses to remain in equilibrium. Slopes
and foundations are two common examples.
The behaviour of the soil mass depends, in the large, on
whether it is loose and contractive or dense and dila-
tive. If the soil is dense, then any perturbation by the
earthquake will cause it to dilate, thereby increasing its
undrained, or short term, strength. A typical static
undrained stress strain curve for a dense sand is shown
in Figure 3.15. At large strains, a steady state of
deformation is reached at which shear strain continues
at a constant shear stress. This undrained steady state
shear strength has been denoted by S
US
. A characteris-
tic of a dense granular soil is a large value of S
US
. On
the other hand, loose soils have static, undrained stress-
strain curves typically like that illustrated in Figure
3.16. In this case the curve drops off with increasing
strain to a relatively small value of S
US
.
Clearly, a slope or foundation soil composed of dense
material should remain stable under seismic loading.
On the other hand, the stability of a loose soil mass
depends, to a first analysis, on whether or not the steady
Knights Drain Flood Gate Waitaki Street
KNF001.CPT, 06-17-1993
0
5
10
0
5
10
15
20
25
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
q
c

(
M
P
a
)
R
f

(
%
)
Depth (m)
Low value of R
f
indicates clean sand (candidate
for liquefaction if q
c
small enough)
Friction ratio, R
f
High value of
R
f
indicates
cohesive
fines: little risk
of liquefaction
even though
q
c
is low
Shibata &
Teparaska
Low density (low q
c
) and
low R
f
indicating loose
sandy material: q
c
below
all three criteria: liquefaction
highly likely
q
c
below two of three
criteria: reasonably
high likelihood of
liquefaction
Although q
c
is low,
combination of q
c
and R
f
indicates high fines
content; liquefaction unlikely
Cone
resistance, q
c
Davis & Berrill
criterion
Zhou's criterion
Figure 3.14a: Cone Penetrometer (CPT) log from a typical lifelines site in the Christchurch Study, with the
three criteria used in estimating whether or not the site would liquefy in the scenario earthquake
0 5 10 15 20
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
5 0
R
f
(%)
q
c
(MPa)
D
e
p
t
h

(
m
)
Knights Drain Flood Gate
KNF001.CPT, 06-17-1993
Low friction ratio R
f
and moderate
density (q
c
):
Likely to liquefy in
stronger earthquake
Moderate likelihood
of liquefaction
in scenario
earthquake
Highly likely
to liquefy
Too cohesive
to liquefy
despite low
density
Figure 3.14b: Interpretation of liquefaction hazard. Single cross-hatching indicates layers highly likely to
liquefy in scenario earthquake; double hatching indicates layer might liquefy
there are two consecutive stages. The first comprises
the build up of pore pressure, depending mainly on the
amplitude and duration of cyclic shear strain
c
, in-
duced by the earthquake. This corresponds to the
period of loading up to the peak in Figure 3.16a or the
cyclic part in Figure 3.16b. The second stage com-
state strength exceeds the static driving stress,
s
.
These two cases are now examined in more detail.
Liquefaction Flow Failures
Dobry et al. (1984) note that in liquefaction failures
involving flow of material and large displacements,
STRAIN STRAIN
(a) (b)
S
H
E
A
R

S
T
R
E
S
S
After
reaching ' = 0
condition
caused by
cyclic load
Before
cycling
S
H
E
A
R

S
T
R
E
S
S
S
us S
us
During cycling
Monotonic
loading
after
cycling
{
Figure 3.15: Stress-strain behaviour for
undrained loading of dense sand From
Whitman (1987)
STRAIN
(a)
S
H
E
A
R

S
T
R
E
S
S
STRAIN
(b)
S
H
E
A
R

S
T
R
E
S
S
S
us
S
us
Collapse
During cycling
{
Figure 3.16: Stress-strain behaviour for
undrained loading of loose sand. From Whitman
(1987)
prises flow driven by the static shear stresses
s
, and
proceeds only if
s
> S
US
. Thus to analyse the stability
of a slope or foundation against flow failure, we need
first to check the static stability, using appropriate
values of S
US
in regions of contractive soil. If the
structure is stable under these conditions, the analysis
can stop there. However, if it is not, then it is necessary
to check whether the build up of pore pressure which
triggers the strength reduction, will indeed occur under
the design earthquake. Dobry et al. present this ap-
proach for earth dams, and give details of how it might
be applied to the dam problem. Their procedure
includes a novel laboratory test in which a torsional
cyclic shear stress is applied to an undrained triaxial
specimen which has been consolidated and is main-
tained under an anisotropic stress system representing
the static in situ stress state, simulating the two aspects
of the problem. However, this general approach could
equally well be applied to the seismic stability of
shallow foundations and to static liquefaction flow
failures such as the Nice Airport failure (Schlosser et
al., 1985).
While the approach is simple in concept, the determi-
nation of in situ values of S
US
is far from trivial.
Laboratory determination of S
US
depends on the very
difficult task of obtaining undisturbed samples.
Poulos et al. (1985) describe a procedure they have
developed over the years. It involves undrained tests
on both field and reconstituted samples, with an allow-
ance for sample disturbance. Their method is based on
the premise that for a given soil, S
US
depends uniquely
on void ratio, e. But Vaid et al. (1989), for example,
find that preshearing has a marked effect on the dilatancy
behaviour of sand and thus on S
US
and Konrad et al.
(1991) question the uniqueness of the steady-state line.
Seed (1987) and Seed et al. (1988) have presented
correlations between corrected SPT values, (N
1
)
60
, and
values of S
US
obtained by back analyses of flow fail-
ures. However, Finn (1993) points out that there are
difficulties with this approach, and it suffers from the
general shortcomings of the SPT, mentioned above.
Because flow failures usually involve quite loose and
often silty materials, the CPT should be the more
appropriate in situ test. Ishihara et al. (1990) present
correlations between q
c
and S
US
obtained by back analy-
ses of flow failures in Japan.
Deformation Failures
In a dilating (dense) rather than contractive (loose) soil,
permanent displacements may occur during momen-
tary strength reductions, as discussed in the introduc-
tion, but these are intermittent, of limited magnitude,
and cease when the shaking stops. While permanent
displacements in dilating soils are limited, they may
still be large enough to impair the function of the
structure. Whitman (1987) terms such occurrences
deformation failures, and states that their analysis
presents one of the present-day frontiers of soil dy-
namics. Whitman discusses some computational pro-
cedures that have not yet become part of everyday
engineering practice. He emphasises the need to test
computation against experiment, and suggests the use
of centrifuge model tests because of the infrequency of
earthquakes for full scale tests. Use of the Newmark
(1965) sliding block analogy has been suggested for
the calculation of limited, permanent displacements.
This suggestion has been taken up by, among others,
Baziar, Dobry and Alemi (1992) who study lateral
spreading at the Wildlife, California site in the 1987
earthquake, and by Byrne, Jitno and Salgado (1992)
who apply it to the upper San Fernando dam in the 1971
earthquake. The success of both modellings suggest
that this is a fruitful approach.
Intermediate Cases
We have considered the two extreme cases where the
soils were either clearly contractive or clearly dilative,
and completely undrained. Partial drainage could lead
to a reduction in S
US
in a dilating soil. For a soil mass
that is in equilibrium before the earthquake, partial
drainage should pose a problem only during shaking
and then only if S
US
drops below the sum of the seismic
and static shear stresses. Here, because the seismic
component of shear stress is cyclic, displacements
should remain limited.
Whitman (1985, 1987) points out two other subtle
variations to the simple cases. The first occurs when a
cohesionless soil remains globally undrained, but un-
dergoes local changes in void ratio which cause a loss
in strength and thus, possibly, a flow failure. The
second concerns high excess pore pressures generated
in a non-critical region, which lead to a critical loss of
strength when they diffuse into a more sensitive region.
This could explain several delayed flow failures that
have been observed. A local example of delayed failure
can again be found at the Landing Road Bridge, where
the 4 to 5 m high west approach embankment failed
about 15 minutes after the earthquake, presumably as
a front of high pore pressure propagated slowly up-
wards from the liquefied soil into the unliquefied crust
of silty sand on which the embankment was founded.
3.6 Counter Measures
Countermeasures against liquefaction fall into two
classes:
a) Those which strengthen the soil.
b) Those which modify the structural design to cope
with effects of liquefaction.
Because of shortage of land and high seismic activity
in Japan, Japanese engineers are advanced in the devel-
opment of countermeasures, and the reader is referred
to an excellent text by staff of the Port and Harbour
Research Institute which has recently been published
in English (PHRI, 1997). Figure 3.17 from this work
summarizes the various approaches that may be taken.
3.7 Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to give a broad view of
the liquefaction problem without excessive detail.
Therefore many significant results have been omitted.
I should have liked to discuss results from centrifuge
tests, such as those of Lambe and Whitman (1985),
Hushmand, Scott and Crouse (1988) and Lin and
Dobry (1992). Centrifuge tests on shallow foundations
show that smaller excess pore pressures tend to de-
velop beneath foundations than in the free field. This
implies that if a reliable level-ground analysis shows
there should be no significant pore pressure increase in
the free field, then any foundations should also be safe
from liquefaction.
The empirical study of lateral spreading distances by
Bartlett and Youd (1992) should be of interest to
lifelines engineers, as should the work of Tokida and
his colleagues on drag loads imposed on piles (Tokida
et al., 1993). Further case histories of lifeline damage
have been assembled by Hameda and ORourke (1992)
and ORourke and Hameda (1992), Brunsden (1996)
and Keenan et al. (1995). These are recommended for
the additional insights they provide to the behaviour of
engineering lifelines.
The main points made in this review may be summa-
rised as follows:
1 Damage due to liquefaction effects has been exten-
sive and costly in past earthquakes. Lifelines are
particularly susceptible, with pipelines buried in
laterally-spreading soil most probably the principal
victim.
2 Fine sands and coarse silts are the most susceptible
soils to liquefaction. From a geological viewpoint,
laterally-accreted late Holocene deposits are par-
ticularly liable to liquefy.
3 Liquefaction problems can be separated into two
classes: Those where static shear stresses must be
sustained, as in slopes or foundations, and those
involving level ground, where static equilibrium
does not require any shear strength.
4 Procedures for predicting the liquefaction potential
LIQUEFACTION
REMEDIATION
Soil
Improvement
Structural
Design
Improve the soil
so that the soil
grain skeleton will
not collapse under
earthquake loading
Achieve rapid
dissipation of
excess pore
water pressure
Maintain
stability
by reinforcing
structure
Relieve external
forces by softening
or modifying
structure
Increase the
liquefaction
strength of
the soil
Reduce
earthquake-
induced shear
stress ratio
EXAMPLES
install drains
replace sand with
gravel
EXAMPLES
strengthen pile
foundation (increased
number and thickness
of piles; install
bracing members
reinforcement of soil
prevent deformation
with sheet piles or
underground wall
EXAMPLES
adjustment of
bulk unit weight
of buried structures
reduce slope angles
EXAMPLES
compaction
consolidation
preloading
replacement (refilling
with material which will
not liquefy)
EXAMPLES
adjustment of
bulk unit weight
of buried structures
reduce slope angles
Figure 3.17: Various basic strategies for liquefaction remediation (from PHRI, 1997)
of level-ground sites are well-established and a
number of methods have been presented here.
5 In cases where shear stresses must be resisted for
static equilibrium, behaviour after initial liquefac-
tion depends on whether the residual strength is
sufficient to resist the driving stress. This in turn
depends principally on whether the soil is in a dense
or a loose state. If the soil is loose, then a flow
failure, with large displacements, is possible. If it
is dense, then deformation should be limited, but
may still be damaging.
6 Determination of the residual or steady state shear
strength is a very difficult problem because of
sample disturbance. Simple methods for measur-
ing S
US
have not yet been found. For rough, prelimi-
nary assessments, in situ test methods may be used.
7 The Newmark sliding-block approach appears
promising for estimating displacements in limited-
deformation problems.
8 Between the two extreme cases of liquefaction
flow failures and deformation failures, there are
many intermediate cases influenced by secondary
effects such as partial drainage, diffusion of excess
pore pressure and redistribution of void ratio.
Great progress has been made in our understanding of
liquefaction phenomena, in understanding the me-
chanics of the various aspects of the general problem
and in formulating analysis procedures. However,
further work is required, for example, in finding more
robust methods for determining steady-state strength.
Finally, let us note the importance of case histories,
which have played a central part in the past. They will
continue to be important, with emphasis directed more
to flow and deformation failures than to level ground
cases.
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to acknowledge and thank the many
colleagues and former students who have stimulated
his interest in liquefaction and improved his imperfect
understanding of it. Special mention should be given
to Dr R O Davis and Professor Pierre Foray.
3.8 References
Bartlett, S.F. and T.L. Youd (1992). Empirical Pre-
diction of lateral Spread Displacements, Proc
4th Japan-US Workshop on Earthquake Resist-
ant Design of Lifeline Facilities, Honolulu, pp.
351-366.
Bazier, M.H., R. Dobry and M. Alemi (1992). Evalu-
ation of Lateral Ground Deformation Using
Sliding Block Model, Proc 10th World Conf.
Earthq. Eng, Madrid, Vol. 3, pp 1401-1406.
Berrill, J.B., J. Canou, P. Foray and J.-L Pautre, (1992).
Piezocone Testing of Liquefaction Sites:
Normalization of Excess Pore Pressure, Proc.
10th World Conf. Earthq. Eng, Madrid, Vol. 3,
pp 1421-1424.
Berrill, J. B. and S. A. Christensen (1995). The Effect
of Lateral Spreading on the Landing Road Bridge
in the 1987 Edgecumbe, New Zealand Earth-
quake, Proc 7th Canadian Conf. Earthq. Eng.,
Montreal, pp 139-146.
Bienvenu Vronique (1988). Studies of Liquefaction
in 1929 Murchison and Inangahua (1968) New
Zealand Earthquakes, Master of Engineering
Thesis, University of Canterbury, Christchurch,
New Zealand, March 1988.
Brunsdon D. R. et al. (1996) Lessons for New Zealand
Lifelines Organisation from the 17 January
1995. Great Hanshin Earthquake, Bull. NZ
Nat. Soc. Earthq. Eng., Vol. 29, pp 1-55.
Byrne, P.M., H. Jitno and F. Salgado (1992). Earth-
quake Induced Displacements of Soil-Struc-
ture Systems Proc. 10th World Conf. Earthq.
Eng, Madrid, Vol. 3, pp 1407-1412.
Canou J., (1989). Contribution ltude et lvaluation
des proprits de liqufaction dun sable,
Mmoire de thse de Doctorat de lENPC,
Paris, 338 pp.
Castro, G. (1975) Liquefaction and Cyclic Mobility
of Saturated Sands, Journal of the Geotechnical
Engineering Division, ASCE, Vol. 101, GT6,
pp 551-568.
Castro, G., S.J. Poulos and F.D. Leathers (1985), A
Re-examination of the Slide of the Lower San
Fernando Dam, Journal of Geotechnical En-
gineering Division, ASCE, Vol. 111, GT9, pp
1093-1107.
Davis, R.O. and J.B. Berrill (1982) Energy Dissipa-
tion and Seismic Liquefaction in Sands, Earth-
quake Engineering and Structural Dynamics,
Vol. 10, pp 59-68.
Davis, R.O. and J.B. Berrill (1996) Liquefaction
Susceptibility Based on Dissipated Energy: a
Consistent Design Methodology, Bulletin. NZ
Nat. Soc. Earthq. Eng. Vol 29, pp. 83-91.
Dobry, R., R.S. Ladd, F.Y. Yokel, R.M. Chung and D.
Powell (1982). Prediction of Pore Water Pres-
sure Buildup and Liquefaction of Sands During
Earthquakes by the Cyclic Strain Methods,
Building Science Series 138, National Bureau
of Standards, US Department of Commerce,
US Government Printing Office, Washington,
DC.
Dobry, R., R. Modhaman, P. Dakoulas, and G. Gazetas
(1984) Liquefaction Evaluation of Earth Dams
- A New Approach, Proc of the Eighth World
Conf. in Earthq. Eng, Vol. 3, pp 333-348.
Dobry, R., D.J. Powell, F.Y. Yokel and R.S. Ladd
(1980), Liquefaction Potential of Saturated
Sand - The Stiffness Method, Proceedings 7th
World Conf. on Earthq. Eng, Istanbul, Turkey,
Vol. 3, pp 25-32.
Dou, Yiqiang and J.B. Berrill (1991) Evaluation of
Liquefaction Potential by Pattern Recognition,
Proc Pacific Conf. Earthq. Eng, Auckland, Vol.
1, pp 301-311.
Dou Yiqiang and J.B. Berrill (1993) A Pattern Recog-
nition Approach to Evaluation of Soil Lique-
faction Potential Using Piezocone Data, Soil
Dyn. Earthq. Eng, (in press).
Finn, W.D. Liam (1993) Evaluation of Liquefaction
Potential, Proc. Seminar on Soil Dyn. and
Geotech. Earthq. Eng, Lisbon, Balkena, pp
127-158.
Florin, V.A. and P.L. Ivanov (1961) Liquefaction of
Saturated Sandy Soils, Proc. 5th Int. Conf.
Soil Mech. Found. Eng, Paris, Vol. 1, pp 107-
111.
Guilhem, O. and J. B. Berrill (1993). Cone Penetrometer
Results and Estimates of Liquefaction Potential
at some key Christchurch Lifelines Sites, Can-
terprise Report CP/2245, University of Canter-
bury, Christchurch, New Zealand, 53 pp.
Gutenberg, B. and C.F. Richter (1954). Seismicity of
the Earth, Princeton Univ. Press.
Hameda, M., and T. ORourke eds (1992) Case Studies
of Liquefaction and Lifeline Performance Dur-
ing Past Earthquakes, (Tech. Report NCEER-
92-0001 and 0002) NCEER, Buffalo, NY, Vols
1 & 2,
Hardin, B.O. (1965) The Nature of Damping in Sands,
J. Soil Mech. Found. Div. ASCE, Vol. 91, SM1,
pp 63-97.
Husmand, B., R.F. Scott and C.B. Crouse (1988)
Centrifuge Liquefaction Tests in a Laminar
Box, Geotechnique, Vol. 38, pp 253-262.
Ishihara, K. (1985) Stability of Natural Deposits
During Earthquakes, Proc. of the Eleventh Int.
Conf. on Soil Mechanics and Foundation Eng.,
Vol. 1, pp 321-376.
Ishihara, K. (1993) Liquefaction and Flow Failure
during Earthquakes, Gotechnique, Vol 43, pp
351-415.
Ishihara, K., S. Yasuda and Y. Yoshida (1990) Lique-
faction-induced flow failure of embankments
and residual strength of silty sands, Soils and
Foundations, Vol. 30, No. 3 pp 69-80.
Iwasaki, T. (1986) Soil Liquefaction Studies in Japan:
State-of-the-Art, Soil Dyn. Earthq. Eng, Vol.
5, pp 2-68.
Keenan, R. P., J. B. Berrill and J. R. Pettinga (1995)
Foundation Loads due to Lateral Spreading at
the Landing Road Bridge, Whakatane, Proc.
Ann. Conf. NZNSEE, New Plymouth, pp 169-
176.
Kuerbis, R.H. and Y.P. Vaid (1989) Undrained Be-
haviour of Clean and Silty Sand, Proc. 12th
Int. Conf. on Soil Mech. Found. Eng, Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil, August.
Konrad, J.-M., E. Flavigny and M. Meghachou (1991),
Comportement non drain du sable dHoustun
lche, Rev. Fran. Gotech. No. 54, pp 53-63.
Lambe, P.C. and R.V. Whitman (1981). Dynamic
Centrifuge Modelling of a Horizontal Sand
Stratum, Research Report R82-14, Dept. Civil
Eng, Mass. Institute of Technology.
Lambe, P.C. and R.V. Whitman (1985) Dynamic
Centrifugal Modeling of a Horizonal Dry Sand
Layer, Journal of Geotechnical Engineering,
ASCE, Vol. 111, 3, pp 265-287.
Liao, S.C. and R.V. Whitman (1985) Overburden
Correction Factors for SPT in Sand, J. Geotech.
Eng, ASCE, Vol. 112, No. 3, pp 373-377.
Liao, S.C., D. Veneziano and R.V. Whitman (1988)
Regression models for Evaluating Liquefac-
tion Probability, J. Geotech. Eng, ASCE, Vol.
114, pp 389-411.
Lin, L. and R. Dobry (1992), Centrifuge Study of
Shallow Foundations on Saturated Sand Dur-
ing Earthquakes, Proc. 4th Japan-US Work-
shop on Earthq. Res. Design of Lifeline Facili-
ties, Honolulu, pp 493-508.
Long, E.L. (1973) Earth Slides and Related Phenom-
ena, The Great Alaska Earthquake of 1964:
Engineering, National Academy of Science,
Washington, D. C., pp 644-773.
Luong, M.P. (1980) Phnomnes Cycliques dans les
Sols Pulvrulents, Rev. Franaise
Gotechnique, No. 10, pp 39-53.
McCahon et al. (1997). Hazards to Engineering Life-
lines in Christchurch, In Risks and Realities: A
Multi-disciplinary Approach to the Vulnerabil-
ity of Lifelines to Natural Hazards, Centre for
Advanced Engineering, University of Canter-
bury.
Meigh, A.C. (1987). Cone Penetration Testing,
Butterworths, London, 141 pp.
Nemat-Nasser, S. and A. Shokooh (1979) A Unified
Approach to Densification and Liquefaction of
Cohesionless Sand in Cyclic Shearing, Can.
Geotech. J. Vol. 16, No. 3, pp 659-678.
Newmark, N.M. (1965) Effects of Earthquakes on
Dams and Embankments. Fifth Rankine Lec-
ture, Geotechnique, London, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp
139-159.
ORourke, T.D. and J.W. Pease (1992). Large Ground
Deformations and their Effects on Lifeline Fa-
cilities : 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake, Tech-
nical Report NCEER-92-0002 Nat. Center for
Earthq. Eng, Buffalo N.Y., Vol. 2, pp 5-1 to 5-
85.
Peck, R.B. (1979) Liquefaction Potential: Science
Versus Practice, Journal of Geotechnical En-
gineering, ASCE, Vol. 105, GT3, pp 393-398.
PHRI (1997) Handbook on Liquefaction Remediation
of Reclaimed Land, Balkema, 312 pp.
Poulos, S.J., G. Castro and J.W. France (1985) Lique-
faction Evaluation Procedures, Journal of
Geotechnical Engineering, ASCE, Vol. 111, 6,
pp 772-791.
Robertson, P.K. and R.G. Campanella (1985) Lique-
faction Potential of Sands Using the CPT, J.
Geotech. Eng, ASCE, Vol. 109, GT11, pp 1449-
1459.
Ross, G.A., H.B. Seed and R.R. Migliaccio (1973)
Performance of Highway Bridge Foundations,
The Great Alaska Earthquake of 1964: Engi-
neering, Nat. Acad. Sci., Washington DC, pp
190-242.
Schlosser, F. (1985) Liquefaction de Veines de Sable
Lche dans des Talus Sous-Marins, Proc. 11th
Int. Conf. Soil Mech. Found. Eng, San Fran-
cisco, Vol 3, pp 1713-1716.
Scott, R.F. and K.A. Zuckerman (1973) Sand Blows
and Liquefaction, The Great Alaskan Earth-
quake of 1964 - Engineering Volume, Commit-
tee on the Alaska Earthquake, Division of Earth
Sciences, National Research Council, National
Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., pp
179-189.
Seed, H.B. (1987), Design Problems in Soil Liquefac-
tion, J. Geotech. Eng, ASCE, Vol. 113, No. 7,
Aug. pp 827-845.
Seed, H.B. and I.M. Idriss (1971), Simplified Proce-
dure for Evaluating Soil Liquefaction Poten-
tial, J. Soil Mech. Found. Eng Div., ASCE,
Vol. 97, SM9, pp 1249-1273.
Seed, H.B. and K.L. Lee (1966), Liquefaction of
Saturated Sands During Cyclic Loading, J.
Soil Mech. Found. Eng Div., ASCE, Vol. 92,
SM6, pp 105-134.
Seed, H.B., R.B. Seed, L.F. Harder and H.-L. Jong
(1988). Re-evaluation of the Slide in the Lower
San Fernando Dam in the Earthquake of Feb-
ruary 9, 1971, Report No. UCB/EERC-88/04,
University of California, Berkeley.
Seed, H. Bolton, K. Tokimatsu, L.F. Harder and R.M.
Chung (1985), Influence of SPT Procedures in
Soil Liquefaction Resistance Evaluations, J.
Geotech. Eng, ASCE, Vol. 3, No. 12, Dec.
Shibata, T., and W. Teparaksa (1988), Evaluation of
Liquefaction Potentials of Soils Using Cone
Penetration Tests. Soils and Foundations, Vol.
28, pp 49-60.
Tinsley, J.C. and W.R. Dupr (1992), Liquefaction
Hazard Mapping, Depositional Faces and Lat-
eral Spreading Ground Failure in the Monterey
Bay Area, Central California, during the 10.7.89
Loma Prieta Earthquake, Proc. 4th Japan-US
Workshop on Earthq. Res. Design of Lifeline
Facilities, Honolulu, pp 71-86.
Tokida, K., H. Iwasaki and T. Hameda (1993), Lique-
faction Potential and Drag Force Acting on
Piles in Flowing Soil, Proc. 6th Int. Conf. Soil
Dyn. Earthq. Eng, Bath, U.K. (in press).
Troncoso, J.H. (1990), Failure Risks of Abandoned
Tailings Dams, Proc. Int. Symp. on Safety and
Rehabilitation of Tailings Dams, ICOLD, Syd-
ney, Australia, May, pp 82-89.
Tsuchida, H. (1970), Prediction and Countermeasure
Against the Liquefaction in Sand Deposits,
Abstract of the Seminar in the Port and Harbor
Research Institute, pp 3.1-3.33 (in Japanese).
Tsuchida, H. and S. Hayashi (1971), Estimation of
Liquefaction Potential of Sandy Soil, Proc.
3rd Meeting, U.S. Japan Panel on Wind and
Seismic Effects, Tokyo.
Vaid, Y.P. and J.C. Chern (1983) Effect of Static
Shear on Resistance to Liquefaction, Soil and
Foundations, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp 47-60.
Vaid, Y.P., E.K.F. Chung and R.H. Kuerbis (1989).
Preshearing and Undrained Response of Sand,
Soils and Foundations, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp 49-
61.
Vreugdenhil, R.A. (1995). Interpretation of Piezocone
Data and its use in Estimating Liquefaction
Potential, Research Report 95-7, University of
Canterbury, 184 pp.
Vreugdenhil, R.A., R.O. Davis and J.B. Berrill (1995).
Liquefaction Potential and Piezocone Re-
sponse, Bull. NZ Nat. Soc. Earthq. Eng., Vol.
28, pp 106-112.
Whitman, R.V. (1985), On Liquefaction, Proc. 11th
Intl Conf. Soil Mech. Found. Eng, Vol. 4, pp
1923-1926.
Whitman, R.V. (1987) Liquefaction - the State of the
Art, Bull. N.Z. Nat. Soc. Earthq. Eng, Vol. 20,
pp 145-158.
Yamada, G. (1966) Damage by Earth Structures and
Foundations by the Niigata Earthquake, June
16 1964, Soils and Foundations, Vol 6, pp 1-
13.
Youd, T.L. (1984) Geologic Effects - Liquefaction
and Associated Ground Failure, pp 210-232 in
Proceedings of the Geologic and Hydrologic
Hazards Training Program. Open-File Report
84-760, US Geological Survey, Menlo Park,
California.
Zhou, S. (1980). Evaluation of the Liquefaction of
Sand by Static Cone Penetration Test. Proc.
7th World Conf. Earthq. Eng, Istanbul, Vol. 3,
pp 156-162.
3.9 Summary of Liquefaction Effects
These diagrams are taken from the 1993 report of the Wellington Lifelines Group and are reproduced with permission
as a graphic illustration of the likely effects on engineering lifelines.
Post Liquefaction
Ground Surface
Eruptions of Sand/Water at Irregular Spacing
Original G.L.
LIQUEFIED MATERIAL
Pipe Lowered
(a) Level field liquefaction
LIQUEFIED MATERIAL
Pipe lowered and laterally displaced
Ground Fissures
Post Liquefaction
Ground Surface
(b) Lateral spreading due to liquefaction
LIQUEFIED MATERIAL
Pipe raised and displaced
Post liquefaction
Ground Surface
Structure Tilts and Sinks
(c) Shallow foundation failure and associated ground deformation
Figure 3.18: Ground movement due to liquefaction
E
Span Drops
Pier Rotates
LIQUEFIED SOIL
(Provides no support)
Moment capacity Failure
(a) Deep foundation failure
LIQUEFIED
SOIL
Chamber 'floats'
in Liquefied Zone
breaking Connections
(b) Flotation of buried structures
Full Conduit Less Effected
Settlement
Above Liquefied Zone -
Follows Ground Settlement
DENSE
SAND
Empty Conduit Floats
LIQUEFIED SOIL
LOOSE SAND
(c) Flotation of buried conduits
Figure 3.19: Structural displacements
A
B
C
A
A
O
r
i
g
i
n
a
l

T
o
e
P
o
s
t

L
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

T
o
e
O
r
i
g
i
n
a
l

C
r
e
s
t
P
o
s
t
L
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n
C
r
e
s
t
P
o
s
t

L
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
P
o
s
i
t
i
o
n

o
f

P
i
p
e
P
l
a
n
G
R
O
U
N
D

C
R
A
C
K
S
A
B
C
B
R
u
p
t
u
r
e
s

i
n

P
i
p
e
G
r
o
u
n
d

S
u
r
f
a
c
e

a
f
t
e
r
L
a
t
e
r
a
l

S
p
r
e
a
d
i
n
g
C
r
o
s
s
-
s
e
c
t
i
o
n

A

-

A
L
I
Q
U
E
F
I
E
D

M
A
T
E
R
I
A
L
Figure 3.20: Effect of lateral spreading on buried pipes
LIQUEFIED MATERIAL
FILL FILL
FILL
Failure Surface
(a) Shallow lateral failure
LIQUEFIED MATERIAL
FILL
FILL
Failure Surface
NON LIQUEFIABLE MATERIAL
(b) Deep seated lateral failure
Failure Surface
LIQUEFIED MATERIAL
(c) Embankment end failure
Figure 3.21: Embankment Stability
Civil Services 71
Chapter 4
Civil Services
4.1 Introduction
The Civil Services Group has concentrated on the land
drainage, sewerage and water supply systems serving
the Christchurch area, including some comment on
Lyttelton services. Also included in the brief was fuel
supplies and a short report on this aspect is included,
although the view of the industry is that in the event of
damage to Christchurch installations a number of alter-
native means of bringing fuel to the city will be
available.
While flooding presents the most frequently occurring
emergency for Christchurchs civil service lifelines,
flood damage to facilities and underground services is
localised and minor. Likewise, the effects of extreme
snow and wind events cannot be shown to pose signifi-
cant threats. Only the seismic hazard carries the poten-
tial for significant widespread disruption and damage
to the citys civil services.
For this study, an earthquake has been defined having
a return period of 150 years and a shaking intensity
lying between MM VIII and IX. Coupled with the
liquefaction potential of much of the citys eastern
districts and the magnification effects that can be
expected, this earthquake has the potential to cause
significant damage to pipelines and facilities, particu-
larly where design or detailing has not included present
day seismic requirements and considerations. It is fair
to say that Christchurch is at significant risk.
The lifelines project reflects a belief that much can be
done in advance to mitigate or eliminate likely damage
and also to prepare for the event in such a way that
disruption and restoration times are minimised. It may
seem there is no sensible alternative to this belief but,
in fact, where it is known that central government
funding will be generously available after an event, a
more cynical view can prevail which resists spending
mitigation dollars now on the understanding that some-
one elses money will fix the damage after the earth-
quake.
A prudent utility manager will endeavour to under-
stand the importance and vulnerability of the systems
elements, prioritise and recommend mitigating meas-
ures and ensure thorough emergency response plan-
ning. In seeking to win a share of scarce resources for
this activity the manager will need to place before
decision makers a sensible compromise that balances
the cost of mitigation against the risk of the event and
the cost of damage that the mitigation work is designed
to reduce or remove. Another balance must be estab-
lished between spending now compared with the cost
of putting extra effort into the response. It may, for
example, be wiser to plan for additional crews to repair
breaks than to spend now on renewing vulnerable
pipelines.
Because most of a utility managers assets are buried,
the opportunity for mitigating pipeline damage by
retrofitting is limited. Instead, the focus must be on
new work, including renewal, where material and joint
choice, design and location can have a significant
influence. Fortunately, factors that improve a pipe-
lines performance during an earthquake are well es-
tablished, involving ductility, flexibility and the ability
to accommodate tension, compression, shear and rota-
tional movement at structure entries. Materials and
jointing systems are available that provide these fea-
tures. Mitigation at design stage is also essential for
Christchurchs civil service facilities reservoirs,
pump stations, treatment works, retention basins,
stopbanks, tidal control structures, etc. Awareness of
liquefaction potential requires that more attention is
given to foundation design, particularly when recent
earthquakes of moderate size are providing evidence of
ground accelerations in excess of current code require-
ments. An exercise in Christchurch that assessed lique-
faction potential at 16 important lifeline facilities (in-
cluding nine in the civil services area) using cone
penetrometer soundings, found that 12 of the structures
were founded on soils at risk of liquefying under the
chosen earthquake scenario. This must ring alarm bells
for utility managers. Careful investigation and design
can overcome this problem. For example, at the Halswell
water supply reservoir site, additional excavation plus
the installation of a synthetic barrier mitigated the
liquefaction potential that site investigation had re-
vealed.
Problems of inaccessibility do not apply as much to
civil services facilities and structures and here manag-
ers have wide scope for mitigation by retrofitting.
Costs are often not great and can usually be incorpo-
rated in maintenance budgets. Much more difficult is
the state of mind amongst plant operators that looks for
any evidence of instability or lack of security under
seismic loading and programmes work to remove it.
This awareness must be broad enough to gauge the
security of other services (water, power, telecommuni-
cation, drainage) on which the operators own service
or facility may depend. Raising staff awareness will
thus be an important part of mitigation.
In this study, officers with a day-to-day involvement
with the particular lifeline have assessed both the
vulnerability and importance of each element, and its
dependence on other services and recommended miti-
gation measures for the particular hazard. The work
has served to open up the subject of the performance of
Christchurchs lifelines during severe natural events. It
now remains for the managers responsible for those
services to ensure that the work of assessing and
prioritising the many mitigating recommendations is
pursued and appropriate measures implemented.
4.2 Land Drainage
Seismic risk
System description
Christchurchs land drainage system is centred around
three small coastal rivers that flow from west to east to
the sea. These are the Heathcote, Avon and Styx Rivers
and they are maintained by the Christchurch City
Council. Two similar rivers drain some small areas of
Christchurch but are maintained by the Canterbury
Regional Council. These are the Halswell River and
the South Branch Waimakariri River.
The Christchurch City Council maintains roughly 400
kilometres of waterway (i.e. rivers, dug drains, con-
crete channels, timbered drain, etc.) and over 500
kilometres of pipeline ranging in diameter from 100
mm to 2,100 mm. Most of the pipes are reinforced
concrete rubber ring jointed (RCRRJ) but also in-
cluded are perforated subsoil pipes, ceramic, ac, and
single and double skin brick barrel pipelines.
Unless otherwise stated, piping mentioned in this re-
port or shown on the map is 450 mm diameter or greater
(see Map 18, p 301).
The rivers and their main tributaries on the flat carry a
continuous baseflow that is spring fed in their upper
reaches. The baseflow also regulates the inflow and
level of shallow groundwater in the eastern half of the
city. During major storms that generate high rainfall
and low barometric pressures, low-lying urban areas
are vulnerable to flooding.
On the Port Hills, the natural valleys are the primary
drainage system. No baseflows exist. During storms
hill catchments can produce high flows that can scour
their easily erodible loess soil mantle.
Many of the larger waterways on the flat are bordered
by trees. In fact, much of the waterway system has a
high environmental value. The land drainage system
also includes retention basins, stop banks and several
pumping stations of various sizes.
The sewerage system is interconnected at various
locations to provide emergency sewage overflows
(normally during storms) under controlled conditions.
However, it is anticipated that following a major earth-
quake the land drainage system will also need to have
the ability to convey raw sewage from areas where the
sewerage system is inoperable.
Heathcote River Catchment
The Heathcote River drains a catchment area of ap-
proximately 10,500 hectares to the Avon/Heathcote
Estuary. Spring-fed headwaters sustain the rivers
baseflow.
The upper portion (upstream of the Cashmere Stream
confluence) drains the predominantly industrial areas
of Hornby and Islington via large diameter concrete
pipelines. These drain to three open waterways and
then to the river.
Below its junction with the Cashmere Stream the river
generally follows the toe of the Port Hills, draining
mainly residential suburbs and the Woolston industrial
area that discharges via a mixture of open waterways
and pipe networks. Cashmere Stream is the rivers
largest tributary. It serves a large rural area drained by
a system of open waterways. Within the Heathcote
River catchment is the recently constructed Wigram
retention basin.
Other land drainage structures include the Woolston
Cut and the new Woolston barrage. Only one of
Christchurchs 18 stormwater pump stations lies within
the Heathcote River catchment.
Avon River catchment
The Avon River drains a catchment area of approxi-
mately 8,400 hectares to the Avon/Heathcote Estuary.
Spring-fed headwaters sustain the rivers baseflow.
There are six tributary streams branching out above
Mona Vale (in the vicinity of Fendalton Road/
Holmwood Road). These serve mostly residential ar-
eas by a mixture of open and piped networks. Below
Mona Vale the river flows through the central business
Civil Services 73
district which is drained mostly by pipelines. There are
some brick barrel pipelines within the business district.
Downstream of the central business district the river
flows through residential areas to the sea. On the way
it collects flows from major tributaries such as St
Albans Creek, Dudley Creek, Shirley Stream and Horse-
shoe Lake. Horseshoe Lake is the outlet for the 1,800
and 2,100 mm diameter RCRRJ Dudley Creek diver-
sion pipeline and some semi-rural open waterways.
From approximately Porritt Park to the Estuary there
are sections of stopbanking to prevent tidal flooding of
low areas. Fourteen stormwater pumping stations are
within the Avon catchment. Most are alongside the
Lower Avon.
Styx River catchment
The Styx River drains a catchment area of approxi-
mately 5,000 hectares to near the mouth of Brooklands
Lagoon (north of Christchurch). The uppermost part of
the Styx River drains the residential suburbs of
Casebrook and Redwood. The river then flows for
approximately 15 km through rural land to the
Brooklands Lagoon, which is located near the
Waimakariri River mouth.
The lower reaches receive drainage from the small
settlements of Spencerville, Brooklands and Kainga.
The major Styx River tributary is the Kaputone Stream
which drains most of Belfast township including a
small industrial area.
Other systems
South Branch Waimakariri River (Otukaikino
Creek)
The Otukaikino Creek serves almost entirely rural
land. The exception is the Belfast township. Kaputone
Creek in the Styx River catchment serves about half of
Belfast but the rest of the township is drained to
Otukaikino Creek via Wilsons and Johns Drains.
Coastal hillside drains
These drain the suburbs of Mount Pleasant, Redcliffs
and Sumner and are generally a watercourse down the
valley discharging to the Estuary or sea via a pipeline.
Outfall drain
Outfall Drain runs adjacent to Linwood Avenue. It is
concrete lined for its upper length and the rest is earth
banks. It drains some of the city centre and the suburbs
of Linwood and Bromley. It discharges to the Avon/
Heathcote Estuary via a multi-cell box culvert fitted
with flapgates at Humphreys Drive.
Sea outfalls
The suburb of Parklands is drained directly to the sea
via a 1,575 mm diameter RCRRJ pipeline. Two other
smaller pipelines outfall to the sea at Beach Road and
Pacific Road, North New Brighton.
Halswell River tributaries
Nottingham Stream drains most of the residential sub-
urb of Halswell to the Halswell River. Other drains and
Knights Stream also drain to the Halswell River. These,
and the river itself, are maintained by the Canterbury
Regional Council.
The 162 ha Halswell Junction Road industrial area is a
subcatchment of Knights Stream. It contains the
Halswell Junction Road retention basin.
Templeton
The Templeton township is to the south-west of the
main Christchurch urban area. Stormwater disposal in
this area is by ground soakage.
General
Most of the pipelines greater than 450 mm diameter are
reinforced concrete with rubber ring joints. Within the
central business district there are some brick barrel
pipelines. Many of the smaller pipelines (less than 450
mm diameter) are located beneath the street side chan-
nel and are a mixture of concrete and asbestos cement
and are either fully encased or capped with concrete.
Generally, open waterways are either timbered, con-
crete lined or earthen banks.
System vulnerability
The normal functions for the land drainage system,
together with the additional emergency function of
conveying raw sewage, would be made vulnerable by
the following earthquake effects.
Waterway bank failure
This is particularly the case in liquefaction zones. In the
larger waterways, the consequent loss of low flow area
and raised invert levels is likely to have a minimal
effect, possibly raising groundwater levels signifi-
cantly in some low coastal areas. There would still be
reasonable storm flow capacity and sewage flows
should be uninterrupted.
Smaller waterways could be partially blocked.
Pipe damage
In general, it is likely that most pipelines will still
function but with a reduced capacity and a tendency for
blockages to occur. Specific pipelines of greatest vul-
nerability are identified below.
Trees
Waterways generally will be vulnerable to the effects
of trees falling into them either through bank slumping
or breaking of the trunks.
It is unfortunate that as Christchurchs main drainage
systems flow towards their outfalls and their impor-
tance increases, so too does the liquefaction risk and
therefore the possibility of serious damage. Flooding
of low lying areas is likely. The likelihood and severity
of flooding will increase should a storm occur after the
earthquake.
In the catchments upstream of the river lengths the
damage will be minor and if a storm occurs the poten-
tial for flooding in these areas will not be high.
Heathcote River catchment
In the upper catchment area of Hornby and Islington,
large reinforced concrete pipes are the main system of
drainage. This area is prone to ground shake but should
not liquefy. It is expected that these pipelines will stay
basically intact with some minor differential move-
ment in joints. While these pipelines may remain in
service, it may take several years to bring the system to
a repaired condition.
From Wigram Road through to the Cashmere Stream
junction the river passes mainly through zone 3B so it
is subject to ground shake and has a moderate risk of
liquefying. Open waterways draining to the river, and
the river itself, could sustain some slumping of banks.
If a storm occurs there is a low to moderate risk of some
flooding of low-lying residential areas next to the river.
The river flows in and out of different earthquake risk
zones from the Cashmere Stream junction to Opawa
Road. Generally it is vulnerable to high ground shake
and moderate liquefaction. At some points it is close to
the hills and could also be affected should a large
landslide occur. The river banks are susceptible to
slumping. This could reduce the area of the main
floodway and should a storm occur there is a moderate
risk of some flooding of low lying residential areas
next to the river.
From Opawa Road to Ferry Road there are stopbanks
to prevent tidal flooding. At this point the river runs
around the edge of a liquefaction zone, so there is a low
chance of these banks slumping. This could cause tidal
flooding of low areas, with the chance of this happen-
ing increasing if the Woolston barrage cannot be closed
as the tide would get to this reach more quickly and the
level would be higher.
At the upstream end of the Woolston Cut is the Woolston
Barrage which is in zone 3A, a high risk area for
liquefaction and ground shake. This structure is new
(1993) and has been designed in accordance with
current standards. The structure is built on caissons
founded on non-susceptible soils. There should be no
major problems in an earthquake.
The Woolston Cut is also in a high risk area for ground
shake and liquefaction, however it is expected that
while some displacement of the present wall units will
occur, the cut would not suffer significant structural
damage. It is a relatively new structure (1986).
Below the Woolston Cut there is a length of the river
that is very close to Ferry Road and is prone to lique-
faction. Should the river banks collapse in this area the
road could be affected. There is a risk of damage to
major service lines which run along Ferry Road at this
point.
Downstream of this high area the river flows through
low lying land, past Ferrymead Historic Park to the
Estuary. This section of the river is prone to liquefac-
tion but bank failure would cause minimal reduction in
hydraulic capacity.
The piped and small open waterways that drain into the
upstream tributaries of the Avon River are within zone
3 which is prone to high ground shake. It is expected
that these systems will not suffer major damage and
should be able to continue to function. However, it may
take some years to check the piped networks and repair
if necessary.
The tributary streams above Mona Vale are also in the
earthquake zone prone to high ground shake. Most of
these streams have a spring-fed base flow and are
generally shallow and wide. In an earthquake they
could be vulnerable to minor bank damage but there
should not be major restrictions to the flows. The river
all the way through the central business district and to
the Dudley Creek junction is in the same category as
the tributary streams described above. Trees along the
river banks could cause problems if they fall into the
waterway.
The upstream end of St Albans Creek runs through a
pocket of land vulnerable to a moderate to high risk of
liquefaction. The creek through here is intermittently
timbered and has a permanent low flow. Some bank
collapse is possible and there is a low chance of the
creek being severely restricted. In a storm this would
cause extensive residential property flooding.
Civil Services 75
Most of Dudley Creek and Shirley Stream are in the
same category as the tributary streams above Mona
Vale.
The large diameter Dudley Creek Diversion pipeline is
within a zone prone to high ground shake and a high
liquefaction risk. This pipeline is founded on a crushed
metal bedding. It could suffer significant displacement
downstream of Marshland Road but should stay basi-
cally intact apart from some joint failure. Long term it
could be expensive and time consuming to get this
pipeline back to its original alignment and capacity.
From the Dudley Creek junction at the Estuary, the
river is within an area prone to high ground shake and
also has a high risk of liquefying. Horseshoe Lake also
falls within this category. Through this length of the
river there is a high chance of the river banks slumping.
The intermittent stopbanking could also be affected in
this way. Should a storm occur there could be flooding
of low-lying residential land.
However, the major risk will be tidal inundation of low
lying residential areas usually protected by the
stopbanking. The suburb of Bexley is particularly at
risk.
There would probably need to be large-scale evacua-
tions. Repair work could be difficult and time consum-
ing due to the repetitive nature of tidal flooding. This
length of the river has been classified as the most
vulnerable to damage.
Styx River catchment
The uppermost portion of the Styx River down to Main
North Road is prone to ground shake but should not
incur any major damage.
Kaputone Creek and the river from Main North Road
to Radcliffe Road are both vulnerable to a moderate
risk of liquefaction and bank slump could occur. Be-
cause the river flows through rural land any damage
would be confined mainly to crops and pasture.
From Radcliffe Road to the Brooklands Lagoon there
is a high risk of liquefaction and high ground shake.
The river is tree lined for most of this length and there
is a risk of trees snapping or slumping into the river and
impeding the rivers flow. There is also a high chance
of bank slump. These factors could cause adjoining
low-lying rural land to flood from baseflow back up
and elevated groundwater levels. It would be difficult
to drain this land quickly and crops and pasture could
be extensively damaged.
Near the Brooklands Lagoon is the small settlement of
Brooklands. Low-lying properties could suffer flood-
ing.
The Styx River tidegates on the line of the Waimakariri
River stopbanks is an important flood control structure
for the extensive floodplain adjoining the lower reaches.
Designed and constructed in the early 1980s it is
intended to remain intact in a major earthquake, but
could be significantly displaced because of the high
liquefaction risk in the area. Complete or partial loss of
gate function would cause saline flooding of pasture
land and elevated groundwater levels.
This length of the river has been classified as having the
greatest vulnerability.
Other Systems
Otukaikino Creek
From Dickeys Road to the Waimakariri the river is
within a moderate liquefaction risk zone. There could
be some bank slump but this should not seriously
impair the flow.
Coastal hillside drains
These drains are all vulnerable to moderate ground
shake and a moderate risk of liquefaction. There could
be damage to the valley watercourses, redirecting the
flow, and bank slumping is possible in the downstream
reaches. Some of these drains have been identified as
having a high risk of damage to property should a storm
occur. This is because the drains do not have a perma-
nent base flow so any damage to the waterway will not
be causing immediate problems and therefore may not
be discovered immediately. Therefore, if a storm oc-
curs there could be widespread flooding of the flat
residential land at the base of the watercourses.
Outfall drain
Outfall Drain is in the zone vulnerable to a high risk of
liquefaction and ground shake. The length of drain
with earth banks could suffer from some bank slump.
The precast concrete lined portion could be some
displacement of the precast units. Any possible dam-
age in either lengths should not cause major flooding if
a storm occurred.
The tidegates at the Estuary are at risk of settling due
to liquefaction and saltwater intrusion could be a
problem in the event of tidegate failure.
Sea outfalls
These outfalls are prone to high ground shake and a
high risk of liquefaction and also damage from the sea
There is a high chance that these systems, particularly
the Parklands Outfall, could be extensively damaged.
If a storm occurs, surface flooding is highly likely.
Halswell River tributaries
The Nottingham Stream flows through land vulnerable
to high ground shake but not to liquefaction. The
channel should not be seriously damaged.
General
Pumping stations
The 14 stormwater pump stations have been inspected
and their seismic vulnerability assessed as being in the
low risk category. However, piped connections to the
stations were classified as having a low to moderate
risk of damage.
Brick barrel pipelines
These are all within areas at risk of liquefaction and
high ground shake. Brick pipelines are particularly
vulnerable to ground shake and it is expected that
significant damage will occur. These pipelines have
been classified as having the highest vulnerability to
damage.
Retention basins
These are in areas subject to high ground shake. Wave
action could cause minor damage.
Water quality
The entry of raw sewage into the land drainage system
will occur via existing overflows. These are generally
located close to the rivers and adequate baseflow
should be available for conveyance. However, there is
likely to be ponding in areas of significant bank slump-
ing or pipe failure where no baseflow exists.
All of the rivers are vulnerable to hazardous spills due
to storage tanks failing in an earthquake. Some of the
possible contaminants could cause extensive damage
to wildlife and the river biota. It could take a long time
for the rivers to recover from such spills.
A significant pollutant will be silt due to mini land-
slides and the river banks collapsing. Once again this
type of pollutant could cause serious long-term dam-
age to the rivers environment.
Kerb channels and sumps
In the Edgecumbe earthquake in 1987 it was reported
that 30% of all stormwater sumps were either de-
stroyed or displaced. This is caused by longitudinal
movement of kerb and channel and/or upward dis-
placement of sumps. Christchurch can expect similar
damage. If a storm occurred, stormwater would not be
able to drain efficiently to damaged sumps and their
respective outfalls. Surface flooding would be inevita-
ble and this could hamper property access and repair of
services.
Mitigation measures
It is clear that in a major earthquake event in Christ-
church, serious damage and widespread disruption is
likely to occur to the land drainage system in some
areas. Damage to property due to flooding is extremely
probable should a storm occur after the event. Mitiga-
tion measures for the land drainage system fall mainly
under the category of organising response measures.
That is, checking and repairing the various elements in
order of priority so that we are not caught out should a
storm occur, and that the passage of baseflows (includ-
ing sewage) is maintained.
It is essential that planning be undertaken to identify
the likely responses after an earthquake especially in
the following areas:
Maintaining the passage of baseflows and/or sew-
age flows together with public health precautions.
Checking the flood channels are clear in the three
major rivers.
The Woolston Barrage has to be checked. If it gets
jammed shut then a storm could cause flooding
upstream or if jammed open saltwater damage is
possible.
Checking stopbanks along the Avon River and
responding to damage to prevent tidal inundation.
Making sure hillside waterways and outlets are
clear.
Ensuring that personnel and equipment are avail-
able for the above.
Other mitigation measures that can be completed prior
to an earthquake include:
Providing adequate fixing and bracing of plant in
pumping stations.
In areas subject to liquefaction/lateral spreading
use flexible pipeline materials with full joint
strength. For key mains, traditional rubber ring
jointed pipes may not be adequate in these condi-
tions.
Use maximum strength couplings or joint lengths
when connecting pipelines to structures. This may
be particularly appropriate for large diameter pipes
where joints normally have less capacity to absorb
rotation. Special joints may be required. Investi-
Civil Services 77
gate the feasibility of allowing space between joints
to permit pipeline to compress without damage.
Insert hazard maps as layers in Geographic Infor-
mation Systems for planning and location of serv-
ices.
Ensure equipment sourced from overseas meets
seismic detailing requirements.
Embody seismic thinking into the planning and
design process. Ensure that seismic risks are cov-
ered in the revision of the Design Manual.
Put in place management plans and provide train-
ing to ensure controlled and intelligent response to
disaster situations. Prepare a database of plant and
materials, both within and outside areas likely to be
affected.
Identify spare parts and sandbag requirements and
hold in stock or identify ready sources of supply.
Identify and prepare cost/benefit estimates and
priorities of the specific mitigation measures avail-
able to protect the integrity of the drainage system.
Factors to be taken into account include cost, rela-
tive risk and extent of damage, public safety and
health, receiving water quality and property dam-
age.
Investigate methods of improving brick barrel pipe-
lines by relining or other methods. If this is not
possible, programme replacement of pipelines with
other suitable materials.
Establish where hazardous spills are possible and
encourage owners to install bunds to contain spills
in an earthquake.
Study the performance of existing materials and
investigate possible design improvements.
Prepare a comprehensive earthquake response
management plan covering:
Response structure such as staff require-
ments, duties, decision making delegation,
communications liaison with Civil Defence
and other service authorities, etc.
Emergency response centre facilities.
Measures for staff rescue, accommodation,
safety and support.
Identification of essential plant, equipment
and materials, and sources of emergency
supply.
Priority list of drainage facilities to be
checked, and a standardised format for
reporting damage.
Procedures for thorough debriefing.
Snowstorm Risk
System description
Refer to Land Drainage Seismic Risk, Section 4.2.
Vulnerability
The normal functions for the land drainage system,
together with the emergency function of conveying
sewage overflows, would be made vulnerable by the
following snow storm effects.
Weather pattern
The low barometric pressure usually required to pro-
duce a significant snowfall in Christchurch also has the
effect of increasing the tide levels. High runoff from
snow and associated heavy rainfall combined with
these tidal effects can produce flooding, particularly in
the lower reaches of the rivers (see Section 2.7 for
details on the weather patterns required for heavy
snowfall).
Hillside slips
Saturated hillsides can be made more vulnerable to
slipping by the weight of heavy snow fall. Slips can
block off the usual natural flow paths and hillside
drains, causing stormwater to find an alternative way
down the hill. This can sometimes be through residen-
tial sections and buildings. During the August 1992
snow storm, hillside slips were a major concern.
Loss of electricity and telecommunications
During the initial phase of snow storm it can be
expected that electricity and telephone lines could be
cut off for a number of hours to most areas of Christ-
church.
Loss of telephone communications would prevent the
public from reporting drainage problems. However,
internal communications by radio telephone (or
cellphone) would be less vulnerable and still likely to
be functioning.
Stormwater pumping stations could be affected by loss
of electricity but this should not have any major conse-
quences if electricity is restored within a day. Some
pumping stations do not have gravity overflows so will
need to be given priority for reconnection. The large
pumping station at Horseshoe Lake has a standby
power generator.
At the sewer pumping stations that do not have diesel
backup, sewage overflows to the rivers would occur.
Blockages
Heavy snow can build up on inlets to the land drainage
system causing partial or full blockages. Snow loads
would cause branches to break off trees, which could
also contribute to blockages.
This can occur in open drains, usually at inlets to pipes
causing backing up and possible localised flooding.
Street sumps could be blocked causing street flooding,
thereby aggravating already difficult traffic condi-
tions. Snow blockages are easily cleared. However,
due to staff limitations, problems will still occur.
Transportation
During the initial stages when roads are covered with
snow there can be problems with staff getting to
emergency and operation control centres. Inspecting
trouble spots in response to public complaints is also
difficult without the availability of four-wheel drive
vehicles or chains.
Mitigation measures
Weather pattern
Ensure that all weather warnings, flood procedures
and responses are up to date.
Hillside slips
Require maintenance staff to report possible prob-
lems on the hillsides and include an ongoing report-
ing procedure for signs and causes of possible
future slips. Where necessary, do preventative work.
Loss of electricity and telecommunications
Provide priority list to Southpower for reconnec-
tion of important pumping stations.
Seek extra safeguards for radio telephone/cellphone
systems.
Inlet blockages
If resources are seriously stretched and the weather
allows it, encourage capable members of the public
to clear snow away from roadside sumps.
Transportation
Ensure that at least one four-wheel drive vehicle is
available and also chains for other vehicles for land
drainage personnel to gain access to sites where
assessments or operations are required.
Encourage considering four-wheel drive when look-
ing at future vehicle purchases.
Pumping stations
Investigate which pumping stations are at risk of
flooding if electricity supply is cut off. Install
gravity outfalls where possible and carry out any
other works that would prevent the pump stations
from failing.
Tsunami, Local Flooding and Slope
Hazard Risk
System description
Refer to Land Drainage Seismic Risk, Section 4.2.
Vulnerability
Tsunami
River banks
During the scenario described, waves would propagate
up the Avon, Heathcote and Styx Rivers, overtopping
the stopbanks along the lower reaches. River banks are
vulnerable to damage from the scouring effect of the
fast moving wave and slumping by rapid draw down
effects as the wave recedes. Stormwater pipe outfalls to
the river could be seriously damaged in the lower
reaches.
Sea outfalls
The sea outfalls, including the hillside drain outfalls,
are vulnerable to quite serious damage and wave ef-
fects could cause damage and flooding further up-
stream.
Pumping stations
Two of the stormwater pumping stations are vulner-
able to flooding from a tsunami. They are:
Pumping station number 209 Beachville Road.
Subject to inundation from Estuary.
Pumping station number 217 Bridge Street.
Subject to inundation from Estuary and beach.
Local flooding
Local flooding occurs in those areas that are either
permanent natural floodplain and ponding areas or
small in extent and frequency such that further improve-
ment in the drainage system is difficult or expensive.
Civil Services 79
Slope hazard
Earthquake scenario
All waterways on the hillside are vulnerable to moder-
ate ground shake and a moderate risk of liquefaction.
Slips and falling debris could cause blockages in wa-
terways. If a storm occurs during or following the
earthquake, flows could be redirected through residen-
tial sections and buildings.
Heavy rainfall scenario
As for the earthquake scenario, slips could cause block-
ages in waterways. It is highly likely that property
damage will occur due to secondary flows through
residential sections and buildings. Secondary flows
and/or inundated overland flows could also induce
slips.
Mitigation measures
Tsunami
Establish communication linkage with early warn-
ing system.
Investigate the possible effects of inundation of the
two vulnerable pump stations and carry out pre-
ventative works if necessary.
Consider scour and draw-down effects when de-
signing new bankworks. Instigate response meas-
ures to ensure that following the event all beach
outfalls and affected waterways are inspected for
damage and any repairs carried out in an appropri-
ate order of priority.
A greater understanding of effects is required.
Model the tsunami scenario using MIKE II so that
the extent of flooding can be assessed. Mitigation
measures for flood affected area might include:
determination of areas that should be
evacuated where human safety is at risk.
gates that provide for greater flow of flood
water into waterways and rivers when the
wave receding.
Local flooding
Identify on flood awareness maps.
Control flood damage through floodplain manage-
ment plans prepared jointly by Christchurch City
Council and Canterbury Regional Council.
Slope hazard
Require maintenance staff to report possible prob-
lems on the hillsides and include an ongoing report-
ing procedure for signs and causes of possible
future slips and debris problems and, where neces-
sary, carry out preventative work.
Consider possibility of secondary flows and their
effects when designing hillside drainage systems.
4.3 Sewer System
Seismic hazard
System description
The Christchurch sewer system comprises:
175 km of trunk gravity sewers (300 mm and larger
diameter) and pressure mains;
approximately 1,135 km of minor gravity mains
reticulation (225 mm or smaller diameter);
74 pumping stations; and
one major treatment plant at Bromley and two
minor satellite plants at Belfast and Templeton.
Christchurch sewer mains analysis
The lengths, types and construction materials of Christ-
church sewers are shown in Table 4.1.
The citys first sewers were constructed in 1880 with
most early construction occurring in three boom peri-
ods, 1880 to 1884, 1900 to 1910 and 1924 to 1931. In
the first period, 51 km of ceramic sewer was laid,
mostly within the four avenues but also branching into
St Albans, Sydenham, Addington and Linwood. The
citys 7 km of brick barrel sewers and the old number
1 pumping station were also constructed during this
period. From 1900 to 1910, a further 120 km of ceramic
sewerage was laid, and pumping stations 2 and 3
constructed. This extended the system radially an av-
erage of 2 km. Parts of Cashmere and Sumner were also
separately reticulated around this time, although most
of these Sumner sewers have now been renewed.
The years 1925 to 1930 saw an amazing 250 km of
sewer and 23 pumping stations built, extending the
system into the suburbs of St Albans, Richmond,
Avonside, Linwood, Woolston, Opawa, St Martins,
Beckenham, Somerfield, Spreydon, Riccarton,
Fendalton, Bryndwyr and Papanui. During this period
a mixture of cement jointed ceramic and reinforced
concrete pipes were used. Ceramic pipes continued to
be used until around 1950 before being superseded in
all but 100 mm diameter laterals by rubber ring jointed
reinforced concrete pipes. From 1973 to 1987, cheaper
Lengt h
(m)
Gravity
main
Pressure
main
Ot her Average
age
Age range
Cast Iron 4040 290 3730 - 73 16-83
Asbestos
Cement
19,217 1966 16,115 1,136 17 4-30
Reinforced
Concrete
(rectangular)
137,921 114,758 20,363 2240 31 4-66
Earthenware 4033 3770 283 95 60-110
Brick Barrel 5145 5145 - - 110 110
Total 170,356 125,929 40,491 3376
Note: 3,796 metres not included material type not known
Table 4.1: Christchurch city sewers
asbestos cement pipes were used in all but the larger
diameters (450 mm upwards). Since 1987 PVC piping
has been the predominant sewer material used.
The citys two most important sewers, the northern and
southern relief sewers were constructed in the 1950s
along with pumping station 1 which was commis-
sioned in 1956. Most trunk reticulation is less than 40
years old, the main exceptions being the brick barrels,
the two pressure mains from terminal pumping station
11, laid in 1907 and 1924, and ceramic sewers in the
central city area.
More than 80% of trunk gravity reticulation is con-
structed of rubber ring jointed reinforced concrete
pipes, the rest being (in decreasing order of length)
ceramic, brick, asbestos cement, PVC, concrete lined
steel and cast iron.
Most pressure mains are either asbestos cement or
reinforced concrete, PVC and cast iron being the other
materials used.
Age of Christchurch city sewage treatment
facilities
The Bromley Wastewater Treatment Plant was com-
missioned in 1962 with later expansions. Treatment
currently consists of screening, primary sedimenta-
tion, biological filtration, secondary sedimentation and
oxidation ponds.
The Belfast oxidation ponds were constructed in 1972,
and the Templeton Plant in 1958.
The reticulation has an estimated replacement value of
$475 million, and the Bromley Wastewater Treatment
Plant $200 million.
Vulnerability
Reticulation
In this section reference is drawn to the Seismic Hazard
map (Map 19, p 302) on which the trunk sewer system
has been superimposed.
Most vulnerable to earthquake damage are the brick
barrel sewers, lime cement mortar jointed ceramic
sewers, and all sewers in the 2A and 3A liquefaction
zones (the 3A zone covers most of east Christchurch)
Widespread damage of these sewers can be expected,
with numerous broken junctions, broken collars, dis-
placed joints, and possible losses of grade.
The traditional use in Christchurch of short pipes on
either side of manholes, will help rubber ring jointed
gravity sewers remain operational, but ceramic and
brick barrel sewers are almost certain to suffer col-
lapses.
Many of the pressure mains laid in liquefiable ground
will be sufficiently damaged to make them unusable
until repaired.
Of the 74 pumping station catchments covering the
urban area, 30 have no emergency overflow with 15 of
these having catchments of more than 50 ha.
Sewage overflows will be unavoidable and may create
a serious health hazard in catchments without bypasses
to the stormwater system.
Most river crossings are siphons, important exceptions
being pressure mains suspended from the Pages Road
and Ferrymead Bridges. These are likely to break,
cutting off South Brighton and all suburbs east of
Ferrymead Bridge.
Civil Services 81
Pumping stations
An inspection of all 74 pumping stations was carried
out to check the seismic vulnerability. The findings are
summarised below.
Pumping station buildings
The majority of buildings are likely to suffer moderate
damage with cracking of brittle components such as
concrete/brick/block walls, but will remain substan-
tially intact. Fifteen percent could have walls collaps-
ing or failing completely. The cracking of basement or
well walls could allow the ingress of water and sewage
into basements and dry wells.
Pumping stations 2, 3, 4, 5 and 51 are in the may
collapse category. Of these, only pumping station
number 5 has a catchment area of any significance (51
ha).
Pumping stations 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 18, 26, 27, 28 and 59
are in the next category up of Moderate damage, some
walls fail in face loadings. Of these stations pumping
station number 11 is of vital importance to the network,
followed by pumping station number 6, then pumping
station numbers 18 and 28.
Many stations have manual sump pumps which may
not be activated in time to possibly prevent the dry well
from being flooded by seepage from the wet well. The
Scada alarm system, now being installed in Pumping
station number 15 and ultimately planned to serve all
important pump stations, will, if still working after the
earthquake, warn of water rising on the dry well floor.
Pumping equipment
The majority of pumping equipment (90%) falls in the
small possibility of damage category. The remaining
10% is in the damage highly unlikely category.
Pipes/connections
The majority of pipe connections were found to be
inflexible and therefore likely to be damaged where
piping enters wells and basements, particularly where
liquefaction/settlement is likely to occur (65% of in-
stallations).
Electrical services
Most installations were found to have little risk of
damage to electrical services (91%). However the
majority of pump stations rely on electricity supplied
by Southpower with no emergency generator backup.
Supply is usually via a Southpower kiosk substation
and these are highly vulnerable. In some cases the
failure of one kiosk may mean others in the area could
take up the load once Southpower has made the appro-
priate alterations. However a pumping station with a
high electrical demand could cause problems. Only
pumping stations 1, 11 ,15, 78 and 80 have standby
generation.
Alarm/Scada equipment
Alarms and Scada equipment generally rely on the
Telecom Network to operate but in general are not
critical to the functioning of the network. As noted
above, a new Scada control and alarm system is being
installed in all pumping stations which is radio based.
Treatment works
Bromley wastewater treatment plant
Buildings these were found to be of low risk of
damage. However at Bromley, should cracks appear in
walls below ground level or substantial leaks occur in
the basement reticulation systems, the sump pump
system could be unable to cope.
Pumping equipment pumping equipment was also
found to be of low risk.
Pipework and connections as for pumping stations,
highly vulnerable at pipe/structure interfaces.
Electrical services generally low vulnerability.
Emergency generating equipment operates on site and
is able to supply the fuel power needs of the plant.
Alarms and control equipment VDUs and computer
equipment were found to be unrestrained.
Templeton plant
Minimal damage likely to buildings, a small possibility
of damage to pumping equipment and pipes/connec-
tions and damage to electrical services and alarm
equipment unlikely.
Proposed mitigation measures
Reticulation
The following mitigation measures are recommended:
Construct controlled overflows to the stormwater
system at critical points in those catchments where
none exist at present. This work to be prioritized on
catchment importance. Estimated cost $10,000 per
overflow with possibly 20 new overflows required.
Strengthen structurally suspect brick barrels iden-
tified from CCTV(closed circuit television). The
likely need for this work has already been recog-
nised and it will be funded from the sewer renewal
budget. Estimated cost is between $1 million and
$3 million.
Take all opportunities presented by major road-
works to renew remaining trunk ceramic sewers
and also those serving the central city commercial
area. Possible cost $300,000 per year on average,
again funded from the sewer renewal budget.
Investigate earthquake protection measures as part
of upcoming review of the Design Manual.
Use flexible pipeline materials with full joint
strength for future pressure main work, e.g. welded
polyethylene.
Prepare an earthquake response plan. It should
include a prescribed procedure for prioritising re-
pair work.
Pumping stations
Pumping station buildings
Recommended mitigation measures are:
Seismically strengthen buildings that are most at
risk and pose greatest threat to network as whole.
Only pumping station number 5 and, possibly,
pumping station number 2 have been identified in
this category. Estimated cost $100,000.
Ensure sump pumps are adequately maintained,
secure, and in important stations have backup elec-
tricity supply. Providing backup electricity supply
for sump pumps will require a small standby gen-
erator, sometimes housed outside the pump station
because of space limitation, and associated electrics.
Some 14 important pumping stations have been
identified for this work. Estimated cost $20,000
each.
Establish a stock of petrol-driven pumps, stored in
key locations around Christchurch that could be
used to back up sump pumps in an emergency or
where no pumps drain dry wells.
Two pumps are currently reserved for this purpose
but more are considered necessary.
Pumping equipment
Ensure equipment is properly restrained.
Pipes/connections
Establish a programme of fitting flexible joints to
pipe entries at high liquefaction risk sites that are
also important to the network as a whole.
This work may be needed at possibly 20 pumping
stations still to be identified. Depending on the distance
between the valve box and the pump station, up to three
flexible joints may be needed. Where there is insuffi-
cient distance between the valve box and the pumping
station to install a flexible joint, the valve box could
instead be rigidly connected to the pumping station and
just one flexible joint installed in the pipework on the
other side. Estimated cost is $5,000 per station. Flex-
ible joints could be achieved using a length of
polyethylene pipe between long gibault joints or a
length of rubber piping either flange or steel band
connected. There are also manufactured couplings
suitable for the purpose.
A further mitigation measure is to identify spare parts
requirements and hold in stock or identify ready sources
of supply.
Electrical equipment
Recommended mitigation measures are to:
liaise with Southpower as regards security of sup-
ply to key pumping stations in the network;
investigate standby generation for pumping station
numbers 20, 35, 36, 42, 46, 63 and 20, these
pumping stations being most important to the net-
work (excluding pumping station numbers 1, 11
and 15 which already have standby generation);
ensure all electrical cabinets are bolted down; and
ensure all emergency battery banks are restrained.
Alarm Scada equipment
No mitigation measures recommended. New radio
based scada system currently being installed will be
less vulnerable.
Miscellaneous
Restrain all miscellaneous loose equipment capable of
causing damage, e.g. diesel tank stands and drums,
spare parts, fluorescent lights (often hung from hooks),
water cisterns, etc.
Treatment works
Bromley wastewater treatment plant
Buildings review sump capacity and ensure opera-
tion in the event of a power failure.
Pumping equipment no mitigation measures recom-
mended.
Pipework and connections establish a programme to
upgrade reticulation system at key/critical points. These
critical points will first need to be identified.
Alarms and control equipment restrain VDUs and
computer equipment with inexpensive hold down straps.
Civil Services 83
Wind
Vulnerability
The wind storm will not affect buried reticulation and
should cause only minimal damage to sewer pumping
station buildings. Sewer pumping stations will how-
ever be vulnerable to both loss of power and telephone
(used by the alarm system). This could result in dry
wells being flooded in stations that are not protected by
overflows to the stormwater system.
At the treatment works, some scour of the oxidation
pond banks is possible but serious damage is consid-
ered unlikely.
Mitigation measures
Proposed mitigation measures mainly relate to power
failure. They are to:
install sewer overflows at or close to unprotected
pumping stations;
liaise with Southpower regarding security of sup-
ply to key pumping stations in the network, supply-
ing them with a prioritized list;
check pumping station sites for possible damage to
buildings and overhead telephone wires from trees;
and
ensure aerials for the new radio-based Scada sys-
tem will not be damaged by trees.
Snow
Vulnerability
In the August 1992 snow storm, power failure lead to
the Sumner pump station flooding and two other pump
stations east of Ferrymead Bridge being nearly flooded.
The pumping station alarm system did not help much
as it only indicated high water at most stations and did
not warn of the more serious problem of water on the
dry well floor.
This meant that the most critical stations needing
urgent attention could only be identified by visiting
each station in turn, a job that was hindered by lack of
four-wheel drive transport. (The new Scada alarm
system currently being installed will warn of water on
the dry well floor.)
At the treatment works, build up of snow on the
trickling filter covers caused concern and the oxidation
ponds were close to overtopping.
The snow storm caused three hill slips which exposed
minor sewers but did not break them.
Mitigation measures
Proposed mitigation measures are to:
install overflows to the stormwater system where
necessary;
liaise with Southpower regarding security of sup-
ply to key pumping stations in the network, supply-
ing them with a prioritized list;
install automatic sump pumps with reasonable ca-
pacity in all stations (currently underway);
seal all high level ducting into wet and dry wells;
ensure availability of four-wheel drive transport;
and
ensure sufficient stocks of submersible pumps,
generators, lights and diesel.
Tsunami
Vulnerability
Areas affected by the tsunami hazard are Brooklands,
Spencerville, North Brighton, New Brighton, Brighton
Spit, Ferrymead, and east of Ferrymead Bridge.
A total of 13 pumping stations in these areas will be
inundated, with few likely to remain operational at
present. The stations affected, in descending order of
catchment size are pumping station numbers 35, 37,
57, 31, 38, 34, 52, 55, 77, 78, 33, 59, 48, and 30. The
failure of these stations will not affect sewage disposal
in other pumping station catchments.
Mitigation measures
Proposed mitigation measures to minimize damage to
pumping station plant are to:
waterproof pump station buildings below inunda-
tion levels, replacing louvre doors with solid ones
(installing higher vents where necessary), install-
ing waterproof seals around all doors, wet well
covers, and other openings below flood level;
seal all high level ducting into wet and dry wells;
and
ensure electrics in outside electrical cabinets are
above flood level.
Local flooding
Vulnerability
Pumping stations with door and other openings below
predicted flood levels will be vulnerable to dry well
flooding. Also vulnerable are electrics below flood
level in outside cabinets.
Heathcote River catchment
Working up the river, pump stations situated in the
floodplain area are pumping station numbers 15, 12,
13, 18, 19, 20, 21 ,22, 23, 43, 68 and 42. Of these,
pumping station number 15 will be inundated 400 mm,
pumping station number 18, 250 mm, pumping station
number 19, 330 mm, pumping station number 21,
1.4 m, pumping station number 22, 650 mm, pumping
station number 23, 600 mm, pumping station number
43, 400 mm. Pumping station numbers 12, 13, 20, 68
and 42 are above flood level.
Pumping stations numbers 45, 35, 46, 63, 39, 54 and 28
are situated in the Avon River floodplain. Pumping
station numbers 35, 54 and 28 should escape flooding,
but estimated inundation depths at the other stations
are pumping station number 45, 300 mm, pumping
station number 46, 200 mm, pumping station number
63, 350 mm and pumping station number 39, 300 mm.
Styx River
Only pumping station number 77 in Brooklands is
located in the floodplain. This is a submersible pump
station with an above ground electrical cabinet which
will be inundated at approximately 500 mm.
Mitigation measures
Proposed mitigation measures are to make affected
pumping stations watertight below inundation levels.
This work will include replacing louvre doors with
solid ones (installing vents higher up if necessary),
concrete boxing around doors and electrical cabinets,
ensuring wet well covers seal well and sealing high
level ducting into the pump station.
4.4 Water Supply
Seismic risk
System description
Christchurch is situated partly on a flat alluvial plain
and partly on the Port Hills to the south. The city is
bounded on the east by the Pacific Ocean and is
underlain with aquifers.
Some pumping station suction tanks, particularly in the
eastern part of the city, are fed by artesian wells.
Christchurch city is served by 84 pumping stations and
37 service reservoirs. The pumps draw water from five
underground aquifers at depths between 22 and 190
metres.
Approximately 50% of the primary pumping stations
have a standby diesel generator installed in case of
power failure. Secondary pumping stations do not have
standby generators. Of the total pumping stations, 25%
have standby generators. There is also a mobile diesel
powered pump available.
The city has five supply zones based on the system
operated by the various authorities that merged in 1989
to form the new Christchurch city. Those trunk mains
analysed in this study totalled approximately 160 km in
length (total length of mains is 1,300 kms).
These zones operate at differing pressures but in an
emergency can be interconnected by opening valves
that have been installed at zone boundaries.
Because of the climate in Christchurch a very small
proportion of the supply is used as potable water the
majority used for irrigation.
A small stand-alone system serves the small settlement
of Kainga/Stewarts Gully. This system does not have
storage, but does have a standby generator.
Trunk mains linking the pumping stations and reser-
voirs as well as major distribution pipes are shown on
Map 20 (p 303) and range in size up to 600 mm. The
length of water supply mains in the city is approxi-
mately 1,300 kilometres. The mains range in size from
80 mm to 600 mm diameter and are constructed with
widely differing materials. Table 4.2 shows the ap-
proximate length of mains for each size and material.
The first watermains were installed in the city during
the period 1900 to 1905 and some of these old mains are
still in use. In fact, some 10% (131 kms) of the mains
were installed before 1920. Table 4.3 summarises the
length of mains and materials installed in each 20 year
period since 1900 (note that the last period is 12 years).
Also in the city are two small systems that are not
controlled by the Councils Water Supply Unit. These
are:
Spencer Park recreation area which is a popular
camping area where the supply is owned and oper-
ated by the citys Parks Unit. The system incorpo-
rates a small elevated tank but there is no standby
generator.
Christchurch International Airport has a stand alone
system with four of its seven wells serviced by
standby generators.
Civil Services 85
Material Size of Pipe (mm)
80 100 150 175 200 225 250 300 375 450 600 Total
AC 3 350 220 1 135 2 8 54 3 776
CI 25 136 42 27 3 233
CLS 25 5 1 3 3 12 3 3 3 58
DI 1 1 1 1 3 7
PVC 20 15 3 12 50
ST 1 35 12 5 2 4 5 6 11 81
EVER 1 65 20 1 8 95
Total 55 612 311 2 175 10 13 88 11 9 14 1300
Length (kms) for each size (mm)
AC: Asbestos Cement, PVC: Poly Vinyl Chloride, CI: Cast Iron, ST: Spiral Welded or Riverted Steel,
CLS: Concrete Lined Steel, EVER: Asbestos Cement (Everite), DI: Ductile Iron.
Table 4.2: Summary of sizes and materials of mains
Outside the city, the Banks Peninsula District Council
has a system in the Lyttelton harbour basin served by
water drawn from seven wells in Heathcote, piped to
settlement tank at Heathcote and then distributed to
Lyttelton by two systems.
Firstly the water is pumped to the Heathcote Reservoir
above the Tunnel Road from which it is piped through
the rail tunnel in a 200 mm main to supply lower
Lyttelton and the Exeter Street pumping station. Water
can then be pumped to the main reservoir in Lyttelton.
The second supply is pumped directly from the
Heathcote pumping station to the Cornwall Road res-
ervoir via a 200 mm main passing through the ventila-
tion shaft of the Lyttelton Road Tunnel.
Water is distributed to Diamond Harbour via a 150 mm
steel submarine main and to Governors Bay via a
uPVC trunk main.
The distribution lines consist predominantly of 75 mm
cast iron with the more modern mains being uPVC.
Apart from uPVC, the pipes are 70 to 100 years old.
System vulnerability
The whole area would be subject to earthquake dam-
age, some flat areas would be subject to liquefaction,
ground settlement, flooding and, near the coast, tsu-
nami.
The Sumner, Redcliffs, Mt Pleasant area east of the
Ferrymead Bridge over the Heathcote River is particu-
larly vulnerable. If the link across the bridge is cut then
the area will be entirely dependent on the water that is
in the reservoirs at the time. There are no wells in the
area.
With regard to the reticulation system, the main prob-
lem areas appear to be where the main is attached to or
built into bridges crossing Christchurchs rivers. While
the more modern bridges should not be too vulnerable
to damage themselves, most could suffer slumping of
the bridge approaches with the distinct possibility that
the mains could shear.
Damage to pipes will also occur due to differential
movement at soil transition zones and in areas of
Material Period
1900-1920 1921-1940 1941-1960 1961-1980 1981-1992 Total
AC 1 2 158 424 191 776
CI 88 13 98 18 16 233
CLS 21 1 13 13 10 58
DI 7 7
PVC 1 4 45 50
ST 21 28 9 11 12 81
EVER 3 88 1 3 95
Total 131 47 367 471 284 1300
Length (kms) shown for each period (years)
AC: Asbestos Cement, PVC :Poly Vinyl Chloride, CI: Cast Iron, ST: Spiral Welded or Riverted Steel,
CLS: Concrete Lined Steel, EVER: Asbestos Cement (Everite), DI: Ductile Iron.
Table 4.3: Summary of length and materials in periods
liquefaction. Landslides may well cause displacement
or lack of support to pipelines.
Forty percent of the pumping stations are at low risk,
40% of very low risk, with the remaining 20% high risk
(these being substantially constructed of unreinforced
masonry). A few small reservoirs are laterally unre-
strained and therefore highly vulnerable. Pumping
equipment is of low risk.
Seventy percent of the pipework and connections at
reservoirs is of low risk with 30% likely to be substan-
tially damaged. There is a general lack of flexible
connections. Ninety percent of electrical services are
of little risk.
Details of the vulnerability of the reservoirs and pump-
ing stations are shown in the vulnerability charts pre-
pared for the Council by Kingston Morrison.
Those pumping stations that do not have a standby
diesel generators are of course doubly vulnerable and
shearing of well pipes could be a problem.
Vulnerable components within the Banks Peninsula
District reticulation are numerous. The 300 mm trunk
main from the Dyers Road well is strapped to the side
of the bridge on the Tunnel Road with no means of
shutting it off quickly.
The Heathcote pump house is a very old building and
likely to be damaged during an earthquake. All reser-
voirs in Heathcote and Lyttelton are old and not de-
signed to meet current seismic standards. Both tunnel
portals present likely damage to the watermains if
ground movement in the area is large.
Pump houses and reservoirs are 70 to 100 years old.
The trunk mains to Diamond Harbour and Governors
Bay are likely to be damaged due to landslip.
Mitigation measures
At first glance it would appear that the Christchurch
water supply system is rather vulnerable to earthquake
damage but the following points need to be made
which show the system in a somewhat better light:
The Christchurch system is a massive grid network
and is not dependent on long isolated trunk mains
that are not duplicated. With judicious operation of
valves there are numerous routes available to get
water from one point to another. As well as the 160
kms of mains analysed, there are 1,140 kms of
subsidiary mains that can be utilised. There is
considerable redundancy built into the system.
Twenty five percent of the pumping stations have
standby diesel generators.
A number of the pumping stations and reservoirs
are of modern earthquake resistant design.
A number of the stations are artesian fed.
Since 1994, a duplicate McCormacks Bay reser-
voir has been constructed and this substantially
boosts storage east of the Ferrymead Bridge.
The Banks Peninsula District system is critically de-
pendent on the mains through the rail and road tunnels
and on its old substandard reservoirs and pump houses.
However, since the commencement of the lifelines
project the Heathcote settlement tank, pumping station
and the Cornwall Road reservoir have been replaced.
For reticulation, the main mitigation measures pro-
posed are the installation of sufficient additional valves
either side of vulnerable bridge crossings so that the
loss of water can be minimised. Extra valves at major
intersections will reduce areas required to be shut
down to repair broken mains. Residents should be
encouraged to have on-site storage sufficient for at
least three days and it should be mandatory for business
relying on water to have on site storage. Toilet cisterns
and hot water cylinders hold a certain amount but roof
storage tanks should be installed. Garden irrigation
should be banned after any extensive damage to the
water supply systems.
Mitigation measures proposed for the reservoirs and
pumping stations include:
seismically strengthen buildings that are vulner-
able and considered important enough;
restrain all reservoirs that are presently unrestrained;
initiate an audit to check on the strength of all
reservoirs against current code requirements and
strengthen where appropriate;
ply;
restrain emergency batteries, cabinets, caustic tanks,
spare motors, trolleys, sump pumps, computer
equipment, switchboards, etc.; and
initiate a programme of installing flexible connec-
tions to critical installations.
Where standby generators are installed, there should
be a minimum diesel storage capacity sufficient for
three days operation.
An earthquake response plan should be prepared to
cover the following points:
the amount and nature of stores that should be held
including stores held by neighbouring local au-
thorities;
Civil Services 87
staff requirements and duties, delegation authority,
liaison with Civil Defence and other authorities;
availability of equipment and manpower with pos-
sible assistance from neighbouring local authori-
ties;
response priorities with a list for checking of facili-
ties using a standardised damage report form;
available option; and
facilities to be available at emergency response
centres.
Snow
Vulnerability
Snow in Christchurch is most likely in June, July,
August and based on the August 1992 snow storm
approximately 30 cm can be expected on the flat and up
to 1 metre on the Port Hills. Heavy snow could cause
problems with loss of power, possible aerial damage
and access problems to reservoirs. The effects would
be greater on the Port Hills (particularly if strong winds
accompanied the snow).
However, with 25% of the pumping station having
standby diesel generators and virtually all sites having
backup battery systems available for all radio commu-
nication channels the effects should not be great. One
further point is that water consumption during winter is
low.
Structural damage to reservoirs and pump houses is not
likely to be a problem.
Mitigation measures
The problems caused by heavy snow should not be
great and mitigation measures proposed for the reser-
voir and pumping stations include:
increasing battery capacity for communications to
24 hours;
ensuring that at least one four-wheel drive vehicle
with chains is available and that chains are avail-
able for other vehicles; and
liaise with Southpower as regards security of
supply.
Wind
Vulnerability
Strong winds can be experienced in Christchurch at all
times of the year and typically are northwest or south-
west, but strong northeast winds are also possible.
Strong winds will cause problems with loss of power.
Falling tree branches and trees will block access and
possibly damage buildings, reservoirs and aerials.
Standby diesel generators and battery backup for com-
munications will considerably lessen the effects of
wind.
Mitigation measures
Damage to pump houses, reservoirs and aerials should
not be great. However, mitigation measures should
include:
increasing battery capacity for communications to
24 hours;
checking all reservoir and pump house sites and
access tracks on the Port Hills for trees that could be
removed to minimise the problem; and
ply.
Tsunami
Vulnerability
A typical tsunami that could affect Christchurch would
be caused by a large earthquake centred on coastal
South America. Widespread inundation would occur
along the coast with water depths ranging from 0.2 m
and 1.2 m at New Brighton and South Brighton respec-
tively. Moncks Bay area could have water depths up to
1.7 m with 0.7 m at Sumner.
It is not anticipated that pump houses will be damaged
but pumps and electrical equipment could be put out of
action at Effingham Street (1), Palmers Road (2),
Estuary Road (3), Moncks Spur number 1 (2) and
Clifton number 1 (2).
The Banks Peninsula District water supply could be
affected by damage to pumps and electrical equipment
at the Dyers Pass Road pump station (2).
Water supply could also be affected by:
inundation from beach overtopping;
inundation from Estuary; and
combined inundation from beach and Estuary.
Mitigation measures
With the extensive grid network of the reticulation
system it will still be possible to supply water to
residents even if the above stations are out of action.
Mitigation measures proposed are:
ensuring that all electrical equipment is, if possible,
mounted above possible inundation levels; and
investigating the feasibility of waterproofing the
pumping stations.
Local flooding
Vulnerability
Local flooding of the Avon, Heathcote and Styx Rivers
and their tributaries would not seriously disrupt the city
water supply. Access could be somewhat restricted but
is not considered to be a serious problem.
Pumps and electrical equipment could be affected at
Chapmans Road, St Johns and Bexley.
Mitigation Measures
The loss of the above stations will not seriously affect
the systems ability to supply water to the residents.
Mitigation measures proposed are:
ensuring that all electrical equipment, if possible is
mounted above possible inundation levels; and
investigating the feasibility of waterproofing the
pumping stations.
General review of standby capacity
A total review of the water supply standby diesel
capacity is required and this review is scheduled to be
undertaken in the next 12 to 18 months. The review will
include location, total capacity and suitability of exist-
ing equipment.
The review is required not only for emergency situa-
tions but also for factors such as load shedding to
ensure that the best use is made of energy tariffs.
4.5 Petroleum Products
Description
There are three coastal shipping tankers that provide
bulk stock replenishment into the Lyttelton tank farm
storage.
Kotuku, Kuaka and Taiko are each contracted to freight
petroleum products to all New Zealand ports from the
New Zealand Refining Co at Marsden Point in
Whangarei. Kuaka and Kotuku were built in 1975 and
carry a capacity of 34.8 million litres. Taiko was built
in 1984 and has a storage capacity of 34.6 million litres,
of which 5.6 million litres are bitumen dedicated.
Approximately half of each tanker capacity is trans-
ferred from ship to shore at Lyttelton and the frequency
of any one of these is usually every nine to ten days.
Each of the tankers bring in the same product grades,
although Taiko is more black oil based (diesoline,
heavy and light fuel oil, bitumen), Kuaka and Kotuku
are more white oils (motor spirit, jet A1). Other over-
seas vessels (imports) bring in lesser quantity products
(avgas 100, mineral turpentine - HAWS, white spirits
- LAWS) and generally arrive to replenish shore stocks
every two to three months.
The average discharge from the refinery-based vessels
amounts to approximately 16 to 17 million litres which
is generally made up of (say) eight million litres motor
spirit, five million litres diesoline, and the balance jet
A1. These product quantities are pumped ex ship at a
rate of 700,000 litres per hour via one or both 200 mm
marine loading arms to 250 mm wharf lines (hardpipe)
and into industry storage tanks.
Jet A1 (dual purpose Kerosine), HAWS, LAWS, Avgas
100, LFO, HFO and bitumen is permanently stored at
Lyttelton and distributed by tank truck from there.
Motor spirit and diesoline are transferred from any
Lyttelton storage tank through to the Mobil storage
facility at Woolston (and distributed by tank truck from
there) via the Lyttelton-Woolston pipeline which is of
100 mm diameter. The pipeline which is in operation
18-20 hours per day Monday through Friday, transfers
at a rate of approximately 80,000 litres per hour and is
operated solely to provide day-to-day requirements for
all industry product drawoff at Woolston.
Total port storage covering the products mentioned in
still-in-use tanks include:
motor spirit 27,900,000 litres (7,300,000 litres at
Woolston);
diesoline 16,300,000 litres (2,700,000 litres at
Woolston); and
jet A1 (DPK) 17,300,000 litres (2,900,000 litres at
Woolston).
Vulnerabilities
The petroleum industry is very concerned at the vul-
nerability of its systems to fire and efforts to ensure
safety from a fire viewpoint are very much in the
forefront.
The industry is in the process of a full redevelopment
of the Lyttelton tank farm (see Chapter 11, Section
11.9) and consultants have been employed by the
various oil companies in designing for this work.
Although the Hazards Group is concerned at the pos-
sible liquefaction potential of the tank farm area, such
tests as have been undertaken have convinced the oil
Civil Services 89
companies to their satisfaction that such concern is
unwarranted, at least in the foundation areas for the
tanks. However there is less certainty regarding the
stability of the bunds (the stopbanks) around the tank
farm and there is a possibility that the stability of the
seaward edge of the tank farm is in question.
Detailed examination of the vulnerabilities requires
more skills than are presently available in the industry
in Christchurch, and because of the redevelopment
proposals the industry has chosen not to participate in
the formal vulnerability analysis. This is not from any
lack of concern but simply an acknowledgement that
the progressive redevelopment of the tank farm is
making the area very much safer.
Mitigation Measures
Most of the measures relate to automatic shutting off of
valves in the event of anything unusual and the newer
structures (the petroleum pipeline and the installations
at Woolston) are considered by the industry to be
adequate.
In the event of the Lyttelton port becoming unusable
then petroleum products could be provided to Christ-
church from other ports, particularly Nelson or Timaru.
Lyttelton tank farm
Electrical and Communications 91
Chapter 5
Electrical and Communications
5.1 Telecom New Zealand
Limited
Description of the Telecom network
Telephone network
Telecom New Zealand Limited (TNZL), together with
a number of other telecommunication operators, pro-
vides telecommunication services in the greater Christ-
church area. TNZL operates a very wide range of
services and technologies as a single network through-
out New Zealand.
This network is one of the most modern in the world
with considerable investments and operating systems
to support a high level of robustness and diversity.
Telephone Exchange Types
The network consists of the following types of ex-
changes in a broad form of hierarchy:
Remote line units (RLU);
Local exchanges (LX);
Tandem exchanges (TX); and
Toll exchanges (SX).
Remote line units
A remote line unit (RLU) is dependent upon another
switch (its host) to provide service. All calls to or from
a RLU are switched via the host exchange, even when
calling and called parties are connected to the same
RLU.
All RLUs in Christchurch have either diverse dedi-
cated links to their host switch, or have stand-alone
control modules (SACMs) which will provide local
switching functions if the link to the host exchange is
lost.
Local exchanges
By contrast, a local exchange operates as a stand-alone
unit. When both the calling and the called parties are
connected to the same local exchange, a call can be
established without assistance from another exchange.
Calls between parties connected to different local
exchanges in the greater Christchurch area are gener-
ally connected via a direct single junction link. (Small
rural exchanges are the exception.)
Tandem exchanges
There are three types of tandem exchange in Christ-
church.
The local tandem feature of Christchurch central
switch which hosts a small number of rural ex-
changes.
The two toll tandem exchanges at Christchurch
which provide access to the rest of New Zealand
and overseas and are thus referred to as toll ex-
changes These have dual routes to all the LXs in
the greater Christchurch area and are configured as
a mate pair to reduce the impact of a junction or
switch failure (see Network Diversity).
Tandems performing hosting for the RLUs within
the Christchurch free calling area.
Junction routes
Except for circuits between toll exchanges, circuits
provided between exchanges at different sites are re-
ferred to as junctions. The majority of the junction
routes in the Christchurch area are provided using fibre
optic transmission system (FOTS). The fibre optic
cables are drawn into PVC ducts and terminal equip-
ment is located at each exchange to derive the junctions
required. The layout of the Christchurch metropolitan
area has enabled Telecom to construct a network of
FOTS links between the major exchange sites in a
configuration that provides two or three independent
routes out of each site.
Trunk routes
Circuits between Christchurchs toll exchanges and
toll exchanges elsewhere in New Zealand are referred
to as trunks. Major trunk routes from Christchurch,
which use either microwave radio or fibre optic sys-
tems, are as follows.
North Island
Digital Microwave Radio, (DMR) and Fibre Optic
Transmission systems (FOTS).
South Island
Two FOTS as far south as Waimate, then a mix of
FOTS and DMR to Dunedin.
Network Management
The Network Management Centre at Hamilton is staffed
24 hours per day to monitor the state of the network,
and is able to implement traffic control measures
within minutes of problems being detected.
Network diversity
Within the Christchurch metropolitan area a high level
of bearer diversity has been achieved by creating a
ring system with spokes to the central hub.
The major exchanges in the Christchurch area are all
directly connected to each other over this bearer sys-
tem with the maximum diversity that current technolo-
gies permit. A minimum of two (and often three)
independent routes are established between each pair
of exchanges, so that the impact of the normal failure
mechanism, i.e. single damaged cable or FOTS failure,
is minimised. In the event of such a failure there would
be an immediate impairment of service but not a total
loss. Procedures for restoration require manual recon-
nection of bearer plant and may involve a visit to a
suburban site.
Trunk diversity both north and south of Christchurch is
available as parallel dual digital FOTS links (in com-
bination with digital microwave radio). These dual
links traverse the length of the South Island and then
continue through the North Island.
The network is structured to provide alternative rout-
ing of traffic should failure of exchanges, trunk or
junction routes occur. For customers other than those
connected to a particular exchange, any such failure
would result in impaired service, not total loss. Total
loss generally requires the simultaneous loss of several
exchanges, trunk or junction routes.
Customer Behaviour
Since the introduction of SPC exchanges Telecom has
had the capability of monitoring calling behaviour on
a real-time basis. Experience with monitoring has
shown that normal network performance is greatly
affected by customer calling patterns and these are in
turn affected by calendar events or local events. Expe-
rience has also proved that small-scale local events can
considerably increase calling rates. Localised events
can result in network congestion in a local area and
cause difficulties for the affected customers in com-
pleting calls, but leave the rest of the network operating
normally. More widespread events can cause a general
network blockage with a collapse of its ability to
function through overloading.
Traffic management systems are used to control these
situations by restricting the ability to originate calls.
However, it is vital that radio and television can be used
to discourage unnecessary use of the telephone net-
work following a major disaster. Failure to do so
means that load shedding will have to be activated with
a concomitant risk of disallowing emergency calls.
Currently the cellular network could suffer even greater
overloading if many of its cells are out of service.
An example of this process occurred during the
Edgecumbe earthquake where, because of high levels
of calls incoming to the area, it was necessary to apply
100% restriction to calls from selected exchanges such
as International and Auckland for several days after the
event.
This behaviour will be repeated in every civil emer-
gency, i.e. network overloading because of customer
behaviour, even though no physical network failure
has occurred.
Mobile radio network
The mobile radio network (both VHF and UHF) pro-
vides facilities for communication between fixed sites
and portable radio equipment, which can be either
mounted in vehicles or hand-held. It does not normally
provide access to or from the public telephone net-
work, although the new trunked dispatch service does
provide such access.
Fixed radio sites
VHF radio repeater equipment, comprising both trans-
mitters and repeaters, is provided for the mobile radio
service at elevated sites.
Each transmitter and receiver unit work as a set, on
separate transmit and receive frequencies called a
Channel. The particular channel transmitter is only
active when switched on by the users base station or
mobiles. The base station is linked to the radio site by
either land-lines or radio.
Mobile radio privacy
Mobile radio operates by broadcasting calls and recipi-
ents need to identify their own calls. Although this
results in a lack of privacy, this method of operation
can have its own advantages, e.g. when making enquir-
ies as to availability or location of mobiles.
Trunked dispatch (Fleetlink)
Many of the mobile radio systems described above
have been upgraded to a new system called trunked
dispatch. This system dynamically allocates channels
to customers under control of the repeaters. Simplex
operation is also possible if mobiles are equipped for it.
System channel sharing
Although some mobile radio services use dedicated
channels many users share channels, and perhaps trans-
mitter/receiver equipment. Thus a number of remote
control units may be controlling a particular transmit-
ter. Sharing of channels may result in congestion
should calling patterns increase (as is likely following
a major disaster). This applies particularly to cellular
and trunked dispatch systems.
Fixed radio equipment failure
Owing to the nature of the operation of mobile radio, all
radio communication normally passes through the
fixed radio site repeater unit. This has the disadvantage
that the failure of the repeater associated with a particu-
lar channel usually means that channel is no longer able
to be used to communicate between any other radio
transceiver on that channel. However by using
Simplex mode, it may be possible for these mobiles
to communicate to other similarly-equipped mobiles,
but limits to range will be imposed by the transmitter
power available and the terrain.
Cellular radio network
The cellular radio network provides facilities for com-
munication between the public telephone network and
portable telephones, or between portable telephones.
Selection of the desired distant party is by dialling.
Method of operation
Portable telephones using cellular radio can be either
mounted in vehicles or hand-held.
It operates on the basis of radio terminals being allo-
cated a specific area of coverage known as a cell. As
a cellular telephone moves from one cell to another, the
second cells radio terminal automatically takes over
the provision of service without the user being aware of
the change. This operation is controlled by a central-
ised cellular radio switch (MSC), which also dynami-
cally assigns one of a limited number of radio fre-
quency channels associated with each cell to the user at
that particular time.
As the cellular radio service is connected to the public
switched telephone network (PSTN), access is avail-
able to and from the rest of the PSTN.
Cellular radio sites in the Christchurch area
Radio equipment, comprising both transmitters and
receivers, are provided for the cellular radio service at
several sites, spread throughout the greater Christ-
church area. As cellular telephone traffic grows, addi-
tional cellular radio sites will be provided, with the area
covered by existing sites reducing accordingly.
Links between cellular radio sites and the MSC
All cell sites in Christchurch are connected to the MSC
via fibre optic transmission systems and a limited
amount of digital microwave radio.
Assessment of the Effect of a Major
Earthquake
This section defines the expected impact that a moder-
ately large to large earthquake of 150 year return period
would have on the Telecom networks.
Vulnerability
Vulnerability of the telecommunications network was
assessed in accordance with the methodology used for
other lifelines (see Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3). The
following points emerged from the review.
All telecommunications equipment is critically re-
liant on the power supply. Standby power genera-
tion equipment (to provide an essential supply) is
provided at most locations. The adequacy of fuel
reserves at individual sites is being reviewed, giv-
ing consideration to the possibility of a prolonged
power outage and likely difficulties in obtaining
access to the sites for refuelling. This underlines the
interdependence of lifelines and the need for mu-
tual understanding of both resilience and expecta-
tions.
Switching equipment relies on air conditioning
equipment to ensure the temperature does not ex-
ceed certain levels. While air conditioning equip-
ment is not operating, temperatures need to be
monitored to ensure they do not rise to damaging
levels. Air conditioning equipment is reliant upon
power and, in some cases, a water supply (replen-
ishment only), and adequate seismic restraint of all
fans, ducting, pipework and chillers.
The telecommunications network makes good use
of diversity by means of alternative physical routes
and alternative media. However, there are still
some parts of the network where improvements can
be made. All exchanges in the Christchurch area
are stored program control. This has resulted in
some centralisation of switching operations with
UTILITY: TELECOM NZ LIMITED REGIONAL LOCAL NETWORK: TELECOMMUNICATIONS
VULNERABILITY
TO HAZARD
IMPACT
OF DAMAGE
NETWORK
ELEMENTS
COMPONENTS COMMENT
I
M
P
O
R
T
A
N
C
E

1

-

5
E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E

H
A
Z
A
R
D
G
R
O
U
N
D

S
H
A
K
E
L
I
Q
U
E
F
A
C
T
I
O
N
L
A
N
D
S
L
I
D
E
G
R
O
U
N
D

S
E
T
T
L
E
M
E
N
T
D
U
R
I
N
G

E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E
I
M
M
E
D
I
A
T
E
L
Y

A
F
T
E
R
P
E
R
I
O
D

F
O
L
L
O
W
I
N
G
R
E
T
U
R
N

T
O

N
O
R
M
A
L
I
T
Y
Site
Building
Telecom Equipment
Mechanical Services
Electrical Services
Site
Building
Telecom Equipment
Mechanical Services
Electrical Services
Site
Building
Telecom Equipment
Mechanical Services
Electrical Services
Site
Building
Telecom Equipment
Mechanical Services
Electrical Services
Site
Building
Telecom Equipment
Mechanical Services
Electrical Services
Site
Building
Telecom Equipment
Mechanical Services
Electrical Services
Site
Building
Telecom Equipment
Mechanical Services
Electrical Services
2
1
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
3B
1
3
3
3
3
3
1
1 1
1
1
1
2
2
0
0 0
0 0
0 0 0 0
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2 2
2
2
3
1
1
2
0 1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
2
1
1
0 1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
1
0 0
1
0
0
0
0
0
2 2
2
2
3
1
2
2
0 2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0 0
1
0
0
0
0
0
2 2
2
2 1
1
1
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
0
0
1
1
1
0 1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
0
0
1
1
2
0 2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0 0
1
0
0
0
0
0
2 2
2
2
2
0
0
1
0 0
1
0
0
0
0
0
2 2
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2 2
2
2
0
0
0
1
0 0
1
0
0
0
0
0
2 2
2
2
3
Check top restraint of transmission equipment
Check restraint of air conditioning duct: roof space
Check restraint of exchange batteries
Bank at back of site
Check top restraint of transmission equipment
Re-support cable runways below ceiling of
NEAX exchange area
Building strengthening recommended by recent
detailed structural assessment of building
Fluorescent luminaires could swing and impact
during earthquake
Brick end wall of building (south end) may
collapse. Provide top fixing for rack in the
transmission equipment row
Provide restraint for cable air drier
Provide restraint for hose reel water pressure tank
Check restraint of exchange batteries
Fluorescent luminaires could swing and impact
during earthquake
Possibility of failure of brick veneer, otherwise
building grading = 1
Provide additional top restraint for MDF
EXCHANGE A
South Christchurch
EXCHANGE B
Southeast
Christchurch
EXCHANGE C
North Christchurch
EXCHANGE D
Southwest
Christchurch
EXCHANGE E
West Christchurch
EXCHANGE F
Southwest
Christchurch
EXCHANGE G
Northwest
Christchurch
RLU
RLU
RLU
RLU
RLU
61K
Figure 5.1: Sample vulnerability chart 1
remote line units being dependent upon their hosts
for switching of calls.
Local reticulation (exchange to customer) is mainly
by underground cables using copper conductors.
By its widespread nature this reticulation is suscep-
tible to damage, with certain common types of
cables, now obsolete, more likely to give problems.
Any cables affected by severe shaking or signifi-
cant differential ground movement, such as at cross-
ing discontinuities in soil types, are likely to be
damaged. Cables at bridge crossings would be
especially vulnerable.
Junction and trunk cables between exchanges are
by fibre optic cables installed in ducts. These are
vulnerable in areas subject to significant ground
movement, e.g. crossing a fault, in areas subject to
liquefaction, or where a landslide carries both ducts
and cables with it.
SAMPLE VULNERABILITY CHART
VULNERABILITY TO HAZARD IMPACT OF DAMAGE
NETWORK: CABLING REGIONAL LOCAL UTILITY: TELECOM NZ LIMITED
C
O
M
P
O
N
E
N
T

E
L
E
M
E
N
T
I
M
P
O
R
T
A
N
C
E

1
-
5
G
R
O
U
N
D

S
H
A
K
E
L
I
Q
U
E
F
A
C
T
I
O
N
L
A
N
D
S
L
I
D
E
G
R
O
U
N
D

S
E
T
T
L
E
M
E
N
T
Z
O
N
E

B
O
U
N
D
R
Y
D
U
R
I
N
G

E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E
I
M
M
E
D
I
A
T
E
L
Y

A
F
T
E
R
P
E
R
I
O
D

F
O
L
L
O
W
I
N
G
R
E
T
U
R
N

T
O

N
O
R
M
A
L
I
T
Y
C
O
M
M
E
N
T
CH-MH960A FERRY RD
CH-MH954A MANCHESTER
CH-MH957A HIGH ST
CH-MH985B HIGH ST
CH-MH968 FERRY RD
CH-MH310 MANCHESTER
CH-MH291 COLOMBO
CH-MH291 COLOMBO
CH-MH101 HEREFORD
CH-MH105 COLOMBO
CH-MH105 COLOMBO
CH-MH303 HEREFORD
CH-MH968 FERRY RD
CABLE, 79 2000
CABLE, 78 2000
CABLE, 53 3200
CABLE, 77 2000
CABLE, 80 2000
CABLE, 44 2000
CABLE, 50 4000
CABLE, 74 2000
CABLE, 48 2400
CABLE, 67 2000
CABLE, 64 2000
CABLE, 72 2000
CABLE, 68 2000
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1
1 1 1
1 1
2
3 3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1
1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
1
2 2 2 2 2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3 3 3 3 3 3
Where ducts and cables enter buildings in areas
subject to liquefaction, damage may occur due to
differential movement between the surrounding
ground and the building.
Aerial systems for microwave radio could become
misaligned even when the supporting structures are
intact. However, modern systems are reasonably
tolerant of movement.
Exchange buildings have varying degrees of earth-
quake resistance, mainly depending upon their age
and the attention given to detailing for seismic
SAMPLE VULNERABILITY CHART
HTN-HSL
HTN-HSL
HTN-MH249
MH-BKM249
BKM-CAS
ISL-WILMERS RD
WILMERS RD-HSL JNT RD
HSL JNT RD-HSL EXCH
ISL-TRANS
HTN-HSL
342
308
337
337
314
341
341
341
524
309
NETWORK: CABLING REGIONAL LOCAL UTILITY: TELECOM NZ LIMITED
C
O
M
P
O
N
E
N
T

E
L
E
M
E
N
T
I
M
P
O
R
T
A
N
C
E

1
-
5
G
R
O
U
N
D

S
H
A
K
E
L
I
Q
U
E
F
A
C
T
I
O
N
L
A
N
D
S
L
I
D
E
G
R
O
U
N
D

S
E
T
T
L
E
M
E
N
T
Z
O
N
E

B
O
U
N
D
R
Y
D
U
R
I
N
G

E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E
I
M
M
E
D
I
A
T
E
L
Y

A
F
T
E
R
P
E
R
I
O
D

F
O
L
L
O
W
I
N
G
R
E
T
U
R
N

T
O

N
O
R
M
A
L
I
T
Y
C
O
M
M
E
N
T
3
1
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
0
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
3
3
2
3
3
2
2
1
3
South Island are completely dependent on the cen-
tral switch. Failure of this switch or the links to it
would completely disable these services.
The fleetlink trunked dispatch service is normally
dependent on a central switch. However, failure of
this switch or the links to it would merely disable
the linking between repeater sites. Many users
would be unaware of such a switch failure.
capacity during their design. Some older buildings
need to be brought up to an acceptable standard.
The operation of some telephone exchanges may
be unstable due to congestion caused by repeated
redialling attempts. Dial tone may be slow to
appear.
The cellular and paging networks for most of the
Impact on the public-switched
telephone network (PSTN)
Little effect on the majority of buildings and equip-
ment.
Little disruption to customer services from damage
that is incurred by plant and equipment at network
sites.
Widespread calling congestion of all exchange
switches. Dial tone may be slow to appear as a
result.
Widespread damage to copper cables between cus-
tomers and the exchange (local access cables).
This is due to water penetration through cracks in
the sheathes of lead-sheathed cables, which are in
turn caused by severe ground shaking and differen-
tial earth movement in liquefaction zones.
Prolonged restoration repairs to local access lead-
sheathed cables over many months, but with virtu-
ally all other elements of the PSTN being restored
to full capacity within one week.
Little damage (except at some bridge crossings) to
the route diverse fibre optic junction cable system,
and hence little loss of junction links although there
may be some reduction in junction capacity.
A strong possibility of the failure of both trunk
links north of Christchurch due to lack of geo-
graphic diversity.
Impact on the cellular network
Very heavy cellular network congestion for the
first two hours, with some relief after three to six
hours (as service demands are impeded through
individual cellphone batteries depleting and the
probable lack of mains power for re-charging).
Disruption of service at some cell sites due to the
depletion of battery reserve following the loss of
mains power to sites.
Disruption of service from some cell sites due to the
loss of their fibre optic cable links to the cellular
switch.
Little effect on the equipment and masts at the cell
sites.
Little effect on the connection of the cellular net-
work to the PSTN or the trunk network.
The cellular network should be restored to virtually
full capacity within four days.
In recent major international disasters cellphones
have proven to be an extremely useful and speedy
way for utilities to augment their communications
systems.
The management of cellular network congestion
by Telecom should be in favour of the utility and
emergency organisations, and the restriction of
other Christchurch cellular customers should be
considered to establish that preference.
Impact on the land mobile radio
services
Only a minimal loss of services overall (e.g. 10%),
providing the timber masts at hill top radio stations
do not fail.
Little effect on the land mobile radio equipment at
these stations.
Loss of all physical links to the radio stations,
resulting in the loss of access to the PSTN for
fleetlink users.
Little disruption to the conventional land mobile
channel services due to traffic congestion.
Congestion may occur on fleetlink channels, but
can be overcome by installing extra shared chan-
nels (within say two days).
Impact on paging network
Loss of the entire Canterbury paging network due
to the trunk links north being lost, or due to loss of
vulnerable cable links between the paging switch
and the hill top radio stations.
Paging network should be fully restored within two
to four days by using temporary radio links.
Mitigation measures
Telecom is undertaking a number of mitigation meas-
ures which have been identified as a result of this
lifelines study. These measures are additional to the
normal earthquake and seismic control practices which
provide a good standard of protection to plant inside
buildings. Some of the mitigation measures identified
in the lifelines study are:
Telecom to establish pre-plans with broadcasting
media so that the public can be advised against the
use of their telephones or cellphones after major
disasters, unless necessary for their safety or to
obtain supplies.
Restoration of internal communication to be given
highest priority.
Where several mobile cell sites have overlapping
coverage, investigate the feasibility of carrying the
links to half the sites on alternate bearers.
Telecom to keep back-up databases of critical plant
records.
All electronic databases holding copies of network
records have back-up power supply to ensure these
records remain available.
Lead-sheathed cables to be recognised as having
higher risk of damage than modern plastic types.
Cables to important lifeline sites such as Civil
Defence, schools, Southpower, hospitals, fire, po-
lice to be reviewed with this in mind.
Some minor building structures to be strengthened.
Some switching cabinets to be given additional top
support.
Casters to be removed from computer tables and
replaced with flat footing.
Bookcases and filing cabinets to be secured to
avoid toppling.
Flexible connections to be provided on engine
alternator fuel lines to storage tanks where re-
quired.
Fuel supplies to be reviewed for extended periods
of mains power supply unavailability (also trans-
port of fuel to sites after a disaster).
Some power plant (batteries and rectifiers) require
additional bracing.
Some roof-mounted air conditioning condensers to
be checked for adequacy of bracing.
Continue with the installation of diverse bearer
routes.
Assessment of the Effect of Flooding
Two flooding scenarios were considered:
a 500-year flood in the Waimakariri River causing
the southern stopbanks to fail; and
sustained extremely heavy rainfall event in Christ-
church causing local flooding.
Waimakariri River 500 year flood
Scenario
For details of the scenario, see Section 2.3 Waimaka-
riri Flood Hazard. A 500-year flood of the Waimaka-
riri River could break out on the south bank at:
Halkett (15% probability);
Crossbank (16% probability); and
McLeans Island (3% probability).
Flooding at Christchurch Airport, or in the upper
reaches of the Avon, for example, could be caused by
a breakout at either Halkett or McLeans Island. The
probability of this happening in any one year is (15%
+ 3%) x 1/500 = 0.036% (equivalent of an event with
a 3,000 year return period).
Map 12 (p 295)shows the location of key nodes and
cable routes in the Telecom network with reference to
the general flood plain expected for the Waimakariri
500-year flood scenario, if breakout occurs at all three
of the above locations. Note that the flood plain shown
is slightly offset from its proper location due to slight
differences in the street/river mapping databases used
by Telecom and the Christchurch City Council. The
more accurate Christchurch City Council plans (CCC
flood plain shown on a CCC street/river mapping
database) have been used to assess the vulnerability of
specific Telecom sites.
There should be some advance warning of this event,
as rainfall monitoring in the Waimakariri catchment
can give in excess of 12 hours warning of a threatening
situation. If a breakout occurs, it will take four hours
for the floodwaters to reach the outskirts of Christ-
church, eight hours to reach the Square, and over 12
hours to reach the Estuary.
Except at bottlenecks, flow rates should not exceed
4 km/hr. The average depth of flood channels in the
western part of Christchurch will vary from 200 mm to
350 mm. Slightly greater depths of flooding can be
expected at low spots. Much greater depths of
flooding can be expected within the Avon and Heathcote
river terraces. The duration of the flooding could be up
to two days west of the Square, and up to three days east
of the Square.
The flooding is expected to cause:
some roads to be impassable due to the depth of
flood water;
major surface flooding in many suburbs (see Map
12, p 295);
the flood waters to contain silt, and possibly sewer-
age; and
possible loss of the road and rail bridges across the
Waimakariri River, and/or washing out of their
approaches, with consequential loss of services
carried by these bridges.
If heavy rainfall falls on Christchurch prior to, or
during, this flood, these effects will be further aggra-
vated.
Impact of flood levels
Buried cables
Telecom buried cables are designed to function in wet
environments, so the effect on them should be mini-
mal. Surface water flooding levels will increase the
static water pressures on cable sheaths, and in some
cases this will result in some water penetration, bring-
ing on faults within one to two days after the flood.
These will be relatively randomly distributed in the
flooded areas of Christchurch, and should only af-
fect a small proportion of Telecom customers.
Cabinets
These are almost always located in the road reserve at
the fenceline. Flood levels up to 200 mm in the cabinet
will have no effect. Beyond this, up to 100 customers
could lose service for each additional 40 mm of flood
level.
Pillars
Are located in the road reserve at the fenceline. Flood
levels up to 400 mm will normally have no effect.
Beyond this level, faults may occur, typically affecting
only one to four customer lines.
The only cabinets and pillars expected to be signifi-
cantly affected by the flood levels are those few that are
located in river terraces, where the deeper flood levels
(up to 1.0 m to 1.5 m) could occur. Only a very small
proportion of customers would be affected.
Exchange equipment
Exchange equipment will be at risk as soon as flood
levels rise more than 50 mm above the exchange floor
level. Of those looked at, two Telecom exchanges are
at risk of this. These are both outlying exchanges that
are not essential to the Telecom network.
If the equipment is powered up at the time, irreversible
damage could occur, requiring replacement of the
immersed equipment (and possibly other equipment as
well). If the equipment is powered down before
immersion, it is expected that once the flood levels
have subsided the immersed equipment can be suc-
cessfully salvaged and restored to full service within
days.
Exchange cable wells
High water levels in Telecom ductlines/manholes may
cause exchange cable wells to fill with water at a rate
faster than the permanently installed sump pump can
handle. In many cases, the sump pump outlet pipe
discharges into a gully trap below the extreme flood
level hence it may not be able to work in these
extreme flood situations. If the water level rises to
within one metre of the exchange floor level, in many
exchanges this could result in unfilled unpressurised
plastic cables, installed between the air dams in the
cable well and the main distribution frame on the floor
above, becoming partially submerged. Faults affect-
ing many customers could result.
Other sites
Both local circuit area (LCA) equipment buildings
may be flooded. The general comments made above
about exchange equipment also apply to the electronic
transmission equipment at these sites. The one differ-
ence is that, given sufficient warning, it may be possi-
ble to relocate/remove the equipment and back plane
wiring at the foot of the racks, and keep the equipment
working at full, or near full, capacity, even with water
up to 200 mm above floor level in the building.
Toll links
There are two diverse toll links north, and two diverse
toll links south. There is a possibility that flooding of
the Waimakariri River could affect each of the toll
links north. Since the probability of both these events
happening is negligible, and either link can support
99% of normal peak toll traffic, minimal effect on the
toll traffic north is expected.
Both of the diverse toll links south are carried by buried
optical fibre cables, and will be unaffected by flooding
from the Waimakariri River.
Cellular network
Two of the twelve Christchurch cell sites could suffer
from flood immersion to varying extents, but loss of
both these sites would only have a minimal effect on
the coverage and service level of the surviving cellular
network.
Land mobile radio/Fleetlink/paging
These networks should be completely unaffected. The
only impact that seems possible, if the Colombo Street
bridge and/or the Ferrymead bridge over the Heathcote
River is lost, or its approaches are washed away, is loss
of the Telecom cables carried by the bridge(s). This
seems extremely unlikely since the floodwater veloc-
ity is only expected to be little more than 2 km/hr. Even
if this happened, this would only result in the loss of the
fleetlink access to the public switched telephone net-
work (PSTN), some land mobile radio landline con-
nections, and the loss of all paging signals to one of the
two Christchurch paging transmitters. Since all paging
signals are broadcast from both the transmitters, loss of
one bridge will only result in the Christchurch paging
coverage being slightly decreased (i.e. more black
spots). However, loss of both bridges (or their ap-
proaches) will result in the total loss of the Christ-
church paging network. The basic land mobile and
fleetlink radio operations would continue essentially
unaffected.
Traffic overloading
In common with all of the scenarios, some initial
congestion on the telephone, cellular and Fleetlink
networks is expected. If people are at home during the
flood, it is expected that the telephone network will be
very busy, but shouldnt be catastrophically over-
loaded. Some exchanges may be subject to minor load
shedding. Loss of some cell sites may increase traffic
on other cells, but since most of the PSTN will still be
functional this is not expected to be a problem.
Mains power
If it is assumed that all Telecom sites in, or near the
flood plain (see Map 12, p 295), lose mains power, the
only sites affected that do not have their own engine
alternator set mains back-up are:
one exchange;
four cell sites; and
both LCA equipment buildings.
All these sites have many hours battery reserve.
Telecom has several transportable engine alternator
sets in Christchurch so, at the very worst, only a few of
the least important cell sites or LCA equipment build-
ings would suffer total power loss. This would not
have a significant impact on either the cellular network
or the telephone network.
Road access
Some roads may be impassable for virtually all vehi-
cles, and others may only be useable by high wheel
base vehicles such as Hi Luxes or trucks. However,
this should not present any great difficulties to the
Telecom repair effort, so long as there remains at least
one suitable bridge crossing of the Heathcote River and
the Avon River, Wairarapa Stream and Hewlings
Stream.
Summary
Public switched telephone network
A relatively small number of customers may lose
service. Otherwise, except for some initial congestion,
this network will be virtually unaffected.
Cellular network
Virtually unaffected.
Land mobile/fleetlink/paging networks
Unaffected.
Repair work required
Much of the repair work will not be able to begin until
the flood levels have partially or fully subsided. This
is expected to take between one and three days (pre-
sumably from the time the rainfall eases off in the upper
Waimakariri River catchment).
Cable network
Any connectors in pillars, connection blocks in cabi-
nets and telephone sockets in houses that have been
immersed will probably have to be replaced. Associ-
ated cabling and mounting hardware will have to be
hosed down (to remove silt, etc) and dried. Unfilled
cables suffering from water penetration will have to be
opened up and dried, or replaced. Service should be
restored to most customers within one week, and to all
customers within two weeks.
Exchange equipment
Assuming any exchange equipment which suffered
immersion was powered down before the event, sal-
vage and full restoration is expected to be possible.
However this could take up to three to five days after
flood waters subside to below floor level.
If the equipment is still powered up when immersed,
irrecoverable damage will result. The electronic cards
will need to be replaced, and the backplane wiring and
connectors cleaned out. Depending on the availability
of spare cards, this could take from one to four weeks.
Toll links
If both toll links north are lost, a temporary limited
capacity radio link bypassing the affected area could be
installed within two to three days. Restoration of a full
capacity link north will depend on the lesser of the
times needed to restore either link north.
Mitigation measures
In exchange cable wells, seal all incoming ducts/
holes/slots (including the sump pump discharge
pipe hole). If the cable wells have external manhole
lids, these should be either sealed, or fitted so that
when immersed, water will only trickle through
them. This should stop water entering the cable
well at more than a trickle, even under severe flood
conditions.
The seal must be able to withstand a reasonable
head of water (say 3 m) and should preferably be
fire retardant. Duct caps are not an acceptable
means of sealing ducts. Note that ALL ducts/holes/
slots must be sealed flood water must not be
allowed to pour into the cable well.
Sump pump discharge pipes should end well above
any anticipated flood levels. Typically they should
end at least 500 mm above ground level.
Small electronic equipment buildings that have no
cable well should have all incoming pipes or holes
(full or empty) sealed (to withstand a 3 m head of
water). ALL open pipes must be sealed, including
those containing other services like the incoming
mains power.
Prepare preplans for:
Sandbagging or fitting shutters to the ex-
change/LCA equipment building doors (and
any other water entry weak points) to
ensure that even when flood levels are above
floor level, the flow of water into the
building is restricted to a trickle.
Bringing in a bigger pump, if the sump
pump can not cope. Ensure there is some
window/hole/vent above the maximum flood
level, through which the pump discharge
hose can be fed.
Relocating/removing equipment cards and
backplane wiring from the bottom 200 mm
of racks in both LCA equipment buildings.
Removing all power, DC or AC (including
engine alternator generated mains) from all
equipment, once the water level rises above
floor level (if the first two measures fail).
Cleaning and salvaging all electronic cards,
wiring and connections that were immersed
in floodwater (after flood levels have sub-
sided). At least one kit should be estab-
lished in Christchurch for this purpose.
Make provision for a temporary 140 Mbit radio link
to bypass the vulnerable section in one of the toll
links north.
Make provision for external connection of a mains
supply from a transportable engine alternator set at
all cell sites, LCA equipment buildings.
Ensure the circuit breakers protecting any power
points in exchange cable wells (i.e. below floor
level), are not also protecting other important power
feeds above floor level.
Sustained extremely heavy rainfall in
Christchurch (local flooding)
Scenario
If there is sustained heavy rainfall in Christchurch,
street flooding on the flat, flooding in the vicinity of the
Avon, Heathcote and Styx Rivers, and slips on the Port
Hills are likely to occur.
Street flooding
Figure 5.1 shows a typical road cross-section to which
new roads and many existing roads are currently de-
signed. The formed road kerb-to-kerb is designed to
contain rainfall from a five year (return period) storm.
Rainfall from a 10 year storm should be contained
within the road reserve, fenceline-to-fenceline.
Building floor levels 150 mm above fenceline ground
level should remain dry in a 50 year storm, and floor
levels 250 mm above fenceline ground level should
remain dry in a 150 year storm.
Figure 5.1 does not apply to many of the (older) roads/
footpaths in Christchurch. Also, the dimensions shown
on it are fairly approximate they should be taken as
an indication only of susceptibility of properties to
street flooding.
All roads in Christchurch have a minimum grade of
1:500, to channel rainfall into stormwater collection
points. These could be rivers, creeks or major
stormwater pipes. Christchurch City Council (CCC)
1:2000 stormwater plans shows the street water (down-
hill) flow direction, the stormwater collection points,
and their associated catchment area.
Local street flooding levels can rise to more than the
levels shown on Figure 5.1 if:
The stormwater drains, pipes, kerbing, culverts etc,
become blocked with leaves, debris, etc.
Rainfall rates are so heavy that the stormwater pipe
system cant cope, causing water to back-up.
The worst hit areas will be those close to the
stormwater collection points.
The local area (or building) is in a low spot,
relative to the general ground level in that area.
Christchurch City Council 1:2000 sewer plans give the
absolute levels of sewer manhole lids (typically lo-
cated in the crown of the road). These can be used to
measure the absolute levels of the kerb, fenceline
ground level, and floor level of particular sites of
interest. If accuracy is required, the sewer manhole lid
should be lifted and the distance to the bottom of the
sewer pipe invert measured. The absolute level of the
invert is noted on the sewer plans, and this should be
very accurate.
Sewer manhole lids however are often raised or low-
ered when the road is resealed, and these changes in
level are not always entered on the CCC sewer plans.
Flooding in the vicinity of the Avon, Heathcote
and Styx rivers
The expected local flooding in the vicinity of the Avon,
Heathcote and Styx Rivers for a 1000 year storm, is
shown on Map 10. Most of these flooding areas and
associated flood levels are similar to, or less than, those
associated with the Waimakariri 500 year flood. Those
few local flooding areas not in the Waimakariri 500
year flood plain are not in significant areas for any of
the Telecom networks.
Slips on the Port Hills
This issue is covered in Section 2.8 Slope Hazard
(page 45).
Impact of local flooding
All the general comments made in the section relating
to the impact of the Waimakariri 500 year flood (except
for the comment on toll links), apply equally to this
local flooding scenario.
Toll links
Both diverse toll links north will be unaffected by local
flooding. The two diverse toll links south are carried
by buried optical fibre cables, which will only be
affected by washouts of bridges and/or bridge ap-
proaches at rivers south of Christchurch. Since the two
routes south are reasonably geographically diverse, it
is extremely unlikely both routes will be affected.
Specific Telecom buildings
The relative levels of the kerb, fenceline (ground level)
and floor were measured at:
eight of the twenty-two Christchurch exchanges;
both LCA equipment buildings; and
three of the nine cell sites (that are not in one of the
above buildings).
These comprised the Telecom sites in, or near, the
Waimakariri 500 year flood plain, the exchange in the
Tsunami flood plain, and the three most important
Telecom exchanges.
Of these, two exchanges seem quite vulnerable to
flooding, having floor levels only 50 mm and 80 mm
respectively above the fenceline level.
Five of the six other exchanges measured, both LCA
equipment buildings and one cell site may also be
vulnerable, having floor levels between 150 mm and
305 mm above the fenceline level.
100
125
3 m
5 yr
STORM
150
100
10 yr
STORM
FENCELINE
150 yr
STORM
50 yr
STORM
SEWER
MANHOLE
Figure 5.1: Typical road cross-section
Since the actual levels of street flooding are likely to
vary considerably from site to site, and cannot be
readily predicted, more exact determination of which
sites will flood to above floor level is not possible.
If all incoming ducts/holes into the exchange cable
well are sealed, the exchange doors and other water
entry weak points are sandbagged, and a fairly substan-
tial pump is working in the building, it should be
possible to sustain outside flood levels of up to 400 mm
above floor level, without the internal flood levels
exceeding the critical 50 mm height.
Only one of the Telecom sites has a basement. If street
flooding levels exceed 50 mm above kerb level, water
will flow down the vehicle access ramp into the base-
ment. The roller door at the basement entrance is not
expected to withstand more than a metre or two of
water pressure from water pouring down the ramp.
Important equipment housed in this basement includes
the Southpower 11kV/400V transformer supplying
this site, and the air driers keeping up air pressure in
(and hence water out of) most of the high pair count
Telecom cables servicing the central business district.
If the mains supply is lost, the engine alternator sets
(sited at ground level) will automatically start up and
carry the essential load. If the air driers fail, after some
time water could enter major pair count cables, causing
major loss of service throughout parts of the central
business district.
Mains power
It is not anticipated that street flooding and local river
flooding will have significant effects on the mains
supply in Christchurch. Only a few isolated areas
could be affected. Since all but one of the twenty two
exchanges, and four of the twelve cell sites have engine
alternator set mains back-up, only one exchange site,
eight cell sites, and the two LCA equipment building
sites could lose all mains power. With only a few sites
(if any) expected to be affected, the battery reserve at
each of these sites should be ample to maintain service
until one of the several Christchurch Telecom trans-
portable engine alternator sets can be brought to the
affected sites to supply mains power.
Summary
If no exchange has to be powered down (in response to
a threat of partial immersion), only a relatively small
number of customers will lose service. Except for
some initial congestion, this network will be virtually
unaffected. However, it is possible that in extreme
circumstances a few of the less critical of the twenty-
two Christchurch Telecom exchanges could suffer
from street flooding and hence have to be powered
down.
Cellular network
Land mobile/fleetlink/paging network
Unaffected.
All the comments made in the section relating to the
impact of the Waimakariri 500 year flood on the cable
network and exchange equipment, apply equally here,
except that if the basement of the central exchange
building is flooded, and remains flooded for some time
(with consequential failure of the air driers and subse-
quent water entry into some high pair count cables)
then it may take many months to fully restore service
to the central business district.
Mitigation measures
All the comments relating to the impact of the
Waimakariri 500 year flood apply. Additional mitiga-
tion measures include:
making provision at the top of basement access
down ramps for a 400 mm high barrier to be
installed, when required. Store the barrier (and
sand and sandbags) in the basement of the building.
considering shifting air driers in basements up to
ground floor level.
measuring the relative kerb, fenceline, and floor
levels at the remaining fourteen Christchurch ex-
change sites.
Assessment of the effect of a major
windstorm
Scenario
For details of the scenario, see Section 2.6 Extreme
Wind Storm Scenario. A 150 year north-westerly
windstorm, causing gusts on the plain to 53 m/s to 57
m/s (180 km/hr to 205 km/hr) with lulls of 26 m/s
(94km/hr). Speedup over hills will accelerate the wind
by 15% to 30%. Thus we have to consider peak gusts
of 205 x 1.3 = 270km/hr at the radio sites on the Port
Hills, and 205 km/hr on the plains. The peak of the
storm would only last for (say) three to four hours, but
this would probably be followed by heavy rains com-
pounding the damage. The following are expected:
Flying objects to cause a lot of damage.
Some roofs to be lost and many windows to be
broken.
Some roads to be impassable due to fallen trees.
Widespread loss of power as fallen trees disrupt
overhead power wires. The 220 kV feeds to the city
may also be down, thereby causing a total power
black-out.
Fires started by arcing power lines which the Fire
Brigade will find difficult to control as they might
not have road access and wind speeds will still be
high making fire fighting both difficult and hazard-
ous.
Norwesterly windstorm to be followed by a south-
erly change bringing rain.
This scenario involves wind speeds only 20% higher
than the 1 August 1975 storm.
Probable extent of damage
Towers and masts
There are four Telecom radio stations and twelve cell
sites. The wind ratings of towers are based on historical
data for the area and certain derating factors. Many
sites are designed to handle gusts of 320 km/hr (90
m/s) and have safety margins over and above this.
Other sites will have lower ratings. Cellular towers are
designed to handle wind speeds of 180 km/hr (50 m/s)
with safety margins of over 30%. Hardwood masts
have historically been designed by making them
stronger than anything that has previously been blown
over. It is probable that masts and towers will survive
the wind loadings, but that some dipoles and other
antennas on these masts could be destroyed.
In summary, this means that land mobile, paging, and
trunked dispatch networks could be partially disabled.
Loss of most cell sites
Eight of the twelve Christchurch cell sites do not have
standby power. Many of these could lose their mains
power supply. Those that do will completely fail after
the five hour battery reserve has been used unless a
portable engine alternator (E/A) is connected to the cell
site. As Telecom has several transportable E/A sets in
Christchurch it should be possible to keep most cell
sites functional unless road access is blocked by fallen
trees. It is concluded that it will be harder to get cellular
calls through, but major difficulties are not expected
throughout most of Christchurch.
A prioritised pre-plan is required to determine whether
the E/A sets can in fact be used to restore cellular
service.
Aerial wire
Many customers will lose service due to loss of their
aerial wire service connections. Flying debris and
falling trees pose the greatest threat. These customers
will be scattered in pockets around the city. As the
programme to convert aerial service leads to under-
ground leads progresses, this will become less of a
problem in the future.
Toll links north
Both of the two toll links north could be affected by a
windstorm. There will be little impact if only one link
is lost.
Toll links south
These should not be affected as there is buried fibre for
the whole route between Christchurch, Timaru, Dunedin
and Invercargill.
Roofs
The roof of one radio station is vulnerable due to its
lightweight construction. Loss of roofs at mountain
tops is not unknown, as in November 1982 one radio
site lost a section of its roof. If roofs are lost, equipment
will probably still function, but rain following the
windstorm could then damage/disable the equipment.
Roofs at other sites are expected to remain intact.
Windows
Many windows would be blown in or be broken by
flying objects. Rain or snow following the windstorm
would be able to enter the buildings through the broken
windows and damage the equipment. Broken glass
would have to be extricated from the equipment during
the clean up after the windstorm; this would pose a risk
to the availability of the network as during the work
equipment could be accidentally disturbed/disrupted.
Most critical network sites either do not have windows
or they have been filled in.
Traffic overloading
If people are home from work during the windstorm, it
is expected that the telephone network will be very
busy, but shouldnt be catastrophically overloaded.
Some exchanges may experience minor load shedding.
Loss of some cell sites may increase traffic on other
cells, but since most of the PSTN will still be functional
this should not be a problem.
Telephone Network
Most customers will have service, but toll links north
may be lost or only half available, and many customers
with aerial service connections will lose service. They
will be relatively easy to repair once the winds have
died down. It will take some time to repair these
connections if damage is widespread.
Time to repair
The time to repair depends upon:
The difficulty of gaining access to sites. There will
be many fallen trees blocking access to critical
sites. Repair crews will need chainsaws so that they
can cut access ways through fallen trees and winches
so that they can pull trees out of the way.
The time taken for the winds to subside to a safe
working level. This could take quite some time at
exposed radio sites.
Mitigation measures
Review the safety margins used when specifying
ties to hold roofs down.
Remove windows on outside walls by filling in or
barricading them from equipment rooms at key
sites.
Have chainsaws available so that repair crews can
clear paths through fallen trees.
Develop prioritisation pre-plans showing the allo-
cation priorities for engine alternators.
Provide tarpaulins and sand bags (empty) so that
temporary covers can be arranged if a roof is blown
off.
Review the wind ratings of antennas, associated
fittings and feed cables.
Review the wind ratings of masts at strategic life-
lines radio sites in Canterbury.
snowstorm
Scenario
For details of the scenario, see Section 2.7 Snowstorm
Scenario. A snowstorm drops snow to a depth of 0.3
m throughout most of the city with much greater depths
on the Port Hills. (The 1992 storm averaged 0.2 m deep
on the flat.) The peak of the storm would probably last
for (say) two days, but this would probably be accom-
panied by some wind making access difficult during
the storm. There may be some rain after the storm
compounding the flood damage. The following are
expected:
Flooding as the snow melts.
Some roads to be impassable due to deep drifts
(especially on the Port Hills) or localised flooding.
Access to the radio sites on the Port Hills to be
blocked. Helicopter access will be impossible due
to wind or white-out conditions.
Widespread loss of power as the weight of snow
either directly or indirectly through broken tree
branches breaks overhead power wires. Flooding
may also disable some underground power serv-
ices.
The Fire Brigade to be busy dealing with localised
flooding.
Some roofs to be heavily loaded and possibly
collapse.
Increased wind loadings due to surface area in-
crease following snow and ice build up.
Probable extent of damage
Towers and masts
There are four Telecom radio sites and twelve cell sites.
The combined snow and wind ratings of masts and
towers are expected to survive the storm, but some
dipoles and other antennas on these masts could be
damaged. This means that the land mobile, paging, and
trunked dispatch networks may be partially disrupted.
Loss of most cell sites
Eight of the twelve Christchurch cell sites do not have
standby power. Many of these could lose their mains
power supply. Those that do will completely fail after
the battery reserve has been used, unless a portable
engine alternator (E/A) is connected to the cell site. As
Telecom has a number of transportable E/A sets in
Christchurch it should be possible to keep most cell
sites functional unless road access is blocked by snow
drifts. Major difficulties are not expected throughout
most of Christchurch.
Aerial service leads
Many customers will lose service due to loss of their
aerial service leads through the weight of snow break-
ing wires or tree branches overloaded with snow fall-
ing and breaking wires. Many telephone poles will be
broken. These customers will be scattered in pockets
Mitigation measures
Develop prioritisation pre-plans showing the allo-
cation priorities for engine alternators.
Continue the conversion programme for convert-
ing aerial service leads to underground.
Review the combined snow and wind ratings of:
aerials, dipoles, waveguides, and coaxial cables
etc., at the critical land mobile sites;
the radio station building roofs as they are
unknown; and
the land mobile radio masts.
Assessment of the effect of slope
hazard
Scenario
For details of the scenario, see Section 2.8 Slope
Hazard and Damage to Services on Hills. The slope
hazards considered at each site/route were:
debris landing (or flowing) onto the site/route from
above (i.e. soil falls and flows, and rock falls); and
collapse of the ground at the site/route, due to loss
of foundations or formation by mass movement of
either the subgrade or the underlying natural soil
and rock.
The triggering events are either:
an extreme rainfall event with a return period of
approximately 100 years; or
a serious earthquake occurring when groundwater
levels are high, again with a return period of ap-
proximately 100 years.
The worst impacts would result from an earthquake
occurring when groundwater levels were high (e.g. at
the end of winter). An earthquake in dry soil conditions
would cause some rock failures, but very little soil
would slip, and hence this would not present a great
slope hazard problem.
Impact of slips
To assess the likely impact of slips on key services on
the Port Hills, a visual inspection was carried out with
Mark Yetton, Engineering Geologist and other service
providers.
Telecom equipment sites
Telecom has only three equipment sites on the hills
around the city. As the programme to convert service
leads to underground leads progresses this will become
less of a problem in the future.
Toll links north
Both of the two toll links north could be affected by a
snowstorm. If only one link is lost, this will have very
little impact.
Toll links south
Should not be affected as there is buried fibre for the
whole route between Christchurch, Timaru, Dunedin
and Invercargill.
Telephone network (PSTN)
Many customers with aerial service connections might
lose service. Although they will be relatively easy to
repair, it will take some time to repair all these connec-
tions if damage is widespread.
Traffic overloading
If people are home from work during the snowstorm, it
is expected that the telephone network will be very
busy, but shouldnt be catastrophically overloaded.
Some exchanges may experience minor load shedding.
Loss of some cell sites will increase traffic on other
cells, but since most of the PSTN will still be functional
this should not be a problem.
Roofs
The roofs at all Telecom sites are expected to carry the
snow, although the strength of those at some radio
station buildings need to be reviewed.
Interdependence
Most Telecom telephone poles support power service
leads from the opposite side of road, as well as
telephone service leads. The priority that the replace-
ment of broken telephone poles is given may be dic-
tated by the need to restore power to houses, rather than
the need to restore telephone service.
Time to repair
The time to repair depends upon:
The difficulty of gaining access to sites. Repair
crews will be reliant upon heavy machinery to
remove large snow drifts for gaining access to sites.
The time taken for whiteout conditions and/or any
strong winds to subside to a safe working level.
This could take quite some time at exposed radio
sites.
near Christchurch. These are all radio stations and are
located on the brow of a hill. At each of these sites
there is very little chance of any problems occurring.
Slope angles are very gentle, the rock appears strong
and there are no significant cuts to undermine the
strength of the adjacent slopes.
The only structure at risk is the structure supporting the
aerials for the radio links to exchanges on Banks
Peninsula. This is located on moderately steep ground.
The rock supporting one of the bottom feet could fail in
a very strong earthquake, causing the structure to
buckle. If this occurs, all links to these Banks Penin-
sula exchanges would be lost. Heavy rainfall is not
expected to have any effect on this structure.
Key cable routes
There are four cable routes on, or at the foot of, the Port
Hills that are of particular importance to Telecom.
After visual inspection of these routes, it was con-
cluded there is likely to be very little overall impact on
these cable routes. However, cable breaks resulting
from road shoulder failure are distinctly possible at two
places.
One of these places has a history of failure, failing as
recently as 1992 in the Big Snow and leaving Telecom
pipes exposed with no support, i.e. high and dry. On
that occasion there were no breaks in the ducts, and no
damage to the cables.
These two weak spots could be overcome by the
construction of appropriately designed retaining walls.
Other vulnerable locations may exist on these routes,
but these could not be ascertained by surface inspec-
tion only.
A complete break in the cables in ducts at one of these
known vulnerable places, would result in:
Loss of fleetlink access to the public switched
telephone network (PSTN).
Loss of land mobile radio landline connections to a
Telecom radio site. This would only have a mini-
mal impact on the operation of land mobile radio
channels at this site.
Slight loss in paging network coverage over Christ-
church.
Loss of telephone service to most Cashmere cus-
tomers.
Loss of various FM radio station links to Sugarloaf.
A complete break in the cables in ducts at the other of
these known vulnerable places, would result in:
Loss of links to some exchanges in the Banks
Peninsula area.
Loss of one cell site, with consequential loss of
cellular coverage in the Lyttelton Harbour area, and
a major degradation in off-shore cellular coverage.
Loss of all broadcast links to the BCNZ Gebbies
Pass AM radio transmitters (3YA, 3YC).
Loss of land mobile radio landline connections to
one of the Telecom radio stations This would only
have a minimal impact on the operation of land
mobile radio channels at this site.
Slight loss of paging network coverage over Christ-
church.
If both the vulnerable ductlines failed, in addition to the
above impacts, the Christchurch Paging network would
be severely affected.
Telecom plant buried at the foot of the Port Hills is not
expected to be affected by any slope failure, even
though the roads themselves may become covered with
slip material.
Mains power
In a significant disaster it is probable that slope failure
will cause mains power to be lost to several radio sites.
All these radio stations have engine-alternator sets to
provide back-up mains power, so loss of mains power
should not cause any problems, so long as fuel supplies
to the engine-alternator sets can be replenished in time.
Road access
While substantial damage to roads on the Port Hills can
be expected, road access to each of the radio sites
should not be a problem, after allowing twelve hours
for debris to be cleared from the roads. In many places
roads may be reduced to one lane, reducing traffic flow
rates.
Summary
Scattered pockets of customers on the Port Hills may
lose service. Also, links to several exchanges in the
Banks Peninsula area could be lost.
Cellular network
Cellular coverage of the Lyttelton Harbour area, and
much of the off-shore area could be lost. The rest of
Christchurch would not be significantly affected.
Land mobile
Fleetlink
Could lose access to the public switched telephone
network. Otherwise unaffected.
Paging
Very little effect, unless several independent ductlines
all fail.
Aerial support structure
Although the structure may buckle if the rock under
one of the front feet collapses, the aerials should not be
damaged. To restore service, some sort of temporary
bracing for the support structure would be required,
and the aerials would have to be realigned. This should
be completed within two days.
Failure of vulnerable ductlines
Temporary repairs to the optical fibre cables should be
completed within two days. This will restore the
cellular, land mobile, fleetlink, and paging networks to
full service. This will also restore all links to Banks
Peninsula exchanges.
Temporary repairs to the copper cables to restore
telephone service to individual customers on the Port
Hills will take longer. Service will be restored progres-
sively over a two day to five week period.
Mitigation measures
Consider building appropriately designed retain-
ing walls at identified vulnerable points on key
ductlines.
tsunami
Scenario
For details of the scenario, see Section 2.5 Tsunami
Hazard. A tsunami with a return period in excess of
100 years. Assumed features of the tsunami are:
Total water level variation of 5 m above mean sea
level (MSL) to 5 m below MSL, i.e. 4 m above
spring high tide to 4 m below spring low tide.
Water level disturbances reducing over a three to
five day period.
Tsunami wave period of 3 hours, with a minimum
of one hour from the peak to the trough of the first
wave.
Wave not breaking in Lyttelton Harbour, with
maximum water levels of +5 m (MSL) at the port
and +3 m (MSL) at the head of the harbour. The
total port area will be covered to a depth of between
1 m and 2 m for up to 30 minutes. The water level
will not reach the township.
Wave breaking in the Avon and Heathcote estuary,
with no discernible wave trough. The wave speed
in the estuary will be about 20 km/hr. The initial
wave height at the estuary mouth will be +3 m
above normal tide level. This wave height will
decrease by 0.3 m/km of travel beyond the estuary
mouth. At Dyers Road the wave height will be
about +1.5 m above normal tide level (i.e. 2.5 m
above MSL at high spring tide).
Water receding from the estuary will scour the
bridge abutments at the Ferrymead bridge and the
Bridge Street bridge and scour the sea wall along
the Moncks Bay and Redcliffs foreshore. This may
lead to possible wall failure with collapse of the
associated road and services.
Bores initially 3 m above high water level will
travel up the Avon and Heathcote rivers. The bore
height will reduce to 0 m (above high water level)
about Fitzgerald Avenue on the Avon River, and
about Opawa Road on the Heathcote River. Areas
of inundation from the first tsunami wave are
shown on Map 11 (p 294).
Scour through the beach dunes is expected to in-
crease the length of each entry point by 20%, and
reduce its height by 20%. Scour at the estuary
mouth is similarly expected to widen it by 20% and
deepen it by 20%. Consequently, although the
second wave will be at a lower height, it is expected
to result in greater levels of inundation than the first
wave. (Map 11 shows inundation areas for the first
wave only.)
Inundation levels over ground at estuary margins will
be:
Sumner, 0.7 m
Moncks Bay/Redcliffs, 1.7 m
McCormacks Bay, 1.1 m over causeway
Ferrymead, 0.3 m
South Brighton, 0.5 m (Bridge St) increasing to
1.65 m (South Brighton spit).
Average inundation levels and flow velocities along
connect cabinets, and 400 mm at Telecom pillars,
customers telephone circuits will start short circuiting.
To minimise damage to the Telecom cable circuits,
they should be powered down prior to immersion. To
achieve this, it may be necessary to disconnect tel-
ephone service from blocks of customers in much
larger areas than the inundation areas shown in Map 11
(p 294).
Summary
Large numbers of customers in the eastern suburbs
may lose telephone service.
Cellular network
Cellular coverage of the Lyttelton Harbour area, and
much of the off-shore area could be lost. The rest of
Christchurch would not be significantly affected.
Land mobile
Fleetlink
Unaffected.
Paging
If important Telecom cables are broken due to scouring
of roadways and bridge abutments, work could begin
immediately on installing a temporary radio link to
restore some of the lost circuits. This could be com-
pleted within two days, restoring:
links to all exchanges in the Banks Peninsula area;
full (normal) cellular coverage to the Lyttelton
Harbour and off-shore areas;
all broadcast links to the BCNZ Gebbies Pass AM
radio transmitters (3YA, 3YC);
all land mobile radio landline connections; and
full (normal) paging network coverage over Christ-
church.
All remaining repair work, including restoring junc-
tion links to the three exchanges, and telephone service
to large pockets of customers in Sumner, Moncks Bay,
Redcliffs, Ferrymead, Woolston, Bromley, Aranui,
Avondale, Bexley and New Brighton, would not be
the east Brighton coast (from overtopping of dunes/
sea wall):
From Rawhiti St to Rodney Street 1.2 m, 4 km/
hr (i.e. from 700 m north of the New Brighton
clock tower to 700 m south of the New Brighton
clock tower)
Elsewhere, from Rothesay Road 0.2m to 0.55 m,
0.5 km/hr to 1 km/hr (Waimairi Beach) to South
Brighton spit except for Jellicoe Road (0.7 m) and
Heron Street (1.0 m).
Impact of tsunami
Equipment sites
Two exchanges, and one cell site are located in areas
expected to be inundated by the tsunami. Of these, only
one exchange is expected to have any problems. It is
expected to be inundated to a depth of 1.2 m, with water
flow velocity of 1 m/s, or about 4 km/hr. If seawater
cannot be kept out of the exchange, it is vital that it be
powered down with consequential loss of telephone
service to its customers.
Cable routes
Scouring of roadways and bridge abutments could
cause breaks in the Telecom cables buried along these
roads. This could result in:
loss of links to some exchanges in the Banks
Peninsula area;
loss of the link to one cell site, with consequential
loss of cellular coverage in Lyttelton Harbour area,
and a major degradation in off-shore cellular cov-
erage;
loss of all broadcast links to the BCNZ Gebbies
Pass AM radio transmitters (3YA, 3YC);
loss of Land Mobile Radio landline connections to
one of the Telecom radio sites (this would only
have a minimal impact on the operation of land
mobile radio channels at this site);
slight loss of Paging network coverage over Christ-
church;
loss of all junction links to three exchanges to the
south of the estuary; and
loss of telephone service to all of Moncks Bay,
Redcliffs, Ferrymead, and much of Woolston and
Bromley.
Other plant
Once water levels exceed 200 mm at Telecom cross-
able to start until the continuing tsunami waves sub-
side. The waves could take two to four days to subside
sufficiently.
Cable network
Any connectors in pillars, connection blocks in cabi-
nets, telephone sockets in houses, and internal house
wiring that have been immersed, will probably have to
be replaced. Associated cabling and mounting hard-
ware will have to be hosed down (to remove silt, sand,
etc.) and dried.
Repair of Telecom cables broken due to scouring of
roadways and bridge abutments may have to wait until
repair of the associated road/road shoulder is suffi-
ciently advanced. Customers service affected by
either immersion of plant or cable breaks, should be
progressively restored over a period of two days to two
months, after the tsunami subsides. The junction cable
links should be restored within two days of the tsunami
subsiding.
Exchange equipment
Assuming any exchange equipment which suffers im-
mersion is powered down before the event, salvage and
full restoration is expected to be possible. However,
this could take up to five days after waters subside to
below floor level.
If the equipment is still powered up when immersed,
irrecoverable damage will result. The electronic cards
will need to be replaced, and the backplane wiring and
connectors cleaned out. Depending on the availability
of spare cards, this could take from two weeks to six
months.
This will restore telephone service to all those custom-
ers connected to the exchange who were outside the
tsunami inundation areas (or were in areas where the
inundation level was less than 200 mm) probably
about 70% of the exchanges customers.
Mitigation measures
In exchange cable wells, seal all incoming ducts/
holes/slots (including the sump pump discharge
pipe hole). If the cable wells have external manhole
lids, these should be either sealed, or fitted so that
when immersed, water will only trickle through
them. This should stop water entering the cable
well at more than a trickle, even under severe
flood conditions.
The seal must be able to withstand a reasonable
head of water (say 3 m) and should preferably be
fire retardant. Duct caps are not an acceptable
means of sealing ducts. Note that all ducts/holes/
slots must be sealed water must not be allowed
to pour into the cable well.
Sump pump discharge pipes should end well above
any anticipated flood levels. Typically they should
end at least 500 mm above ground level. At the
worst affected exchange the sump pump discharge
pipe should end at least 1500 mm above ground
level.
Prepare preplans for responding to a tsunami alert by:
External sandbagging, or fitting shutters to
the exchanges external doors and any other
water entry weak points (e.g. ventilation
louvres), to ensure that even when outside
water levels are 1.2 m above floor level, the
flow of water into the building is restricted
to a trickle.
Bringing in a bigger pump, if the sump
pump cant cope. Ensure there is some
window/hole/vent above the maximum
water level, through which the pump dis-
charge hose can be fed.
Disconnecting telephone service to those
blocks of customers expected to be inun-
dated by the tsunami, by removing links on
the main distribution frames at the appropri-
ate exchange.
Removing all power at an exchange (in-
cluding engine-alternator generated mains)
from all equipment.
Prepare preplan for cleaning and salvaging
all electronic cards, wiring and connections
that were immersed in floodwater (after
water levels have subsided). At least one
kit should be established in Christchurch
for this purpose.
Move sump pump power point at the ex-
change to above floor level.
Ensure the circuit breaker protecting the
power points in the exchange cable well is
not also protecting other important power
feeds above floor level.
5.2 New Zealand Fire Service
Communications Network Description
Introduction and seismic vulnerability
The New Zealand Fire Service is divided into six
Regions with two of these being in the South Island.
Christchurch is the location of No. 5 Region Headquar-
ters, which is responsible for all areas north of a line
drawn along the Waitaki River, across the Southern
Alps, and along the Haast River. This area is divided
into four areas (Christchurch, Nelson, Timaru and
West Coast).
The Christchurch Area Headquarters is located in the
main central fire station at 200 Kilmore Street, and is
responsible for the operation of over 50 fire brigades
from Hinds in the south, to Springfield in the west, and
Kaikoura to the north. The urban Christchurch area,
which this report is particularly concerned with, in-
cludes nine fire stations of which six are permanently
manned, and the other three are staffed by volunteers
(Sumner, Lyttelton and Brooklands).
The New Zealand Fire Service relies on two main
methods of communications VHF radio and tel-
ephone.
Radio
The New Zealand Fire Service primary communica-
tion is by VHF (AM) radio-telephone network which
covers the entire region. All brigades are activated by
a selective tone callout system (Secal) based in the
Regional Control Room located at 200 Kilmore Street.
In the event of any repeater failure, all radios in this
region are multi-channelled which allows access to any
other repeater still in operation. Should there be a total
repeater failure, all radios have simplex crystals fitted
allowing point-to-point communications.
All brigades communication equipment is DC-pow-
ered with adequate battery back-up to enable continu-
ity of operation in the event of any mains failure for an
indefinite period. The Regional Control Room has all
its main electronic equipment securely bolted down,
with the taller racks being bolted together and top-
braced. All sub-stations and volunteer brigades have
their equipment in standard cabinets in secure loca-
tions.
Telephone
The sole responsibility for accepting emergency 111
calls throughout this region is in the Regional Control
Room in Christchurch. All telephone circuits, private
fire alarms, the PABX and any other miscellaneous
circuitry is provided by Telecom or their subsidiaries.
A degree of diversity has been provided by having
alternate cable routes from two Christchurch Telecom
exchanges for incoming 111 lines. There is a diesel
stand-by generator and an UPS to maintain continuity
of operation in the event of any mains failure. All main
electronic devices are DC-powered with battery back-
up.
Control room evacuation
The New Zealand Fire Service has numerous fall-back
positions in the event of an evacuation being necessary.
In the first instance, the service has a mobile command
unit which is capable of accepting all incoming 111
calls by using cell phones and then activating the
appropriate brigade by VHF radio.
A secondary control room has been established at the
Woolston Training Centre in the event of a more
prolonged evacuation being necessary.
There is a further secondary control facility based at
Nelson which also has the capability of turning out all
brigades in the region.
Vulnerability
The resources of the Fire Service are widely separated
with each brigade being totally self-reliant to handle all
emergencies within its area of responsibility. In the
event of any natural disaster, it would be a relatively
simple process to utilise surrounding brigades to take
responsibility for any station which may become inop-
erative.
Mitigation measures
To undertake a review of all electronic and compu-
ter-based equipment for security.
To check on all seismic bracing of electrical and
electronic cabinets and stand-by generators.
To assess all fuel lines for flexibility and adequate
fuel requirements.
To review the risks of topping hazards.
To continue the policy of region-wide standardisa-
tion of all communications equipment, and main-
taining an adequate level of spares to enable imme-
diate restoration of services.
Flooding Vulnerability
Waimakariri flood hazard
This event will have the least effect on the New
Zealand Fire Services ability to maintain an effective
firefighting force and will certainly have no effect on
communications networks. It may flood some of the
nine urban fire stations such as Brooklands, but would
have to be extremely severe to put communications out
of order, or be of sufficient depth to prevent appliances
from being operated effectively.
Local river flooding hazard (Avon/
Heathcote)
This event could cause some concern, not so much for
the ability to maintain communications which will be
largely unaffected, but more so for the ability to move
appliances around the city if bridge approaches are
washed out, etc.
It is most unlikely that any flooding would occur with
such speed that the Service would not have time to
reposition appliances to either higher ground at strate-
gic sites around the city or to other, unaffected urban
fire stations.
Tsunami flooding hazard
There are several sites which are close to the coastline
such as New Brighton, Sumner and Woolston.
Depending on the warning period of such an event,
these appliances could be rapidly moved to more
inland sites.
It is most unlikely that any adverse effect would be
noticed on the communications network, as all sites are
self-sustaining on several days battery back-up sys-
tems.
Communications system mitigation
measures available
Principal issues and actions
The only fixed site which has a unique function is
the main mobilising centre located at the Christ-
church Central Fire Station in Kilmore Street.
The flood level of this centre is well above the 50-
year flood plain and is most unlikely to be affected
in the event of the Avon River flooding.
Should any unexpected event happen which pre-
vented this centre from remaining operational, the
Service has the ability to carry on the functions of
this site from literally anywhere in the city at
minimal notification (minutes rather than hours).
It is undoubtedly to the Services advantage that
resources are spread very evenly around the city
and suburbs, with each Brigade being totally inde-
pendent of the others to carry out their operational
tasks.
It is similarly of considerable advantage that all the
Services equipment is highly mobile and can be
readily relocated to safer areas.
Windstorm Vulnerability
This event will have little or no effect on the New
Zealand Fire Services ability to effectively communi-
cate with its fire fighting force.
However, this event could create problems if interde-
pendency issues become involved, specifically the
issue of damage to Telecom lines, or radio systems, as
the Services communication system is dependent on
these to operate in a normal state.
Damage to stations may mean that some resources are
unobtainable, but because of the spread of stations the
loss of all vehicles would be extremely unlikely.
Snowstorm Vulnerability
However, this event could create problems if interde-
pendency issues become involved, specifically the
issue of damage to Telecom lines, or radio systems, as
the Services communication system is dependent on
these to operate in a normal state.
Slope Hazard Vulnerability
However, this event could create problems for the
Service if the interdependency issues become involved,
specifically the issue of damage to Telecom lines, or
radio systems, as the Services communication system
is dependent on these to operate in a normal state.
5.3 New Zealand Police
Introduction
Although there has been a recent review of the way in
which the Police are organised since the time of the
Lifelines study, this change has not affected the sys-
tems vulnerability. Police staff in Canterbury were
divided into two separate districts:
Christchurch City District is responsible for polic-
ing of the city and suburbs. Staff from the Central
Police Station cover the inner city area, but a recent
move towards community-oriented policing has
seen the introduction of major suburban police
stations at Hornby, New Brighton, Papanui and
Sydenham, and Community Constable offices in
numerous other suburbs.
Canterbury Rural District is responsible for polic-
ing all areas outside the city boundaries. Police
stations at Ashburton, Kaiapoi, Lyttelton and
Rangiora are supplemented by one or two man
stations throughout the rural area.
Police rely on three main areas of communication
telephone, radio, and data.
Telephone
The Police control room at Christchurch Central pro-
vides the sole answering point for 111 emergency and
*555 circuits in Canterbury. Direct telephone circuits
to other emergency services are also provided to this
location. Police have embarked on a programme of
Mitel PABX installations at all major Police stations.
These PABXs are networked countrywide via digital
or analogue circuits.
There is a large degree on interdependency on other
providers Telecom for 111, *555, direct and trunk
lines, Clear Communications and Telecom for major
tie-lines and, to a lesser extent, Southpower for mains
power.
Diversity for critical circuits such as 111 lines and
major tie-lines has been provided through alternative
Telecom exchanges. At Christchurch Central and
major suburban police stations, diesel standby genera-
tors and UPSs provide an emergency mains supply for
PABX units.
System-fail bypass circuitry ensures trunk circuits are
automatically routed through to Police control-rooms
and watch-houses in the event of PABX failures. At
Christchurch Central the control-room consoles pro-
viding integrated telephone and radio facilities are DC
powered with battery back-up.
Radio
Police operate a VHF FM radiotelephone network
serving mobiles throughout Canterbury, and a UHF
FM radiotelephone network serving portables through-
out Christchurch City. A series of VHF and UHF hill
top repeaters are linked via microwave and UHF links
to the Central Police Station control room.
Frequency diversity in link paths exists between some
sites, as does automatic activation of back-up trigger
equipment. Generally though, reliance on the quantity
of channels available and the physical separation of the
various repeater sites is considered to offer sufficient
redundancy in the event of some network components
being damaged by a natural disaster.
Interdependency on other providers does exist e.g.
Southpower for mains power. Wherever possible,
emergency mains power is supplied from diesel standby
generators. A requirement that radio equipment on all
sites is DC powered with battery back-up is also rigidly
adhered to.
Data
Police stations in Canterbury are served by a computer
data network providing access to the Wanganui Com-
puter Centre, and to host computers in Christchurch
and Wellington, running a variety of applications.
Critical components in this network are data switches
and protocol equipment housed at the Central Police
Station. Once again, high interdependency exists on
Clear Communications and Telecom for provision of
digital data circuits into police buildings and, to a lesser
extent, Southpower for mains power.
At Christchurch Central and major suburban Police
stations, diesel standby generators and UPSs provide
emergency mains supply for data equipment.
Control room evacuation
Police have considered the need for possible evacua-
tion of Christchurch Central in an emergency. A
suburban police station has been fully equipped with
an emergency control room. The 111 lines from two
separate Telecom exchanges and the Central Police
Station trunks can be diverted to this room. An alter-
native method of accessing all police radio channels is
also provided. This room is also equipped with access
to the data network, although this is reliant on equip-
ment at the Central Police Station remaining intact.
Seismic Vulnerability
Moderate event
Police stations in Christchurch are relatively modern
with the Central Police Station being 25 years old, and
major suburban stations being built within the last
seven years. They should, therefore, be capable of
withstanding an earthquake of this magnitude with
only moderate damage. Equipment within is, there-
fore, likely to remain functional or require little reme-
dial action. Similarly, all repeater site buildings are
solidly constructed with good foundations.
Major items of electronic equipment for each network
are housed in rack cabinets complete with doors. These
cabinets, ranging in height from 1 m to 2.1 m are bolted
individually to wooden plinths, and to each other.
It is expected that damage sustained in an earthquake
of this type and magnitude would be as follows:
interruption of primary mains supplies to Police
stations;
interruption of primary mains supplies to radio
repeater sites;
loss of some telephone and data circuits into Police
stations causing a variety of outages dependent on
alternate circuit routing;
possible misalignment of microwave and UHF
aerials causing interruption of radio circuits with-
out back-up facilities; and
damage to freestanding electronic equipment, e.g.
data terminals etc.
The vulnerability chart which assisted in the investiga-
tion is shown in Figure 5.4.
Major event
Under this scenario the following damage may be
expected to occur:
structural damage to police stations;
structural damage to repeater site buildings;
structural damage to transmission towers, masts,
coaxial feeders and aerials;
1
2
3
2
3
3
1
2
1
3
2
2
2 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 1 3 3
1 2 3
1 3 3
1 3 3
2 3 3
1 2 3
0 1 2
0 1 2
1 2 2
0 1 2
0 1 2
2 2 3
2 2 3
COMPONENT
ELEMENT
Building
Control System
Rented speech/data circuits
PABX
Data equipment
Microwave links
UHF repeaters
UHF links
VHF standby triggers
Mains supply
COMMENT
I
M
P
O
R
T
A
N
C
E

1

-

5
E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E

H
A
Z
A
R
D
G
R
O
U
N
D
S
H
A
K
E
L
I
Q
U
E
F
A
C
T
I
O
N
L
A
N
D
S
L
I
D
E
G
R
O
U
N
D

S
E
T
T
L
E
M
E
N
T
D
U
R
I
N
G

E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E
I
M
M
E
D
I
A
T
E
L
Y
A
F
T
E
R
P
E
R
I
O
D

F
O
L
L
O
W
I
N
G
R
E
T
U
R
N

T
O

N
O
R
M
A
L
I
T
Y
5
4
5
5
4
5
2
3
4
Standby mains supply
UPS supplies
DC supplies 5
5
4
4
UTILITY: NEW ZEALAND POLICE REGIONAL NETWORK: Station 2
Figure 5.4: Police vulnerability chart
loss of primary and possibly standby mains sup-
plies;
loss of telephone and data circuits irrespective of
alternate routing;
misalignment of microwave and UHF link aerials;
and
damage to electronic equipment both freestanding
and rack-cabinet mounted.
The police consider the following when designing
their communications networks to maximise their reli-
ability particularly during disasters:
constantly review police station buildings and re-
peater sites to identify communications equipment
and cabling which is unacceptably vulnerable to
seismic activity;
meeting standards for seismic bracing of equip-
ment cabinets and battery stands in equipment
rooms;
ensuring there is route diversity and equipment
redundancy when installing new equipment in each
network;
ensuring sufficient spares are held for major net-
work nodes so that service can be restored without
delay; and
ensuring that sufficient trained staff are locally
available to maintain the critical elements of the
network.
Flooding Vulnerability
The police communications networks would be only
minimally affected by flooding hazards whether these
originate from the Waimakariri river, the Avon or
Heathcote rivers, or from a tsunami.
Christchurch Central
The control room, the various communications equip-
ment rooms and the electrical switchboards are located
at least one floor above ground level.
The basement and an adjacent loading dock for the
cell-block are situated below street level. However,
electrical or communications cabling which runs in
this area is sealed with terminations being accom-
plished on upper floors. Two sump pumps, alarmed for
pump failure, are set into the basement floor with
outlets two floors above.
The transformer kiosk feeding the building may be
vulnerable to flooding. Flooding problems are not,
however, expected with the diesel standby generator as
this is located on a raised terrace with fuel tank inlet
pipe and vents at terrace tarmac level.
Major suburban police stations
These have differing communications equipment room
locations with Hornby on the ground floor and New
Brighton and Papanui on the first floor. Diesel standby
plants at Hornby and New Brighton would be moder-
ately vulnerable to Waimakariri flooding and tsunami
respectively with generators at ground level and in-
ground tanks possibly subject to fuel contamination.
Police VHF and UHF repeater sites
These sites are not expected to be affected by flooding
or by the effects of excessive rainfall, with the excep-
tion of a site of lesser importance in the New Brighton
area with high vulnerability to a tsunami.
Mitigation measures
The police have considered the following to minimise
the vulnerability of their communications networks to
flooding:
new suburban Police stations planned for the Christ-
church area are to have communications equip-
ment located on the first floor;
diesel standby plants to be installed at Papanui and
Sydenham Police Stations are to be equipped with
above ground fuel tanks; and
sufficient spares, including battery-powered emer-
gency radio repeaters and PABX units, have been
purchased for rapid deployment should flooding
cause equipment failures.
5.4 Trans Power New Zealand
Ltd Electrical System
Description
Introduction
The electrical distribution system comprises a regional
supply from the national grid to a local distribution
network. The regional supply network is owned by
Trans Power New Zealand and the distribution net-
work is owned and operated by Southpower.
Regional network
Southpowers Christchurch network is supplied with
electricity from four Trans Power substations, namely:
Islington;
Addington;
Bromley; and
Papanui.
Of these, Islington is the most important, followed
closely by Bromley, then Addington and Papanui.
Islington is a focal point for the South Island section of
the national grid. Although it is part of a network, it is
principally supplied by 220 thousand volt (kV) alter-
nating current (AC) from Twizel (three transmission
lines) and Livingston (one line). These transmission
lines are carried by steel lattice towers. Islington
supplies Bromley at 220kV, Addington at 66kV and
Papanui at 66kV via overhead towered lines.
Bromley Substation, although being supplied from
Islington, is also connected directly from Twizel at
220kV. This has built an element of redundancy into
the system, should a problem occur at Islington. Addi-
tionally there is a Southpower 66kV transmission line
between Islington and Bromley which could be uti-
lised by Trans Power in an emergency.
The above substations supply the Southpower network
at 66kV, 33kV and 11kV.
Electrical system vulnerability
See Figures 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7.
Regional system
System seismic design
The equipment and buildings at the Trans Power sub-
stations in the Christchurch Region vary in age from
approximately 65 years old (Addington Substation
Building) to relatively new (South Island Control Cen-
tre at Islington). Most equipment in switchyards was
sourced from overseas and has been designed to with-
stand a variety of earthquake loadings from 0.25g or
less for older equipment to 0.7g for newer equipment.
Some brittle equipment mounted on porcelain insula-
tors now has to withstand up to 1.5g because it is unable
to absorb earthquake energy in a ductile fashion.
In the last few years, Trans Power has retrofitted
improved seismic restraint to critical equipment in-
cluding transformers and circuit breakers, and has
carried out building strengthening work.
Transmission lines and their supporting towers nor-
mally perform well in earthquakes as they are designed
to resist wind and snow loads which tend to exceed
earthquake induced loading. The main potential prob-
lems could be foundation failure due to land slippage
on the Port Hills or lateral spreading of the banks of the
Lower Heathcote River (affecting one tower).
Moderate regional event
A moderate to severe regional earthquake of up to MM
IX (peak ground acceleration of approximately 0.4g,
28% probability in 50 years) is less than Trans Powers
design requirements for new buildings and equipment.
Therefore, it is likely that most significant damage will
occur with older equipment and buildings.
In addition to building surveys that have been carried
out in the past, a walk-through inspection of all of
Trans Powers Christchurch facilities was carried out
to assess the current vulnerability of equipment and
buildings.
The assessed vulnerability of principal facilities is as
follows.
Islington Substation
Islington Substation (220kV and 33kV) was built in the
early 1950s. A significant amount of equipment has
subsequently been replaced. The most vulnerable
areas are transformer restraint (due to long lead times
for major repair or replacement), equipment mounted
on brittle insulators, e.g. reactors, circuit breakers etc.,
and bus work where there is no allowance for differen-
tial movement.
Some brittle components have been base isolated using
a shock absorbing system which should greatly in-
crease the chance of surviving intact. A significant
amount of spares are held on site. Liquefaction in
unlikely to occur on this site.
Bromley Substation
Bromley Substation (220kV and 66kV) was partly
built in the early 1950s and extended in the early 1970s
(220kV switchyard). Again, the most vulnerable areas
are transformer hold down, brittle equipment and bus
work. Some spares are held on site. This site was
specifically checked for liquefaction potential and
found to be low risk.
Addington Substation
Addington Substation (66kV) was started during World
War I and extended in the early 1920s. The building
has subsequently been strengthened and most, if not
all, of the equipment subsequently replaced. The
major transformer banks have been retrofitted with
seismic hold down brackets to current Trans Power
Standards. The areas of greatest vulnerability are the
insulator mounted equipment and the internal 11kV
Utility: Trans Power Regional/Local Network: 220 kV Sub Station
Islington
Vulnerability to Hazard Impact of Damage
Component Size Comment
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
G
r
o
u
n
d

S
h
a
k
e
L
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n
L
a
n
d
s
l
i
d
e
G
r
o
u
n
d

S
e
t
t
l
e
m
e
n
t
Z
o
n
e

B
o
u
n
d
a
r
y
D
u
r
i
n
g

E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e
I
m
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
l
y

A
f
t
e
r
P
e
r
i
o
d

F
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
R
e
t
u
r
n

t
o

N
o
r
m
a
l
i
t
y
Transmission lines
Termination towers
Gantries bus work
Circuit breakers
(external)
CTs/VTs
Reactors
Oil storage tanks
Power transformers
Underground cabling
Communications
tower
Scada
Overall building
Control cabinets
panels
Emergency
generator
Suspended ceilings
Cranes
Batteries
Condensors
Storage spares
33 kV yard
Buswork
5
5
5
1 0 0 1 3 2 1
1 0 0 1 3 2 1
1 2 3 1 0 0 1
4 2 0 0 1 3 1-2 1
1
1
1 1 1
3
3 1-2
1-2
4
4
1
2
2
3
0
0
0 0
0
0 1
1
1
5 1-2 0 0
0 0
1
1 1 2 2
3 3 3
3 5
5
5
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1
1 2
2 2
2
3 3 3
3
4
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
1-3 1-3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1
1
1 1
1
5
4
4
2
2
3
3
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0 3
1-2
1-3
1-3
5 2 0 0 1 3 2 1
2 days
2 days
2 days
2-4 days
2 weeks
1 week
4 weeks
>18 mths
1-2 days
>2 mths
>1 week
>2 weeks
1-2 days
3 mths 0 0 2
3 mths
1 day
>12 mths
Varies
2 days
Temporary towers available
Temporary towers available
Spares available
Spares available
Spares available
Spares available
Spares available
Spare may be avialable need
structure check
Some cabinets have HD
bolts missing
Distilled water will tip over
Spares not held down
Figure 5.5: Trans Power vulnerability chart 1
switchgear. Previous testing suggests that this site has
moderate liquefaction potential.
Papanui Substation
Papanui Substation (66kV) was initially built in the
early 1950s. Some seismic strengthening has been
carried out including transformer hold down. Vulner-
able areas are mainly bus work and insulated mounted
equipment. Sites tested nearby indicate liquefaction
potential is low.
South Island Control Centre, Islington
The South Island Control Centre was constructed in the
early 1980s and is unlikely to sustain anything more
than superficial damage. The most vulnerable areas
are computer terminals in the control room and com-
UTILITY: TRANSPOWER REGIONAL/LOCAL NETWORK: ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION
I
M
P
O
R
T
A
N
C
E

1

-

5
S
L
O
P
E

S
T
A
B
I
L
I
T
Y
D
U
R
I
N
G

E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E
I
M
M
E
D
I
A
T
E
L
Y

A
F
T
E
R
P
E
R
I
O
D

F
O
L
L
O
W
I
N
G
R
E
T
U
R
N

T
O

N
O
R
M
A
L
I
T
Y
COMPONENT ELEMENT COMMENT
ISLINGTON-BROMLEY
TRANSMISSION LINE
TOWER NUMBER
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
2
1
2
1
1?
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
1 3 3 3
Access to most towers difficult
on Port Hills
On flat ground
Rapaki Track
Huntsbury
Victoria Park
Dyers Pass Road
Worsleys Spur
Kennedy's Bush Road
Kennedy's Bush Spur
Landsdowne
ISLINGTON SUBSTATION
Switchyard
Control building
SOUTH ISLAND SYSTEMS CONTROL
Building
BROMLEY SUBSTATION
Switchyard
Control building
ADDINGTON SUBSTATION
Switchyard
Control building
PAPANUI SUBSTATION
Switchyard
Control building
ADDINGTON STORE
Buildings
Yard
TRANSMISSION LINES
ISL-BROM
ISL-ADD
ISL-PAP
5
5
5
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1
1 0
0 0
0
0 0 2 3 2 0 0
5
5
5
5
5
0
0 0
0 1
1
1
1 1
1 0
0 0
0
5
5
5
5
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0 0 0
1
1
1
1 1
1 2
1 1
5
4
4
4
0 0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1 1
1
1
2
2
5
5
5
5
1
1
1
1 1
1
1
0 0
0 0
0
0
0
2
2
2
3
On edge of flooding
Electrical D.B. vulnerable, then
computer floor vulnerable
Site well above rivers
66 kV circuit breaker
Near Dudley Creek
Levels vary
Lower Heathcote
UTILITY: TRANSPOWER REGIONAL/LOCAL NETWORK: ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION
I
M
P
O
R
T
A
N
C
E

1

-

5
W
A
I
M
A
K

F
L
O
O
D
I
N
G
D
U
R
I
N
G

E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E
I
M
M
E
D
I
A
T
E
L
Y

A
F
T
E
R
P
E
R
I
O
D

F
O
L
L
O
W
I
N
G
COMPONENT ELEMENT COMMENT
L
O
C
A
L

F
L
O
O
D
I
N
G
T
S
U
N
A
M
I

F
L
O
O
D
I
N
G
puting equipment in the computer room. As for the
substation, liquefaction is unlikely.
Addington South Island Warehouse
The Addington South Island Warehouse was recon-
structed in the 1970s. Older buildings have been
retrofitted with seismic strengthening. Large spares
that are required to be stored upright are held in
specially designed support frames. Other components
are stored horizontally outside. As for the substation,
this area has moderate liquefaction potential.
Transmission lines
Transmission lines are not very vulnerable to seismic
attack and, therefore, are likely to sustain only minor
damage. The portion that passes over the Port Hills is
well founded and, therefore, unlikely to be damaged by
landslip. Only one tower could be affected by liquefac-
tion/lateral spreading of the Heathcote River banks. There
is also a 66kV Southpower line running parallel with this
line and in an emergency could take over from it.
Summary
The Trans Power Christchurch region installations are
likely to withstand a moderate to severe regional event
with minor damage. The damage is likely to be
repaired sufficiently to reinstate full service within a
few days.
Electrical system mitigation
measures
Regional Network
Background
Responsibility for this network rests with Trans Power
Limited which has a long-standing record of attention
to seismic aspects of its facilities. This has included
surveys and strengthening of buildings and vital equip-
ment.
Trans Power Limited has a policy in place with the
following objectives:
to maintain power supplies during and after an
Edgecumbe size earthquake (MM IX);
to restore power supplies to earthquake damaged
areas within three days;
to ensure safety of the public and personnel; and
to minimise the cost of repairs.
Involvement in the lifelines project has provided a
broader insight into earthquake related issues, and has
led to the identification of specific concerns and items
requiring attention in order that objectives be met.
Principal issues to emerge were:
Some major items of equipment do not fully com-
ply with Trans Powers earthquake standards and a
programme is in place to rectify the situation.
The availability of spares for damaged equipment
is dependent on some spares held on site and others
held at the Trans Power South Island Warehouse at
Addington. It is important that all critical spares are
stored in such a manner that damage during the
event is highly unlikely. This could be achieved by
ensuring that spares are securely held down or
stored lying horizontally on the ground to eliminate
the chance of tipping over.
Subsequent to the Wellington Lifelines Study, a
new national system of equipment and spares in-
ventory is in place and will greatly assist the rein-
statement operation.
All Trans Power substations in the Christchurch
region have a degree of redundancy and it is consid-
ered likely that sufficient equipment would with-
stand the earthquake to be able to restore some
power supplies in a day or two, if not sooner.
Trans Power continually review design standards
in line with experience gained from Edgecumbe
and overseas earthquakes.
Continue the development of operational proce-
dures and training to respond to a major earth-
quake.
Continue the development of procedures for re-
routing lines and by-passing damaged equipment
for the various scenarios expected following a
major earthquake.
Mitigation summary
Key mitigation issues to be addressed are:
continue with the seismic upgrading of transmis-
sion equipment and buildings where appropriate;
continue to review maintenance contract condi-
tions to ensure the availability of experienced re-
pair personnel (self sufficiency);
continue review of seismic design standards; and
ensure adequate contingency plans are in place for
the operation and the repair of the transmission
system damaged by a major earthquake.
Electrical system flooding vulnerability
Regional system
This event is the least likely flooding event, but is the
one most likely to have the greatest effect on Trans
Powers electricity transmission system.
Islington Substation
The switchyards and control buildings are located on
the edge of the potential flood plain, and would not be
highly vulnerable to damage from shallow local flood-
ing. All vulnerable equipment is at first floor level.
Bromley Substation
The substation is approximately 0.7 km from the near-
est point of the flood plain and is on relatively high
ground and, therefore, unlikely to be vulnerable.
Addington Substation
The site is approximately 1.5 km from the nearest flood
plain and so not vulnerable.
Papanui Substation
This substation is 1.0 km from a flood plain and,
therefore, also very unlikely to be vulnerable.
South Island Control Centre, Islington
The control centre is within a flood plain and so is
potentially vulnerable to flooding. However, the floor
level is approximately 300 mm above surrounding
ground and, as the centre is on the edge of the flood
plain, flooding is unlikely. Should it occur, 100 mm
depth of water inside the building may enter the main
electricity distribution board and 200 mm would be
above the false computer floor.
Addington South Island Warehouse
The site is approximately 1.3 km from the nearest flood
plain and is, therefore, not likely to be vulnerable.
Transmission lines
Only the Islington to Bromley transmission line passes
through any potential flood plains, namely south of
Halswell and in the Heathcote Valley area. Tradition-
ally, transmission towers have not been highly vulner-
able to damage as a result of flooding. The velocity of
floodwaters in the flood plains is not likely to be
sufficient to damage towers with floating debris.
Local rivers flooding hazard
All of the substations are outside the local river flood
plains and, therefore, primarily vulnerable to local
flooding due to blocked drains etc., and would be
unlikely to result in a loss of service. A similar
situation applies for the South Island Systems Control
and the Addington Warehouse.
Transmission lines
As for the Waimakariri flood hazard, the transmission
towers are unlikely to be vulnerable to significant
damage from floating debris etc., and are normally
well founded to avoid problems with erosion, etc.
Only the Islington to Bromley transmission line ap-
pears to be affected by flooding as a result of a tsunami
and again, is unlikely to receive sufficient damage to
result in a loss of service.
The principal issues and actions to emerge were:
Some items of critical equipment in South Island
System Control building could be damaged in the
very unlikely event of a Waimakariri flood hazard.
Appropriate mitigation measures would be to en-
sure that existing sump pumps are adequately main-
tained. The provision of equipment for sand bag-
ging around doorways would also be prudent.
Electrical system windstorm
vulnerability
Windstorm
The 150-year return period wind (28% probability is
50 years) consisting of up to 200 km/hr gusts on the
plains with peak gusts on exposed portions of the Port
Hills up to 270 km/hr, is greater than the assumed
design wind speeds on Trans Power buildings and
equipment.
Transmission lines
Most transmission towers are not highly vulnerable as
their as-built strength generally exceeds design strength.
The conductors have a factor of safety in excess of two
based upon design loads, the critical load case being
high winds combined with extremely low tempera-
tures. Such temperatures (freezing or below) are
unlikely as part of the windstorm scenario. Most of the
transmission lines are on towers and, therefore, above
the height of toppling trees.
Substations
Substation buildings and equipment, where little or no
flying debris is likely to enter the sites are not highly
vulnerable to damage, except perhaps for some win-
dows in substations. The greatest risk is from flying
debris (such as roofing iron, etc.) hitting equipment
and causing outages due to flashovers. Also, debris
entering buildings through windows could cause trip
outs and damage to control equipment.
Electrical system windstorm mitigation
Regional network
practically, it would be difficult to prevent debris
from entering the site;
substation windows could be made less vulnerable
by the use of Georgian wired glass or by blocking
up non-essential windows; and
temporary transmission towers are held at Islington
should a number of permanent towers fail.
Electrical system snowstorm vulnerability
Snowstorm
The 150-year return period snowstorm (28% probabil-
ity is 50 years) consisting of approximately 300 mm of
snow on the ground. This event is greater than the usual
design criteria for the design of transmission line.
Transmission lines
Transmission lines are the weak link in the system as
far as vulnerability to outages due to snowstorms are
concerned. During the August 1992 snowstorm (ap-
proximately 80 year return period or 46% chance in 50
years) the Islington to Bromley transmission line was
out of service for a number of hours. This was likely
due to flashovers caused by frequent clashing between
conductors when snow suddenly fell from a lower
conductor allowing it to spring up and hit the conductor
above. In addition, as access was a problem, the
reconnection of the line was delayed for safety reasons
until it could be inspected.
Substations
Substations buildings and equipment have low vulner-
ability to damage during a severe snowstorm.
Electrical system snowstorm mitigation
Regional network
Transmission lines could be made less vulnerable
to outages due to severe snowstorms by either using
heavier conductors or closing up the spacing be-
tween towers. Both measures would involve con-
siderable expense and, therefore, be difficult to
justify for such an unlikely event.
Trans Power now have their own all-terrain vehicle
to provide access to difficult sites during adverse
conditions.
Electrical system slope instability
vulnerability
Regional system
Port Hills slope instability
Slope instability in the vicinity of transmission tower
foundations could result in tower damage and, in the
worst case, tower failure. Transmission of electricity
could only be resumed once temporary towers had
been erected.
Islington-Bromley 220 kV Transmission Line:
This is the only transmission line in the Christchurch
region passing over the potentially unstable sloping
ground on the Port Hills. Of the 25 towers on the Port
Hills, 21 have low vulnerability and the remaining four
moderate vulnerability to damage.
Electrical system mitigation measures
Regional network
The four moderately vulnerable towers could be
investigated in detail to establish the feasibility and
cost of modifying foundations, to lower vulnerabil-
ity.
Such an investigation may also indicate that actual
risk is lower than anticipated or that the cost of
mitigation could not be justified in relation to the
risk.
5.5 Southpower Distribution
Network
Introduction
Southpower receives power from the following nine
Trans Power substations:
Islington;
been laid in a common trench spaced 300 mm apart at
a minimum depth of 750 mm.
Over their full length they have been encased in weakmix
cement-bound sand (ratio 1 to 15) to improve their
thermal rating, especially in dry soil or sand. The
concrete has cross-sectional dimensions of 600 mm
(w) by 300 mm (h), and is capped by a 50 mm layer of
hard concrete dyed red which provides some physical
protection from mechanical diggers.
Most 66 kV District substation buildings meet latest
building codes, except for Fendalton (1953) and
Brighton (1957).
33 kV district substations
All of these substations, except Moffett, are supplied
by a 33 kV overhead line network, and have either one
or two 33 to 11 kV transformers. Moffett is fed by two
33 kV underground cables.
The larger substations have two independent trans-
formers fed from separate overhead lines with each
transformer and line rated to carry the full district
substation load should the other fail. The 11 kV
switchgear feeds up to 8 x 11 kV cables and is housed
in two switchrooms linked by a buscoupler.
The 33 kV overhead line network has the flexibility to
allow inter-connection between substations via differ-
ent routes. Some interconnection is also possible using
the 11 kV overhead line network.
Middleton, Moffett and Shands substation buildings
are of modern design and constructed from a series of
large, rectangular, reinforced concrete pipe sections
connected together to form a room.
Harewood, Hornby and Sockburn substations are of
concrete block construction, and were built prior to
1970.
These substations are directly supplied at 11 kV by
either 3 or 4 radial 11 kV cables, and do not require
supply transformers. The cables have usually been laid
along the same route and have sufficient capacity to
supply the full District substation load should one
cable fail. The 11 kV switchgear may feed up to 12 x
11 kV cables and is housed in either two or three
switchgear rooms links by buscouplers.
These substations can be interconnected during a fault
using the comprehensive 11 kV underground cable
network. Most 11 kV district substation buildings
meet latest building codes, except for Grimseys Win-
ters (1953) and Woolston (1940).
Addington;
Papanui;
Bromley;
Springston;
Hororata;
Arthurs Pass;
Castle Hill; and
Coleridge.
Most of the power is distributed from 45 district (zone)
substations fed at either 66 kV, 33 kV or 11 kV from the
Trans Power substations. The 66 kV network includes
three outdoor switchyards located at Halswell,
Heathcote and Pages. Several Southpower district
substations are outside the lifelines study area and are
not listed.
The district substations feed a comprehensive 11 kV
network of approximately 7,500 small substations
which in turn provided a 230/400 volt street supply.
District substation network
There are 30 district substations (Table 5.1) within the
lifelines study area are and these are supplied from four
Trans Power substations.
All of these substations can be remotely controlled and
monitored from Southpowers Armagh Street control
room using a computerised supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) control system. Manual
control can be exercised locally if necessary.
Most of these substations are supplied by two radial 66
kV cables connected to two 66 to 11kV transformers.
Each 66 kV cable and associated transformer has an
emergency rating equivalent to the full load of the
district substation (normally 40 MVA) and can main-
tain supply should the other cable or transformer fail.
The transformers supply 11 kV switchgear housed in
either two, three, or four, fire- and explosion-resistant
switchgear rooms. The switchgear may feed up to 20
x 11 kV cables and can be sectionalised using
buscouplers between the switchgear rooms.
There are very few interconnections between substa-
tions at 66 kV but ties are provided by a comprehensive
11 kV network.
For each district substation the two 66 kV cables have
Trans Power
Substations
Southpower Substations Supply
Voltage
(kV)
Rated
Capacity
(MVA)
Addington Armagh 66 40
Fendalton 66 40
Milton 66 40
Oxford/Tuam 66 40
Foster 11 20
Knox 11 20
Montreal 11 20
Spreydon 11 20
Plus 1 single cable feed 11 -
Bromley Barnett Park 66 20
Brighton 66 40
Dallington 66 40
Heathcote (incl switchyard) 66 40
Pages (switchyard) 66 -
Portman 66 20
Linwood 11 20
Pages Kearneys 11 20
Plus 5 single cable feeds 11 -
Woolston (indirect supply) 11 20
Papanui McFaddens 66 40
Bishopdale 11 20
Grimseys Winters 11 20
Harris 11 20
Plus 2 single cable feeds 11 -
Islington Halswell (switchyard) 66 -
Hawthornden 66 40
Hoon Hay 66 40
Harewood 33 15
Hornby 33 20
Middleton 33 23
Moffett 33 23
Shands 33 23
Sockburn 33 20
Table.5.1: District substations within the lifelines study area
Primary 11 kV system
Each district substation feeds a primary 11 kV under-
ground cable distribution system which supplies a
number of network building substations usually con-
nected as closed rings. The ring cables have differen-
tial protection which automatically isolates them dur-
ing a cable fault without loss of supply. These substa-
tions house several units of 11 kV metal clad switchgear
and a local distribution transformer and, in the inner
city, are often within high rise building complexes.
Several are within building basements and most have
pumping systems and water level alarms. Altogether
there are approximately 260 network substations.
Secondary 11kV system
Each network substation feeds a secondary 11 kV
underground cable distribution system which supplies
a number of kiosk substations and small building
substations. Overhead 11 kV lines are used in some
outer city areas. The substations are ring connected
where possible with the mid-point switches left open.
The circuits are protected at the network substations by
overcurrent relays. Normally the faulted portion can
be isolated and the 11 kV system switched to quickly
restore power via another route. There are approxi-
mately 2,300 kiosks and 300 small building substa-
tions. Although Southpower has approximately 5,000
pole-mounted 11 kV to 400 volt transformers, only 300
are within the urban area.
Kiosk substations are of sheet metal construction and
house switchgear and a distribution transformer to
provide a street supply of 230/400 volts. The trans-
former sizes used range from 200 kVA to 500 kVA.
This restriction in size ensures the load may be easily
transferred to surrounding substations in the event of a
system fault.
In industrial and commercial areas, the transformer
size may need to be increased to 1000 kVA or several
transformers used. Either small building substations,
or kiosks with externally mounted transformers, may
be used to accommodate the larger transformers.
230/400 volt system
The 230/400 volt circuits are a mixture of overhead
lines and underground cables with much of the inner
city supplied by underground cables. Southpower has
a long-term programme for undergrounding most of
the city overhead reticulation, and for several years all
new subdivisions have been designed using under-
ground cables.
Most of the 230/400 volt system has been designed
with interconnections to allow the quick restoration of
power during a fault.
Electrical system vulnerability
See Figures 5.8 to 5.19.
District and local networks
Earthquakes
The study of the electrical system has largely been
confined to 30 district (zone) substations as they sup-
ply the bulk of the power to the lifelines study area of
urban Christchurch and Lyttelton.
District substations supply approximately 260 net-
work substations and these form the next most impor-
tant distribution layer. A detailed study of these has not
been carried out because their area of supply can
usually be fed from surrounding network substations
using the large number of 11 kV interconnections that
normally exist.
To assist with this study, Southpower has employed a
consultant (Kingston Morrison) to carry out a survey of
all district substations and some selected smaller sub-
stations.
Earthquake vulnerability charts have been prepared for
district substations and important Southpower office
and stores buildings.
The study has also highlighted Southpowers risk of
exposure to claims of contravention of the provisions
of the Resource Management Act due to oil spill.
District substations
District substation buildings are mostly well designed
using reinforced and filled concrete block construction
and should withstand an earthquake without much
damage. The most vulnerable are Harewood, Hornby
and Sockburn substations which have unfilled con-
crete block walls and Woolston substation which has
concrete columns and brick infill panel walls. These
have a higher risk of moderate structural damage but
this is not expected to cause a loss of supply.
At Sockburn and Moffett substations, sound attenua-
tion walls require checking for strength and stability as
they could damage switchyard equipment if they fell.
The 66 kV to 11 kV transformers at district substations
weigh approx 45 tonnes and have a separate radiator
bank mounted on a common continuous foundation
pad. These have adequate mounting strength. The 33
kV to 11 kV transformers at district substations weigh
slightly less but in some cases the radiator bank has
been mounted on a separate, non-continuous founda-
tion pad. Some of these also have inadequate fixing to
their foundation pads. The cooling radiator banks and
oil conservator tanks on Ferranti transformers needs to
be checked for strength and may require extra bracing.
The 11 kV indoor switchgear at district substations is
mounted on concrete floors and appears to be ad-
equately fixed. The 11 kV auxiliary and voltage trans-
formers mounted on rails on the top of some switchgear
units may need to be more securely fixed.
Both 66 kV and 33 kV outdoor switchgear is used at
some of Southpowers district substations. At Hornby
and Sockburn substations, the switchgear support
frames are very flexible and may require further brac-
ing.
Control cabinets within these substations have been
checked and found to be securely mounted.
Network substations
A small percentage of these buildings were built in the
1920s and 1930s, and some may be sufficiently dam-
aged to disable the equipment inside and cause a loss of
supply.
These very old substations were constructed from
double brick, unusually with a reinforced concrete
band at roof level, but without reinforced concrete
columns. Fortunately they are normally surrounded by
more modern ones which can pick up their load via the
11 kV system. There are six areas of the city where
several older network substations (prior to 1940) are in
close proximity. These are in the suburbs of Addington,
Beckenham, North Linwood, Papanui, St Albans and
Woolston.
The 11 kV switchgear in network substations has been
upgraded and well maintained over the years and
should not cause many problems.
UTILITY: Southpower DISTRICT NETWORK: 66 kV District Subs (& 66 kV cables)
COMPONENT ELEMENT COMMENTS
Q
T
Y
I
M
P
O
R
T
A
N
C
E
E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E

H
A
Z
A
R
D
G
R
O
U
N
D

S
H
A
K
E
L
I
Q
U
E
F
A
C
T
I
O
N
L
A
N
D
S
L
I
D
E
G
R
O
U
N
D

S
E
T
T
L
E
M
E
N
T
D
U
R
I
N
G

E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E
I
M
M
E
D
I
A
T
E
L
Y

A
F
T
E
R
P
E
R
I
O
D

F
O
L
L
O
W
I
N
G
R
E
T
U
R
N

T
O

N
O
R
M
A
L
I
T
Y
For each component: Assess importance 1 to 5
Assess vulnerability on hazard map 0 to 3
Assess impact of damage 0 to 3
Armagh Building
11kV swgr
66kV tsfmrs
66 cables
Barnett Park Building
11kV swgr
66kV tsfmrs
66 cables
Brighton Building
11kV swgr
66kV tsfmrs
66 cables
Building
11kV swgr
66kV tsfmrs
66 cables
Dallington
Fendalton
Building
11kV swgr
66kV tsfmrs
66 cables
Halswell
Switchyard
Building
66kV swgr
66 lines
Bldg-Ripple
Ripple eqpt
Building
11kV swgr
66kV tsfmrs
66 cables
Building
11kV swgr
66kV tsfmrs
66 cables
Hoonhay
Heathcote
Switchyard
Building
11kV swgr
66kV tsfmrs
66 cables
66kV swgr
Hawthornden
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x2
x2
x2
x2
x2
x2
x2
x2
x2
x2
x2
x2
x2
x36
x12
x23
x26
x23
x7
x4
x26
x26
x6
x4
x26
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
3
5
5
3B
3/3B
2
2/2B
3A
3A
3
3/3A
3
3/3B
3B
3/3B
3B
3
3
3B
3A/
3B
3B
3B
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
1
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
1 1 0
0 0
0
0
0 0
0
0
0 0
0
0
2 2
2
2
2 2
2
2 2
2
2
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
2 3 1
2 2 1
1 1 2
1 1 2
2 2 2
2 2 1
2 2 1
2 2 2
2 2 1
Built? Strong
Two old bridges (Armagh)
Built 1977
Possible pylon damage
Built 1957
Built 1972
Modern foot bridge (Snell)
Built 1953
Built 1969 and 1989
Designed to 0.75g
Built 1989
Built 1970
Built 1971
Designed to 0.75g
Built 1972
Figure 5.8: Southpower vulnerability chart 1
Kiosk and building substations
The transformers installed within kiosk substations
have not been bolted down because of the difficulty of
gaining access to their mountings. These substations
are occasionally hit by vehicles and it has been found
that the transformer damage is reduced by its ability to
move.
It is likely that they will survive a moderate earthquake
satisfactorily because they are connected to flexible
HV and LV cables and restrained from moving far by
the sides of the Kiosk housing. Most have metal cable
boxes over the HV bushings which should protect
them from damage by impact. With a severe earth-
quake the damage may be more substantial. A suitable
method of mounting these transformers is being inves-
tigated.
Q
T
Y
I
M
P
O
R
T
A
N
C
E
E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E

H
A
Z
A
R
D
G
R
O
U
N
D

S
H
A
K
E
L
I
Q
U
E
F
A
C
T
I
O
N
L
A
N
D
S
L
I
D
E
G
R
O
U
N
D

S
E
T
T
L
E
M
E
N
T
D
U
R
I
N
G

E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E
I
M
M
E
D
I
A
T
E
L
Y

A
F
T
E
R
P
E
R
I
O
D

F
O
L
L
O
W
I
N
G
R
E
T
U
R
N

T
O

N
O
R
M
A
L
I
T
Y
Building
11kV swgr
66kV tsfmrs
66 cables
Building
11kV swgr
66kV tsfmrs
66 cables
Building
11kV swgr
66kV tsfmrs
66 cables
Building
11kV swgr
66kV tsfmrs
66 cables
Building
66kV swgr
66 cables
Bldg-ripple
ripple eqpt
Bldg-ripple
ripple eqpt
x1
x26
x2
x2
x1
x28
x2
x2
x1
x24
x2
x2
x1
x1
x2
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x18
x1
x1
5
5
5
5
3
3
5
3 1
1
1
1
3
3/3B
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
3/3A
/3B
3B
3B
3A
3A 1
3A
3/3B
3B
3A/
3B
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0 0 1
1
1
1
1 1
1
1 1
1 1
1 1 0
0
0
0
0
2
0 0
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
Built 1972
Built 1981
Built 1974
Built 1989
Built 1989
Built 1986
McFaddens
Milton
Oxford-Tuam
Pages
Switchyard
Papanui
(ripple)
Portman
All of the transformers in smaller building substations
should be bolted down, but a check is required to
confirm this. The mounting brackets on some trans-
formers appear to be insufficient and should be re-
placed.
Cable systems
It is expected that most underground cables will re-
spond well to an earthquake although damage can be
expected where cables are stretched as a result of
ground subsidence.
Some cable strain may occur where underground ca-
bles rise directly from the ground without slack and are
supported or terminated on ground mounted equip-
ment. Locations where this can occur are:
at external pad mounted transformers which are
connected directly to underground cables. It is
possible for the cable tension to also break the
transformer bushings;
at the base of power poles supporting cables con-
nected to the overhead system; and
in kiosks where underground cables connect di-
rectly onto low and high voltage switchgear.
These problems are less likely to occur at building
substations as the cables are supported in an open
trench system and have freedom to move if required.
Some district substations are fed by 66kv cables which
have been encased in concrete to improve their thermal
rating and mechanical protection. They are expected to
withstand an earthquake satisfactorily except in areas
where differential ground settlement is possible. This
may crack the unreinforced concrete sleeve and cause
localised crushing or shearing of the cable.
UTILITY: Southpower DISTRICT NETWORK: 11 kV District Subs (& 11 kV supply cables)
Q
T
Y
I
M
P
O
R
T
A
N
C
E
E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E

H
A
Z
A
R
D
G
R
O
U
N
D

S
H
A
K
E
L
I
Q
U
E
F
A
C
T
I
O
N
L
A
N
D
S
L
I
D
E
G
R
O
U
N
D

S
E
T
T
L
E
M
E
N
T
D
U
R
I
N
G

E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E
I
M
M
E
D
I
A
T
E
L
Y

A
F
T
E
R
P
E
R
I
O
D

F
O
L
L
O
W
I
N
G
R
E
T
U
R
N

T
O

N
O
R
M
A
L
I
T
Y
Building
11kV swgr
11kV cables
Building
11kV swgr
11kV cables
Building
11kV swgr
11kV cables
Building
11kV swgr
11kV cables
Building
11kV swgr
11kV cables
Building
11kV swgr
11kV cables
Building
11kV swgr
11kV cables
Building
11kV swgr
11kV cables
Building
11kV swgr
11kV cables
Building
11kV swgr
11kV cables
Building
11kV swgr
11kV cables
Building
11kV swgr
11kV cables
x1
x18
x3
x1
x11
x3
x1
x20
x3
x1
x23
x6
x1
x18
x3
x1
x21
x3
x1
x16
x4
x1
x18
x3
x1
16
x3
x1
x11
x2
x1
x18
x3
x1
x16
x4
5 3
3
5 2
5 3B
2/3B
3B
5 3
5
5 3
3/3B
3B
3B
3/3B
5 3A
3A
5 3B
3B
5 3A
3A
5 2
1/2/
2B
5 3B
3/3B
5 3
3A/
3B
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1
1 0 0
0 0
0
0
0 0
0
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1 1
1
0
0
0
0
0 0
0 0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1
1
1 0
0
0 0
0
2
2
1 0 0
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1 1
1
1 1 1
1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 2
2 2
2 2
1 1 1
1 1 1
Bishopdale
Cashmere Road
(network centre)
Foster
Grimseys-
Winters
Harris
Knox
Linwood
Montreal
Pages
Kearneys
Simeon
(network centre)
Spreydon
Woolston
(network centre)
Built 1966
Built197? - strong
Built 1992
Built 1953
Built 1966
Built 1968
Built 1962
Built 1964
Built 1977
Built ? - swg room OK
Possible line damage
Built 1966
Built 1940
Of particular concern is the pair of 66kv cables that run
between the Addington and Armagh substations and
pass over two Armagh Street bridges. An investigation
into the vulnerability of these bridges indicates that
damage in the form of cracking of the spandrels and
wing walls is possible. Ground settlement at the ap-
proaches is possible which may damage the cables.
Their repair requires specialist skills.
Overhead line systems
Southpowers overhead line systems operate at 66 kV,
33 kV, 11 kV and 230/400 volts. Only the outer areas
of Christchurch rely on supply from the overhead high
voltage system. The 66 kV overhead lines are sup-
ported by pylons rather than poles.
Although most of Southpowers damage is likely to
Q
T
Y
I
M
P
O
R
T
A
N
C
E
E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E

H
A
Z
A
R
D
G
R
O
U
N
D

S
H
A
K
E
L
I
Q
U
E
F
A
C
T
I
O
N
L
A
N
D
S
L
I
D
E
G
R
O
U
N
D

S
E
T
T
L
E
M
E
N
T
D
U
R
I
N
G

E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E
I
M
M
E
D
I
A
T
E
L
Y

A
F
T
E
R
P
E
R
I
O
D

F
O
L
L
O
W
I
N
G
R
E
T
U
R
N

T
O

N
O
R
M
A
L
I
T
Y
Building
11kV swgr
33kV swgr
33kV tsfmr
33kV lines
Building
11kV swgr
33kV swgr
33kV tsfmr
33kV lines
Building
11kV swgr
33kV swgr
33kV tsfmr
33kV lines
Building
11kV swgr
33kV swgr
33kV tsfmr
33kV lines
Sound wall
Building
11kV swgr
33kV swgr
33kV tsfmr
33kV lines
Building
11kV swgr
33kV swgr
33kV tsfmr
33kV lines
Sound wall
x1
x9
x2
x2
x2
x1
x11
x7
x2
x3
x3
x11
x2
x2
x2
x3
x1
x11
x3
x2
x2
x3
x11
x2
x2
x2
x1
x1
x10
x3
x2
x2
5 3
5
4
4
3
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
1
1
3
2
0 0 1
2
1 0 0
2
1
1
3
2
1
1
1
3
2
1
1
1
1
0 0
0 0 1
2
1
2
3
2
1
1
1
3
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
0 0
0 0
1
3
2 2
1 1 2
1 1 1
1
1 1
1 1 1
2 2 2
2
2 2
2 2 2
2
3 3
3 3
3 3
2
2 2
2 2 2
2
2 2
1 1 1
1
1 1 1
1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1
2 2 2
2
2 2
2 2 2
2
2 2
3 3
3 3
1 1 2
1 2 2
1 1 1
2 2 2
3 3 2
1 2 2
Built 1972 - unfilled blk
Inadequate hold down
Built? - unfilled blk
Built 1972
Built 1972
Built 1977
Built? - unfilled blk
Inadeuate hold down
Sockburn
Shands
Moffet
Middleton
Hornby
Harewood
Overhead line and insulator damage. The lines and
insulators may break if poles move out of align-
ment.
Emergency spares
Southpower has a works depot at Packe St where
distribution equipment spares are stored. Work is in
progress to catalogue these items and identify addi-
tional items to be ordered. Attention has been given to
bracing the storage racks and providing restraints to
prevent items falling off shelves. The possibility of
restraining stored transformers is being investigated.
occur to the overhead reticulation system, it is expected
that it will be easily repaired. Failure of supply can be
caused by:
Poles moving out of alignment. This is likely to
occur with poles subjected to a sideways strain and
where the ground is unstable or may liquefy.
Pole mounted transformer damage. This can occur
when crossarm hung transformers and platform
mounted transformers shift position. The out of
balance weight of larger transformers may cause
some poles to lean or break.
UTILITY: SOUTHPOWER LIMITED REGIONAL/LOCAL
NETWORK: ELECTRICITY
DISTRIBUTION
VULNERABILITY TO
HAZARD
IMPACT OF
DAMAGE
COMMENTS COMPONENT
ELEMENT
Q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e

1

-

5
W
a
i
m
a
k

f
l
o
o
d
i
n
g
L
o
c
a
l

f
l
o
o
d
i
n
g
T
s
u
n
a
m
i

f
l
o
o
d
i
n
g
D
u
r
i
n
g

f
l
o
o
d
i
n
g
I
m
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
l
y

a
f
t
e
r
P
e
r
i
o
d

f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
R
e
t
u
r
n

t
o

n
o
r
m
a
l
i
t
y
Armagh
Barnett Park
Brighton
Dallington
Fendalton
Halswell
Switchyard
Hawthornden
Heathcote Building
11 kV Sw/ gr
66 k V Trans
66kV Lines
66kV Sw/ gr
Building
66kV Sw/gr
66 Lines
Bldg - Ripple
Ripple Eqpt
x1
x36
x 2
x2
x1
x12
x1
x2
x1
x23
x2
x2
x1
x26
x2
x2
x1
x23
x2
x2
x1
x7
x4
x1
x1
x1
x26
x2
x2
x1
x26
x6
x1
x4
Edge of Flood plain
Within flood plain
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
3
3
2
2
1
3
3
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
3
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
3
3
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
2
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Building
11 kV Sw/ gr
66 k V Trans
66 Cables
Building
11 kV Sw/ gr
66 k V Trans
66 Cables
Building
11 kV Sw/ gr
66 k V Trans
66 Cables
Building
11 kV Sw/ gr
66 k V Trans
66 Cables
Building
11 kV Sw/ gr
66 k V Trans
66 Cables
Building
11 kV Sw/ gr
66 k V Trans
66 Cables
Office buildings
Southpowers new office buildings at the corner of
Manchester and Armagh Streets, which have some
important functions, are of sound construction.
Southpowers old Armagh Street buildings, which
have other important functions, are of inadequate
strength. The control room which monitors and con-
trols the operation of the power distribution system is
located within this old building complex and is manned
by system controllers/operators 24 hours per day. A 35
kVA standby generator provides a backup supply for
the control room. Southpower is currently looking into
the possibilities of relocating the control room from
this old building (since done).
The Packe St works depot buildings were checked for
adequate strength.
Radio communication links
A number of Telecom transmitter sites are used for
DISTRIBUTION
VULNERABILITY TO
HAZARD
IMPACT OF
DAMAGE
COMMENTS COMPONENT
ELEMENT
Q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e

1

-

5
W
a
i
m
a
k

f
l
o
o
d
i
n
g
L
o
c
a
l

f
l
o
o
d
i
n
g
T
s
u
n
a
m
i

f
l
o
o
d
i
n
g
D
u
r
i
n
g

f
l
o
o
d
i
n
g
I
m
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
l
y

a
f
t
e
r
P
e
r
i
o
d

f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
R
e
t
u
r
n

t
o

n
o
r
m
a
l
i
t
y
Hoon Hay
Mc Faddens
Milton
Oxford - Tuam
Pages
Switchyard
Papanui
(Ripple)
Portman
Harewood
Building
11kV Sw / gr
66kV Trans
Building
11kV Sw / gr
66kV Trans
66 Cables
Building
11kV Sw / gr
66kV Trans
66 Cables
Building
11kV Sw / gr
66kV Trans
66 Cables
Building
11kV Sw / gr
66kV Trans
66 Cable
Building
66kV Sw / gr
66 Cables
Bldg - Ripple
Ripple Eqpt
Bldg - Ripple
Ripple Eqpt
Building
11kV Sw / gr
33kV Trans
33kV Lines
Edge of local flood
plain
Edge of flood plain
Edge of flood plain
Edge of Waimak
food plain
x1
x26
x2
x2
x2
x2
x2
x2
x2
x2
x2
x2
x2
x26
x1
x28
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x9
x18
x24
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
0
1
2
1
3
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
66 Cables x2 5 1 1 0 2 0 0 0
33kV Sw / gr x2 5 1 1 0 1
0
0 0
day-to-day vehicle communication. Most vehicles have
radiotelephones which can switch channels to different
repeaters if required.
A radio link at Mt Sugarloaf is also used to control and
monitor the operation of some remote district substa-
tions. Within most of the Christchurch urban area
remote control is achieved using Southpowers under-
ground communication cable network.
Electrical system mitigation measures
earthquakes
General
Southpower is able to respond promptly to electricity
outages caused by a wide range of emergencies as part
of its routine operations. This method of operation and
preparedness will be of assistance in the event of a
major system disruption.
Widespread damage to the distribution system would
place enormous demands on resources, and it may be
necessary to approach other electrical supply authori-
ties for assistance. In the event of a major emergency,
it is likely that Trans Powers system will also be
affected with the consequent loss of supply to most or
all of Christchurch.
Engineering measures
The following mitigation measures have been identi-
fied.
DISTRIBUTION
VULNERABILITY TO
HAZARD
IMPACT OF
DAMAGE
COMMENTS COMPONENT
ELEMENT
Q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e

1

-

5
W
a
i
m
a
k

f
l
o
o
d
i
n
g
L
o
c
a
l

f
l
o
o
d
i
n
g
T
s
u
n
a
m
i

f
l
o
o
d
i
n
g
D
u
r
i
n
g

f
l
o
o
d
i
n
g
I
m
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
l
y

a
f
t
e
r
P
e
r
i
o
d

f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
R
e
t
u
r
n

t
o

n
o
r
m
a
l
i
t
y
Hornby
Middleton
Moffett
Shands
Sockburn
Bishopdale
Cashmere Rd
(Network Centre)
Foster
Building
11kV Sw / gr
33kV Trans
33k V Lines
Building
11kV Sw / gr
33kV Sw / gr
33kV Trans
33k V Lines
Building
33kV Sw / gr
Sound Wall
11kV Sw / gr
33kV Trans
33k V Lines
Building
11kV Sw / gr
33kV Sw / gr
33kV Trans
33k V Lines
Building
33kV Sw / gr
11kV Sw / gr
33kV Trans
33k V Lines
Building
11kV Sw / gr
11kV Cables
Building
11kV Sw / gr
11kV Cables
Building
11kV Sw / gr
11kV Cables
x1
x11
x2
x3
x3
x2
x2
x2
x11
x3
x3
x2
x2
x1
x11
x3
x11
x2
x2
x2
x1
x10
x3
x2
x2
x1
x18
x3
x1
x11
x3
x1
x20
x3
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
3
3
x2
x2
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
2
x2
x2
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
x1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Within Waimak
flood plain
Edge of flood plain
33kV Sw / gr x7 5 x2 x1 0 1 0 0 0
District substations
Strengthen the mounting system for some 33/11 kV
supply transformers.
Check the strength and stability of 33/11 kV supply
transformers foundation pads which were not con-
structed as one continuous unit.
Check the strength of the radiator banks and oil
conservator tanks on the Ferranti 66/11 kV supply
transformers and fit extra bracing if necessary.
DISTRIBUTION
VULNERABILITY TO
HAZARD
IMPACT OF
DAMAGE
COMMENTS COMPONENT
ELEMENT
Q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e

1

-

5
W
a
i
m
a
k

f
l
o
o
d
i
n
g
L
o
c
a
l

f
l
o
o
d
i
n
g
T
s
u
n
a
m
i

f
l
o
o
d
i
n
g
D
u
r
i
n
g

f
l
o
o
d
i
n
g
I
m
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
l
y

a
f
t
e
r
P
e
r
i
o
d

f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
R
e
t
u
r
n

t
o

n
o
r
m
a
l
i
t
y
For each component: Assess importance 5 to 5 - 5 most important
Assess vulnerability on hazard map 1 to 3 - 3 most vulnerable
Assess impact of damage 1 to 3 - 3 most impact
1
Grimseys Winters
Harris
Knox
Linwood
Montreal
Pages Kearneys
Simeon
(Network Centre)
Spreydon
Woolston
(Network Centre)
Building
11kV Sw / gr
11kV Cables
Building
11kV Sw / gr
11kV Cables
Building
11kV Sw / gr
11kV Cables
Building
11kV Sw / gr
11kV Cables
Building
11kV Sw / gr
11kV Cables
Building
11kV Sw / gr
11kV Cables
Building
11kV Sw / gr
11kV Lines
Building
11kV Sw / gr
11kV Cables
Building
11kV Sw / gr
11kV Cables
x1
x23
x6
x1
x18
x3
x1
x21
x3
x1
x16
x4
x1
x18
x3
x1
x16
x3
x1
x11
x2
x1
x1
x3
x18
x16
x4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Lyttleton
Edge of Flood plain
Check the strength of the 33 kV outdoor switchgear
support frames and strengthen if necessary.
Check the stability of the sound attenuation walls at
Sockburn and Moffett substations and strengthen
or replace as necessary.
Check the stability of the auxiliary and voltage
transformers mounted on the top of some units of
11 kV switchgear and improve the method of fixing
if necessary.
Network substations
Consider either strengthening or replacing selected
old network substation buildings if they have a
critical role in the security of supply. This could be
achieved by bracing the building at roof level to
transfer the wall face loads to the opposite side
walls. The walls themselves could be strengthened
by bolting steel members to them at appropriate
positions to provide structural ribs to reduce face
loads.
Kiosk and building substations
If possible, establish a suitable method of securely
mounting transformers in kiosk substations despite
the difficult access.
DISTRIBUTION
VULNERABILITY TO
HAZARD
IMPACT OF
DAMAGE
COMMENTS COMPONENT
ELEMENT
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e

1

-

5
W
i
n
d

E
x
p
o
s
u
r
e
D
u
r
i
n
g

W
i
n
d
I
m
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
l
y

a
f
t
e
r
P
e
r
i
o
d

f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
R
e
t
u
r
n

t
o

n
o
r
m
a
l
i
t
y
66kV TOWER LINES
Hawthornden - Islington 66kV
Islington - Halswell 66kV
Halswell - Heathcote 66kV
Heathcote - Bromley 66kV
Heathcote - Barnett Park
66kV/11kV
33kV POLE LINES
11kV POLE LINES
Heathcote - Lyttleton Line
Other 11kV Lines
400V POLE LINES
CITY Urban
City Rural
SUBSTATION STRUCTURES
Heathcote
Halswell
Pages
Papanui
Sockburn
Hornby
Middleton
Moffet
Harewood
Shands
SUBSTATION BUILDINGS
POLE MOUNTED
SUBSTATIONS
5
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
1 1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
Access to most towers
difficult on
Port Hills
On hills
On hills
On hills
66kV
66kV & Ripple Plant
66kV & Ripple Plant
66kV & Ripple Plant
33kV
33kV & Ripple Plant
33kV
33kV & Ripple Plant
33kV
33kV
For each component Assess importance 1 to 5 - 5 most important
Assess vulnerability 1 to 3 - 3 most vulnerable
4 3 2 2 0 0
5 3 3 3 2 0
Check the mounting for building substation trans-
formers and strengthen any which are inadequate.
Cable systems
The 66 kV cables could be damaged by excessive
differential ground settlement during an earthquake.
Sites identified where this could occur are the
approaches to the two Armagh Street bridges, and
these should be investigated to determine if extra
support is needed.
Note: There is a small risk that HV and LV cables
could be stressed where they rise directly from the
ground and connect to ground mounted equipment.
The number of locations where this is possible is
very large, and mitigation measures are not practical.
Overhead line systems
The mounting strength of transformers on two pole
structures should be checked and upgraded if nec-
essary.
Note: Damage may be widespread on the overhead
system, but should be repaired without too much
difficulty as only standard components are used
and access is easy. Temporary overhead lines may
need to be erected to accelerate the restoration of
power to some underground supply areas.
General measures
The battery banks in some substations have inad-
equate support and require further bracing.
Some of the essential equipment in the main office
building is not adequately fixed. This includes
For each component Assess importance 1 to 5 - 5 most important
DISTRIBUTION
IMPACT OF
DAMAGE
COMMENTS COMPONENT
ELEMENT
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e

1

-

5
D
u
r
i
n
g

f
l
o
o
d
i
n
g
I
m
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
l
y

a
f
t
e
r
P
e
r
i
o
d

f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
R
e
t
u
r
n

t
o

n
o
r
m
a
l
i
t
y
Hawthornden - Islington 66 kV
Islington - Halswell 66kV
Halswell - Heathcote
Heathcote - Bromley 66kV
Heathcote - Barnett Park
66kV/11kV
Lyttelton - Heathcote 11kV
Line
Sugarloaf 11kV Line
Marleys Hill 11kV Line
Mt Pleasant 11kV Line
33kV Lines
Other 11kVLines
Low Voltage Lines
Streetlighting
Substation Buildings
Switchyards
5
5
4
5
5
4
4
4
5
5
4
3
3
5
5
2
2
3
2
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
3
3
2
1
1
1
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
2
0 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2 2 0
0 2 2
2 0
2 0
1 0
2 0
1
0 1
0 On flat
On flat
difficult on Port Hills
On flat
On hills but has standby
Alternative routes exist
Some alternatives
available
Some alternatives
available
Some alternatives
available
VULNERABILITY TO
HAZARD
S
n
o
w

L
o
a
d
i
n
g
DISTRIBUTION
VULNERABILITY TO
HAZARD
IMPACT OF
DAMAGE
COMMENTS
COMPONENT ELEMENT
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e

1

-

5
S
l
o
p
e

S
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
D
u
r
i
n
g

E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e
I
m
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
l
y

a
f
t
e
r
P
e
r
i
o
d

f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
R
e
t
u
r
n

t
o

n
o
r
m
a
l
i
t
y
Halswell - Heathcote
32 Towers
Transmissions Line
Tower Number
30
29
28
27
26
25
24
23
22
21
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10c
10b
10a
9
8
7
6
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
3
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3 3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
On flat ground
Rapaki Track
Huntsbury Track
Dyers Pass Road
Worsleys Spur
Westmorland
Off Cashmere Road
On flat ground
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
most computer centre equipment (computer, pe-
ripherals) and some control room equipment (VDUs
etc.).
Planning to manage the impact
Issues to consider are:
The maintenance of all spares in stock is being
prepared, and will be analysed to determine if any
increases are necessary. Some components can
easily be sourced but the spare parts for some
equipment such as older 11 kV switchgear are no
longer available. If some old equipment is seri-
ously damaged, it may have to be completely
replaced rather than repaired.
DISTRIBUTION
VULNERABILITY TO
HAZARD
IMPACT OF
DAMAGE
COMMENTS
COMPONENT ELEMENT
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e

1

-

5
S
l
o
p
e

S
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
D
u
r
i
n
g
e
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e
I
m
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
l
y

a
f
t
e
r
P
e
r
i
o
d

f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
R
e
t
u
r
n

t
o

n
o
r
m
a
l
i
t
y
Heathcote-Barnett
19 Towers
Transmission Line
Tower Number
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
Heathcote-Lyttleton
Transmission Line
Tower Number*
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
1
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
0
3
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
3
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3 3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
Barnett Park
Dyers Pass Road
Mt Pleasant Road
Bridle Path Road
On flat ground
Access to some poles
difficult
Above vulnerable bank
Bridle Path track
Off Harmans Road
Off Harmans Road
Adjacent Harmans Road
Harmans Road
Harmans Road
9 5 1 3 1 3 3
Summit Road. New
stucture
* (Refer to Southpower layout 28-07-94) HV System Diagram sheet 15.2
Southpowers exposure to flooding risk
General
In general, the distribution network is not exposed to
any great risk because of moderate flooding. Most HV
equipment is constructed such that flooding in excess
Ensuring as many staff as possible are well trained
and skilled in the restoration of services.
Continuing with the present planning policy of
ensuring alternative supply routes are provided for
consumers wherever possible and commercially
viable.
of one metre would be required before catastrophic
failure of equipment would occur.
Events such as the August 1992 storm, its associated
snow melt and high spring tides, have already shown
the network to be quite robust with only localised
flooding around substations close to the Heathcote and
Avon rivers. It would be possible, where localised
flooding in excess of one metre occurs, to electrically
isolate those substations on a substation-by-substation
basis as the need arises before major damage occurs to
electrical equipment.
Control centre
This is located on the second floor of the Armagh site
and is not considered at risk.
Hornby District Substation appears to be the most
exposed district substation to a Waimakariri flood and
falls within the potential flood plain. This substation
may be vulnerable to damage from local flooding.
However, this event is considered the least likely of the
flooding events. It is possible to transfer the load from
this substation on to neighbouring substations should
the need arise.
Brighton District Substation appears to be the next
most exposed district substation which would be af-
fected by the Waimakariri flooding as it appears to lie
within the flood plain. Past history has shown that in
actual fact this substation has been unaffected by any
peak flooding which has occurred in recent years, and
is protected by the Avon stopbank.This stopbank ap-
pears to be designed for a 50-year return period. How-
ever, if this level was to be exceeded then the Brighton
District Substation would be exposed.
Heathcote District Substation is on the edge of the
flood plain, but on slightly higher ground than the
surrounding area. There is not expected to be any
major problems here.
Armagh District Substation is located on the edge of
the flood plain and no major problems are expected to
occur here.
Oxford-Tuam District Substation is on the edge of the
flood plain and has some diversification with half of
the switchgear located at ground level and the balance
at the first floor level.
Pages Switchyard is on the edge of the flood plain.
Water entry into buildings could damage ripple equip-
ment. This is not expected to happen since the building
foundations are about 300 mm above ground level.
Other District Substations within the city are not af-
fected by the flood plain.
Local rivers flooding hazard
Brighton District Substation falls within the local river
flood plain. However, as identified previously the
Avon stopbank is expected to prevent major damage
occurring, as past history has shown.
Hoon Hay District Substation appears to be on the edge
of this flood plain, but is not expected to be affected by
it. Heathcote District Substation is also on the edge of
this flood plain, but is higher than the surrounding
ground and is not expected to be affected by it. Pages
Switchyard is on the edge of the flood plain and, as
above, should not be affected.
Other district substations all appear to be unaffected by
flooding of the Avon and Heathcote rivers.
This event is not expected to affect any district substa-
tions or major plant.
Some local loss of power may occur at distribution
substations located close to the coast. However, this is
considered minor and it should be relatively easy to
restore power.
Localised heavy rainfall
Localised heavy rainfall in the central city can cause
flooding in basement substations situated below ground
level in the basements of central city buildings.
It is expected they may not cope with the volume of
water that may flow down access ways because of
flooding in the streets. These substations either have
limited pumping facilities or rely entirely on the
stormwater systems associated with the basements in
which they are situated.
In the past twenty years there has been flooding in the
central business district caused by localised heavy
rainfall. None of these occasions have caused major
flooding of basement substations. However, the streets
have not been flooded for long periods.
Some of these substations are fitted with high water
level alarms.
Mitigation measures
The subtransmission network (66 kV and 33 kV)
would generally not require any special mitigation
measures since most of this equipment is mounted
higher than the distribution network.
The electricity distribution network at the 11 kV level
is made up of many lines and cables able to provide a
multitude of options and alternatives for at least limited
power supply for the many flooding scenarios that
exist.
Specific flooding mitigation measures are as follows:
control centre standby shift standby power plant
from below ground level to a position above ground
level to provide the control centre with a more
secure standby power supply;
Hornby district substation prepare a plan to
transfer the load of this substation of nearby substa-
tions;
Brighton district substation identify the essen-
tial services that could be supplied from alternative
nearby substations.
Ensure pumps and hoses are on hand if needed; and
Establish a supply of sand bags.
To achieve this the following is required:
informed and competent operational staff;
reliable UHF radio systems for communicating
with operational staff;
competent emergency contractors to provide resto-
ration of services as soon as possible; and
reliable UHF radio and/or cell phone network for
communicating with contractors.
Southpowers exposure to wind hazard
General
Wind damage is considered high risk to the overhead
line network. The most devastating winds in Canter-
bury have been from the north west. History has shown
lines crossing the north west wind suffer more damage
that others.
Events such as the big blow in 1975 caused major
damage in the rural area, however the city urban area
was less affected.
Falling trees and flying debris are responsible for
causing damage to the overhead distribution system.
Repairs cannot usually be made until the wind subsides
to a safe level.
66 kV lines
It is expected that these lines will withstand damage
from high winds, however falling trees and flying
debris may cause conductor damage as they have in the
past. Hardware on towers can fail or bend, but this does
not usually disrupt the power supply and repairs can be
carried out when the wind subsides.
33 kV and 11 kV lines
These lines are the most exposed to wind damage. Pole
lines are designed to withstand wind speeds based on
NZS4203:1984. Poles are selected on their mechani-
cal load rating to meet Canterbury conditions.
Lines are also exposed to falling trees and flying debris,
however it is expected most damage would be limited
to conductor damage since a conscious effort has been
made to reduce line spans to limit pole damage as a
mitigation measure learnt from the 1975 wind storm.
Reducing the span size to 55 m to 60 m has proved
beneficial in limiting damage as was proven in the high
winds during April 1994 where some gusts were re-
ported to 130km/h.
Heavy emphasis has been placed on having trees
maintained near overhead lines in the last few years
with the result that the number of power cuts have been
reduced.
400 V lines
The low voltage network is usually less affected by
wind other than trees toppling or branches breaking off
bringing down lines. The average pole span in the
urban area is 40m. These poles usually have conduc-
tors attached in a number of directions making failure
less likely.
Lines that fail are easily repaired, once the wind has
reduced to a level that worker safety is not compro-
mised.
Pole mounted substations
These substations are at risk of failing in high winds
because of the transformers large surface area to wind
and the relatively high centre of gravity of this struc-
ture. The rural area distribution transformers are
predominantly mounted on single pole structures and
two pole substation structures still exist in some of the
older areas of Christchurch. The majority of the city
area now has transformers mounted on the ground and
these are not expected to be affected by strong winds.
Substation buildings and structures
The greatest risk to substation buildings and structures
is caused by flying debris. Substation structures are
more at risk than their adjacent buildings and any
damage could have a significant impact. Much of this
equipment is older with the availability of spares
limited.
Mitigation measures
instigate emergency storm contingency plan;
an active campaign to encourage tree owners to
keep trees clear of lines;
hold some replacement switchgear as an emer-
gency spares;
hold emergency lines spares; and
temporary concrete blocks.
reliable UHF Radio systems for communicating
Southpowers exposure to snow hazard
General
In general the distribution network is not exposed to
any long term risk because of a severe snow storm.
It is expected that any snow fall will be heavier on the
Port Hills than on the plains and, as such, those lines
located on the hills will be most exposed, with the
effect that access for repair will almost be impossible
during the storm and immediately after.
The August 1992 snow storm tested the network with
heavy snow loading and damp ground conditions. A
small number of poles failed, however the major dam-
age was due to poles moving with the extra weight
causing lines to hang dangerously low or even break in
some cases.
66 kV tower lines
The Halswell to Heathcote line and the Heathcote to
Barnett Park lines are most exposed because of their
location predominantly on the Port Hills.
These lines are generally very robust and constructed
on steel towers. In severe snow conditions ice build up
on the conductors causes them to sag and sometimes
break.
Trans Powers supply to their Bromley Substation is
located alongside the Southpower Halswell to Heathcote
line for much of its length. It is probable that both lines
will be affected by these conditions as they were in
1992, the result of which is loss of power to much of the
eastern side of the city for some hours.
Snow and ice falling off conductors can cause me-
chanical failure of line hardware.
33 kV lines
These lines are exposed to damage from snow and
movement because of the damp ground conditions.
Past experience has shown precast concrete poles to be
more at risk than wooden poles because of shock
loading on the lines caused by falling trees and snow
and ice falling from conductors. These lines are
located on the outskirts of the city and have alternative
routes available to supply various district substations
as the need arises.
11 kV lines
The most exposed 11 kV lines are located on the Port
Hills and some loss of power can be expected in this
area. Repair work will be hampered by access to the
site due to heavy snow fall.
The 11 kV line to Lyttelton is expected to be affected
by heavy snow fall but was unaffected by the 1992
storm because the snow depth was minimal on the
Lyttelton side of the Port Hills.
Important communication sites on the Port Hills ap-
pear to be backed up by standby power plants.
Low voltage lines
These lines are exposed, however the low voltage
network is very robust and major problems tend to be
limited to poles moving causing lines to hang low,
barge boards pulling off houses and leaning poles.
Generally loss of power on this part of the network
would be minimal.
The LV network relies on Telecom poles on the alter-
native side of the road for its road crossings. These
poles are generally not as robust as those in the electric-
ity network and some failures can be expected. This
would result in loss of power supply at the local level
only.
To aid the flow of traffic initially it may be necessary
to cut road crossing supplies free of the network. Later
repair is relatively simple.
Substation buildings and switchyards
Substation buildings and switchyards are expected to
be relatively unaffected by a heavy snow fall.
Mitigation measures
It is expected that some loss of supply will occur in the
city due to heavy snow loading on overhead lines.
As much of the city gets its supply via the underground
cable, network only parts of the city should be affected
by heavy snow fall.
During snow fall only limited repairs will be achieved,
however once it has subsided it is expected repairs will
be made relatively quickly subject to site access avail-
ability.
Specific mitigation measures are as follows:
instigate emergency storm contingency plan;
prepare plans to shift load from Bromley Trans
Power supply to the Islington Southpower supply
via the Southpower 66 kV network;
prepare plans to provide a limited supply to the
eastern part of the city via the 11 kV network should
the Heathcote/Halswell 66 kV line fail;
identify essential services that should have priority
within the city;
ensure emergency levels of poles, line hardware
and replacement conductor are available; and
establish an emergency contact with appropriate
helicopter companies.
Southpowers exposure to slope hazard
General
The risk of slope hazard affecting distribution towers
on the Port Hills is considered relatively low. Access
in wet weather can be difficult to some locations. The
Heathcote-Halswell section of this line is normally run
as a backup supply thus reducing the importance of this
section of line.
The Heathcote-Lyttelton distribution line is consid-
ered vulnerable to slope hazard. Should a slip take out
a pole structure in this line a power supply to Lyttelton
would be lost.
Islington-Bromley 66 kV line
The most vulnerable section at risk to slope hazard is
the Halswell-Heathcote portion. This section has 32
towers in total. Virtually all the towers have a low to
medium exposure to slope stability. One tower with a
high rating adjacent to Cashmere Road is a new tower
installed for the Westmorland deviation in 1991. This
has concrete belled foundations on each leg 4 m deep
with a 1.2 m top diameter to 1.8 m bottom diameter.
Blasting was not necessary for this foundation, how-
ever considerable effort was required to obtain the
depth of 4 m. This work was carried out before any
disturbance to the subsoil.
Heathcote to Barnett Park 66 kV and 11 kV
lines
This line also has one tower with high exposure to slope
stability. The other 18 towers all have low to medium
exposure to slope stability.
Tower 16 is located on rock adjacent to a creek. The
foundations for this tower are of the grillage type. The
grillage is 6x4' and the four holes were blasted and dug
out to suit the grills. The lower two foundation holes
have been keyed into the rock.
Lyttelton to Heathcote 11 kV line
This line consists of 16 two-pole structures installed 2
m apart bolted together with two horizontal crossarms.
Four structures on this line have high exposure to slope
stability. This line is to have maintenance performed
on it in the next few years. Position of structures will
be a necessary consideration at this time.
Replacement of the in-line structures will require spe-
cialist advice to achieve the best location. This pole
line has been in this position for 40 years and appears
to have escaped any major slips.
Mitigation measures
The Halswell to Heathcote line is operated in the
unloaded mode (i.e. open) and can be used to provide
a limited power supply to the eastern side of the city
should the Trans Power tower lines fail. This line has
a lower importance because it is an alternative supply.
Tower 6 is of concern. It is one of the most recently
constructed towers with a lot of effort being placed on
foundation construction. As a mitigation measure 15
m hardwood poles are held as an emergency spare to
replace a tower should one fail.
The Heathcote to Barnett Park tower line has a high
level of importance and tower 16 has been identified as
the most vulnerable.
Further checks of this foundation have revealed that it
is constructed on rock. As a mitigation measure 15 m
hardwood poles are held as an emergency spare and as
above should a tower fail these poles would be used as
a substitute.
The Lyttelton to Heathcote 11 kV line is to have pole
maintenance and replacement performed on it within
the next few years. As a mitigation measure slope
hazard will be a consideration at the design stage of this
project.
A further problem on the hills has been identified as
access to the location of individual towers or poles. As
a mitigation measure a bulldozer is on standby as a
contingency measure.
emergency spares, 15 m poles;
establish an emergency contact;
heavy lift helicopter, bulldozer or large backhoe,
4x4 vehicles; and
temporary concrete blocks/stays.
5.6 Broadcasting System
Introduction
Sound Radio Broadcasting facilities in Christchurch
are operated by several private broadcasting organisa-
tions, along with two publicly owned networks run by
Radio New Zealand. There are local stations originat-
ing programmes from studios in Christchurch city, and
network stations relaying programmes from elsewhere.
Radio transmitter sites are located on the fringes of the
Christchurch metropolitan area as dictated by techni-
cal requirements. Most of the FM sound radio transmit-
ter stations are co-sited at the Sugarloaf television
transmitter site, located on the Port Hills.
Television Broadcasting facilities in Christchurch are
operated by Television New Zealand ( a State-Owned-
Enterprise ) and by several private broadcasting or-
ganisations. There are network stations relaying pro-
grammes from Auckland, and local stations originat-
ing programmes from studios in Christchurch city.
Television transmitter sites are located on the Port
Hills, the major site is Sugarloaf, to the south of the
Christchurch metropolitan area, with some smaller
translator sites serving topographically isolated areas.
Sound Radio Broadcasting
Radio New Zealand
Radio New Zealand operates three sound radio broad-
cast stations in Christchurch, all with transmitters
remote from the studios. These are:
675 kHz - 3YA, 10 kW transmitter at Gebbies Pass,
broadcasting the National Radio programme from
studios in Wellington, via the studios in Kent
House, Christchurch. This is a network programme.
963 kHz - 3YC, 10 kW transmitter at Gebbies Pass,
broadcasting the AM Network programme from
studios in Wellington, via the studios in Kent
House, Christchurch. This is a network programme.
89.7 MHz - 3CCP, 50 kW transmitter at Sugarloaf,
broadcasting the Concert FM programme from
studios in Wellington. Programme is carried by
B.C.L. circuits.
Private Radio
The majority of sound radio broadcast stations in
Christchurch are privately owned. Almost all have
their transmitters remote from the studios. These are:
612 kHz - 3XG, 2 kW transmitter in Winters Road,
Mairehau, broadcasting the Radio Rhema pro-
gramme from studios in Upper Queen Street, Auck-
land. This is a network programme. Some local
programming is included during the day from stu-
dios in Birmingham Drive, Christchurch.
1098 kHz - 3ZB, 5 kW transmitter at Ouruhia,
broadcasting the Christchurch Newstalk ZB pro-
gramme from studios in Kent House, Christchurch.
1260 kHz - 3XA, 2.5 kW transmitter in Hills Road,
Mairehau, broadcasting the Classic Rock, C93
programme from studios in Kilmore Street, Christ-
church. This is an off-air re-broadcast of the C93-
FM transmission.
1413 kHz - 3XP, 100 W transmitter at the Ferrymead
Historic Park, Bridle Path Road, Christchurch.
(Studio and transmitter co-located.)
90.5 MHz, 1.5 kW transmitter at Sugarloaf, broad-
casting the 90.5 Tahu FM programme from stu-
dios at the Nga Hau E Wha National Marae in Pages
Road, Christchurch. This is part of the Iwi network.
91.3 MHz - 3ZM, 50 kW transmitter at Sugarloaf,
broadcasting the 91ZM programme from studios
in Kent House, Christchurch.
92.1 MHz, 25 kW transmitter at Sugarloaf, broad-
casting the 92 More FM programme from studios
in Victoria Street, Christchurch.
casting the Classic Rock, C93 programme from
studios in Kilmore Street, Christchurch.
casting the Radio Pacific, (T.A.B.) programme
from studios in Ponsonby, Auckland. This is a
network programme. Some local programming is
included during the day from studios in Manchester
Street, Christchurch.
94.5 MHz, 40 kW transmitter at Ouruhia, broad-
casting the i 94.5 Easy Listening programme
from studios in Kilmore Street, Christchurch.
96.1 MHz, 600 W transmitter at Huntsbury Hill,
broadcasting Polytech Broadcasting Students pro-
grammes from studios in Madras Street, Christ-
church. Transmission times are irregular to suit
course timetables.
96.9 MHz, 3.5 kW transmitter at Sugarloaf, broad-
casting the (Access Radio) Plains FM programme
from studios in Madras Street, Christchurch.
97.7 MHz, 40 kW transmitter at Ouruhia, broad-
casting the Classic Hits programme from studios
in Kent House, Christchurch.
98.3 MHz, 100 W transmitter at Ilam Road, broad-
casting the (Students Association Radio) 98
R.D.U. programme from studios in Ilam, Christ-
church. (Studio and transmitter co-located.)
99.3 MHz, 5 kW transmitter at Winters Road,
broadcasting the Life FM programme from stu-
dios in Birmingham Drive, Christchurch.
Sound Radio Broadcasting Backup
Facilities
Power Supplies all Radio New Zealand, and all
Radio Network, and most of the other studios and
transmitters are equipped with standby diesel genera-
tors.
Programme Links some stations use Telecom
programme circuits, others use UHF radio, only a few
have standby circuits.
Transmitters the locations, structures, and equip-
ment are all solidly constructed with good foundations,
and are considered to be capable of withstanding
moderate earthquakes and other hazards without inter-
ruption to service.
Antennas at all AM sites, there is no alternative to
the designated antenna system. At Sugarloaf, and at
Ouruhia, the FM antenna systems are constructed in
two identical units, so that if one fails, the other can
carry programmes at reduced efficiency.
Television Broadcasting
Television New Zealand
Television New Zealand operates two television broad-
cast stations in Christchurch, transmitters are fed from
studios in Auckland. These are:
TV-1, Channel 3, 50 kW transmitter at Sugarloaf,
broadcasting the TV One programme from stu-
dios in Auckland. This is a network programme.
broadcasting the TV 2 programme from studios
in Auckland. This is a network programme.
Private Television
In addition to the Television New Zealand stations,
there are eight private television broadcast stations in
Christchurch, with transmitters at Sugarloaf (or at
Marleys Hill). These are:
CTV, Channel 48, 30 kW transmitter at Sugarloaf,
broadcasting the Horizon TV programme from
studios in Christchurch.
broadcasting the TV 3 programme from studios
in Auckland. This is a network programme.
Sky TV, Channel 30, 160 kW transmitter at
Sugarloaf, broadcasting the Sky Movies TV pro-
gramme from studios in Auckland. This is a
network programme.
Sugarloaf, broadcasting the Sky Sport TV pro-
network programme.
Sugarloaf, broadcasting the Sky News TV pro-
network programme.
Sugarloaf, broadcasting the Sky Four TV pro-
network programme.
Sugarloaf, broadcasting the Sky Five/Action TV
programme from studios in Auckland. This is a
network programme.
Cry TV, Channel 56, 0.9 kW transmitter at Marleys
Hill, broadcasting the Cry TV programme from
studios at Marleys Hill. (Studio and transmitter
together.)
Television Broadcasting Backup
Facilities
Power Supplies All Television New Zealand stu-
dios and transmitters, and most private studios and
tors.
Programme Links Stations use Telecom and/or
B.C.L. protected programme circuits.
Transmitters The locations, structures, and equip-
ment are all solidly constructed with good foundations,
and are considered to be capable of withstanding
moderate earthquakes and other hazards without inter-
ruption to service.
Antennas At Sugarloaf, the TV antenna systems are
constructed in two identical units, so that if one fails,
the other can carry programmes at reduced efficiency.
Broadcasting System Vulnerability
Moderate Earthquake
It is expected that with an earthquake of this type and
magnitude, the only damage sustained by (sound radio
and television) broadcasting stations would be:
the interruption of power supplies to studios;
the interruption of power supplies to transmitters;
and
the interruption of programme circuits between
studios and transmitters.
All stations would be unaffected, for a limited time, by
the loss of power supplies as the studios and all the
tors.
Sound Radio Broadcasting Stations, NewstalkZB (3ZB)
and National Radio (3YA) both have a standby (UHF)
programme circuit, in addition to the normal Telecom
programme circuit. Television Broadcasting Stations
have access to portable linking equipment, for use if the
main programme bearers are damaged.
The Big One Earthquake
With an earthquake of this type, it is expected that
broadcasting stations will sustain the following dam-
age:
structural damage to studios;
damage to studio equipment;
loss of power supplies to the studios;
loss of power supplies to the transmitters;
interruption of programme circuits between stu-
dios and transmitters;
interruption of programme circuits between studio
centres;
structural damage to transmission buildings;
damage to transmission equipment;
damage to antenna systems; and
damage to transposer/translator systems.
Tsunami And Flooding
Television House in a flooding event, it is expected
that the only broadcasting building that has a basement
and likely to be affected would be Television House
(TVNZ).
Ouruhia transmission site it is estimated that The
Radio Network transmission site at Ouruhia would
have water lapping at the base insulator during a worst-
case Styx River flooding event. Newstalk ZB would
still be on the air at that level of water.
Many transmission sites could be affected by the loss
of Telecom programme circuits.
The Southshore Translator (and Transposer) site could
suffer substantial damage from a tsunami. This site
serves Redcliffs and Sumner with:
TV One Ch 5 and Ch 50
TV2 Ch 1
Concert FM 99.9 MHz
More FM 95.3 MHz
Windstorm
Sugarloaf The antenna tower is designed to with-
stand a 60m/s windspeed at its top.
Ouruhia It is guestimated that the antenna mast
will withstand a 70 m/s windspeed. This should be
confirmed by an engineering review of the entire
structure.
Landslide And Slope Instability
Sugarloaf The antenna tower and the equipment
building are solidly constructed with good founda-
tions, the site is considered not to be susceptible to any
landslide.
Gebbies Pass The antenna mast and the equipment
building are solidly constructed with good founda-
tions, the site is considered not to be susceptible to any
landslide.
All of the other Christchurch broadcasting buildings
and facilities are located away from the hills, except for
some minor translator and transposer installations.
Broadcasting System Mitigation
Measures
The above investigations show a consistently high
impact, particularly in the periods during and immedi-
ately following most types of disaster. This points to
the need for critical examinations of the robustness of
all sections of the broadcasting services vital to recov-
ery.
Specific mitigation measures identified during the
course of the project include:
A review of the overall robustness of each network
and the establishment of a plan to manage with a
reduced system is required, (i.e. set up a disaster
response plan). This review should be ongoing and
repeated on an annual basis.
Detailed reviews of equipment, studios, buildings,
and masts and towers should be undertaken to
identify specific weak links, including an assess-
ment of the cost-benefit of the resulting mitigation
measures. Normal office equipment and furniture
should not be overlooked. Particular attention to
cable entry/exit points is required. These reviews
should be repeated on an annual basis.
Review the design standards for new and existing
facilities.
A review of Kent House in its role as a common
distribution point should be carried out. Plan to
increase diversity. Although floodwaters from the
Avon River and excess stormwater is not expected
to rise above floor level, a review of the location of
PABX and Telecom equipment could be under-
taken.
Sugarloaf television transmitter Slimline microwave tower
A review of the CTV building in its role as a
common distribution point for CTV, TVNZ, and
the Sky TV services should be carried out. Plan to
increase diversity. A review of the heavy duty
pumping requirements or the relocation of PABX
and other equipment within TV House should be
carried out.
Investigate and/or improve adequacy, reliability
and robustness of standby generating plant. Atten-
tion to fuel supply lines is required. Also, ensure
that fuel supplies are adequate until access is re-
stored.
Initiate and continue staff training in dealing with
the after-effects of a disaster. This training must be
ongoing.
A review of the Ouruhia and Gebbies Pass trans-
mission sites should be carried out. Acquire re-
sources and capabilities to reduce the time to re-
instate antennas and transmission equipment.
It is estimated that The Radio Network transmis-
sion site at Ouruhia would still be on the air during
a worst-case Styx River flooding event, however, a
means of keeping floodwater away from the mast
base insulator should be studied.
An engineering assessment of the Ouruhia antenna
structure to determine the actual failure windspeed
should proceed.
A review in conjunction with BCL of the Sugarloaf
transmission site should be completed. Particular
attention should be paid to the RF feeder routing.
Translator and transposer systems are generally
small installations and do not warrant extensive
mitigation measures.
Telecom exchange
Main Telecom building
Power transformer hold-down (Trans Power)
Transport 147
Chapter 6
Transport
6.1 Introduction the
Christchurch Transport System
Figure 6.1 shows the Christchurch urban area and the
main physical elements of the citys transport system.
This system is made up of:
a road network;
a rail network;
the Port of Lyttelton; and
the International Airport and Wigram Aerodrome.
Other components such as vehicles, fuel, control and
personnel are part of the transport system but their
vulnerability and possible mitigation measures are
beyond this reports scope.
Except for the Port Hills, the urban area is flat, with the
Avon and Heathcote Rivers passing through the city.
The coast forms the eastern edge with the Port Hills on
the southern edge between the city and the Port of
Lyttelton, the Waimakariri River system the northern,
and the Canterbury plains the western.
The rivers are crossed by some forty bridges and the
Port Hills by a road tunnel, a rail tunnel and three road
passes. These crossings, particularly the bridges, have
been identified as the most vulnerable parts of the
transport system which otherwise has many alternative
routes available throughout the dense road network.
Beyond Christchurch, road and rail cross major rivers
and pass through rugged alpine or coastal terrain which
can, in an emergency make maintenance of services
difficult and full reinstatement time consuming.
6.2 Strategic Role of Transport
System in an Emergency
The internal road system of Christchurch serves its
resident and visiting population of about 300,000 peo-
ple and is important to another 50,000 people nearby
and generally to the north. This system is thus the most
important transport lifeline both in the period immedi-
ately following an event and in the reinstatement of
normality. It is described in more detail in Section 6.3.
All emergency services and immediate resources are
located in the urban area mostly close to or in the city
centre. The city centre itself contains the principal
operational and control centres for fire, ambulance,
Police and Civil Defence, the principal hospital, and
for other services such as power, communications and
water.
The external transport linkages are provided by road,
air, sea and rail services. These are needed both by
Christchurch and, because it is the South Islands
largest centre, by much of the island.
Road and rail
Both systems beyond Christchurch are, for much of
their lengths, close together, particularly where they
cross major rivers or topographical features. Whereas
this could allow alternative or transfer facilities it is
also likely that both systems would be disrupted at the
same place. All these long-distance lifelines are long
and thin and thus vulnerable to a break at any point
which renders the whole route unserviceable. Few
alternative road routes are available and they usually
cross the same rivers or physical features as the nor-
mal route.
Road
Roads link to the north principally to the Waimakariri
District, a significant urban area in its own right (and
just on the edge of the Christchurch urban area, but
outside the area considered in this project), and to the
North Island via the Cook Strait Ferries. The northern
part of the West Coast, and Nelson are also served by
the northern road links. Thus, beyond Rangiora the
resources and centres of population are remote from
Christchurch.
The Main South Road connects Christchurch to the
urban areas of Timaru, Dunedin and Invercargill and
their ports, populations and resources, the former a
half-a-days travel, the latter two a full day.
The roads to Akaroa and Greymouth are of lesser
importance.
Rail
The three trunk rail lines connect Christchurch to
Picton, Dunedin and Greymouth, and these, in turn, to
Figure 6.1: Christchurch transport system
P
a
g
e
s
Waimairi Road
R
o
a
d
C
h
r
i
s
t
c
h
u
r
c
h

E
n
g
i
n
e
e
r
i
n
g

L
i
f
e
l
i
n
e
s

S
t
u
d
y

1
9
9
4
T
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t

S
y
s
t
e
m
N
0
1
2
k
ilo
m
e
te
r
s
1
3
L
Y
T
T
E
L
T
O
N
S
U
M
N
E
R
E
S
T
U
A
R
Y
H
e
a
t
h
c
o
t
e

R
i v
e
r
C
a
u
s
e
w
a
y
A
von
R
iver
P
O
R
T
H
I
L
L
S
H
E
A
T
H
C
O
T
E
B
E
L
F
A
S
T
H
A
G
L
E
Y
P
A
R
K
A
I
R
P
O
R
T
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
W
I
G
R
A
M
A
E
R
O
D
R
O
M
E
T
E
M
P
L
E
T
O
N
P
R
E
B
B
L
E
T
O
N
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
M
a
i
n
S
o
u
t
h
R
o
a
d
W
e
s
t
C
o
a
s
t
R
o
a
d
Marshland Road
M
OTORWAY
M
a i n
N
o r t h
R
o a d
W
A
I
M
A
K
A
R
I
R
I
R
I
V
E
R
C
ra
n
fo
rd
S
tre
e
t
I n
n
e
s
R
o
a
d
Y
a
ld
h
u
r
s
t
R
o
a
d
B
l e
n
h
e
i m
R
i c
c
a
r
t o
n
R
o
a
d
R
o
a
d
T
r
a
v
is
R
o
a
d
W
in
te
r
s
R
o
a
d
N
o
r
th
c
o
te
R
o
a
d
M
o
o
r
h
o
u
s
e
A
v
e
B
r
o
u
g
h
a
m
S
tr
e
e
t
B
a
rrin
g
to
n
S
tre
e
t
Colombo St
B
e
a
le
y
A
v
e
D
y
e
rs
Pass
Road
E
v
a
n
s
R
o
a
d
P
a s s
J
o
h
n
s
R
o
a
d
H
a
r
e
w
o
o
d
W
a
ir
a
k
e
i
R
d
R
o
a
d
Fitzgerald Ave
F
e
r
r
y
R
o
a
d
A
v
e
n
u
e
D
y e
r s
L
in
w
o
o
d
W
o
o
d
h
a
m
R
o
a
d
R
o
a
d
P
o
rt
H
ills
B
r
ig
h
to
n
N
e
w
R
o
a
d
M
e
m
o
ria
l
A
v
e
n
u
e
G
r a
h
a
m
s
G
r e
e
r s
P
a
p
a
n
u
i
R
oad
F
e
n
d
a
lto
n
S
h
a
n
d
s
R
o
a
d
S
p
r i n
g
s
R
o a d
H
a
ls
w
e
ll
J
u
n
c
tio
n
R
o
a
d
R
o
a
d
R
a
i
l
P
O
R
T
Transport 149
Lyttelton. They mainly handle freight, with a few
intercity passenger services. There are no suburban
passenger services.
Sea
Lyttelton is close to Christchurch and is an important
lifeline for heavy equipment, food and bulk supplies. It
is within one days sailing of Timaru and Wellington,
and within a few days sailing of all of New Zealands
ports (and some overseas ports). Timaru is also linked
to Christchurch by road and rail within a few hours
travel; other ports such as Nelson, Picton and Dunedin
are more distant and their road and rail connectors
could also be disrupted.
Air
The international airport at Harewood is very close to
the city and is connected to it by a dense and robust
multi-route road network. It has large freight, passen-
ger and military operations capacity for national and
international operations. It is of importance to the
whole South Island if a major event occurs in any of its
urban areas, and possibly important to Wellington.
Wigram aerodrome has had considerable, particularly
military, operational capacity, but its future is still
uncertain. Other airports at Timaru, Dunedin,
Greymouth, Nelson and Queenstown are of limited
capacity and are remote from Christchurch.
Transport interchange
All systems have good interchange facilities with road.
The Port of Lyttelton has sea/road/rail facilities as does
Timaru. The airports are served only by road. Distant
ports and airports are dependent on road or road/rail
links to connect them to Christchurch if sea or air links
are unavailable.
6.3 Description of the
Transport System
The road system
The Christchurch road network can be considered as
comprising three main systems, the city centre streets,
the suburban roads and the external highways. They
operate together as one hierarchical network and
whether or not a road is a State Highway, City Council
or other councils road is immaterial to the transport
needs of the area.
City centre streets
The city centre streets are based on a rectangular grid
with blocks about 250 x 125 metres, surrounded by
four dual carriageways (Deans, Moorhouse, Fitzgerald
and Bealey Avenues), which distribute traffic around
the city centre and between the principal suburban
roads. Madras and Barbadoes Streets act as the main
north-south distributor from Bealey Avenue to
Brougham Street and act in effect as a dual six-lane
road. Brougham Street and its eastward extension to
Lyttelton and westward to Sockburn is the main East-
West industrial distributor with many industrial land
uses along or near it.
In the city commercial centre the roadways are gener-
ally 14 to 16 metres wide within a 20-metre corridor
between the building facades. Most buildings are low
rise (2 to 4 stories), including a considerable number of
vulnerable brick buildings. Outside this, most build-
ings are one or two storey houses and are generally set
well back from the carriageway.
The central city street system provides the right-of-
way for all main utility services, many of which are
carried on the thirteen road bridges which cross the
Avon River. Typically these bridges have a two-metre
headroom above normal water levels, are 20 metres
wide with a similar clear span. The river is generally
less than 1 metre deep and has a hard bottom over its
central city length.
The central street system is controlled by a centralised
traffic signal control system which also serves some
suburban arterials. Whereas disruption to this could
make traffic movement difficult, it is flexible enough
to control most movement, particularly within the
commercial centre, on an emergency or contingency
basis. The system is controlled by computers in the
City Councils Tuam Street building by a series of in-
ground cables.
If these computers go down, individual controllers at
each set of signals will allow them to operate independ-
ently of each other. Power loss to the signals them-
selves would stop them operating there are no
backup power facilities. Associated with this traffic
control system is a series of traffic monitoring cameras,
mounted above key intersections. They are able to
revolve, zoom in/out and could provide very useful
data on the condition of roads following a hazard event.
The monitors are located with the traffic control com-
puters.
Suburban road system
The principal radial routes from the city are connected
to the four avenues and lead out into the suburbs. Like
the city centre, a hierarchy of roads exists with arterial
and distributor roads carrying larger volumes of traffic
between residential suburbs, district centres, schools,
factories and other concentrations. A dense network of
local roads serve needs within these concentrations.
All roads are, however, interconnected giving a very
wide range of alternative route options.
As with the central city roads most of these provide
rights-of-way for a range of services. Buildings are
generally one-storey residences well set back from the
road. There are some district and local shopping
centres where two-storey buildings abut the road. In
Sydenham, many of these buildings are built of brick.
Important bridges occur on the lower Avon and
Heathcote Rivers, the latter providing important links
to Lyttelton. There are several rail and road overbridges
and the Lyttelton Road tunnel on major suburban
roads. Major high tension electricity cables cross
several major roads and overhead services are wide-
spread.
There are three routes across the Port Hills. Evans,
Dyers and Gebbies Passes are linked, at high level, by
the Summit Road and at sea level on the Lyttelton side.
Mount Pleasant Road also links to the Summit Road.
These routes are all hilly and/or winding and only the
Evans Pass Road through Sumner is suitable for regu-
lar use by heavy vehicles, and is so used by vehicles too
large or otherwise undesirable for the road tunnel.
External road links
Beyond the main urban area there are two main corri-
dors and two lesser ones. To the north, Main North
Road and State Highway One link Christchurch to
Rangiora, Kaiapoi and Woodend and further north to
Picton. To the south, Main South Road (State Highway
One) connects Christchurch to Ashburton, Timaru and
the south.
The other main roads are Yaldhurst Road and State
Highway 7 to the West Coast, and State Highway 75
and Halswell Road to Akaroa. These main roads
generally pass through rural areas with few close
buildings.
Their ability to link Christchurch to the outside is
limited by major river crossings and alpine terrain. The
availability of each route may depend on a river cross-
ing or route characteristic some considerable distance
from Christchurch. For example, the Main South Road
crosses the Rakaia River on a 1.8 km long bridge, the
Main North Road traverses the slip-prone Kaikoura
coastal strip and shares the Seddon Bridge with the
railway, the West Coast Road crosses the Alps via
Porters and Arthurs Passes and the Otira Gorge. The
Waimakariri bridges are on the edge of the main
Christchurch area, and separate it from Kaiapoi,
Rangiora and Woodend.
General road network
The network is operated as one hierarchical system
which includes State Highways, City, Banks Penin-
sula, Selwyn and Waimakariri Council roads. The
road system is generally built to a high standard and the
main elements are suitable for heavy vehicles and
heavy volumes of traffic. The central streets typically
carry up to 10,000 vehicles per day with some major
arterials carrying 20,000 to 30,000+ vehicles per day
both in the centre and on the radials and distributors.
Many suburban distributor roads carry over 5,000
vehicles per day, whereas of the rural roads remote
from the city boundary, only Main South Road and
Main North Road carry flows greater than this.
The rural highways (on the outskirts of the city) gener-
ally carry lesser volumes but at higher speeds, and with
a high proportion of heavy vehicles. Russley Road at
its southern end carries over 13,000 vehicles per day,
about twice the volume at its northern end (Johns
Road).
The vehicle fleet is modern with a significant number
of private four-wheel drive cars and recreation vehicles
available. A large coach and bus fleet operates from
the city as do most heavy commercial vehicles. Petrol
service stations are widely dispersed. Most vehicles
are petrol or diesel powered LPG vehicles are
relatively few and many are dual-fuelled. Road repair
and maintenance materials are available close to Christ-
church. Emergency service and contractors yards are
shown on Map 1 page 284 ; these are all served by road.
Rail system description
The Railway system serving Christchurch comprises
three major lines Main North Line, Main South Line
and Midland Line, and the line to Lyttelton.
The Main North Line enters Christchurch from the
north down the east coast, serving the major freight
flows to and from the North Island (via the inter-island
ferries) and the Nelson/Blenheim area and minor inter-
city passenger flows. The Main South Line enters
Christchurch from the south, also along the east coast,
serving the freight flows to and from Timaru, Dunedin
and Invercargill. It also has a minor intercity passenger
flow. The third major line, the Midland Line, services
the South Islands West Coast, both in a freight capac-
ity and as an increasingly important tourist passenger
line. It crosses the alps and links with the Main South
Line at Rolleston.
The Lyttelton line (actually designated as part of the
Main South Line) connects Christchurch City with the
Port of Lyttelton and serves the import/export freight
flows through the Port. A short spur line (of 4.5 km)
Transport 151
running from the Main South Line at Hornby serves as
a feeder line for the industrial area in and around
Hornby. The terminus of all freight traffic can be taken
as Middleton Shunting Yards, and for passengers the
new Christchurch Station, at Addington.
Main North Line
The single track Main North Line runs from Middleton
Marshalling Yard past the new Christchurch passenger
terminal and through the northern suburbs of Riccarton,
Fendalton, Papanui and Belfast.
It then crosses the Waimakariri River, on a steel span
concrete piered bridge, 610 metres long, downstream
of the State Highway 1 Bridge and immediately adja-
cent to the Main North Road Bridge. It passes through
Kaiapoi and, north of Rangiora, crosses the Ashley
River on a 550-metre concrete span bridge with con-
crete piers. In general, the topography of the land over
which the line runs is flat (Waimakariri flood plain or
Marshlands peat marsh) the only significant embank-
ment being both approaches to the Waimakariri River
Bridge.
Main South Line
This line leaves Middleton Marshalling Yard and runs
south through the suburbs of Sockburn, Hornby, Is-
lington and Templeton running underneath two road
overbridges and, in general, runs relatively parallel
with State Highway 1 from Templeton south. It is
double track to Islington and single from there south. It
crosses the Selwyn River on a steel span concrete pier
structure, 300 metres long. The line continues parallel
to State Highway 1 and, 60 km south of Christchurch,
crosses the Rakaia River, the bridge being a steel span/
concrete pier structure, 1750 metres long. The topog-
raphy along this line is flat over the Waimakariri/
Selwyn/ Rakaia River flood plains with no major
earthwork features.
Midland Line
This single track line commences at Rolleston and
travels across the Canterbury Plains, passing through
48 kms of gently rising alluvial plains with no major
earthwork or structural features. It passes through
Darfield, and Springfield before climbing into the
Southern Alps.
From Springfield to Arthurs Pass there are sixteen
tunnels with a total length of 4.2 km, four high viaducts
(steel lattice spans on steel towers) and three standard
bridges in excess of 100 metres length. This section of
line generally follows the course of the Waimakariri
River some height above it and in rock or earth cuttings
for much of the distance until it reaches the confluence
of the Bealey River. It then runs up the Bealey Valley
to Arthurs Pass, and, via the 5.5 km long Otira Tunnel,
to the West Coast.
Lyttelton Line
The section of line between Christchurch and Lyttelton
commences at Middleton. It runs through the suburbs
of Addington, Linwood, Woolston and Heathcote,
before entering the single track 2.6 km long Rail
Tunnel, to the Lyttelton Freight Yard and Port facili-
ties. The length of this line is 14 km and is double track
between Middleton and Heathcote.
The only other major structural features of this line are
the twin bridges spanning the Heathcote River (steel
spans on timber piers with a length of 45 metres), the
Waltham Road overbridge and the tunnel approach
embankment and associated structures (including the
Martindale Road brick arch underbridge) on the Christ-
church approach. The tunnel itself was constructed in
the mid-1860s and has brick, granite block or natural
rock lining throughout its length. The portal at the
Lyttelton end is spanned by a complex two-level road
bridge. Two 200 mm cast iron water mains, and
Telecom New Zealand cables run through the tunnel.
Railway stations and terminals
The only use current use of the original Moorhouse
Avenue railway station by Tranz Rail Limited is to
house train control operations, the railway telephone
exchange, and the signalling relay room (for all signals
between Wilsons Road and Montreal Street). Train
control monitors the running of all trains in the South
Island north of Oamaru, while the telephone exchange
covers the Christchurch area, but is linked to all other
main centres through the Tranz Rail Limited system.
In the event of a mains power failure these facilities are
powered by a 3.3 kV stand-by diesel generator, located
alongside the track just east of Colombo Street.
All passenger services are now handled at the passen-
ger terminal at Addington, which is located on the
south-east side of the Blenheim Road overbridge on
the old railway workshop site. This is a new facility
constructed in 1993.
The main freight handling terminal is in Waltham
Yard, between Waltham Road and Wilsons Road. This
area also houses the main wagon repair facility for the
Christchurch region. On the east side of Wilsons Road
is the locomotive stabling, fuelling and servicing depot
at Linwood, which is in the process of being relocated
to the Middleton Marshalling Yard.
The Middleton Marshalling Yard is the main train
make-up and break-up facility for the Christchurch
Area and is located between Matipo Street and Annex
Road on the north side of the Main Line.
Port of Lyttelton description
The Port of Lyttelton has a major role servicing South
Island imports and exports. It is also important for the
movement of coastal cargo and shipping, and in 1993
handled about 3.5 million tonnes of cargo. The port can
accommodate ships up to 12.3 metres draught.
There are four important areas:
the navigation channel;
Cashin Quay;
the inner harbour; and
the Naval Point reclamation.
These and other features of the port are shown in Figure
6.2.
Navigation channel
The navigation channel is approximately 7 km in
length and 180 metres wide excluding the batter slopes.
The bottom is soft and requires regular maintenance
dredging.
Cashin Quay
The Cashin Quay wharves provide 855 metres berthage
length and are protected by a 180 metre long breakwa-
ter. The breastwork is supported by timber, steel and
prestressed concrete piles. The storage area behind the
breastwork has been reclaimed using quarried rock and
is faced with a concrete retaining wall.
The area includes a container terminal operating with
two container cranes, a bulk export shiploader for coal
and other products and facilities for general cargo.
Road and rail transfer is provided in the area.
Inner harbour
The area provides several breastwork and jetty berths
in a more sheltered environment. A bulk liquids berth
is available for ships carrying petroleum products and
adjacent to this is a dry dock. The bases of the jetties
are founded on bedrock.
Naval Point reclamation
Several oil tanks and pipelines are sited on the land
adjacent to recreational facilities. The land was formed
from low-strength pumped dredgings from the Lyttel-
ton Harbour seabed.
Communications
The communication centre for the port is the Signal
Tower which is at the top level of the Lyttelton Con-
tainer Terminal Administration Building, adjacent to
the Container Terminal entrance off Gladstone Quay.
A backup communication centre is available in the
Lyttelton Port Company Administration Building situ-
ated on the corner of Norwich Quay and Dublin Street.
Container cranes
The port has two container cranes, a Paceco (maximum
lift 46 tonne) and a Liebherr (maximum lift 70 tonne).
Both are designed for combined wind and earthquake
loading. Both cranes have storm pins which stop them
moving along the wharf in strong winds. They are at
their least stable with the boom in the parked up
position.
The Liebherr crane also has storm tie downs on the
seaward side to prevent the possibility of its bogies
lifting under the combined effects of wind and earth-
quake. The stability of the Paceco crane is such that
storm tie down is not required. In the event of both
container cranes becoming inoperable, there are some
large mobile cranes that could unload cellular con-
tainer ships. Alternatively ships carrying their own
container cranes could be used.
Coastal cargo to Lyttelton is shipped in roll on/roll off
vessels (e.g. Pacifica) allowing trucks to be loaded
with supplies and equipment which can simply be
driven to where they are needed.
Transport links
Several jetties and breastworks have capacity for heavy
equipment and cargoes. Heavy equipment can be
transported by quarter-ramp, stern ramp or lift-on lift-
off ships, or as deck cargo on container ships. There is
a heavy-duty ramp at Gladstone Pier which is still
operable, but most roll on/roll off ships in service have
stern or quarter ramps.
No 7 Jetty is an important link for Pacifica ships which
carry their own stern ramps for loading/unloading
cargo. Alternatively Pacifica ships can use No. 4 Jetty.
No. 2 Jetty is another important inner harbour cargo
handling berth. Inner harbour heavy duty pads are
available at No. 7 Jetty, No.1 Breastwork and Gladstone
Pier. The Cashin Quay berths are also heavy duty. The
Oil Wharf is located in the inner harbour.
Christchurch International Airport
description
Christchurch International Airport is at Harewood, 11
km north-west of the city centre. The airport is the
Transport 153
O
i
l

W
h
a
r
f
P
L
y
t
t
e
l
t
o
n

H
a
r
b
o
u
r
F
u
e
l

S
t
o
r
a
g
e
A
r
e
a
R
e
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
R
e
s
e
r
v
e
P
r
o
p
o
s
e
d
M
a
g
a
z
i
n
e

B
a
y
M
a
r
i
n
a
C
o
a
s
t
g
u
a
r
d
C
a
t
t
l
e

J
e
t
t
y
D
r
y

D
o
c
k
Y
a
c
h
t
M
o
o
r
i
n
g
s
N
o
1
J
e
t t y
N
o
6
J
e
t t y
N
o
5
J
e
t
t
y
N
o
4
J
e
t
t
y
N
o
3
J
e
t
t
yN
o
2
J
e
t
t
y
T
u
g
J
e
t
t
y
Z
B
e
r
t
h
G
l
a
d
s
t
o
n
e
P
i
e
r
T
e

A
w
a
p
a
r
a
h
i

B
a
y
7
0

t
o
n
n
e
o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
e
r
c
r
a
n
e
4
6

t
o
n
n
e

p
a
c
e
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
e
r
c
r
a
n
e
B
u
l
k
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
s
s
h
i
p

l
o
a
d
e
r
L
y
t
t
e
l
t
o
n
C
o
n
t
a
i
n
e
r

T
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
C
Q
4
C
Q
3
C
Q
2
C
Q
1
C
a
s
h
i
n
Q
u
a
y
R
o
a
d

T
u
n
n
e
l
R
a
i
l

T
u
n
n
e
l
T
o

C
h
r
i
s
t
c
h
u
r
c
h
1
2

k
m
C
h
a
r
l
o
t
t
e
J
a
n
e
Q
u
a
y
G
e
o
r
g
e
S
e
y
m
o
u
r
C
y
r
u
s
W
i
l
l
ia
m
s
Q
u
a
y
G
o
d
l e
y
Q
u
a
y S
i
m
e
o
n
Q
u
a
y
N
o
r
w
i
c
h
L
o
n
d
o
n
O
x
f o
r d
S
t r e
e
t
C
a
s
h
i
n
Q
u
a
y
S
u
m
n
e
r
R
o
a
d
I
N
N
E
R
H
A
R
B
O
U
R
V
e
h
i
c
l
e

W
o
r
k
s
h
o
p
L
y
t
t
e
l
t
o
n

P
o
r
t
C
o
m
p
a
n
y

B
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
F
i
r
e

S
t
a
t
i
o
n
M
e
d
i
c
a
l

C
e
n
t
r
e
P
o
l
i
c
e

S
t
a
t
i
o
n
G
r
a
i
n
S
i
l
o
s
B
u
l
k

M
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
s
S
t
o
c
k
p
i
l
e

A
r
e
a
(
c
o
a
l
)
P
a
r
k
T
c
e
C
r
e
s
s
y
T
c
e
B
r
i t t a
n
T
c
e
D
u
b
l i n
S
t r e
e
t
S
i
g
n
a
l

T
o
w
e
r
N
a
v
a
l
P
o
i
n
t
G
l
a
d
s
t
o
n
e
Quay
S
c
a
l
e

i
n

M
e
t
r
e
s
5
0
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
Figure 6.2: Port of Lyttelton
South Islands only international airport and is a major
element of the domestic main trunk system. It is also
the air servicing base for aircraft operations to the Ross
Sea area of Antarctica. There are about 100,000
aircraft movements each year and 3.2 million passen-
gers. A plan of the airport is shown in Figure 6.3.
Runways
The main 02-20 runway is 3,287 m long and 45 m wide
and is suitable for all aircraft currently flying. The
subsidiary or nor-west 11-29 runway is 1,741 m long
and 45 m wide. It is not suitable for B747 or C5A
aircraft but will accommodate all other aircraft regu-
larly visiting Christchurch. Both runways have paral-
lel taxiways which could be used as runways in emer-
gency situations.
The runways and associated taxiways consist of pave-
ments of flexible type construction, i.e. an asphalt
surface over a compacted gravel base. In general they
consist of 850 mm of compacted gravel with a 50 mm
asphalt surface course. Pre-1960 runway construction
records are incomplete and construction depths are not
known accurately for the oldest portion of the runway.
A regular maintenance programme is in place to pro-
tect the sub-grade from water intrusion.
The airport is built on gravels laid down by the
Waimakariri River during the extended erosion proc-
ess of the east side of the main divide and lies across
several old flood channels which originate in the coun-
try area on the south bank of that river some 20 km west
of the airport.
Navigational aids
The main 02-20 runway is equipped with an instrument
landing system, the norwest 11-29 runway is a non-
instrument strip.
Descent guidance is provided by visual approach slope
indicator systems on both runways. The runways are
delineated by edge lights and the taxiways by centreline
lights. A stand-by power system owned and operated
by Airways Corporation is available for all navigation
lighting systems in the aircraft operational areas.
The radio navigation aids at the airport include an
instrument landing system, a very high frequency
omni-directional radio range and distance measuring
device, several non-directional beacons, and a primary
surveillance radar system. Standby power is available
for all on-airport navigation facilities. Where stand-by
power is not available, i.e. in some remote locations,
limited service is available by way of battery back-up
power.
Subsidiary areas
To the west of the main runway and lying parallel to it
is a grass strip used by light aircraft. It is 525 m long and
100 m wide. There are a series of apron areas lying to
the east of the main runway and equipped with in-
ground piped refuelling systems for jet aircraft. The
fuel is pumped via welded steel pipes from a fuel farm
situated on the airport at Wairakei Road.
The domestic and international aprons are used by all
commercial aircraft up to and including B747s and are
clustered around the terminal buildings. The Antarctic
apron is used by a variety of military type aircraft up to
and including Galaxy aircraft engaged in Antarctic
support. Part of this apron is used for overnight freight
operations. To the south and north of the main terminal
area there are two smaller apron areas used for domes-
tic and international air freight operations.
Buildings
The terminal building consists of a basement and three
upper floors with a control tower equivalent to a height
of five floors. The building is equipped with a stand-by
power generation system.
The principal aircraft maintenance buildings adjoin the
main terminal buildings, the Antarctic apron and near
the northern end of Orchard Road. The Rescue Fire
Service is situated in a purpose-built building with a
radio equipped watchroom on an upper level. This
watchroom could be used in emergency situations for
on-airport control tower functions.
Utility services
The airport is fully serviced with underground utilities
as follows:
Water supply is from seven wells fitted with sub-
mersible pumps feeding into a ring main system. A
stand-by generator and pump system has been
installed to maintain essential services. The ring
main consists in general of 250 mm diameter asbes-
tos cement pipes.
Electricity supply is provided by way of 11 kV and
33 kV underground cables from Grays-Avonhead
Roads and 11 kV from Wairakei Road. Some
overhead supply is fed on to the airport from two
positions on Russley Road.
The airport sewerage system is owned by the Air-
port Company and is connected to the city system
at the corner of Wairakei and Stanleys Roads. It
consists of a series of concrete mains ranging from
300 mm to 375 mm in diameter and was laid in 1964
to Christchurch Drainage Board specifications.
Transport 155
P
O
U
N
D
R
O
A
D
M
A
I
N
R
U
N
W
A
Y
02
2 0
A
i
r
p
o
r
t

F
i
r
e
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
G
R
A
Y
S
R
O
A
D
AVONHEAD
R
O
A
D
P
O
U
N
D
R
O
A
D
J
E
S
S
O
N
S
R
O
A
D
N
R U N W A YS U B S I D I A R Y
2
9
1
1
A
i
r

N
Z
M
t
c
.
A
n
s
e
t
t
M
t
c
.
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
T
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
D
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
T
e
r
m
i
n
a
l
M
t
.

C
o
o
k
M
t
c
.
A
n
t
a
r
c
t
i
c

A
p
r
o
n
F
u
e
l
F
a
r
m
C
I
A
L
M
t
c
.
A
i
r

N
Z
M
t
c
.
5
0
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
0
3
0
0
4
0
0
M
e
t
r
e
s
R
U
S
S
L
E
Y
R
O
A
D
O
R
C
H
A
R
D

R
D
W
A
IR
A
K
E
I R
D
M E M O R I A L A V E N U E
T
o
C
i
t
y
Figure 6.3: Christchurch International Airport
Note: This plan does not show the terminal extensions under construction in 1997
There is an extensive network of underground
cables servicing the telecommunication needs of
the airport community. This network is connected
by fibre-optic cable to the Memorial Avenue ex-
change and a similar linkage exists between the
airport and Airways Corporation Control Centre in
the technology park.
Three oil companies supply fuel and lubricants to
aircraft at Christchurch International Airport. They
operate from separate depots off Wairakei Road
and Ivan Crescent. Total stocks of approximately
4.2 million litres of fuel is held at the airport. Shell
Oil has a pipeline and in-ground hydrant system
servicing the international and domestic passenger
aprons, and Mobil Oil has a similar one that serv-
ices the Antarctic apron. BP Oil uses the Shell
system to service the international apron as re-
quired. All companies use tanker trucks on the
apron where necessary. The fuel depot is resupplied
by fleets of tanker trucks that haul fuel from Lyttel-
ton and/or Woolston via Port Hills Road, Brougham
Express way, Curletts Road, Yaldhurst Road,
Russley Road and Wairakei Road. At normal usage
rates, reserves of fuel range from seven to fourteen
days. The oil companies provide all of their own
plant, equipment and buildings on land leased from
the Airport Company.
Wigram Aerodrome
Wigram aerodrome is a former Royal New Zealand Air
Force facility approximately 8 km west-southwest of
Christchurch city centre, which is now closed.
It is an air base with runways (one sealed), taxiways,
hangars and support areas including training buildings,
workshops and residential accommodation. It has its
own reticulated system for power, water supply and
sewage collection and disposal.
The main hard surfaced runway 03-21 is 1580 m long
and 30 m wide. It is capable of handling relatively
heavy aircraft such as the P3 Orion and the C130
Hercules. The length of 1580 metres would create
limitations for its use by some civilian air craft. There
are a series of secondary grass runways (vectors, 18-36
and 24-90) located to avoid cross wind operations.
The airfield is built on gravels laid down by the
Waimakariri River and has one flood channel which
crosses the airfield in a north-west/south-east direc-
tion. Apron areas provide hard standing facilities adja-
cent to the hangar buildings.
Fuel storage facilities are provided in underground
storage tanks for both aviation fuels and motor trans-
port.
Reticulated services provided at the airport consist of
a foul sewer which relies on all sewage being collected
at a common point and then being disposed of to the
city system via a rising main. Storm water drainage is
provided by way of soakpits. Electricity supply is
provided by way of 1100 volt ring main with a series of
strategically placed transformers. Water supply for
both domestic and fire purposes is provided by five
underground wells situated around the existing water
tower. The water is reticulated by way of a ringmain
system. The system can be connected to the Christ-
church City supply. Telephone services are provided
by way of an on-base telephone exchange and under-
ground reticulation.
The future of the aerodrome is uncertain.
6.4 Vulnerability Earthquake
The vulnerability of the transport system has been
assessed for three stages following a major earthquake:
1 Immediately following (what will happen)
Period: hours
2 Shortly after (how can the city be put back into
operation)
Period: days
3 Full return to normality
Period: weeks or months.
Road network vulnerability
The road network has two basic components, the roads
themselves, and the bridges which carry them.
Immediately following a major earthquake
Road system damage types
Roads may be severed by damaged or collapsed bridges.
There may be localised damage on many streets caused
by structural failure, collapse of underground and
overhead services, damage from water mains or other
flooding, landslides in hillside suburbs or riverbank
and swampland slumping. Debris from buildings,
poles, bridges, other structures, overhead wires and
abandoned or crashed vehicles may also disrupt roads.
Kerbs and channels and road surfaces would be dis-
torted and broken.
Generally, alternative routes would be available nearby
possibly on a restricted speed, width or loading basis.
Hillside, riverbank and bridge damage may take con-
Transport 157
siderable time to reinstate whereas roads subject to
liquefaction and other localised damage will be repair-
able, albeit temporarily, relatively quickly.
Damage to drainage, sewerage and high-pressure wa-
ter systems will cause extensive damage to roads.
Flooding or intense rain following an earthquake would
exacerbate the situation.
Damage to telephone and power cables and the exca-
vation to allow repairs will also cause damage.
The networks ability to function will depend on the
magnitude and extent of the above damage and disrup-
tion and is thus difficult to predict.
There are, however, streets in the city centre which are
expected to be disrupted by debris from collapsed
buildings (particularly brick) following the earthquake
incident.
Three levels of disruption are shown in Figure 6.4:
roads which can be cleared by a grader within a few
hours;
those which require a bulldozer or similar machine
to create a one-way street within two days; and
those where collapse of steel or reinforced concrete
buildings would require lifting equipment to create
a one way street within five days.
There is little documented information as to the effects
of earthquakes on trees. When trees are brought down
by earthquakes it is mostly by way of landslides, earth
slumping, etc. There is the question of how trees might
react to the phenomenon of liquefaction (sand or swamp
ground conditions). If the whole root zone became a
morass and the tree began to sway with the movement
of the earthquake, then uprooting would be most prob-
able. Trees in the north and eastern parts of the city
would be most at risk. In sand and shingle soils with
low shear strength the swaying motion of the tree may
cause roots to lift through the loosened soil and the tree
to fall. In soils with a high shear strength, roots may
hold firm but the swaying motion of a tall slender
trunked tree may cause it to break at some point above
a quarter of the height of the tree. Plantation and
shelterbelt conifers would be most at risk. There is
evidence that trees can die following earthquakes due
to direct root damage and disruption of the soil in the
root zone. Obviously any tree which had its root
anchorage significantly weakened by an earthquake
would also be more susceptible to windthrow for some
years following the event.
Traffic control computers and monitoring equipment
are potentially susceptible to dislocation damage in an
earthquake event.
Analysis of the network on a sector and primary route
basis provides a basis for assessing overall network
vulnerability, operational capability following an event,
and priority for reinstatement and mitigation meas-
ures.
Figure 6.5 (page 159) shows the sectors, subsectors,
primary routes and internal sector distributors used for
the analysis. All points in the city centre are linked by
the city street grid and this gives access to the four
avenues which distribute traffic around the city centre
and to the suburbs.
Five primary routes linked by the four avenues, serve
five primary destinations and the suburbs through
which they pass:
the airport;
the north;
the eastern suburbs;
the port; and
the south.
Six sectors are bounded by the primary routes and the
four avenues, and there are four subsectors as follows:
in the Southern Sector
the Hillside suburbs from Heathcote to
Westmoreland.
the Harbour basin.
in the Eastern and North Eastern Sector
east of Ferrymead bridge (a mixture of
coastal and hillside suburbs).
Brighton between Travis Swamp, the
sea and estuary and the Avon River.
These subsectors have specific features and bounda-
ries different to the main sectors which are generally
flat and internally robust, with many road alternative
routes available.
Bridge vulnerability
Earthquake damage to bridges will vary greatly. Com-
mon damage to bridges designed within recent years
will be controlled yielding of columns and joints.
P
E
A
C
O
C
K
S
T
B
E
V
E
R
ID
G
E
S
T
A
V
O
N
R
I V
E
R
A
B
E
R
D
E
E
N
S
T
R
E
E
T
O
T
L
E
Y
S
T
M
E
L
R
O
S
E
S
T
M
O
A
P
L
E
L
Y
S
T
N
C
O
N
F
E
R
E
N
C
E
S
T
S
A
L
IS
B
U
R
Y
S
T
G
R
A
C
E
F
IE
L
D
A
V
E
P
E
T
E
R
B
O
R
O
U
G
H
S
T
COLOMBO ST
DURHAM ST NORTH
B
E
A
L
E
Y
A
V
E
BARBADOES ST
CHURCHILL ST
FITZGERALD AVE
A
L
E
X
A
N
D
R
A
H
E
Y
W
O
O
D
W
IL
L
O
W
S
T
O
X
F
O
R
D
T
C
E
C
A
M
B
R
I D
G
E
T
C
E
H
U
R
L
E
Y
S
T
R
E
E
S
BANGOR ST
N
O
V
A
P
L
BARBADOES ST
K
IL
M
O
R
E
S
T
C
H
E
S
T
E
R
S
T
E
A
S
T
DAWSON ST
A
R
M
A
G
H
S
T
E
L
M
G
R
O
V
E
G
L
O
U
C
E
S
T
E
R
S
T
C
A
M
B
R
ID
G
E
T
C
E
O
X
F
O
R
D
T
C
E NEW REGENT
C
H
E
S
T
E
R
S
T
W
E
S
T
A
R
M
A
G
H
S
T
G
L
O
U
C
E
S
T
E
R
S
T
K
IL
M
O
R
E
S
T
CRANMER SQ
CRANMER SQ
MONTREAL ST
W
O
R
C
E
S
T
E
R
S
T
H
E
R
E
F
O
R
D
S
T
CAMBRIDGE TCE
OXFORD TCE
C
A
S
H
E
L
S
T
T
U
A
M
S
T
L
IC
H
F
IE
L
D
S
T
C
A
M
B
R
ID
G
E
T
C
E
O
X
F
O
R
D
T
C
E
S
T
A
S
A
P
H
S
T
S
T
A
S
A
P
H
S
T
STEWART ST
B
A
L
F
O
U
R
T
C
E
H
A
L
K
E
T
T
A
C
T
O
N
S
T
W
A
L
K
E
R
S
T
W
IL
M
E
R
S
T
MONTREAL ST
DURHAM ST SOUTH
W
IN
C
H
C
O
M
B
E
A
L
C
E
S
T
E
R
COLOMBO ST
W
E
L
L
E
S
S
T
D
U
N
D
A
S
S
T
B
A
T
H
S
T
S
O
U
T
H
W
A
R
K
S
T
A
L
L
E
N
S
T
E
A
T
O
N
S
T
M
O
R
T
IM
E
R
P
L
MADRAS ST
WILLIAMS C
O
V
E
N
T
R
Y
BARBADOES ST
F
E
R
R
Y
R
O
A
D
A
L
F
R
E
D
S
T
S
T
A
S
A
P
H
S
T
FITZGERALD AVE
M
O
O
R
H
O
U
S
E
A
V
E
FALSGRAVE
N
E
R
S
E
N
T
C
E
C
A
R
L
Y
L
E
S
T
M
O
O
R
H
O
U
S
E
A
V
E
ORBELL
M
O
O
R
H
O
U
S
E
A
V
E
H
O
R
A
T
IO
S
T
S
T
D
A
V
ID
S
T
C
A
T
H
E
D
R
A
L
S
Q
U
A
R
E
A
S
H
S
T
POPULAR
B
E
D
F
O
R
D
R
O
W
H
IG
H
S
T
LIVERPOOL
LATIMER SQ
LATIMER SQ
A
V
O
N
R
I V
E
R
MANCHESTER ST
MADRAS ST
W
O
R
C
E
S
T
E
R
S
T
H
E
R
E
F
O
R
D
S
T
C
A
S
H
E
L
S
T
L
IC
H
F
IE
L
D
S
T
T
U
A
M
S
T
CLARKSON
DORE ST
L
IV
IN
G
S
T
O
N
E
S
S
E
X
L
O
N
D
O
N
S
T
A
V
O
N
R
IV
E
R
AVON RIVER
A V O N
R
I V
E
R
AVO
N
RIVER
ROLLESTON AVE
C
H
R
I
S
T
C
H
U
R
C
H
W
O
M
E
N
'S
H
O
S
P
I
T
A
L
C
H
R
I
S
T
C
H
U
R
C
H
H
O
S
P
I
T
A
L
T
E
L
E
C
O
M
C
I
V
I
L

D
E
F
E
N
C
E
H
E
A
D
Q
U
A
R
T
E
R
S
C
I
V
I
C
O
F
F
I
C
E
S
C
D
C
D
P
H
H
F
C
R
1
2
2
R
1
2
3
R
1
1
0
R
1
0
9
R
1
1
1
R
1
1
2
R
1
1
3
R
1
1
4
R
1
1
5
R
1
1
6
R
1
1
8
R
1
1
9
R
1
2
0
R
7
0
1
R
7
0
3
R
7
0
2
R
7
0
4
B
u
i
l
d
i
n
g

d
e
b
r
i
s

z
o
n
e

L
e
v
e
l

1
B
u
i
l
d
i
n
g

d
e
b
r
i
s

z
o
n
e

L
e
v
e
l

2
B
u
i
l
d
i
n
g

d
e
b
r
i
s

z
o
n
e

L
e
v
e
l

3
U
s
e
a
b
l
e

(
m
i
n
o
r

d
a
m
a
g
e
)
U
s
e
a
b
i
l
i
t
y

r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
e
d

(
m
o
d
e
r
a
t
e

d
a
m
a
g
e
)
S
e
v
e
r
e

d
a
m
a
g
e
,

l
i
k
e
l
y

t
o

b
e

u
n
u
s
e
a
b
l
e
B
r
i
d
g
e

n
u
m
b
e
r
R
1
2
2
H
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
H
C
i
v
i
l

D
e
f
e
n
c
e

S
e
c
t
o
r

H
Q
C
D
C
i
t
y

C
o
u
n
c
i
l

S
e
r
v
i
c
e

C
e
n
t
r
e
F
i
r
e

s
t
a
t
i
o
n
F
P
o
l
i
c
e
P
C
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
o
r
s

y
a
r
d
C
N
O
T
E
:
L
E
V
E
L

1
B
r
i
c
k

d
e
b
r
i
s

m
a
y

l
i
e

o
n

t
h
e

s
t
r
e
e
t

b
u
t

c
a
n

b
e

c
l
e
a
r
e
d
w
i
t
h
i
n

6

h
o
u
r
s

o
f

e
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e
L
E
V
E
L

2
B
u
l
l
d
o
z
e
r

o
r

e
q
u
i
v
a
l
e
n
t

r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d

t
o

c
r
e
a
t
e

a

o
n
e
-
w
a
y
s
t
r
e
e
t

w
i
t
h
i
n

4
8

h
o
u
r
s

o
f

e
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e
L
E
V
E
L

3
C
o
l
l
a
p
s
e

o
f

r
e
i
n
f
o
r
c
e
d

c
o
n
c
r
e
t
e

o
r

s
t
e
e
l

b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
.
A
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l

l
i
f
t
i
n
g

e
q
u
i
p
m
e
n
t

n
e
e
d
e
d

t
o

c
r
e
a
t
e

a

o
n
e
-
w
a
y
s
t
r
e
e
t

w
i
t
h
i
n

5

d
a
y
s

o
f

e
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e
Figure 6.4: Central city building debris zones
(immediately following a major earthquake)
Transport 159
P
a
g
e
s
Waimairi Road
R
o
a
d
N
0
1
2
k
ilo
m
e
te
r
s
1
3
L
Y
T
T
E
L
T
O
N
S
U
M
N
E
R
E
S
T
U
A
R
Y
H
e
a
t
h
c
o
t
e

R
i v
e
r
C
a
u
s
e
w
a
y
A
von
R
iver
P
O
R
T
H
I
L
L
S
H
E
A
T
H
C
O
T
E
B
E
L
F
A
S
T
A
I
R
P
O
R
T
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
W
I
G
R
A
M
T
E
M
P
L
E
T
O
N
P
R
E
B
B
L
E
T
O
N
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
M
a
i n
S
o
u
t
h
R
o
a
d
W
e
s
t
C
o
a
s
t
R
o
a
d
Marshland Road
M
OTORWAY
M
a i n
N
o r t h
R
o a d
W
A
I
M
A
K
A
R
I
R
I
R
I
V
E
R
C
ra
n
fo
rd
S
tre
e
t
I n
n
e
s
R
o
a
d
Y
a
ld
h
u
r
s
t
R
o
a
d
B
l e
n
h
e
i m
R
i c
c
a
r
t o
n
R
o
a
d
R
o
a
d
T
r
a
v
is
R
o
a
d
W
in
te
r
s
R
o
a
d
N
o
r
th
c
o
te
R
o
a
d
M
o
o
r
h
o
u
s
e
A
v
e
B
r
o
u
g
h
a
m
S
tr
e
e
t
B
a
rrin
g
to
n
S
tre
e
t
Colombo St
B
e
a
le
y
A
v
e
D
y
e
rs
Pass
Road
E
v
a
n
s
R
o
a
d
P
a s s
J
o
h
n
s
R
o
a
d
H
a
r
e
w
o
o
d
W
a
ir
a
k
e
i
R
d
R
o
a
d
Fitzgerald Ave
F
e
r
r
y
R
o
a
d
A
v
e
n
u
e
D
y e
r s
L
in
w
o
o
d
W
o
o
d
h
a
m
R
o
a
d
R
o
a
d
P
o
rt
H
ills
B
r
ig
h
to
n
N
e
w
R
o
a
d
M
e
m
o
ria
l
A
v
e
n
u
e
G
r a
h
a
m
s
G
r e
e
r s
P
a
p
a
n
u
i
R
oad
F
e
n
d
a
lto
n
S
h
a
n
d
s
R
o
a
d
S
p
r i n
g
s
R
o a d
H
a
ls
w
e
ll
J
u
n
c
tio
n
R
o
a
d
N
O
R
T
H

E
A
S
T
E
R
N
S
E
C
T
O
R
N
O
R
T
H

W
E
S
T
E
R
N
S
E
C
T
O
R
W
E
S
T
E
R
N
S
E
C
T
O
R
E
A
S
T
E
R
N
S
E
C
T
O
R
H
I
L
L
S
I
D
E
S
U
B

S
E
C
T
O
R
F
E
R
R
Y
M
E
A
D
C
O
A
S
T
A
L
S
U
B

S
E
C
T
O
R
B
R
I
G
H
T
O
N
C
O
A
S
T
A
L
S
U
B

S
E
C
T
O
R
5 5
5
5
3
3
3
4
S
O
U
T
H
E
R
N
S
E
C
T
O
R
P
r
i
m
a
r
y

R
o
u
t
e
M
a
j
o
r

S
e
c
t
o
r
D
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
o
r
S
u
b

S
e
c
t
o
r
B
o
u
n
d
a
r
i
e
s
R
o
u
t
e

I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
K
E
Y
3
C
E
N
T
R
A
L
S
E
C
T
O
R
H
A
R
B
O
U
R

B
A
S
I
N
S
U
B

S
E
C
T
O
R
Figure 6.5: Christchurch transport, sectors, subsectors and primary routes
Although repairs will be needed the bridges should
remain useable by vehicles.
A number of road and rail overbridges built before the
mid-1960s are expected to sustain considerable dam-
age such as retaining wall and batter slope failure,
yielding, rotation, lateral movement and settlement.
They are also likely to produce considerable debris and
in some cases may collapse. Such damage may disrupt
the transport network although ground level or nearby
road diversions are available in most cases. They may,
however, require complete reinstatement.
Most older river bridges are relatively robust, includ-
ing the central city Avon River bridges which are squat
structures built into the river banks. The bridges over
the lower reaches of the Avon appear vulnerable being
located in the liquefaction zone.
The external routes from the city pass over large
bridges such as the Waimakariri and Rakaia bridges,
and their alternatives (the respective Gorge Bridges)
are also large. Their vulnerability has been assessed on
the same basis as the internal ones but require more
detailed assessment, and extension to include distant
bridges such as the Awatere bridge at Seddon.
The use of many bridges may be restricted (even though
they may remain structurally sound) as the result of
damage to other services using the bridges or the
approaches and the work of reinstating these services.
Immediately following an earthquake some bridges
would be subject to restricted loadings which would
need to be imposed for varying periods. In general:
Where it has been identified that bridge collapse is
likely, or that a structure is unusable, then all
vehicles would be prevented from using the bridge
for an extended period (until major repair/rebuild-
ing is completed), i.e. in the order of months (or for
a temporary bridge, e.g. a Bailey bridge, or prop-
ping to be installed one week).
Where moderate to severe damage is predicted,
and/or where temporary propping or similar work
is needed, then the probable vehicle restrictions
would be:
Immediately after the earthquake, emergency
vehicles only, one vehicle at a time, and crawl
speed (note that it is unlikely that a weight limit
would be imposed in the majority of cases).
This restriction would remain until the tempo-
rary work is completed say in the order of
three days.
Following propping and/or other short term
repairs the bridge could be restricted to Class I
traffic (i.e. normal highway traffic) and speed
restricted (i.e. 30 km/hr). For severe damage, or
uncertain structural capacity, it may be neces-
sary to limit the bridge to one heavy vehicle at
a time. This restriction would remain until
more permanent repairs could be completed,
one to six months.
Where some damage is identified, but the bridge
remains useable, the probable restriction would be
a speed limit of say 30 km/hr until repairs are
completed.
Summary tables
Four sets of tables (located at the end of the Earth-
quakes section) summarise information on the roading
system (Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4):
Primary route vulnerability (Table 6.1) page 167;
Internal sector vulnerability (Table 6.2) page 170;
Key bridges primary routes (Table 6.3) page
176; and
Bridges summary internal sectors (Table 6.4)
page 179.
These tables include mitigation measures and priorities.
Period following earthquake
The general comments above describe the immediate
effects of the earthquake where establishing emer-
gency corridors for services, rescue and movement of
people are the priority. Following this is a period when
the city is getting back on its feet before the eventual
return to normality.
Activities required include:
opening up routes with priority decided by the
hierarchy of primary routes, sector distributors
followed by remaining arterial, distributor and lo-
cal roads.
assessing limits, restrictions and long-term rein-
statement priorities.
co-ordinating with road-based services (water, dam-
age etc.).
removing debris and re-establishing maintenance
regimes.
clearing landslides slips and blockages on hillsides
and riverside roads.
The time reconstruction will take depends to a great
extent on the season in which the earthquake occurs,
and weather conditions.
Transport 161
Four Avenues
These roads are robust for most of their lengths, with
only three bridges on them, at Fitzgerald Avenue,
Carlton Mill and the Colombo Street flyover.
The two river bridges are unlikely to sustain significant
damage and reinstatement would be rapid. The river
bank alongside Fitzgerald Avenue just north of the
bridge may collapse but this would affect at most only
one carriageway.
The flyover is predicted to sustain severe damage,
possibly requiring major and thus lengthy repairs.
Debris from its damage could block Colombo Street,
but Gasson Street is available as an alternative. Simi-
larly, Moorhouse Avenue traffic would, eventually, be
able to use the ground level alternatives alongside the
bridge. Immediately after an earthquake, traffic would
have to use the one-way system.
The avenues themselves have large numbers of trees
but few close buildings, and most damage is likely
from broken major underground services. The former
could be cleared within hours, the latter, days, weeks or
months depending on the extent of serious damage.
Restoration of services could probably be the greatest
source of damage to the roads as a result of a severe
earthquake. Adequate reinstatement of the avenues
could be completed within days except for the flyover
(if it is replaced).
Airport primary route
This route is likely to open within the first day. As well
as serving the airport it connects to the McLeans Island
area, the primary source of roading aggregate and some
plant for reconstruction work.
Northern primary route
The twin motorway bridges over the Waimakariri
River are likely to remain useable after an earthquake.
The old Main North Road Bridge is likely to be
severely damaged, and unusable. The rail bridge could
be used for emergency road use, access is available at
both ends and temporary decking could probably be
provided. If all four bridges are unusable, reinstate-
ment of one crossing could be very lengthy. Fording is
impracticable, the crossing would require a large number
of Bailey or temporary span materials and the alterna-
tive Waimakarari gorge bridge is very vulnerable to
earthquake damage. Overall, this crossing is a key
lifeline point of potentially high vulnerability. Sea
connections for Wellington would be established long
before the road could be opened.
The Styx Mill overbridge could be replaced quickly by
a ground level rail crossing immediately; the rail line
itself is expected to be out of action or isolated by the
earthquake for some considerable time.
The alternative, Marshland Road, is also vulnerable
because of the likely collapse of the bridge over the
Styx River.
State Highway One could probably be opened within
two or three days unless major bridges are out or the
Kaikoura slips have moved significantly. Damage due
to most slips could be repaired in two to three days but
the Kaikoura Coast slip areas could take up to three
weeks.
For some bridges on this and other rural routes, fords
and other temporary crossings may be available or can
be rapidly constructed.
Eastern suburbs primary route
This route is likely to be affected by road slumping
alongside Avonside Drive (which can be bypassed by
Worcester Street), and by the collapse of the Pages
Road bridge over the Avon. Temporary bridging
should re-establish the route within three days. An
alternative route is available via Travis Road to the
north or the Bridge Street bridge to the south.
Lyttelton Primary route
This route has high potential vulnerabilities. The
Waltham Road overbridge is likely to be severely
damaged but Gasson Street and Wilsons Road effec-
tively bypass it. There are several Heathcote River
bridges, most of which should remain serviceable with
some load restrictions. Reinstatement of at least one
crossing should be made within two days.
The Road tunnel itself is unlikely to suffer severe
damage but both portals and the cuttings and embank-
ment and bridges on the Tunnel Road are vulnerable, as
is the lighting and ventilation equipment. The Tunnel
Road can be bypassed (Port Hills and Bridle Path
Roads) but adequate reinstatement may take up to three
weeks. Collapse of the tunnel harbour end portal could
damage Norwich Quay and access to the wharves
clearance may take two to three days.
If the tunnel is unusable, the Ferrymead Bridge and
Evans Pass route will be important. This route is
vulnerable to landslips and could take several days to
reinstate. The vulnerable Ferrymead bridge could be
bypassed via Bridle Path Road.
Southern primary route
This route is most vulnerable at the Blenheim Road and
Sockburn (two) overbridges, and the Rakaia Bridge
north of Ashburton. The overbridges have level cross-
ing alternatives available (within hours), and other
road routes are available nearby. If the Rakaia Bridge
is not totally destroyed this route should be operable
within three days.
Further considerations
In addition to the vulnerability of the bridges, the roads
themselves can be expected to suffer, in dispersed and
localised areas with damage from stormwater systems
disruptions, water main breakages, trench slumping,
and slipping of banks and other earthworks. Reinstate-
ment of these will depend on resources available and
route priorities. Extensive damage over wide areas
could take several weeks to repair given that in that
case major structures and services will also be under
reinstatement.
Return to normality
This process will benefit from some breathing space,
detailed planning and assessment particularly on
whether or not to replace bridges. Road bridges over
railways (in particular with the lower train numbers
and different legislative requirements than when most
were built) may be replaced with level crossings.
Reconstruction of major river bridges will take months.
The time taken for the overall return to normality will
ultimately depend on the total extent of reconstruction
required and the available resources.
Full reconstruction of the Waimakariri or other bridges
such as the Awatere road/rail bridge at Seddon may
take several months. It must be borne in mind that the
transport system is only one lifeline and the same
limited contracting, machinery and manpower will be
reinstating all of them.
Rail system vulnerability
Immediately following major earthquake
Main North Line
This line would be closed for the majority of the length
under consideration in this study.
From the Middleton Yard terminus to Riccarton Road
it crosses a liquefaction zone. Because of the low
surface loading of rail track likely damage will be
minimal, with some horizontal and vertical alignment
correction being required. The Blenheim Road
Overbridge is likely to obstruct this section.
From Riccarton Road to Sturrocks Road there is likely
to be significantly more damage, with both vertical and
horizontal displacement of the track over its entire
length, and minor damage to the abutment/span inter-
face of the three small bridges across the Avon River,
Waimairi and Wairarapa Streams.
The section from Sturrocks Road to the Waimakariri
River is likely to sustain the most significant damage.
It has three major bridges; two of which have relatively
high approach embankments. These are likely to suffer
from severe ground settlement and slumping-out of
batters. The bridges are founded below the silt/sand
layer and are likely to suffer damage through ground
shake, mainly differential pier settlement and possible
holding down bolt failure of span/pier linkages.
The remainder of the section will suffer minor distor-
tion (in comparison) of track alignment.
Main South Line
This line, within the limits of this study, is located on
zone 3 alluvial. As such, reasonably severe lateral and
vertical displacement is likely to be the only resultant
damage. The only structures on this line are the
Curletts Road and Sockburn Overbridges. It is ex-
pected that some blockage to the line will occur only at
the Sockburn Structure.
Middleton Lyttelton Line
From the terminus to Ensors Road minor track damage
is expected in the form of lateral and vertical displace-
ment. Blockages are also expected as a result of
damage to the Colombo Street and Waltham Road
Overbridges.
From Ensors Road to Thompson Road the track crosses
three different types of substructure. Damage will vary
from minor to severe displacement as above. How-
ever, the worst damage on this section is likely to be on
the approaches of the twin bridges crossing the
Heathcote River. This embankment is on a high
liquefaction zone and is likely to suffer from signifi-
cant settlement. This in turn will create severe differ-
ential settlement at the abutments. The bridges them-
selves are likely to sustain light damage through bolt
shear.
From Thompson Road to the Tunnel Mouth This is
on zone 2 and 2B. From the Tunnel Road Overbridge
to Martindale Road the track is built on a high embank-
ment. This section is likely to sustain the most severe
damage, with significant settlement of the embank-
ment and probable collapse of the masonry abutments
of the Martindale Road underpass. The track is also
likely to be blocked by landslip in and around the
tunnel portal, with possible failure of the portal struc-
ture.
Lyttelton Tunnel and Lyttelton Yard Complex The
tunnel itself is unlikely to sustain any significant dam-
Transport 163
age apart from minor loosening of some masonry
lining. However, the portals, as mentioned above, are
likely to suffer at least partial collapse and/or landslip
blockages. This could be worsened at the Lyttelton
portal with failure of the masonry supports for the
Sutton Quay overpass.
Cashin Quay yard is likely to be severely damaged
through rock fall blockages and slip circle effects on
the reclamation.
Rail yard facilities
These would be totally immobilised as a result of
liquefaction and ground settlement effect, disabling
trackwork and derailing locomotives and rolling stock.
Period following earthquake event
During this period the rail system would be reinstated
from Lyttelton (Priority 1), from the South (Priority 2),
and from the North (Priority 3). These priorities may,
however, change, depending on the interrelationship
of road/rail to provide primary links to the remainder of
the country.
It is difficult to establish a time frame; however within
one to two weeks a partial service on all lines could be
provided, although this would be dependent on the
availability of materials, equipment and manpower
resources, as well as the priority of providing a rail
service in relation to other needs at the time.
Return to normal
A best guestimate for the full return to normal of all
rail services would be in the region of six months.
There are two key locations that are likely to control the
length of this period. These are:
(1) The old Christchurch Railway Station, Moorhouse
Avenue This building houses the computerised
Train Control system for Oamaru-Picton and the
West Coast, as well as the Rail Telephone Ex-
change. The ability to bring these facilities back
into full service will be governed by the amount of
damage sustained by the building and the equip-
ment.
(2) Main North Line Bridges These are the weak
links in the local system and are likely to require
extensive permanent repair.
Vulnerability of Port of Lyttelton
Immediately following earthquake
The greatest risk arises from the effect of slip
circles at the Cashin Quay reclamation. Severe
shaking could unbalance the equilibrium of the
reclamation causing subsidence of the pavements
adjacent to the wharf and uplift of the seabed. The
piled structure could suffer some consequential
damage due to movement of the seabed, but com-
plete collapse is not likely. Damage would occur at
the interface between the breastwork and land, i.e.
to tiebacks, deadmen and retaining wall. The slip
circle risk also exists at Z Berth, Gladstone Pier
Inner and No 1 breastwork.
Jetties supported on piles would suffer little or no
damage owing to their flexible behaviour (except at
the interface with the land).
The channel is not at risk from shaking as the virgin
mud is too cohesive to suddenly slump. The vulner-
ability of the inner harbour seabed is also low.
Rocks from rubble slopes could, however, roll into
some of the berth areas. Slumping of sediment
accumulating under jetties is also a low risk.
The rock protection barriers are very stable. Cashin
Quay breakwater at Sticking Point could suffer
limited damage, but is not considered a significant
risk.
Liquefaction of the reclaimed areas is not consid-
ered to be a risk. The quarry rock fill material used
for the Cashin Quay reclamation is not susceptible to
liquefaction. An oil company report noted that the
tank farm at Naval Point, which is on land reclaimed
using pumped dredgings, is not considered suscep-
tible to liquefaction, and slip circle failure of the sea
wall is unlikely to affect the tanks. However the
grading of the marine silts comprising the reclama-
tion is close enough to those of silts vulnerable to
liquefaction to justify further investigation.
The central substation is the only link that the
Lyttelton Port Company has with Southpowers
network and failure would result in a total loss of
power supply to the port. The substation is situated
below Simeon Quay adjacent to No. 7 Jetty. There
is a standby generator for essential functions in the
Lyttelton Container Terminal Administration Build-
ing, including the communications equipment in
the Signal Tower.
The Southpower link from Heathcote is an over-
head cable and any problem can be quickly recti-
fied. The poles supporting the overhead wires are a
low risk for earthquakes.
The Signal Tower itself is vulnerable to building
damage requiring evacuation and was designed
only to the normal code requirements for office
buildings.
Several navigation marks are mounted on piles which
are not susceptible to earthquake damage. Some of the
navigation lights are solar powered and should not be
damaged in an earthquake. The main sector lights are
land based and have standby batteries to cover for a
power cut. There would be some risk to the buildings
housing these lights from landslides. Loss of some
lights would restrict movement of vessels at night.
Period following earthquake
Restoration of facilities in the period following an
earthquake would follow the following priorities:
restore port communications in the Signal Tower;
restore power, water and telephones services;
reinstate damaged fuel/oil pipelines (assuming these
had been isolated); and
reinstate damaged links between inner harbour
jetties and land, e.g. temporary bridging.
Return to normality
After a major earthquake event ten months is estimated
to restore the Cashin Quay breastwork and six months
for other wharves.
In all but extreme events it is probable that inner
harbour jetties (e.g. No. 2 and No. 7) would still be
serviceable.
Vulnerability of airport
Immediately following earthquake
Damage to runways, taxiways and aprons is likely to be
negligible and easily repaired. The large grass areas
would remain useable by light aircraft and military
aircraft such as Hercules.
Most buildings, including the main passenger termi-
nals, are likely to remain useable despite suffering
superficial damage such as cracks, displaced linings
and broken windows.
One area of concern is damage to machinery and
equipment within buildings, particularly that associ-
ated with communication, navigation and power dis-
tributors. This was found to be inadequately secured in
many cases and failure or fire could result from move-
ment.
Underground services including fuel reticulation, sew-
erage and water supplies are unlikely to sustain dam-
age from liquefaction or settlement but gravel soils
may be subject to lateral displacement and thus cause
damage. The fuel storage and reticulation systems
have recently been upgraded to reduce vulnerability.
Some LPG installations are under review now.
Period following and return to normality
In view of the limited extent of damage expected, the
period following the earthquake required for return to
normality is expected to be short unless major damage
to the main runways occurs. Full runway reinstatement
could take some weeks to repair, but reduced runway
lengths (or one of the two main runways) could allow
restricted operations.
6.5 Mitigation Measures
Earthquake
The vulnerability analysis for the different elements of
the transport system has identified a need for many
relatively minor mitigation works which could be
carried out to existing structures, control and power
systems and ancillary equipment. Specific measures
for consideration are listed below for each transport
mode. Further detailed investigations are required for
these measures.
Road network
Bridges
Bridge vulnerability mitigation measures are indicated
for bridges in the summary tables (Tables 6.1 to 6.4).
Typically mitigation measures may include:
Strengthening connections, particularly between
superstructures and substructures.
Increasing column strength and ductility.
Strengthening or renewing retaining and approach
structures.
Strengthening lateral/longitudinal restraint mecha-
nisms.
Constructing landing slabs.
the addition of information plaques to bridges over
which key lifelines services pass, describing their
location and nature (services authorities).
Further technical assessment of the Sutton Quay
rail overbridge/road retaining structure and clarifi-
cation of responsibilities (TNZ, Tranz Rail, BPDC).
Detailed geotechnical and structural investigation
of vulnerable bridges located on primary routes, or
significant alternative routes, for which simple
mitigation measures are not immediately apparent
Transport 165
(e.g. Ferrymead Bridge, Pages Road, Marshland
Road-Styx River).
Service authorities to consider isolation of their
services from the Ferrymead Bridge.
A priority list for the initial re-establishment of the
primary routes allowing bridges to carry heavy vehicle
loads is as recommended below:
Central City
Moorhouse/Colombo clear debris to establish
ground level bypass.
Barbadoes Street (Avon River) approach works
(State Highway).
Montreal Street (Avon River) approach works.
Airport Route
Fendalton Road (Avon River) approach works.
Fendalton Road (Wairarapa Stream) approach
works.
Port Route
Waltham overbridge approach works (State
Highway)
Opawa Expressway (Heathcote River) approach
works (State Highway).
Port Hills Road (Tunnel Road overpasses) clear
debris (State Highway).
Tunnel Portals clear debris (State Highway).
Norwich Quay/Sutton Quay check for damage
(State Highway).
Route to North
Main North Road (Styx Rail overbridge) clear
debris to establish ground level rail crossing (State
Highway).
Main North Road (Styx River) approach works
(State Highway).
Northern Motorway (Waimakariri River) ap-
proach works, structural repairs (State Highway).
Northern Motorway (Tram Road, Ohoka Road,
Smith Street overpasses) clear debris to estab-
lish ground level by passes, approach works on side
streets (State Highway).
Eastern Suburbs Route
Pages Road (Avon River) check bridge
Bridge Street (Avon River) approach works.
Route to South
Blenhiem Road overpass check bridge
Main South Road (Sockburn overpass) clear
debris to establish ground level crossing.
Access to Port Hills
Colombo Street (Heathcote River) approach
works.
Access to east of Ferrymead
Ferrymead Bridge (Heathcote River) approach
works and propping, services reinstatement critical
to eastern areas.
These are considered the minimum to establish an
emergency level of access to key areas throughout the
city, possibly requiring some use of alternative routes.
Other bridges listed in Tables 6.1 to 6.4 should then be
progressively checked for damage and temporary and/
or permanent repairs programmed.
It also needs to be recognised that after shocks may
further damage already weakened structures.
Roads
General measures identified are:
Clarify ventilation requirements to allow contin-
ued operation of Road Tunnel to Lyttelton, provide
backup power facilities for emergency use.
Development of integrated response plans for the
road and bridges network, recognising the accessi-
bility needs for evacuations, supplies, fuel sup-
plies, and services reinstatement.
Make a list of services that are likely to require
extensive (disruptive) remedial work immediately
after the hazard event on primary routes and other
high priority access routes, and make it available to
emergency response organisations and service au-
thorities.
Ensure that the vulnerability of services on primary
routes and other high priority access routes is
minimised. For example, early replacement of
older, vulnerable underground pipes (e.g.
stormwater) on key lifelines roads.
Undergrounding overhead services, particularly
on significant lifelines routes.
Service authorities to consider lifelines issues when
planning service installations on key roads.
Selection of trees which are more likely to survive
an earthquake, particularly on key routes. Plant
only known rootfirm species in areas where lique-
faction may occur.
Earthquake proofing traffic signal control and sur-
veillance systems.
Investigation of the need for railway and road
bridges when they become due for reconstruction
or rehabilitation, and safeguarding land for ground
level replacements. The elimination of some of
those bridges would decrease route vulnerabilities
for road and rail.
Identification of alternative river crossings (such as
fords) including investigation of the use of rail
bridges (and the tunnel) for road vehicles, and
safeguarding the land for this.
Review route diversion procedures and informa-
tion systems these could be used for minor
emergencies such as weather induced route
severances.
Investigation and recording of temporary emer-
gency bridging materials and equipment (including
bailey bridges) and their locations.
Securing road tunnel mechanical/electrical serv-
ices.
Review standards of construction and maintenance
of all transport facilities to reduce the vulnerability
of the road network, for example trench backfilling
and reinstatement requirements.
Develop a co-ordination strategy with the contract-
ing industry to provide for a planned response
capability for machinery resources.
Make a list, and make it available to emergency
response organisations, of plant machinery re-
sources, location, likely availability, contact names
and means of contact.
Undertake measures to minimise disruption due to
slips on the Dyers Pass/Summit Road route to
communications repeater sites and other key sites
on the Port Hills.
Rail system
Given the nature of the rail system there are likely to be
few actions that can be taken from a network planning
perspective.
The only engineering measures identified are the better
securing of bridge beams to piers and abutments,
strengthening of batter slopes at the Heathcote portal of
the Lyttelton Tunnel, and replacement of masonry
piers on both the Martindale Road underpass and
Sutton Quay overpass.
The need to secure communication and signal control
equipment, or to make it re-locatable was also identi-
fied, as was reviewing the performance of rail system
infrastructure between Picton and Christchurch under
earthquake hazard to identify and prioritise mitigation
measures for reducing earthquake vulnerability.
Port of Lyttelton
No major physical works for improving the robustness
of the existing ports structures have been identified.
The effects of a major earthquake could be mitigated in
future planning for redevelopment of the inner har-
bour. This would necessitate identifying key structures
that would provide links in the lifelines chain and
designing them to remain serviceable after a major
earthquake. The lifelines goals would need to be one of
the objectives of the redevelopment programme. The
Lyttelton Port Company has written action plans for
civil and other emergencies.
The Lyttelton Port Company and Southpower are
looking at establishing another substation at the east
end of the Lyttelton township in order to reduce the
possibility of power interruptions caused by damage
both outside and within the Lyttelton Port Company
network. However, total loss of power within the
Lyttelton Port Company network would not prevent
ships from delivering supplies and equipment.
Using the power ability of one of the rail ferries to
provide power to the port would be unlikely as it would
require the provision of an expensive (and otherwise
redundant) 6.6-11 kV transformer.
In the event of damage to the base of a jetty where it
links to the land, a plan for temporary bridging could
shorten the time taken to recommence operations.
Identifying the type of bridging needed and its avail-
ability and location should be undertaken. This should
include the possibility of quickly erecting a rail linkspan
in the event of major damage to the rail system on the
lines to Picton and to the south.
Airport
The buildings and infrastructure of the airport are
robust and unlikely to suffer major damage. However
the vital services such as navigation aids, lighting,
power supplies and communications and security sys-
tems are vulnerable since they can be displaced, over-
turned or disconnected by minor structural damage.
Securing such equipment to its shelves (and the shelves
themselves) and assessing their portability or back-up
(continued on page 184)
Transport 167
H
A
Z
A
R
D

E
V
E
N
T
:
E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E
P
r
i
m
a
r
y
R
o
u
t
e

a
n
d
F
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
R
o
a
d

N
a
m
e
s
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
o
f

R
o
u
t
e
E
f
f
e
c
t

o
f

H
a
z
a
r
d
A
v
a
i
l
a
b
i
l
i
t
y

o
f
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
s
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
N
o
r
t
h
e
r
n
A
c
c
e
s
s

t
o
n
o
r
t
h
e
r
n

a
r
e
a
s
(
R
a
n
g
i
o
r
a
,
W
o
o
d
e
n
d
)

a
n
d
l
i
n
k
a
g
e

t
o
N
o
r
t
h

I
s
l
a
n
d
a
n
d

n
o
r
t
h
e
r
n
S
o
u
t
h

I
s
l
a
n
d
E
a
s
t
e
r
n
A
c
c
e
s
s

t
o
e
a
s
t
e
r
n
C
h
r
i
s
t
c
h
u
r
c
h
s
u
b
u
r
b
s
.
C
r
a
n
f
o
r
d
;

M
a
i
n

N
o
r
t
h
;
M
o
t
o
r
w
a
y
W
o
o
d
h
a
m
;

P
a
g
e
s
3 3
(
i
)
B
r
i
d
g
e
s
-
M
a
j
o
r

d
a
m
a
g
e

a
t

S
t
y
x
R
a
i
l

o
v
e
r
b
r
i
d
g
e
,

c
l
e
a
r
a
n
c
e
w
o
r
k
s
/
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y

r
a
i
l
c
r
o
s
s
i
n
g

r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
.
-
A
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s

l
i
k
e
l
y

a
t
o
t
h
e
r

b
r
i
d
g
e
s
.
(
i
i
)
R
o
a
d
s
-
P
o
s
s
i
b
l
e

l
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n
e
f
f
e
c
t
s

o
v
e
r

p
a
r
t
s

o
f

r
o
u
t
e
.
-
D
a
m
a
g
e
d

u
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d

a
n
d
o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

l
i
k
e
l
y

t
o
d
i
s
r
u
p
t

r
o
a
d
s
.
-
D
a
m
a
g
e

t
o

k
e
r
b
s

a
n
d
c
h
a
n
n
e
l
s

a
n
d

r
o
a
d

s
u
r
f
a
c
e
s
.
(
i
)
B
r
i
d
g
e
s
-
M
a
j
o
r

d
a
m
a
g
e

a
t

P
a
g
e
s
R
o
a
d

b
r
i
d
g
e

w
i
l
l

d
i
s
r
u
p
t
t
h
i
s

r
o
u
t
e
.
(
i
i
)
R
o
a
d
s
-
A
n
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
e
d

l
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
-
D
a
m
a
g
e
d

u
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d

a
n
d
o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
.
-
D
a
m
a
g
e
d

k
e
r
b
s
,

c
h
a
n
n
e
l
s
,
r
o
a
d

s
u
r
f
a
c
e
s
.
-
L
i
m
i
t
e
d

b
e
c
a
u
s
e

o
f

t
h
e
v
u
l
n
e
r
a
b
i
l
i
t
y

o
f
M
a
r
s
h
l
a
n
d

R
o
a
d

b
r
i
d
g
e
o
v
e
r

S
t
y
x

R
i
v
e
r
.
-
O
t
h
e
r

r
o
u
t
e
s

g
e
n
e
r
a
l
l
y
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
,

a
l
t
h
o
u
g
h
m
a
n
y

A
v
o
n

R
i
v
e
r
c
r
o
s
s
i
n
g
s

d
i
s
r
u
p
t
e
d
.
-
S
e
e

B
r
i
d
g
e
s

t
a
b
l
e
.
-
U
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
i
n
g
/
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g
.
-
S
e
e

B
r
i
d
g
e
s

t
a
b
l
e
.
-
U
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
i
n
g
/
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g
.
B B
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
:
1

t
o

5

-

5

m
o
s
t

i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
.
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
:
A
E
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
e
d

a
s

s
o
o
n

a
s

p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
.
B
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
d

f
o
r

w
o
r
k
s

o
r

f
u
r
t
h
e
r

i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
.
C
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

b
u
t

c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n

c
a
n

b
e

d
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
.
Table 6.1: Primary route vulnerability
H
A
Z
A
R
D

E
V
E
N
T
:
E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E
P
r
i
m
a
r
y
R
o
u
t
e

a
n
d
F
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
R
o
a
d

N
a
m
e
s
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
o
f

R
o
u
t
e
E
f
f
e
c
t

o
f

H
a
z
a
r
d
A
v
a
i
l
a
b
i
l
i
t
y

o
f
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
s
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
L
y
t
t
e
l
t
o
n
A
c
c
e
s
s

t
o

P
o
r
t
o
f

L
y
t
t
e
l
t
o
n
.
S
o
u
t
h
e
r
n
A
c
c
e
s
s

t
o
s
o
u
t
h
,
D
u
n
e
d
i
n

e
t
c
.
B
a
r
b
a
d
o
e
s
;

B
r
o
u
g
h
a
m
;
O
p
a
w
a

E
x
p
r
e
s
s
w
a
y
;

P
o
r
t
H
i
l
l
s
;

T
u
n
n
e
l
;

N
o
r
w
i
c
h
Q
u
a
y
B
l
e
n
h
e
i
m
;

M
a
i
n

S
o
u
t
h
4 3
(
i
)
B
r
i
d
g
e
s
-
M
a
j
o
r

d
a
m
a
g
e

a
t

W
a
l
t
h
a
m
o
v
e
r
b
r
i
d
g
e
,

T
u
n
n
e
l

R
o
a
d
o
v
e
r
p
a
s
s

s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
s
,

a
n
d
N
o
r
w
i
c
h
/
S
u
t
t
o
n

Q
u
a
y
s
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e

i
s

l
i
k
e
l
y

t
o
s
e
v
e
r
e
l
y

d
i
s
r
u
p
t

t
h
i
s

r
o
u
t
e
.
(
i
i
)
R
o
a
d
s
-
L
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

d
a
m
a
g
e

o
n
p
a
r
t
s

o
f

r
o
u
t
e
,

i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

d
a
m
a
g
e
s
.
-
P
o
s
s
i
b
l
e

p
a
r
t
i
a
l

b
l
o
c
k
a
g
e
s
d
u
e

t
o

s
l
i
p
s

o
n

P
o
r
t

H
i
l
l
s
R
o
a
d
.
(
i
i
i
)
T
u
n
n
e
l
-
D
a
m
a
g
e

t
o

l
i
g
h
t
i
n
g

a
n
d
v
e
n
t
i
l
a
t
i
o
n

e
q
u
i
p
m
e
n
t
.
-
P
o
r
t
a
l
s

d
a
m
a
g
e
d

b
y

s
l
i
p
s
w
o
u
l
d

a
f
f
e
c
t

t
u
n
n
e
l
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
.
(
i
)
B
r
i
d
g
e
s
-
D
a
m
a
g
e

t
o

B
l
e
n
h
e
i
m

R
o
a
d
a
n
d

S
o
c
k
b
u
r
n

R
a
i
l
o
v
e
r
p
a
s
s
e
s

w
i
l
l

p
a
r
t
i
a
l
l
y
(
a
t

l
e
a
s
t
)

d
i
s
r
u
p
t

t
h
i
s
r
o
u
t
e
.
(
i
i
)
R
o
a
d
s
-
D
a
m
a
g
e
d

k
e
r
b
s
,

c
h
a
n
n
e
l
s
,
s
u
r
f
a
c
e
s

a
n
d

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
.
-
R
e
f
e
r

E
a
s
t
e
r
n

a
n
d
S
o
u
t
h
e
r
n

S
e
c
t
o
r
s
t
a
b
l
e
s
.
-
R
e
f
e
r

w
e
s
t
e
r
n

a
n
d
s
o
u
t
h
e
r
n

s
e
c
t
o
r
s
.
-
S
e
e

b
r
i
d
g
e
s

t
a
b
l
e
.
-
H
i
l
l
s
i
d
e

p
l
a
n
t
i
n
g
s
.
-
R
e
v
i
e
w
/
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
t
u
n
n
e
l

p
o
r
t
a
l

b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
.
-
S
e
e

B
r
i
d
g
e
s

t
a
b
l
e
.
-
U
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
i
n
g
/
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g
.
B
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
:
1

t
o

5

-

5

m
o
s
t

i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
.
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
:
A
E
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
e
d

a
s

s
o
o
n

a
s

p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
.
B
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
d

f
o
r

w
o
r
k
s

o
r

f
u
r
t
h
e
r

i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
.
C
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

b
u
t

c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n

c
a
n

b
e

d
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
.
Table 6.1: Primary route vulnerability (continued)
Transport 169
H
A
Z
A
R
D

E
V
E
N
T
:
E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E
P
r
i
m
a
r
y
R
o
u
t
e

a
n
d
F
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
R
o
a
d

N
a
m
e
s
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
o
f

R
o
u
t
e
E
f
f
e
c
t

o
f

H
a
z
a
r
d
A
v
a
i
l
a
b
i
l
i
t
y

o
f
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
s
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
A
i
r
p
o
r
t
A
c
c
e
s
s

t
o
a
i
r
p
o
r
t
.
F
o
u
r
A
v
e
n
u
e
s
D
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
a
r
o
u
n
d

C
i
t
y
c
e
n
t
r
e
;

a
c
c
e
s
s
t
o

e
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
.
F
e
n
d
a
l
t
o
n
;

M
e
m
o
r
i
a
l
B
e
a
l
e
y
;

F
i
t
z
g
e
r
a
l
d
;
M
o
o
r
h
o
u
s
e
;

D
e
a
n
s
;

H
a
r
p
e
r
5 5
(
i
)
B
r
i
d
g
e
s
-
M
i
n
o
r

e
f
f
e
c
t
s

o
n
l
y
.
(
i
i
)
R
o
a
d
s
-
T
r
e
e
s
,

s
o
m
e

o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

d
a
m
a
g
e
d
.
-
R
o
b
u
s
t

r
o
u
t
e
.
(
i
)
B
r
i
d
g
e
s
-
S
e
v
e
r
e

d
a
m
a
g
e

t
o
M
o
o
r
h
o
u
s
e
/
C
o
l
o
m
b
o
o
v
e
r
b
r
i
d
g
e
,

m
a
y

a
f
f
e
c
t
r
o
u
t
e
.
-
S
o
m
e

d
a
m
a
g
e

t
o
F
i
t
z
g
e
r
a
l
d

A
v
e
n
u
e

b
r
i
d
g
e
.
(
i
i
)
R
o
a
d
s
-
S
o
m
e

l
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
-
D
a
m
a
g
e
/
b
l
o
c
k
a
g
e

d
u
e

t
o
c
o
l
l
a
p
s
e
d

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

o
r
b
r
o
k
e
n

o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d

l
i
n
e
s
.
R
e
f
e
r

W
e
s
t
e
r
n

a
n
d

n
o
r
t
h
-
w
e
s
t
e
r
n

s
e
c
t
o
r
s
.
O
t
h
e
r

l
o
c
a
l

r
o
a
d
s

a
n
d

c
e
n
t
r
a
l
C
i
t
y

s
t
r
e
e
t
s
,

o
n
e

w
a
y

p
a
i
r
s
.
-
C
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
u
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
i
n
g

o
f
p
o
w
e
r

l
i
n
e
s
.
-
S
e
e

b
r
i
d
g
e
s

t
a
b
l
e
.
-
C
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
u
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
i
n
g

o
f
p
o
w
e
r

l
i
n
e
s
.
A A
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
:
1

t
o

5

-

5

m
o
s
t

i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
.
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
:
A
E
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
e
d

a
s

s
o
o
n

a
s

p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
.
B
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
d

f
o
r

w
o
r
k
s

o
r

f
u
r
t
h
e
r

i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
.
C
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

b
u
t

c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n

c
a
n

b
e

d
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
.
Table 6.1: Primary route vulnerability (continued)
H
A
Z
A
R
D

E
V
E
N
T
:
E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E
S
e
c
t
o
r
R
o
u
t
e

-

R
o
a
d

N
a
m
e
s
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
o
f

R
o
u
t
e
E
f
f
e
c
t
s

o
f

H
a
z
a
r
d
A
v
a
i
l
a
b
i
l
i
t
y

o
f
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
s
P
h
y
s
i
c
a
l

W
o
r
k
s
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
E
a
s
t
e
r
n
S
o
u
t
h
e
r
n
F
o
u
r

A
v
e
n
u
e
s

t
o
L
y
t
t
e
l
t
o
n
F
e
r
r
y

R
o
a
d
/
W
o
r
c
e
s
t
e
r
S
t
r
e
e
t
;

L
i
n
w
o
o
d

A
v
e
n
u
e
;
C
a
u
s
e
w
a
y
;

M
a
i
n

R
o
a
d
(
S
u
m
n
e
r
)
;

E
v
a
n
s

P
a
s
s
F
o
u
r

A
v
e
n
u
e
s

t
o
G
o
v
e
r
n
o
r
s

B
a
y
C
o
l
o
m
b
o
;

D
y
e
r
s

P
a
s
s
4
(
A
n

a
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
r
o
u
t
e

t
o

t
h
e
P
o
r
t

i
f

T
u
n
n
e
l
i
s

c
l
o
s
e
d
)
.
3
(
i
)
B
r
i
d
g
e
s
-
M
a
j
o
r

d
a
m
a
g
e

t
o
F
e
r
r
y
m
e
a
d

B
r
i
d
g
e

w
o
u
l
d
t
h
r
e
a
t
e
n

r
o
u
t
e

a
v
a
i
l
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
.
-
M
o
d
e
r
a
t
e

d
a
m
a
g
e

o
f
C
a
u
s
e
w
a
y

b
r
i
d
g
e
.
(
i
i
)
R
o
a
d
s
-
L
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

d
a
m
a
g
e

i
n
L
i
n
w
o
o
d

A
v
e
n
u
e
,

F
e
r
r
y
R
o
a
d

a
r
e
a
s
.
-
B
u
r
s
t

w
a
t
e
r

p
i
p
e
s

a
n
d
o
t
h
e
r

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

d
a
m
a
g
e
,
b
r
o
k
e
n

o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d

p
o
w
e
r
l
i
n
e
s

i
n

t
h
e
s
e

a
r
e
a
s

a
n
d
a
d
j
o
i
n
i
n
g

a
b
o
v
e

b
r
i
d
g
e
s
.
-
S
l
i
p
s

o
n

E
v
a
n
s

P
a
s
s
w
o
u
l
d

c
l
o
s
e

r
o
a
d
.
(
i
)
B
r
i
d
g
e
s
-
C
o
l
o
m
b
o

S
t
r
e
e
t

r
a
i
l
o
v
e
r
b
r
i
d
g
e

u
n
u
s
a
b
l
e
.
-
H
e
a
t
h
c
o
t
e

R
i
v
e
r

c
r
o
s
s
i
n
g
O
K
.
-
F
e
r
r
y
m
e
a
d

B
r
i
d
g
e

c
o
u
l
d
b
e

b
y
-
p
a
s
s
e
d
,

p
r
o
v
i
d
e
d
a
c
c
e
s
s

a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e

P
o
r
t
H
i
l
l
s

R
o
a
d
/
B
r
i
d
l
e

P
a
t
h
R
o
a
d
.

H
o
w
e
v
e
r
,

P
o
r
t
H
i
l
l
s

R
o
a
d

l
i
k
e
l
y

t
o

b
e
a
f
f
e
c
t
e
d

b
y

P
r
i
m
a
r
y
R
o
u
t
e

d
a
m
a
g
e
,

B
r
i
d
l
e
P
a
t
h

l
i
k
e
l
y

t
o

b
e

c
l
o
s
e
d
b
y

s
l
i
p
s
.
-
N
o

r
e
a
d
y

a
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e

t
o
E
v
a
n
s

P
a
s
s

(
T
u
n
n
e
l
,
G
e
b
b
i
e
s

P
a
s
s
,

D
y
e
r
s
P
a
s
s
)
.
-
A
t

g
r
a
d
e

r
a
i
l
w
a
y
c
r
o
s
s
i
n
g
s

a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
.
-
N
e
a
r
e
s
t

a
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
r
o
u
t
e

o
v
e
r

h
i
l
l
s

i
s
C
h
r
i
s
t
c
h
u
r
c
h

R
o
a
d
T
u
n
n
e
l
.
-
R
e
f
e
r

B
r
i
d
g
e
s

t
a
b
l
e
.
-
U
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
i
n
g

o
f
o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
.
-
R
e
n
e
w
/
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n

a
t
r
i
s
k

u
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

a
t

k
e
y
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
-
R
e
t
a
i
n
m
e
n
t

o
r

p
l
a
n
t
i
n
g
o
f

p
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l

s
l
i
p

z
o
n
e
s
:
-
E
v
a
n
s

P
a
s
s
-
B
r
i
d
l
e

P
a
t
h

R
o
a
d
B
B
/
C
B C
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
:
1

t
o

5

-

5

m
o
s
t

i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
.
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
:
A
E
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
e
d

a
s

s
o
o
n

a
s

p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
.
B
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
d

f
o
r

w
o
r
k
s

o
r

f
u
r
t
h
e
r

i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
.
C
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

b
u
t

c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n

c
a
n

b
e

d
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
.
Table 6.2: Internal sector vulnerability
Transport 171
H
A
Z
A
R
D

E
V
E
N
T
:
E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E
S
e
c
t
o
r
R
o
u
t
e

-

R
o
a
d

N
a
m
e
s
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
o
f

R
o
u
t
e
E
f
f
e
c
t
s

o
f

H
a
z
a
r
d
A
v
a
i
l
a
b
i
l
i
t
y

o
f
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
s
P
h
y
s
i
c
a
l

W
o
r
k
s
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
F
o
u
r

A
v
e
n
u
e
s

t
o
S
o
u
t
h
-
W
e
s
t
L
i
n
c
o
l
n
;

H
a
l
s
w
e
l
l
4 3
(
i
i
)
R
o
a
d
s
-
L
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

d
a
m
a
g
e
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
o
u
t

s
e
c
t
o
r

-
s
l
u
m
p
i
n
g

a
n
d

b
r
o
k
e
n
k
e
r
b
s

a
n
d

c
h
a
n
n
e
l
s
.
-
B
u
r
s
t

w
a
t
e
r

p
i
p
e
s

a
n
d
d
a
m
a
g
e

t
o

o
t
h
e
r

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
,
b
r
o
k
e
n

o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d

p
o
w
e
r
l
i
n
e
s
.
-
M
e
d
i
u
m

t
o

h
i
g
h

r
i
s
k

o
f
r
o
a
d

b
l
o
c
k
a
g
e
s

d
u
e

t
o

s
l
i
p
s
o
n

D
y
e
r
s

P
a
s
s

R
o
a
d
.
(
i
)
B
r
i
d
g
e
s
-
S
o
m
e

d
e
b
r
i
s

f
r
o
m

L
i
n
c
o
l
n
R
o
a
d

o
v
e
r
p
a
s
s
,

r
e
a
d
i
l
y
c
l
e
a
r
e
d
.
-
S
o
m
e

d
i
s
r
u
p
t
i
o
n

a
t
H
e
a
t
h
c
o
t
e

R
i
v
e
r
,

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
w
o
r
k
s
.
(
i
i
)
R
o
a
d
s
-
M
i
n
o
r

l
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

d
a
m
a
g
e
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
.
-
S
o
m
e

d
a
m
a
g
e

t
o

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
,
k
e
r
b
s

a
n
d

c
h
a
n
n
e
l
s

e
t
c
.
-
S
p
a
r
k
s

R
o
a
d

r
o
u
t
e
l
i
k
e
l
y

t
o

b
e

m
o
r
e
r
o
b
u
s
t
.
-
U
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
i
n
g

o
f
o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
.
-
R
e
n
e
w
/
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n

a
t
r
i
s
k

u
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

a
t

k
e
y
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
-
R
e
t
a
i
n
m
e
n
t

o
r

p
l
a
n
t
i
n
g
o
f

p
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l

s
l
i
p

z
o
n
e
s
:
-
D
y
e
r
s

P
a
s
s

R
o
a
d
-
U
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
i
n
g

o
f
o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
.
-
S
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g

o
f
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

a
t

b
r
i
d
g
e
s
.
C
B
/
C
B C C
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
:
1

t
o

5

-

5

m
o
s
t

i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
.
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
:
A
E
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
e
d

a
s

s
o
o
n

a
s

p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
.
B
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
d

f
o
r

w
o
r
k
s

o
r

f
u
r
t
h
e
r

i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
.
C
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

b
u
t

c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n

c
a
n

b
e

d
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
.
Table 6.2: Internal sector vulnerability (continued)
H
A
Z
A
R
D

E
V
E
N
T
:
E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E
S
e
c
t
o
r
R
o
u
t
e

-

R
o
a
d

N
a
m
e
s
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
o
f

R
o
u
t
e
E
f
f
e
c
t
s

o
f

H
a
z
a
r
d
A
v
a
i
l
a
b
i
l
i
t
y

o
f
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
s
P
h
y
s
i
c
a
l

W
o
r
k
s
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
N
o
r
t
h
-
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
F
o
u
r

A
v
e
n
u
e
s

t
o
W
e
s
t
R
i
c
c
a
r
t
o
n
;

Y
a
l
d
h
u
r
s
t
F
o
u
r

A
v
e
n
u
e
s

t
o
J
o
h
n
s

R
o
a
d
P
a
p
a
n
u
i
;

H
a
r
e
w
o
o
d
3 3
(
i
)
B
r
i
d
g
e
s
-
N
i
l
.
(
i
i
)
R
o
a
d
s
-
M
i
n
o
r

l
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

d
a
m
a
g
e
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
.
-
S
o
m
e

d
a
m
a
g
e

t
o

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
,
k
e
r
b
s

a
n
d

c
h
a
n
n
e
l
s

e
t
c
.
-
C
o
l
l
a
p
s
e
d

b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
t
h
r
o
u
g
h

c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l

a
r
e
a
s
.
(
i
)
B
r
i
d
g
e
s
-
N
i
l
.
(
i
i
)
R
o
a
d
s
-
M
i
n
o
r

l
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

d
a
m
a
g
e
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
.
-
S
o
m
e

d
a
m
a
g
e

t
o

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
,
k
e
r
b
s

a
n
d

c
h
a
n
n
e
l
s

e
t
c
.
-
C
o
l
l
a
p
s
e
d

b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
t
h
r
o
u
g
h

c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l

a
r
e
a
s
.
-
B
r
o
k
e
n

o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d

p
o
w
e
r
l
i
n
e
s
.
-
P
r
i
m
a
r
y

r
o
u
t
e
s
.
-
F
e
n
d
a
l
t
o
n
/
M
e
m
o
r
i
a
l
.
-
U
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
i
n
g
.
C
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
:
1

t
o

5

-

5

m
o
s
t

i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
.
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
:
A
E
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
e
d

a
s

s
o
o
n

a
s

p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
.
B
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
d

f
o
r

w
o
r
k
s

o
r

f
u
r
t
h
e
r

i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
.
C
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

b
u
t

c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n

c
a
n

b
e

d
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
.
Transport 173
H
A
Z
A
R
D

E
V
E
N
T
:
E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E
S
e
c
t
o
r
R
o
u
t
e

-

R
o
a
d

N
a
m
e
s
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
o
f

R
o
u
t
e
E
f
f
e
c
t
s

o
f

H
a
z
a
r
d
A
v
a
i
l
a
b
i
l
i
t
y

o
f
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
s
P
h
y
s
i
c
a
l

W
o
r
k
s
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
N
o
r
t
h
-
E
a
s
t
e
r
n
C
i
r
c
u
m
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l
R
o
u
t
e
s
F
o
u
r

A
v
e
n
u
e
s

t
o
W
a
i
m
a
k
a
r
i
r
i

R
i
v
e
r
H
i
l
l
s
;

S
h
i
r
l
e
y
;

M
a
r
s
h
l
a
n
d
;
M
a
i
n

N
o
r
t
h
B
r
o
u
g
h
a
m
;

S
o
u
t
h
e
r
n
A
r
t
e
r
i
a
l
;

C
u
r
l
e
t
t
s
;
P
e
e
r
;

W
a
i
m
a
i
r
i
;
G
r
a
h
a
m
s
;

G
r
e
e
r
s
;
N
o
r
t
h
c
o
t
e
;

W
i
n
t
e
r
s
;
Q
E

I
I
;

T
r
a
v
i
s
J
o
h
n
s
;

R
u
s
s
l
e
y
;
C
a
r
m
e
n

(
S
H
1
)
3
2
-
3
2
-
3
(
i
)
B
r
i
d
g
e
s
-
C
l
o
s
u
r
e

o
f

r
o
a
d

l
i
k
e
l
y

a
t
S
t
y
x

R
i
v
e
r
.
-
C
l
o
s
u
r
e

l
i
k
e
l
y

a
t
W
a
i
m
a
k
a
r
i
r
i

R
i
v
e
r
.
(
i
i
)
R
o
a
d
s
-
S
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t

l
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n
d
a
m
a
g
e

l
i
k
e
l
y
.
-
B
u
r
s
t

w
a
t
e
r

p
i
p
e
s

a
n
d
o
t
h
e
r

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

d
a
m
a
g
e
,
b
r
o
k
e
n

o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d

p
o
w
e
r
l
i
n
e
s
.
(
i
)
B
r
i
d
g
e
s
-
A
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s

l
i
k
e
l
y

a
t
m
o
s
t

l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
s

i
n

o
r
d
e
r

t
o
o
p
e
n

r
o
u
t
e
,

n
o

m
a
j
o
r
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
a
l

p
r
o
b
l
e
m
s
a
n
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
e
d
.
(
i
i
)
R
o
a
d
s
-
L
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

e
f
f
e
c
t
s
T
r
a
v
i
s

R
o
a
d
,

B
r
o
u
g
h
a
m
S
t
r
e
e
t
,

i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
d
a
m
a
g
e
s

e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
(
i
)
B
r
i
d
g
e
s
-
N
i
l
.
(
i
i
)
R
o
a
d
s
-
O
v
e
r
h
e
a
d

p
o
w
e
r

l
i
n
e
s
.
-
M
a
i
n

N
o
r
t
h

R
o
a
d
a
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e

m
a
y

b
e
d
i
s
r
u
p
t
e
d

a
t

r
a
i
l

b
r
i
d
g
e
.
-
B
r
o
o
k
l
a
n
d
s

d
i
v
e
r
s
e
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
.
-
J
o
h
n
s

R
o
a
d

r
o
u
t
e
.
-
D
i
v
e
r
t

o
n
t
o

m
o
t
o
r
w
a
y
t
o

c
r
o
s
s

W
a
i
m
a
k
a
r
i
r
i
R
i
v
e
r
.
-
L
o
c
a
l

r
o
a
d
s
.
-
L
o
c
a
l

r
o
a
d
s
.
-
R
e
p
l
a
c
e
/
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
S
t
y
x

R
i
v
e
r

b
r
i
d
g
e

o
n
M
a
r
s
h
l
a
n
d

R
o
a
d
.
-
U
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
i
n
g
.
-
R
e
n
e
w
/

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n

a
t
r
i
s
k

u
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
i
n
g
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

a
t

k
e
y
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
-
U
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
i
n
g
.
-
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g
.
-
U
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
i
n
g
.
B C
B
/
C
B C B
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
:
1

t
o

5

-

5

m
o
s
t

i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
.
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
:
A
E
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
e
d

a
s

s
o
o
n

a
s

p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
.
B
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
d

f
o
r

w
o
r
k
s

o
r

f
u
r
t
h
e
r

i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
.
C
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

b
u
t

c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n

c
a
n

b
e

d
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
.
H
A
Z
A
R
D

E
V
E
N
T
:
E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E
S
e
c
t
o
r
R
o
u
t
e

-

R
o
a
d

N
a
m
e
s
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
o
f

R
o
u
t
e
E
f
f
e
c
t
s

o
f

H
a
z
a
r
d
A
v
a
i
l
a
b
i
l
i
t
y

o
f
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
s
P
h
y
s
i
c
a
l

W
o
r
k
s
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
M
a
i
n

N
o
r
t
h
;

P
a
p
a
n
u
i
;
B
l
i
g
h
s
;

I
d
r
i
s
;
S
t
r
o
w
a
n
;

W
h
i
t
e
l
e
i
g
h
;
B
a
r
r
i
n
g
t
o
n
C
u
r
l
e
t
t
s
;

H
o
o
n

H
a
y
;
C
a
s
h
m
e
r
e
3
2
-
3
(
i
)
B
r
i
d
g
e
s
-
M
i
n
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
l
y

r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
.
-
B
a
r
r
i
n
g
t
o
n

S
t
r
e
e
t

b
r
i
d
g
e

a
t
H
e
a
t
h
c
o
t
e

R
i
v
e
r

m
a
y

b
e
u
n
u
s
a
b
l
e
.
(
i
i
)
R
o
a
d
s
-
S
o
m
e

l
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

e
f
f
e
c
t
s
s
o
u
t
h

o
f

R
i
c
c
a
r
t
o
n

R
o
a
d
.
-
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

d
a
m
a
g
e
.
-
S
o
m
e

d
a
m
a
g
e

t
o

k
e
r
b
s

a
n
d
c
h
a
n
n
e
l
s

a
n
d

r
o
a
d

s
u
r
f
a
c
e
s
.
(
i
)
B
r
i
d
g
e
s
-
T
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y

r
e
p
a
i
r
s

a
t
C
a
s
h
m
e
r
e

R
o
a
d
.
(
i
i
)
R
o
a
d
s
-
S
o
m
e

l
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

e
f
f
e
c
t
s
s
o
u
t
h

o
f

R
i
c
c
a
r
t
o
n

R
o
a
d
.
-
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

d
a
m
a
g
e
.
-
S
o
m
e

d
a
m
a
g
e

t
o

k
e
r
b
s

a
n
d
c
h
a
n
n
e
l
s

a
n
d

r
o
a
d

s
u
r
f
a
c
e
s
.
-
L
o
c
a
l

r
o
a
d
s
.
-
C
o
l
o
m
b
o

S
t
r
e
e
t

b
r
i
d
g
e
.
-
S
e
e

B
r
i
d
g
e
s

t
a
b
l
e
.
-
U
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
i
n
g
.
C
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
:
1

t
o

5

-

5

m
o
s
t

i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
.
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
:
A
E
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
e
d

a
s

s
o
o
n

a
s

p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
.
B
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
d

f
o
r

w
o
r
k
s

o
r

f
u
r
t
h
e
r

i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
.
C
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

b
u
t

c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n

c
a
n

b
e

d
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
.
Transport 175
H
A
Z
A
R
D

E
V
E
N
T
:
E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E
S
e
c
t
o
r
R
o
u
t
e

-

R
o
a
d

N
a
m
e
s
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
o
f

R
o
u
t
e
E
f
f
e
c
t
s

o
f

H
a
z
a
r
d
A
v
a
i
l
a
b
i
l
i
t
y

o
f
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
s
P
h
y
s
i
c
a
l

W
o
r
k
s
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
E
n
s
o
r
s
;

A
l
d
w
i
n
s
T
u
n
n
e
l
;

B
e
x
l
e
y
3 2
(
i
)
B
r
i
d
g
e
s
-
N
i
l
.
(
i
i
)
R
o
a
d
s
-
L
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

d
a
m
a
g
e
.
-
B
u
s
t

w
a
t
e
r

p
i
p
e
s

a
n
d
o
t
h
e
r

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

d
a
m
a
g
e
,
b
r
o
k
e
n

o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d

p
o
w
e
r
l
i
n
e
s
.
(
i
)
B
r
i
d
g
e
s
-
M
o
d
e
r
a
t
e

d
a
m
a
g
e

t
o
T
u
n
n
e
l

R
o
a
d

b
r
i
d
g
e
s
w
h
i
c
h

w
o
u
l
d

r
e
q
u
i
r
e
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y

r
e
p
a
i
r
s

t
o
e
n
s
u
r
e

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
.
(
i
i
)
R
o
a
d
s
-
L
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

d
a
m
a
g
e
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
o
u
t

s
e
c
t
o
r

-
s
l
u
m
p
i
n
g

a
n
d

b
r
o
k
e
n
k
e
r
b
s

a
n
d

c
h
a
n
n
e
l
s
.
-
B
u
r
s
t

w
a
t
e
r

p
i
p
e
s

a
n
d
d
a
m
a
g
e

t
o

o
t
h
e
r

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
,
b
r
o
k
e
n

o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d

p
o
w
e
r
l
i
n
e
s
.
-
M
a
n
y

o
t
h
e
r

l
o
c
a
l

r
o
a
d
s
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
.
-
O
t
h
e
r

l
o
c
a
l

r
o
a
d
s
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
,

a
t

g
r
a
d
e
r
a
i
l
w
a
y

c
r
o
s
s
i
n
g
s
.
-
A
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e

H
e
a
t
h
c
o
t
e
R
i
v
e
r

c
r
o
s
s
i
n
g
s

a
t
R
u
t
h
e
r
f
o
r
d

S
t
r
e
e
t
,
R
a
d
l
e
y

S
t
r
e
e
t
.
-
U
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
i
n
g

o
f
o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
.
-
R
e
n
e
w
/
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n

a
t
r
i
s
k

u
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

a
t

k
e
y
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
-
R
e
f
e
r

B
r
i
d
g
e
s

t
a
b
l
e
.
-
U
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
i
n
g

o
f
o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
.
-
U
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
i
n
g

a
n
d
o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
.
-
R
e
n
e
w
/
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n

a
t
r
i
s
k

u
n
d
e
r
g
r
o
u
n
d
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

a
t

k
e
y
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
C C C
B
/
C
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
:
1

t
o

5

-

5

m
o
s
t

i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
.
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
:
A
E
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
e
d

a
s

s
o
o
n

a
s

p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
.
B
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
d

f
o
r

w
o
r
k
s

o
r

f
u
r
t
h
e
r

i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
.
C
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

b
u
t

c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n

c
a
n

b
e

d
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
.
I

D
B
r
i
d
g
e

N
a
m
e
D
a
m
a
g
e
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
R
o
u
t
e
/
S
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
C
o
m
m
e
n
t
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
N
o
r
t
h
e
r
n

P
r
i
m
a
r
y

R
o
u
t
e
T
7
0
2
S
t
y
x

(
R
a
i
l

o
/
b
)
3
R
e
m
o
v
e

s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
;

o
r
S
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n

s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
;

o
r
r
e
p
l
a
c
e

w
i
t
h

a
r
c
h
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
s
3
G
r
o
u
n
d

L
e
v
e
l

b
y

p
a
s
s
e
a
s
i
l
y

c
r
e
a
t
e
d
C
T
4
0
1
T
7
0
1
T
5
0
1
S
t
y
x

R
i
v
e
r
C
h
a
n
e
y
s

O
'
p
a
s
s
M
o
t
o
r
w
a
y

(
W
a
i
m
a
k

R
)
2 2 2
N
o
n
e

r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
I
m
p
r
o
v
e

l
o
n
g
i
t
u
d
i
n
a
l

E
Q
r
e
s
t
r
a
i
n
t
.
U
p
g
r
a
d
e
s
u
p
e
r
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
/
p
i
e
r

c
a
p
c
o
n
n
e
c
t
i
o
n
3 3 4
O
l
d

M
a
i
n

N
o
r
t
h

R
o
a
d
B
r
i
d
g
e

l
i
k
e
l
y

t
o

b
e
s
e
v
e
r
e
l
y

d
a
m
a
g
e
d
-
C A
-
E
a
s
t
e
r
n

S
u
b
u
r
b
s

P
r
i
m
a
r
y
R
o
u
t
e
R
1
0
2
P
a
g
e
s

(
A
v
o
n

R
i
v
e
r
)
3
U
n
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c

t
o

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
(
i
e

r
e
p
l
a
c
e
)
4
B
L
y
t
t
e
l
t
o
n

P
r
i
m
a
r
y

R
o
u
t
e
R
7
0
1
W
a
l
t
h
a
m

(
R
a
i
l

o
/
b
)
3
R
e
m
o
v
e

s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e

-
u
n
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c

t
o

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
3
G
a
s
s
o
n

S
t
r
e
e
t

b
y
p
a
s
s
C
R
2
0
5
O
p
a
w
a

E
x
'
w
a
y

(
H
e
a
t
h
c
o
t
e

R
)
1
N
i
l
5
S
e
e

n
o
t
e
*
-
Table 6.3: Key bridges primary routes
Transport 177
I

D
B
r
i
d
g
e

N
a
m
e
D
a
m
a
g
e
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
R
o
u
t
e
/
S
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
C
o
m
m
e
n
t
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
L
y
t
t
e
l
t
o
n

P
r
i
m
a
r
y

R
o
u
t
e
(
C
o
n
t
)
T
7
1
1
P
o
r
t
h
i
l
l
s

R
o
a
d

(
T
u
n
n
e
l

R
o
a
d
o
/
p
a
s
s
)
3
E
n
h
a
n
c
e

c
o
l
u
m
n

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
a
n
d

d
u
c
t
i
l
i
t
y
.

U
n
d
e
r
p
i
n
a
b
u
t
m
e
n
t
s
4
B
y

p
a
s
s

a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e

v
i
a
P
o
r
t

H
i
l
l
s
R
o
a
d
/
H
e
a
t
h
c
o
t
e
V
a
l
l
e
y
,

h
o
w
e
v
e
r

t
h
i
s

i
s
a
l
s
o

a
f
f
e
c
t
e
d

b
y

d
e
b
r
i
s
f
r
o
m

t
h
e

O
v
e
r
p
a
s
s
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
.
A
T
7
1
2
H
o
r
o
t
a
n
e

V
a
l
l
e
y

(
T
u
n
n
e
l

R
d
o
'
p
a
s
s
)
3
B
u
i
l
d

n
e
w

"
c
u
l
v
e
r
t
"

t
y
p
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
4
B
y
p
a
s
s

a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
B
T
7
1
3
H
e
a
t
h
c
o
t
e

V
a
l
l
e
y

(
T
u
n
n
e
l
R
o
a
d

o
'
p
a
s
s
)
2
U
n
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
4

"

"
B
-
T
u
n
n
e
l
1
R
e
v
i
e
w

p
o
r
t
a
l

b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
e
i
s
m
i
c

c
a
p
a
c
i
t
y

a
n
d
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n

i
f

n
e
c
e
s
s
a
r
y
4
A
-
N
o
r
w
i
c
h

Q
u
a
y
/
S
u
t
t
o
n

Q
u
a
y
(
r
a
i
l

o
/
b
)
3
F
u
r
t
h
e
r

i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
.
5
T
h
i
s

c
o
m
p
l
e
x

s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
c
o
u
l
d

a
f
f
e
c
t

r
o
a
d
,

a
n
d
r
a
i
l

a
c
c
e
s
s

t
o

p
o
r
t

a
n
d
a
c
c
e
s
s

t
o

w
h
a
r
v
e
s
.
A
R
7
0
5
S
o
u
t
h
e
r
n

P
r
i
m
a
r
y

R
o
u
t
e
B
l
e
n
h
e
i
m

R
o
a
d

(
R
a
i
l

o
/
b
)
3
S
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n

c
r
i
b
w
a
l
l
s
,
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n

a
b
u
t
m
e
n
t

b
a
s
e
l
a
t
e
r
a
l

r
e
s
i
s
t
a
n
c
e
3
B
y
p
a
s
s

a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
B
T
7
0
8
S
o
c
k
b
u
r
n

(
u
n
d
e
r
p
a
s
s
)
2
C
o
n
c
r
e
t
e

p
r
o
p
s

b
e
t
w
e
e
n
a
b
u
t
m
e
n
t
s
3
B
y
p
a
s
s

a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
C
T
7
0
9
S
o
c
k
b
u
r
n

(
R
a
i
l

o
/
b
)
2
S
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g

e
x
p
e
n
s
i
v
e
3
B
y
p
a
s
s

a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
C
Table 6.3: Key bridges primary routes (continued)
I

D
B
r
i
d
g
e

N
a
m
e
D
a
m
a
g
e
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
R
o
u
t
e
/
S
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
C
o
m
m
e
n
t
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y

f
o
r
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
A
i
r
p
o
r
t

P
r
i
m
a
r
y

R
o
u
t
e
R
1
2
5
F
e
n
d
a
l
t
o
n

(
A
v
o
n

R
)
1
N
i
l
4
-
-
F
e
n
d
a
l
t
o
n

(
W
a
i
r
a
r
a
p
a
)
1
N
i
l
4
-
R
1
2
3
F
o
u
r

A
v
e
n
u
e
s

P
r
i
m
a
r
y

R
o
u
t
e
C
a
r
l
t
o
n

M
i
l
l

(
A
v
o
n

R
)
1
N
i
l
4
-
R
7
0
2
M
o
o
r
h
o
u
s
e
/
C
o
l
o
m
b
o

(
O
'
p
a
s
s
)
3
L
o
n
g
i
t
u
d
i
n
a
l

s
e
i
s
m
i
c
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g
3
B
y
p
a
s
s

a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
B
R
1
0
9
F
i
t
z
g
e
r
a
l
d

(
A
v
o
n

R
)
2
S
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n

c
o
n
n
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
b
e
t
w
e
e
n

s
u
p
e
r

a
n
d

s
u
b
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e

a
n
d

b
e
t
w
e
e
n

t
h
e
t
w
o

s
p
a
n
s
4
B
D
a
m
a
g
e

C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
:

1
.

M
i
n
o
r
,

p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e

s
p
e
e
d

r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
,

s
o
m
e

w
o
r
k
s

r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d

i
m
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
l
y

a
n
d

f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g

e
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e
.
2
.

M
o
d
e
r
a
t
e
,

r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s

(
l
o
a
d
/
s
p
e
e
d
)

w
o
u
l
d

b
e

a
p
p
l
i
e
d
,

s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t

a
m
o
u
n
t

o
f

w
o
r
k
s

r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
.
3
.

S
e
v
e
r
e
,

c
o
l
l
a
p
s
e

l
i
k
e
l
y
/
b
r
i
d
g
e

l
i
k
e
l
y

t
o

b
e

u
n
u
s
a
b
l
e
,

o
r

u
s
e
a
b
l
e

f
o
r

e
m
e
r
g
e
n
c
y

t
r
a
f
f
i
c

o
n
l
y
,

m
a
j
o
r

w
o
r
k
s

o
r

b
y
p
a
s
s

r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d

i
n

l
o
n
g

t
e
r
m
.
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
:
A
.

E
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

r
e
g
a
r
d
e
d

a
s

a
n

u
r
g
e
n
t

w
o
r
k
s

o
r

f
u
r
t
h
e
r

i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
e

i
t
e
m
.
B
.

S
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
d

f
o
r

w
o
r
k
s

o
r

f
u
r
t
h
e
r

i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
.
C
.

W
o
r
k
s

d
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e
,

b
u
t

m
a
y

r
e
q
u
i
r
e

f
u
r
t
h
e
r

i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

(
e
.
g
.

o
f

n
e
e
d

f
o
r

s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
)
.
*

T
h
e

H
e
a
t
h
c
o
t
e

R
i
v
e
r

B
r
i
d
g
e

o
n

t
h
e

E
x
p
r
e
s
s
w
a
y

i
s

t
h
e

m
o
s
t

r
o
b
u
s
t

c
r
o
s
s
i
n
g

(
F
e
r
r
y
m
e
a
d

a
n
d

T
u
n
n
e
l

(
R
o
u
n
d
a
b
o
u
t
)

R
d

B
r
i
d
g
e
s

a
r
e

v
u
l
n
e
r
a
b
l
e
)
.

T
h
i
s

b
r
i
d
g
e

w
i
t
h

u
s
e

o
f

T
u
n
n
e
l

i
n
t
e
r
c
h
a
n
g
e

g
r
o
u
n
d

l
e
v
e
l

b
y

p
a
s
s
e
s

a
n
d

P
o
r
t

H
i
l
l
s

R
o
a
d

w
o
u
l
d

p
r
o
v
i
d
e

r
o
u
t
e

t
o

L
y
t
t
e
l
t
o
n
.

I
t

c
o
u
l
d

p
r
o
v
i
d
e

a
c
c
e
s
s

t
o

E
v
a
n
s

P
a
s
s

(
v
i
a

B
r
i
d
l
e

P
a
t
h

R
o
a
d
)

i
f

T
u
n
n
e
l

u
n
u
s
e
a
b
l
e
.

Table 6.3: Key bridges primary routes (continued)
Transport 179
I
D
B
r
i
d
g
e

N
a
m
e
s
D
a
m
a
g
e
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
C
o
m
m
e
n
t

-

W
o
r
k
s

t
o

r
e
-
o
p
e
n

o
n

T
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y

B
a
s
i
s
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y

f
o
r
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
R
2
0
1
R
8
0
1
T
7
1
0
T
2
0
1
R
1
0
1
R
2
0
3
R
2
0
2
E
a
s
t
e
r
n

S
e
c
t
o
r

-

C
i
t
y

t
o

P
o
r
t
o
f

L
y
t
t
e
l
t
o
n

v
i
a

F
e
r
r
y
R
o
a
d
/
L
i
n
w
o
o
d

A
v
e
n
u
e

a
n
d

v
i
a
E
v
a
n
s

P
a
s
s
.
F
e
r
r
y
m
e
a
d
.
C
a
u
s
e
w
a
y
.
E
a
s
t
e
r
n

S
e
c
t
o
r

-

C
r
o
s
s

S
e
c
t
o
r
R
o
u
t
e
s
.
T
u
n
n
e
l

R
o
a
d

r
a
i
l

o
v
e
r
b
r
i
d
g
e
.
T
u
n
n
e
l

R
o
a
d
.
S
o
u
t
h

B
r
i
g
h
t
o
n
.
E
a
s
t
e
r
n

S
e
c
t
o
r

-

O
t
h
e
r

B
r
i
d
g
e
s
.
G
a
r
l
a
n
d
s

R
o
a
d
.
R
u
t
h
e
r
f
o
r
d

S
t
r
e
e
t
S
o
u
t
h
e
r
n

S
e
c
t
o
r
O
p
a
w
a

R
o
a
d
.
3 2 2 2 1 2 1 3
S
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g

t
o

b
e

i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
e
d
.
S
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g

t
o

b
e

i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
e
d
.
M
a
j
o
r

s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
a
l

i
m
p
r
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
s
w
o
u
l
d

b
e

r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
.
M
a
j
o
r

s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
a
l

i
m
p
r
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
s
w
o
u
l
d

b
e

r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
.
N
i
l
.
- -
S
h
e
a
r

k
e
y
s

b
e
t
w
e
e
n

s
u
p
e
r
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
a
n
d

p
i
e
r

a
n
d

a
b
u
t
m
e
n
t
s
.
T
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y

j
o
i
n
t

r
e
p
a
i
r
s
,

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s

a
n
d

p
r
o
p
p
i
n
g
.
T
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y

r
e
i
n
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t

o
f

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
e
s
.
T
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y

b
y
p
a
s
s

c
o
u
l
d

b
e

e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
e
d
.
L
i
k
e
l
y

t
o

r
e
q
u
i
r
e

t
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k

a
n
d

p
r
o
p
s
t
o

r
e
m
a
i
n

u
s
a
b
l
e
.
-
A
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s

r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
.
T
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y

m
i
n
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
.
A
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s
.
A B C C
- - - B
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
:
1

t
o

5

-

5

m
o
s
t

i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
.
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
:
A
E
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
e
d

a
s

s
o
o
n

a
s

p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
.
B
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
d

f
o
r

w
o
r
k
s

o
r

f
u
r
t
h
e
r

i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
.
C
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

b
u
t

c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n

c
a
n

b
e

d
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
.
Table 6.4: Bridges summary internal sectors
I
D
B
r
i
d
g
e

N
a
m
e
s
D
a
m
a
g
e
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
C
o
m
m
e
n
t

-

W
o
r
k
s

t
o

r
e
-
o
p
e
n

o
n

T
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y

B
a
s
i
s
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y

f
o
r
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
R
2
0
8
R
2
0
9
R
2
1
0
R
2
1
3
R
2
1
4
R
2
1
7
R
2
1
9
R
2
2
0
R
2
2
1
T
2
0
2
T
7
0
3
T
7
0
4
T
7
0
5
E
n
s
o
r
s

R
o
a
d
.
W
i
l
s
o
n
s

R
o
a
d
.
T
e
n
n
y
s
o
n

S
t
r
e
e
t
.
C
o
l
o
m
b
o

S
t
r
e
e
t

(
H
e
a
t
h
c
o
t
e
)
.
B
a
r
r
i
n
g
t
o
n

S
t
r
e
e
t
.
C
a
s
h
m
e
r
e

R
o
a
d
.
R
o
s
e

S
t
r
e
e
t
.
S
p
a
r
k
s

R
o
a
d
.
L
i
n
c
o
l
n

R
o
a
d
.
C
u
r
l
e
t
t
s

R
o
a
d
.
L
i
n
c
o
l
n

R
o
a
d

o
v
e
r
p
a
s
s
.
R
a
c
e
w
a
y

o
v
e
r
p
a
s
s
.
S
o
u
t
h
e
r
n

S
e
c
t
o
r

C
o
n
t
W
r
i
g
h
t
s

R
o
a
d

o
v
e
r
p
a
s
s
.
2 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2
P
o
s
s
i
b
l
e

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g

o
f
c
o
n
n
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
.
M
a
j
o
r

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g
/
r
e
n
e
w
a
l
.
-
M
a
j
o
r

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g
/
r
e
n
e
w
a
l
.
M
a
j
o
r

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g

o
f
s
u
b
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
.
- -
M
a
j
o
r

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g
/
r
e
n
e
w
a
l

o
f
c
u
l
v
e
r
t

s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
.
- - - -
T
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s
.
M
i
n
o
r

r
e
p
a
i
r
s

p
o
s
s
i
b
l
y
.
M
i
n
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s

(
l
o
n
g

t
e
r
m

p
i
l
e

r
e
p
a
i
r
s
l
i
k
e
l
y
)
.
M
i
n
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s
.
M
a
y

b
e

d
a
m
a
g
e
d

b
e
y
o
n
d

r
e
p
a
i
r

o
r

t
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y

u
s
e
.
M
i
n
o
r

r
e
p
a
i
r
s

a
n
d

t
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y

p
r
o
p
p
i
n
g
.
M
i
n
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s
.
M
i
n
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s
.
M
i
n
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s
.
M
i
n
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s
.
M
i
n
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

a
n
d

j
o
i
n
t

r
e
p
a
i
r
s
.

C
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
e
d

y
i
e
l
d
i
n
g
.
M
i
n
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

a
n
d

j
o
i
n
t

r
e
p
a
i
r
s
.

C
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
e
d

y
i
e
l
d
i
n
g
.
M
i
n
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

a
n
d

j
o
i
n
t

r
e
p
a
i
r
s
.

C
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
e
d

y
i
e
l
d
i
n
g
.
- - - - B B - -
C
- - - -
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
:
1

t
o

5

-

5

m
o
s
t

i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
.
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
:
A
E
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
e
d

a
s

s
o
o
n

a
s

p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
.
B
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
d

f
o
r

w
o
r
k
s

o
r

f
u
r
t
h
e
r

i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
.
C
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

b
u
t

c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n

c
a
n

b
e

d
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
.
Table 6.4: Bridges summary internal sectors (continued)
Transport 181
I
D
B
r
i
d
g
e

N
a
m
e
s
D
a
m
a
g
e
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
C
o
m
m
e
n
t

-

W
o
r
k
s

t
o

r
e
-
o
p
e
n

o
n

T
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y

B
a
s
i
s
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y

f
o
r
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
T
7
0
6
T
7
0
7
R
7
0
3
R
7
0
4
R
1
3
1
R
1
5
9
R
1
4
6
R
1
5
0
R
4
1
2
R
4
1
1
R
4
0
5
A
n
n
e
x

R
o
a
d

o
v
e
r
p
a
s
s
.
C
u
r
l
e
t
t
s

R
o
a
d

R
a
i
l

o
v
e
r
p
a
s
s
.
C
o
l
o
m
b
o

S
t
r
e
e
t

R
a
i
l

o
v
e
r
p
a
s
s
.
D
u
r
h
a
m

S
t
r
e
e
t

R
a
i
l

o
v
e
r
p
a
s
s
.
W
e
s
t
e
r
n

S
e
c
t
o
r
S
t
r
a
v
e
n

R
o
a
d

(
n
o
r
t
h

K
i
l
m
a
r
n
o
c
k
)
.
S
t
r
a
v
e
n

R
o
a
d

(
s
o
u
t
h

F
e
n
d
a
l
t
o
n
)
.
C
l
y
d
e

R
o
a
d
.
W
a
i
m
a
i
r
i

R
o
a
d
.
N
o
r
t
h
-
W
e
s
t
e
r
n

S
e
c
t
o
r
I
d
r
i
s

R
o
a
d
.
H
a
r
e
w
o
o
d

R
o
a
d

(
S
t
y
x

R
i
v
e
r
)
.
S
a
w
y
e
r
s

A
r
m
s

R
o
a
d

(
S
t
y
x

R
i
v
e
r
)
.
N
o
r
t
h
-
E
a
s
t
e
r
n

S
e
c
t
o
r
M
a
r
s
h
l
a
n
d

R
o
a
d

(
S
t
y
x

R
o
a
d
)
.
1 2 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 3
- -
M
a
j
o
r

s
e
i
s
m
i
c

s
t
r
e
n
g
h
t
e
n
i
n
g
.
I
n
c
r
e
a
s
e

b
e
a
r
i
n
g

s
e
a
t
i
n
g

a
r
e
a
.
M
a
j
o
r

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g
.
M
a
j
o
r

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g

o
r

r
e
n
e
w
a
l
.
- - - - -
I
m
p
r
o
v
e

l
a
t
e
r
a
l

r
e
s
t
r
a
i
n
t
.
M
i
n
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s
.
M
i
n
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s

a
n
d

j
o
i
n
t

r
e
p
a
i
r
s
.

C
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
e
d
y
i
e
l
d
i
n
g
.
U
n
u
s
a
b
l
e
,

u
n
r
e
p
a
i
r
a
b
l
e
.
S
u
p
e
r
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e

s
e
t
t
l
e
m
e
n
t

r
e
p
a
i
r
s
.
M
i
n
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s
.
M
i
n
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s
.
- - - - -
U
n
l
i
k
e
l
y

t
o

b
e

u
s
a
b
l
e
.
- -
C C
- - - - - - -
A
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
:
1

t
o

5

-

5

m
o
s
t

i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
.
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
:
A
E
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
e
d

a
s

s
o
o
n

a
s

p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
.
B
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
d

f
o
r

w
o
r
k
s

o
r

f
u
r
t
h
e
r

i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
.
C
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

b
u
t

c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n

c
a
n

b
e

d
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
.
I
D
B
r
i
d
g
e

N
a
m
e
s
D
a
m
a
g
e
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
C
o
m
m
e
n
t

-

W
o
r
k
s

t
o

r
e
-
o
p
e
n

o
n

T
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y

B
a
s
i
s
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
f
o
r
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
-
R
1
0
5
R
1
0
8
R
1
0
7
R
1
0
6
R
1
0
4
R
1
0
3
R
3
0
3
R
1
1
0
R
1
1
1
N
o
r
t
h
c
o
t
e

E
x
p
r
e
s
s
w
a
y

A
l
u
f
l
o
C
u
l
v
e
r
t
s
.
N
e
w

B
r
i
g
h
t
o
n

R
o
a
d

(
D
u
d
l
e
y
C
r
e
e
k
)
.
S
t
a
n
m
o
r
e

R
o
a
d

(
A
v
o
n
)
.
S
w
a
n
n
s

R
o
a
d

(
A
v
o
n
)
.
G
a
y
h
u
r
s
t

R
o
a
d

(
A
v
o
n
)
.
A
v
o
n
d
a
l
e

R
o
a
d

(
A
v
o
n
)
.
W
a
i
n
o
n
i

R
o
a
d

(
A
v
o
n
)
.
S
h
i
r
l
e
y

R
o
a
d

(
S
h
i
r
l
e
y
S
t
r
e
a
m
)
.
C
e
n
t
r
a
l

C
i
t
y

S
e
c
t
o
r
B
a
r
b
a
d
o
e
s

S
t
r
e
e
t
.
K
i
l
m
o
r
e

S
t
r
e
e
t
.
2 1 2 3 3 3 3 1 1 2
S
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n

c
o
n
n
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
.
M
a
j
o
r

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g
.
S
e
i
s
m
i
c

l
a
t
e
r
a
l

r
e
s
t
r
a
i
n
t

a
t
a
b
u
t
m
e
n
t
s

a
n
d

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
a
b
u
t
m
e
n
t

w
a
l
l
s
.
S
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n

a
b
u
t
m
e
n
t
s
.
M
a
j
o
r

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g
,

n
e
w
E
x
p
r
e
s
s
w
a
y

b
r
i
d
g
e

p
r
o
p
o
s
e
d
.
- -
S
h
e
a
r

c
o
n
n
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
s
u
p
e
r
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
/
a
b
u
t
m
e
n
t
s
.
M
i
n
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s
.
-
M
i
n
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s
,

t
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y

p
r
o
p
p
i
n
g
,
r
e
p
a
i
r
s
.
A
p
p
o
r
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s
,

p
r
o
p
p
i
n
g
.
B
r
i
d
g
e

u
n
u
s
a
b
l
e
.
M
a
y

b
e

u
s
a
b
l
e
.

E
x
t
e
n
s
i
v
e

p
r
o
p
p
i
n
g
.
M
a
j
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s
,

p
r
o
p
p
i
n
g
.
M
i
n
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s
.
M
i
n
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s
.
- -
C C C B - - - B
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
:
1

t
o

5

-

5

m
o
s
t

i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
.
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
:
A
E
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
e
d

a
s

s
o
o
n

a
s

p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
.
B
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
d

f
o
r

w
o
r
k
s

o
r

f
u
r
t
h
e
r

i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
.
C
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

b
u
t

c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n

c
a
n

b
e

d
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
.
Transport 183
I
D
B
r
i
d
g
e

N
a
m
e
s
D
a
m
a
g
e
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
C
o
m
m
e
n
t

-

W
o
r
k
s

t
o

r
e
-
o
p
e
n

o
n

T
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y

B
a
s
i
s
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
f
o
r
M
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
R
1
1
2
R
1
1
3
R
1
1
4
R
1
1
5
R
1
1
6
R
1
1
8
R
1
1
9
R
1
2
0
M
a
d
r
a
s

S
t
r
e
e
t
.
M
a
n
c
h
e
s
t
e
r

S
t
r
e
e
t
.
C
o
l
o
m
b
o

S
t
r
e
e
t

(
A
v
o
n
)
.
A
r
m
a
g
h

S
t
r
e
e
t
.
G
l
o
u
c
e
s
t
e
r

S
t
r
e
e
t
.
H
e
r
e
f
o
r
d

S
t
r
e
e
t
.
D
u
r
h
a
m

S
t
r
e
e
t
.
M
o
n
t
r
e
a
l

S
t
r
e
e
t
.
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
S
h
e
a
r

c
o
n
n
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
s
u
p
e
r
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
/
a
b
u
t
m
e
n
t
s
.
- - - - - - -
M
i
n
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s
.
- - - - - -
M
i
n
o
r

a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h

w
o
r
k
s
.
B - - - - - - -
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
:
1

t
o

5

-

5

m
o
s
t

i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
.
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
:
A
E
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
e
d

a
s

s
o
o
n

a
s

p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
.
B
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

a
n
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

b
e

p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
d

f
o
r

w
o
r
k
s

o
r

f
u
r
t
h
e
r

i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
.
C
D
e
s
i
r
a
b
l
e

b
u
t

c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n

c
a
n

b
e

d
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
.
facilities is a relatively cheap task which should be
undertaken. Air conditioning plant is widespread at the
airport and is similarly vulnerable and its failure or
displacement can damage more vital equipment, its
security should be also investigated.
Beyond the airport the security of communication and
power supply needs further investigation in addition to
investigation on the airport.
6.6 Vulnerability Major
Windstorm
The windstorm peak may last 1 to 1.5 hours, however
high winds may continue for some time (see Section
2.6).
Roads will be blocked by trees and overhead services,
traffic signs and roofing, glass and other building
debris. Abandoned and crashed vehicles, including
trucks and trailers, could also disrupt roads. Alterna-
tive routes may not be available and rain following the
windstorm could occur and may exacerbate the situa-
tion.
Immediate response may be difficult as communica-
tions and power towers, pylons and poles may be
damaged. Damage is likely to be widespread. Broken
power lines may prevent an early response to road
clearance. Initial priorities would concentrate on es-
tablishing emergency corridors for services, rescue
and movement of people.
hierarchy of Primary Routes, Sector Distributors
followed by remaining Arterial, Distributor and
Local Roads. Determining priorities will need to be
co-ordinated with service authorities in ensuring
that the most effective actions from the total City
point of view are undertaken first. (Service Author-
ity work in restoring all overhead services is likely
to take several months but this need not impinge
markedly on key transport routes.);
statement priorities;
removing debris from roads, footpaths, drains, be-
neath bridges, etc., and re-establishing mainte-
nance regimes.
Initial road clearance will be followed by detailed
clean up programmes and finally a return to normal
maintenance schedules.
Rail operations would be suspended during the peak
wind event due to the risk of passenger carriages (in
particular) blowing over during wind gusts. This would
require sufficient early warning to enable arrange-
ments for passenger safety to be made. Areas most at
risk would be the main trunk lines to the north and south
of the city.
Other rail infrastructure including buildings (espe-
cially large glazed areas, e.g. Addington Station) and
communications aerials would be at risk.
Airport vulnerability
The main impact of the worst scenario wind storm
would be on navigational aids and communications
equipment. The existing aerials and masts associated
with the communications and glide slope system are
not designed for wind speeds in the order of those set
out in the scenario.
The restoration of services after a wind storm could be
achieved relatively quickly with the availability of
spare aerials and mast components from both on site
and from other sites within the Airways Corporation
network.
The vulnerability of radar systems has been assessed
and it is felt that the secondary surveillance radar and
radome on Cass Peak should be able to withstand the
expected wind strengths (the identical unit in Welling-
ton has demonstrated excellent performance in severe
storm conditions). The primary radar mast is felt to be
vulnerable.
Other considerations for wind storm conditions are the
impact on buildings and, particularly, on structures
such as the control tower which is very exposed and
may suffer damage. An alternate site for Air Traffic
Services exists in the Fire Service watch room if
significant damage is sustained. Wind blown debris on
runways would need to be cleared prior to operations
recommencing.
Restoration of Service
The airport would be closed during a wind storm of the
order estimated. The airport could be reopened very
quickly after a storm has passed but the operation may
be limited to daytime visual flight rules if navigation
aids have been damaged. The degree of damage would
define the limitations to operations and a priority
would have to set at the time on which navigation aids
would be repaired first.
Full restoration of services assuming the worst case
damage could take up to three weeks.
Transport 185
Port of Lyttelton vulnerability
Wind has not caused any known damage of signifi-
cance to port installations. Provided adequate warning
is provided, container cranes and other critical equip-
ment and berthed ships can be secured. Design wind
speeds for port structures are typically 70 knots (130
km/h) to 85 knots (160 km/h), with the container
cranes designed for 92 knot (170 km/h) winds. Veloci-
ties above this level are likely to result in damage to
facilities such as the signal tower and container cranes.
At wind gust velocities of 170 km/h it is possible that
bollards on older inner harbour finger jetties would
pull away if ships were berthed there.
Trees
Wind storms present the biggest threat to trees in
Canterbury with winds of the severity of the 1975
storm anticipated to recur on average approximately
every 30 years. In most years, however, high winds are
experienced which cause significant damage to planta-
tions and amenity trees. In Canterbury forest situations
in 1975, 64% of all trees uprooted or broken were
shelterbelts and group plantings the greatest risk to
roads being blocked in rural and semi rural areas. Old
roadside poplar shelterbelts and willow often suffering
from extensive decay are another high risk. On average
deciduous trees are less likely to be windthrown than
evergreen trees as they are without foliage for approxi-
mately four to five months of the year when they
present less sail effect to wind forces. Weeping
willows are an exception as brittle timber and very
weighty dense branches makes them particularly prone
to wind damage. The trunks of most other open grown
deciduous broadleaved trees are usually stockier than
Pinus species and therefore less prone to stem break-
age.
Research following the catastrophic storm in England
in 1987 found that trees that had been pruned to thin
crown density stood, while unthinned trees fell. Judi-
cious pruning obviously plays an important part in
significantly reducing the degree of risk from
windthrown tree hazards. Of concern in urban areas is
the long term effect trenching/excavation operations
may have had on the root systems and stability of trees
growing on or near public roads.
Mitigation measures
Road System
Mitigation measures for snow and wind hazards are
discussed in Section 6.7 Major Snowstorm.
Airport
The design of aerials and masts should be assessed in
terms of the worst scenario. If it is practical to strengthen
the aerials and masts, an upgrading programme should
be undertaken. CIAL should discuss the writing of a
formal restoration plan with the Airways Corporation
to enable speedy reinstatement of service.
A disaster plan for the wind storm scenario should be
written to provide protection to buildings and people.
Points to be considered could include advice on open-
ing windows on the lee side of the building to minimise
windows blowing out etc. A structural engineer should
be engaged to establish strategies for minimising inter-
nal wind pressure differentials.
6.7 Vulnerability Major
Snowstorm
The snowstorm may last for several days. Roads may
be completely blocked by snow, and in some locations
by trees and collapsed overhead services. Abandoned
and crashed vehicles could also disrupt roads.
If snow freezes on road surfaces, traffic disruption
would increase markedly as the ice could not be cleared
until the snow thawed. All vehicles would, in these
conditions, require chains if the roads were passable.
The spreading of grit would help alleviate icy condi-
tions. The effects would be magnified on the Port Hills
where blockages could last several days or longer.
Alternative routes may be available if ongoing snow
clearance during the storm allows emergency corridors
to remain open. Power loss would result in loss of
traffic lights.
Some communications difficulties would occur, par-
ticularly as access could be difficult. This would limit
the amount of available information on conditions and
problems.
Flooding is likely from snowmelt, particularly when
combined with and tidal effects.
Initial priorities would concentrate on establishing
emergency corridors for services and the rescue and
movement of people.
hierarchy of primary routes, sector distributors
followed by remaining arterial, distributor and lo-
cal loads (this is the hierarchy identified in this
report);
statement priorities;
removing snow, tree, etc. debris and re-establish-
ing maintenance regimes; and
clearing landslides, slips and blockages on hill-
sides.
Snow clearing plant is located throughout the city in
various contractors depots. The City Councils in-
house contractor has three yards, each able to respond
in some way. This will be of value as the immediate
availability of external contractors plant cannot be
guaranteed.
Service Authority work in restoring all overhead serv-
ices is likely to take several months, but with effective
co-ordination will not impinge markedly on key trans-
port routes. Initial road clearance will be followed by
detailed clean-up programmes, retaining wall con-
struction and the like. Normal maintenance schedules
will be phased in.
Rail operations would be suspended with the build up
of snow on tracks. As with roads, trains could resume
operations once snow clearance or snow melt had
occurred.
Damaged trees and overhead power lines adjacent to
tracks would also disrupt operations, requiring clear-
ance prior to the resumption of services.
The effect of snow on airport operations will depend on
what happens after the snow fall and to some extent
how wet the snow is when it falls. During the
snowstorm the airport may be closed and efforts will
begin immediately to clear snow from the runways,
taxiways and apron areas. However, the ability of the
airport maintenance staff to clear snow is limited by
equipment.
If the snow freezes to runway surfaces the airport will
be closed until the snow thaws. There are no acceptable
methods available for clearing frozen snow/ice from
the runway surfaces.
The main strip area may be cleaned reasonably quickly
if freezing does not occur but clearing of snow from
around navigation aids will be slow and manpower
intensive. This may mean that limited daytime visual
operations only may be possible in the short term.
The impact of snow falls of varying depths has been
considered. The restoration and mitigation measures
described are for snow falls of up to 250 mm. In
extreme events where the snow fall exceeds this level
the ability to clear snow without specialist equipment
is limited.
Restoration of Services
1 Immediate action will be taken during the snow
storm to attempt to keep the runway system clear.
2 In freezing snow conditions:
No action will be possible until snow thaws. A
further two to three days will be required to clear
melting snow.
3 If temperatures remain above freezing:
Limited operations may be possible after one day of
snow clearing with full services available in two to
three days.
Road access to the port would be blocked thereby
affecting operations. Shipping would be affected by
land-based disruption. The closure of roads means the
port cannot be serviced by personnel. The signals
tower, built in the 1970s, has a flat roof which could be
damaged under snow overload. Container crane opera-
tions would be suspended until snow could be cleared.
Trees
The planting of large branched evergreen trees in
positions where the branches are likely to overhang the
road carriageway should be avoided. Commonly planted
trees such as Pinus radiata, Cuppressus macrocarpa
and Acacia (wattle species) and cedar species are
particularly susceptible to major branch and stem break-
age under the weight of snow. In wet ground conditions
evergreen trees heavily laden with snow may lift at the
roots and fall over, particularly when accompanied by
high winds. Pinus radiata suffered a high incidence of
this in the August snow of 1992.
If large exotic conifers, evergreens etc. are required for
planting near roads they should be of a species indig-
enous to high snowfall areas and therefore naturally
resistant to snow damage.
Generally it would be safer to plant deciduous trees
(with the exception of willows) as the weight of snow
on bare branches would not ordinarily be sufficient to
cause major breakage or root lift.
Another consideration with regard to deciduous trees is
that bare branches allow sunlight to reach the road
carriageway causing the snow to melt faster.
Transport 187
Mitigation measures
Road Network (Snow and Wind Hazards)
Investigate the resilience of and the need for backup
power facilities for traffic monitoring cameras and
display units to enable ongoing conditions moni-
toring of key city sites from the City Councils
Tuam Street building.
Establish priorities for putting overhead services
underground on key transport routes, including
primary routes, sector distributors and other arte-
rial routes.
Clarify and document emergency event procedures
(disaster plan), responsibilities and information
flows across transport agencies and other lifelines
agencies including establishing response plans and
reconnaissance plans.
Provide more 4-wheel drive vehicles in the Coun-
cils fleet.
Procedures should be developed for the spreading
of grit.
As a general guideline, the following are recommended
for the management of trees in the vicinity of all public
roads:
Plant fewer large growing conifers/evergreens on
the north side of roads than the south.
Avoid planting damage-prone conifers/evergreens
such as Pinus radiata, Cuppressus macrocarpa,
Acacia/Racosperma (Wattle species) and most
Eucalyptus species within 35 metres of roads.
Plant at wider spacings to ensure individual trees
grow and adapt to wind forces and have adequate
room for lateral root development.
Carry out frequent pruning to thin crown and re-
duce excessive end weight on large branches.
Progressively remove suspect pines, macrocarpas,
evergreens, debilitated poplars and willow and
replant with more suitable species.
Airport
A disaster plan should be written to highlight action to
be undertaken and contingency measures and a resto-
ration plan for scenarios should be written. Relation-
ships with business partners involved in contracting
should be formed to enable access to more equipment
to speed snow clearing.
6.8 Vulnerability
Waimakariri River Flooding
General effects
Breakout affecting the transport system could occur at
any of three locations as detailed below.
Upstream breakout from Halkett
The most upstream breakout, from Halkett, would
result in flows crossing the Main South Road in several
locations in the Hornby/Wigram area, flowing into the
upper reaches of the Heathcote and Halswell Rivers.
River water would also flow across the airport, cross-
ing Russley Road and flowing east of Memorial Av-
enue to reach the Avon River. This event would have
the following effects:
Road network disruption to State Highway 73,
Main South Road and State Highway 75 to Akaroa,
water depth approximately 0.5 metre. The road
would be closed to traffic blocking access to the
south and west.
Similar disruption to Russley Road would occur.
Flooding of the Avon River from Hagley Park to
the Estuary could block access from the south of the
city to the north. There could be some washouts.
Clearance of roads following the flood should be
able to be effected quickly.
Access from the north of the city to the north should
be available. Road access to the port could be
threatened by high flood levels in the Heathcote
River.
Rail network washouts of ballast would close
the south line. Temporary repairs could be effected
quickly once floodwaters subsided.
Port of Lyttelton no direct effects.
Breakout floodwaters from Crossbank
Breakout floodwaters from Crossbank would flow
across the airport, following both the Avon River path
above, and also along Johns Road into the Upper Styx
River. Effects are as follows.
Road network Russley/Johns Road would be
closed, depth up to 1 metre. Main North Road and
Marshland Road would be restricted to heavy vehi-
cles and four-wheel drives, depth up to 0.5 metre.
Access would be available from the south and west,
with limited access from the north.
Rail network ballast washouts on the north line
would affect rail transport to the north, probably for
several days. Access remains available from the
south and the port.
Port of Lyttelton no direct effects.
Downstream breakout at Englebrechts
The downstream breakout at Englebrechts would flow
directly into the South Branch of the Waimakariri,
flooding the Chaneys and northern motorway areas
south of the main river. Water would also enter Kaputone
Stream to the Styx River. Effects are as follows.
Road network Main North Road, northern mo-
torway and Marshland Road likely to be closed.
This would cut access to the north during the
duration of the flood event. Access would be avail-
able to the south, the airport and the port.
Rail network ballast washouts would close the
north line only.
Port of Lyttelton no effects.
Even without breakout, there could be some disruption
to the transport system. While the twin motorway
bridges and rail bridge across the Waimakariri are
expected to survive this flow, the older Main North
Road bridge with its shallower piles could well be
severely damaged. In transport terms this would not be
a major problem, although it would bring into question
the issue of whether to rebuild the bridge at all.
A major flood event breaking out from the Waimakariri
upstream of the airport could result in damage to the
runway and taxiway system, probable flooding of the
airport terminal building basement and other airport
buildings (aircraft operators, freight forwarders etc.)
and severe damage to power, water, sewerage and
stormwater reticulation. Depending on water veloci-
ties in the old flood channels the runway may be
damaged by scouring and will definitely be left cov-
ered with silt and debris. The flooding of the terminal
building basement will result in a loss of power, heat-
ing, cooling and some communication (see Section
6.9).
The damage to site reticulation services such as power
and water will be significant as the floodwaters drown
pumping stations and electrical substations on site.
Restoration
The main limiting factors in restoring services will be
the availability of water and power. It is also likely that
flood waters will dump silt into the soak pits on site.
The ability to pump out flood water from buildings and
ponding areas will depend on being able to dispose of
the water.
Limited services operating during the hours of daylight
under visual flight rules might be operational in two to
three weeks. Full restoration of services is likely to take
four to six months.
Mitigation measures
The most effective mitigation measure is the Canter-
bury Regional Councils proposed flood alleviation
scheme, comprising of a stopbank system west of the
airport. This would not reduce the likelihood of the
breakouts described above from occurring, but would
divert these flows safely back into the Waimakariri.
The possibility of reducing velocities in the old flood
channels near the airport should be investigated.
The possible development of a second parallel runway
system in the longer term (20 to 25 years) may give an
opportunity to reduce the impact of flooding in the
design of the earthworks associated with such a pro-
posal. An airport restoration plan should be developed
to speed the process of returning to normality.
6.9 Vulnerability Local Flood
Hazard
The flooding scenario is described in Section 2.4,
Local Flooding Hazard, an event being close to the
Probable Maximum Flood. Effects on the transport
system would arise from flooding of the Avon,
Heathcote and Styx Rivers, together with the accumu-
lation of stormwater throughout the city, unable to
enter the drainage system. There would be widespread
local ponding throughout the city, with secondary
surface flow paths developing to tributary streams,
open drains and river channels. These flow paths
would very likely be concentrated on roads, primarily
because adjoining properties tend to be raised above
road level, and because of the blocking effect of fences,
etc. In general, most roads would remain passable by
vehicles, with some roads totally blocked and others
requiring four-wheel drive type vehicles. There are a
number of likely trouble spots as highlighted below.
There could also be significant effects in hill catch-
ments, with saturated soils slipping and affecting roads
on or immediately below the Port Hills. These are
discussed in Section 6.11, Slope Hazards, in relation
to the transport system.
A further form of local flooding could occur in the
event of extreme high tide levels in the Estuary. This
could cause significant inundation effects in low lying
areas of eastern Christchurch. However, the attenua-
Transport 189
tion effects over wide areas, together with limits to the
amount of sea water that can physically enter the
Estuary and the blocking effect of existing stopbanks,
would restrict the maximum inundation depth (see
Section 2.4, Local Flooding Hazard).
Northern Primary route
Blockages and flooding of the Styx River could cause
backing up of floodwaters at Main North Road (cul-
vert) and the alternative Marshland Road bridge, al-
though it is unlikely that this would be sufficient to
affect traffic. Styx River flooding would cause disrup-
tion in the Brooklands area, probably blocking Lower
Styx Road in several locations. Cranford Street would
be affected by local floodwaters in the Dudley Creek
and Innes Road areas. These could have significant
traffic disruption effects, however the road is expected
to be passable. Papanui Road could be similarly af-
fected by Dudley Creek flooding.
Eastern Suburbs Primary route
Major river-based disruption is expected near the Pages
Road Bridge over the Avon River where floodwaters
could be up to 900 mm deep for several hours coincid-
ing with very high tide levels. Alternative routes via
Bridge Street, New Brighton Road or Travis Road
would be similarly affected, although to a lesser extent.
This route to the port is not expected to be affected by
river-based flooding, although local flooding effects
could be disruptive. Slips are discussed in relation to
slope hazards.
Alternative routes via Linwood Avenue or Ferry Road
would be affected by flooding associated with high
estuary level and backing up of the Heathcote River.
Ferry Road would probably be impassable for several
hours. The Sumner route would also be affected by
road flooding of Wakefield Avenue and hill slips.
Southern Primary route
No major effects are anticipated. Localised flooding on
the alternative Riccarton Road route in the Church
Corner vicinity would disrupt traffic flows on both
Riccarton and Yaldhurst Roads.
Airport Primary route
No major river-based effects are anticipated. Local
flooding in the vicinity of the Russley/Memorial inter-
section could potentially disrupt access both to the
airport and on the north-south State Highway 1 route.
Four Avenues Primary route
No major river-based effects are anticipated.
Other effects
A number of roads crossing the Heathcote River would
be closed for several hours. These include Sparks
Road, Cashmere Road, Ashgrove Terrace, Fairview
Street, Centaurus Road, Tennyson Street, Waltham
Road and Opawa Road. All would require detours of up
to 3 km.
The flat gradients of the citys river channels result in
relatively low river velocities. This means that bridge
foundation scour and/or road undermining effects have
not to date been significant. There are likely to be some
locations however (e.g. Heathcote River - Colombo
Street bridge) where the bridge/culvert waterway area
is undersized and where a hydraulic head can be
developed. High local velocities in these situations
could cause local scour effects and, potentially, under-
mining of foundations.
While the more localised flooding and secondary flow
paths create a nuisance, affected areas could generally
be expected to be accessible by four-wheel drive vehi-
cles. This storage of stormwater also helps to mini-
mise peak river flooding and associated effects at road
crossings. However, the continuing operation of road-
side sumps and stormwater collection systems is essen-
tial in allowing the local effects to be minimised.
No major flooding effects are anticipated as the rail
infrastructure and key facilities are above likely flood
levels. Slip hazard effects are discussed in Section
6.11.
Railway embankments themselves can create flooding
problems, if waterways become blocked.
The airport is prone to local flooding in a prolonged
heavy rainfall scenario. The airport site relies on soak
pits for the disposal of stormwater. None of the major
river systems (Avon, Heathcote or Styx) have signifi-
cant effects on the airport. Many of the existing build-
ings on site are built with ground floor levels which are
at or very near ground level. The main terminal
complex is built across the natural fall on the site which
makes it vulnerable to flooding in basement areas. The
terminal basements contain service areas and flooding
would result in the loss of power, sewerage, heating,
cooling and some communications.
Restoration
In the worst case scenario with significant local flood-
ing affecting the terminal basement, the restoration of
services would hinge on the availability of power,
heating and sewerage system. These services could be
restored within two to three weeks. Limited operations
could be available within one to two days.
Port vulnerability
No major flooding effects are anticipated.
Mitigation measures
Road network
Ensure that good records of sump locations and
stormwater pipelines are available to key people in
an emergency situation.
Adequate sump maintenance and street cleaning
procedures are needed to ensure that available staff
are not overloaded in clearing blocked sumps and
stormwater systems in an emergency situation.
Develop self-cleansing sump inlet structures that
retain functionality in wet weather yet avoid the
intrusion of rubbish into the river system during
normal weather.
Disaster planning.
Airport
Future buildings on site should be designed with
crucial services above ground floor level. Ground
floor levels should be established at a minimum
height of 300 mm above surrounding levels.
Investigate feasibility of interim stormwater stor-
age facilities.
A disaster plan should be written to cover this scenario
aimed at minimising the impact of the flooding and a
restoration plan should be written highlighting the
reinstatement of key services and systems.
6.10 Vulnerability Tsunami
Peak river velocities arising from the tsunami bore
were calculated using a model of wave propagation
excluding stopbank overflow effects. The tsunami
wave takes the form of a rapid three hour tidal
cycle. The velocities calculated are 2.3 m/second at
Pages Road (Avon River) and at Tunnel Road
(Heathcote River). These are about double normal
flood flow velocities and could cause scour of
riverbanks. It is expected that velocities would exceed
1.5 m/s for less than half an hour.
Effects will be confined to coastal areas and routes and
structures associated with the Waimakariri, Styx, Avon
and Heathcote Rivers. The primary routes and their
alternatives are detailed below.
Northern Primary route
Information in Section 2.5, Tsunami Hazard, sug-
gests that bore velocities in the Waimakariri River may
be high enough to damage river protection works. This
could affect major bridge structures, not only on the
Waimakariri but also the Cam and Kaiapoi Rivers.
These effects have not, however, been quantified.
Eastern Suburbs Primary route
This route will be significantly affected. The tsunami
bore is expected to propagate up the Avon River to near
Fitzgerald Avenue, flooding riverside roads and poten-
tially damaging bank protection works. The initial
wave height at the Estuary mouth of some three
mreduces as it travels upstream, but would disrupt this
route in the Pages Road/Avon River vicinity, with
inundation depths of around 0.5 m to 1 m.
Alternative routes would be similarly affected. Inun-
dation is not expected to have any major lasting effects
on the road infrastructure, however scouring of sandy
berms could undermine paths and kerbs and channels.
Access to areas east of the Avon River would be
available to the north, e.g. Travis Road.
Although the tsunami bore wave in the Heathcote
River is expected to travel as far as the Opawa Express-
way, its height will not be sufficient to disrupt the road.
Velocities are not expected to be sufficient to threaten
the Expressway bridge.
However, alternative routes to the port and the Sumner/
Redcliffs area will be significantly affected. Linwood
Avenue and Ferry Road will both be affected by the
surge in the Estuary, with inundation depths likely to be
about 0.5 m.
The causeway across McCormacks Bay would be
inundated by over 1 metre, with significant inundation
also in the Redcliffs (Moncks Bay) area. Water veloci-
ties some six times greater than normal tidal velocities
could undermine sea walls that protect the road in this
vicinity. Disruption can also be expected in Sumner,
with overtopping between Shag Rock and Cave Rock
flooding the road and flowing into Sumner. Long term
damage to roads is not expected to be significant in this
Transport 191
area. However, access to Sumner could be lost, al-
though alternative access would be available via Evans
Pass.
Southern Primary route, Airport Primary
route
No effects.
Effect on bridges
Scour
As peak velocities during the assumed event are greater
in magnitude than flood velocities but are of much
shorter duration, it is believed that there may be some
local scouring effect at bridges on the lower reaches of
the rivers.
Drag on bridge structure
Although an exhaustive check on all the bridges has not
been carried out, it is clear that a number of bridge
decks will obstruct the passage of the worst case
surge. For example, the surge level at the Ferrymead
Bridge is within 500 mm of deck level, and at Rutherford
Street, the deck is overtopped. However, calculations
indicate that the drag forces are not high, certainly no
worse than the earthquake forces that the bridges have
been designed for.
Buoyancy
A potentially serious problem is buoyancy created by
the air trapped under deck slabs in the spaces between
the bridge beams. Although it is unlikely that any
bridge decks will be lifted off their bearings, it is
conceivable that the reduction in net downwards load
on prestressed beams could result in excessive tensile
stresses in the tops of the beams. The Rutherford Street
bridge, with its low deck soffit level of RL 11.4, is
potentially vulnerable to this condition, with stress
levels being close to acceptable limits. Other bridges,
with soffit levels higher their RL 12.0 are less vulner-
able. However, Ferrymead Bridge is also vulnerable as
set out in Chapter 12.
Overall, it is expected that most or all of the bridges will
be able to survive the buoyancy that may result from
the worst case surge. This assumes that the peak surge
level quoted in the Barnett Report (see page 34) is
overly conservative.
The only potential effect is scouring of the bridge piles
at the Heathcote River crossing. Bore velocities are not
expected to be sufficient to cause significant problems.
No effects.
The tsunami would inundate harbour facilities by up to
1 m to 2 m. Given adequate warning of the event,
precautions such as the turning off of electric power,
evacuating the harbour of vessels, etc., would limit
loss. Experience at Lyttelton has shown that tsunami
waves do not shoal into breaker type waves. Loss of
any structures is extremely unlikely, however some
damage to the Cashin Quay breakwater may occur.
Siltation of the main channel could occur, but this
could be dealt with through the maintenance dredging
programme. Overseas experience has shown that fires
in electrical and fuel installations are frequently asso-
ciated with tsunamis. It is probable that the port would
be operable immediately following the event. Electri-
cal services would take several days to restore.
Mitigation measures
Identification of road routes that would be avail-
able for evacuations from eastern and low-lying
suburbs (more work required in comparing road
levels with wave profiles in rivers).
Technical assessments of vulnerable road network
structures (e.g. Moncks Bay sea wall, Ferrymead
Bridge, Bridge Street and Pages Road Bridges) and
the need for scour protection measures.
6.11 Vulnerability Slope
Hazard
Introduction
This section reviews the overall likely performance of
the main road transport routes given the slope hazard
scenarios outlined in Section 2.8, Slope Hazard.
Slope hazards considered here include inundation by
soil falls and flows and rock falls, and the loss of
foundations or formation by mass movement of either
the subgrade or underlying natural soil and rock.
The triggering events are either extreme rainfall or
serious earthquake, particularly when the earthquake
occurs when groundwater levels are high. The approxi-
mate return period for both events is 100 years.
Given the limited time available and the aims of the
project only those locations with current evidence of
significant hazard have been noted. In any major event
there will be some unpredictable surprises and in
addition there will be many minor slides, falls and
retaining wall collapses.
The Slope hazard transport locality plan (Map 8, p
291) shows the locations referred to in the following
text.
Primary transport routes
These are defined as routes serving primary destina-
tions. The only primary route crossing the hill areas is
the port route of Port Hills Road-Tunnel Motorway-
Road Tunnel-Lyttelton.
Table 6.5 (page 195) locations 16 - 18, summarises the
details of three areas of this route potentially at risk. In
turn, these are as follows.
Port Hills Road: Only a short length of road is at risk
from significant debris flows or rock falls in this area.
While there is a chance of both lanes of the road being
blocked by debris, fortunately there is a possible by-
pass around this area until it is cleared, either through
the Old Orchard or around the nearby industrial prop-
erty.
Tunnel Motorway: There is a risk of debris flows and
rock falls off the high slopes above the cut benches and
from the cut benches themselves. This extends over
almost 2 km of road with varying degrees of risk. In
most cases, the width of the motorway will ensure at
least one lane will remain passable, but it is possible
that short stretches will be completely blocked. These
should be able to be cleared within hours provided the
appropriate machinery is available.
Road Tunnel, Lyttelton Portal: High cut benches in
loess on the west side of the portal may block part of the
roundabout with debris, but the east side should remain
passable.
In summary, this route may be closed by debris imme-
diately following the triggering event but it is likely at
least one lane can be reopened within hours of the
event.
As explained in the subsection Hill feeder roads, in
the event of the closure of the tunnel, Gebbies Pass is
likely to be the best alternative route to the Port.
Major sector distributors
Ferrymead - Sumner - Evans Pass has been designated
as the only major sector distributor in the hill areas.
Locations 12 to 15 and location 24 (Table 6.5) record
details of the potentially affected areas. In turn, these
are as follow.
Shag Rock: The very high rock cliffs commencing at
Shag Rock extend over a distance of 500 mto the
Clifton Hill turnoff and could generate major rock
falls, particularly at the Clifton Hill end. Fortunately,
there may be enough room to construct a temporary
bypass around the beach and car park to give access to
Sumner. There is no feasible mitigation option to
prevent the rock falls.
Evans Pass: The Sumner side of Evans Pass is not as
bad as the Lyttelton side and with one possible excep-
tion (location 12, Table 6.5) the road formation is likely
to stay intact. Debris and rocks will need to be cleared.
However it is highly likely the Lyttelton side will be
much more seriously affected in a number of locations
where the road has been built on very high placed stone
retaining walls. In addition there are potentially
unstable high rock cliffs in many locations above the
road with some very large blocks of rock which could
fall. This section of road may be closed for weeks to
months.
Hill feeder roads
Although this not a category listed elsewhere in this
report, after consideration it seems justified to evaluate
at least one main route up to each of the main hill areas
for both civil defence and access to the water reser-
voirs, etc. The most important of these, Dyers Pass
Road, is also important for access to the various trans-
mitters and Governors Bay.
Dyers Pass Road Governors Bay
Locations 1 to 8 (Table 6.5) cover this route. The first
section of Dyers Pass benefits by having duplicate
routes available if problems do develop. Hackthorne
Road up to Dyers Pass is free of significant potential
problems and could provide alternative access in the
lower section of Dyers Pass Road. Above the Sign of
the Takahe the road up through Victoria Park is an
alternative route for part of the way, although it is
relatively narrow.
The road up to the summit is likely to remain passable
for at least one lane traffic, except for a matter of hours
immediately following the event while debris is cleared.
The most significant area where both lanes of the road
formation may slide (location 2, Table 6.5) can either
be bypassed using the Victoria Park route, or the
carpark adjacent to the area widened slightly to allow
more space around the fill area.
The continuance of the route on over to Governors Bay
is likely to require much longer to reopen because of
larger scale debris and rock falls. Also, lower down,
there is the possibility of losing sections of the road
formation itself.
Transport 193
Lyttelton Governors Bay Gebbies
Pass
This route was not initially considered as important
until it became clear that Evans Pass, the alternative
route to Lyttelton, was likely to suffer major damage.
Access to the port over either Dyers Pass or Gebbies
Pass, and then around the edge of the harbour basin, is
the other alternative route. The section of road from
Lyttelton to Governors Bay is common in this route to
both the hill passes and is therefore separated out in the
discussion below.
Lyttelton Governors Bay
Soil debris onto the road and loss of the outside road
shoulder are likely in many places along this route
(Table 6.5, locations 32 to 39). The entire road forma-
tion was lost in a rainfall triggered slide near Cass Bay
in 1986, but fortunately a small loop of the old road
remained intact nearby so the road remained open over
the months required to repair the problem. The fill at
this location is now much stronger and better drained
and is unlikely to slide again. Several similar gully
crossings are nearby and may result in loss of the outer
lane but hopefully a one lane bypass can be created
reasonably soon after the event.
Governors Bay Gebbies Pass
This route is reasonable all the way to the end of the
Teddington Flats. Soil debris falling onto the road is
likely in a number of places and may be extensive at the
box cutting near Allandale. At Gebbies Pass itself, both
lanes of the current seal are at risk and have been
progressively subsiding at location 45, Table 6.5. For-
tunately the inner road shoulder is quite wide at this
point and a one lane bypass may be possible. Work will
probably be needed soon at this location just to main-
tain the current road under normal conditions.
Apart from debris falling onto the road, the route
generally should be able to be reopened reasonably
quickly (i.e. within 24 hours) for at least one lane
traffic.
Gebbies Pass is thus probably the best alternative route
to the port and, compared to either Evans Pass or Dyers
Pass, requires the least mitigation to give reasonable
confidence of future access.
Huntsbury Hill
No major problems are likely due to the gentle gradient
and absence of major cuts.
Bridle Path road
One area may be closed by debris and rock fall just
south of the Ferrymead entrance (location 21, Table
6.5). This should be able to be reopened quickly and if
required a temporary road formed in the adjacent
empty paddock.
Major Hornbrook and Mt Pleasant roads
No major problems for the same reasons as Huntsbury
Hill.
Soleares Avenue
A steep fill embankment just down from Valencia
Place may affect the outer lane and Telecom cables.
Otherwise there are no major problem areas.
Moncks Spur road
Similar to Huntsbury and Mt Pleasant.
Clifton
The approach to the climb up to Clifton Hill is subject
to potential rock fall from the cliffs which extend round
from Shag Rock. This could be cleared relatively
quickly providing no large volume is involved.
Potentially more serious is the possibility of a founda-
tion failure in the crib walling commencing approxi-
mately 30 m past the first hairpin and extending over 40
m to 50 m (location 29, Table 6.5). In this area the crib
wall which supports the road formation is built out over
a high 50 to 60 degree loess bank which could fail in a
strong earthquake. The same section is vulnerable to
loess slides from the high cut batters above the road
(part of this failed in the snow storm in 1992). This slide
material could surcharge the road putting further strain
on the crib foundations.
Further up the road (location 31, Table 6.5) there may
be minor debris falls and slides and a section of road
formation crossing a gully between Kinsey Terrace
and Tuawera Terrace could result in loss of one lane.
However, there has been recent reconstruction work of
Clifton Terrace which has markedly improved the
situation.
Scarborough
The greatest potential risk along this section of road is
at the bottom near the lifeboat slipway and before the
first hairpin bend. The rock cliff at this point overhangs
the road (location 26, Table 6.5). This could fail in a
similar way to the rock fall 300 m south of this point
which collapsed the Edwin Mouldey track in 1986.
This would probably block both lanes and bypass
options are very limited. However more serious is the
threat such a rock fall poses to the road above as it
switches back beyond the hairpin (location 29, Table
6.5). The road is actually built out on the overhang.
There are likely to be rock falls and soil falls onto the
road from the first hairpin up to No 127, after which
point the batters are less steep.
Rail tunnel
There is a complex interrelationship at the Lyttelton
rail portal between the roads and the rail tunnel which
passes underneath. This is essentially a structural analy-
sis problem, however there are no signs of road defor-
mation to date and a brief inspection of the first 30 m
of tunnel has not revealed any sign of lining failure.
In contrast, at the Heathcote Portal there are 10 to 15 m
high,
1
/
4
to 1, unsupported batters in loess and loess
colluvium on both sides of tunnel mouth. These would
be vulnerable in a serious earthquake and could block
the tunnel at least for several hours until the debris is
cleared.
Conclusions
Slope hazards associated with a major earthquake or
rainstorm are likely to have only moderate impact on
the one primary transport route which crosses the hills
(City - Road Tunnel - Lyttelton). Similarly only one
major sector distributor, the road to Sumner, is poten-
tially affected by slope hazards however impacts along
the Sumner end of this could be severe.
Locally severe impact is likely on some of the hill
feeder roads, particularly Evans and Dyers Pass and the
Lyttelton Harbour roads. With the exception of
Scarborough, and possibly Clifton Hill, the nominated
feeder roads for the main residential suburbs should all
perform reasonably well.
6.12 Mitigation Measures
Status of Measures
Road network
Bridge strengthening requirements being taken into
account in bridge maintenance programme of the
Christchurch City Council.
Rolling programme of low cost earthquake strength-
ening of key State Highway bridges by Transit New
Zealand.
Recognition of lifeline routes in undergrounding
programme of Southpower.
TNZ strategy for tree maintenance on State High-
ways.
Airport
Earthquakes
Christchurch International Airport Limited (CIAL)
has undertaken a survey of existing buildings and the
status of plant and equipment. A list of mitigation
measures has been made. Where necessary designs
have been done and are in the process of being imple-
mented.
A study of the impact of seismic activity on the runway
system has been commenced.
CIAL has held discussions with Telecom and
Southpower on the security of supply and the status of
equipment.
Flooding (Waimakariri)
CIAL is undertaking a study of the implications of
Waimakariri flooding looking particularly of the old
flood channels on relation to the airport.
Flooding (Local)
CIAL has adopted a policy of designing new buildings
with local flooding setting design parameters for floor
levels and siting of critical services. Discussions are
taking place with the Christchurch City Councils
Drainage Unit to look at strategies for stormwater
disposal.
Transport 195
VULN'Y IMPACT
M
A
P

R
E
F
E
R
E
N
C
E
I
M
P
O
R
T
A
N
C
E

1

-

5
E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E

H
A
Z
A
R
D
S
L
O
P
E

H
A
Z
A
R
D

T
Y
P
E
R
I
S
K

R
A
T
I
N
G
D
U
R
I
N
G

E
A
R
T
H
Q
U
A
K
E
I
M
M
E
D
I
A
T
E
L
Y

A
F
T
E
R
P
E
R
I
O
D

F
O
L
L
O
W
I
N
G
R
E
T
U
R
N

T
O

N
O
R
M
A
L
I
T
Y
MITIGATION MEASURES COMMENT
Telecom cable affected
Victoria Park alternative route
500 m length
250 m length
One lane at risk only
Retainment
Retainment
Planting above road
Planting above road
Retainment
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
3 2 1
4 3 2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2
2 3
3
1 1
1
1 1 1
1,2
1,2 1
1
1
1
1
1
Plantings
Plantings
Retainment
Retainment
Plantings
Limited
Retainment
1
1
1
1
1
1,2
1,2
3
2 2 2
2 2
3
3
3 3 3
1
1
1
1
2
3
1,2
1,2
2 1 1
3 3
3
3
3 3 1
4 3 3 3 3 3
Batter plantings
Batter plantings
Very limited
Retainment or Bench
1,2 2 2 2 1 1
1,2 3 3 3 1 1
1 1 2 3 3 2
1 3 3 3 1 1
3 2 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 2 3 1,2
3 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 2 2 3
2 3 3 3 2 1
2 3 3 3
3 3 3 3 3
3
2
2 2 2 1 1
1
4
2 2
2 2 2
3 3 3
3 3 3 3 3
3 3 3
3
1 1
1 1
1
1
4
1 1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1 1
3
3
3 3 3 3
3
3 3
3 3 3 3
3 2 2
2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2
2
2 2 2
2 2
4
1,3
4 2
3 3
3 3 3
3 3 3
3 3
3
3
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1
1
1
1
2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2
2 2
4
1,2
2
Retainment
Very limited
Retainment
Retainment
Diversion onto beach
Mesh rock bolts
Ground anchors
Limited
Limited
Ground anchors
Retainment
Retainment
Retainment
Retainment
Retainment
Limited
Limited
Limited
Extensive retainment
Retain and drain
Plantings
Limited
Retainment drains
Retainment
Limited
820 m in two lengths
1000m length
Major work involved
Plantings may help at Lyttelton end
Major work involved
Alternative route available
Existing shrubs too small
Partial blockage only
100 m on both sides
Telecom also affected
Debris off private land
Telecom also affected
Major engineering to improve
Crib foundation failure
Private land?
Outer lane only
One lane only affected
Major engineering
2 - 3 km of unstable loess batters
Bypass available
Bypass probably possible
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
Dyers Pass
to
Sign of Kiwi
Sign of Kiwi
to
Governors Bay
Evans
Pass
Port Hills Road
through road tunnel
Rail tunnel Heathcote end
Bridle Path Road
Mt Pleasant
Sumner Road
Scarborough Road
Clifton Hill
Lyttelton
to
Governors Bay
Governors Bay
to
Gebbies Pass
Slope hazard type:
1 = soil debris onto road
2 = rock debris onto road
3 = slide of shoulder and one lane
4 = slide of both lanes
Risk 1 to 3 3 most at risk
ROAD
Table 6.5: Slope hazard vulnerability chart
(to be read in conjunction with Maps 5 (p288) and 8 (p 291))
Emergency Buildings 197
Chapter 7
Emergency Buildings
7.1 Buildings Investigated
Introduction
Buildings associated with the necessary services fol-
lowing a major earthquake or natural disaster cover a
very wide range. Because of the nature of their use,
such buildings have, over the years, been generally
well designed and constructed to state-of-the-art of the
day.
It is particularly noticeable, however, that the perform-
ance attained is very strongly related to the age of the
building. The appreciation that the performance, de-
sign and construction of structures has advanced con-
siderably over the years, has to be acknowledged.
It is noted that in most situations consultants are
involved in reporting and investigating on the possible
vulnerability of the buildings. The state of buildings
tend to speak for themselves, but the contents are
generally overlooked, and this could be the controlling
factor at the time of a natural disaster.
Buildings investigated
The buildings investigated in relation to an earthquake
hazard are reported in the following categories. (See
also Tables 7.1 and 7.2.)
Broadcasting
CTV building
Early (1929) reinforced building with frames and walls.
Well designed for its specific occupancy. Attention
drawn to securing water storage tanks, electrical com-
ponents and office equipment.
Television House
Substantial reinforced concrete framed building with
basement. Attention drawn to securing general office
equipment.
Radio New Zealand Kent House
Well constructed reinforced concrete core and frame
building built in 1978. Attention drawn to securing
services and general office equipment.
Transmitter Masts
Gebbies Pass. Concrete column and wall building
with timber roof trusses, built in 1932. Grossly
overdesigned for present style of equipment.
Ouruhia. Tidy reinforced concrete block construc-
tion.
Masts. Masts are generally very resilient structures
and should perform satisfactorily providing there is
no foundation failure. Attention is drawn to secur-
ing equipment and considering face loads, etc.
Lyttelton Container Terminal Signal Tower
Main building is of substantial construction with rein-
forced concrete with shear core. Tower adequate. At-
tention drawn to vulnerability of other ancillary build-
ings, and to securing services and general office equip-
ment.
Police
Hereford Street Police Station
Substantial reinforced concrete building with gener-
ous columns and beams with basement. Attention
drawn to fixing of water storage tanks and general
office equipment.
Hornby Police Station
Sound timber and reinforced concrete building built in
1990. Attention drawn to securing services.
NZ Fire Service (seven stations, workshop
and training school)
The NZ Fire Service has many fire stations and ancil-
lary buildings throughout the greater Christchurch
area. They are fortunate that good simple design and
construction has been carried out over the years. They
have full backup operations from other stations. Atten-
tion drawn to securing of battery backup and general
office equipment.
St John Ambulance
St. John Ambulance have recently moved into new
premises in the central city area. The building is part
mid-1960s construction and part late-1980s. Renova-
tions and strengthening were being carried to suit the
new occupancy. They have access to two city streets
and good visibility for their vehicles. Attention drawn
to securing general office equipment.
Suburban bus companies
Buildings represent a small percentage of site area.
Buses are stored in the open. Maintenance building
built 1920s, offices 1960 and 1980. Attention drawn to
fixing of equipment for office and operation use.
Pumping Station Scrottons Road
Early unreinforced brick columns and walls building
with timber roof trusses. Attention drawn to checking
wall stability to avoid possible damage to electrical
equipment.
Buildings mitigation measures
Service organisations should endeavour to obtain a
structural report on their buildings. This may prove a
formality for the later buildings, but certainly a warn-
ing of hazards for the earlier ones. This report should
be endorsed to include restraint recommendations to
all fittings, fixtures and other equipment.
Secondary power systems to stand-by equipment should
be adequately restrained.
Records should be stored in such a manner that they
and their containers do not become dislodged in the
event of an earthquake.
Essential communication equipment should be ad-
equately restrained on desks etc., or where operating.
Building adequacy should be reviewed as demands and
equipment change. This is particularly noticeable with
electrical equipment where size diminishes as time
advances.
7.2 Building Services
Introduction
The focus of this section is on building services for
emergency buildings or essential buildings. A lot of the
comments will apply equally (or more so) to non-
essential commercial, industrial and public buildings
outside the scope of this study.
The task group involved in surveying the emergency
buildings also viewed and commented on the building
services, where appropriate. A specific survey of build-
ing services was not undertaken by the Emergency
Buildings task group.
The 1991 CAE project Lifelines in Earthquakes: Wel-
lington Case Study reports in detail on building serv-
ices in commercial, industrial and public buildings.
It was felt that the findings for the Wellington report
were sufficiently general enough to apply to the Christ-
church study. That being the case, this section draws
heavily on the material presented in Section B9 of that
report, but is specific to emergency or essential build-
ings, and modified where necessary to suit Christ-
church conditions.
General
Building services can be important lifelines within
buildings and are necessary in most of the emergency
or essential buildings to enable the occupants to func-
tion effectively.
They should be capable of continued use following
(and during, for some) an earthquake. Otherwise they
should be readily repairable within the timeframe
imposed by the availability or restoration of the life-
lines external to the building to allow the essential
building services to be used where no in-house emer-
gency services are available. The range of vital serv-
ices can vary with the different emergency buildings.
The following range of services can be vital for emer-
gency buildings:
electrical;
water supply (and plumbing);
fire protection;
heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC);
communications;
vertical transportation;
security; and
special processes.
General vulnerability issues
In any emergency building, provided it remains structur-
ally sound during and following an earthquake, contin-
ued occupation and use will be dependent upon the
continuity of supply of water, electricity, communica-
tions services and other essential services.
Electricity is required to maintain:
lighting;
ventilation supply, exhausts and conditioned air
for some processes and emergency equipment;
water pumping;
communications telephone and data;
boiler operation;
domestic hot water;
freezers and coolrooms drugs, goods etc.;
kitchens;
medical services;
stormwater and sewage pumping;
lifts, particularly for patients or disabled people in
hospitals and medical centres; and
security.
Buildings provided with emergency power generators
would normally be expected to be able to supply, as a
minimum, the essential services for up to 24 hours.
This is sufficient for intermittent installation outages
but could be insufficient to cope with the longer out-
ages due to major seismic events.
Water supply would need to be maintained for the
satisfactory operation of:
domestic cold water systems;
domestic hot water;
fire hose reels;
fire sprinklers;
kitchens; and
laboratories.
Buildings with water storage usually can provide 24
hours usage for domestic purposes but not for such
services as fire. Without mains water and fire water
storage most fire protection systems would be com-
pletely inoperable and ineffective.
Although electricity and water are absolutely vital for
the continued operation of building services, even
basic requirements for occupancy and functioning
require restoration of other services.
Public buildings
The Wellington study split public buildings into two
broad categories:
government, transport and emergency buildings;
and
hospitals.
For each main category, assessments were made for
high, medium and low quality buildings. These assess-
ments are generally quite applicable to the essential
Christchurch buildings.
For each building category, assessments of vulnerabil-
ity and impact of loss of each service were made in
tabular form. The vulnerability of each service within
the building category and the impact of the loss of the
service were graded on a points system of l to 10, a
score of l indicating low vulnerability or importance
and a score of 10 indicating high vulnerability or
importance. A score of l for vulnerability means the
services would not suffer significant damage and would
be available immediately after the earthquake. A score
of 10 for vulnerability means that the service would
suffer substantial damage and would take considerable
time to reinstated.
The vulnerability charts were assessed on the basis of
an earthquake of 0.9g intensity for the Wellington
Region. The charts will generally be relevant to the
Christchurch study where both the design earthquake
level is less as are the seismic design standards that
apply to services installations.
It should be acknowledged that the assessments were
made subjectively, but with the knowledge of both past
and present design and installation standards. The
tables presented can also apply to the various building
service systems present in typical commercial, indus-
trial and public buildings, likely to be found in the
greater Christchurch area.
In the following schedules, the classification of quality
(high, medium and low) relate to the quality of installed
services. This assesses the ability of a public building
to withstand a moderate earthquake and remain func-
tional, which will enable it to provide a service imme-
diately following the seismic disturbance.
In assessing the immediate ability to respond, the
predominant factors were:
the ability of the building to remain intact and
structurally sound for use;
the ability of building services to be able to function
on in-house power;
the ability of furniture and essential portable first-
aid equipment to remain intact;
the adequacy of housing of general medical sup-
plies and their availability for use; and
the availability of communication facilities either
immediately or at least within two hours.
Building classification public and
emergency buildings
High quality
This would most probably only relate to buildings and
services installed within the past five years and those
for which proper seismic engineering was applied to
the building services. During construction the instal-
lations would have been subject to good supervision as
distinct from observation or no review at all.
Some minor damage will most likely occur.
Medical and essential services would be adequately
housed and have suffered little or no seismic damage
and be immediately available.
HVAC systems will be operational and will be gener-
ally air types with no major weight items in the ceiling
spaces.
Electrical systems will be fully functional and power
available to ventilation fans and all essential services
from in-house or on-site emergency generators. Fuel
supplies would be expected to provide at least five days
supply.
Fire protection will generally be by sprinklers with
dual water supplies or on-site storage and will be fully
functional together with hose reels and alarm systems.
Fire pumps will also most probably have a diesel
driven standby. Water storage in this grade of building
should be adequate to provide at least 24 hours usage.
Medium quality
This would most probably only relate to buildings
completed over the past five to ten years or those for
which some upgrading of services has been completed.
These buildings would not have necessarily been sub-
mitted to the same degree of detailed design as high
quality buildings, have limited essential services and
not have received detailed construction supervision.
HVAC systems will probably be limited in operation.
Electrical systems will be operational, emergency power
most probably limited to say lifts, emergency lighting
and fire and sump pumps.
Fire protection will be operational and where sprin-
klers are installed there will be no supply other than city
mains. Some damage will have occurred and some
services may be limited or not available.
Low quality
Buildings in this category will be those of an age
outside the parameters above, have limited services,
will be subject to limited use and their HVAC will,
most probably, not be functional. No generator for
electrical emergency power. Battery essential lighting.
Fire protection limited to code with no wet systems.
Hospitals
The various departments (in Wellington) have been
scheduled and reviewed in overall terms, mainly to
measure the impact of the loss.
Hospitals by their very nature tend to be a series of
buildings linked by services. As such, some depart-
ments are wholly dependent upon central services for
their continued operation.
Government
In this area, central government, regional and local
body buildings, Emergency services such as ambu-
lance, police and Civil Defence, and transport centres
were considered.
Assessment and vulnerability and
impact of loss
Tables 7.1 (for hospitals) and 7.2 (for government,
transport and emergency buildings) indicate the results
of the Wellington Groups analysis. Overall results
and trends will be very similar for the stock of public
and emergency buildings in the greater Christchurch
region. As with previous assessments, reliance has
been placed on experience and judgement.
Expected common failures in
earthquakes
The charts reflect the wide and critical vulnerability of
building services, and provide reminders of the com-
mon failures of such systems in earthquakes.
In many cases, a service fails due to the failure of an
initial item of equipment which comprises only a small
part of that particular service. The general vulnerabil-
ity of services is demonstrated by the following review
of failure examples.
Heating ventilation and air conditioning
systems
Inadequately restrained equipment:
In ceiling spaces relatively heavy plant such as fan
coil units able to move sideways, may break away
from fixings and fall, damaging ceiling, compo-
nents and possibly causing injury. Excessive move-
ment may break water or electrical connections
with risk of flooding, fire and loss of function.
Similar results may occur if piping systems are
RISK
1 - 10 1 - 10
VULNERABILITY
IMPACT OF
LOSS
BUILDING TYPE H M L H M L
RISK
1 - 10 1 - 10
VULNERABILITY
IMPACT OF
LOSS
DEPARTMENTS
Accident & Emergency
Ward Blocks
Theatre Suites
X-Ray Department
Fracture Departments
Laboratories
CSSD
Kitchen
Laundry
Boiler House
Bulk Medical Gases
Central Power
2 6 8 10 9 9
9 1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
5
6
6
5
5
5
5
6
7
7
6 7
8
8
7
7
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
8
8 8
8 8
8 7
7 7 7
7 7 7
7
7
7
9
9
9
9
9
9
6 6 6
6
6
10 9
5
SYSTEMS
HVAC
Electrical
Medical
Fire
Plumbing
Lifts
Life Support
Communications
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
4
4
4
5
6
3
5
5
6
5
7
8
7
4
8
9
9
9
9
8
9
8 8
9
9
9
9
8
9 9
8
9
9
9
9
7
6 7
5
3
ELEMENTS
HVAC
Vent Fans
A/C Fans
Pumps
Boilers
Chillers
Piping
Ductwork
Fuel Systems
Cooling Towers
Tanks
Mains Power
Essential Power
MCCs
Cool Rooms
Freezers
1
1
1
1
1
2 2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
4
4
3
4
4
4
4
5 3
3 5 7
1 3 6
5
5
8
7
7
8
8
8
8
7
5
4
8
7
7
8
7
7
7
6 6
4
3
7
7
6
8
4
7
6
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2 2 2
2 2
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
7
5
8
ELECTRICAL
Mains
Transformers
MSB
Generator
Gen Fuel
Batteries
DBs
Light Fittings
MSB Location
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
8
8
8
8
5
4
4
10
10
10
10 10
10
10
10
10
10
9 9 8
6 6 6
6
6 9
7 8
9
- - -
MEDICAL
Bulk O
2
Bottle O
2
Med Air
Med Vacuum
N
2
O Bulk
N
2
O Bulk
Drug Coolers
X-Ray Equipment
Theatre Lights
Anaesth. Equipment
Equipment Racks
2
2
2 2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2 2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
3
3
3
9 9 9
8 8 8
10 10 10
10
10
10
10
10
10
8 8 8
8 8 8
8 8 8
8 8
7 7 7
9
9 9 9
-
-
FIRE
Mains Water
Water Storage
Mains Power
Sprinkler Pipework
Hose Reels
Extinguishers
Alarms
Fuel Supply
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2 2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
4
6
3
5
1
8
7
6
7
7 7
7 7
7 7
7 7
8
6 6
6 6
2 2
- - -
-
-
-
PLUMBING
Water Storage
Tanks
Mains Water
Pipework
Water Pumps
Sewage Pumps
S. Water Pumps
H.W. Storage
Waste and Vents
1
2
3
1
2
1
1
1
1
5
3
4
2
3
2
2
2
2
8
4
4
4
3
2
2
2
2
10
9
6
8
9
10
9
9
8
8 8
9 9
7 7
7 7
8 8
10 10
9 9
9 9
7 7
LIFTS
Passenger
Patient
Goods
Mains Power
Essential Power
Seismic Switch
Current Code
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
3
3
3
2
1
5
5
5
5
5
2
-
8
8
6
8
4
9
9
-
-
-
-
-
-
6 6
8 8
4 4
9 9
9 9
COMMUNICATIONS
PABX
Computer
Radio
TV
Paging
Nurse Call
Security
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
3
3
2
2
2
2
4
5
5
2
2
2
2
6
8
6
5
4
7
7
8
8
6
5
4
7
7
8 8
8
6
5
4
7
7
Table 7.1: Hospital risk assessment (from the Wellington Lifelines Study)
H M L H M L
RISK
1 - 10 1 - 10
VULNERABILITY
IMPACT OF
LOSS
RISK
1 - 10 1 - 10
VULNERABILITY
IMPACT OF
LOSS
BUILDING TYPE
BUILDINGS
Central Government
Local Government
Regional Councils
Civil Defence
Airports
Rail Stations
Fire Stations
Ambulance
Police
Military
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
2
4
4
4
3
4
6
6
5
4
4
7
7
7
5
7
8
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
8 8
8
9 9
9 9
9
9
9
9
9
9
8 8
7 7 7
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
2
1
SYSTEMS
HVAC
Electrical
Fire
Plumbing
Lifts
Communications
2
2
2
2
2
1
3
2
3
3
3
1
4
2
3
4
3
2
5
7
6
6
8
2
6
7
6
6
8
2
6
7
6
6
8
2
ELEMENTS
HVAC
Vent Fans
A/C Fans
Pumps
Boilers
Chillers
Piping
Ductwork
Fuel System
Cooling Towers
Tanks
Mains Power
Essential Power
MCCs
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
3
2
3
3
2
2
1
3
3
2
1
-
3
3
3
4
4
2
-
1
5
6
8
7
7
6
7
8
7
7
2
2
2
5
5
6
7
7
6
8
7
7
6
3
2
2
4
3
7
7
7
6
8
6
7
6
4
2
2
ELECTRICAL
Mains
Transformers
MSB
Generator
Gen Fuel
Batteries
DBs
Light Fittings
MSB Location
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
2
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
-
-
3
8
2
5
4
4
9
9
6
6
6
9
9
9
8
9 8
6 6
8
8
8
9
9
9
-
- -
10
10
10
FIRE
Mains Water
Water storage
Mains Power
Sprinkler Pipework
Hose Reels
Extinguishers
Alarms
Fuel Supply
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2 2
3
3
4
5
1 6
7 7
7 7
7 6 6
6 6 6
8
7 7 7
7 7 - -
-
- - - -
PLUMBING
Water Storage
Tanks
Mains Water
Pipework
Water Pumps
Sewage Pumps
S. Water Pumps
H.W. Storage
Waste and Vents
1
2
3
1
2
1
1
1
1
5
3
4
2
3
2
2
2
2
8
4
4
4
3
2
2
2
2
10
7
6
9
7
10
9
6
8
9
7
6
8
7
9
6
8 8
9
7
6
7
7
9
6
10 10
LIFTS
Passenger
Goods
Mains Power
Essential Power
Seismic Code
1 3
1 3
2 2
1 1
1 5
5
5
2
-
-
6 6 6
6 6 6
4 4 4
6 - -
- -
-
COMMUNICATIONS
PABX
Computer
Radio
TV
Security
2
2
1
1
2
3
3
2
2
2
5
5
2
2
2
9
9
8
4
9
9
9
8
4
9
9
9
8
4
9
FUEL SERVICES
Fuel Oil
Petrol
Aviation
Fuel Pumps
2
2
2
1
3
3
3
2
5
5
5
3
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
Table 7.2: Government, transport and emergency buildings risk assessment (from the
Wellington Lifelines Study)
poorly anchored to the building, allowing move-
ment relative to secured equipment.
Movement of main plant items such as boilers,
chillers, cooling towers and tanks may break water
and electrical connections.
Inadequate allowance for movement:
Failure of pipework connections at building entry
points, between buildings or across seismic gaps.
Failure of ductwork connections across seismic
gaps in the building.
Electrical
Generator starting batteries moving and breaking
terminals and connections.
Main switchboards moving sideways or toppling
over breaking connections.
Light fittings falling out of ceiling fixings and
breaking connections with a risk of injury and fire.
Flooding of below-ground substations and genera-
tor rooms.
Fire protection
Movement of battery boxes and alarm panels break-
ing connections with loss of detector circuits and
brigade connection
Loss of power or fuel supply to sprinkler or wet
riser booster pumps.
Failure of water storage tank or connections.
Pipework rigidly restrained too close to sections of
building structure designed for differential shear-
ing movement, causing flooding and loss of func-
tion.
Failure of water supply at building entry.
Plumbing and drainage
Water storage tanks moving, impacting on adjacent
structural members or collapsing.
Pipework connections shearing causing flooding
or loss of water.
Hot water cylinders toppling over.
Failure of water main at underground entry.
Failure of sanitary plumbing or drains causing
flooding, health risk.
Lifts
Lift shaft damage, rail misalignment.
Movement of hoist machines.
Damage to controls.
Flooding of lift well and pit.
Jamming of landing or car doors.
Refrigeration
Movement of unrestrained evaporators causing the
refrigeration pipework to shear at the point of
connection to the unit.
Restrained and unrestrained evaporators, fixings
pulling through insulating sandwich panels to which
they are fastened.
Communications systems
Loss of unrestrained items of equipment such as
power supplies and electronic equipment not fixed
in restrained racks, e.g. PABXs, amplifiers.
Flooding of basement located PABX rooms.
Microwave dishes and satellite dishes out of align-
ment.
Security systems
Jamming of locks due to doors and frames racking.
Personal computers falling off desks.
Power supplies falling over.
Fittings and fixtures
Free-standing, unrestrained shelving overturning
or racking.
Personal computers, facsimile machines, word-
processors and other loose desk-top items falling to
the floor.
Magnetic as well as weaker mechanical cupboard
door locks opening and spilling their contents.
Freestanding uplighters overturning.
Large pot plants overturning.
General conclusions
It was found that significant services damage is un-
likely in small- to medium-strength earthquakes. Al-
though some components may fail, the overall effect
will not be serious.
Significant damage, however, may occur to services
where they:
pass between buildings;
pass across seismic gaps, at junctions between
different structural systems; and
are attached to unrestrained plant items where the
lateral support has been inadvertently left off.
It should be remembered that some services may be
disrupted temporarily because of the correct action of
an in-built safety device. This applies particularly to all
forms of vertical transportation, for which it may take
up to three days to reset safety devices.
Even minor repairs are expected to take a significant
time due to the low availability of the appropriate
skilled manpower and materials.
Significant services damage is unlikely in an earth-
quake of moderate intensity provided the building and
its services are designed in accordance with good
current practice. Some components may fail, but the
effect is not expected to be serious.
Mitigation measures
Detailed mitigation measures are as wide and varied as
the systems and their elements. The following items
provide a general outline of important aspects which,
when consistently addressed, will significantly reduce
earthquake risk. Many of the items do not involve large
capital expenditure. They should be attended to by
suitably qualified persons on new projects in the design
phase, and on existing buildings at the earliest possible
time.
Seismic restraint of plant and equipment including
housekeeping items, storage shelves and appli-
ances in accordance with NZS4219.
Provision of flexible elements in services passing
across structural and architectural discontinuities,
e.g. seismic joints and foundation beams.
Location of fluid-filled tanks and containers away
from items of electrical and communications equip-
ment.
Provision of on-site services connections to allow
for the substitution of failed lifelines such as:
power generation by diesel generators;
uninterruptible power supplies;
24 hours water storage; and
emergency battery or battery inverters
supplying lighting.
Provision of systems to augment weak lifelines
such as:
power conditioning equipment to smooth
out voltage dips and spikes;
water pumps to boost weak water supply
pressures; and
cartridge water filters to clean dirty water
supplies and chemicals to manually/au-
tomatically disinfect water supplies.
Provisions of alternative lifelines such as:
Dual water supplies where twin independ-
ent supplies are available, e.g.:
two independent town mains;

town mains plus well;
town main plus on-site water storage;
and
dual fired heating hot water boilers (elec-
tricity and oil).
Alternative communication links, e.g.:
Telecom wire and fibre optic, together
with microwave and possibly UHF
Alternative supplies where possible, e.g.:
11 kV and 400 V, or
two x 11 kV (feed from different reticu-
lation systems or feed from a ringmain)
Provision for the connection of mobile units,
e.g.:
generators;
sewage/waste disposal tankers; and
water supply tankers/milk tankers.
Ensure that all expendable items have replace-
ments available and storage tank levels are main-
tained.
Planned preventative maintenance contracts to
maintain equipment, energy and water supplies,
both incoming and storage.
Contractual arrangements that are legally binding
with the appropriate service contractors for early
response to assist in rehabilitation after the event.*
Provision and safe storage of essential spares for all
critical items of equipment, and ensuring these are
accessible.
Compilation of up-to-date as-built documentation
on site for all services and operation and mainte-
nance manuals.
* Because of the projected shortage of skilled tradesmen available
immediately after the event, building owners or operators of
buildings that are essential to the recovery phase such as
hospitals, energy suppliers, local authorities, etc., should look to
arranging contracts with local contractors and contractors out-
side the areas so that they have first call on those contractors
resources immediately after the event. These contracts, once
established, should be reviewed annually to ensure the con-
tracted parties are readily equipped and can react in the required
time. This enables the contracted parties to be forewarned so that
the individuals who will respond are aware of their obligations
and can make alternative arrangements for their immediate
family during their expected absence.
Central city buildings, with Victoria Square in the middle left
New Zealand Fire Service 207
Chapter 8
New Zealand Fire Service
Rather than investigate the effect on the capability of
the Fire Service on a hazard-by-hazard basis, as was the
practice adopted for the other utilities, a different and
more appropriate method has been adopted here. This
is because of the unique nature of the Fire Service with
its mobile provision of service and lack of dependence
on fixed buildings.
8.1 Scenario
Scenario
The adopted scenario is shown in Table 8.1. The
scenario quantifies the resources likely to be available
after an earthquake. This compilation was done after
consideration of the reports of the other utilities likely
performance as a result of the earthquake.
New Zealand Fire Service staff
numbers
Staff members (both permanent and volunteer) avail-
able for duty in the event of a major disaster hitting the
city are shown in Table 8.2.
On-duty In reserve
Permanent 40 125
Volunteers (ChCh) 45 75
85 200
Table 8.2: NZFS on-duty and reserve
staff numbers
Task forces
There are three task forces (north, south and west)
available, which each contain 50 staff members plus
additional support staff. This number usually indicates
16 2x2 wheeled units with 60 staff as each Task Force
minimum. Task Forces can be broken down into 10
single units operating under a team leader (officer) and
three staff, but they should not be further reduced.
Loss of stations 4 (8 remain)
Loss of units 3 (30 remain)
Injuries - treated on site Minor only
Loss of power to substations 70%
Loss of water - reticulated 40% (shutting down valves)
Loss of communications Intermittent
Staff immediately available 40 permanent; 45 volunteers
Staff first recall 40 permanent; 25 volunteers
Staff full recall 85 permanent; 50 volunteers
Roading 10% impassable
Bridges 15% impassable
Collapsed buildings 30 identified
Persons trapped in buildings (60) 20% of damaged buildings
Hazardous substances 3 events (minor)
Fires 40 fire calls; 60+ assistance in first hour
Run out of fuel 4 hours; most units
NB 1: See Table 8.4 Scenario based on the work of the other task groups
NB 2: Should the event occur in darkness, increase losses of stations, units and injuries, as well as
times to gather reconnaissance, intelligence and reporting times of additional staff.
Table 8.1: Scenario adopted for NZFS
8.2 New Zealand Fire Service
Initial Reaction Plan
Priorities first life, then property
Priorities under the New Zealand Fire Service Initial
Reaction Plan are to protecting life first, then property.
Priorities are to:
1 restore 111 and turnout lines to New Zealand Fire
Service;
2 gather status intelligence local and area;
3 prioritise requests for responses to all emergencies;
4 match against resources (primary) and build-up (10
hours);
5 reinforce those in field, man relief and spare units;
6 restore stations for welfare, shelter, replenishment
of operational and social needs;
7 power up all New Zealand Fire Service facilities
(batteries, generators, LPG);
8 co-ordinate with other agencies (e.g. police, ambu-
lance, Civil Defence) on water, tankers, transport,
rescue units, etc;
9 ensure overview of all New Zealand Fire Service
operations within 50 miles of affected area;
10 maintain Task Force welfare and changeover (regu-
larly);
11 produce situation reports of all requirements and
activities to Fire Command and Civil Defence; and
12 review priorities 1 to 11 on a regular basis.
Inputs and Outputs
There are six key inputs and six key outputs in the New
Zealand Fire Service Initial Reaction Plan as listed
below. In all cases, it should be remembered that
darkness doubles difficulties.
Six key inputs
communications;
power;
shelter;
relief;
supplies; and
fuel.
Six key outputs
extinguish;
rescue;
water;
containment;
co-ordination; and
consolidate.
8.3 Hazardous Substances
Scenario Problems
As the majority of bulk chemicals are in industrial
estates and these are, in the main, not labour intensive,
then evacuation of plant is the primary role, followed
by containment by plant staff/or NZ Fire Service. No
clean-up or removal is envisaged for some consider-
able time following an event unless reactions takes
place.
As incidents of fire and collapse are serviced, some
elements of hazardous materials may be present. These
will be dealt with depending on their severity, and their
effects on the general public and services, systemati-
cally.
Presently, the NZ Fire Service has one dedicated
Hazmat unit capable of decontaminating NZ Fire
Service staff and a small number of civilians. The
Health authorities should bear in mind the possible
needs of larger groups for decontamination and should
gear up accordingly.
Functions and events
disrupting NZ Fire
Service operation
directly after event
Ramifications Mitigation
1 Family commitments
- On duty
- Off duty
- Want to return; check status
- Delay in response while making
safe
Welfare plan - implemented June
94
Local station assembly area
2 Tankers availability - Local authority tankers on
station
Ensure TA aware of our
requirements
(List of all tankers within 50 km
of Christchurch attached as Table
8.6)
3 Overland mains
(1.75 km - 4 pumps)
- High demand
- Fires
- Portable supply
Hold until prioritised. All reserve
pumps and A and B type with
spare hose
4 State of Fire Service
buildings
- Doors jammed
- Loose fittings
Procedure Earthquake drive
through or remove from framing
5 Communication
- main channels
- Transmitter out
- Realigned
Switching; simplex; cellular.
Priority restoration, Mt Pleasant
6 Rescue role
- priority
- Overload of requests Split resources; unite with Red
Cross and trained CD groups,
possibly allocate Officer or Senior
Firefighter to semi-trained groups
of volunteers
7 Hazardous materials - Mixed cocktails
- Fire
- Large numbers to decontaminate
High risk plans, cordon, blocked
drains Stabilise; leave signage.
Only able to decontaminate own
staff and small number of general
public
8 LPG bulk tanks and
fixed installations
- Leaks
- Fires
- Pipelines
See list of locations of all units
more than 4,0001tr (Table 8.7);
auto shut-off valves on most of
excess flow valves. Portable
cylinders on heating units would
create numerous fires if operating
during predicted earthquake due
to pilot lights and lack of auto
excess flow valves. Ruptures of
fixed piping would result in entire
contents of cylinders leaking into
structures, which in turn may be
ignited by naked flames or
electrically, causing explosion and
fire
9 Assembly
- staging areas
- Task Force required
- Activate Training and relief
pumps
Initial base HQ, if available or
Woolston Training Centre
(Workshops)
10 Use of media for
recall of staff
- Congestion of airways
- priority CD
Pre-recorded tapes to radio
stations; part recall or all staff
Table 8.3: Post-earthquake Task Group
disrupting NZ Fire
Service operation
11 Feeding and shelter - NZ Fire Service self-sufficient
24 hours but after that CD
required
Use of houses adjoining FS
properties
- Harewood - Russley Hotel/
Commodore Hotel;
- St Albans - Redwood Hotel
- Wigram/Sockburn - Blenheim
Road Hotel
- Addington - Cashmere Club
- Woolston - Ferrymead Tavern
- Headquarters - Christchurch
City, Travel Lodge, etc.
Various volunteer stations on
outer ring of City
12 Toilets Use fire stations after reco.
survey
Rubbish bins
Plastic sheeting
Screens
13 4WD vehicle - Marginal 3 units
- Only 2WD on all other units
Have understanding with Defence
FS to send 4 vehicles for joint
operations.
- Police have number of 4WD in
rural division .
- Territorial authorities = 10
(4x4 tankers)
14 Reconnaissance - Require urgent overview of each
zone
Pre-plan route cards of each
zone to key premises. These
route cards are being researched
prior to preparation 1994/95
year and will include primary
service buildings. High
occupancy an special identified
risks premises, i.e. power
substations, hospitals and
chemical plants
15 111 system - Overload several hours Request Telecom to transfer all
calls to Dunedin or Wellington
Fire HQ's. If able to contact, or to
Christchurch Police HQ's for
Liaison Officer Fire to re-
despatch
16 Resources (local) - Demand on these from several
agencies
Priority on hire pumps,
tarpaulins, and heavy lifling
gear. May need suppiy of empty
sandbags
17 24 hour rostering - Overload on manpower after 6
hours
Use buses, vans or taxis to tum
around crews. Task forces may
need shuttle type unit to change
over
18 Aerial reconnaissance - With breakdown of normal
communications, aerial
observations imperative
Endeavour to have one unit
exclusive Fire Service use (in
CD plan) Rotary wing preferred
(fixed wing too fast)
Table 8.3: Post-earthquake Task Group (continued)
Christchurch Headquarters Station
disrupting NZ Fire
Service operation
19 Electricity - High demand for electricity
- Computers down; dedicated
supply required
Portable generators or
substations;
- Fixed generator HQ's station;
- Police have generators
(Central, New Brighton,
Hornby and Papanui)
20 Signage - Various indicators in use for
damaged, dangerous, trapped
etc
Universal type of signage needed
for all agencies. Need to develop
this inter-agency wide (same
f ormat )
21 Inter-agencies - Loss of power
- Loss of communications
- Restricted roading
- Loss of water
All need urgency by Fire Service
Liaison Officer at CD HQ's;
Monitoring, requesting and
updating Fire Control wherever
it may be based
Table 8.3: Post-earthquake Task Group (continued)
Event/
Function
Recovery
of basic
service or
control
Provision
of 50%
service
Provision
of full
service
Comment
Mitigation
Loss of 30%
stations (3 stations
untenable)
2 days 4 days 1 month Based on priority
allowances
Loss of 10% fire
units
1 hour 2 hours 1 day Use of reserve fleet and
Training units
Loss of water 3 hours 3 days Several weeks Use tankers from volunteer
stations
Power to stations 2 hours 24 hours 5 days Use generators to best
advantage. Merge some
stations and units
Loss of Comms
[VHF
[Phones
[Cell
4 hours
6 hours
4 hours
1 day
1 day
1 day
4 days
6 days
2 days
]Switching links (other
]repeater sites). Use
]simplex, unit to unit only.
]Request priority (111
]exchange). Hire extras;
]high demand for shrinking
]resource
Recall staff 2 hours 8 hours 1 day Depends on contact.
Accountability or send
around pick-up unit
Loss of sewage 24 hours 3 - 4 days 1 month Use of equipment on
stations
Loss or overload
111 system
2 hours 1 day 2 days (Estimate 100 calls). Use
Police/Wellington or
Dunedin
Roading 3 hours 1 day 3 weeks Re-route after
reconnaissance
Bridges 3 hours 2 days 3 months Re-route after
reconnaissance
Collapse of
buildings
24 hours 10 days Several
months
Pre-planned route check to
identify
Fuel loss 10 hours 24/48 hours 2 weeks Bring in mobile transfers to
service fleet from central
depot
Table 8.4: Scenario based on the work of the other taskgroups
Table 8.5: Indicated problems For NZ Fire Service one hour into event
1 Access Roads to Centre City
Marginal
6 Inter-Agency Responses
Need to use inter-agency responses co-
ordinated through HQ's Station and Civil
Defence HQ's
2 Bridge Access South
Critical
Bridge Access North, West
Marginal
7 Dedicated Resources
Dedicated resources such as tankers, road
dozers and 4WD units will require forrning and
operating as a mobile response group to the
larger incidents
3 To Hospitals
Delays predicted
8 Identification
Identification of severely affected areas and the
planning of resources to combat and stabilise
situations by primary reconnaissance and
tasking must have high priority
4 Water Supplies
Severely restricted
Need for use of river and land mains
Urgent actuations of stop valves to conserve
water in affected areas
9 Time
Time and the advent of darkness add depth to
the above scenario and will need to be pre-
planned as an important consideration;
5 Communication
Intermittent and simplex (line of site, may be
only initial system available)
10 Training in Triage
Training in triage for fireslcollapses/rescues.
Water supplies need evaluation, showing team
"skills" levels.
Category B
Dedicated Rural Fire Engine
4x4 or 4x2 1800 ltr+
Carter Holt Harvey Forest Ltd 5 units
4x4
Selwyn Plantation Board 2 units
4x4
Department of Conservation 1 unit
4x4
(Southpower Team)
1 unit
Canterbury Regional Council 1 unit
Waimakariri District Council 1 unit
4x4
Total within 50 km 10x(4x4) + 1x(2x4) 11
Reserve Ashburton District Council 1 unit
4x4
Hurunui District Council 1 unit
Total Reserve 02
Category C
Dedicated Rural Fire Engine
4x2 (ex NZ Fire Service)
up to 1800 ltr, 100 HP+
HP/HV pump
Waimakariri District Council
Selwyn District Council
(Southpower Team)
1 unit
2 unit
1 unit
1 unit
Total 05
Reserve Ashburton District Council 04
Category E
Dedicated Water Carrier or Tanker
Tanker
4x4 or 4x2, 3000 ltr+, 100 HP+
LP/HV pump
Selwyn Plantation Board
Banks Peninsula District Council
5 units
5 units
2 unit
1 unit
3 units
Total 16
Reserve Hurunui District Council
3 units
10 units
Total Reserve 13
Category F
Dedicated Water Carrier or Trailer
6x4, 8000 ltr+, 160 HP+
LP/HV pump
Ashburton County Council
1 unit
2 units
1 unit
1 unit
Total 05
Table 8.6: Fire units/water carriers (not part of NZFS Service Fleet)
Category G
Slip on or Trailer Tanker
4500 ltr+
HP/LV pump
Carter Holt Harvey Forests
Ashburton County Council
2 units
4 units
3 units
1 unit
Total 10
Category H
Dedicated Smokechaser
4x4, 280 ltr+
HP/LV (diaphragm pump)
Ashburton
Christchurch
Banks Peninsula
2 units
3 units
3 units
1 unit
Total 09
Category I
Slip on Smokechaser Tank & Pump
200 ltr+
LP/HV pump (diaphragm pump)
Selwyn Plantation Board
Carter Holt Harvey Forests
1 unit
2 units
1 unit
4 units
Total 08
Reserve Hurunui District Council 01
TOTALS
Fire Units/Water Tankers in
Local Bodies and
64
Territorial Authorities
Reserves
20
Table 8.6: Fire units/water carriers (not part of NZFS Service Fleet) (continued)
ORGANISATION LOCATION TANK SIZE
Adams Print - Div. of PRF NZ Ltd 234 Annex Road 4,300
Canterbury Carton Co Ltd 122 Antigua Street 4,315
Peterson Chemicals Ltd 122 Bamford Street 7,870
Mobil Bealey 268-270 BealeyAvenue 5,000
Bascands Ltd 30 Birmingham Drive 16,080
Firestone Retreading & Warehouse 51 Birmingham Drive 7,440
Europa Sales Yards Service Station 63 Blenheim Road 7,500
Caltex Blenheim Road 149 Blenheim Road 7,435
Wrightson Wool Centre Ltd 503 Blenheim Road 4,300
Blighs Road Service Station Ltd Blighs Road 4,500
Borden Filmpac (ChCh) NZ Ltd 74 Branston Street 15,000
Firth Industries Ltd 7 Broughs Road 9,300
Shell Brougham 495 Brougham Street 7,440
Toyota NZ (ChCh) Ltd 81 Burchanans Road 48,000
Burwood Hospital 300 Burwood Road 4,740
Christchurch Gas Ltd 95 Byron Street 40,000
Caledonian Hotel 101 Caledonian Road 5,000
Mainguard Packaging Ltd 66 Carmen Road 6,700
Princess Margaret Hospital Cashmere Road 4,740
Shell NZ Ltd Chapmans Road 82,500
Shell Oil NZ Ltd 69 Chapmans Road 15,000
Allan Autogas Ltd Cnr Clothier & Essex Streets 4,325
Shell Cashmere 25 Colombo Street 7,440
C E Boon Ltd 221 Colombo Street 15,000
Christchurch Women's Hospital 885 Colombo Street 4,740
Caltex Cranford Street 500 Cranford Street 7,000
Shell Curletts Road Cnr Curletts & Blenheim Roads 7,480
The Chateau on the Park 187-189 Deans Avenue 4,000
Air New Zealand - Technical HQ's Dury Road, Christchurch Airport 7,500
BP Edgeware 71 Edgeware Road 4,500
BOC Gases NZ Ltd 21-27 Epsom Road 150,000
Country Fare ChCh Ltd 38 Essex Street 48,500
Mobil Aldwins Road Ltd 375 Ferry Road 7,500
Shell Ferry Road 417 Ferry Road 7,300
Radley Motors 619 Ferry Road 5,000
Estuary Energy Centre Ltd 1105 Ferry Road 4,876
National Can NZ Ltd 45-49 Fitzgerald Avenue 48,500
Dallington Service Station Ltd 712 Gloucester Street 7,499
MM Cables NZ Ltd 650-652 Halswell Junction Road 30,000
BP Oaklands 246 Halswell Road 7,499
Nicholl Bros (Halswell Garage) 345 Halswell Road 4,876
Cardwell Motor Services Ltd 210 Harewood Road 7,000
New Brighton Service Station 40 Hawke Street 7,500
Central Police Station 48 Hereford Street 18,200
Ansett NZ Ltd - Maintenance Ivan Crescent, Christchurch Airport 7,500
Caltex Lincoln Road 55 Lincoln Road 4,490
Parkroyal (ChCh) Ltd Crn Kilmore & Durhams Streets 18,100
Table 8.7: LPG storage tanks (over 4000 litres) as of August 1994
ORGANISATION LOCATION TANK SIZE
Shell Raceway 250 Lincoln Road 7,499
BP Gainsborough 457 Linwood Avenue 7,499
CWF Hamilton & Co Ltd 20 Lunns Road 28,600
Boral Gerrard Springs Ltd 25 Lunns Road 4,454
Metropolitan Service Station 355-359 Madras Street 7,499
Regents Park Main North Road 4,990
Belfast Service Centre 752 Main North Road 4,500
Fulton Hogan Canterbury Ltd Main South Road, Hornby 28,600
BP Sockburn 222 Main South Road 4,300
Mobil Wigram 243 Main South Road 7,500
Crowes Service Station Ltd 720 Main South Road 8,000
Mayell Foods Ltd 789 Main South Road 4,800
BP Marshlands 432 Marshlands Road 7,499
Fendalton Service Station 1 Memorial Avenue 7,499
Craddocks Service Centre Ltd 546 Memorial Avenue 4,800
Shell Moorhouse Avenue 40 Moorhouse Avenue 4,925
Big Fresh Food Co 347 Moorhouse Avenue 4,876
Christchurch Polytechnic 369 Moorhouse Avenue 4,995
Christchurch Polytechnic 369 MoorhouseAvenue 4,996
Lancaster Park Motor Co Ltd 511 Moorhouse Avenue 28,650
Opawa Garage Ltd 11 Opawa Road 4,315
Winstone Wallboards Ltd 219 Opawa Road 91,200
Stadium Auto Centre Ltd 165 Pages Road 4,876
Avon City Motors Ltd 461 Papanui Road 7,499
Arctic Coldstorage Ltd 58 Parkhouse Road 7,440
Tiffany Foods Ltd 10 Print Place 4,995
BP Riccarton Road 41 Riccarton Road 8,000
Caltex Riccarton Road 64 Riccarton Road 7,500
Bush Inn Hotel - Cobb & Co 340 Riccarton Road 4,876
Russley Hotel 75 Roydvale Avenue 6,700
Harewood Truck Stop Ltd 527 Sawyers Arms Road 48,500
NZ Fibre Glass Ltd Shands Road 43,165
Wattie Frozen Foods Ltd Shands Road 4,136
Branston Auto Services 25 Shands Road 4,876
BP Hoon Hay 69 Sparks Road 4,500
Canterbury Health Ltd 21-45 St Asaph Street 7,440
BP QEII 308 Travis Road 7,499
Flexipac - Borden NZ Ltd 66 Treffers Road 7,000
Medical Waste (Canterbury) Ltd Wairakei Road 4,995
US Naval Antarctic Support Unit Christchurch Airport: Public Works 7,435
Burnside Motors Ltd 449 Wairakei Road 7,499
Norths Bakery Ltd 584 Wairakei Road 28,650
Mobil Wainoni 175 Wainoni Road 7,375
Gasson Motors Ltd 196 Waltham Road 7,480
Waltham Road Services Ltd 229 Waltham Road 5,000
Yaldhurst Motors Ltd Main West Coast Road, RD6 4,740
Port-A-Gas Ltd 119 Wrights Road 30,000
Coro Trading Ltd 150 Yaldhurst Road 4,490
Table 8.7: LPG storage tanks (over 4000 litres) as of August 1994 (continued)
New Zealand/Los Angeles Workshop 219
Chapter 9
New Zealand / Los Angeles Workshop
9.1 Lessons from the
Northridge and Loma Prieta
Earthquakes
Introduction
In August 1994, 7 months following the Northridge
earthquake, a team from Wellington and Christchurch
Lifelines groups went to Los Angeles for a joint NZUS
Lifeline Workshop.
The Earthquake
The magnitude 6.8 (surface wave magnitude) Northridge
earthquake struck at 4.31 am on 17 January, 1994. The
epicentre was located in the community of Northridge in
the San Fernando Valley, approximately thirty kilome-
tres northwest of downtown Los Angeles. The earth-
quake had a focal depth of 20 kilometres.
The Joint NZ/US Lifeline Workshop
The Northridge earthquake was of considerable interest
to New Zealand engineers and lifelines operators due to
similarities in both seismicity and infrastructure, facili-
ties and other buildings.
The Centre for Advanced Engineering recognised the
level of interest in the field of lifelines, and promoted the
idea of a joint New Zealand and United States lifelines
workshop involving representatives of the Wellington
Earthquake Lifelines Group and Christchurch Lifelines
Group. This workshop was held in the offices of the
Southern California Gas Company on 15 and 16 August
1994. The workshop was organised from New Zealand,
with the assistance of the Southern California Gas Com-
pany.
The purpose of the workshop was as follows:
to identify the current approach to lifeline earthquake
preparedness in both countries; and
to identify outcomes from the Northridge earthquake
from utility operators.
Eleven representatives from New Zealand lifelines or-
ganisations and consultancies attended the workshop,
along with approximately twenty United States counter-
parts.
The following personnel from New Zealand attended the
workshop:
Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Group:
David Bell;
Brian Hasell;
John Lamb;
John Lumsden; and
Allan Watson.
Wellington Earthquake Lifelines Group;
Nick Coad;
David Hopkins;
Rachael Hughes;
Peter Leslie;
John Norton; and
Bill Smith.
Note: The 1994 Wellington Earthquake Lifelines group
Report contained a large section dealing with Northridge
investigation to which some of the Christchurch mem-
bers contributed. This chapter, which has a Christchurch
perspective, is written by Christchurch members of the
team, and includes comments on a visit to San Francisco
to investigate the effects of the Loma Prieta earthquake.
This information was presented at the 1994 Christchurch
Workshop.
If there was a common theme to the Workshop it would
be the value of co-operation, recognition of interdepend-
ency, and the benefits of prior planning.
The fact that 11 people from New Zealand Lifeline
Organisations and Consultancies attended this Work-
shop is indicative of the co-operation that exists within
New Zealand to reduce the impact of earthquakes on
engineering lifelines. The representation from Los An-
geles and Californian organisations was most gratifying
and the participation of a representative from the Califor-
nia Utilities Emergency Association served to underline
the importance attached to co operation.
The meeting allowed the New Zealand representatives to
hear first-hand accounts and experiences of the Loma
Prieta, Northridge and other recent California earth-
quakes. New Zealand representatives were mindful of
the different context of the Northridge earthquake in
terms of its relative effects on the city as opposed to a
similar size earthquake in central Wellington or Christ-
church.
The intention of this section is highlight the aspects of the
presentations and visits relating to interdependence and
co-operation amongst lifeline utilities, with particular
emphasis on mitigation measures, preparedness, and
recovery. It is intended to supplement reports by others
focusing on technical matters within each utility.
Workshop overview
The focus was on the Northridge earthquake, but inevi-
tably others were mentioned as were other emergencies
such as California wild fires and the Los Angeles riots of
1992.
A wide range of topics from research funding to techni-
cal detail was covered. Los Angeles Lifeline Utility
Organisations were represented at a high level through-
out, and this added greatly to the value of the seminar for
the New Zealand group. Many of the presenters and
participants had been in key roles in the response to the
Northridge earthquake and had clearly taken consider-
able trouble to gather information for presentation at the
Workshop.
There was a general preparedness to share information
and the Workshop could have easily have had another
day devoted to follow-up discussions and questions.
Objectives of the Visit
In the teams visit to Los Angeles (and for San Francisco/
Oakland) the desired outcomes in relation to Christ-
church were largely achieved, as summarised below.
1 Assess the comparability of the California events
with Christchurch. (Some of them were, but ground
conditions were not equivalent and the sheer size of
Los Angeles means that not all of the city and nearby
jurisdictions were affected, which with mutual aid,
meant many resources were available for restoration
of services.)
2 Identify Lifeline problems, both the expected and
unexpected, including interdependence problems.
(They were, but most were expected.)
3 Obtain expert views on mitigation measures, particu-
larly those previously adopted but now changed as a
result of previous earthquakes. (The higher than
previously experienced ground accelerations are re-
quiring a reconsideration of designs.)
4 Obtain information on the time required to restore
adequate service. (The times achieved were most
impressive with basic service restored in nearly all
cases within one to three days.)
5 Obtain views on acceptable levels of risk and the link
to investment from Lifelines providers, politi-
cians, community leaders etc. (Not much informa-
tion on these matters was obtained, but there were
different approaches from different organisations).
6 Make contact with appropriate staff with a view to
in depth discussions and inspections. ( The inspec-
tions on the final three days in Los Angeles and
particularly the San Francisco/Oakland visits were a
highlight.)
7 Discuss the applicability of Response Plans. (There
was an emphasis on generalised response plans rather
than for specific events.)
8 In San Francisco/Oakland, assess the effects of lique-
faction. (The three days there most valuable in the
reassurance given about the relative resiliency of
pipelines, although it was realised that the Loma
Prieta earthquake was not as large as that in the
scenario for Christchurch.)
Workshop presentations
Initiatives in lifeline earthquake preparation
Presenter: Anshel Schiff, Stanford University, a noted
US lifeline expert.
This presentation traced the United States Federal Gov-
ernment initiatives from the formation of a US-Japan
Earthquake Engineering Group in 1963, through meas-
ures following the San Fernando earthquake of 1971, to
the passage of the Earthquake Hazard Reduction Act
1990, which urged improvement of engineering life-
lines.
Notably, this Act called on the Federal Emergency
Management Association (FEMA) and the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to submit
a plan, including precise timetable and budget estimates
for developing and adopting, in consultation with appro-
priate private sector organisations, design and construc-
tion standards for lifelines.
Formation by the American Society of Civil Engineers
(ASCE) of a Technical Committee on Lifeline Earth-
quake Engineering (TCLEE) in 1974 gave evidence of
professional co-operation and recognition of the impor-
tance of the field of lifeline earthquake engineering. The
focus of this group is on mitigation measures and it has
been instrumental in developing standards and improv-
ing awareness since its inception.
Private sector utility organisations are co-operating by
sharing information on damage and preparing guides to
good practice. They are also developing response plans
and conducting training exercises.
Overall, Professor Schiffs presentation indicated the
importance that had been attached by Federal, State and
Professional Organisations to the subject of lifelines and
this was evident in the level of research funding being
made available.
California Utilities Emergency Association
(CUEA)
Presenter: Katherine Latipow, Executive Director.
This presentation covered the role of the State of Califor-
nia Governors office of Emergency Services (OES).
This office has several divisions including one for utili-
ties and another for telecommunications.
The OES seeks to establish common organisational
structures for response to emergencies, with a regional
focus. It aims to assist at the government and industry
interface and is pushing for improved communications
such as the Operational Area Satellite Information Sys-
tem (OASIS). OES also promotes the development and
use of mutual aid agreements between organisations.
CUEA is an autonomous organisation of public and
private utilities fostering co operation in emergency
planning, response, mitigation and recovery. CUEA
represents utilities in both emergency and non-emer-
gency situations and provides a link to the State-run
OES.
In an emergency, CUEA establishes a Utilities Opera-
tions Centre staffed by CUEA representatives from gas,
electric, water and telecommunication utilities. This
centre co-ordinates utility-related emergency response
and recovery issues during major emergencies. Principal
concerns in California include:
damage assessment;
outage duration;
restoration priorities;
distribution of potable water;
co-ordination in government agencies in affected
areas; and
media releases.
Examples of CUEA contributions to disaster response
include:
co-ordination of emergency diesel fuel delivery to
telecommunications;
facilities for generator operation during the Northridge
earthquake;
assisting in prioritisation of electrical power restora-
tion to vitally impacted locations in the Loma Prieta
earthquake;and
the airlifting of two 250 kV circuit breakers from the
east coast to the west coast in the Loma Prieta
earthquake.
CUEAs current planning activities include participa-
tion in:
utility advisory committees;
government and industry task forces on potable wa-
ter distribution and emergency cellular communica-
tions;
preparation of planning documents for critical facil-
ity security and for mutual aid agreements; and
facilitation of access to information sources, work-
shops, conferences and training programmes.
CUEA exists because of the recognition of the impor-
tance of the interdependence of engineering lifelines. It
was originally chartered in 1950 as part of Californias
Civil Defence Plan, but it was not until 1990 that it was
established as representing all utilities in an emergency.
Significantly, transportation utilities are not included,
though clearly close liaison exists.
CUEA aims to encourage wider membership to provide
a larger base from which to promote its objectives.
Clearly, there are parallels for New Zealand. Utility
organisations seeking to improve co-operation in emer-
gency and who wish to examine the effects of
interdependencies, should maintain liaison with CUEA.
New Zealand perspectives
Presenters: John Lumsden (CAE), Peter Leslie (WRC),
John Lamb (CRC), John Norton (THCC) and David
Hopkins (Kingston Morrison).
The New Zealand presentations covered key aspects of
the Wellington Lifelines Project, the Wellington Earth-
quake Lifelines Group, the Christchurch Engineering
Lifeline Project, preparedness, response plans and inter-
dependence.
The interdependence of utilities was identified as impor-
tant in response planning and in prioritising mitigation
measures. Techniques for analysing relative depend-
ence, importance and priority were described.
It was gratifying to note that many of the issues raised in
the New Zealand presentation, particularly on interde-
Significant damage to monitors and work-stations re-
sulted in reduced surveillance in the early stages.
In the Northridge earthquake, 187,000 lines were af-
fected for up to 22 hours.
Key findings and lessons from an interdependence and
response planning perspective included:
Three hour battery reserve is not long enough.
Power to alarm/monitoring systems is vital (back-up
power for this is critical).
Testing of stand-by generators is recommended.
A Network Management Centre is critical to dial tone
delivery.
Back-up systems for communications are most worth-
while.
Integrated utility response plans are valuable.
Mutual aid agreements between utilities are vital.
An established network of communication between utili-
ties is critical. An example was quoted where a telecom
field worker would not venture into an area of telecom-
munications damage for fear of a dam bursting. Those in
control of the telecommunications recovery were able to
obtain authoritative clearances as to the safety of the dam
from their counterparts in the Department of Water and
Power. Telecommunications repairs could thus proceed
without delay.
Exercises are the best preparation.
A clear impression was given that good planning and
mitigation had reduced damage and impact, but there
was room for improvement.
Water supply in Northridge earthquake
Two organisations gave presentations, the Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power and the Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California.
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
(DWP)
Presenter: Bob Giles.
This was an excellent blow-by-blow description of DWPs
response. It is of interest to note that it took 12 days to lift
the boil water notice.
Other key points to emerge were:
There were many offers of mutual aid, including
several from out of State. Because of the existence of
these aid agreements, phone orders for materials and
pendence and response planning, proved to be of particu-
lar relevance to many of the subsequent presentations.
This prompted a complimentary comment from one US
participant on our achievement, especially in the absence
of a major earthquake in a New Zealand city.
One particular point covered in the New Zealand presen-
tation which emerged as important in almost all other
presentations was the need to handle media releases
responsibly and pro-actively.
Effects of a large earthquake on Los Angeles
Presenter: Ron Eguchi (Vice-President, EQE Interna-
tional).
This presentation reminded participants that the
Northridge earthquake was not the worst that LA could
face. It consisted of the results of a analysis of movement
of the Elysian Fault with a magnitude 7.0 earthquake
near downtown Los Angeles.
Impressive use of GIS systems and the resulting col-
oured graphs was made in presenting the results of
predictions. The County of Los Angeles has US$500
billion at risk, while the city has a US$200 billion
exposure. This exposure includes 4,000 steel frame
buildings, 300 of which did not perform well in the
Northridge earthquake.
Plots of MM intensity, damage, injury, deaths, and
uninhabitable residences were presented. The overall
losses were computed to be US$75 billion, split US$50
billion for general damage and US$25 billion for life-
lines. The total of US$75 billion compares with an
estimate done by similar means for the Northridge earth-
quake of between US$13 and US$20 billion in direct
damage. A feature of the damage ratios used for houses
was that they were significantly higher than those com-
monly accepted for values of MM less than eight.
Overall, this presentation served as a reminder that
damage and disruption can rise exponentially as the size
of an earthquake increases. Survival in Northridge was
not necessarily the ultimate test.
Telecommunications in the Northridge
earthquake
Presenters: Mike Caren, Director, Emergency Prepared-
ness, Pacific Bell, and Bill Sevido, Pacific Bell.
A detailed account of outages in Loma Prieta and
Northridge was given resulting in some interesting com-
parisons. Telecommunciations damage in Loma Prieta
was $70 million compared with $26 million for
Northridge, both figures being for repairs only.
Calls in both earthquakes were around twice normal.
labour were acceptable. Assistance from surround-
ing authorities came in the form of equipment and
personnel.
Mutual aid crews from outside Los Angeles were
used during the day time, reserving the night-time
work for locals who were more familiar with the
system. Provision for accommodation and meals was
difficult. Care had to be taken to avoid fatigue amongst
workers.
Communications had been difficult because there
was no common radio frequency.
Cellular phones had proved beneficial, especially the
use of ones personally owned by staff. This was in
spite of the fact that a repeater station failed.
A 24-hour information centre was set up for custom-
ers.
Media response was via a single source.
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
(MWD)
Presenter: Bill Cooper.
This presentation provided an interesting overview of
the damage to the Jensen Filtration Plant which suffered
US$4.8 million damage. A US$11 million programme
for repair and mitigation is underway.
From an interdependency and response planning per-
spective the following comments were noted:
A viable emergency preparedness programme is es-
sential.
Mitigation work carried out since 1971 reduced im-
pact considerably.
Better recognition of emergency personnel ID is
required.
Provision of lodging and meals for staff was difficult,
especially with no water or power in hotels and
motels.
MWD is contemplating the free storage of staff
recreational vehicles (campervans) at key sites on the
basis that they would be available in emergencies.
MWD proposes to establish prior contracts with local
equipment suppliers and hirers for use in emergen-
cies.
Communications were difficult in the first 48 hours.
A special Emergency Operation Centre was estab-
lished at the treatment plant. This was separate from
the area control centre.
MWD plan to purchase a helicopter, with pilot, to
assist with emergencies in future.
Improvement projects scheduled are:
updating of emergency response plans;
installation of GIS systems to give better and quicker
information;
developing a business resumption programme; and
formalising mutual aid contracts.
Electrical systems in Northridge earthquake
Two organisations made presentations. These were South-
ern California Edison and the Los Angeles Department
of Water and Power. The comparative size of these two
organisations which, between them, serve the greater
Los Angeles area can be seen by the fact that Southern
California Edison has 4.2 million customers and DWP
1.36 million.
Southern California Edison
Presenter: Dennis Ostrom, Seismic Consultant.
There were US$50 million in damage and related costs,
and 1.1 million customers lost power initially, although
half a million of these were restored to power almost
immediately. After 12 hours all but 180,000 customers
had power, after 16 hours this had reduced to 40,000 and
after 30 hours to 3,000. All service was restored within
56 hours of the earthquake.
Edisons distribution facilities experienced 471 sus-
tained and 200 momentary circuit interruptions. Thir-
teen poles and 61 transformers were damaged and re-
quired replacement. Over 200 spans of conductor re-
quired replacement or repair. Over 40 pad-mounted
transformers shifted on their pads and required resetting.
An interesting point to emerge in discussions was that the
peak daily demand in winter (January) is some 40% of
the peak daily demand in summer. This fact allowed
repairs and re-energising to be effected using spare
equipment.
No significant problems were mentioned regarding ac-
cess or coping with the response. Dennis Ostrom, a keen
motorbike user, found that a mountain bike was the best
means of transport immediately following the earth-
quake. He was able to by-pass lines of stationary traffic
and gain access to otherwise inaccessible areas.
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power
(DWP)
Presenter: Ron Tognazzini, Seismic Manager.
DWP has 1.36 million customers serving 3.5 million
people and has 11,000 employees. At the time of the
earthquake it was generating approximately 1,900 MW
out of a total capacity of around 5,000 MW. Rigid
conductors, transformers, cantilever supports, discon-
nect switches and structural systems were damaged. A
graph of the restoration is shown in Figure 9.1.
The presentation provided a valuable and close insight
into the restoration process, proving the value of redun-
dancy in the systems. The presentation included a se-
quence of colour slides showing the step-by-step resto-
ration of the power grid.
DWP have been active in seismic mitigation since 1971
and this has paid off well. Seismic qualification of
equipment also paid dividends.
The state of DWP in seismic mitigation is indicated by
the proposed future design changes:
more rigorous design procedures;
higher design loads;
more full scale testing;
use of alternative materials (to porcelain); and
system configuration changes.
Central to the recovery of DWPs system was the Energy
Control Centre (ECC), a robust facility located in the
mountains to the north-west of the city. The day-to day
experience of dispatchers in balancing load and genera-
tion was helpful in giving the necessary knowledge of
system flexibility. The considerable redundancy helped
as did the low load in January.
An interesting observation from the Manager of the ECC
was that in a previous emergency, senior management
was allowed on the dispatch room floor and this proved
counter-productive. In the Northridge earthquake, spe-
cial efforts were made to keep senior management (Emer-
gency Command Centre) separate from the Energy Con-
trol Centre activities. This worked well.
The Manager of the ECC, Marcie Edwards, made some
telling points at the Workshop:
dont tie up key low level people on other tasks;
prepare access methods in advance, e.g. have maps of
patrol roads ready;
keep the media well informed explain what, when
and why things are being done;
review station layouts for by-pass options;
technical aspects are largely known management
is the key to recovery; and
decide in advance about logistic support of person-
nel, e.g. payroll, accommodation, shifts.
Gas supply
Presenters: John May, Martin Remmen, Randy Ragos.
The presentation covered the more spectacular aspects
of the mobile home fires and the house fires in Balboa
100
90
80
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0 24 48 72
Hours after earthquake
%

o
f

c
u
s
t
o
m
e
r
s
93%
97%
99.5%
Figure 9.1: Power service restoration in the Northridge earthquake
Street. A lack of water to fight fires was highlighted and
it was noted that the toppling of water heaters accounted
for 39% of fires.
Martin Remmen was in the emergency operation centre
for four days. The gas system took 12 days to restore
fully. The bulk of the damage occurred to residential and
light industrial installations.
The controversy over automatic shut-off valves also
emerged. The gas company now has instructions for
people not to turn-off their gas unless there is evidence of
leakage. This represents a reversal of previous policy.
Even so, Los Angeles City Fire Department requires
seismic shut-off valves for new construction. This is
being resisted by Southern California Gas since it causes
more problems than it solves.
Little was raised regarding interdependency and re-
sponse planning, but the gas company consider them-
selves to have been lucky in this earthquake.
The Workshop was held at the offices of Southern
California Gas and this afforded the opportunity of
visiting their spacious, well-equipped, high-tech Emer-
gency Control Centre. This impressive facility had
special screens for monitoring television news, a valu-
able source of information. Communication terminals,
computers, and special overhead TV cameras were in-
stalled. There was also provision for a media interview
area as well as supplies of food. Interestingly, there were
full height glass partitions, suspended ceilings, and unse-
cured equipment in this facility. Nevertheless, it is clear
that emergency response is being taken seriously by this
organisation.
Transportation Systems in Northridge
Earthquake
Responsibility for transportation systems within the
greater Los Angeles area is split between California
Department of Transportation (Caltrans), which is simi-
lar to Transit New Zealand and looks after the freeway
network, and the Los Angeles City and other cities which
are equivalent to our territorial authorities. Presentations
were made by both Caltrans and the Los Angeles City
Department of Transportation (LADOT).
Caltrans
Presenter: Jack Hallin, Deputy District Director.
Although repair costs will total US$300 to US$350
million, only a small proportion of freeway structures
were significantly affected by the earthquake. This meant
that alternative routes were available in most cases,
although at some inconvenience. Critical areas were the
intersection of the Interstate 5 and Freeway 14 which is
a large complex of elevated interchanges, and the Santa
Monica freeway west of Los Angeles city. This is one of
the busiest freeways in the world carrying some 340,000
vehicles per day.
All freeways were scheduled to be restored by December
1994. The key Santa Monica freeway was substantially
replaced by April 1994 which is equivalent to building
the Thorndon Overpass two or three times over in 65
days.
Funding reimbursement is available from FEMA which
pays 100% of costs in the first 180 days and between 80%
and 92% after that.
Special contract procedures and conditions were put in
force to expedite reconstruction. These included bonus/
penalty clauses, 24-hour, seven day working with no
allowance for rain days. A mixture of bidding and force
account methods were used, depending on scale of the
work and its urgency.
Design of freeway replacements complied with post-
Loma Prieta standards, and it can be assumed that the
extensive research and development work initiated after
Loma Prieta enabled a quicker response to the Northridge
damage than would otherwise have been possible. Some
discontinuities in the bridges were removed, but gener-
ally geometry was kept the same. Mitigation measures
had been carried out on a number of bridges in the Los
Angeles area, notably steel jacketing of columns. These
performed well.
Detours were set up quickly, especially at the Santa
Monica freeway, aided by the Los Angeles citys earth-
quake traffic management centre. This is used every day
to control traffic within the city, and in particular to cope
with unforeseen blockages and accidents. The ATSAC
system (Automatic Traffic Surveillance and Control) of
LADOT provides graphical and video signals which
enable computer control of traffic lights. The system was
reprogrammed to give priority to designated detours.
The urgency of replacement of freeways is indicative of
the reliance on the motor vehicle in Los Angeles gener-
ally.
Los Angeles City Department of Transportation
Presenter: Tom Conner, Assistant General Manager.
Tom Conner gave a comprehensive overview of the
earthquake damage to buildings and infrastructure. From
the perspective of the Los Angeles Department of Trans-
portation, it emphasised the value of co-operation be-
tween Caltrans, LADOT, Santa Clarita City, Los Ange-
les County, FEMA, OES, and the Federal Highways
Administration. Through this co-operation, approvals
for work were streamlined. A small example was that
new traffic lights could be put in within a matter of hours
when approval would normally take up to one month.
The metro systems, consisting of bus and rail were
relatively unaffected by the earthquake and this allowed
commuters an alternative to the collapsed freeways,
particularly from Santa Clarita. Ridership was many
times normal at the peak, and remains about double the
pre-earthquake level. Generally, traffic signals survived
and performed satisfactorily once energised.
Key points from an interdependence and response plan-
ning perspective to emerge were:
Two-way radios worked well.
The phone system was satisfactory but was over-
loaded.
Cellular phones were handy, but there was no provi-
sion for priority for emergency management use.
Preparedness plans and training were invaluable.
Daily press briefings were given and it was found that
the people respond well to accurate and helpful
information.
Agency co-ordination was essential and works well
in the emergency context. As Tom Conner said later
People want to be part of the solution, not part of the
problem.
In spite of the value of pre-planning of response,
much was achieved on the just-do-it principle.
This applied particularly to the construction of some
detours which were designed and constructed from
the bulldozer seat.
For transportation systems, there are close parallels in
the LA experience for New Zealand, especially in the
need for good communications, co-operation amongst
agencies and preparedness planning.
Sewage system in the Northridge
earthquake
Presenters: Del Biagi, Director, Bureau of Sanitation,
Rafael Solorzano and others.
Del Biagi explained the system and noted that the Bu-
reaus emphasis has shifted from response in the late
1970s to preparedness and mitigation.
Not much damage occurred at treatment plants, but
considerable damage was done to lines. The following
points were made:
Employee preparedness paid off.
Response plans must cover all times of day and night
and cater for holidays.
Redundant communications and emergency systems
paid off.
Electricity is vital and back-up should be provided
where possible.
Stand-by generators should be serviced by those who
depend on them, not by an outside agency or depart-
ment.
Structural and non-structural mitigation work car-
ried out by the Bureau of Sanitation cut losses and the
impact of the earthquake overall. It allowed greater
focus on recovery of the sewerage system.
Rafael Solorzano focused on damage to sewer lines and
the problems of inspection, collation of damage records,
and procedures and documentation for funding of re-
pairs. The collection system totals 7,000 miles of pipe
with an average age of 50 years. GIS systems were used
to log damage. Interestingly, plots of building damage
and its severity were used to prioritise sewer inspections
by closed circuit television. In all US$200 million dam-
age was done to sewer lines.
Because of the difficulties in identifying damage, the
Bureau of Sanitation asked FEMA for an extension of
time in lodging its claims. Mr Solorzano emphasised the
need to liaise with funding agencies in the early stages.
Efforts in repair were categorised as emergency and non-
emergency. Progressive discovery of leaks occurred as
water was restored to the city. Broken water mains
caused wash-outs in some places compounding damage
to the Bureaus sewers.
On the funding side, there was concern that the city must
bear the cost of inspection if no damage was found, and
that FEMA would pay for the CCTV inspections but not
for the interpretation of the video film.
Recommendations were made as follows:
Employ three teams in recovery, one for inspection
and damage assessment, one for project definition
and co-ordination with funding agencies and one for
design and construction.
Liaise early with funding agencies on arrangements
for inspection and repairs.
Know the hot-spots of your system, i.e. those likely
to give trouble in earthquake.
Summary Of Key Issues
In reviewing the Workshop, the presentations and visits,
the following points stand out as providing worthwhile
pointers for New Zealands Lifeline Organisations.
Effect of a larger event
A bigger event would have increased problems in
non-linear fashion. Extrapolation of the Northridge
experience to more critical facilities should be done
with this in mind.
Damage assessment
This has an important role to play in a number of
ways.
Firstly, prior to the earthquake, it allows the identifi-
cation of hot-spots by examining the possible
impact on the system of failure of particular ele-
ments.
Secondly, it raises staff awareness of the facilities
and their vulnerability generally.
Thirdly, and increasingly, GIS systems are helpful in
providing a tool to prioritise inspections in the imme-
diate aftermath of an earthquake. This has been
assisted by the CUBE (Caltec USGS Broadcast of
Earthquakes Facility) which provides on-screen iso-
seismal maps. The use by the Bureau of Sanitation of
plots of building damage to prioritise their inspec-
tions of sewers is a classic example of the use of GIS
and inter-utility co-operation.
Communications
These hold the key to effective response.
This applies to automatic information systems on the
status of plant and to person-to-person communica-
tions both within a lifeline organisation and between
one utility and another. Prior personal contact amongst
key managers is helpful.
Organisational preparedness
There is a need to separate Emergency Command
Centres (senior management) from Emergency Con-
trol Centres (system operators).
Professional associations and inter-utility co-
operation
These are clearly valuable in establishing networks
so that key engineering lifeline managers are known
to one another. The California Utilities Emergency
Association could be a valuable source of informa-
tion and guidance for New Zealand engineering
lifeline organisations.
Mutual aid contracts
The value of these was emphasised by a number of
presenters. These can be anything from an informal
arrangement to a formal contract. The key factor is
that prior contact is made and the likely scope of
required support defined.
Cellular phone network
This is clearly growing in popularity and had an
important role to play in the Northridge earthquake.
There is a need to establish a dedicated part of this
network for use by emergency operators. There is
also a need for the various organisations involved in
cellular networks to co-operate in an emergency to
ensure full coverage of the affected area.
Planning and training
The importance of this was emphasised by many of
those involved. We all know that this is the case, but
it is more difficult to do something about it. Califor-
nia has had 25 federal disasters in the last 10 years, so
that the need to plan and carry out training and
exercises is widely accepted. People will only know
what to do if they have the opportunity to practise.
Timing of earthquake
Some reminders of this were given in the time of day
that the earthquake occurred and the fact that it was
a holiday. A further factor was that the electrical load
was some 40% of what it would have been in the
summer. Options for repair and recovery would have
been limited had higher loads been on the system.
Special contractual measures
These have immense potential benefit and organisa-
tions should give them prior consideration. The very
rapid completion of the Santa Monica freeway re-
pairs and reconstruction are testimony to the value of
innovative and flexible arrangements.
Handling of the media
A consistent message came through from all in-
volved the media demand, and deserve, attention.
They are also a source of valuable information. It is
vital that communication with the media is controlled
through a single source for each organisation. Infor-
mation must be accurate and explain what, why,
where and when things will be done to restore nor-
mality.
Seismic mitigation
It was clear from many of the presentations and
discussions held that mitigation, both structural and
non-structural, had been seen to be extremely worth-
while. Testimony to this is the ongoing programmes
of mitigation by all organisations.
Traffic management
One advantage that Los Angeles had was a sophisti-
cated system for the automatic surveillance and con-
trol of traffic. This allowed detours to be put in place
through city suburbs with the lights automatically
controlled to give necessary priorities. Equivalent
New Zealand response may not require such sophis-
tication, but at least the value of pre-planning for
these events is evident.
Each earthquake is unique
It is important to remember that each earthquake is
unique in its location, its size, the length of time
involved in the earthquake, the timing of the earth-
quake (day or night, weekday or weekend/holiday).
The effects of the earthquake are also unique with
factors such as the location of services, their age,
their design, their construction, their materials, the
soils, the relationship to buildings and to other serv-
ices, to roadways, to rivers, etc., all affecting the
damage sustained.
Lifeline engineering is not a precise science
Earthquake engineering, and in particular lifelines
engineering, is not a precise science and it is therefore
impossible to predict accurately what will happen in
Christchurch, or elsewhere, as the result of an earth-
quake. Notwithstanding this, in California most of
the mitigation measures undertaken on services as a
result of lessons learned from previous earthquakes,
were largely successful (although they may not have
been had the earthquakes been of longer duration)
and it is therefore well worthwhile mitigating in
accordance with present knowledge.
The Christchurch approach is appropriate
The above means that the imprecise way in which the
Christchurch Project has had to be approached does
not detract from the benefits likely to be obtained as
a result of the Project. In fact, the approach taken
trying to relate the services not only to their design,
methods of construction etc., but also the soil condi-
tions, is entirely appropriate. The somewhat crude
classification of vulnerability on a scale of 1 to 3 is
perfectly appropriate in assisting in the determina-
tion of the priority for mitigation measures, and,
notwithstanding the tremendous amount of money
thrown at the problems by the well-resourced
American authorities, the Christchurch approach on
a shoe-string is still very worthwhile.
The team was surprised that the Americans did not
seem to take into account the soil conditions in
explaining, or predicting, damage as much as ex-
pected, although that situation was different in San
Francisco/Oakland where they have experienced liq-
uefaction problems. They were able to relate the
damage that had occurred to ground conditions.
Engineering services are resilient
One major impression was the way in which the
engineering services are remarkably resilient, par-
ticularly when compared with the amount of building
damage which received so much publicity.
Damage is still visible, but not all effects
The drive through the various affected areas in Los
Angeles most worthwhile and the team was amazed
at the extent of damage still visible in so many areas
seven months after the earthquake. Although all
engineering services were again operable, that did
not mean that the effects on the community had
passed.
It is important to remember that utilities are there to
serve the public who may be very badly affected
emotionally and financially and therefore even more
demanding than usual.
Mutual aid
In relation to the restoration of services the concept of
mutual aid, where adjoining authorities came to
the assistance of the affected ones, was most interest-
ing in the California area, but the sheer size of Los
Angeles meant that although many had been affected
by the earthquake, there was still many more nearby
ready and able to assist.
FEMA funding
The resources provided by FEMA (Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency) was very impressive
and the way in which restoration of services was
undertaken was often affected by the way in which
funding was available.
People response
Provision of accommodation and meals for those
involved in making repairs and organising recovery
emerged as a concern. So too did the tendency of
those involved to work extended periods and so
suffer fatigue. This had to be watched.
Although the value of planning prior to the event is
well recognised, considerable scope must be given to
those in the field to solve the problems on the ground.
This is the just-do-it approach. Clearly, with proper
communication and pre-planning combined with this
spirit, much can be achieved.
In relation to people response, it is worth concluding
with Tom Conners observation which sums up why
cities cope much better than expected with major
disasters:
People want to be part of the solution not
part of the problem
Miscellaneous Quotes
The following miscellaneous quotes noted during the
Workshop and inspections are of interest.
A visit to an earthquake makes you a believer.
Mutual aid agreements determined in advance are a
help.
A GIS helps in evaluating the effect of an earthquake.
A disaster day practising a co-ordinated response
to a simulated disaster across the whole of the com-
munity is worthwhile.
Before Northridge the geologists thought they had
sorted out the faults they are now rethinking.
The Northridge repair costs were of the order of
$US13 to 20 billion.
Dont publicise that it will be three days before the
power is restored it becomes the expected per-
formance regardless of the effects of the earthquake.
Telecom equipment survived but not the structures.
A lot more outside plant damage was expected (with
the exception of fibreoptic cables which were thought
would perform well) than actually occurred.
Test/use the emergency power plants regularly for an
extended period on full load.
Audit to see that all procedures of mitigation are
actually continuing in place regular testing is
essential.
The team did not hear of any damage and we believe
there was no damage to cable ducts in the Loma
Prieta or Northridge earthquakes. Nearly all the prob-
lems were at the structures.
Vehicles taken home by staff aid tremendously in the
inspections necessary immediately after an earth-
quake and before planning restoration.
Having a core staff of your own is essential in being
able to cope with damage quickly.
Offices performed very badly, particularly with com-
puters, drawers and plan rooms and material off
shelves.
Dont have a detailed emergency response plan be-
cause it never occurs like it is predicted!
In setting up mitigation measures, test rather than
analyse their likely performance if at all possible.
Think carefully about the number of spare parts you
have because if you simply replace those that have
been damaged with the same then they may well be
damaged in an aftershock.
Dont take the operators away from the work just for
the information services managers who dont do
the physical work can be very good as liaison people.
Develop media response in advance to explain the
reasons why services are being restored in a certain
order.
A clean/clear change is needed to the emergency
organisation rather than overlap with the normal
management structure.
Waterheaters that moved were a major problem with
gas supplies.
All trenches throughout Los Angeles are backfilled
with one, two or three sacks of cement slurry mix (the
team saw virtually no settlement of trenches.)
LPG gas bottles and gas heaters could be a real source
of fire in Christchurch.
In Los Angeles dependence on vehicles is a way of
life is it any different in Christchurch?
Make sure the public know what is involved in
restoration. If they know, they will put up with it. It
is essential that the media has good information or
they will make up their own!
The refuse collection programme to the Los Angeles
Landfill was lost for one day only but they needed a
special household hazardous waste roundup because
of the dangerous/hazardous materials dumped on the
floor from shelves.
Bolt down or secure small items.
Have an employee emergency preparedness pro-
gramme.
The person who has to use the emergency equipment
in an emergency should maintain it.
Have a separate emergency preparedness budget.
In sanitary sewers, it was mainly the clay pipes that
were damaged and the concrete undamaged.
In looking for sewer breaks authorities used the GIS
to overlay the water breaks (which were visible) in
the first instance.
Damage to sewer pipes was not so much related to the
materials but more to the shallow depths (shallow is
five metres).
There seemed to be no connection with the soil type
and damage in Los Angeles unless liquefaction was
involved.
One often has to proceed on very limited data but that
is not an excuse for not doing anything.
The demand on the system (the time of the day, the
week, month, etc.,) makes a big difference in the
ability to cope with outages.
The impact of an earthquake increases in a non-linear
way in relation to magnitude/intensity.
Modified Mercalli is a measure of the damage that
occurred to other than engineering structures. It is not
a measure of ground acceleration and the length of
time an earthquake shakes is most significant.
The source of funds available for restoration of the
damage often determines the way the restoration is
carried out and its priority.
Practical Lessons from the Loma Prieta
Earthquake
Acknowledgement
The following lessons were adapted from those listed in
Practical Lessons from the Loma Prieta Earthquake,
Report from a Symposium sponsored by the Geotechnical
Board and the Board on Natural Disasters of the National
Research Council. Ron Eguchi, the Visiting Fellow at
the Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Workshop, was
a joint author on the lifeline perspective of this report.
Many of the general observations made in the report will
apply in Christchurch and the lesson approach used in
the National Research Council publication has been
used.
Lesson 1: Investments made in earthquake preparedness
and hazard and risk mitigation do pay off.
Lesson 2: Those who are aware of the risks involved
from earthquakes have an obligation to ensure that
the policy-makers are aware of the risks, the costs and
benefits of various strategies and must make strong
recommendations for earthquake hazard and risk
mitigation.
Lesson 3: Utility operators need to know quickly follow-
ing an earthquake what are the affected areas so that
emergency response decision-makers can make a
sensible decision. Los Angeles has a CUBE system
which produces within minutes of an earthquake
being monitored a map on screen showing the loca-
tion of the earthquake, its time and its magnitude.
Lesson 4: Even though it may be thought that a consid-
erable amount is known about the seismic geology of
an area, each earthquake is unique and it is very
difficult to forecast accurately what will happen. The
more is known of the present conditions the better
will be our prediction of the future response to
earthquakes.
Lesson 5: Damage can occur at a considerable distance
from the epicentre of an earthquake and reflections
from the regional geologic structure may play a
significant part. This needs to be borne in mind in
view of the close proximity of the Port Hills. It is
important also to emphasise that damage may occur
from smaller magnitude earthquakes close to Christ-
church, not only from the Big One on the main
alpine fault.
Lesson 6: There are surprising variations in the intensity
and nature of strong ground motion resulting from an
earthquake and engineers must not assume that the
Earthquake Code is adequate for all sites. The nature
and location of the substrata is particularly important
knowing that about half of Christchurch could be
subject to liquefaction.
Lesson 7: As has been observed in many earthquakes, the
intensity of seismic shaking is critically dependent
upon the nature of the local soils and shallow geo-
logical structures. It is important that the impact of
possible hazards be incorporated into landuse plan-
ning or building codes.
Lesson 8: In the Loma Prieta earthquake the geological
maps prepared for the purpose of identifying poten-
tial areas of liquefaction proved adequate in defining
the locations of major occurrences of liquefaction
and lateral spreading.
In Christchurch there must be continued refining of
the accuracy of our maps and where facilities must be
built in areas identified as being susceptible to lique-
faction, measures must be taken to ensure that the
ground improvement techniques are used to mini-
mise earthquake damage.
Lesson 9: A significant effect of earthquakes is land-
slides, and it is important that maps be developed for
landslide potential. Some work was done on slope
hazards on the Port Hills but it needs to be borne in
mind that detailed geological studies were not under-
taken. The time of the year at which an earthquake
occurs, the duration of the shaking and the water
content of the material very much affects the extent
of landslides.
Although there was no mention in San Francisco
regarding rockfalls, these could be a significant prob-
lem on the Port Hills.
Lessons 10 and 11: Properly engineered fills perform
well and it is important to ensure that proper place-
ment and compaction of material is undertaken. In
Christchurch the stability of some of the older fills
has not been examined and there must be some
concern regarding the likely performance of these,
particularly the bridge approaches and some of the
cut and fill on the hill areas.
Lesson 12: Skilled earthquake engineers can consider-
ably reduce the loss of life and damage resulting from
the loss of structures. This applies in lifelines as well
as buildings.
Lesson 13: Although in some cases bridges and build-
ings that had been retrofitted to resist earthquakes
sustained structural damage, many bridges that had
not been retrofitted sustained little or no damage, but
this is not a reason for not undertaking mitigation
measures. Not enough is known about the way in
which structures perform, but any mitigation meas-
ure is obviously better than none at all.
Lesson 14: Hinge restrainers generally performed well
on highway bridge structures and on the Los Angeles
Freeways the relative simplicity and fragility of some
of these is of interest.
Lesson 15: It is important that both building owners and
lifeline operators realise the fact that although work
may be done to mitigate the effects of an earthquake
there is no absolute surety that damage will not ensue.
Lesson 16: Inspections during the building of engineer-
ing lifelines and their buildings are important to see
that the designers intentions are actually carried
through into the construction.
Lesson 17: Unreinforced masonry buildings and fences
can be dangerous, not only to occupants but also to
the control structures in Lifelines. In many cases the
lifelines themselves performed satisfactorily but it
was the buildings that enclosed their control struc-
tures that caused problems. Sometimes the buildings
were satisfactory but the contents had not been re-
strained.
Lesson 18: Simple measures are available for greatly
reducing earthquake losses and the anchoring of
equipment is essential.
Lesson 19: When considering possible damage to instal-
lations note must be taken of adjacent hazards which
may impact on the particular lifeline.
Lesson 20: Old cast iron pipes are most prone to damage
and an earthquake will find the weakest (most cor-
roded) pipes.
Lesson 21: Well-designed water and waste water treat-
ment facilities will probably experience little dam-
age but the non-structural components are also im-
portant.
Lesson 22: Structures founded on soft soil are very
vulnerable even to earthquakes of short duration, but
are much worse so in the event of longer duration
earthquakes.
Lesson 23: The structures that are necessary in sub-
stations need to be seismically resistant as well as
remote from the human hand. Many electrical instal-
lations could be designed to resist earthquake motion
if they were laid horizontally rather than vertically,
but space requirements often mean there are vulner-
able vertical components in substations.
Lesson 24: It is important to convey the results of
earthquake research to the potential users of these
findings and it must be ensured that the engineering
community within Christchurch is aware of the knowl-
edge that is actually available.
Lesson 25: A disruption of water pipelines, particularly
from elevated reservoirs, can deplete the water avail-
able for firefighting. However, although automatic
cut-off valves are considered, it has to be borne in
mind that an earthquake-operated valve which will
retain the water in reservoirs may still leave a com-
munity without firefighting supplies. (The valves
proposed in Christchurch are activated by flow rather
than by earthquake motion.)
Lesson 26: Good emergency response in recovery plans
are essential to facilitate co-ordination and quick
response to an earthquake, but the response plans
need to be general rather than specific. The results of
the earthquake are not always predictable and there
may well be a different situation from that originally
predicted.
Lesson 27: Although Christchurch does not have a
reticulated gas supply, there is a potential for ignition
of bottled gas by the reactivation of power supply.
Lesson 28: Following an earthquake there could be a
tendency to simply restore what was already there as
is the basis of many insurance policies, but in resto-
ration it needs to be borne in mind that there may be
a need to upgrade the damaged elements to mitigate
against similar damage from later earthquakes (or
perhaps even aftershocks?).
Lesson 29: The earthquake often will damage old instal-
lations which should have been replaced but have not
been because of lack of finances. The earthquake
does not help in this.
Lesson 30: Although a community is very resilient it
needs to be aware of the potential for earthquake
damage so that the community is better able to
function in response to the earthquake.
Lesson 31: Rushed post-earthquake inspections of in-
stallations are not necessarily accurate and inspec-
tions often have to be redone. It is important that
adequate records of inspections are kept and staff
trained in advance, if possible.
Lesson 32: Fibre-optic cable is remarkably resilient but
it is important to have slack in the cable to allow for
movement.
Lesson 33: Different sections of the community will
respond in different ways to the stress imposed on it
by an earthquake and these issues may affect restora-
tion priorities.
Lesson 34: Earthquakes seek out the weakest buildings
and if these are historic buildings work needs to be
undertaken in advance to ensure their retention. This
will apply for engineering lifelines as well.
Lesson 35: The public need to be aware of the risks
related to gas leakage and hazardous substances
following an earthquake. It is important that those
involved in the restoration of services are not ex-
posed to even further hazards.
Lesson 36: Disagreement over damage estimates, the
cost of repairs and the level of expected performance
will occur following an earthquake and it is important
that these are resolved quickly so that restoration of
services is not held up.
Lesson 37: Although there are many successful mitiga-
tion efforts, many people elect not to undertake them
and simply blame the earthquake. With the increase
of knowledge in Lifeline Engineering this approach
may not be so acceptable for services in the future.
Lesson 38: We need to bear in mind the factors that
motivate service operators and building owners re-
lating to the return on investments, lowering ex-
penses, curtailing losses and avoiding liability, and
point out that although the cost benefit of measures
may be difficult to quantify, there are very definite
benefits in undertaking mitigation measures.
Lesson 39: In the event of an earthquake authorities need
to capitalise on the effect on the community through
their increased awareness of earthquakes and it may
be that we should be referring to recent earthquakes
as a wake-up call.
Lesson 40: Recovery from a destructive earthquake is
expensive for everybody and anything to reduce the
cost is worthwhile.
Although the report on the Loma Prieta earthquake is
acknowledged as above, the 40 lessons derived for
Christchurch do not, in many ways, relate directly to the
lessons included in the National Research Council Book.
Having seen the damage first hand that occurred in the
Northridge earthquake, the team was more than ever
convinced of the obligation to do everything possible to
mitigate the effects on Christchurch of an earthquake.
The team was very reassured as a result of the visits that
they are on the right lines in their approach to investigat-
ing Christchurch engineering lifelines. What has been
achieved so far will be a very significant step in enabling
Christchurch to better withstand an earthquake.
9.2 Geotechnical Aspects
Introduction
At 4:31 am on 17 January 1994, a magnitude 6.7 earth-
quake struck the Los Angeles metropolitan area, causing
direct damages estimated at US$15 to US$20 billion and
making this the single most costly natural disaster to
affect the United States of America. The earthquake,
centred beneath the city of Northridge, resulted in 61
deaths, caused serious injury to a further 1,500 people,
and left 22,000 homeless. Widespread damage to infra-
structure and lifelines occurred, extensive landslides and
ground failures were triggered, and significant structural
effects on residential and commercial buildings resulted
in more than 3,000 being declared unsafe for re-entry.
The following summary of geotechnical aspects of the
Northridge earthquake is based on two specific publica-
tions, Goltz (1994) and Stewart et al (1994), as well as
personal observations during site visits in mid-August
1994.
Geology and seismology
The Northridge earthquake occurred on a south-dipping
fault adjacent to the north-dipping structures involved in
the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake (M = 6.6). The
rupture initiated about 18 km below the surface, propa-
gated up-dip to a depth of about 5 km (Figure 9.2), and
had a source duration of approximately 6 seconds. As the
rupture did not reach the ground surface, it is generally
considered to have occurred on a blind thrust that had
not previously been identified as an active fault capable
of causing widespread damage. Six aftershocks of mag-
nitude M > 5 were recorded, the largest having M = 6.0,
and these all had a similar mechanism to the main shock.
Vertical uplifts to a maximum of about 60 cm in the
epicentral region were recorded from GPS resurveys
following the earthquake.
The Los Angeles area is underlain by a variety of
consolidated sedimentary, volcanic and crystalline base-
ment rocks (Figure 9.3), and active north-south com-
pression is occurring across the region. Extensive
Pleistocene alluvial and marine terrace deposits are also
present, whilst basin areas such as the San Fernando
Valley are infilled by Holocene age (i.e. postglacial)
sediments (Figure 9.3). Damage patterns from the 1994
Northridge earthquake show strong correlations with
geology, the majority of red-tagged (= unsafe) buildings
being located on softer surficial Holocene deposits in the
San Fernando and Santa Clarita Valleys (Figure 9.3).
The Modified Mercalli intensity plot (Figure 9.4) simi-
larly reflects the distribution of softer Holocene sediments,
with intensities of VII throughout most of the epicentral
area (about 250 km
2
) on which are superimposed local
elongate zones that experienced VIII and, very locally,
IX.
Ground motions and site effects
The maximum horizontal acceleration recorded was
1.82 g on thin alluvium over bedrock at Tarzana some 17
km from the fault rupture surface, and at the Jensen
Filtration Plant a value of 0.98 g was measured on soil
only about 10 km distant (Figure 9.5). At Pacoima Dam
left abutment an MHA value of 1.58 g was recorded on
rock, and the next largest value on rock was 0.49 g at a
site 36 km southeast of the epicentre. Contours of maxi-
mum horizontal acceleration, ignoring those at Tarzana
and Pacoima Dam because of possible topographic in-
fluences, reflect both the south-to-north rupture mecha-
nism and the effects of local site geology (Figure 9.6). In
general, the vertical ground accelerations were about
two-thirds of the horizontal values obtained.
The distribution of red-tagged (= unsafe) buildings can
be assumed to reflect variations in ground conditions and
shaking intensities, but may also be influenced by the age
and type of construction employed. It is significant that,
in addition to the Northridge epicentral area, a number of
other concentrations of structural damage are apparent at
P
a
c
ific
O
c
e
a
n
*
F
o
c
u
s
Santa
C
l
a
r
a
R
iv
e
r
Sa
n
G
a
b
r
ie
l
M
o
u
n
tain
s
S
a
n
ta
M
o
n
ic
a
M
tn
s
S
a
n
G
a
b
r
ie
l
F
a
u
lt
L
o
s
A
n
g
e
le
s
N
o
rth
rid
g
e
*
S
a
n
F
e
r
n
a
n
d
o
V
a
lle
y
N
o
r
t
h
r
id
g
e
R
u
p
t
u
r
e
N
e
w
h
a
ll
S
a
n
ta
S
u
s
a
n
a
M
tn
s
V
e
r
d
u
g
o

M
o
u
n
t
a
i
n
s
S
a
n
F
e
r
n
a
n
d
o
F
a
u
lt
H
o
lly
w
o
o
d
F
a
u
lt
E
ly
s
ia
n
P
a
r
k F
a
u
lt
N
e
w
p
o
r
t
I
n
g
le
w
o
o
d
F
a
u
lt
S
a
n
t
a
S
u
s
a
n
a
F
a
u
lt
Bridge failures
110
5
10
5
118
210
2
134
170
405
101
14
Figure 9.2: Geological model of the Northridge earthquake (view to the south east)
Sherman Oaks, Hollywood, central Los Angeles,
Newhall, Santa Monica, and the Santa Clarita Valley
(Figure 9.3). These areas are all underlain by deep
Holocene deposits in obvious alluvial basins, and in
some areas, such as Sherman Oaks and Santa Monica (to
the north and south of the Santa Monica Mountains,
respectively), energy focusing due to basin and edge
effects is considered to have been a significant factor.
The soils in many of these areas are also mapped as
potentially liquefiable, and whilst liquefaction is not
generally evident, the soft soils may have yielded under
the relatively high ground accelerations to produce the
observed damage. It has been suggested, however, that in
the Santa Monica area site amplification may have
occurred because of the presence of deeper, older and
stiffer soils.
2 0 2 4 6 8
Scale (mi)
P
A
C
I
F
I
C
O
C
E
A
N
S
a
n
ta
M
o
n
i
c
a
B
a
y
Santa Monica
Marina del Rey
Redonda Beach
Long
Beach
Holocene sediments
Pleistocene alluvial and marine terrace deposits
LEGEND
Rock - undifferentiated consolidated sedimentary,
volcanic and crystalline basement rocks
LOS PADRES
NATIONAL
FOREST
ANGELES
NATIONAL
FOREST
S
A
N
G
A
B
R
IE
L
M
O
UNTAINS
S
A
N
T
A
MONICA
MOUNTAINS
SANTA
S
U
S
A
N
A
M
OUNTAINS
S
IM
I
H
IL
L
S
23
23
23
1
101
101
27
1
1
1
91
150
126
34
5
5
14
14
5
5
10
103
110
10
110
10
134
1
42
710
605
2
104
105
118
118
118
Los
Angeles
Inglewood
Hollywood
Watts
Compton
Culver
City
Malibu
Pacific
Palisades
Burbank
Sherman
Oaks
Northridge
San
Fernando
Piru
Filmore
Thousand Oaks
Simi
Valley
Universal
City
Glendale Pasadena
EPICENTER
B
IG
M
OUN
T
A
IN
Santa
Clarita
Figure 9.3: Damage patterns from the 1994 Northridge earthquake and generalised geologic conditions in
the Los Angeles area
Ground failure and landslides
Ground failure by soil liquefaction and dynamic ground
compaction is considered to have occurred up to 50 km
north and south of the epicentre, and clear evidence
exists for lateral spreading due to liquefaction in sandy
fills at Redondo Beach (Figure 9.3). In the San Fernando
and Simi Valleys widespread deep liquefaction has
been postulated with water table depths of 6 m to 8 m,
resulting in intact block movements at some localities,
but the evidence for such a failure mechanism has yet to
be demonstrated. In central Los Angeles partial liquefac-
tion of Holocene alluvial and dune deposits was also
suggested as a cause of distress in buried utility pipes, but
other infrastructure components (such as pavements) did
not behave similarly and the observed failures may have
more to do with age and the type of pipe welds. Of
1
0.1
0.01
1 10 100
Distance to surface projection of rupture (km)
P
e
a
k

h
o
r
i
z
o
n
t
a
l

a
c
c
e
l
e
r
a
t
i
o
n

(
g
)
Alluvium
Free field
Structure
2nd %
16th %
50th %
84th %
98th %
Figure 9.5: Comparison of selected recordings of mean peak horizontal acceleration on alluvium with
predictions based on the attenuation relationships developed by Boore et al
34.0
34.5
118.0 118.5 119.0
+ +
+ +
+
+
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
Sta. Monica
Torrance
Montebello
Glendale
San Fernando
Tarzana
Santa Monica Mtns
Chatsworth
Sta. Clarita Fillmore
Sta.
Susana
Mtns
Palmdale
Oxnard
IX
IX
VIII
VI
V
VII
VIII
VII
VI
V
8
9
9
8
Epicenter
Felt at Intensity 9
Felt
9
F
0 20
km
6
6
6
8
7
8
8
8
8
7
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
8
7
7
6
6
7
7
7
7
8
8
5
7
5
F
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
8
6
4
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
7
7
6
5
5
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
8
Figure 9.4: Contours of Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) observed during the
Northridge earthquake
0
.4
0
.
2
0
.
2
0
.2
0
.
2
0.2
0
.
2
0
.1
0.2
0.2
0
.2
0
.
4
0
.4
0
.
2
0
.
2
0
.
6
0
.
4
0.6
0.8
0
.
4
0
.
4
0
.
4
0.4
0.6
0
.8
0.8
0.8
0.3
150
23
126
118
126
14
5
5
14
23
23
101
1
1
1
1
118
91
42
103
134
2 27
118
110
710
710
605
110
10
10
110
10
405
210
5
101
34
101
Note: Site classification was provided by the owner/agency except for USGS stations. Sites were typically classified by
surficial geology; however, USC stations were classified based on Seed et. al. (1976) in which surficial materials
with V
s
> 800 m/s are designated as "rock" sites.
SURFACE PROJECTION OF
APPROXIMATE FAULT RUPTURE PLANE
0 2 4 6 8 2
Scale
miles
P
A
C
I
F
I
C
O
C
E
A
N
EPICENTER
Legend
Rock Station
Soil Station
N
Figure 9.6: Contours of maximum horizontal acceleration based on recordings at rock
and soil sites
particular significance in terms of the observed partial
liquefaction is the potentially much more severe effects
that would have resulted had shaking continued for a
longer duration.
The Northridge earthquake caused hundreds of scattered
rockfalls and landslides throughout Los Angeles and
Ventura Counties up to a distance of approximately 25
km from the epicentre. The principal failure sites were in
the Simi Hills, Big Mountain, the Santa Monica, San
Gabriel and Santa Susana Mountains, and along the
marine terrace bluffs in Santa Monica and the Pacific
Palisades (Figure 9.2). The predominant modes of fail-
ure were shattered ridges, shallow surficial slides,
rockfalls, and rockslides. Their impacts included road
closure, direct property damage, and increased suscepti-
bility to subsequent storm-induced debris flows.
Performance of geotechnical structures
Many geotechnical structures such as dams, hillside
structural fills, earth retaining structures, and solid waste
landfills were strongly shaken by the Northridge earth-
quake, and although most performed very well there
were several notable failures. There are approximately
65 dams, both concrete and earth- and rock-fill, within 40
km of the epicentre, and many act as debris dams and had
little active reservoir storage at the time of the earth-
quake. With the exception of the concrete arch Pacoima
Dam, all dams performed well and observed damage was
confined to surface cracking and some shallow slides,
and no significant damage was reported to any of the
earth structures. At Pacoima, however, which was within
10 km to 12 km of the rupture, directional shaking effects
produced extensive rockfalls and the left abutment ap-
pears to have moved downstream by some 10 mm to 15
mm relative to the arch. Pacoima Dam was subjected to
a peak horizontal acceleration of 1.25 g on the upper left
abutment during the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake, and
one instrument on the crest recorded about 2.3 g during
the 1994 Northridge earthquake. Investigations are pres-
ently being carried out to determine what (if any) reme-
dial measures are required for the Pacoima Dam, which
is still operational.
The only significant flow slide to occur during the 1994
Northridge earthquake was a small tailings dam at a sand
and gravel aggregate mining operation in Tapo Canyon
near Simi Valley. The dam was approximately 25 m
high, was located only about 12 km from the rupture
source, and experienced MHA values in the range 0.4g
to 0.6 g. Portions of the dam slid up to 30 m downstream,
releasing the saturated tailings which then flowed down
existing watercourses, and the failure is thought to have
been caused by liquefaction. Some hillside structural
fills and earth retaining structures experienced failures,
and significant damage was reported to concrete and
concrete crib retaining walls subjected to horizontal
accelerations of about 0.6 g. The overall performance of
landfills during the Northridge earthquake is regarded as
encouraging, with no signs of major instability and
damage limited to cracking of the soil covers due to a
variety of possible causes.
Some implications for Christchurch
There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn
from the Northridge earthquake in relation to the possi-
bility of seismic damage in Christchurch, as follows:
Although the Northridge earthquake was located
beneath Los Angeles, rather than 50 km to 100 km
distant, it produced similar shaking intensities
(MMVII and locally MMVIII/IX) to those antici-
pated in Christchurch. The high horizontal
accelerations experienced were to a significant ex-
tent offset by the relatively low duration (6 to 10s) of
shaking, and this (together with the timing of the
main shock) was critical in limiting the potential for
damage and loss of life.
Further seismic studies are needed to determine if
active faults exist beneath the Canterbury Plains near
Christchurch which could produce similarly high
ground accelerations. The present seismicity model
for Christchurch relies heavily on work completed on
the Porters Pass Tectonic Zone, and on inferences
regarding other major active faults to the west and
northwest.
Severe shaking of the thinning sediment wedge against
the Port Hills is considered possible given the ob-
served effects of the Northridge earthquake, and the
potential for significant ground amplification effects
should be further evaluated. Extensive liquefaction
in the saturated sandy and silty sediments of the
Avon-Heathcote estuary is still regarded as probable,
especially given the high water table there.
Local rockfalls and shallow landsliding must be
anticipated on the Port Hills, with consequential
potential for damage to houses and injury to occu-
pants. Some protection measures can be implemented
for house sites in hill or footslope locations, but
prediction of specific problems or failure sites is not
considered generally feasible.
Well engineered geotechnical structures can be ex-
pected to perform satisfactorily in a similar earth-
quake, and the generally sound performance of the
Los Angeles dams, fills, etc., is most encouraging.
Localised ground cracking, especially in older fills or
stiff liners, must still be anticipated, however.
References
Goltz, J D (ed.) (1994). The Northridge, California
Earthquake of January 17, 1994, General Recon-
naissance Report Technical Report NCEER-94-
0005 National Center for Earthquake Engineer-
ing Research State University of New York at
Buffalo.
Stewart, J P, J D Bray, R B Seed, N Sitar (eds.) (1994).
Preliminary Report on the Principal Geotechnical
Aspects of the January 17,1994 Northridge Earth-
quake, Report No UCB/EERC-94/08 Earthquake
Engineering Research Center College of Engi-
neering, University of California at Berkeley.
9.3 Transportation
Introduction
Most engineering services in the greater Los Angeles
area were essentially fully restored within three days of
the 17 January 1994 Northridge earthquake. As far as
they impacted directly on the public, many were restored
within 24 hours. The exception to this was the transpor-
tation network.
In an area where goods and people movement is domi-
nated by the freeway system, the earthquake produced
severe and long-lasting transport disruption. A total of
eight overpasses collapsed blocking some of the busiest
freeways. More than a month later there was still
massive traffic disruption with sections of (Interstate) I-
5 and I-10 still closed. Seven months later all routes were
open with some temporary sections and work was still
proceeding at a number of sites. A completion date of
December 1994 has been set, almost one year after the
earthquake.
Although the damage to commercial and residential
buildings was severe close to the epicentre and the
impact of this type of damage on the local area continued
for months, within days the event became a transporta-
tion earthquake. There were dramatic pictures of col-
lapsed sections of freeways in the media and a wider
effect on commuters living well beyond the area of the
damage. This emphasises yet again the vital role played
by the media in such events. In the days and months
following the earthquake extensive traffic detours, bus
and rail system expansion and demand management
were required to restore mobility to the affected corri-
dors. Information services and the media generally were
vitally important in implementing these measures.
The information in this section has been summarised
from material obtained during a visit to Los Angeles as
part of the Joint New Zealand/Los Angeles Lifelines
Workshop on 15 to 18 August 1994. In particular,
gratefull acknowledgement is made for the assistance of
Mr Jack Hallin of Caltrans and Mr Thomas Conner of the
City of Los Angeles. A full list of references is attached.
Impact on the freeway system
The impact on the freeway system occurred in three areas
(see Figure 9.7): Golden Gate Freeway I-5 and SR-14 at
Gavin Canyon, Simi Valley Freeway SR-118 and Santa
Monica Freeway I-10.
1-5/Route 14 corridor
The Golden Gate Freeway (I-5) is Southern Californias
main link with Central and Northern California and is
especially important for produce and goods movement.
The Antelope Valley Freeway (Route 14) provides resi-
dents from the Santa Clarita and Antelope Valleys with
commuter access to employment centres in Los Angeles
and surrounding cities. Prior to the earthquake, there
were 22 freeway and surface highway lanes carrying
more than 216,000 vehicles per day through the moun-
tain pass where I-5 and R-14 intersect. After the earth-
quake only six lanes were usable.
Fortunately, the Santa Clarita Metrolink rail line parallel
to I-5 was undamaged. This line was extended by 86 km,
five new stations were opened and bus and shuttle
services provided. Ridership leapt from 1,000 to 22,000
passengers per day, stabilising later at 5,000. By Febru-
ary, 13 of the 22 highway lanes were usable, with one
designated carpool lane in each direction. Other recov-
ery measures included detours onto old surface roadways.
Simi Valley (R-118) corridor
The R-118 freeway was closed due to severe damage to
bridges (see 4,5,6 on Figure 9.7) requiring 187,000
vehicles per day to find alternatives. Fortunately, there
was a good grid system of surface arterial highways in
the area with excess capacity available to accept diverted
traffic. The Ventura County Metrolink rail line also
assisted after a three-day delay needed to clear a derail-
ment. The line was extended 25 km and three new
stations built. Ridership increased from 2,100 to 3,000
boarding per day.
At the Balboa Boulevard crossing of R-118 (site 6) the
overbridge carried power, water, gas and telephone
services. The water lines suspended from the structure
ruptured and washed out the soil beneath an abutment
which then settled. The bridge satisfactorily resisted the
seismic forces, its damage and closure being a direct
result of the damage to another lifeline.
I-10 Freeway corridor
The Santa Monica Freeway (I-10) is considered to be the
busiest freeway in the world, carrying over 340,000
vehicles per day. The earthquake heavily damaged two
long bridges spanning four major surface streets (see 7,8
on Figure 9.7) at a location where the average daily flow
was 271,000 vehicles per day.
The freeway traffic was diverted to the parallel arterial
street system, including preferential treatment for carpool
lanes. An example of the routing used, taken from a
publicity leaflet, is shown in Figure 9.8. Carpool or high
occupancy vehicles (HOV) were those with two or more
occupants. Assisted by the computer controlled traffic
signal system (ATSAC Smart Corridor) delays on carpool
routes averaged 3 to 5 minutes, with 10 to 15 minutes on
the longer mixed flow detours. Existing transit (bus)
services were expanded but experienced only modest
increases in ridership.
Retrofitted structures
Following the 1971 San Fernando earthquake, it was
found that the unseating of bridge decks at abutments and
expansion joints was the principal cause of collapse. A
programme of retrofitting existing state-highway bridges
with hinge restrainers was started. This Phase I pro-
gramme was extended in 1988 with a Phase II pro-
gramme of strengthening single-column piers by enclos-
Santa
Monica
Bay
Manhattan Beach
Redondo Beach
Topanga
Beach
Venice
S
a
n
G
a
b
r
i
e
l
M
t
s
Torrance
Carson
Hawthorne
Lakewood
Bellflower
Gardena
Compton
Paramount
Norwalk
Downey
Willowbrook
Lynwood
Bell
Gardens
East
Los Angeles
Monterey
Alhambra
Pasadena
Glendale
Burbank
V
e
r
d
u
g
o
M
t
s
Sun Valley
Van Nuys
Reseda
Northridge
Chatsworth
San FernadoValley
Canoga
Park
Tarzana
Woodland
Hills
Encino
Sherman
Oaks
S
anta
M
onica Mts
Pacific Palisades
Santa Monica
Hollywood
Beverly Hills
LOS ANGELES
Culver City
Los
Angeles
Intl
Marina
del Ray
Inglewood
Watts
Walnut
Park
Cudahy
Bell
Huntingdon
Park
Florence-
Graham
Lennox
Lawndale
North Long
Beach
El Segundo
Ladera
Heights
Commerce
Maywood
West Hollywood
North
Hollywood
South Pasadena
Altadena
Sunland Tujunga
San
Fernando
Santa Susana
Mts
S
a
n
R
a
f
a
e
l
H
il
l
s
2
1
3
4
5
6
7
8
Epicenter
KEY
1 Gavin Canyon Undercrossing (I-5)
2 SR14/I-5 Separation and Overhead (southbound)
3 SR14/I-5 North Connector
4 Bull Creek Canyon Channel Bridge (SR118)
5 Mission-Gothic Overcrossing (SR118)
6 Balboa Boulevard Overcrossing (SR118)
7 Fairfax-Washington Undercrossing (I-10)
8 La Cienega-Venice Undercrossing (I-10)
S
a
n
G
a
b
r
i
e
l
M
t
s
Figure 9.7: Location map of bridges with major damage
ing them in steel jackets and some associated strengthen-
ing of abutments and footings. A further programme
(Phase III) was initiated following the Loma Prieta
earthquake and involves retrofitting multi-column and
complex structures.
Caltrans staff evaluated state highway and local bridges
and selected these for possible retrofitting based on the
bridges vulnerability, the seismic hazard at the site and
the impact of failure. The evaluation considered:
The bridges vulnerability to strong-motion earth-
quakes measured in terms of year designed, column
type, abutment type, skewness, bent redundancy, and
potential for drop-type failure.
The seismic hazard at the bridge site measured in
terms of maximum expected peak rock acceleration,
maximum expected duration of ground shaking, and
local soil conditions.
The impact of a possible bridge failure on the local
community measured in terms of average daily traf-
fic on the structure, average daily traffic under or
405
NORTH
Eastbound HOV
lane begins at
Overland
Single Occupant
Vehicles must exit
at Robertson
Single Occupant
Vehicles must exit
at La Brea
Westbound HOV
lane begins at
Western
2
2
2
2
2
2
HOV Only Alternate Route
Mixed flow Alternate Route
WASHINGTON
JEFFERSON
C
I
E
N
E
G
A
L
A
W
A
S
H
IN
G
T
O
N
V
E
N
IC
E
B
L
N
A
T
IO
N
A
L
B
L
S
A
W
T
E
L
L
E
W
E
S
T
W
O
O
D

B
L
O
V
E
R
L
A
N
D
P
IC
O
B
L
NATIO
NAL
B
L
R
O
B
E
R
T
S
O
N

B
L
L
A

C
I
E
N
E
G
A
C
AD
ILLAC
F
A
I
R
F
A
X
A
P
P
L
E

S
T
.
VENICE BL
WASHING
TO
N
BL
ADAMS BL
L
A

B
R
E
A
L
A

B
R
E
A
W
E
S
T
E
R
N
A
V
E
PICO BL
F
A
I
R
F
A
X
10
Figure 9.8: Re-routing of freeway traffic with preferential carpool lanes
over the structure, type of leased air space (residen-
tial, office, parking, storage), type of facility crossed,
route.
Those bridges identified in this process were then re-
viewed in detail by experienced Caltrans design engi-
neers. This process was only partially complete at the
time of the Northridge earthquake. Also, while the work
required in Phase I (hinge restraint) and Phase II (single
column jacketing) was nearly complete there had been
very little progress with the more extensive and costly
task of retrofitting multi-column pier bridges. State-
wide this task was only 2% complete with a further 7%
underway.
Of the seven concrete bridge structures that collapsed
during the Northridge event, none had been retrofitted in
the Phase II programme. The eighth bridge (site 6),
Balboa Boulevard Overcrossing of SR-118, was dam-
aged by subsidence caused by a waterpipe rupture and so
is not considered in this discussion.
The two adjacent bridges on SR-118 (sites 4,5) had been
evaluated by Caltrans as not requiring retrofit but failed
due to shear in short columns. The other five bridges had
been scheduled for Phase II retrofit but the work had not
yet been started. These bridges either failed when deck
sections came off their supports or by shear failure in
short columns when the hinge restrainers were sufficient
to keep the deck on the supports.
In contrast to these collapses there was no significant
damage to structures that had been retrofitted under the
Phase II programme. Some of these were in locations
where they were exposed to shaking at least as severe as
that impacting on the collapsed structures. Some 24
retrofitted bridges experienced peak ground accelerations
over 0.5 g and all performed satisfactorily. An example
is a 320 m long curved box girder structure at the I-10/I-
405 interchange located some 6 km west of the I-10
freeway structures that collapsed. A free-field motion
recorder fixed to this bridge showed a peak acceleration
at deck level of 1.83 g. The single-column piers of this
structure had been retrofitted with steel jackets in 1991.
No significant damage occurred to this structure.
It is apparent that the bridge retrofit programmes were
effective and Caltrans are seeking to have funds pro-
vided so that the programme can be speeded up. It should
be noted, however, that the Northridge event had a
duration of only 9 seconds, and a longer duration event
would be a more severe test.
Other initiatives to reduce risk in future designs and
either adopted as policy by Caltrans or under active
consideration include:
avoidance of large skews in geometry;
consideration of alternative routing to reduce the
number of multi-level crossings; and
use of freeway over-crossings rather than under-
crossings.
Impact on other transportation systems
Very little damage occurred to the local roading system
remote from the freeway system. Any problems were
due to landslides blocking roads, rather than structural
failures.
Airports and railway tunnels were closed briefly for
inspection as a precautionary measure but no serious
damage was found.
At Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) minor flood-
ing occurred after the sprinkler system was activated.
The airport closest to the epicentre was Van Nuys Air-
port, some 6 km to the southeast. The glass panels of the
control tower broke during the earthquake, interrupting
operations of the tower.
A 64-car freight train passing through Northridge de-
railed at the time of the earthquake. There were 16 tank
cars carrying sulphuric acid causing a 8,000 gallon acid
spill. There was also a 2,000 gallon diesel fuel spill from
the locomotive. This incident was not immediately
responded to by the Los Angeles Fire Department due to
the number of priority calls at the time. Train service was
restored two days later.
References
Yates, Robert R (1994). Northridge Earthquake Trans-
portation Response After-action Report, City of
Los Angeles Department of Transportation, March
1994.
Yates, Robert R (1994). Northridge Earthquake Long
Term Transportation Recovery Task Force, City
of Los Angeles Department of Transportation,
June 1994.
Buckle, I G (1994). The Northbridge, California earth-
quake of January 17, 1994: Performance of high-
way bridges, Technical Report NCEER-94-0008,
National Centre of Earthquake Engineering Re-
search, State University of New York at Buffalo,
March 1994.
EQE International (1994). The January 17, 1994
Northridge, California Earthquake.
Seismic Advisory Board (1994). Background Report
DBL1 Bridges, February 1994.
Lund, Le Val (1994). Northridge Earthquake, January
17, 1994, Lifeline Performance (Draft), ASCE
Technical Committee on Lifeline Earthquake
Engineering, February 1994.
9.4 Water and Wastewater
Utilities
Introduction
Discussions about the performance of water and
wastewater pipelines and facilities during seismic activ-
ity inevitably centre on one of three main areas of
interest. There is the earthquake itself and its accompa-
nying damage its size, location, depth, intensity, time
of occurrence, its primary manifestation, the explana-
tions of its origins and propagation and the scientific and
subjective measurement of its effects. There is the dam-
age measured in loss of life, injury, homelessness, social
disruption, disorientation, delays, damage to structures
(domestic and commercial) to infrastructure and to the
natural environment as well as consequential damage,
aftershock effects, and risk of fire.
Secondly, there is the recovery from that damage
involving human and material resources. The implemen-
tation of emergency plans, co-ordination with other
related utilities, interaction with funding agencies and
decision makers, public relations and information gath-
ering and analysis.
Thirdly, among the three areas of interest is preparation
and contingency planning including design and investi-
gation adequacy, emergency planning, mutual aid, miti-
gation of damage, retrofitting, material and plant avail-
ability, investigation, analysis and reporting, damage
prediction and risk analysis.
In this chapter, the experience of visiting the sites of two
major recent earthquakes in southern California, focus-
ing on water and wastewater pipelines and facilities, is
presented under the above three headings. Throughout
the text a particular statement of lessons gleaned from the
visit is followed by referenced examples illustrating the
point. In this way it is hoped that readers with an interest
in utility management will be able to find parallels to
their own concerns.
The earthquake and accompanying
damage
Pipelines
Basic rules for reducing buried pipeline damage during
earthquake are now well known, for example as devel-
oped and set out by the Wellington Earthquake Lifelines
Group.
Applicability of these findings was confirmed during the
Northridge earthquake where more recently laid services
generally featuring more ductility and/or flexibility in
their material and joint type showed remarkable resist-
ance. Close analysis attempting to detail correlations
between pipe damage and shaking intensity, soil type,
material jointing and age was lacking, but the impression
gained was that New Zealand lifeline studies have prob-
ably overestimated the number of breaks likely for the
various combinations of pipe size, soil type, material,
age and earthquake intensity.
Distribution water main breaks in the City of Los Ange-
les numbered over 1100, almost half of which (47%)
occurred in the West Valley District which includes the
San Fernando Valley epicentre area. The other half were
to the east and south but in broad bands corresponding
with surface damage. Breaks were concentrated in cast
iron piping with rigid joints or in steel pipes with some
level of corrosion.
Boil water notices were posted and the requirement
was gradually lifted as connection was restored with the
final notice removal occurring 12 days after the event.
Damage to major aqueducts supplying Los Angeles City
Water and Power occurred at 20 locations, the most
significant damage being to steel pipelines with lap
welded joints where the vulnerability occurs at the curved
portion of the bell, resulting in circumferential cracking.
Pullouts at mechanical joints also occurred as did buck-
ling in steel pipes where large strains were imposed.
Discussion with officers from the Pacific Gas and Elec-
tricity Utility based in San Francisco confirmed the
vulnerability of screw joint steel and cast iron pipe and
noted their companys programme to replace with
polyethylene. Statistics provided by the Southern Cali-
fornia Gas Company showed that in Los Angeles, of the
181 distribution main failures, 154 were in metal pipe
and 27 in plastic. While their breakage rate seemed
surprisingly low, the Gas Company had to deal with
some other very large numbers:
Number of outages restored by company 122,886
Customers who turned gas off unnecessarily 107,865
Total number of leak investigations 61,172
A GIS-based analysis of the likely sewer system damage
identified 54.4 km of mains in the high risk category (see
Recovery below). Of these, 16% needed emergency
repair, 49% sustained damage that may require repair
and 35% were undamaged. Most breaks occurred in
sewers smaller than 400 mm diameter, which make up
90% of the collection system. Close to the epicentre
damage occurred regardless of soil type, but with more
distant areas the liquefaction potential of the soil became
a factor in the degree of damage. Los Angeles City
reported that their large diameter reinforced concrete
mains were undamaged, that breaks occurred most fre-
quently at joints and in locations with a high water table.
Correlation of breaks with geology
There was disappointment at Northridge for those mem-
bers of the team from New Zealand hoping to examine
work aimed at correlating damage (to underground pipes
for example) with soil structure and geology or with pipe
material and age. It was clear from the Utility Managers
that their focus was on assessing and repairing damage,
while at the same time maintaining the documentation
and records that would secure the Federal funding that
was available. Even six months after the event these were
for some pressing, overriding concerns. But, particularly
in the case of the private utilities, once the supply to the
customer was restored, there was little evidence of a
desire to establish the correlations sought by New Zea-
land team members.
An exercise carried out by the Wellington Earthquake
Lifelines Group calculated, for the 375 km of water
supply pipe in the Hutt City network (ranging from 100
mm to 375 mm diameter), the number of breaks likely in
an MM VIII earthquake, taking into account pipe ductilily
and soil stiffness. The results need to be checked against
breakages in actual events, but that type of analysis was
not available for Northridge.
In the San Francisco/Oakland area a higher awareness of
regional geology was evident amongst Utility managers
and for the Loma Prieta earthquake plots relating water
main breaks to liquefiable soils had been made for the
marina district showing the relationship between vertical
settlement caused by liquefaction and pipe breaks.
One interesting plot of above ground damage caused by
the Northridge quake superimposed on a regional relief
map showed concentrations of damage remote from the
epicentre. These were either very close to the intersec-
tion of low ranges of hills with the sediment filled basins
or appeared to follow old river channels across the flats.
The possibility that this shows magnification for effects
close to hilly areas raises questions for Christchurch
relating to vulnerability of the citys southern boundary
defined by the Port Hills.
Major facility damage
Recovery to full operation of the wastewater and water
treatment facilities located relatively close to the epicen-
tre (i.e. within 15 km) was remarkably fast despite some
significant damage (see Table 9.1).
These fast recovery times probably contributed to the
somewhat cursory reporting that the damage has re-
ceived. Managers were justifiably proud of the recovery
performance and outside investigators tend to lose inter-
est when the plant is reported fully operational. In fact it
was a salutary experience to check these installations
more closely and receive detailed descriptions of the
damage, (much of it non-structural) and the costs to
remedy it.
At the Jensen Filtration Plant for example, much was
made of one major break in an 84 inch diameter influent
pipe. This plant has instituted major mitigation work
following the 1971 Sylmar earthquake and operators
were satisfied with the performance and the fast restora-
tion to full service. Nevertheless a detailed listing
showed that damage though minor was extensive and the
estimated cost to repair amounted to US$4.8 million
(NZ$8.0 million).
Similarly, at the new Don Tillman sewage treatment
plant located 7 km from the epicentre, which was back in
operation within hours, the listing of damage runs to
seventeen pages with repairs estimated at US$1.5 mil-
lion (NZ$2.5 million). It was clear in these examples that
while overall facility performance may be excellent in
terms of returning to full operational capacity, miscella-
neous damage can be both extensive and expensive.
Furthermore, much of this minor damage can be avoided
by good design or by subsequent careful mitigation
work.
A damage prone area perhaps not well identified by
treatment facility managers occurs at free water surfaces
in structures such as ponds, clarifiers, tanks and reser-
voirs. Forces developed by sloshing water can cause
damage well beyond that predicted by normal horizontal
seismic loads. Roof structures, flight systems, test equip-
ment and floating or poorly secured apparatus close to
the surface are prone to damage. The debris can then
cause secondary problems at gates, pipe outlets or other
discharge routes.
Stand-by plant
The failure of stand-by power generation plant either to
fire from a black start mode or to remain in service for
an extended period was a common complaint amongst
both utility managers and custodians of large buildings.
Problems were varied and highlighted the need to ana-
lyse carefully the many circumstances which could go
wrong. In the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, the East Bay
Municipal District sewage treatment plant generators
which normally supply surplus power to the city grid,
came on line after the city power failed and immediately
tripped out on overload. A switching error had allowed
the plant to attempt to supply the whole city with power.
More common were complaints that stand-by plant failed
to fire automatically from a black start on high load, and
there was concern that regular testing of this plant was
not thorough and did not test start-up on full load. Plant
frequently showed an inability to remain operational
under load for an extended period.
Examination of stand-by plant needs to go beyond the
plant itself. If cooling systems depend on an external
water supply the plant will obviously fail if the water
supply has been damaged. Security of such things as fuel
storage, fuel lines, switchboard and control cabinets
must all be checked and upgraded if necessary.
Recovery
Use of GIS
The use of computerised maps and GIS to assist decision
making during the recovery period can provide a power-
ful tool hitherto unavailable to Utility Managers. How-
ever its usefulness is enhanced only in proportion to the
amount of preparation of the essential underlying map-
ping layers that have occurred prior to the event. Manag-
ers where facilities are or can be plotted in a CAD or GIS
environment need to consider the demands that will be
placed on the mapping system during the emergency and
ensure the system is ready to meet them. Acquiring and
digitising base data is time consuming and not possible
during the recovery period.
The clearest example was provided by the City of Los
Angeles Bureau of Engineering which had the problem
of locating sewer damage. A real spur to the exercise was
provided by the Federal funding which was available for
90% of the repair work cost, providing the City Council
located the damage and convinced FEMA (Federal
Emergency Management Administration) it was earth-
quake related. Once water was available some severe
damage evidenced itself, but closed circuit television
(CCTV) was necessary to find structural damage that
was not causing any discernible interference to flow. A
means of prioritising the CCTV work was required to
reduce the 11,400 km of sewer to a manageable level,
while retaining confidence that the sewers likely to be
damaged were televised. To do this the Bureau hypoth-
esised that known surface and subsurface damage were
the best indicators of likely sewer distress and accord-
ingly plotted in a GIS environment the location and
condition of all buildings inspected for damage, water
leak positions and street, kerb and sidewalk damage.
Total grid scores were counted and the totals were used
to set inspection priorities. This lead to 54.4 km of sewer
being identified as high risk and requiring CCTV inspec-
tion.
Earthquake information
Early accurate information describing the nature of the
Plant Type Capacity Damage Recovery to Full
Operation
Jenson Full water treatment 400 million gpd
Significant, but
localised
1 week
Van Norman Full water treatment 600 million gpd Significant 6 days
Donald Tillman Sewage treatment 150 million gpd Minor 10 - 12 hours
Glendale Sewage treatment 20 million gpd Minor 10 - 12 hours
Note: Los Angeles major sewage treatment plant (the Hyperion, located on the coast) suffered no significant damage
and continued operation under its own power.
Table 9.1: Time for recovery to full operation for Los Angeles sewage and water treatment plants
earthquake is essential for utility managers whose re-
sponsibilities are over a large area since it can influence
the early decisions made and save wasted effort. The
size, location, depth to focus, duration and type of fault
movement must be immediately available so that, cou-
pled with an understanding of the area geology intelli-
gent guesses can be made at an early stage, of where the
vulnerable and therefore damaged areas are likely to be.
For a utility with wide spread facilities this knowledge
allows efficient direction of scarce inspection resources.
In Southern California each major utility is linked to a
network called CUBE (Caltrac USGS Broadcast of Earth-
quakes facility) which records and maps all quakes
within minutes of their occurrence. Users of this system
have a range of options for the sorting and viewing of the
growing database and have more or less immediate
access to information about an earthquake event. Emer-
gency control centres will thus have more or less imme-
diate access to earthquake information.
Aftershock records
The role of aftershocks, in adding flesh to the bare bones
of information provided by the initial quake, may not be
widely appreciated. As secondary ruptures occur and
their epicentre located, the pattern defines a subsurface
plane which in turn identifies both the fault surface and
the extent of the rupture. Of more importance to the
Utility Manager is the need to keep in mind the likelihood
of aftershocks and ensure field crews understand the
ensuing dangers and problems. Aftershocks can cause
failure of weakened structures and endanger those in
inspection or rescue roles. They can also disrupt repairs
that have been carried out on a temporary basis.
Mutual aid
Assistance between adjoining local authorities or utility
operators can be formalised to a much greater degree
than occurs in New Zealand. In the United States this
takes the form of mutual aid agreements which set out the
basis for assistance. For example, both the San Francisco
Water Department and the Eastern Bay Municipal Util-
ity District (Oakland) sent fully-equipped teams to the
Northridge area to assist the Water and Power depart-
ment of Los Angeles City in water main repair. To make
this work, compatibility of materials and skills is essen-
tial which clearly requires previous planning and co-
ordination. One recent initiative by the OES (California
Office of Emergency Service) is to establish the Califor-
nia Utilities Emergency Association (CUEA), a joint
public/private autonomous organisation set up to achieve
inter utility co-ordination. The association has 125
member companies as of September 1994.
Preparedness
Recovery plans
Being prepared for an earthquake requires commitment
to both the things that can be done now (design of new
work, mitigation by way of replacement, duplication,
retrofitting, securing, strengthening, relocating) and plan-
ning the emergency procedures that operate when the
event occurs. This is disaster recovery planning and for
Utility Managers is quite distinct from civil defence
involvement. In Christchurch the Civil Defence emer-
gency caused by a large earthquake is likely to be over in
a matter of a week or two, by which time the threat to life
will have been controlled. For the Utility Manager,
disruption to the utilitys normal operation could last a
year or more as reticulation damage is found and repaired
and structural damage to the treatment and pumping
facilities is addressed.
In California, State law in the form of SB 1841 requires
local government and public agencies to adopt the Stand-
ardised Emergency Management System (SEMS) which
requires that, in times of disaster, local jurisdictions co-
ordinate their response activities with the Counties,
which in turn must co-ordinate with the State. This
requirement as it applies to water utilities originated as a
result of problems in multi-agency co-ordination during
the 1989 Loma Prieta quake and the Oakland fires of
1991.
A clear message from utility earthquakees is that the
response plan should deal with organisation, procedures,
lines of command and resources in terms of sustaining
the relief effort rather than attempt to anticipate specific
events. It can be assumed that if the utilitys skilled staff
will be available to direct and undertake the recovery
work, attention in response planning should be directed
instead at ensuring that decision making personnel are in
place and well informed, that communication is estab-
lished and maintained, that relief and recovery effort is
resourced and sustained and that publicity and public
relations are properly addressed.
Thus the Director of the water supply side of Los Angeles
Department or Water and Power reported deficiencies in
emergency planning in such simple areas as providing
for relief workers who slept at the yard between shifts
it was impractical for them to get home; accommodating
the vehicles and staff that came from other areas; com-
municating with vehicles on non-city radio frequencies;
providing meals when many food outlets were closed
(holiday) or damaged.
Code design requirements
Of profound significance for all Utility Managers is the
evidence in recent years that recommended design
accelerations have been too low for both horizontal and
vertical directions. The Northridge event added to this
discrepancy by recording surprisingly high accelerations
for a quake of this size (6.7), and reports are talking about
further code revisions to accommodate them. For utility
operators the implications are clear. For all existing
important facilities the design assumptions used to cal-
culate and detail seismic resistance should be deter-
mined, compared with todays code requirements, and
mitigation measures considered. Presentation of these
measures to the decision makers should include an
assessment of the risks and costs of not proceeding as
described elsewhere in this report.
East Bay Municipal Utility District were anxious about
reservoirs designed in 1973 for a maximum horizontal
ground acceleration or 0.1 g. Code requirements today
were set at 0.5 g and they were anticipating a new code
level of 0.7 g.
Those engaged in walk-down surveys to assess seis-
mic risk need to be aware that the high vertical
accelerations being recorded, coupled with the horizon-
tal component means that unsecured installations will
walk off their foundations. Large tanks, for example in
addition to being susceptible to side plate compression
failure, can move off foundations and damage inlet and
outlet piping. Even more alarming is the magnification
of acceleration that can occur at above-ground levels in
facility buildings. Forces on elevated plant such as over-
head cranes, storage hoppers, etc. can be higher than
those occurring at ground level and their securing needs
special attention. The Donald C Tilman Reclamation
Plant (sewage treatment) which was located only 7 km
from the epicentre, reported damage to three overhead
cranes all of which were subsequently locked out of
service pending structural evaluation.
Use of GIS in mitigation scenarios
Establishing the appropriate level of investment in miti-
gation measures is clearly a vexed issue for a utilitys
directors. There is a balance which establishes a sensible
relationship between the likely cost of an elements
failure during an earthquake and the cost of mitigating
works designed to reduce or eliminate the failure. The
analysis assesses the probability of the design earth-
quake, assigns to the event the appropriate future date
and then compares discounted damage costs with present
day mitigation.
The use of interactive intelligent GIS environments to
assess and cost these scenarios is well advanced in the
States. As an example, a firm of San Francisco based
consultants has developed a program that covers the
USA on a 25 km square grid on which is transposed soil
data (average of first 30 m depth), major lifelines (free-
ways, oil pipelines, major water aqueducts, emergency
services, high voltage transmission lines, the railway
network, etc.). Relationships are included that, for exam-
ple, link each utility to likely damage and restoration
time for various sizes of earthquake. The program can
then simulate a particular earthquake and predict for the
authorities the likely effects, costs and restoration peri-
ods. Calibration of the model is possible given the
information that comes out of events like Northridge.
Provided the data is available, the program can work at
any level of detail and an example was viewed where a
citys water supply network was analysed and various
levels of earthquake mitigation developed and costed for
investment decision.
East Bay Municipal Utility District based in Oakland has
undertaken a similar simulation exercise on their water
system which conveys water from the headwaters of the
Mokelume River via three adjacent pipelines 90 miles in
length, that traverse major faults associated with the San
Andreas group. Their analysis has lead to a recom-
mended programme of mitigation amounting to US $162
to 202 million.
An interesting point made in the analysis is that a utility
must achieve another balance that between mitigation
and preparedness. It was found more cost effective to
reduce customer outage times following an earthquake
by deliberately planning for extra maintenance crews to
deal with breaks than to undertake wholesale pipe im-
provement as a mitigation measure.
Parking building, Northridge
Interdependence of Lifelines 247
Chapter 10
Interdependence of Lifelines
Introduction
Task groups considered hazards to discreet networks
and devised mitigation measures on that basis. But
there is a strong interdependency between lifelines.
Water supply systems need electricity. Communica-
tions systems are of critical importance to the operation
of, and disaster response to, all lifelines. Restoration of
water, power, sewer and telecommunications services
is often dependent on the roading network.
Interdependencies arise in relation to network per-
formance (if A fails then B fails), and in relation to
recovery (we cant fix A until B is fixed).
An assessment of interdependency in recovery is im-
plicit in much of the individual lifelines assessments as
consideration must be given to demands on other
services in deciding impact factors. But, as with the
Wellington project, a specific focus on inter-depend-
encies is still considered worthwhile, notwithstanding
the extreme difficulty in doing so.
How can interdependencies be
provided for in analysis?
From an analytical point of view, there are two broad
approaches available: top down, and bottom up.
A top down approach would look at some valued
service which is highly dependent on lifelines, and
simply ask the question: what lifelines failures could
cause loss of that service or an unacceptable delay in
restoring it? Those causes may then be addressed by
The service in question could be a particularly impor-
tant lifelines facility, for example a key substation, or
could be some other service, for example a hospital.
A bottom up approach would treat the combined life-
lines services as one system, and, component by com-
ponent, work through the full implications of any
particular component failure.
The approach used for the individual lifelines analyses
was, broadly speaking, a bottom up approach. Under-
taken properly, this approach is exhaustive, and there-
fore very time consuming. It would be appropriate to
risk management of, say, a nuclear power facility
where the expectations for reliability would justify the
cost of analysis. It is not appropriate for this project,
however, particularly given the uncertainties in hazard
and system knowledge. The uncertainty in defining
failure mechanisms within a particular service network
would make establishing connections to other net-
works highly problematic.
So, for the moment at least, we are left with a top down
approach.
Where to start?
The key consideration for interdependency analysis is
the length of down time of the failed system. This is the
case whether in relation to operational or recovery
interdependencies. So, looking at a particular lifelines-
dependent service, mitigation effort should be focused
on reducing the downtime through failure to accept-
able levels. Acceptable levels of downtime will be
based upon community expectations of the service
concerned.
Public expectations can be managed through prepared-
ness programmes and thereby enable costs of mitiga-
tion to be minimised, but in any case it is necessary that
these expectations be known.
The approach taken by the Wellington project team is
helpful here as a beginning.
Table 10.1, based on the Wellington project, usefully
illustrates indicative general interdependencies
in recovery between lifelines services. The
interdependencies will, however, vary site-to-site, as
well as over time. Table 10.2 is an indication of service
recovery times from a general point of view, which,
again, is useful as a starting point, but there is no
substitute for looking at the particular cases.
In the real world, an exhaustive analysis would only be
applied to an actual disaster situation where the prob-
lems are known and clear objectives and priorities are
able to be set. Project management techniques could
then be used to optimise interdependent recoveries.
It would be of value in the meantime that essential
community services highly dependent on lifelines be
identified so that suitable arrangements any required
for collaboration can be made.
Note: 3 = High Dependence
2 = Moderate Dependence
1 = Low Dependence
= No Dependence
THESE ARE
DEPENDENT
ON THESE
Water Supply
W
a
t
e
r

S
u
p
p
l
y
S
t
o
r
m

D
r
a
i
n
a
g
e
M
a
i
n
s

E
l
e
c
t
r
i
c
i
t
y
V
H
F

R
a
d
i
o
R
o
a
d
i
n
g
R
a
i
l
w
a
y
s
S
e
a

T
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
A
i
r

T
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
B
r
o
a
d
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
F
u
e
l

S
u
p
p
l
y
F
i
r
e

F
i
g
h
t
i
n
g
S
a
n
i
t
a
r
y

D
r
a
i
n
a
g
e
S
t
a
n
d
b
y

E
l
e
c
t
r
i
c
i
t
y
T
e
l
e
p
h
o
n
e

S
y
s
t
e
m
s
2 3
Sanitary Drainage
Storm Drainage
Mains Electricity
Standby Electricity
VHF Radio
Telephone Systems
Roading
Railways
Sea Transport
Air Transport
Broadcasting
Fuel Supply
Fire Fighting
Equipment
2
2
2
1
3
3
3
1
2
3 2
2 3
2
2 2 2 2 3
1 1 1
1
2
2 1 2 3
3 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2
1 2 1
1 3 2 1 1 3
1 1 1
1
1
1 1 3 2
2 2 2 3 3 3 3
3
3 3
3 3 3
3
3
2
2 2 2 2 2
1
2 3
1 3
Table 10.1: Interdependence of lifelines (first
week after earthquake)
Observations about
Christchurch lifelines
interdependencies an
intuitive view
While an analytical approach poses almost insurmount-
able difficulties, there are some things we can take
comfort from. Firstly, there is usually a high level of
redundancy in Christchurch networks. Even when fail-
ures occur, re-routing will often be an option.
However, utility and emergency services operations
have to be arranged so that emergency provision of
vital services such as power, water, toilet facilities etc.,
will have to be made to provide for the time between the
event (say an earthquake) and the provision of services
by other utilities.
Secondly, the lifelines project has in itself provided for
interdependencies in a management sense through
opening lines of communication through network pro-
viders and in the sharing of information about each
others networks. If a disaster were to occur today,
there would be a high level appreciation of the need for
priorities to be established across the services, and a
high level of cooperation and expertise would be
immediately available to address both priorities.
This team building effect of the lifelines project fosters
an appreciation of lifelines as one system and will
facilitate cross-utility mitigation measures where they
are identified.
When particular network owners are considering their
budget allocations it is most important that the value to
other lifelines of any proposed mitigation be taken into
account. The success of this project can be judged, in
no small way, to the extent that they do this.
At the workshop, three groups looked at particular
critical services as an exercise using the following
approach:
Tasks
1 The seismic hazard scenario applies.
2 Select an element of service or network component
which is dependent on other networks.
3 Agree on an acceptable outage time for 2 above.
4 Identify dependencies specific to 2. (Table 10.1
may help).
5 Identify (likely) damage to supply networks.
6 Establish recovery time for interdependent ele-
ments. (Table 10.2 may help).
7 Identify mitigation opportunities.
8 Prepare an action plan.
9 Report back 2 to 8 to full forum. Has/would this
exercise cause a review of mitigation measures
presently proposed?
(NB 6, 7, 8 require co-operation with other opera-
tors/task groups.)
The next step would be to consider the action plan
as a whole and review as necessary.
The results of the 12 hour exercise are not reported in
this book in that more time was required to produce
useful results, although an understanding was achieved
of the processes involved. The participants in the
exercise all agreed that a detailed look at the concepts
involved in interdependencies heightened their aware-
ness of the fact that in a large emergency event no
utility can stand alone.
Interdependence of Lifelines 249
UTILITY COMMENT
RECOVERY OF
BASIC SERVICE
OR CONTROL
PROVISION OF
50% SERVICE
PROVISION OF
FULL SERVICE
Drainage:
Sewage
Stormwater
Up to 2 weeks
for control
12 weeks minimum
2 - 3 days 12 weeks 12 months
Important for early
sewage control.
24 months minimum
As for water, 6
months min for
inspection - CCTV.
Electricity:
Transpower
Southpower
Telecom:
VHF Mobile &
Fleetlink
Local
Telephone
Tolls
Cellular
Broadcasting
Up to 3 days 2 weeks
Up to 3 days for
control. 1 week for
service
4 weeks
0 0
Up to 2 days 3 - 6 weeks
Up to 4 days
Up to 6 hours
2 weeks
4 days
2 - 3 days 2 - 3 weeks 2 - 6 months Access and tower
antennae
realignments.
Standby power.
Telephone link.
2 weeks
1 month
Switching units.
Transmission towers.
Transmission towers
12 months
2 weeks
12 months
Buildings. Line
structures.
Access and
equipment. Standby
fuel.
Sub stations.
Cable structures.
9 - 12 months
Radio
communication.
Access and
equipment.
Transmission towers.
Water
12 months Access and
equipment. Pipe
replacements.
Radio
communications.
Up to 2 days 2 weeks
Roading
Rail
Port
Airport
Definitions
1 - 2 days. Some
vehicular access to
most areas.
3 - 4 weeks
1 - 2 weeks 1 - 2 months
1 - 2 days 6 - 8 weeks
1 - 2 weeks 1 - 2 days
Ability to provide a
basic manageable
service for priority
use.
Provision of general
service to most
areas. Some
queuing or overload.
Temporary fixes in
place.
4 - 6 weeks
Controls and
navigation aids.
12 - 24 months Access. Power.
6 months
18 - 24 months
Track alignment.
Buildings.
Signalling. Slips.
Table 10.2: Recovery of service a preliminary assessment of the time to recover
following a major earthquake
The participants in the Workshop were aware of the
Wellington Earthquake Lifelines Group (WELG)
Project on The value of interdependence analysis on
response planning fully reported in Sections 4.1 - 4.6
of the 1993 report of the WELG. Section 4.5, the
Summary of the findings of the WELG Report, is
reproduced below.
Summary of Findings
Interdependence of lifelines is a key concept to be
integrated into the response plan of utilities. The
analyses in this report are illustrative only and are
based on particular scenario assumptions and ex-
pectations. The principal findings of this Group are
as follows:
Interdependence analysis is fundamental as a re-
sponse planning tool for lifeline utilities.
Response planning for utilities provides a means of
minimising the impacts of damage from earth-
quakes and providing for the earliest possible res-
toration of services. It is important for meeting both
social and commercial objectives.
An outline for a Utility Response Plan is presented
based on:
identifying a hierarchy of key components to be
inspected (and if necessary, responded to) fol-
lowing an event.
identifying contingency preparations which are
needed to activate key responses.
determining a basis for making decisions on
allocating resources following an event.
providing realistic assessments of times to re-
cover.
In the Response Plans, the impact of damage to
other services needs to be addressed and planned
for.
From the three analyses reported, the indications
are that assessed times for recovery are increased
significantly when the impacts of interdependence
are included. Implications from this follow in the
area of overall Civil Defence planning.
Interdependence analysis has application in the
areas of risk assessment and in identifying mitiga-
tion priorities.
There is considerable benefit in each utility prepar-
ing its response plan individually and collectively
reviewing the plans against a variety of events and
assumptions both to heighten their awareness of
each others needs and to enhance those plans.
Doing so would identify critical interdependencies.
Where practicable, these interdependencies can be
modified by mitigation or allowed for in the re-
sponse plan.
WELG has done further work on response plans since
then.
In Christchurch, work has been undertaken since the
October 1994 workshop by the individual utilities and
this is reported in Chapter 11. No further work has been
done on interdependencies as yet (but see possible
further work in Chapter 13).
Notwithstanding the above, in the event of a major
emergency all utilities are now aware of the impor-
tance of interdependencies as is the Regional Control-
ler of Civil Defence who may have the ultimate respon-
sibility to determine priorities and allocate resources.
The Chief Engineer in Civil Defence (at present the
Director of Operations of the Christchurch City Coun-
cil) has accepted the task of co-ordinating the re-
sponses of the various utilities if required for Civil
Defence.
It may well be that future formal work on
interdependencies is not warranted and the current
focus on response plans (which take into account
interdependencies) is the best approach. In due course
an exercise which will highlight interdependencies
will be held.
Multiple services in one area
Summary of Benefits 251
Chapter 11
Summary of Benefits and Work
Undertaken or Proposed
Removing spare (loose) electric motors and other
equipment (from pumping stations) that could move
and damage installed equipment.
Increased instrumentation, monitoring equipment
and battery capacity in pumping stations so that, in
the event of a power outage, a longer period can
elapse before operations staff lose contact and no
longer are aware of the situation.
Obtained budget provision and arranged for major
($270,000) seismic strengthening of the two 11,000
cubic metre Worsley Spur reservoirs that have been
identified as likely to collapse in a severe earth-
quake.
Installed remotely operated (from Colombo Street
water supply control room) motorised valves at
most major bulk storage reservoirs. Following a
staff investigation, it was decided that in the event
of an earthquake the motorised valves on the
Worsleys, Cashmere, Hackthorne, Sutherlands and
Huntsbury No 1 reservoirs will fully close. All
others will stay open and be closed at 50% capacity.
This minimises the risk of water damage, or wast-
age, due to ruptured pipelines in the vicinity.
Undertaken pipework alterations at some loca-
tions, that allow water to bypass (by operating
valves) normal supply routes, this allowing limited
continuity of supply if a pump, pipe, or reservoir
fails on the usual arrangement.
Investigated the feasibility of water proofing
pumping stations sufficiently to minimise damage
if a tsunami occurs. This feature has been incorpo-
rated in the new Aston Drive pump station.
Commenced a programme of installing isolating
valves on key trunk mains that pass over at risk
bridges.
Consciously paying more attention to design detail
of new works to ensure mitigation measures are
included in design.
Initiated, and managing a research project, funded
by the NZ Water and Waste Association to inves-
11.1Christchurch City Council
Water Services
A comprehensive report was presented to the Christ-
church City Council City Services Committee and this
followed a seminar organised for elected members in
September 1996. The report dealt with projected miti-
gation measures and financial implications, emergency
response and business continuance planning and insur-
ance cover relating to infrastructural assets managed
by the Water Services, Waste Management and City
Streets Units. The following sections have been ex-
tracted from that report.
Of the hazards examined (earthquake, tsunami, flood,
snow, wind, slope hazard) earthquake has the most
impact and, as it is a reasonably probable event,
justifies significant attention in terms of mitigation
measures.
The following sections of the report summarise the
mitigation programmes currently being developed by
the Water Services Unit.
Water Supply
The attached schedule and tables (Tables 11.1 and
11.2) sets out Lifelines work expanded for the coming
ten year period, including 1996/97. Budget require-
ments are not particularly high and have been included
in current programmes.
Considerable work has already been done in the water
supply area. A survey has been completed, followed by
remedial work, of all water supply facilities to identify,
then secure or remove any unsecured equipment that
could move in an earthquake and damage itself or other
essential equipment. Examples include:
Bolting down standby generator sets, batteries etc.
Installing brackets to prevent overhead cranes jump-
ing their travelling rails and falling down.
Securing computers and other control equipment
(that were sitting on desk tops) to ensure they will
not fall.
Table 11.1: Engineering lifelines mitigation programme water supply system
W
A
T
E
R

S
E
R
V
I
C
E
S

U
N
I
T
E
N
G
I
N
E
E
R
I
N
G

L
I
F
E
L
I
N
E
S

M
I
T
I
G
A
T
I
O
N

P
R
O
G
R
A
M
M
E
L
A
N
D

D
R
A
I
N
A
G
E

S
Y
S
T
E
M
1
9
9
6
/
9
7
1
9
9
7
/
9
8
1
9
9
8
/
9
9
1
9
9
9
/
0
0
2
0
0
0
/
0
1
2
0
0
1
/
0
2
2
0
0
2
/
0
3
2
0
0
3
/
0
4
2
0
0
4
/
0
5
2
0
0
5
/
0
6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
0
1
1
C
C
T
V

i
n
s
p
e
c
t
i
o
n

o
f

b
r
i
c
k

b
a
r
r
e
l
s
t
o
r
m
w
a
t
e
r

p
i
p
e
l
i
n
e
s
B
r
i
c
k

b
a
r
r
e
l

s
t
o
r
m
w
a
t
e
r

p
i
p
e
r
e
p
a
i
r
/
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
t
R
e
v
i
e
w

o
f

D
e
s
i
g
n

M
a
n
u
a
l

a
n
d
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n

o
f

n
e
w

v
e
r
s
i
o
n
S
t
u
d
y

m
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s

a
t

f
i
v
e
s
t
o
r
m
w
a
t
e
r

p
u
m
p
i
n
g

s
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
I
n
s
p
e
c
t

a
n
d

s
e
c
u
r
e

p
u
m
p

s
t
a
t
i
o
n
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
s

a
n
d

s
t
o
r
e
d

e
q
u
i
p
m
e
n
t
C
o
m
p
l
e
t
e

s
t
u
d
y

o
f

s
t
o
p
b
a
n
k
l
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

p
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l

a
n
d

d
e
f
i
n
e
w
o
r
k
s
S
t
o
p
b
a
n
k

r
e
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n

o
r
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g
C
o
m
p
l
e
t
e

s
t
u
d
y

o
f

m
i
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n

f
o
r
p
u
m
p

s
t
a
t
i
o
n

i
n
u
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
P
u
m
p

s
t
a
t
i
o
n

p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n

a
g
a
i
n
s
t
i
n
u
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
e

e
f
f
e
c
t
s

o
f

p
o
w
e
r

s
u
p
p
l
y
l
o
s
s
P
r
e
p
a
r
e

e
m
e
r
g
e
n
c
y

r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e

p
l
a
n
s
a
n
d

t
r
a
i
n

s
t
a
f
f
T
o
t
a
l
s
9
6
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
8
,
0
0
0
3
,
0
0
0
5
,
0
0
0
5
,
0
0
0
8
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
2
5
,
0
0
0
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
3
,
0
0
0
2
,
0
0
0
5
,
0
0
0
1
3
2
,
0
0
0
3
,
0
0
0
2
,
0
0
0
5
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
5
0
,
0
0
0
5
0
,
0
0
0
5
8
,
0
0
0
1
5
1
,
0
0
0
1
5
1
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
1
0
1
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
1
0
1
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
1
0
1
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
1
0
1
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
1
0
1
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
1
0
1
,
0
0
0
F
i
g
u
r
e
s

i
n

n
o
r
m
a
l

t
y
p
e

a
r
e

a
l
r
e
a
d
y

b
u
d
g
e
t
e
d
.
F
i
g
u
r
e
s

i
n

i
t
a
l
i
c
s

a
r
e

n
o
t

b
u
d
g
e
t
e
d
.
N
B
Table 11.2: Engineering lifelines mitigation programme land drainage system
1
9
9
6
/
9
7
1
9
9
7
/
9
8
1
9
9
8
/
9
9
1
9
9
9
/
0
0
2
0
0
0
/
0
1
2
0
0
1
/
0
2
2
0
0
2
/
0
3
2
0
0
3
/
0
4
2
0
0
4
/
0
5
2
0
0
5
/
0
6
W
A
T
E
R

S
E
R
V
I
C
E
S

U
N
I
T
E
N
G
I
N
E
E
R
I
N
G

L
I
F
E
L
I
N
E
S

M
I
T
I
G
A
T
I
O
N

P
R
O
G
R
A
M
M
E
W
A
T
E
R

S
U
P
P
L
Y

S
Y
S
T
E
M
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
T
o
t
a
l
s
N
C

=

n
o

d
i
r
e
c
t

c
o
s
t
N
B
W
o
r
s
l
e
y

R
e
s
e
r
v
o
i
r
s

-

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g
C
o
m
p
l
e
t
e

r
e
s
e
r
v
o
i
r

i
s
o
l
a
t
i
o
n

a
n
d
a
u
t
o
m
a
t
i
c

o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n

p
r
o
j
e
c
t
I
n
s
t
a
l
l

i
s
o
l
a
t
i
o
n

v
a
l
v
e
s

a
t

a
l
l

b
r
i
d
g
e
s
C
o
m
p
l
e
t
e

p
r
o
j
e
c
t

f
o
r

n
a
t
i
o
n
w
i
d
e
p
o
o
l
i
n
g

o
f

w
a
t
e
r

s
u
p
p
l
y

m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
s

b
y
3
0

D
e
c
e
m
b
e
r

1
9
9
7
F
i
x

f
l
e
x
i
b
l
e

j
o
i
n
t
s

a
t

c
r
i
t
i
c
a
l

p
u
m
p
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
s

(
a
b
o
v
e

a
n
d

b
e
l
o
w

g
r
o
u
n
d
)
I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
e

a
n
d

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n

r
e
s
e
r
v
o
i
r
p
i
p
e
w
o
r
k
R
e
v
i
e
w

d
e
s
i
g
n

p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e

a
n
d
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
P
r
e
p
a
r
e

e
m
e
r
g
e
n
c
y

r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e

p
l
a
n
s
a
n
d

t
r
a
i
n

s
t
a
f
f
W
a
t
e
r
p
r
o
o
f

v
u
l
n
e
r
a
b
l
e

p
u
m
p

s
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
1
8
0
,
0
0
0
5
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
N
C
9
0
,
0
0
0
1
5
,
0
0
0
1
7
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
5
,
0
0
0
1
7
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
7
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
N
C
5
,
0
0
0
2
0
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
5
,
0
0
0
1
4
7
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
1
5
,
0
0
0
5
3
,
0
0
0
3
8
,
0
0
0
3
6
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
1
5
,
0
0
0
1
5
,
0
0
0
3
6
,
0
0
0
3
6
,
0
0
0
2
1
,
0
0
0
2
1
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
2
1
,
0
0
0
tigate the feasibility of setting up a mutual assist-
ance agreement (materials, plant, labour, and techni-
cal support) between Water Supply Authorities in
times of emergency.
Commenced a programme of installing controlled
standpipes on artesian well heads so that water can
be drawn from the well, even if the pump station is
inoperable.
Become involved with the Council study on the
vulnerability, and mitigation measures for the
Ferrymead bridge site.
The scheduled programme shows the continuation and
completion of the above projects but also allows for:
The fitting of flexible joints both above and below
ground at selected pump stations.
Strengthening reservoir pipework.
A review of design practice to ensure lifeline con-
siderations are part of the design phase.
Preparation of Emergency Response and Business
Continuance Plans.
Land Drainage
Land Drainage Lifelines work is not as advanced as
Water Supply and the ten year programme contains a
number of investigations with future spending very
dependent on the outcome.
CCTV inspection of the 15 km of stormwater brick
barrel culverts is being completed this year, pre-
liminary to decisions on action that may be taken to
strengthen them. They are generally still in very
good condition and current thinking is that it may
be wiser to be properly prepared to repair damage
than to spend large amounts on their renewal. There
may be a much cheaper non-destructive means of
securing and strengthening the brick lining and this
will be considered. In the meantime a nominal
$100,000 per year is shown, but this is not included
in current programmes.
Investigation of stopbank stability on the lower
Avon is proceeding, but it is simply not possible to
predict what works may be recommended.
Emergency Response Plan preparation is com-
mencing now as a single exercise involving City
Streets, Waste Management and Water Services.
Other initiatives are as described in the 10 year
schedule.
11.2Christchurch City Council
Waste Management (Sewerage)
1. Reticulation
(a) Work is proposed to construct emergency overflow
installations to allow emergency discharge to the
stormwater system at 19 pumping stations (num-
bers 12, 13, 14, 22, 28, 33, 34, 38, 39,41, 44, 45, 50,
51, 52, 54, 56, 63 and 67).
(b) Work is proposed to replace the rising main on
Pages Road bridge. No. 57 rising main on Ferrymead
bridge is programmed for 1997/98 as a capital work
as a result of the poor condition of the pipeline. It
will also act as a lifeline improvement.
(c) Brick sewer renewal and/or replacement is pro-
posed for 3 km out of 6 km of sewer in Kilmore,
Madras, Fitzgerald, Tuam and Moorhouse.
2. Pumping Stations
(a) It is proposed to provide flexible couplings for
those pumping stations which are at critical points
in the network, either at terminals where several
pipelines meet, at inline locations with other pump-
ing stations or in the eastern earthquake liquifac-
tion zone. There are 18 pumping stations (numbers
7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 28, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37, 38, 45,
46, 54 and 57).
(b) It is proposed to waterproof buildings and electrical
control cabinets at risk of flooding at pumping
stations 15, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 39, 43, 45, 46, 63, 77.
(c) Strengthening of the only two pumping stations
assessed as being at risk in an earthquake (pumping
stations 2 and 5).
(d) It is proposed to install standby power plants at
critical points in the network similar to 2(a) above.
There are 14 pumping stations (numbers 20, 33, 34,
36, 38, 40, 41, 42, 60, 67, 75, 76, 77 and 78).
(e) Purchase of portable pumping equipment is pro-
posed for service in emergencies at other pumping
stations assessed as either at less risk or at less
critical locations than 2(d) above.
3. Treatment Plant
(a) Investigation of locations where flexible couplings
at buildings are needed is proposed.
(b) These will then be installed in as yet unidentified
but critical locations.
(c) It is proposed to upgrade the basement sump pumps
where the current pumps are totally inadequate.
(d) Tying down of control equipment against displace-
ment under earthquake attack has been done at the
treatment plants.
The work proposed is shown in Table 11.3.
City Streets
General earthquake and other hazards mitigation meas-
ures recommended in the Lifelines Project Report are
proposed as follows. Some of these involve Transit NZ
and other authorities.
Earthquake
(a) Bridges
Strengthen connections particularly between su-
perstructures and substructures.
Increase column strength and ductility.
Strengthen or renew retaining and approach struc-
tures.
Strengthen lateral/longitudinal restraint mecha-
nisms.
Construct landing slabs.
Addition of information plaques to bridges over
which key lifelines services pass, describing their
location and nature (services authorities).
Further technical assessment of the Sutton Quay
rail overbridge/road retaining structure and clarifi-
cation of responsibilities (TNZ, NZ Rail, BPDC).
Detailed geotechnical and structural investigation
of vulnerable bridges located on Primary Routes, or
significant alternative routes, for which simple
mitigation measures are not immediately apparent.
(e.g. Pages Road, Marshland Road-Styx River).
(b) Roads
Clarify ventilation requirements to allow contin-
ued operation of Road Tunnel to Lyttelton, provide
backup power facilities for emergency use.
Development of integrated response plans for the
road and bridges network, recognising the accessi-
bility needs for evacuations, supplies, fuel sup-
plies, and services reinstatement.
Early replacement of older, vulnerable underground
pipes (e.g. stormwater) on key lifelines roads.
Undergrounding overhead services, particularly
on significant lifelines routes.
Service authorities to consider lifelines issues when
planning service installations in key roads.
Selection of trees which are more likely to survive
an earthquake, particularly on key routes. Plant
only known rootfirm species in areas where lique-
faction may occur.
Earthquake proofing traffic signal control and sur-
veillance systems.
Investigation of the need for railway and road
bridges when they become due for reconstruction
or rehabilitation, and safeguarding land for ground
level replacements. The elimination of some of
those bridges would decrease route vulnerabilities
for road and rail.
Identification of alternative river crossings (such as
fords) including investigation of rail bridges (and
the tunnel) for road vehicles, and safeguarding the
land for this.
Review route diversion procedures and informa-
tion systems, these could be used for minor emer-
gencies such as weather induced route severances.
Investigation and recording of temporary emer-
gency bridging materials and equipment (including
bailey bridges) and their locations.
Securing road tunnel mechanical/electrical serv-
ices.
Review standards of construction and maintenance
of all transport facilities to reduce the vulnerability
of the road network, for example trench backfilling
and reinstatement requirements.
Snow and Wind
Investigate the resilience of and the need for backup
power facilities for traffic monitoring cameras and
display units to enable ongoing conditions moni-
toring of key city sites from the City Councils
Tuam Street building.
Establish priorities for undergrounding overhead
services on key transport routes, including primary
routes, sector distributors and other arterial routes.
Tree management procedures, particularly on arte-
rial roads (e.g. type, pruning, spacing, removal of
suspect trees).
Clarify and document emergency event procedures
(disaster plan), responsibilities and information
Table 11.3: Engineering lifelines mitigation programme waste water system
1
9
9
6
/
9
7
1
9
9
7
/
9
8
1
9
9
8
/
9
9
1
9
9
9
/
0
0
2
0
0
0
/
0
1
2
0
0
1
/
0
2
2
0
0
2
/
0
3
2
0
0
3
/
0
4
2
0
0
4
/
0
5
2
0
0
5
/
0
6
W
A
S
T
E

M
A
N
A
G
E
M
E
N
T

U
N
I
T
E
N
G
I
N
E
E
R
I
N
G

L
I
F
E
L
I
N
E
S

M
I
T
I
G
A
T
I
O
N

P
R
O
G
R
A
M
M
E
W
A
S
T
E

W
A
T
E
R

S
Y
S
T
E
M
1

R
E
T
I
C
U
L
A
T
I
O
N
(
a
)

E
m
e
r
g
e
n
c
y

O
v
e
r
f
l
o
w

i
n
s
t
a
l
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
(
b
)

R
i
s
i
n
g

M
a
i
n
s

o
n

b
r
i
d
g
e
s

r
e
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
t
(
c
)

B
r
i
c
k

s
e
w
e
r

r
e
n
e
w
a
l

a
n
d
/
o
r

s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n
i
n
g
2

P
U
M
P
I
N
G

S
T
A
T
I
O
N
S
(
a
)

P
r
o
v
i
d
e

f
l
e
x
i
b
l
e

c
o
u
p
l
i
n
g
s

a
t

P
u
m
p
i
n
g

S
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
(
b
)

C
o
n
t
i
n
u
e

w
a
t
e
r
p
r
o
o
f
i
n
g

p
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e

a
t

b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
(
c
)

S
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
e
n

P
S
2

a
n
d

P
S
5
(
d
)

I
n
s
t
a
l
l

s
t
a
n
d
b
y

p
o
w
e
r

p
l
a
n
t
s
(
e
)

P
u
r
c
h
a
s
e

o
f

p
o
r
t
a
b
l
e

s
t
a
n
d
b
y

p
u
m
p
i
n
g

e
q
u
i
p
m
e
n
t
3

T
R
E
A
T
M
E
N
T

P
L
A
N
T
S
(
a
)

I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
e

l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
s

w
h
e
r
e

f
l
e
x
i
b
l
e

c
o
u
p
l
i
n
g
s

a
t

b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s

a
r
e

n
e
e
d
e
d
(
b
)

I
n
s
t
a
l
l

f
l
e
x
i
b
l
e

c
o
u
p
l
i
n
g
s
(
c
)

U
p
g
r
a
d
e

b
a
s
e
m
e
n
t

s
u
m
p

p
u
m
p
s
(
d
)

T
i
e

d
o
w
n

c
o
n
t
r
o
l

e
q
u
i
p
m
e
n
t
T
o
t
a
l
s
4
0
,
0
0
0
4
0
,
0
0
0
4
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
3
0
,
0
0
0
2
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
3
0
,
0
0
0
3
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
3
0
,
0
0
0
2
0
,
0
0
0
1
3
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
2
0
,
0
0
0
4
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
9
5
,
0
0
0
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
1
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
4
0
,
0
0
0
1
4
0
,
0
0
0
1
3
0
,
0
0
0
1
1
0
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
,
0
0
0
1
,
0
0
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
0
,
0
0
0
1
0
,
0
0
0
2
0
,
0
0
0
(
P
a
g
e
s

R
o
a
d
)
(
I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
)
flows across transport agencies and other lifelines
agencies including establishing response plans and
reconnaissance plans.
Provide more 4-wheel drive vehicles in the Coun-
cils fleet.
Procedures for the spreading of grit.
Flooding
Ensure that good records of sump locations and
stormwater pipelines are available to key people in
an emergency situation.
Adequate sump maintenance and street cleaning
procedures are needed to ensure that available staff
are not overloaded in clearing blocked sumps and
stormwater systems in an emergency situation.
Develop self-cleansing sump inlet structures that
retain functionality in wet weather
Disaster planning.
Tsunami
Identification of road routes that would be avail-
able for evacuations from eastern and low lying
suburbs (more work required in comparing road
levels with wave profiles in rivers).
Technical assessments of vulnerable road network
structures (e.g. Moncks Bay sea wall, Ferrymead
Bridge, Bridge Street and Pages Road Bridges) and
the need for scour protection measures.
Slope Hazard
Retainment, plantings, drainage improvements, re-
moval of unsafe rocks, ground anchors at a range of
sites on the Port Hills.
Programmed Work
Most emphasis since the Project Report was completed
has been on bridges and a scoping report Bridge
Strengthening Programme dated February 1996 was
circulated to Council Committee members at a seminar
in September 1996.
Table 2 of that report is set out in Tables 11.4 and 11.5.
It shows a possible programme of bridge strengthening
and/or renewals.
The total cost of the programme is $3,769,974 over 11
years.
These compare with a current annual budget provision
of $110,000 per annum in the five year plan. In addi-
tion, work is being programmed in 1997/98 to renew
deteriorating crib walling on the Blenheim Road
Overbridge and this will include seismic strengthen-
ing.
Year Amount ($)
1996/97 400,000
1997/98 281,300
1998/99 357,629
1999/2000 357,629
2000/01 192,666
2001/02 570,360
2002/03 418,337
2003/04 462,591
2004/05 363,462
2005/06 366,000
Table 11.4: Bridge strengthening programme
Current Disaster/Emergency
Management Planning Initiatives
During 1996, a project for the development of Busi-
ness Continuity Plans was initiated by the Managers
of three Business Units, namely City Streets, Waste
Management and Water Services, as a lead task within
Council.
The managers concerned quickly identified that a
planning need existed far beyond the limits suggested
by the term business continuity and in particular
recognised the need for a level of planning consistent
with and complimentary to that which currently exists
in relation to Councils roles and responsibilities in a
declared Civil Emergency and over and above those
plans establishing response procedures for minor
emergencies.
To that end, a planning project was drafted and agreed
in late 1996, with the project to be completed in three
stages (as illustrated in Figures 11.1 and 11.2).
Disaster Management Planning
'Time' and Terminologies
3 STAGE PROCESS
IMMEDIATE RESPONSE PLANNING
BUSINESS/SERVICES CONTINUITY PLANNING
DISASTER RECOVERY PLANNING
DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN
Figure 11.1: Disaster management planning 1
Table 11.5: Engineering lifelines mitigation programme bridge strenghtening programme
E
N
G
I
N
E
E
R
I
N
G

L
I
F
E
L
I
N
E
S

S
T
U
D
Y
B
R
I
D
G
E

S
T
R
E
N
G
T
H
E
N
I
N
G

P
R
O
G
R
A
M
M
E
B
r
i
d
g
e

N
o
.
B
r
i
d
g
e

N
a
m
e
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e

B
C
B
C

P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
L
i
f
e
l
i
n
e
s

P
r
e
s
e
n
t
P
l
a
n
n
e
d

T
r
a
f
f
i
c

M
o
d
s
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
N
e
t
w
o
r
k
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
c
e
C
o
m
m
e
n
t
s
P
r
o
p
o
s
e
d
P
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
O
r
d
e
r
R
e
t
r
o
f
i
t

C
o
s
t
P
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e

Y
e
a
r
1 5 3
1
6 4 8
1
0 7 6
1
3 2
1
2
1
1 9
1
5
1
4
1
7
1
8
R
7
0
4
R
2
0
1
R
7
0
5
R
4
0
5
R
1
0
2
R
1
0
6
R
7
0
3
R
1
0
4
R
7
0
2
R
1
1
1
R
1
0
9
R
1
0
7
R
1
0
3
R
2
0
6
R
2
1
4
R
1
3
1
R
8
0
1
R
5
0
1
O
l
d

M
a
i
n

N
o
r
t
h

R
o
a
d
C
a
u
s
e
w
a
y
S
t
r
a
v
e
n

R
o
a
d
B
a
r
r
i
n
g
t
o
n

S
t
r
e
e
t
O
p
a
w
a

R
o
a
d
W
a
i
n
o
i

R
o
a
d
S
w
a
n
n
s

R
o
a
d
F
i
t
z
g
e
r
a
l
d

T
w
i
n
K
i
l
m
o
r
e

S
t
r
e
e
t
M
o
o
r
h
o
u
s
e

O
'
B
A
v
o
n
d
a
l
e

R
o
a
d
C
o
l
o
m
b
o

O
'
B
G
a
y
h
u
r
s
t

R
o
a
d
P
a
g
e
s

R
o
a
d
M
a
r
s
h
l
a
n
d

R
o
a
d
B
l
e
n
h
e
i
m

O
'
B
F
e
r
r
y
m
e
a
d
D
u
r
h
a
m

O
'
B
2
4
.
9
1
1
.
7
2
.
3
1
3
1
2
3
.
6
9
1
.
0
8
.
0
7
.
6
5
.
3
1
7 2 3 4
5
.
3
5
4
.
1
6
4
.
0
3
.
6
2
,
7
2
.
6
1
.
3
1
.
3
7 8
1
0
1
1
1
5
1
6
0
.
3
1
.
6
3
.
2
1
8
1
4
(
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
)
T
3
,

W
2
T
3
,

P
1
,

W
3
,

S
3
T
1
T
2
T
3
,

P
3
,

W
3
,

S
7
,

P
o
l
i
c
e
,

F
i
r
e

S
t
a
t
i
o
n
T
2
,

W
3
P
2
,

W
1
,

S
1
T
2
,

W
3
T
1
T
2
,

W
3
,

F
i
r
e

S
t
a
t
i
o
n
T
2
,

W
3
T
1
T
2
,

W
3
T
2
,

W
3
T
2
,

W
3
T
2
T
2
,

W
3
,

S
1
T
2
K
e
y
:
T

=

T
e
l
e
c
o
m
P

=

P
o
w
e
r
W

=

W
a
t
e
r
S

=

S
e
w
e
r
1

=

M
i
n
o
r
2

=

M
e
d
i
u
m
3

=

M
a
j
o
r
N
i
l
W
i
d
e
n

b
r
i
d
g
e

(
l
o
n
g
t
e
r
m
)
C
l
i
p
o
n

c
y
c
l
e

l
a
n
e
s
A
d
d

c
o
r
n
e
r

r
o
u
n
d
i
n
g
s

a
n
d
c
h
a
n
g
e

v
e
r
t
i
c
a
l

a
l
i
g
n
m
e
n
t
A
d
d

c
y
c
l
e

l
a
n
e
s
N
i
l
N
i
l
N
i
l
N
i
l
W
i
d
e
n

t
o

6

l
a
n
e
s
N
i
l
N
i
l
N
i
l
N
i
l
A
d
d

c
y
c
l
e

l
a
n
e
s
W
i
d
e
n

t
o

4

l
a
n
e
s
A
d
d

c
y
c
l
e

a
n
d

t
r
a
f
f
i
c

l
a
n
e
s
W
i
d
e
n

d
o
w
n
s
t
r
e
a
m

s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
6 1 9 2 4
1
3 5
1
2 8
1
0 3
1
8 7
1
4
1
6
1
1
1
7
1
5
L
a
r
g
e

s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
V
i
t
a
l

l
i
n
k

t
o

S
u
m
n
e
r

f
o
r

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
a
n
d

t
r
a
f
f
i
c
R
e
t
r
o
f
i
t

d
e
s
i
g
n

u
n
d
e
r
w
a
y
V
e
r
y

l
a
r
g
e

d
e
t
o
u
r

i
f

B
a
i
l
e
y

b
r
i
d
g
e
u
n
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
T
h
i
s

b
r
i
d
g
e

i
s

a

v
i
t
a
l

l
i
n
k

t
o
B
r
i
g
h
t
o
n
'
s

c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l

c
e
n
t
r
e
.

I
t

i
s
6
5

y
e
a
r
s

o
l
d
L
o
w
e
r

A
v
o
n

B
r
i
d
g
e
E
x
p
e
n
s
i
v
e

a
n
d

d
i
s
r
u
p
t
i
v
e

t
o
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
L
o
w
e
r

A
v
o
n

B
r
i
d
g
e
P
r
i
o
r
i
t
y

f
o
r

w
i
d
e
n
i
n
g

y
e
t

t
o
b
e

d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e
d
L
o
w
e
r

A
v
o
n

B
r
i
d
g
e
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s

i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s

b
o
t
h

b
r
i
d
g
e
s
.
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t

t
r
a
f
f
i
c

r
o
u
t
e
.

M
o
d
e
s
t
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e

r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
I
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t

l
i
f
e
l
i
n
e
s
S
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e

i
s

u
n
l
i
k
e
l
y

t
o

b
e
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
d

s
h
o
u
l
d

i
t

c
o
l
l
a
p
s
e
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 1
0
1
1
1
2
1
3
1
4
1
5
1
6
1
7
1
8
$
3
1
,
0
0
0
$
4
0
0
,
0
0
0
$
1
7
4
,
3
0
0
$
1
0
7
,
0
0
0
$
7
1
5
,
2
5
9
$
1
9
2
,
6
6
8
$
5
7
0
,
3
8
0
$
2
1
8
,
3
3
7
$
2
0
0
,
0
0
0
$
4
0
,
0
0
0
$
1
2
5
,
3
9
4
$
9
7
,
0
0
0
$
1
4
9
,
6
0
8
$
5
0
,
5
8
9
$
1
5
4
,
0
0
0
$
2
0
9
,
4
8
2
$
1
,
0
0
0
,
0
0
0
$
4
,
8
0
1
,
9
7
5
9
5
/
9
6
9
6
/
9
7
9
7
/
9
8
9
7
/
9
8
9
8
/
9
9
/
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
/
0
1
2
0
0
1
/
0
2
2
0
0
2
/
0
3
2
0
0
2
/
0
3
2
0
0
3
/
0
4
2
0
0
3
/
0
4
2
0
0
3
/
0
4
2
0
0
3
/
0
4
2
0
0
3
/
0
4
2
0
0
4
/
0
5
2
0
0
4
/
0
5
$
2
0
9
,
4
8
2
2
0
0
5
/
0
6
2
0
0
6
/
0
7
/
0
8
R
e
t
r
o
f
i
t

c
o
s
t

a
l
l
o
w
s

f
o
r

f
u
l
l

r
e
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
t

P
r
e
p
a
r
e
d

4
/
0
3
/
9
6
water) to at least an acceptable minimum level will be
a prime focus for this stage of the project.
Completion of this stage is targeted for immediately
following stage one, although those continuity issues
which will be required to support the immediate re-
sponses are being addressed, as are possible service
contingencies identified during the progress of stage
one. These contingencies are being logged as they are
identified, for later detailed review and inclusion in the
plan.
Stage Three Disaster Recovery
Planning
To date, review and discussion of longer term recovery
and reinstatement strategies has not progressed beyond
the initial concepts and what might be considered to
some of the overall objectives. However clearly this
stage will focus on delivery of key (albeit impaired and
hence reduced) services over an extended period, strat-
egies which might hasten the restoration of full serv-
ices (new technology) and the possible introduction of
replacement technology with greater resiliency (to
damage) characteristics.
Insurance Issues
In 1991 Central Government established a Disaster
Recovery Plan which identified the need for substan-
tial financial contributions from local authorities fol-
lowing natural disasters and emergencies. The Central
Government Disaster Plan places obligations on local
authorities with respect to reinstatement costs involved
following damage to infrastructural assets of natural
disasters and emergencies. The plan requires that above
the initial threshold level Central Government will
provide 60% of the repair or recovery cost and the
responsibility for the remaining 40% falls on the local
authority. The plan also specifies that unless the local
authority can demonstrate that it has adequately pro-
tected itself through proper maintenance, the provision
of reserve funds, effective insurance or participation in
a mutual assistance scheme with other local authorities
to a level that it can meet its 40% obligation, then
Central Governments 60% share will not be made
available.
Following the issue of the Central Governments Dis-
aster Recovery Plan, the Local Government Insurance
Corporation (LGIC) established the Local Authority
Protection Programme (LAPP). This is a mutual assist-
ance scheme with the contributions of members held in
trust and administered by LGIC. The fund is designed
to cover infrastructure which is generally uninsurable.
Annual contributions to the fund are based on a series
of factors and the contributions are fixed each year.
Disaster
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
B
u
s
in
e
s
s
C
o
n
tin
u
ity
D
is
a
s
te
r
R
e
c
o
v
e
r
y
TIME
E
F
F
O
R
T
Disaster Management Planning
'Time' and 'Effort'
Figure 11.2: Disaster management planning 2
Stage One Immediate Response
Planning
This stage of the project was commenced in early 1997
and uses as its principal tool, the findings of the
Christchurch Lifelines Study Group with particular
emphasis on the exposure presented by the maximum
credible earthquake (mce). The likely planning time-
frame envisaged for this stage is from zero to 24-36
hours.
The threat and vulnerability assessments established
by the Lifelines Study are being expanded and refined
by each of the business units in their specialist areas of
interest. The results of this work will establish a Re-
sponse Hierarchy which will in turn be used for two
primary purposes:
1 To identify and establish the resources required for
an immediate and acceptable emergency response.
2 To ensure the organisational structure and operat-
ing procedures required to maximise the use of
those resources are in place.
A secondary outcome of this work may be the identi-
fication of further hazard mitigation measures.
The business units will be working closely together
(and in liaison with Regional Civil Defence) to ensure
a composite and cohesive plan is prepared.
Stage One planning is due for completion and testing
well prior to the end of 1997.
Stage Two Business/Services Continuity
Planning
This next stage will be required to review and address
the various systems, support and procedural issues
necessary to identify, provide and maintain minimum
acceptable levels of business and services to the com-
munity, for a period (some weeks/months) following a
major event.
Contingencies for the delivery of critical services (e.g.;
In June 1993 the Council resolved to join LAPP. There
is no guaranteed distribution from the fund in the event
of a natural disaster or emergency and the distributions
are at the discretion of the trustees who may take into
account a variety factors including the amount of the
annual contributions, the total fund of contributions
paid, the record of payment, the state of repair of the
infrastructure, progress with risk management, finan-
cial circumstances and other subsidies or compensa-
tion available to the member. However, during the
1995/96 year a focus group was established and this
group has recommended limiting the discretion that the
Fund Trustees currently have in determining the quan-
tum of any distribution. It is expected that this will give
more certainty to members in terms of both coverage
and distributions. The group also made recommenda-
tions on options for the use of the fund in the future.
The fund reinsurance programme was renewed during
1995/96 and additional support means LAPP now
provides $25,000,000 for its members. Assuming
Central Governments 60% contribution, protection of
$62,500,000 is now in place. Reinsurance support has
increased as a result of the understanding the insurance
market appears to now have of the aims and objectives
of the fund.
The infrastructural assets of the Council covered under
the scheme relating to 1995/96 are shown in Table
11.6.
Roads and road structures are not covered under the
LAPP scheme as they attract a subsidy from Transit
New Zealand. The Councils contribution to the fund
for 1995/96 was $229,450 (GST exclusive).
In 1995 the Council commissioned Sedgwick Limited
to identify and quantify (by frequency/severity) the
risk of a major disaster affecting any area within the
citys regional boundaries. The purpose of the study
was principally twofold:
To provide evidence of and to ensure that the
Council achieves a credible level of compliance
with the responsibilities assigned to local authori-
ties under terms of the Natural Disaster Recovery
Plan.
In identifying the sum of any loss resulting from
disasters, provide the Council with the tool with
which to measure the adequacy and cost effective-
ness of existing funding strategies and consider
possible alternatives.
Conclusions and recommendations of the Sedgwick
report were as follows:
That all planning be based on an expected loss of
$50,000,000. This sum is a reasonable compromise
between the maximum credible loss ($36,931,300)
Replacement
Value as @
April 1995
$
Covered by
LAPP
Water
water reticulation 207,941,128 yes
pumping stations 6,066.100 part
less pumping stations insured
(59 of 69 insured)
-5,968,400 insured
208,038,828
Stormwater
stormwater reticulation 357,107,900 yes
Heathcote river floodgates 1,500,000 yes
358,607,900
Waste
sewer reticulation 489,506,903 yes
pumping stations 4,898,500 part
less pumping stations insured
(7 of 87 insured)
-1,965,700 insured
Bromley oxidation ponds 2,000,000 yes
Templeton oxidation ponds 240,456 yes
Belfast oxidation ponds 271,768 yes
494,951,927
Total replacement value
covered by LAPP
1,061,598,655
Table 11.6: City council infrastructural assets covered by LAPP
and the maximum possible ($69,011,500) as iden-
tified within the report.
That the minimum reserve of $5,000,000 earmarked
by the Council for disaster recovery purposes be
maintained to cater for the lower layer of funding
required and specifically to cover the $1,600,000
excess or threshold above which Central Govern-
ment emergency assistance may apply.
That capital and/or maintenance budget appropria-
tion should form a significant part of catastrophe
risk/loss funding, particularly through the middle
layer.
The value of road and road structure infrastructural
assets were included in the Sedgwick report in order to
identify the total cost of any loss.
The recommendations of the Sedgwick report are
being considered by the Director of Finance.
11.3Transpower (New Zealand)
Limited*
Transpower (NZ) Ltd, the owner of the national elec-
tricity grid, took an active role in the Christchurch
Engineering Lifelines Project. In addition to contribut-
ing financially to the project, Transpower carried out a
review of its assets in the Christchurch region to
determine the reliability of its network during and after
a moderate to severe earthquake, flooding, tsunami,
windstorm, snowstorm and slope instability.
The survey was a broad brush review of the entire
system with the aim of pin-pointing weak links in the
system. Consideration was given to both the effect on
the system and the time/costs of mitigation. For exam-
ple, the lead time to replace a large transformer could
be up to twelve months.
As a result of the review of the Transpower system
using a systematic methodology developed for a number
of lifelines participants, a number of vulnerable areas
were identified. Urgent action was taken to mitigate the
areas of concern.
Major transformers at Transpowers Islington and
Bromley substations were significantly strengthened
so as to be able to resist current code earthquake
loadings. The loss of any of the above mentioned
transformers could have caused significant problems
for Transpower and Southpower, the local electricity
distribution company.
A number of more minor vulnerable areas were also
detected and mitigated.
The over all benefit of the Christchurch Engineering
Lifelines Project as far as Transpower is concerned has
meant that a number of weak areas were exposed and
mitigated. This has resulted in the likelihood of outages
being reduced and if they did occur, would be of a
shorter duration, as a result of a major earthquake,
flooding, tsunami, windstorm or snowstorm.
11.4Southpower
A continual review and assessment has taken place
since the original report.
Often this review has been carried out in more detail
than the original report in specific areas particularly
where additional drivers have been identified and lift
the priority as a mitigation measure.
Southpower has demonstrated a high commitment to
improving the electrical infrastructure assets to mini-
mise the impact of a natural disaster or hazard.
It has recognised the fact that it is important for any
business to manage its risk and the possible impact this
may have on its customers. It is also considered ex-
tremely important that action be taken where appropri-
ate as soon as possible to mitigate identified hazards in
a structured manner.
The following work is a summary of the major mitiga-
tion measures that have been actioned to date:
The Control Centre has now been moved to a more
seismically secure part of the new building and
retained at first floor level because of the possibility
of flooding.
The standby generator has now been replaced above
ground level.
Demolition and removal of that part of the
Southpower building considered seismically inse-
cure is under way.
Emergency spares have been relocated after de-
tailed assessment of the buildings identified a far
more secure area of storage.
A seismic restraint project is underway to minimise
the effect of damage on emergency spares during
an earthquake.
Two Armagh bridges that carry major feeders sup-
plying the central city have had their cable supports
substantially strengthened.
* Reference: J Mackenzie (1995). Lifelines Surveys for Mitigation,
A Christchurch Experience, NZNSEE Technical Conference 1995.
Transformer hold down review and bunding at
district substation sites is almost complete.
The sound attenuation wall at Sockburn substation
has been lowered.
Spare circuit breakers, voltage transformers and
auxiliary transformers within substations have been
secured against movement.
Network substations have been assessed to deter-
mine their structural ability to withstand a moder-
ate to severe earthquake. Of the 528 substation
structures 253 will require further evaluation to
determine strengthening needs.
Generic strengthening systems have been designed
and work has started improving the strength of
network substations.
A suitable method of securely fixing transformers
in kiosk substations has been developed.
An engineering review of pole mounted substa-
tions has been commissioned and new standards
set.
Battery banks and chargers in district substations
and network substations have now been strapped
down.
Managing risk of a natural disaster is now an integral
part of Southpowers Asset Management plan. This is
updated annually and provides detailed information on
asset planning for the next ten year period.
The most significant cost to date has been bunding and
strengthening work at major transformer sites. The
expenditure to date on this aspect of work has exceeded
$700,000 and has included all major transformer sites
at the 45 district substations which are part of
Southpowers distribution system many of which are
outside the area of the original lifelines study.
The estimated cost of strengthening work at 253 net-
work substation sites is expected to exceed $4,000,000,
however this is only a fraction of the cost of replace-
ment of these assets.
11.5Telecom
Telecom New Zealand has an extensive risk manage-
ment mitigation programme to protect its assets and
engineering lifelines is part of this programme. Much
of this work would have been undertaken as part of the
normal risk management programme.
As a result of the investigation in Christchurch a
considerable amount of mitigation work has been
undertaken although, fortunately, this has not involved
a lot of expenditure. A structural consultant John
MacKenzie was employed and he developed and used
a standard method of survey of all the key elements
involved in the control and linking of the telecommu-
nications in Christchurch for Telecom. The work un-
dertaken was mainly bracing and anchoring of equip-
ment.
It is important to note that the Telecom network is
protected by the diversity so that the failure of an
individual element simply results in a re-routing of a
call through undamaged elements.
Budget provision for work on Telecom engineering
lifelines in Christchurch City is approximately 4 mil-
lion dollars over 10 years. This will cover seismic
bracing of telecommunication equipment, structural
strengthening of selected buildings, additional fire
protection and physical security measures.
11.6Christchurch International
Airport Limited
Christchurch International Airport Limited (CIAL),
the owner of Christchurch International Airport, is
responsible for providing landing facilities for all air
transportation in and out of Christchurch.
CIAL recognised that not only is air transportation
essential following a major disaster, such as a severe
earthquake, loss of key components could also have a
detrimental effect on the airports ability to function
properly.
In order to assess and mitigate potentially vulnerable
areas, CIAL commissioned an independent lifelines
survey of all the key elements of Christchurch airport
and acted on the findings with urgency.
The key components covered by the survey included:
emergency power generation;
electrical reticulation;
water supply and reticulation;
sewage disposal;
telecommunications;
flight management systems; and
emergency services.
As a result of the survey, a mitigation programme was
initiated. A significant number of areas have been
either attended to directly or are now superseded by the
International Terminal rebuilding project. This in-
cludes:
all international mechanical and electrical services;
emergency generators, air compressors and refrig-
eration compressors (Domestic Terminal);
mechanical services (domestic boiler room);
some heat pumps;
electrical switchboards and control cabinets;
hot water supply tanks (airport fire service); and
foam storage tank (airport fire service).
Some areas have yet to be attended to, but will be as part
of the ongoing mitigation programme. However, just
as importantly, an awareness has been raised of the
correct installation of the new building services as part
of the substantial International Terminal rebuilding
project.
As a result of the Christchurch Engineering Lifelines
Project, the Christchurch International Airport is be-
coming a more dependable part of the transportation
system, especially during and after a major disaster
such as an earthquake, flooding. etc.
11.7Lyttelton Port Company
The Lyttelton Port Company has ensured that all of the
issues raised in the vulnerability assessment of the port
have been investigated. The principle concern is still
the possibility of the loss of the use of Cashin Quay
because of damage at the face of the reclamation as a
result of an earthquake. Although most of the port
structures are unlikely to suffer severe damage, the
interfaces between them and the land are expected to
drop, necessitating remedial work with temporary bridg-
ing which is readily constructed from material already
at the port.
The provision of electrical power to the port has been
reviewed and a new alternative line is to be laid
between the port and Woolston giving much more
security. The two overhead lines over the Port Hills
have been modified so that the configuration now
allows the servicing of the lines independently and
some repoling has been undertaken. Major modifica-
tions were also made at the substation. There is a
possibility that an alternative emergency generator
may be installed.
The equipment at the command at control centres have
been checked and secured.
Significant seismic upgrading has been started on No.7
wharf which is used by Pacifica Shipping. This wharf
would be one of the most important wharves after an
earthquake to provide outside access for emergency
service supplies to Christchurch. The vessels which
use this wharf are totally independent of wharf power.
It is interesting to note that since November 1994 the
Port Company has had a Risk Management Commit-
tee.
11.8Tranz Rail
The train control monitoring equipment has been se-
cured. The stability of embankments and cuttings have
been reviewed. Investigations were undertaken of the
Lyttelton Tunnel portal and the bridges stability and
the Heathcote underpass bridge is to be replaced.
As a result of the Christchurch engineering lifelines
study, work may be undertaken investigating the per-
formance of the Picton-Christchurch line.
11.9Transit New Zealand
The study highlighted the importance of seismically
rating bridges and initiating the remedial works on
those bridges to improve their seismic resistance. The
lifelines work has given some impetus to the national
rating of bridges on the State Highway network and
work is still proceeding. A particular methodology for
use by Transit New Zealand has been developed and is
now underway. It should be noted that the Thorden
overbridge strengthening arose directly from the Wel-
lington lifelines investigation and is top priority for
New Zealand.
11.10 Petroleum Products
The tank farm at Lyttelton is to be redeveloped and
planning is currently under way. The installations will
be built to the latest European safety specifications, but
under the direction of New Zealand engineers who will
ensure that the local standards (particularly earth-
quake) will be met.
11.11 Conclusion
It is gratifying to see such a large amount of work has
been done or is proposed as a result of the engineering
lifelines work. It shows that the considerable effort of
so many people at surprisingly little cost has resulted in
budget provision for mitigation and planning work that
has and will continue to make Christchurch much
better able to withstand the effects of natural hazardous
events.
However, there is an acknowledged need to continue
improving the infrastructure and this is addressed in
Chapter 13.
(RW Meers & Co. photo, Canterbury Museum Ref: 7068.
Reproduced with permission of Canterbury Museum)
Christchurch Cathedral earthquake damage,
1 September 1888.
Flood in Gloucester Street,
Christchurch, 4 February 1868
with the old Gloucester Street
footbridge on left.
(DL Mundy photo, Canterbury Museum
Ref: 1401/8. Reproduced with permission
of Canterbury Museum)
Ferry Road/Ferrymead Liquefaction Investigations 265
Chapter 12
Ferrymead Bridge /Ferry Road
Liquefaction Investigations
12.1Ferrymead Bridge
The following material is summarised from a docu-
ment entitled Ferrymead Bridge Lifelines Investiga-
tion - Initial Report, prepared by City Design, Christ-
church City Council in December 1996.
Background
Ferrymead Bridge (see Figure 12.1) was first flagged
as a lifelines hazard by Works Consultancy Services in
their hazard report prepared for the October 1994
Lifelines Workshop. Work then began on assessing the
impact of a major lifelines event on this structure and
its associated services as the bridge provides the only
link to Sumner for most of them.
Concurrent with this work on the Ferrymead Bridge all
Christchurch City Council controlled structures desig-
nated as a hazard in the October 1994 report were
prioritised for mitigation in terms of a Cost/Benefit
rating. That rating system, contained in the February
1994 Bridge Strengthening Programme Report, placed
the Ferrymead Bridge second behind the Durham
Street Overbridge.
Structural investigation work carried out thus far on the
performance of the Ferrymead Bridge during a seismic
event has shown that the structure and its services are
extremely vulnerable. The best mitigation option is to
replace the existing structure with a new one.
Traffic increases as a result of growth in the Sumner
area will require an additional two lanes to the bridge
within ten years and significant traffic alterations to the
intersection on the Sumner side of the bridge.
A likely scenario may be a parallel widening scheme
whereby a new structure that can withstand all lifelines
events is built upstream from the existing one. The
impetus for spending a considerable sum of money on
strengthening the existing structure is therefore lost as
H
u
m
p
h
r
e
y
s
D
r
iv
e
T
id
a
l
V
ie
w
FERRY
ROAD
C
h
a
rle
s
w
o
rth
S
tre
e
t
D
y
e
r
s
R
o
a
d
T
u
n
n
e
l
R
o
a
d
H
eat hcot e Ri ver
M
a
in
R
o
a
d
B
rid
le
P
a
t
h
R
o
a
d
E s t u a r y
Ferrymead
Bridge
N
Figure 12.1: Ferry Road/Ferrymead Bridge location
is the need for an immediate continuation of an inves-
tigation into strengthening options.
Nonetheless it is considered worthwhile to at least
record the work that has been done to date and then
resurrect this work when traffic options are more
advanced.
Introduction
The Ferrymead Bridge provides a vital link to Sumner
for transport (including a cycleway) and services.
Twenty-five thousand vehicles per day use the bridge
at present, with traffic flows increasing at faster than
average rates for the rest of the city due to the effect of
high growth in the Sumner area. The bridge carries all
the water, sewerage and telephone lines for Sumner.
The bridge is also a vital link in the overweight/
overwidth vehicle route for vehicles to and from the
port of Lyttelton. The bridge is shown in Figure 12.2.
Figure 12.2: The Ferrymead Bridge
The existing Ferrymead Bridge was built in 1967 to
replace an existing narrow structure. Based on Transit
New Zealands design criteria the life of a bridge is 100
years, which means for the Ferrymead Bridge a re-
maining life of at least 70 years. An investigation of
possible strengthening/mitigation options for the bridge
is therefore seen as worthwhile. Considerable effort
has therefore been put into analysing the possible
response of the existing structure to various hazard
events including earthquake shaking, tsunami and flood.
Structural Description
The Ferrymead Bridge is a continuous, three-span,
post tensioned arched beam structure. The L-shaped
abutments and the piers are piled. The piles are at least
10 metres long founded on rock at the Sumner end and
in sand at the city end. The piers have four tapered
columns, a pile cap and 16 prestressed concrete piles.
The columns are connected to the deck by steel dowels
and there are rubber bearing pads between the deck and
the columns. At the abutments there are hold down
bolts and rubber bearings. The deck, which spans
between the post-tensioned arched beams and interme-
diate transverse diaphragms, gives a honeycombed
appearance as shown in Figure 12.3. There are service
ducts on either side of the bridge under the footpaths.
On the downstream side the duct contains Telecom
services and the upstream duct contains two 300 mm
water mains. Other services run under the deck be-
tween the bearings and through the diaphragms.
Figure 12.3: Honey comb structure under the
Ferrymead Bridge
The deck was recently widened by 800 mm on the
downstream side to make room for a cycleway. The
approaches consist of filled embankments approxi-
mately three metres high.
Lifelines Hazards
Following the lifelines approach three events have
been considered, namely earthquake shaking, tsunami
and flood, initially all with a 150 year return period.
(The modern design code return period earthquake for
a structure of this type would be 1,000 years.) Follow-
ing a description of the events concerned, the potential
effects of these hazards are described.
Earthquake
Transverse and longitudinal shaking from a 150-year
return period earthquake is expected to produce shak-
ing intensities of between VIII and IX on the Modified
Mercalli Scale. This is likely to leave alternative routes
to and from Sumner via Evans Pass and Bridle Path
Road closed by slips. The bridge, should it survive,
would therefore provide the only available access to
Sumner. Leaving the community isolated.
Tsunami
Ferrymead Bridge is the only bridge affected by the
150 year return period tsunami event. A water level
three times above normal high water level is expected,
which equates to road level. Water velocity is given as
7 m/s or seven times the normal maximum flow rate.
This imparts an extremely large load onto the bridge
together with huge scour potential so a further search
was made to confirm whether or not the bore height and
water velocity were realistic.
Derek Todd of the Canterbury Regional Council was
able to confirm that the bore height and velocity used
in this investigation were realistic, but felt that the
return period was less certain and could be much
greater.
Flood
The maximum flood velocity is predicted as only
1 m/s compared to the 7 m/s for a tsunami generated
bore. Flooding is therefore not a critical hazard for this
structure and is not considered further.
Structural Analysis
The structural analysis was carried out in two stages.
Stage 1 involved calculating member strengths, trying
to determine a basic failure hierarchy, getting a feel
for the structure and assessing the need for a site
investigation to determine soil properties.
Stage 1 Structural Analysis
The effects of longitudinal and transverse earthquake
shaking were considered on the superstructure and
then on the piles. Calculations developed for trans-
verse earthquake load were then used to determine the
performance under tsunami loads.
Structural Performance Under Earthquake
Transverse Shaking
Calculation of member strengths led to the following
conclusions.
Pier columns will yield before the pile cap.
Pier columns will yield before the piles assuming
sufficient lateral soil strength.
The column shear strength is adequate to resist the
shear associated with column bending overstrength.
There is sufficient longitudinal column steel for
strength, though the bar spacing is greater than
allowable under NZS 3101:1995. Ductility is there-
fore a problem.
There is sufficient area of transverse confining
steel but the spacing is greater than allowable,
especially at the critical column/pile cap interface
causing a ductility problem.
Calculation of joint behaviour led to the following
conclusions:
The steel pin connection at the top of the pier
column is sufficient to fail the column in bending.
There is no pile cap steel within the area of the joint
within the pier column. Behaviour of this joint is
therefore difficult to predict. One way to restore
capacity is by post tensioning the pile cap.
The transfer of horizontal transverse load through
the hold down bolts and bearings at the abutments
is a complicated combination of shear, bending and
friction. The joint is not strong enough to transfer
the full code load earthquake force from the deck.
Sharing of the deck load between piers and abut-
ments requires a computer analysis and soil stiff-
ness properties to determine.
Horizontal transverse load transfers through the
abutment wall to the abutment piles and also to the
wingwalls. The interaction between the wingwalls
and the backfill and the piles and soil cannot be
determined without definitive soil properties and a
full computer analysis.
Structural Performance Under Earthquake
Longitudinal Shaking
To sustain longitudinal horizontal load passive resist-
ance of the soil behind the abutment wall is required
together with sufficient ductility in the pier columns to
withstand the displacement required to generate the
passive resistance. Flexibility in the abutment wall and
its supporting piles is also required.
Calculations of member strengths and relative stiffness
gave the following results:
Passive pressure behind the wall is sufficient to
resist full code earthquake forces.
The piles are flexible enough in bending to allow
sufficient rotation to enable generation of passive
pressure behind the abutment wall though whether
bending can take place or not may depend on the
soil stiffness, which can only be determined by soil
testing.
Shear capacity of the piles is not known as the
amount of transverse steel present is not shown on
the drawings.
Soil strength around the abutment piles should be
sufficient to sustain the seismic loads. CPT testing
is required to confirm this.
Capacity calculations for the pier column/pile joint
were inconclusive. The longitudinal bending capacity
of the pier columns and the piles is similar. The joint,
i.e. the pile cap, should be able to transfer the moments
and shears. Laboratory testing would help to confirm
joint behaviour and to provide a more accurate assess-
ment of column/pile capacities. Soil stiffnesses are
required to determine actual pile behaviour, together
with computer modelling.
Structural Performance Under Tsunami Loading
A tsunami has three effects: flotation, scour and trans-
verse force on the bridge.
Flotation
Flotation reduces the dead weight of the bridge to the
point where it can more easily be pushed sideways and
also reduces the effect of dead load on the post-
tensioned beams to the point where explosive failure is
possible. Mitigation possibilities are as follows:
(a) Strengthening the connection between the deck
and the abutment.
(b) Drilling holes in the honeycomb deck to allow air
to escape.
(c) Putting in place a contingency plan whereby trucks
can be placed on the deck to reduce post tensioning
compression stresses. (As the most likely origin of
a tsunami is South America there would be suffi-
cient time available to arrange this, but there may
be difficulty in persuading truck owners to put their
trucks at risk.)
Scour
Based on the effects of a tsunami which originated in
South America and reached New Zealand at the end of
last century, the river channel dimensions could be
expected to increase substantially though quantifying
this effect is complicated.
The bridge and its approaches form an impediment to
the flow. This further complicates any attempt at a
theoretical prediction. To properly quantify this prob-
lem a university model study is required.
Transverse Force
The expected force on the structure is related to the
square of the bore velocity, assumed equal to its maxi-
mum value of 7 m/s. This imparts a large force of
similar magnitude to a full code earthquake. The struc-
ture as it stands could not withstand this with collapse
at the piers a likely mode of failure. The exact nature of
the failure would depend on soil properties. A flexible
soil would result in pile failure. A stiff soil would result
in pier column failure. The abutment/deck connection
is also vulnerable.
Mitigation possibilities are to strengthen the abutment/
deck connection and to strengthen the piers by infilling
between the columns with concrete or cross bracing,
assuming that the piers are the weak link and not the
piles. Soil testing is required to determine this.
Conclusion From Stage 1 Structural Analysis
The abutment/deck connection can be improved and
pier column ductility can be improved, though there is
little point in doing this if the soil strength and stiffness
is such that failure occurs in or is transformed to, the
piles. Liquefaction potential is also a concern. A site
investigation was therefore required. Stage 2 of the
structural analysis could then proceed on the basis of
results from the site investigation and decisions could
be made as to what mitigation methods, if any, to use.
Stage 2 Structural Analysis
Site Investigation Results
The results of the site investigation are somewhat
alarming as the site is the most susceptible to seismic-
generated liquefaction so far found in Christchurch.
The reason for this is that the Heathcote River and its
predecessors have probably always entered the sea or
estuary at this site, as the rock headland of St Andrews
Hill will have held the outlet. The site has therefore
been subject to a long period of aggradation in shel-
tered tidal conditions. Such low-energy environments
are often identified with loose sediments and a lique-
faction hazard.
The implications of liquefaction for the structure are
severe. There are three problems with liquefaction;
loss of lateral support to the piles, approach embank-
ment settlement and lateral spreading. These problems
are discussed in the following sections.
Loss of Lateral Support To Piles
Liquefaction is predicted to a depth of up to ten metres
for the 150 year return period lifelines event. The actual
extent of liquefaction predicted depends on the method
used, but even the most conservative method still
predicts liquefaction sufficient to cause failure of the
piles in bending from transverse loading for the 150
year return period earthquake. Collapse is certain for
the design code 1 in 1,000 year return period earth-
quake. The question is, then, what minimum return
period earthquake would cause failure under trans-
verse loading? Further investigation of the site inves-
tigation results revealed that a 100 year event is still
likely to cause collapse.
Even a 30 year return period earthquake is predicted to
cause liquefaction of certain layers to over seven
metres depth at the Sumner end of the bridge; however,
with a much reduced seismic-generated horizontal
force accompanying this, the piles should remain capa-
ble of supporting the super structure.
Settlement
The bridge piles are not expected to settle as they are
founded on rock at the Sumner end and in firm sand at
the other, however the approaches are expected to
settle under 150 and 100 year return period earth-
quakes.
Approach settlement of one metre relative to the bridge
deck during the 150 year return period event is con-
ceivable. This is clearly an unsustainable situation for
services crossing the bridge. Settlement is also theo-
retically possible under a 30 year return period earth-
quake though this is considered unlikely due to the
mitigating influence of the approach overburden mate-
rial and the silty nature of the surface layer.
Accurately assessing the relationship between return
period and settlement is not possible.
Lateral Spreading
Lateral spreading is a phenomenon whereby liquefac-
tion of sand at or below bed level allows the embank-
ment to move over the liquefiable layer towards the
centre of the waterway. This can apply passive pres-
sures to abutment walls, piles and pier pile caps and is
also the cause of the very high approach embankment
settlement predicted. The site investigation showed
that this is the most likely cause of collapse of the
structure during seismic shaking.
Calculations carried out subsequent to the site investi-
gation show that the abutment piles would fail under
lateral spreading induced pressures for a 150 and a 100
year return period earthquake, but while a 30 year
return period earthquake may induce high stresses, it
should not cause failure. There is also a mitigating
effect of overburden pressure. As the amount of over-
burden increases the potential for liquefaction de-
creases. This is not enough to eliminate liquefaction
under the approach fills for 150 and 100 year events
and even theoretically for a 30 year return period event,
however Soils and Foundations feel that predicting
liquefaction for a 30 year event is overly conservative.
Liquefaction Probabilities
Given the dramatic predictions of damage as a result of
liquefaction from relatively low-return period earth-
quakes, it is interesting to consider some of the relevant
probabilities:
150 year event, or greater in the next 10 years; p =
7%.
30 year event, or greater in the next 10 years; p =
29%.
It has been 68 years since the last earthquake within
a 30 year return period or greater, p (30 year event
or greater not occurring for 68 years) = 10%.
The TNZ Bridge Design Code could stipulate a one
in 1,000 year earthquake to design for, for a new
structure at this site.
1,000 year event or greater in the next 10 years; p=
1%.
1,000 year event over bridge design life of 100
years; p = 9.5%.
Conclusion from Stage 2 Structural Analysis
The Ferrymead Bridge is extremely vulnerable to
seismic generated liquefaction. The critical element in
this case is the piles, though a definite mode of failure
could not be determined without a 3D computer analy-
sis. Column ductility and the deck/abutment connec-
tion could be improved, but with the probable mode of
failure being lateral spreading induced pile failure,
there seems little point in investigating strengthening
further.
However, one aspect that did require further investiga-
tion is the effect of liquefaction on the surrounding area
and the rest of Ferry Road in particular. With this in
mind a site investigation for Ferry Road was carried out
and the results and the implications for lifelines are
summarised in Section 12.2.
The behaviour under a tsunami load could be investi-
gated further. However, it was felt that as this event
carried with it so many uncertainties determining miti-
gation measures, it could await the outcome of propos-
als for traffic generated upgrades to the bridge and
proposals for services.
Services
The Ferrymead Bridge is packed with vital services for
the Sumner/Mt Pleasant area including water, sewer,
telecommunications, power and streetlighting. The
bridge provides the only link to the area for water,
sewerage and telecommunications (the main power
transmission lines run across the Port Hills).
Services Vulnerability Assessment
As previously mentioned, settlement of the approaches
during a seismic event with respect to the bridge deck
would cause rupture of the services at the abutment. A
tsunami may also disrupt services either by damaging
the bridge or by washing out the approaches. A major
flood is not expected to cause any damage to services.
Response Plans
Existing Services and their respective authorities pro-
jected response plans to date are as follows:
Water
Two 300 mm diameter water mains cross the bridge on
the upstream side in a service duct. Water Services
response plan is to have isolating valves on either side
of the bridge with 50 mm take-offs that hoses can be
connected and then strung across the river.
Sewers
Two pressurised sewer mains run under the centre of
the bridge, a 375 mm diameter AC pipe and a 150 mm
diameter AC pipe. West of the bridge the sewers are
gravity fed. The 375 mm diameter sewer is in need of
replacement as it is choking from the swelling effects
of hydrogen sulphide.
Waste Managements response plan is to allow the
sewage to discharge into the estuary (as would be the
case at any other structure in the city).
Telecommunication
The Telecom service consists of a fibre optic trunk line
that serves an exchange on the Mt Pleasant side of the
bridge, and a 4,000 pair cable that runs back across the
bridge to serve Woolston. A cellphone site on Mt
Pleasant is also accessed by lines across the bridge.
This is the only cellphone site located on the hills and
is therefore the site with the best coverage in Christ-
church and a site that could be important after a major
lifelines event should other services on the flat be
disrupted. There is also a VHF site on Mt Pleasant but
this does not require a link across the bridge to operate.
Telecoms response plan for the fibre optic trunk is to
replace it with an overhead line. This can be done fairly
quickly. The 4,000 pair cable however, could take
months to replace depending on priorities in other parts
of the city. Telecom expect half their response effort
after a lifelines event to be repairing damage caused by
other authorities in the course of their repair opera-
tions.
Power
An 11 kV service crosses the bridge along with
streetlighting and other minor cables. This is not the
main supply and is not so important.
Southpowers response plan is simply to replace any
damaged cables with overhead lines at this location.
Southpower are currently directing their lifelines ef-
forts at their substations, particularly those constructed
before 1964. Prior to strengthening they are capable of
withstanding only a 40 year return period earthquake.
It is hoped to improve their performance to enable
survival of at least a 150 year event.
Possible Mitigation Measures
Several mitigation measures have been proposed for
services in order to get around the problem at the
abutment/backfill interface, including finding an alter-
native route to Sumner and thrusting under the river
away from the bridge.
Thrusting
In August of 1996, Waste Management successfully
thrust a new 325 mm diameter sewer under the
Heathcote about 400 mm upstream from the Ferrymead
Bridge to service part of Mt Pleasant The cost was
approximately $1,000/m for the 200 m line. This does
not provide an alternative route for the lines across the
bridge as they connect into different systems, however
should the lines across the bridge be lost then a 500 m
overground line could be used as a temporary connec-
tion between the two systems.
There is also the possibility of a Telecom or power
service being laid inside a sewer line thrust under the
river. Watermains can be thrust directly.
The system uses a welded plastic pipe which is pulled
through a bentonite stabilised hole. The hole is made by
a reamer that is pulled through the hole as the thrusting
device is removed. Thrusting deep enough to avoid
tsunami-related scour is not a problem.
Automatic Shut - Off Valves
Another suggestion from Kobe for protecting water
stored in reservoirs from reticulation leaks/failures is
to install automatic shut-off valves, which are acti-
vated by seismic shaking. on some reservoirs. The
remaining reservoirs are left connected to the system to
provide water for fire fighting (work is already underway
on this).
Alternative Route
One of the keys to any service authoritys response
plans to any problem is diversity, an option not cur-
rently available in the case of Ferrymead Bridge. All
the service authorities are therefore very keen to ad-
dress this and, as a result, favour investigation of an
alternative route to Sumner from the Brighton Spit.
Transportation Issues
Sumner is a rapidly growing suburb and this together
with average projected traffic growth of 2% to 3% will
mean the bridge will require at least an extra two lanes
by the year 2003 to cope with an expected traffic flow
of 35,000 vpd. It may also be opportune to provide a
cycle crossing on the south side of the bridge as the
cycleway on the north side is difficult to access from
the south. This could have extremely important rami-
fications for retrofitting plans for the bridge.
The bridge currently carries 25,000 vpd. If this link was
lost, the traffic network model predicts that 18,000 vpd
would use Bridle Path Road and that the rest would use
Evans Pass. The additional travel costs of losing the
link are calculated as $69,000 per day. This figure is
important when considering benefits derived from
For example, should the bridge be only slightly dam-
aged and be able to be reopened within only two weeks,
the traffic related cost to the community is still a
million dollars.
This adds impetus to the argument for either replacing
the existing structure or building a new two-lane struc-
ture adjacent to the existing one, which will survive an
event intact and therefore maintain at least two open
lanes while the remains of the existing structure are
removed and a replacement structure built.
Traffic growth predictions also require consideration
of the Bridle Path/Ferrymead/Main Road/St Andrews
Hill intersection. This needs to be worked through.
There is another argument for providing a new bridge
from Sumner to the Brighton Spit. At a cost of five or
six million dollars, the idea seems initially to be folly,
however this route would provide an alternative emer-
gency access to Sumner and would also provide a
beneficial link in the network. Simply considering
traffic travel time benefits over 25 years, discounted
back to present values, the benefit is around 25 million
dollars. Including other costs and benefits compared to
a Do Minimum option, the Net Present Value of
benefits is nearly 40 million dollars.
Initially service authorities felt a bridge across the Spit
would provide a useful link for services, however it
was felt that services are best kept away from struc-
tures. The Spit Bridge idea will therefore be given
consideration from a traffic network perspective only
in the meantime and as provision of an emergency
access route following a lifelines disaster/event.
Interdependencies
The main interdependency regarding the Ferrymead
Bridge is the vehicle access required following an
event for the repair of services damaged by a tsunami
or an earthquake. In the case of a tsunami damaging the
bridge, alternative access is available along Bridle Path
Road or the hills. However, after a major seismic event
slips will have closed these two routes leaving the area
isolated, perhaps with some water left in reservoirs
should they have been fitted with shut-off valves but
with no access for equipment to repair reticulation
problems. The water services across the Causeway are
also vulnerable. Breaks are likely on other reclaimed or
filled areas around McCormacks Bay, which is unfor-
tunately very close to the two big reservoirs on Glenstrae
Road.
An earthquake significantly smaller than that required
to collapse the bridge could cause sufficient settlement
to sever all of the services. Maintaining traffic flow
while water, sewer, Telecom and power are simultane-
ously repaired will not be possible. Significant delay
costs are inevitable.
Summary
The Ferrymead Bridge is extremely vulnerable to
seismic generated liquefaction. The most likely cause
of failure is from lateral spreading causing failure of
the abutment and piles.
Some improvement to performance during transverse
and longitudinal shaking and tsunami effects may be
possible though this will require a computer analysis.
Planned traffic modifications may have a significant
impact on the future of the bridge.
Recommendations
(a) Await study of traffic options for the bridge, the
intersection and a Spit Crossing.
(b) Then investigate options for a new structure, wid-
ening the existing, strengthening the existing or a
combination.
12.2 Ferry Road
The following material is summarised from a Christ-
church City Council document entitled Ferry Road
Liquefaction - Sketch Report, prepared in October
1996.
The report covers the effect of liquefaction from a 150
year return period event on Ferry Road/Ferrymead and
its lifelines, from the Ferrymead Bridge to the Tunnel
Road Roundabout.
From site investigation soil test results, an assessment
was made of the impact on the various lifelines, those
of primary concern being the buried services (which
may float), the riverbank (which may suffer from
lateral spreading) and the general disintegration of the
road surface.
The investigation indicated a similar soil profile along
the length of Ferry Road in question with approxi-
mately two metres of interbedded silts and sands over-
laying sands (see Figure 12.4).
Lifelines in the Ferry Road/Ferrymead area are as
follows:
Transport Ferry Road carries 15,500 vehicles
per day and provides access for the local fire
station.
Sewers A 675 mm diameter foul sewer runs
under the centre of the carriageway, a small 150
mm diameter main runs part way along the northern
property boundaries and various lengths of
stormwater piping traverse the street.
Water A 300 mm diameter AC Main runs under
the southern side of the carriageway.
Telecommunications Twelve ducts run under
the northern footpath. There are 16 access man-
holes from the bridge to the roundabout.
Power Overhead powerlines run the length of
Ferry Road on the north side. On the southern side
underground cabling services the streetlights. Two
high voltage transmission lines supported by lattice
towers cross Ferry Road about halfway along the
section of road in question.
Streetlighting Streetlights run along the south-
ern side of Ferry Road and are supported by con-
crete poles and single outreach mastarms except at
the Tunnel Road end where the streetlights are
supported by the power poles on the north side.
Effects on Lifelines
Details of the expected effects of seismic-generated
liquefaction on services in Ferry Road/Ferrymead are
as follows.
Transport
Widespread liquefaction along the carriageway with
surface cracking and sand boils is expected. Close to
the Ferrymead Bridge and along the riverbank at the
Tunnel Road end severe damage is likely from lateral
spreading to the extent where the carriageway may
become as impassable. A response plan is therefore
required for restoring access to the fire station (which,
itself, may also be subject to damage). The fuel storage
tanks at the service station by the bridge are prime
candidates for flotation with consequent environmen-
tal damage and fire risk.
Sewers
Manholes and pipework are at risk from the effects of
flotation during liquefaction. Calculations show that
for the solid thick walled sewer manholes, many are in
fact more likely to sink than float. However, the pipe
itself is subjected to a considerable buoyancy load if
empty at the time, though mitigating this is the un-
known effect of the pipes concrete haunching. Some
displacement in plan can be expected adjacent to the
river due to lateral spreading.
The rubber ring joints will reduce the impact this has,
though experience from Northridge suggests that if
nothing else this area would be a good starting point
when looking for damage to pipework from a major
shake.
Lateral spreading and major ground rupture aside,
stormwater sewers are less likely to be affected by
liquefaction as they are relatively shallow and there-
fore above the liquefaction zone.
Water
Steel or AC water pipes when full of water have neutral
buoyancy and are not greatly affected by liquefaction
but they are affected by lateral spreading, particularly
as the watermain is the nearest underground service to
the river. The sidelines are quite likely to be damaged
at the joints to where there is a variation in the bare
material. Water Services response plan should take
into account probable loss of this section of the main.
Telecommunications
Manholes are the susceptible part of the Telecom
system. However, the liquefaction zone does not
extend to the surface and the buoyancy load can there-
fore be resisted by the dead weight of the manhole,
overburden and the shear strength of the ducts them-
selves.
Calculations in fact show that if anything the manhole
may tend to sink, with this tendency increased should
the assumed wall thickness of 150 mm be exceeded.
Resisting this tendency is the shear strength of the
ducts. Shear strength varies depending on the material
but with 12 ducts entering either side of each manhole
the Telecom manholes should in theory remain stable.
Power
Power poles are only considered susceptible should
they be subject to a lateral load from cables changing
1 2 3
D
e
p
t
h
(
m
e
t
r
e
s
)
C
P
T
2
B
o
r
e
L
o
g
C
P
T
2
L
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n
P
r
o
b
a
b
l
e
H
A
5
L
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n
P
r
o
b
a
b
l
e
H
A
6
L
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n
P
r
o
b
a
b
l
e
S
i
l
t
S
i
l
t
y
S
a
n
d
S
a
n
d
W
.
T
.
H
i
g
h
H
i
g
h
H
i
g
h
V
e
r
y
H
i
g
h
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x x
x x
x
x
x
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
T
i
m
b
e
r

o
r
C
o
n
c
r
e
t
e
P
o
w
e
r
P
o
l
e
S
e
w
e
r
t
o

3
.
9
5
I
n
v
e
r
t
1
.
9
4
m
T
e
l
e
c
o
m
C
o
n
c
r
e
t
e
S
t
r
e
e
t

L
i
g
h
t
P
o
l
e
Hum
p
h
re
y
s
D
riv
e
T
id
a
l
V
ie
w
F
E
R
R
Y
R
O
A
D
C
h
a
r l e
s
w
o
r t h
S
t r e
e
t
D y e r s R o a d
Tunnel
Road
H
e
a
t
h
c
o
t
e
R
i
v
e
r
M
a
i n
R
o
a
d
B
r i d
l e
P a t h
R o a d
E

s

t

u

a

r

y
H
A
6
H
A
5
C
P
T
1
H
A
4
C
P
T
2
H
A
3
H
A
2
H
A
1
F
e
r
r
y
m
e
a
d
B
r
id
g
e
T
e
s
t

S
i
t
e
s
(
2

t
e
s
t
s
)
L o c a t i o n
L i q u e f i a b l e L a y e r s
( m b e l o w g r o u n d )
S u s c e p t i b i l i t y
C o m m e n t s
C
P
T
1
1
.
2

-

1
.
8
l
o
w
1
.
8

-

2
.
2
m
o
d
-
l
o
w
2
.
2

-

4
.
0
m
o
d
5
.
2

-

5
.
8
m
o
d
C
P
T
2
1
.
2

-

2
.
4
h
i
g
h
2
.
4

-

3
.
8
l
o
w
3
.
8

-

4
.
4
m
o
d
5
.
6

-

6
.
6
m
o
d
H
A
1
1
.
0

-

1
.
5
m
o
d
1
.
5

-

2
.
0
l
o
w
2
.
0

-
v
e
r
y

l
o
w
H
A
2
1
.
0

-

1
.
5
m
o
d
1
.
5

-

3
.
0
l
o
w
H
A
3
1
.
5

-

2
.
0
h
i
g
h
2
.
0

-

2
.
5
m
o
d
2
.
5

-

3
.
0
l
o
w
H
A
4
1
.
5

-

1
.
8
h
i
g
h
1
.
8

-

2
.
5
l
o
w
H
A
5
1
.
0

-

2
.
0
v
e
r
y

h
i
g
h
2
.
0

-

3
.
0
h
i
g
h
H
A
6
2
.
0

-

3
.
0
h
i
g
h
W
a
t
e
r

t
a
b
l
e

a
p
p
r
o
x
i
m
a
t
e
l
y

2
m
.

S
o
i
l
s
a
b
o
v
e

2
.
2
m

h
a
v
e

h
i
g
h

s
u
s
c
e
p
t
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
i
f

w
a
t
e
r

t
a
b
l
e

h
i
g
h
.

P
r
o
x
i
m
i
t
y

t
o

r
i
v
e
r
b
a
n
k

w
i
l
l

r
e
s
u
l
t

i
n

l
a
t
e
r
a
l

d
i
s
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
t
.
T
e
s
t

p
r
o
b
a
b
l
y

i
n

f
i
l
l
,

C
P
T

f
r
o
m

b
r
i
d
g
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s

l
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

a
t

d
e
p
t
h
.
T
h
i
s

a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s

i
s

f
r
o
m

s
c
a
l
a

r
e
s
u
l
t
s

a
n
d
i
s

i
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
v
e

o
n
l
y
.
T
h
i
s

a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s

i
s

f
r
o
m

s
c
a
l
a

r
e
s
u
l
t
s

a
n
d
i
s

i
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
v
e

o
n
l
y
.
T
h
i
s

a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s

i
s

f
r
o
m

s
c
a
l
a

r
e
s
u
l
t
s

a
n
d
i
s

i
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
v
e

o
n
l
y
.
T
h
i
s

a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s

i
s

f
r
o
m

s
c
a
l
a

r
e
s
u
l
t
s

a
n
d
i
s

i
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
v
e

o
n
l
y
.
T
h
i
s

a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s

i
s

f
r
o
m

s
c
a
l
a

r
e
s
u
l
t
s

a
n
d
i
s

i
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
v
e

o
n
l
y
.
O
n
l
y

w
i
t
h

u
n
u
s
u
a
l
l
y

h
i
g
h

w
a
t
e
r

t
a
b
l
e
.
T
h
i
s

a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s

i
s

f
r
o
m

s
c
a
l
a

r
e
s
u
l
t
s

a
n
d
i
s

i
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
v
e

o
n
l
y
.
N
Figure 12.4: Summary of test results, location of tests and services locations for
Ferry Road site investigations
direction. Each power pole in this category needs to be
assessed on an individual basis.
The high voltage transmission lines which traverse
Ferry Road are supported by lattice towers. The critical
loading case for these structures is wind and they are
therefore unlikely to overturn as a result of seismic
loading. They are, however, quite heavy. Minor settle-
ment is therefore probable (assuming the foundations
are not piled).
There are also some cables underground though these
are relatively shallow and therefore less likely to be
directly affected by liquefaction.
Streetlighting
Concrete streetlighting poles extend further into the
ground than power poles and therefore further into the
liquefaction zone, to account for the overturning effect
of the streetlamp outreach arm and the weight of the
concrete pole. From previous earthquakes it is likely
that many of the streetlight poles will be left at odd
angles and require straightening.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The site investigation showed that for the 150 year
return period event the liquefaction risk though not as
great as the Ferrymead Bridge, is still significant.
Disruption to services, particularly in the area affected
by lateral spreading will be severe.
Conclusions/recommendations are as follows:
A response plan is required for Fire Station access
and for flotation of fuel storage tanks.
The sewer manholes and pipework are not at great
high risk except adjacent to the riverbank, where a
response plan is required.
Water pipes (assuming full of water) are only at risk
by the riverbank also, where total loss from lateral
spreading can be expected.
Telecom manholes being close to the surface and
on the north side of the street away from the river
are expected to perform satisfactorily.
Power poles are vulnerable if subject to lateral load.
This should be mitigated against where possible.
Streetlights are likely to get out of plumb.
Continuing Work 275
Chapter 13
Continuing Work
13.1 Introduction
The engineering lifelines work will continue in Christ-
church, and there are many activities that could be
undertaken. The following is a list of possibilities that
will be considered from time to time by the Steering
Committee with a view to having some projects under-
taken each year.
It is important to acknowledge that one of the continu-
ing benefits of an engineering lifelines project is the
inter-utility contact between persons who would be
required to work together in the coordination of their
work in the event of a major emergency. At least an
annual project/function will be required.
In the final session of the October Workshop in 1994
Dr David Hopkins, the External Reviewer, presented a
chart depicting the Lifelines process as set out below.
David Hopkins pointed out that the process is not a
lifeline it is a lifecycle.
Once the hazard has been determined and the
vulnerabilities assessed, the two together form the
risk.
It is then possible to postulate some mitigation to
deal with that risk.
The cost that may be required to deal with the risk
can be estimated but that is not the end of the
process.
It may also be necessary to analyse what would be
the response if nothing had been done. The method
of response may be so simple that no work is
actually necessary beforehand by way of mitiga-
tion.
However, each lifeline does not exist in isolation
and what has to be considered also is the interde-
pendence with other lifelines, i.e. the effect that a
lifeline or other lifelines may have one on another
has to be considered.
It is necessary also to look at the benefits of what is
proposed then to be sure that the work is cost
effective.
Initially this work is done on a very broad scale
which is what the project has done so far, but by far
most of the work that is undertaken as a result of the
lifelines project is not done in conjunction with
other services, but arises from an individual de-
tailed investigation of a service by that utility
owner. It is the follow-up of the project which
results in the mitigation measures.
Once an initial detailed assessment has been done,
unfortunately that is not the end of the process.
More information will be available in the future
regarding the hazards, the risks, the various new
materials and methods dealing with problems, so
the process continues until the diminishing returns
are such that it is no longer worthwhile doing
anything.
The chart is based on an earthquake hazard but is
appropriate for the other hazards.
All of the service authorities in Christchurch have now
been once round that cycle, many in an informal way,
but the opportunity is now for the full process to be
revisited. The following discussion addresses the is-
sues that arise in the future as possible work based on
the lifelines cycle.
13.2 Hazards
In all areas of natural process, there is always knowledge
to be discovered. The hazards in Christchurch are no
exception. Research in some areas is ongoing as part of
other programmes, particularly for the seismic hazard.
Earthquake hazard
The University of Canterbury and the Institute of
Geological and Nuclear Sciences (IGNS) have ongo-
ing research programmes investigating North Canter-
bury faulting, the magnitude and recurrence intervals
of movement on the alpine fault, and the nature of the
recent Arthurs Pass earthquakes. In fact a paper dealing
with the earthquake hazard in Christchurch produced
by D J Dowrick, K R Berryman, G H McVerry and J X
Zaho has been received in late 1997 and is yet to be
considered by the Hazards Group. It is obviously
worthwhile to attempt to resolve any ongoing differ-
ences in approach in relation to the extent and effects
of the hazard.
As part of their lifelines mitigation investigations, the
Christchurch City Council will soon have completed
in-situ testing for liquefaction potential at over 30 sites
in eastern Christchurch.
The Canterbury Regional Council is currently investi-
gating coordinating research in the region, collating
recent and current work and some details of this is set
out below. There is a need to revisit the seismicity
model for the region and Christchurch and this will also
assist to resolve current divergent opinions on the
probability of damaging seismic shaking.
In recognition of the earthquake threat to Canterbury,
and the Regional Councils statutory responsibilities,
the Canterbury Regional Council will complete the
first stage of a comprehensive Earthquake Hazard and
Risk Assessment study in 1997/1998. The long-term
programme will address the earthquake hazard itself,
the risks posed, possible mitigation options and mitiga-
tion implementation methods.
The general aim of the first stage of the study is to
determine the location, average return time and associ-
ated earthquake magnitudes caused by geological struc-
tures (such as active faults) capable of generating
moderate to large magnitude earthquakes.
Future stages of the programme will look at ground
shaking hazard, liquefaction and associated ground
damage, other related earthquake hazards such as slope
instability and tsunami. The final stage of the pro-
gramme will be a risk assessment and will include
estimates of potential damage and casualty estimates
for the main urban areas of the region.
Details of stage one of the study is set out below. (It is
important to note that the investigation is not limited to
the Christchurch Urban Area as is the current Christ-
church Engineering Lifelines Project.)
Aim of Study
The aim of Stage I of the study is to locate and
characterise the active geological structures in the
Canterbury region capable of generating moderate to
large earthquakes.
To achieve this aim the following tasks need to be
completed:
(1) Summarise the tectonic setting of the Canterbury
region with respect to the principal causes of earth-
quakes.
(2) Compile existing records of historical and instru-
mental seismicity in the Canterbury region.
(3) Compile existing information on active or poten-
tially active faults and other tectonic structures in
the Canterbury region and nearby (including off-
shore) that may impact on the region. This should
include information on:
(a) The location and known accuracy of location of
faults;
(b) The length of individual fault segments, the size
of past individual displacements, the frequency
and magnitude of past earthquakes associated
with these surface displacements, and the tim-
ing of the last event; and
(c) The location of tectonic structures (other than
faults) and if appropriate, the frequency and
magnitude of any past earthquakes associated
with these features, and the timing of the last
event.
(4) Undertake aerial photograph analysis in areas
where no existing data are available to determine
the location of active faults. Priority areas include
central and south Canterbury, and the area sur-
rounding the Culverden basin.
(5) Undertake a probabilistic hazard analysis using
the information from (2), (3) and (4) above to
determine the MM Intensity and peak ground
accelerations (PGA) for the main urban areas
(refer Section 3) for return periods of 50, 150, 500
and 1000 years.
(6) Define appropriate earthquake scenarios for Can-
terbury, or parts of, to be used in assessing future
ground shaking, liquefaction, slope failure and (if
appropriate) tsunami inundation studies. This
should involve obtaining a consensus among ap-
propriate experts.
(7) Identify future work that could be undertaken to
better understand the hazard from major large,
damaging earthquake sources in Canterbury region.
Other Hazards
Flood plain of the Avon, Heathcote and
Styx Rivers.
Since the initial Project, computer-based modelling
Continuing Work 277
has included the simulation of the extent, depth and
duration of flooding within the flood plains of the three
small coastal rivers Avon, Heathcote and Styx.
Various scenarios have been modelled including an
extreme event and the impact of the Waimakariri
River overflows.
It is intended that floodplain management strategies
will be adopted jointly by the Canterbury Regional
Council and the Christchurch City Council for imple-
mentation in their Annual Plans and Budget and City/
Regional Plans. As at July 1997 a strategy for the Styx
River had been adopted and adoption of strategies for
the Avon and Heathcote Rivers is intended by end of
1997.
The general thrust of the strategies is to recognise (and
protect if appropriate) existing ponding and floodplain
areas, have appropriate development rules, consider
the effects of rising sea levels and identify any neces-
sary special flood warning or emergency procedures.
These strategies apply generally not only to the engi-
neering lifelines. It is not anticipated that the more
detailed work since 1994 will be likely to require any
modification of the work on the lifelines.
Tsunami and Wind
The tsunami and wind scenarios have been reviewed
since 1994 and no further work is proposed at this stage
on them. The wind hazard was extended to include
comments on a cyclone hazard.
Biological, hazardous substances,
Vandalism/Terrorist
The Auckland Engineering Lifelines Project is consid-
ering a different range of hazards from those consid-
ered in the Christchurch area. Although it is obviously
not appropriate to consider a volcanic hazard for Christ-
church, there is some merit in considering some of the
other hazards under investigation in Auckland (i.e.
biological hazards, hazardous substances spill, vandal-
ism/terrorism) and it may be that these should also be
investigated for Christchurch.
13.3 Use of GIS
At the time of the original project it was considered that
for nearly all services the assessment of vulnerabilities
by an experienced person reviewing a map of the
service under consideration overlaid over the particu-
lar hazard was by far the best way of assessing
vulnerabilities. There are so many variables that have
to be taken into account, most of which are not readily
quantifiable, which means a computer analysis is not
only difficult but may not be worthwhile. However, in
the telecommunications assessment a considerable
amount of work was undertaken with the aid of a
computer.
Many of the utilities are involved in recording details
of their service electronically using Geographic Infor-
mation Systems (GIS). It would seem that when suffi-
cient records are available, and probably with the new
earthquake hazard information, it will be worthwhile
investigating vulnerabilities with the aid of GIS.
At the October 1994 Workshop Mr Ron Eguchi dem-
onstrated the then-current usage of a computer in the
cost assessment and prediction of damage in California
and sophisticated software is now available in New
Zealand. Depending on the extent of GIS usage in the
various services, it may be worthwhile to model/ana-
lyse the damaging effects on infrastructure using the
now available software. Set out below is the main
features of one suite of programmes which is available
and consideration should be given as to whether or not
each services wishes to undertake further investiga-
tions at this stage.
Opus International Consultants have provided the fol-
lowing information on Earthquake Loss Assessment
Analysis Developments
There are two main developments:
The use of Geographic Information Systems (GIS)
to process, store, analyse, retrieve and present
spacial data. GIS use is eminently suited to hazard,
asset, and risk data applications whereby hazards
(earthquake sources and characteristics, ground
conditions amplified shaking, liquefaction, land-
slip and fault movement); inventory (buildings,
lifelines, emergency services facilities); and de-
mography etc. are established as data layers
from which composite models can be established.
Hazard, loss, risk, analysis models and systems
based on data inputs from GIS layers and common
database systems (Lotus, Excel, Access, dBASE
etc.).
Thus there are now modelling/analysis capabilities to
specify a wide range of earthquake scenarios and to
forecast the damaging effects on infrastructure, esti-
mate damage repair costs, and to assess numbers of
displaced people, casualties etc.
Such analyses producing quantified damage estimates
are useful as a basis for risk management practices and
emergency preparedness. Models can be established
for specific intersets, e.g. roading, or telephone com-
munications, upon which to base business risk deci-
sions (mitigation by addition, replacement and retrofit
to appropriate design standards), preparedness plan-
ning (post event business continuity, emergency re-
sponse and recovery measures: Insurance provisions
etc.), or where multiple infrastructure facilities are
modelled then to then determine damage effects inter-
actions and interdependencies. For example damage
to water supply systems can be matched to residential
building property (non or low) damage areas and
emergency accommodation situations as a basis for
planning water provisions in emergency response.
The easier application of scenario based loss assess-
ments enables economical and effective studies of
various magnitude earthquakes from whatever loca-
tion to be used to suit the intended purpose. For
example emergency response planning may be better
set up upon a more frequent strong earthquake rather
than the very much less probable maximum probable
or extreme event. Such an approach presents response
and planning difficulties that are realistic, more within
the appreciation of the personnel involved, and are
more manageable, resulting in better and more serious
consideration.
The quantified loss assessment process is useful for
risk management decisions and preplanning and train-
ing exercises before an earthquake event, and is also
very useful immediately following an event where
either actual earthquake can be modelled to provide
the first estimates of levels and locations of damage to
be used as a basis for managing response activities.
It is clear that once hazard and infrastructure data
have been collected then the task is to undertake
analysis to determine the effects of events. The more
sophisticated the analysis, taking into account the
resolution and quality of data available, then the
higher the confidence in the analysis results. Where
there is doubt about the quality of any particular data
then opportunity should be taken to conduct sensitivity
analyses to show the outcome variations arising from
use of the data value range. Such multiple analyses are
more cost effective with good computer based method-
ologies.
Funded by the United States Federal Government
through the Federal Emergency Management Agency
and the National Institute of Building Science, such an
earthquake loss modelling system has been developed
with intended application to all US state, regional and
local governments use, initially for estimating re-
gional earthquake losses for emergency planning. Risk
Management Solutions (RMS) of California have de-
veloped the necessary computer systems and data
linkages for this Regional Loss Model (RLM).
Through a joint venture relationship between RMS and
Opus International Consultants (Opus) the RLM sys-
tem is to be made available for New Zealand applica-
tions over the next few months (by the end of 1997).
Application of the RLM system takes advantage of the
current establishment of the respective GIS data layers
to make loss assessments for particular or general
infrastructure facilities, producing maps of damage/
cost consequences and tabular output in database form
for subsequent analysis according to use.
13.4 Risk Balancing
As at August 1997 it is most likely that a Ph.D. student
will be working on a thesis based on Christchurch
engineering lifelines and this may well involve GIS
capability. The following is an extract from the pro-
posed thesis abstract.
The importance of lifelines to human civilisation is
significant such that any loss in lifelines can conse-
quently result in severe damage to the performance of
the community and its environment. The application of
proper risk management techniques for different natu-
ral or man-made hazards can provide good control of
risks that resolved many performance and economic
problems. The researcher on her review of literature
found out that there are no available performed studies
that employs easy-to-use and formal risk management
approaches that are applied to lifeline engineering and
its safety. The proposed study addresses risk manage-
ment for lifelines in easy to-use manner to identify the
probable hazards, vulnerability of lifelines, risk evalu-
ation and assessment; that eventually provide the
means to mitigate and control risks to lifelines. The
study will start by the case study of Christchurch as a
pilot study and later a generalised methodology is to be
developed.
The objective of the study is to provide a systematic
approach that supplies a step-by-step risk manage-
ment process that can be applied to existing and new
lifelines and incorporates risk balancing as guideline.
This intended guided risk management scheme shall
suffice for providing optimum mitigation measures
that can be applied to various risk situations, in order
to be utilised by the Government, Departments of
Conservation and Environment, regional or city coun-
cils and utilities in lifelines planning to minimise the
adverse effects of different risks. The expected time
span of this research is about three years.
13.5 Use of TCLEE Guide for
Review of Vulnerabilities
It is possible now to undertake a review of utilities
vulnerability to an earthquake hazard in light of check-
list lists produced by the Technical Council on Lifeline
Engineering (TCLEE). This could be easily achieved
and could be worthwhile. These lists reprinted from
Guide to Post-earthquake Investigations of Lifelines
Continuing Work 279
edited by Anshel J Schiff and published by TCLEE in
August 1991 may be worthwhile.
This guide to Post-earthquake Investigation of Life-
lines has included within it reference to a checklist for
possible damage to engineering services as a result of
an earthquake. A possible project could be the review
of the vulnerabilities assessed as part of the original
project using the checklists provided in the TCLEE
Report.
e.g. Anchorage checklist
Are the anchor bolts cast in place or expansion
anchors?
Can you identify the type or manufacturer of the
anchor?
What is their length of embedment?
What is their diameter?
How did they fail?
Did they pull out of concrete?
Is the concrete cracked? Is it in a tension zone?
Did fracture cones develop in the concrete?
Did the bolts stretch or pull out slightly so that they
are not tight?
Did the bolts break?
Is there any indication that they were installed
incorrectly?
What were the standards, if they existed, when the
equipment was installed?
How many bolts were there and how were they laid
out?
Did the bolt pass through a structural member in
the equipment framing?
Are there signs of distress in the equipment in the
region around the anchor bolt: cracked or chipped
paint, deformation of metal?
Does the equipment introduce a prying action to
the bolt?
Is the bolt hole appropriate to the bolt diameter?
Does the load path from the equipment frame to the
bolt or weld introduce flexibility in the anchorage
system?
What are the sources of loading on the anchorage:
equipment weight, height of centre of gravity, di-
mensions of the base of the equipment?
Were there loads applied through interconnections
to adjacent equipment?
Has the base of the equipment moved on its footing?
Is there a gap around the footing or equipment
pedestal indicating differential movement?
There are other checklists i.e.
equipment checklist;
power systems/power plant checklist;
power systems/substation checklist;
power equipment check list;
water systems checklist transmission and distri-
bution systems;
water systems checklist pumping facilities;
water systems checklist reservoirs;
water systems checklist ground water basins;
water systems checklist pressure reducing and
relief facilities;
water systems checklist treatment facilities;
water systems checklist treatment plant;
sewage systems checklist manholes;
sewage systems checklist sewers;
sewage system checklist treatment plant and
pump stations equipment;
sewage systems checklist treatment plant or
pump station structures;
airport checklist;
port checklist;
highway checklist roadway, bridge abutments,
bridge column/pier supports, bridge deck
communications checklist power room;
communications checklist rectifiers and distri-
bution panels;
communications checklist busbar;
communications checklist engine generators;
communications checklist distribution frame;
communications checklist switch room;
communications checklist transmission room;
communications checklist building facilities;
communications checklist data room;
gas and liquid fuel lifeline issues checklists;
tank checklist;
emergency power- backup batteries;
emergency power engine generators;
emergency power uninterruptable power
supply;
emergency power impact or lack of emergency
power.
Note: These checklists were prepared for post-earth-
quake investigations and as such are not strictly appro-
priate for a vulnerability analysis. However, they do
highlight the types of failures that have occurred in
previous earthquakes and should therefore be worth-
while to use in assessing installations prior to earth-
quakes.
The above summary of the checklists has been in-
cluded to indicate a possible method of reconsideration
of the vulnerability to the earthquake of the various
facilities, bearing in mind that it will be nearly four
years since the original investigation was undertaken.
It would be of value to revisit this area to ensure the
issues originally raised (or perhaps overlooked) are
considered by current staff.
It should be also important to consider whether in the
design of new facilities the vulnerabilities and mitiga-
tion measures identified are being built into new de-
signs and the currently used design codes take into
account the earthquake hazard, particularly to the equip-
ment rather than the traditional design where the build-
ing codes often were the only considerations in consid-
ering vulnerability to earthquake.
13.6 Underground Services
Damage Research
It is relatively easy to assess vulnerability of above-
ground structures when sufficient is known regarding
the ground conditions, but much more difficult to
assess the damage to underground services. The Wel-
lington Project acknowledged this and established a
subgroup of its Civil Services and Gas Task Group to
investigate pipelines. The Christchurch project is in-
debted to that group for their investigations. It is noted
however, that although considerable effort and re-
sources have been expended in New Zealand on re-
search into the earthquake resistance of buildings and
bridges, and particularly components of reinforced
concrete, structural steel and timber, little or no re-
search has been carried out on responsive pipelines.
More work is required in this area.
From a review of the literature it is quite apparent that
the identification of potential ground failure areas
represents a critical step in assessing the earthquake
vulnerability of underground pipes. There are factors,
such as pipe material and joints that also affect the
performance of underground pipes, but to a lesser
extent.
From observation of the earthquake effects in Kobe it
is quite apparent that considerable damage can be
expected in Christchurch in the areas subject to lique-
faction and very much more information is required
regarding the potential for this to assist in evaluating
the economics of replacing underground pipes. At this
stage it seems that an awareness of the factors affecting
underground pipe failures is important in design con-
siderations and for new piping work the vulnerability
to damage must be considered.
Further work on appropriate design codes should be
one of the outcomes of a lifelines investigation in
Christchurch and perhaps New Zealand-wide and un-
dertaking the initial work on such a code would be an
excellent project for Christchurch.
The Christchurch City Council Design Manual for
drainage, pipework and waterways is currently being
updated and will include deliberate reference to lifeline
considerations.
13.7 Critical Areas and Critical
Buildings
Although Christchurch, because of its topography,
does not have the same number of critical areas as
Wellington, or some of the more hilly cities, one such
area is already under investigation the Ferrymead
bridge area. There are others and a multi-utility inves-
tigation should be undertaken on these.
Likewise, there are some critical buildings, some of
which have already been identified. However, consid-
eration should not only be given to ways of maintaining
services to those in an emergency, but to others such as
banks and industries that will be very vital in the
recovery after an emergency.
13.8 Interdependencies
Elsewhere in this section is reference to the
interdependencies between the various utilities in-
volved in restoration of services following an emer-
gency.
Continuing Work 281
This subject has proved to be extremely difficult to deal
with in detail although the project and the work of the
Task Groups has highlighted the fact that the services
are most often dependent on others for their satisfac-
tory operation.
One of the main factors in interdependencies is the time
taken to restore a particular service with it being
accepted that underground pipe services will prove to
be the most time-consuming in restoration. Notwith-
standing the difficulties however, more work should be
done in attempting to develop mitigation opportunities
across the various utilities.
The 1993 Wellington Project presented a Case Study
which may be a suitable model for a similar investiga-
tion in Christchurch. However, it probably has to be
accepted that the co-location of the various representa-
tives from the utilities in the event of an emergency will
probably achieve, on the day, the best coordination.
What has not been determined is what would be the
best preparation for this coordination. It is therefore
suggested that a combined exercise for the utilities
would be most worthwhile.
13.9 Combined Exercise/
Response Plans
The advent of the new Emergency Management Groups
proposed in the Emergency Services Review currently
(1997) being undertaken may assist in coordination but
in the meantime the Controllers Advisory Group for
the Regional Controller in the event of a declared Civil
Defence Emergency undertakes much of the same role.
The Engineer for a Civil Defence Emergency (at
present the Director of Operations Christchurch City
Council) has the coordination responsibility to advise
the Regional Controller.
Previous Civil Defence exercises have tended to focus
on the operation of the various headquarters dealing
with welfare response needs but it would be appropri-
ate to arrange a lifelines emergency exercise. Arising
from this exercise would be a better understanding of
interdependencies and it may be that mitigation plans
will arise.
A possible method of approach in producing response
plans is for each utility to address response planning in
three phases:
Initial actions
activation
identification of damage to the hierarchy of
the service
assessment of the status of the service in
relation to key customers
Recovery of basic service
prioritising of a repair programme
alternatives for service
resource allocation
Restoration programme
13.10 Mutual Aid Agreements
Elsewhere reference is made to mutual aid agreements
in the water and waste water fields which are being
developed nationally and it would be worthwhile at-
tempting to develop these in the other utilities. (Some
utilities are already nationwide but others are not
some organisations have already made arrangements
in advance.)
13.11 Internet
With the increasing use of the Internet, consideration
should be given to putting lifelines information onto
the Internet, provided it can be kept up-to date. Consid-
eration should be given to establishing a small Task
Group to investigate this proposal.
13.12 Risk Management
Seminar
Since the Christchurch Engineering Lifelines Project
first began there has been an increased understanding
of the fact that the lifelines investigation is really only
part of responsible risk management. Consideration
should be given to putting together a Risk Management
Seminar focusing particularly on lifelines in the Christ-
church area. We are particularly fortunate to have
Professor David Elms of the University of Canterbury
and Janet D Gough of Lincoln University resident in
the Christchurch area. Both are acknowledged experts
on risk management and they would be able to contrib-
ute most usefully. Professor Elms will be the supervi-
sor for the Ph.D. thesis mentioned above and Janet
Gough has particular expertise in relation to the com-
munity perception of risk which may well be advanced
if the suggestion of involvement with a social scientist
is progressed as is suggested in the next paragraph.
Any such seminar should address the processes as set
out in the Australian/New Zealand Standard Risk
Management AS/NZS 4360:1995 which was pro-
duced after the 1994 workshop. The project generally
followed the methods set out in the Standard.
13.13 Review Project with
Social Scientist
Mr Ron Eguchi, the invited reviewer from California
suggested in the final session of the October 1994
Workshop that it would be worthwhile attempting to
have the Project reviewed using a social scientist. This
is an acknowledgment that the engineering decision-
makers involved in the Lifelines work are in effect
making decisions on behalf of the community without
reference to the community. In the Workshop it was
submitted that the community should be formally
consulted but the magnitude of this task is formidable.
The suggestion then for a review of the various deci-
sions required and made by the Engineers in the project
may result in a better response to meet the needs of the
community. Dr David Hopkins the external reviewer
in his final summing up of the Workshop made the
point that the participants in the Project as Engineers
were obligated as professionals to have undertaken the
work in a thoroughly professional way. This will mean
that the inevitable post-emergency review of the deci-
sions taken both in preparation and response will be
defensible.
13.14 Task Group Meetings
One of the very significant benefits in the project work
was the grouping together of various utility representa-
tives with dissimilar working interests to produce the
Task Group reports and act as peer reviewers in the
work of others. As a result of the project, very useful
contacts were made in preparation, as it were, for a
major emergency requiring the various utilities to work
together. It is important that these contacts are not lost
and as staff move into different positions the current
staff still know their counterparts in other organisa-
tions. One method of maintaining these contacts is by
the group as a whole attempting a project across all of
the utilities at least annually (since the completion of
the project various utility representatives have been
working together on the Ferrymead problem). How-
ever, if a major project is not adopted then at least
annual task group meetings to review progress in the
previous year would be worthwhile.
It is intended that with the publication of this book the
Task Group Chairmen will call together their various
Task Groups to consider possible future work.
13.15 Promulgation
With the publishing of this book, it is timely to refer to
one of the original objectives of the project being: To
communicate the issues to people involved in the
management of these services and to raise the aware-
ness of the public to their importance.
Bearing in mind that the decision makers of the utilities
have to be aware of the issues involved, it will be
appropriate to visit the various Committees and /or
Boards of Directors of the various utilities to present
the findings of the Project and obtain a continuing
commitment to the ongoing work.
13.16 National Forum
On 22 October 1997 it is intended that a National
Forum for representatives of lifelines groups be held
and it is hoped that this will be the first of many such
meetings.
It is hoped that representatives from current or pro-
posed lifeline groups from Auckland, Waikato, Hawkes
Bay, Wairarapa, Wellington, Christchurch, Timaru,
Dunedin, Southland and the Ministry of Civil Defence
will participate. As one of the prime movers in this
group it is intended that Christchurch will continue a
national involvement. Already through the association
with the Wellington group it was possible for Christ-
church people to take part in investigations following
earthquakes in Northridge and Kobe.
Some of the items for discussion at the first Forum are
Guidelines for the process what is required?
Knowledge sharing.
List of contacts ( both in New Zealand and over-
seas).
Funding approaches and strategies.
Implications of the new Ministry of Civil Defence
for lifelines groups.
The Christchurch Group should, if requested, provide
support to other groups, in the same way as it has
worked with Wellington and Auckland.
13.17 Summary
Dr. David Hopkins in his final summary of the 1994
Workshop drew attention to the need to remember that
the whole engineering lifelines process was aimed at
Value for money through engineering. This means
making the best possible use of available information
and technology so that no matter when the earthquake
occurs, we can look back at money well spent on
reducing earthquake risk to lifelines. This will apply
for all hazards.
Maps 283
Map Limitations
For the siesmic hazard maps, zone boundaries have been determined from geological maps of
the area. These in turn are derived largely from borelog information from about 15,000 sites in
the Christchurch area. Of these, the majority are shallow (less than 3 m deep), and are often
concentrated in particular areas (e.g. the central city). The boundaries between soil types is
therefore frequently ill-defined, particularly with increasing depth. In places the boundaries can
be moved two or three hundred metres to either side, and still fit the available data.
The accuracy of the hazard zone boundaries is even less than for the soil type boundaries as these
relate to the complex 3-dimensional changes in soil types beneath the city. For any critical
structure, a specific site study is needed to determine the actual degree of hazard.
Maps
Reference list for colour maps
Map 1: Seismic Hazard Location of Emergency Services and Major Contractors Yards
284
Map 2: Waimakariri River Floodplain Location of Emergency Services and Major
Contractors Yards
285
Map 3: Local Rivers Floodplain Location of Emergency Services and Major
Contractors Yards
286
Map 4: Tsunami Hazard
287
Map 5: Slope Hazard Zones Hill Areas
288
Map 6: Seismic Hazard Transport System Network
289
Map 7: Bridge Vulnerability
290
Map 8: Slope Hazard Transport System Locality Plan
291
Map 9: Seismic Hazard Telecom Cables
292
Map 10: Local Flooding Hazard Telecom Cables
293
Map 11: Tsunami Hazard Telecom Cables
294
Map 12: Waimakariri Flooding Hazard Telecom Cables
295
Map 13: Seismic Hazard Fire Services
296
Map 14: Seismic Hazard Police Radio Services
297
Map 15: Seismic Hazard Electricity Network
298
Map 16: Electricity Network
299
Map 17: Seismic Hazard Broadcasting Services
300
Map 18: Seismic Hazard Stormwater System
301
Map 19: Seismic Hazard Foulwater Sewer and Pressure Mains
302
Map 20: Seismic Hazard Water Services (Major Pipelines in Metropolitan Area)
303
Map 21: Seismic Hazard Petroleum Products
304
Map 1: Seismic Hazard - Location of Emergency Services and Major Contractors Yards
H
E
A
T
H
C
O
T
E
A
V
O
N
D
U
D
L
E
Y
C
R
E
E
K
S
T
Y
X
W
A
I M
A
K
A
R
I R
I
E
S
T
U
A
R
Y
W
IG
R
A
M
A
IR
P
O
R
T
C
H
R
IS
T
C
H
U
R
C
H
IN
T
E
R
N
A
T
IO
N
A
L
A
IR
P
O
R
T
(
H
A
R
E
W
O
O
D
)
N
3
k
m
2
1
0
1
P
O
R
T
O
F
L
Y
T
T
L
E
T
O
N
G
O
V
E
R
N
O
R
S
B
A
Y
C
O
R
S
A
IR
B
A
Y
E
x
t
e
n
t

o
f

D
e
t
a
i
l
e
d
E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e

H
a
z
a
r
d

S
t
u
d
y

A
r
e
a
P
l
e
a
s
e

n
o
t
e

t
h
e

l
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s

o
f

t
h
i
s

m
a
p
,

a
s

o
u
t
l
i
n
e
d

o
n

p
a
g
e

2
8
3
T
R
A
V
IS
R
O
A
D
P
A
G
E
S
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
W
IN
T
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
J
O
H
N
S
R
O
A
D
M A I N N O R T H R O A D
R U S S L E Y R O A D
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L A
V
E
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
O
A
D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
M
A
I N
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
ROAD TUNNEL
S
H
A
K
I
N
G

Z
O
N
E
S
L
I
Q
U
E
F
A
C
T
I
O
N

Z
O
N
E
S
Z
O
N
E
1
Z
O
N
E
2
Z
O
N
E
3
Z
O
N
E
2
A
Z
O
N
E
2
B
Z
O
N
E
3
A
Z
O
N
E
3
B
B
e
d
r
o
c
k
a
t s
h
a
llo
w
d
e
p
th
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
II-
V
ii
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
le
s
s
th
a
n
5
0
m
d
e
e
p
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
II
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
5
0
-
8
0
0
m
d
e
p
th
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
III-
IX
, h
ig
h
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
o
f g
r
o
u
n
d
m
o
tio
n
.
W
ith
in
Z
o
n
e
3
th
e
r
e
w
ill b
e
a
r
e
a
s
o
f p
r
o
n
o
u
n
c
e
d
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
a
n
d
in
te
n
s
ity
IX
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
0
-
3
0
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
1
0
-
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
-
-
3
0
%
fo
Z
o
n
e
3
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
1
0
-
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
3
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
S
E
I
S
M
I
C

K
E
Y
I
M
P
O
R
T
A
N
T

N
O
T
E
1
.

T
h
e

Z
o
n
e

b
o
u
n
d
a
r
i
e
s

o
n

t
h
i
s

m
a
p

a
r
e

a
p
p
r
o
x
i
m
a
t
e

o
n
l
y
.

A
c
c
u
r
a
c
y

c
a
n

v
a
r
y

f
r
o
m

2
0
m

i
n

a

f
e
w

a
r
e
a
s

w
i
t
h

c
l
o
s
e
d

s
p
a
c
e
d

b
o
r
e
l
o
g
s

t
o

3
0
0
m

i
n

a
r
e
a
s

w
i
t
h

f
e
w

w
i
d
e
l
y

s
p
a
c
e
d

b
o
r
e
l
o
g
s
.
2
.

F
o
r

i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t

s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
s

a

s
i
t
e

s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c

s
t
u
d
y

i
s

n
e
e
d
e
d

t
o

a
c
c
u
r
a
t
e
l
y

d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e

t
h
e

s
o
i
l

p
r
o
f
i
l
e
,

t
h
e

d
e
g
r
e
e

o
f

l
i
k
e
l
y

s
h
a
k
i
n
g
,

a
n
d

t
o

a
s
s
e
s
s

t
h
e

l
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

h
a
z
a
r
d
.
S
O
U
R
C
E
S
D
e
t
a
i
l
e
d

E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e

S
t
u
d
y

A
r
e
a
:
-

T
h
e

E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e

H
a
z
a
r
d

i
n

C
h
r
i
s
t
c
h
u
r
c
h

E
l
d
e
r

e
t

a
l

(
E
Q
C
)

1
9
9
1
A
r
e
a

N
o
r
t
h

o
f

d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d

S
t
u
d
y

A
r
e
a
:
-

W
a
t
e
r

W
e
l
l

D
a
t
a

S
h
e
e
t

S
7
6
/
7
-
8

B
e
l
f
a
s
t

-

S
t
y
l
e

B
r
o
w
n

N
Z
G
S

1
9
7
5

W
a
t
e
r

W
e
l
l

D
a
t
a

S
h
e
e
t

S
7
6
/
4
-
5

K
a
i
a
p
o
i
-
K
a
i
r
a
k
i

B
r
o
w
n

N
Z
G
S

1
9
7
6

E
M
E
R
G
E
N
C
Y

K
E
Y
P
R
I
M
A
R
Y

R
O
U
T
E
M
A
J
O
R
A
R
T
E
R
I
A
L

R
O
A
D
/
M
I
N
O
R
A
R
T
E
R
I
A
L

R
O
A
D
/
L
O
C
A
L

D
I
S
T
R
I
B
U
T
O
R

R
O
A
D
R
A
I
L
W
A
Y
F
I
R
E

S
T
A
T
I
O
N
P
O
L
I
C
E
H
O
S
P
I
T
A
L
C
I
V
I
L

D
E
F
E
N
C
E

S
E
C
T
O
R

H
.
Q
.
C
I
T
Y

C
O
U
N
C
I
L

S
E
R
V
I
C
E

C
E
N
T
R
E
C
O
N
T
R
A
C
T
O
R
S
Y
A
R
D
S
Maps 285
Map 2: Waimakariri River Floodplain Location of Emergency Services and Major Contractors Yards
H
E
A
T
H
C
O
T
E
A
V
O
N
D
U
D
L
E
Y
C
R
E
E
K
S
T
Y
X
W
A
I M
A
K
A
R
I R
I
F
L
O
O
D
P
L
A
I
N
K
E
Y

E
M
E
R
G
E
N
C
Y

K
E
Y
P
R
IM
A
R
Y
R
O
U
T
E
M
A
J
O
R
A
R
T
E
R
IA
L
R
O
A
D
/
M
IN
O
R
A
R
T
E
R
IA
L
R
O
A
D
L
O
C
A
L
D
IS
T
R
IB
U
T
O
R
R
O
A
D
R
A
IL
W
A
Y
F
IR
E
S
T
A
T
IO
N
P
O
L
IC
E
H
O
S
P
IT
A
L
C
IV
IL
D
E
F
E
N
C
E
S
E
C
T
O
R
H
.Q
.
C
IT
Y
C
O
U
N
C
IL
S
E
R
V
IC
E
C
E
N
T
R
E
C
O
N
T
R
A
C
T
O
R
S
Y
A
R
D
S
T
R
A
V
IS
R
O
A
D
P
A
G
E
S
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
ROAD TUNNEL
W
IN
T
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
J
O
H
N
S
R
O
A
D
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L A
V
E
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L R
O
A
D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
M
A
I N
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
G
O
V
E
R
N
O
R
S
B
A
Y
C
O
R
S
A
IR
B
A
Y
E
S
T
U
A
R
Y
W
IG
R
A
M
A
IR
P
O
R
T
C
H
R
IS
T
C
H
U
R
C
H
IN
T
E
R
N
A
T
IO
N
A
L
A
IR
P
O
R
T
(
H
A
R
E
W
O
O
D
)
N
3
k
m
2
1
0
1
P
O
R
T
O
F
L
Y
T
T
L
E
T
O
N
Map 3: Local Rivers Floodplain Location of Emergency Services and Major Contractors Yards
H
E
A
T
H
C
O
T
E
A
V
O
N
D
U
D
L
E
Y
C
R
E
E
K
S
T
Y
X
W
A
I M
A
K
A
R
I R
I
F
L
O
O
D
P
L
A
I
N
K
E
Y

E
M
E
R
G
E
N
C
Y

K
E
Y
P
R
IM
A
R
Y
R
O
U
T
E
M
A
J
O
R
A
R
T
E
R
IA
L
R
O
A
D
/
M
IN
O
R
A
R
T
E
R
IA
L
R
O
A
D
L
O
C
A
L
D
IS
T
R
IB
U
T
O
R
R
O
A
D
R
A
IL
W
A
Y
F
IR
E
S
T
A
T
IO
N
P
O
L
IC
E
H
O
S
P
IT
A
L
C
IV
IL
C
O
U
N
C
IL
S
E
R
V
IC
E
C
E
N
T
R
E
C
IT
Y
C
O
U
N
C
IL
S
E
R
V
IC
E
C
E
N
T
R
E
C
O
N
T
R
A
C
T
O
R
S
T
R
A
V
IS
R
O
A
D
P
A
G
E
S
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
ROAD TUNNEL
W
IN
T
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
J
O
H
N
S
R
O
A
D
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L A
V
E
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L R
O
A
D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
M
A
I N
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
G
O
V
E
R
N
O
R
S
B
A
Y
C
O
R
S
A
IR
B
A
Y
E
S
T
U
A
R
Y
W
IG
R
A
M
A
IR
P
O
R
T
C
H
R
IS
T
C
H
U
R
C
H
IN
T
E
R
N
A
T
IO
N
A
L
A
IR
P
O
R
T
(
H
A
R
E
W
O
O
D
)
N
3
k
m
2
1
0
1
P
O
R
T
O
F
L
Y
T
T
L
E
T
O
N
Maps 287
Map 4: Tsunami Hazard
H
E
A
T
H
C
O
T
E
A
V
O
N
D
U
D
L
E
Y
C
R
E
E
K
S
T
Y
X
W
A
I M
A
K
A
R
I R
I
E
S
T
U
A
R
Y
W
IG
R
A
M
A
IR
P
O
R
T
C
H
R
IS
T
C
H
U
R
C
H
IN
T
E
R
N
A
T
IO
N
A
L
A
IR
P
O
R
T
(
H
A
R
E
W
O
O
D
)
N
3
k
m
2
1
0
1
P
O
R
T
O
F
L
Y
T
T
L
E
T
O
N
T
S
U
N
A
M
I

H
A
Z
A
R
D
I
N
U
N
D
A
T
I
O
N

F
R
O
M

B
E
A
C
H

O
V
E
R
T
O
P
P
I
N
G
I
N
U
N
D
A
T
I
O
N

F
R
O
M

E
S
T
U
A
R
Y
C
O
M
B
I
N
E
D

I
N
U
N
D
A
T
I
O
N

F
R
O
M

B
E
A
C
H

&

E
S
T
U
A
R
Y
I
N
U
N
D
A
T
I
O
N

O
F

L
Y
T
T
E
L
T
O
N

P
O
R
T
Map 5: Slope Hazard Zones Hill Areas
L
I
N
W
O
O
D

A
V
E
R
O
A
D
T
U
N
N
E
L
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L

R
O
A
D
C
O
R
S
A
I
R
B
A
Y
G
O
V
E
R
N
E
R
S
B
A
Y
P
A
G
E
S
R
O
A
D
H
E
A
T
H
C
O
T
E
A
V
O
N
E
S
T
U
A
R
Y
W
I
G
R
A
M
A
I
R
P
O
R
T
P
O
R
T

O
F

L
Y
T
T
L
E
T
O
N
N
3
k
m
2
1
0
1
S
l
o
p
e

H
a
z
a
r
d

Z
o
n
e
s

w
i
t
h

r
e
s
p
e
c
t

t
o

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
Z
o
n
e

1
:
L
o
w

r
i
s
k
.

L
i
k
e
l
y

d
a
m
a
g
e
s

t
o

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

n
e
g
l
i
g
i
b
l
e
.
Z
o
n
e

2
:
M
o
d
e
r
a
t
e

r
i
s
k
.

L
i
k
e
l
y

d
a
m
a
g
e

m
a
y

a
f
f
e
c
t

1
0
%

t
o

2
0
%

o
f

a
r
e
a
,
n
o
r
m
a
l
l
y

w
h
e
r
e

Z
o
n
e

2

i
s

c
l
o
s
e
s
t

t
o

Z
o
n
e

3
.

A

s
i
m
i
l
a
r

p
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n

(
1
0
%

t
o

2
0
%
)

o
f

r
o
a
d
s

a
n
d

o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

c
o
u
l
d

b
e

a
f
f
e
c
t
e
d
.

F
o
r

b
u
r
i
e
d

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

d
a
m
a
g
e

i
s

l
i
k
e
l
y

t
o

o
c
c
u
r

o
n
l
y

f
r
o
m

u
n
d
e
r
m
i
n
i
n
g

o
r

d
e
e
p
-
s
e
a
t
e
d

f
a
i
l
u
r
e

r
e
d
u
c
i
n
g
t
h
e

e
x
t
e
n
t

o
f

d
a
m
a
g
e

t
o

5
%

t
o

1
0
%

o
f

s
e
r
v
i
c
e

l
e
n
g
t
h
.
Z
o
n
e

3
:
H
i
g
h

r
i
s
k
.

L
i
k
e
l
y

d
a
m
a
g
e

m
a
y

a
f
f
e
c
t

u
p

t
o

4
0
%

o
f

a
r
e
a
.

A

s
i
m
i
l
a
r

p
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n

o
f

t
h
e

l
e
n
g
t
h

o
f

r
o
a
d
s

a
n
d

o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
c
o
u
l
d

b
e

a
f
f
e
c
t
e
d
.

O
n
c
e

a
g
a
i
n
,

b
u
r
i
e
d

s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s

a
r
e

l
i
k
e
l
y

t
o

s
u
f
f
e
r

l
e
s
s

d
a
m
a
g
e
,

s
a
y

1
0
%

t
o

2
0
%

o
f

s
e
r
v
i
c
e

l
e
n
g
t
h
.
S
lo
p
e

H
a
z
a
r
d

Z
o
n
e

1
S
lo
p
e

H
a
z
a
r
d

Z
o
n
e

2
S
lo
p
e

H
a
z
a
r
d

Z
o
n
e

3
S
l
o
p
e

H
a
z
a
r
d

K
e
y
Maps 289
Map 6: Seismic Hazard Transport System Network
H
E
A
T
H
C
O
T
E
A
V
O
N
D
U
D
L
E
Y
C
R
E
E
K
S
T
Y
X
W
A
I M
A
K
A
R
I R
I
E
S
T
U
A
R
Y
W
IG
R
A
M
A
IR
P
O
R
T
C
H
R
IS
T
C
H
U
R
C
H
IN
T
E
R
N
A
T
IO
N
A
L
A
IR
P
O
R
T
(
H
A
R
E
W
O
O
D
)
3
k
m
2
1
0
1
P
O
R
T
O
F
L
Y
T
T
L
E
T
O
N
C
O
R
S
A
IR
B
A
Y
E
x
t
e
n
t

o
f

D
e
t
a
i
l
e
d
E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e

H
a
z
a
r
d

S
t
u
d
y

A
r
e
a
N
P
l
e
a
s
e

n
o
t
e

t
h
e

l
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s

o
f

t
h
i
s

m
a
p
,

a
s

o
u
t
l
i
n
e
d

o
n

p
a
g
e

2
8
3
R
5
0
1
T
5
0
1
R
5
0
2
T
7
0
1
R
4
1
3
T
4
0
1
T
7
0
2
R
4
1
1
R
4
1
2
R
1
0
1
R
1
0
2
R
1
0
6
R
1
0
8
R
1
0
3
R
1
0
4
R
8
0
6
R
8
0
1
R
2
0
1
T
2
0
1
R
2
0
2
F
2
0
1
R
2
0
3
T
7
1
0
T
7
1
1 T
7
1
2 T
7
1
3
R
2
0
5
R
2
1
3
R
2
1
4
R
2
1
7
R
2
1
8
R
8
0
4
R
2
1
9
R
2
2
0
R
2
2
1
T
7
0
2
T
7
0
6
T
7
0
5
T
7
0
3
T
7
0
4
R
7
0
5
T
7
0
7
T
7
0
9
T
7
0
8
R
1
3
1
R
1
4
6
R
1
2
5
R
1
6
1
R
1
4
9
R
1
5
0
R
1
4
2
R
2
0
6
R
1
0
5
R
3
0
3
R
1
5
9
R
2
0
8
R
2
0
9
R
2
1
0
R
2
0
7
T
R
A
V
IS
R
O
A
D
P
A
G
E
S
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
W
IN
T
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
J
O
H
N
S
R
O
A
D
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L A
V
E
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
O
A
D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
M
A
I N
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
ROAD TUNNEL
G
O
V
E
R
N
O
R
S
B
A
Y
T
R
A
N
S
P
O
R
T

K
E
Y
M
A
J
O
R

A
R
T
E
R
I
A
L

R
O
A
D
S
M
I
N
O
R

A
R
T
E
R
I
A
L

R
O
A
D
/
L
O
C
A
L

D
I
S
T
R
I
B
U
T
O
R

R
O
A
D
R
A
I
L
W
A
Y
R
O
A
D

B
R
I
D
G
E
S
R
A
I
L

B
R
I
D
G
E
S
R
8
0
6
B
R
I
D
G
E

N
U
M
B
E
R
T
U
N
N
E
L

P
O
R
T
A
L
R
A
I
L

B
U
I
L
D
I
N
G
I
M
P
O
R
T
A
N
T

N
O
T
E
1
.

T
h
e

Z
o
n
e

b
o
u
n
d
a
r
i
e
s

o
n

t
h
i
s

m
a
p

a
r
e

a
p
p
r
o
x
i
m
a
t
e

o
n
l
y
.

A
c
c
u
r
a
c
y

c
a
n

v
a
r
y

f
r
o
m

2
0
m

i
n

a

f
e
w

a
r
e
a
s

w
i
t
h

c
l
o
s
e
d

s
p
a
c
e
d

b
o
r
e
l
o
g
s

t
o

3
0
0
m

i
n

a
r
e
a
s

w
i
t
h

f
e
w

w
i
d
e
l
y

s
p
a
c
e
d

b
o
r
e
l
o
g
s
.
2
.

F
o
r

i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t

s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
s

a

s
i
t
e

s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c

s
t
u
d
y

i
s

n
e
e
d
e
d

t
o

a
c
c
u
r
a
t
e
l
y

d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e

t
h
e

s
o
i
l

p
r
o
f
i
l
e
,

t
h
e

d
e
g
r
e
e

o
f

l
i
k
e
l
y

s
h
a
k
i
n
g
,

a
n
d

t
o

a
s
s
e
s
s

t
h
e

l
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

h
a
z
a
r
d
.
S
O
U
R
C
E
S
D
e
t
a
i
l
e
d

E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e

S
t
u
d
y

A
r
e
a
:
-

T
h
e

E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e

H
a
z
a
r
d

i
n

C
h
r
i
s
t
c
h
u
r
c
h

E
l
d
e
r

e
t

a
l

(
E
Q
C
)

1
9
9
1
A
r
e
a

N
o
r
t
h

o
f

d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d

S
t
u
d
y

A
r
e
a
:
-

W
a
t
e
r

W
e
l
l

D
a
t
a

S
h
e
e
t

S
7
6
/
7
-
8

B
e
l
f
a
s
t

-

S
t
y
l
e

B
r
o
w
n

N
Z
G
S

1
9
7
5

W
a
t
e
r

W
e
l
l

D
a
t
a

S
h
e
e
t

S
7
6
/
4
-
5

K
a
i
a
p
o
i
-
K
a
i
r
a
k
i

B
r
o
w
n

N
Z
G
S

1
9
7
6
S
H
A
K
I
N
G

Z
O
N
E
S
L
I
Q
U
E
F
A
C
T
I
O
N

Z
O
N
E
S
Z
O
N
E
1
Z
O
N
E
2
Z
O
N
E
3
Z
O
N
E
2
A
Z
O
N
E
2
B
Z
O
N
E
3
A
Z
O
N
E
3
B
B
e
d
r
o
c
k
a
t s
h
a
llo
w
d
e
p
th
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
II-
V
ii
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
le
s
s
th
a
n
5
0
m
d
e
e
p
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
II
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
5
0
-
8
0
0
m
d
e
p
th
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
III-
IX
, h
ig
h
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
o
f g
r
o
u
n
d
m
o
tio
n
.
W
ith
in
Z
o
n
e
3
th
e
r
e
w
ill b
e
a
r
e
a
s
o
f p
r
o
n
o
u
n
c
e
d
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
a
n
d
in
te
n
s
ity
IX
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
0
-
3
0
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
1
0
-
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
-
-
3
0
%
fo
Z
o
n
e
3
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
1
0
-
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
3
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
S
E
I
S
M
I
C

K
E
Y
Map 7: Bridge Vulnerability
H
E
A
T
H
C
O
T
E
A
V
O
N
D
U
D
L
E
Y
C
R
E
E
K
S
T
Y
X
W
A
I M
A
K
A
R
I R
I
B
R
I
D
G
E

V
U
L
N
E
R
A
B
I
L
I
T
Y

K
E
Y
P
R
I
M
A
R
Y

R
O
U
T
E
S
M
A
J
O
R

A
R
T
E
R
I
A
L

R
O
A
D
S
M
I
N
O
R

A
R
T
E
R
I
A
L

R
O
A
D
/
L
O
C
A
L

D
I
S
T
R
I
B
U
T
O
R

R
O
A
D
R
A
I
L
W
A
Y
S
E
V
E
R
E

D
A
M
A
G
E
,

L
I
K
E
L
Y
T
O

B
E

U
N
U
S
A
B
L
E
U
S
A
B
L
E

(
M
I
N
O
R

D
A
M
A
G
E
)
U
S
A
B
I
L
I
T
Y

R
E
S
T
R
I
C
T
E
D
(
M
O
D
E
R
A
T
E

D
A
M
A
G
E
)
R
8
0
5
B
R
I
D
G
E

N
U
M
B
E
R
T
R
A
V
IS
R
O
A
D
P
A
G
E
S
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
ROAD TUNNEL
W
IN
T
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
J
O
H
N
S
R
O
A
D
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L A
V
E
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
O
A
D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
M
A
I N
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
G
O
V
E
R
N
O
R
S
B
A
Y
C
O
R
S
A
IR
B
A
Y
E
S
T
U
A
R
Y
W
IG
R
A
M
A
IR
P
O
R
T
C
H
R
IS
T
C
H
U
R
C
H
IN
T
E
R
N
A
T
IO
N
A
L
A
IR
P
O
R
T
(
H
A
R
E
W
O
O
D
)
N
3
k
m
2
1
0
1
P
O
R
T
O
F
L
Y
T
T
L
E
T
O
N
R
5
0
1
T
5
0
1
R
5
0
2
T
7
0
1
R
4
1
3
T
4
0
1
T
7
0
2
R
4
1
1
R
4
1
2
R
1
0
1
R
1
0
2
R
1
0
6
R
1
0
8
R
1
0
3
R
1
0
4
R
8
0
6
R
8
0
1
R
2
0
1
T
2
0
1
R
2
0
2
F
2
0
1
R
2
0
3
T
7
1
0
T
7
1
1 T
7
1
2 T
7
1
3
R
2
0
5
R
2
1
3
R
2
1
4
R
2
1
7
R
2
1
8
R
8
0
4
R
2
1
9
R
2
2
0
R
2
2
1
T
7
0
2
T
7
0
6
T
7
0
5
T
7
0
3
T
7
0
4
R
7
0
5
T
7
0
7
T
7
0
9
T
7
0
8
R
1
3
1
R
1
4
6
R
1
2
5
R
1
6
1
R
1
4
9
R
1
5
0
R
1
4
2
R
2
0
6
R
1
0
5
R
3
0
3
R
1
5
9
R
2
0
8
R
2
0
9
R
2
1
0
R
2
0
7
Maps 291
Map 8: Slope Hazard Transport System Locality Plan
L
y
t
t
e
l
t
o
n

R
e
c
l
a
m
a
t
i
o
n
4
0

a
t

O
h
i
n
e
t
a
h
i

G
o
v
e
r
n
o
r
s

B
a
y
4
1

a
t

A
l
l
a
n
d
a
l
e

G
o
v
e
r
n
e
r
s

B
a
y
4
2

s
o
u
t
h

o
f

A
l
l
a
n
d
a
l
e
4
3
-
4
7

G
e
b
b
i
e
s

P
a
s
s
1
0
1
2

k
m
N
M
A
I
N

R
O
A
D
E V A
N
S
P
A
S
S
S
U
M
M
I
T

R
O
A
D
D
Y
E
R
S
P
A
S
S
R
O
A
D
C
A
S
H
M
E
R
E

R
O
A
D
B
A
R
R
IN
G
T
O
N
S
T
R
E
E
T
COLOMBO STREET
P
O
R
T
H
IL
L
S
R
O
A
D
F
E
R
R
Y

R
O
A
D
1
9
P
R
I
M
A
R
Y

R
O
U
T
E
S
M
A
J
O
R

A
R
T
E
R
I
A
L

R
O
A
D
S
M
I
N
O
R

A
R
T
E
R
I
A
L

R
O
A
D
S
L
O
C
A
L

D
I
S
T
R
I
B
U
T
O
R

R
O
A
D
S
R
A
I
L
W
A
Y
S
I
T
E

N
U
M
B
E
R
E
X
T
E
N
T

O
F

H
A
Z
A
R
D

A
R
E
A
K
E
Y
2
1
2
2
2
3
1
6
1
2
3
4
6
5
9
1
0
1
1
7
8
3
9
3
6
3
7
3
8
3
5
3
4
3
3
3
2
1
8
1
4
1
5
1
2
1
3
2
4
2
8
-
3
1
(
C
l
i
f
t
o
n

T
c
e
)
2
7
2
5
2
6
1
9
2
0
1
7
Map 9: Seismic Hazard Telecom Cables
1
0
1
2
k
m
N
P
R
E
S
T
O
N
S
R
O
A
D
W
IN
T
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
S
A
W
Y
E
R
S
A
R
M
S
R
O
A
D
H
A
R
E
W
O
O
D
R
O
A
D
M
A
I N
N
O
R
T
H
R
O
A
D
B
L
I G
H
S
R
O
A
D
W
A
IR
A
K
E
I
R
O
A
D
W
A
IR
A
K
E
I
R
O
A
D
G
R
A
H
A
M
S
R
O
A
D
N
O
R
T
H
C
O
T
E
R
O
A
D
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L
A
V
E
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L
A
V
E
A
V
O
N
H
E
A
D
R
O
A
D
AVONHEAD ROAD
R U S S L E Y R O
A D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
B
U
C
H
A
N
A
N
S
R
O
A
D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
B
U
C
H
A
N
A
N
S
R
O
A
D
C A R M
E N S R O A D
M
A
IN
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
S
H
A
N
D
S
R
O
A
D
S
P
R
I N
G
S
R
O
A
D
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
J
U
N
C
T
IO
N
R
O
A
D
A
W
A
T
E
A
R
O
A
D
D
U
N
B
A
R
S
R
O
A
D
H A L S W
E L L R O
A D
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
O
A
D
H A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
O
A
D
S
P
A
R
K
S
R
O
A
D
S
P
A
R
K
S
R
O
A
D
H
O
O
N
H
AY
ROAD
B
A
R
R
IN
G
T
O
N
S
T
R
E
E
T
M
I L
T
O
N
S
T
DYE
R
S
P
A
S
S
R
O
AD
C O L O M B O S T R E E T
B
R
O
U
G
H
A
M
S
T
R
E
E
T
S
O
U
T
H
E
R
N
M
O
T
O
R
W
A
Y
C
U
R
L
E
T
T
S
R
O
A
D
B
L
E
N
H
E
I M
R
O
A
D
B
L
E
N
H
E
IM
R
D
M
A
I N
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
R
I C
C
A
R
T
O
N
R
O
A
D
K
I L
M
A
R
N
O
C
K
S
T
R
E
E
T
D E A N S A V E
C
A
S
H
M
E
R
E
R
O
A
D
F
E
N
D
A
L
T
O
N
R
D
H
A
R
P
E
R
A
V
E
R
O
S
S
A
L
S
T
S
T
R
E
E
T
H
E
A
T
O
N
C
R
A
N
F
O
R
D
S
T
R
E
E
T
S
T
R
E
E
T
I N
N
E
S
R
O
A
D
C
R
A
N
F
O
R
D
S
H
IR
L
E
Y
MARSHLANDS ROAD
MARSHLANDS ROAD
R
O
A
D
BURWOOD ROAD M
A
R
I E
H
A
U
R
D
B
U
R
W
O
O
D
R
O
A
D
B
E
A
C
H
R
O
A
D
T
R
A
V
IS
R
O
A
D
FROSTS
ROAD
BOWER AVE
N
E
W
B
R
I G
H
T
O
N
R
O
A
D
A V O N D A L E
R O A
D
B
R
E
E
Z
E
S
R
O
A
D
B
R
E
E
Z
E
S
R
O
A
D
P
A
G
E
S
R
O
A
D
MARINE PARADE
H
A
W
K
E
S
T
S
E
A
V
I E
W
R
D
B
R
I D
G
E
S
T
MARINE PARADE
ESTUARY ROAD
M
A
IN
R
O
A
D
M
A
IN
R
O
A
D
M
O
N
C
K
S
S
P
U
R
R
O
A
D
HORNBROOK RD
BRIDLE PATH RD
F
E
R
R
Y
R
D
TUNNEL ROAD
P
O
R
T
H
IL
L
S
R
D
O
PA
W
A
R
O
A
D
F
E
R
R
Y
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
H
A
R
G
O
O
DS
T
D
Y
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
B
U
C
K
L
E
Y
S
R
O
A
D
W
A
I N
O
I R
O
A
D
W
A
I N
O
I
R
O
A
D
GAYHURST RD
A
L D
W
I N
S
R
D
G
R
E
E
R
S
R
D
E
N
S
O
R
S
R
D
S
T
M
A
R
T
I N
S
R
O
A D
W
ILSO
N
S
R
D
WALTHAM
W
O
R
D
S
W
O
R
T
H
S
T
R
E
E
T
B
R
O
U
G
H
A
M
S
T
R
E
E
T
W
O
O
D
H
A
M
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
STANMORE ROAD
HILLS ROAD
E
D
G
E
W
A
R
E
R
O
A
D
B
E
A
L
E
Y
A
V
E
P
E
T
E
R
B
O
R
O
U
G
H
S
T
A
R
M
A
R
G
H
S
T
G
L
O
U
C
E
S
T
E
R
S
T
K
IL
M
O
R
E
S
T
H
E
R
E
F
O
R
D
S
T
L
IC
H
F
IE
L
D
S
T
S
T
A
S
A
P
H
S
T
M
O
O
R
H
O
U
S
E
R
O
LLESTON AVE
A N T I G U A S T
M O N T R E A L S T
D U R H A M S T
C O L O M B O S T
F I T Z G E R A L D A V E
ROAD
W
O
R
C
H
E
S
T
E
R
S
T
C
A
S
H
E
L
S
T
A
V
E
Z
O
N
E
1
:
Z
O
N
E
2
:
Z
O
N
E
3
:
B
e
d
r
o
c
k
a
t s
h
a
llo
w
d
e
p
th
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
II-
V
III
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
le
s
s
th
a
n
5
0
m
d
e
e
p
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
III
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
5
0
-
8
0
0
m
d
e
p
th
In
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
III-
IX
; h
ig
h
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
o
f g
r
o
u
n
d
m
o
tio
n
. W
ith
in
Z
o
n
e
3
th
e
r
e
w
ill b
e
a
r
e
a
s
o
f p
r
o
n
o
u
n
c
e
d
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
a
n
d
In
te
n
s
ity
IX
+
Z
O
N
E
2
A
:
Z
O
N
E
2
B
:
Z
O
N
E
3
A
:
Z
O
N
E
3
B
:
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
0
%
to
3
0
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
. 1
0
%
to
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
0
%
to
3
0
%
0
f Z
o
n
e
3
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
. 1
0
%
to
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
3
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
C
h
r
i
s
t
c
h
u
r
c
h

E
n
g
i
n
e
e
r
i
n
g

L
i
f
e
l
i
n
e
s

S
t
u
d
y

1
9
9
4
S
e
i
s
m
i
c

H
a
z
a
r
d

a
n
d

T
e
l
e
c
o
m

C
a
b
l
e
s
P
l
e
a
s
e

n
o
t
e

t
h
e

l
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s

o
f

t
h
i
s
m
a
p
,

a
s

o
u
t
l
i
n
e
d

o
n

p
a
g
e

2
8
3
Maps 293
Map 10: Local Flooding Hazard Telecom Cables
1
0
1
2
k
m
N
G
R
E
E
R
S
R
D
E
N
S
O
R
S
R
D
S
T
M
A
R
T
I N
S
R
O
A D
W
ILSO
N
S
R
D
WALTHAM ROAD
W
O
R
D
S
W
O
R
T
H
S
T
R
E
E
T
B
R
O
U
G
H
A
M
S
T
R
E
E
T
W
O
O
D
H
A
M
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
STANMORE ROAD
HILLS ROAD
E
D
G
E
W
A
R
E
R
O
A
D
B
E
A
L
E
Y
A
V
E
P
E
T
E
R
B
O
R
O
U
G
H
S
T
A
R
M
A
R
G
H
S
T
G
L
O
U
C
E
S
T
E
R
S
T
K
IL
M
O
R
E
S
T
W
O
R
C
H
E
S
T
E
R
S
T
H
E
R
E
F
O
R
D
S
T
C
A
S
H
E
L
S
T
L
IC
H
F
IE
L
D
S
T
S
T
A
S
A
P
H
S
T
M
O
O
R
H
O
U
S
E
A
V
E
R
O
LLESTON AVE
A N T I G U A S T
M O N T R E A L S T
D U R H A M S T
C O L O M B O S T
P
R
E
S
T
O
N
S
R
O
A
D
W
IN
T
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
S
A
W
Y
E
R
S
A
R
M
S
R
O
A
D
H
A
R
E
W
O
O
D
R
O
A
D
M
A
I N
N
O
R
T
H
R
O
A
D
B
L
I G
H
S
R
O
A
D
W
A
IR
A
K
E
I
R
O
A
D
W
A
IR
A
K
E
I
R
O
A
D
G
R
A
H
A
M
S
R
O
A
D
N
O
R
T
H
C
O
T
E
R
O
A
D
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L
A
V
E
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L
A
V
E
A
V
O
N
H
E
A
D
R
O
A
D
AVONHEAD ROAD
R U S S L E Y R O
A D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
B
U
C
H
A
N
A
N
S
R
O
A
D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
B
U
C
H
A
N
A
N
S
R
O
A
D
C A R M
E N S R O A D
M
A
IN
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
S
H
A
N
D
S
R
O
A
D
S
P
R
I N
G
S
R
O
A
D
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
J
U
N
C
T
IO
N
R
O
A
D
A
W
A
T
E
A
R
O
A
D
D
U
N
B
A
R
S
R
O
A
D
H A L S W
E L L R O
A D
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
O
A
D
H A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
O
A
D
S
P
A
R
K
S
R
O
A
D
S
P
A
R
K
S
R
O
A
D
H
O
O
N
H
AY
ROAD
B
A
R
R
IN
G
T
O
N
S
T
R
E
E
T
M
I L
T
O
N
S
T
DYE
R
S
P
A
S
S
R
O
AD
B
R
O
U
G
H
A
M
S
T
R
E
E
T
S
O
U
T
H
E
R
N
M
O
T
O
R
W
A
Y
C
U
R
L
E
T
T
S
R
O
A
D
B
L
E
N
H
E
I M
R
O
A
D
B
L
E
N
H
E
IM
R
D
M
A
I N
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
R
I C
C
A
R
T
O
N
R
O
A
D
K
I L
M
A
R
N
O
C
K
S
T
R
E
E
T
D E A N S A V E
C
A
S
H
M
E
R
E
R
O
A
D
F
E
N
D
A
L
T
O
N
R
D
H
A
R
P
E
R
A
V
E
R
O
S
S
A
L
S
T
S
T
R
E
E
T
H
E
A
T
O
N
C
R
A
N
F
O
R
D
S
T
R
E
E
T
S
T
R
E
E
T
I N
N
E
S
R
O
A
D
C
R
A
N
F
O
R
D
S
H
IR
L
E
Y
MARSHLANDS ROAD
MARSHLANDS ROAD
R
O
A
D
BURWOOD ROAD M
A
R
I E
H
A
U
R
D
B
U
R
W
O
O
D
R
O
A
D
B
E
A
C
H
R
O
A
D
T
R
A
V
IS
R
O
A
D
FROSTS
ROAD
BOWER AVE
N
E
W
B
R
I G
H
T
O
N
R
O
A
D
A V O N D A L E
R O A
D
B
R
E
E
Z
E
S
R
O
A
D
B
R
E
E
Z
E
S
R
O
A
D
P
A
G
E
S
R
O
A
D
MARINE PARADE
H
A
W
K
E
S
T
S
E
A
V
I E
W
R
D
B
R
I D
G
E
S
T
MARINE PARADE
ESTUARY ROAD
M
A
IN
R
O
A
D
M
A
IN
R
O
A
D
M
O
N
C
K
S
S
P
U
R
R
O
A
D
HORNBROOK RD
BRIDLE PATH RD
F
E
R
R
Y
R
D
TUNNEL ROAD
P
O
R
T
H
IL
L
S
R
D
O
PA
W
A
R
O
A
D
F
E
R
R
Y
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
H
A
R
G
O
O
DS
T
D
Y
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
B
U
C
K
L
E
Y
S
R
O
A
D
W
A
I N
O
I R
O
A
D
W
A
I N
O
I
R
O
A
D
GAYHURST RD
A
L D
W
I N
S
R
D
C
h
r
i
s
t
c
h
u
r
c
h

E
n
g
i
n
e
e
r
i
n
g

L
i
f
e
l
i
n
e
s

S
t
u
d
y

1
9
9
4
L
o
c
a
l

F
l
o
o
d
i
n
g

H
a
z
a
r
d

a
n
d

T
e
l
e
c
o
m

C
a
b
l
e
s
Map 11: Tsunami Hazard Telecom Cables
1
0
1
2
k
m
N
E
N
S
O
R
S
R
D
S
T
M
A
R
T
I N
S
R
O
A D
W
ILSO
N
S
R
D
WALTHAM ROAD
W
O
R
D
S
W
O
R
T
H
S
T
R
E
E
T
B
R
O
U
G
H
A
M
S
T
R
E
E
T
W
O
O
D
H
A
M
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
STANMORE ROAD
HILLS ROAD
E
D
G
E
W
A
R
E
R
O
A
D
B
E
A
L
E
Y
A
V
E
P
E
T
E
R
B
O
R
O
U
G
H
S
T
A
R
M
A
R
G
H
S
T
G
L
O
U
C
E
S
T
E
R
S
T
K
IL
M
O
R
E
S
T
W
O
R
C
H
E
S
T
E
R
S
T
H
E
R
E
F
O
R
D
S
T
C
A
S
H
E
L
S
T
L
IC
H
F
IE
L
D
S
T
S
T
A
S
A
P
H
S
T
M
O
O
R
H
O
U
S
E
A
V
E
R
O
LLESTON AVE
A N T I G U A S T
M O N T R E A L S T
D U R H A M S T
C O L O M B O S T
G
R
E
E
R
S
R
D
P
R
E
S
T
O
N
S
R
O
A
D
W
IN
T
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
S
A
W
Y
E
R
S
A
R
M
S
R
O
A
D
H
A
R
E
W
O
O
D
R
O
A
D
M
A
I N
N
O
R
T
H
R
O
A
D
B
L
I G
H
S
R
O
A
D
W
A
IR
A
K
E
I
R
O
A
D
W
A
IR
A
K
E
I
R
O
A
D
G
R
A
H
A
M
S
R
O
A
D
N
O
R
T
H
C
O
T
E
R
O
A
D
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L
A
V
E
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L
A
V
E
A
V
O
N
H
E
A
D
R
O
A
D
AVONHEAD ROAD
R U S S L E Y R O
A D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
B
U
C
H
A
N
A
N
S
R
O
A
D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
B
U
C
H
A
N
A
N
S
R
O
A
D
C A R M
E N S R O A D
M
A
IN
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
S
H
A
N
D
S
R
O
A
D
S
P
R
I N
G
S
R
O
A
D
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
J
U
N
C
T
IO
N
R
O
A
D
A
W
A
T
E
A
R
O
A
D
D
U
N
B
A
R
S
R
O
A
D
H A L S W
E L L R O
A D
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
O
A
D
H A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
O
A
D
S
P
A
R
K
S
R
O
A
D
S
P
A
R
K
S
R
O
A
D
H
O
O
N
H
AY
ROAD
B
A
R
R
IN
G
T
O
N
S
T
R
E
E
T
M
I L
T
O
N
S
T
DYE
R
S
P
A
S
S
R
O
AD
B
R
O
U
G
H
A
M
S
T
R
E
E
T
S
O
U
T
H
E
R
N
M
O
T
O
R
W
A
Y
C
U
R
L
E
T
T
S
R
O
A
D
B
L
E
N
H
E
I M
R
O
A
D
B
L
E
N
H
E
IM
R
D
M
A
I N
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
R
I C
C
A
R
T
O
N
R
O
A
D
K
I L
M
A
R
N
O
C
K
S
T
R
E
E
T
D E A N S A V E
C
A
S
H
M
E
R
E
R
O
A
D
F
E
N
D
A
L
T
O
N
R
D
H
A
R
P
E
R
A
V
E
R
O
S
S
A
L
S
T
S
T
R
E
E
T
H
E
A
T
O
N
C
R
A
N
F
O
R
D
S
T
R
E
E
T
S
T
R
E
E
T
I N
N
E
S
R
O
A
D
C
R
A
N
F
O
R
D
S
H
IR
L
E
Y
MARSHLANDS ROAD
MARSHLANDS ROAD
R
O
A
D
BURWOOD ROAD M
A
R
I E
H
A
U
R
D
B
U
R
W
O
O
D
R
O
A
D
B
E
A
C
H
R
O
A
D
T
R
A
V
IS
R
O
A
D
FROSTS
ROAD
BOWER AVE
N
E
W
B
R
I G
H
T
O
N
R
O
A
D
A V O N D A L E
R O A
D
B
R
E
E
Z
E
S
R
O
A
D
B
R
E
E
Z
E
S
R
O
A
D
P
A
G
E
S
R
O
A
D
MARINE PARADE
H
A
W
K
E
S
T
S
E
A
V
I E
W
R
D
B
R
I D
G
E
S
T
MARINE PARADE
ESTUARY ROAD
M
A
IN
R
O
A
D
M
A
IN
R
O
A
D
M
O
N
C
K
S
S
P
U
R
R
O
A
D
HORNBROOK RD
BRIDLE PATH RD
F
E
R
R
Y
R
D
TUNNEL ROAD
P
O
R
T
H
IL
L
S
R
D
O
PA
W
A
R
O
A
D
F
E
R
R
Y
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
H
A
R
G
O
O
DS
T
D
Y
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
B
U
C
K
L
E
Y
S
R
O
A
D
W
A
I N
O
I R
O
A
D
W
A
I N
O
I
R
O
A
D
GAYHURST RD
A
L D
W
I N
S
R
D
C
h
r
i
s
t
c
h
u
r
c
h

E
n
g
i
n
e
e
r
i
n
g

L
i
f
e
l
i
n
e
s

S
t
u
d
y

1
9
9
4
T
s
u
n
a
m
i

H
a
z
a
r
d

a
n
d

T
e
l
e
c
o
m

C
a
b
l
e
s
Maps 295
Map 12: Waimakariri Flooding Hazard Telecom Cables
M
A
R
I E
H
A
U
R
D
R
D
E
N
S
O
R
S
R
D
S
T
M
A
R
T
I N
S
R
O
A
D
W
ILS
O
N
S
R
D
WALTHAM ROAD
W
O
R
D
S
W
O
R
T
H
S
T
R
E
E
T
B
R
O
U
G
H
A
M
S
T
R
E
E
T
W
O
O
D
H
A
M
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
STANMORE ROAD
HILLS ROAD
E
D
G
E
W
A
R
E
R
O
A
D
B
E
A
L
E
Y
A
V
E
P
E
T
E
R
B
O
R
O
U
G
H
S
T
A
R
M
A
R
G
H
S
T
G
L
O
U
C
E
S
T
E
R
S
T
K
IL
M
O
R
E
S
T
W
O
R
C
H
E
S
T
E
R
S
T
H
E
R
E
F
O
R
D
S
T
C
A
S
H
E
L
S
T
L
IC
H
F
IE
L
D
S
T
S
T
A
S
A
P
H
S
T
M
O
O
R
H
O
U
S
E
A
V
E
R
O
LLESTON AVE
A N T I G U A S T
M O N T R E A L S T
D U R H A M S T
C O L O M B O S T
P
R
E
S
T
O
N
S
R
O
A
D
W
IN
T
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
S
A
W
Y
E
R
S
A
R
M
S
R
O
A
D
H
A
R
E
W
O
O
D
R
O
A
D
M
A
I N
N
O
R
T
H
R
O
A
D
B
L
I G
H
S
R
O
A
D
W
A
IR
A
K
E
I
R
O
A
D
W
A
IR
A
K
E
I
R
O
A
D
G
R
A
H
A
M
S
R
O
A
D
N
O
R
T
H
C
O
T
E
R
O
A
D
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L
A
V
E
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L
A
V
E
A
V
O
N
H
E
A
D
R
O
A
D
AVONHEAD ROAD
R U S S L E Y R O
A D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
B
U
C
H
A
N
A
N
S
R
O
A
D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
B
U
C
H
A
N
A
N
S
R
O
A
D
C A R M
E N S R O
A D
M
A
IN
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
S
H
A
N
D
S
R
O
A
D
S
P
R
I N
G
S
R
O
A
D
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
J
U
N
C
T
IO
N
R
O
A
D
A
W
A
T
E
A
R
O
A
D
D
U
N
B
A
R
S
R
O
A
D
H
A L S W
E L L R
O
A D
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
O
A
D
H A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
O
A
D
S
P
A
R
K
S
R
O
A
D
S
P
A
R
K
S
R
O
A
D
H
O
O
N
H
AY
ROAD
B
A
R
R
IN
G
T
O
N
S
T
R
E
E
T
M
I L
T
O
N
S
T
DYE
R
S
P
A
S
S
R
O
AD
B
R
O
U
G
H
A
M
S
T
R
E
E
T
S
O
U
T
H
E
R
N
M
O
T
O
R
W
A
Y
C
U
R
L
E
T
T
S
R
O
A
D
B
L
E
N
H
E
I M
R
O
A
D
B
L
E
N
H
E
IM
R
D
M
A
I N
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
R
I C
C
A
R
T
O
N
R
O
A
D
K
I L
M
A
R
N
O
C
K
S
T
R
E
E
T
D E A N S A V E
C
A
S
H
M
E
R
E
R
O
A
D
F
E
N
D
A
L
T
O
N
R
D
H
A
R
P
E
R
A
V
E
R
O
S
S
A
L
S
T
S
T
R
E
E
T
H
E
A
T
O
N
C
R
A
N
F
O
R
D
S
T
R
E
E
T
S
T
R
E
E
T
I N
N
E
S
R
O
A
D
C
R
A
N
F
O
R
D
S
H
IR
L
E
Y MARSHLANDS ROAD
MARSHLANDS ROAD
BURWOOD ROAD
B
U
R
W
O
O
D
R
O
A
D
B
E
A
C
H
R
O
A
D
T
R
A
V
IS
R
O
A
D
FROSTS
ROAD
BOWER AVE
N
E
W
B
R
I G
H
T
O
N
R
O
A
D
A V O N D A L E
R O A
D
B
R
E
E
Z
E
S
R
O
A
D
B
R
E
E
Z
E
S
R
O
A
D
P
A
G
E
S
R
O
A
D
MARINE PARADE
H
A
W
K
E
S
T
S
E
A
V
I E
W
R
D
B
R
I D
G
E
S
T
MARINE PARADE
ESTUARY ROAD
M
A
IN
R
O
A
D
M
A
IN
R
O
A
D
M
O
N
C
K
S
S
P
U
R
R
O
A
D
HORNBROOK RD
BRIDLE PATH RD
F
E
R
R
Y
R
D
TUNNEL ROAD
P
O
R
T
H
IL
L
S
R
D
O
P
A
W
A
R
O
A
D
F
E
R
R
Y
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
H
A
R
G
O
O
DS
T
D
Y
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
B
U
C
K
L
E
Y
S
R
O
A
D
W
A
I N
O
I
R
O
A
D
W
A
I N
O
I
R
O
A
D
GAYHURST RD
A
L D
W
I N
S
R
D
G
R
E
E
R
S
R
D
1
0
1
2
k
m
N
Map 13: Seismic Hazard Fire Services
1
0
1
2
k
m
N
E
N
S
O
R
S
R
D
S
T
M
A
R
T
I N
S
R
O
A D
W
ILSO
N
S
R
D
WALTHAM ROAD
W
O
R
D
S
W
O
R
T
H
S
T
R
E
E
T
B
R
O
U
G
H
A
M
S
T
R
E
E
T
W
O
O
D
H
A
M
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
STANMORE ROAD
HILLS ROAD
E
D
G
E
W
A
R
E
R
O
A
D
B
E
A
L
E
Y
A
V
E
P
E
T
E
R
B
O
R
O
U
G
H
S
T
A
R
M
A
R
G
H
S
T
G
L
O
U
C
E
S
T
E
R
S
T
K
IL
M
O
R
E
S
T
W
O
R
C
H
E
S
T
E
R
S
T
H
E
R
E
F
O
R
D
S
T
C
A
S
H
E
L
S
T
L
IC
H
F
IE
L
D
S
T
S
T
A
S
A
P
H
S
T
M
O
O
R
H
O
U
S
E
A
V
E
R
O
LLESTON AVE
A N T I G U A S T
M O N T R E A L S T
D U R H A M S T
C O L O M B O S T
P
R
E
S
T
O
N
S
R
O
A
D
W
IN
T
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
S
A
W
Y
E
R
S
A
R
M
S
R
O
A
D
H
A
R
E
W
O
O
D
R
O
A
D
M
A
I N
N
O
R
T
H
R
O
A
D
B
L
I G
H
S
R
O
A
D
W
A
IR
A
K
E
I
R
O
A
D
W
A
IR
A
K
E
I
R
O
A
D
G
R
A
H
A
M
S
R
O
A
D
N
O
R
T
H
C
O
T
E
R
O
A
D
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L
A
V
E
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L
A
V
E
A
V
O
N
H
E
A
D
R
O
A
D
AVONHEAD ROAD
R U S S L E Y R O
A D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
B
U
C
H
A
N
A
N
S
R
O
A
D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
B
U
C
H
A
N
A
N
S
R
O
A
D
C A R M
E N S R O A D
M
A
IN
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
S
H
A
N
D
S
R
O
A
D
S
P
R
I N
G
S
R
O
A
D
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
J
U
N
C
T
IO
N
R
O
A
D
A
W
A
T
E
A
R
O
A
D
D
U
N
B
A
R
S
R
O
A
D
H A L S W
E L L R O
A D
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
O
A
D
H A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
O
A
D
S
P
A
R
K
S
R
O
A
D
S
P
A
R
K
S
R
O
A
D
H
O
O
N
H
AY
ROAD
B
A
R
R
IN
G
T
O
N
S
T
R
E
E
T
M
I L
T
O
N
S
T
DYE
R
S
P
A
S
S
R
O
AD
B
R
O
U
G
H
A
M
S
T
R
E
E
T
S
O
U
T
H
E
R
N
M
O
T
O
R
W
A
Y
C
U
R
L
E
T
T
S
R
O
A
D
B
L
E
N
H
E
I M
R
O
A
D
B
L
E
N
H
E
IM
R
D
M
A
I N
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
R
I C
C
A
R
T
O
N
R
O
A
D
K
I L
M
A
R
N
O
C
K
S
T
R
E
E
T
D E A N S A V E
C
A
S
H
M
E
R
E
R
O
A
D
F
E
N
D
A
L
T
O
N
R
D
H
A
R
P
E
R
A
V
E
R
O
S
S
A
L
S
T
S
T
R
E
E
T
H
E
A
T
O
N
C
R
A
N
F
O
R
D
S
T
R
E
E
T
S
T
R
E
E
T
I N
N
E
S
R
O
A
D
C
R
A
N
F
O
R
D
S
H
IR
L
E
Y
MARSHLANDS ROAD
MARSHLANDS ROAD
R
O
A
D
BURWOOD ROAD M
A
R
I E
H
A
U
R
D
B
U
R
W
O
O
D
R
O
A
D
B
E
A
C
H
R
O
A
D
T
R
A
V
IS
R
O
A
D
FROSTS
ROAD
BOWER AVE
N
E
W
B
R
I G
H
T
O
N
R
O
A
D
A V O N D A L E
R O A
D
B
R
E
E
Z
E
S
R
O
A
D
B
R
E
E
Z
E
S
R
O
A
D
P
A
G
E
S
R
O
A
D
MARINE PARADE
H
A
W
K
E
S
T
S
E
A
V
I E
W
R
D
B
R
I D
G
E
S
T
MARINE PARADE
ESTUARY ROAD
M
A
IN
R
O
A
D
M
A
IN
R
O
A
D
M
O
N
C
K
S
S
P
U
R
R
O
A
D
HORNBROOK RD
BRIDLE PATH RD
F
E
R
R
Y
R
D
TUNNEL ROAD
P
O
R
T
H
IL
L
S
R
D
O
PA
W
A
R
O
A
D
F
E
R
R
Y
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
H
A
R
G
O
O
DS
T
D
Y
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
B
U
C
K
L
E
Y
S
R
O
A
D
W
A
I N
O
I R
O
A
D
W
A
I N
O
I
R
O
A
D
GAYHURST RD
A
L D
W
I N
S
R
D
G
R
E
E
R
S
R
D
Z
O
N
E
1
:
Z
O
N
E
2
:
Z
O
N
E
3
:
B
e
d
r
o
c
k
a
t s
h
a
llo
w
d
e
p
th
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
II-
V
III
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
le
s
s
th
a
n
5
0
m
d
e
e
p
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
III
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
5
0
-
8
0
0
m
d
e
p
th
In
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
III-
IX
; h
ig
h
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
o
f g
r
o
u
n
d
m
o
tio
n
. W
ith
in
Z
o
n
e
3
th
e
r
e
w
ill b
e
a
r
e
a
s
o
f p
r
o
n
o
u
n
c
e
d
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
a
n
d
In
te
n
s
ity
IX
+
Z
O
N
E
2
A
:
Z
O
N
E
2
B
:
Z
O
N
E
3
A
:
Z
O
N
E
3
B
:
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
0
%
to
3
0
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
. 1
0
%
to
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
0
%
to
3
0
%
0
f Z
o
n
e
3
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
. 1
0
%
to
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
3
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
C
h
r
i
s
t
c
h
u
r
c
h

E
n
g
i
n
e
e
r
i
n
g

L
i
f
e
l
i
n
e
s

S
t
u
d
y

1
9
9
4
S
e
i
s
m
i
c

H
a
z
a
r
d

a
n
d

F
i
r
e

S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
P
l
e
a
s
e

n
o
t
e

t
h
e

l
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s

o
f

t
h
i
s
m
a
p
,

a
s

o
u
t
l
i
n
e
d

o
n

p
a
g
e

2
8
3
Maps 297
Map 14: Seismic Hazard Police Radio Services
1
0
1
2
k
m
N
E
N
S
O
R
S
R
D
S
T
M
A
R
T
I N
S
R
O
A D
W
ILSO
N
S
R
D
WALTHAM ROAD
W
O
R
D
S
W
O
R
T
H
S
T
R
E
E
T
B
R
O
U
G
H
A
M
S
T
R
E
E
T
W
O
O
D
H
A
M
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
STANMORE ROAD
HILLS ROAD
E
D
G
E
W
A
R
E
R
O
A
D
B
E
A
L
E
Y
A
V
E
P
E
T
E
R
B
O
R
O
U
G
H
S
T
A
R
M
A
R
G
H
S
T
G
L
O
U
C
E
S
T
E
R
S
T
K
IL
M
O
R
E
S
T
W
O
R
C
H
E
S
T
E
R
S
T
H
E
R
E
F
O
R
D
S
T
C
A
S
H
E
L
S
T
L
IC
H
F
IE
L
D
S
T
S
T
A
S
A
P
H
S
T
M
O
O
R
H
O
U
S
E
A
V
E
R
O
LLESTON AVE
A N T I G U A S T
M O N T R E A L S T
D U R H A M S T
C O L O M B O S T
P
R
E
S
T
O
N
S
R
O
A
D
W
IN
T
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
S
A
W
Y
E
R
S
A
R
M
S
R
O
A
D
H
A
R
E
W
O
O
D
R
O
A
D
M
A
I N
N
O
R
T
H
R
O
A
D
B
L
I G
H
S
R
O
A
D
W
A
IR
A
K
E
I
R
O
A
D
W
A
IR
A
K
E
I
R
O
A
D
G
R
A
H
A
M
S
R
O
A
D
N
O
R
T
H
C
O
T
E
R
O
A
D
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L
A
V
E
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L
A
V
E
A
V
O
N
H
E
A
D
R
O
A
D
AVONHEAD ROAD
R U S S L E Y R O
A D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
B
U
C
H
A
N
A
N
S
R
O
A
D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
B
U
C
H
A
N
A
N
S
R
O
A
D
C A R M
E N S R O A D
M
A
IN
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
S
H
A
N
D
S
R
O
A
D
S
P
R
I N
G
S
R
O
A
D
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
J
U
N
C
T
IO
N
R
O
A
D
A
W
A
T
E
A
R
O
A
D
D
U
N
B
A
R
S
R
O
A
D
H A L S W
E L L R O
A D
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
O
A
D
H A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
O
A
D
S
P
A
R
K
S
R
O
A
D
S
P
A
R
K
S
R
O
A
D
H
O
O
N
H
AY
ROAD
B
A
R
R
IN
G
T
O
N
S
T
R
E
E
T
M
I L
T
O
N
S
T
DYE
R
S
P
A
S
S
R
O
AD
B
R
O
U
G
H
A
M
S
T
R
E
E
T
S
O
U
T
H
E
R
N
M
O
T
O
R
W
A
Y
C
U
R
L
E
T
T
S
R
O
A
D
B
L
E
N
H
E
I M
R
O
A
D
B
L
E
N
H
E
IM
R
D
M
A
I N
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
R
I C
C
A
R
T
O
N
R
O
A
D
K
I L
M
A
R
N
O
C
K
S
T
R
E
E
T
D E A N S A V E
C
A
S
H
M
E
R
E
R
O
A
D
F
E
N
D
A
L
T
O
N
R
D
H
A
R
P
E
R
A
V
E
R
O
S
S
A
L
S
T
S
T
R
E
E
T
H
E
A
T
O
N
C
R
A
N
F
O
R
D
S
T
R
E
E
T
S
T
R
E
E
T
I N
N
E
S
R
O
A
D
C
R
A
N
F
O
R
D
S
H
IR
L
E
Y
MARSHLANDS ROAD
MARSHLANDS ROAD
R
O
A
D
BURWOOD ROAD M
A
R
I E
H
A
U
R
D
B
U
R
W
O
O
D
R
O
A
D
B
E
A
C
H
R
O
A
D
T
R
A
V
IS
R
O
A
D
FROSTS
ROAD
BOWER AVE
N
E
W
B
R
I G
H
T
O
N
R
O
A
D
A V O N D A L E
R O A
D
B
R
E
E
Z
E
S
R
O
A
D
B
R
E
E
Z
E
S
R
O
A
D
P
A
G
E
S
R
O
A
D
MARINE PARADE
H
A
W
K
E
S
T
S
E
A
V
I E
W
R
D
B
R
I D
G
E
S
T
MARINE PARADE
ESTUARY ROAD
M
A
IN
R
O
A
D
M
A
IN
R
O
A
D
M
O
N
C
K
S
S
P
U
R
R
O
A
D
HORNBROOK RD
BRIDLE PATH RD
F
E
R
R
Y
R
D
TUNNEL ROAD
P
O
R
T
H
IL
L
S
R
D
O
PA
W
A
R
O
A
D
F
E
R
R
Y
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
H
A
R
G
O
O
DS
T
D
Y
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
B
U
C
K
L
E
Y
S
R
O
A
D
W
A
I N
O
I R
O
A
D
W
A
I N
O
I
R
O
A
D
GAYHURST RD
A
L D
W
I N
S
R
D
G
R
E
E
R
S
R
D
Z
O
N
E
1
:
Z
O
N
E
2
:
Z
O
N
E
3
:
B
e
d
r
o
c
k
a
t s
h
a
llo
w
d
e
p
th
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
II-
V
III
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
le
s
s
th
a
n
5
0
m
d
e
e
p
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
III
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
5
0
-
8
0
0
m
d
e
p
th
In
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
III-
IX
; h
ig
h
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
o
f g
r
o
u
n
d
m
o
tio
n
. W
ith
in
Z
o
n
e
3
th
e
r
e
w
ill b
e
a
r
e
a
s
o
f p
r
o
n
o
u
n
c
e
d
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
a
n
d
In
te
n
s
ity
IX
+
Z
O
N
E
2
A
:
Z
O
N
E
2
B
:
Z
O
N
E
3
A
:
Z
O
N
E
3
B
:
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
0
%
to
3
0
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
. 1
0
%
to
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
0
%
to
3
0
%
0
f Z
o
n
e
3
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
. 1
0
%
to
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
3
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
C
h
r
i
s
t
c
h
u
r
c
h

E
n
g
i
n
e
e
r
i
n
g

L
i
f
e
l
i
n
e
s

S
t
u
d
y

1
9
9
4
S
e
i
s
m
i
c

H
a
z
a
r
d

a
n
d

P
o
l
i
c
e

R
a
d
i
o

S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
P
l
e
a
s
e

n
o
t
e

t
h
e

l
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s

o
f

t
h
i
s
m
a
p
,

a
s

o
u
t
l
i
n
e
d

o
n

p
a
g
e

2
8
3
Map 15: Seismic Hazard Electricity Network
H
E
A
T
H
C
O
T
E
A
V
O
N
D
U
D
L
E
Y
C
R
E
E
K
S
T
Y
X
W
A
I M
A
K
A
R
I R
I
E
S
T
U
A
R
Y
C
O
R
S
A
IR
B
A
Y
P
O
R
T
O
F
L
Y
T
T
E
L
T
O
N
G
O
V
E
R
N
O
R
S
B
A
Y
I
M
P
O
R
T
A
N
T

N
O
T
E
1
.

T
h
e

Z
o
n
e

b
o
u
n
d
a
r
i
e
s

o
n

t
h
i
s

m
a
p

a
r
e

a
p
p
r
o
x
i
m
a
t
e

o
n
l
y
.

A
c
c
u
r
a
c
y

c
a
n

v
a
r
y

f
r
o
m

2
0
m

i
n

a

f
e
w

a
r
e
a
s

w
i
t
h

c
l
o
s
e
d

s
p
a
c
e
d

b
o
r
e
l
o
g
s

t
o

3
0
0
m

i
n

a
r
e
a
s

w
i
t
h

f
e
w

w
i
d
e
l
y

s
p
a
c
e
d

b
o
r
e
l
o
g
s
.
2
.

F
o
r

i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t

s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
s

a

s
i
t
e

s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c

s
t
u
d
y

i
s

n
e
e
d
e
d

t
o

a
c
c
u
r
a
t
e
l
y

d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e

t
h
e

s
o
i
l

p
r
o
f
i
l
e
,

t
h
e

d
e
g
r
e
e

o
f

l
i
k
e
l
y

s
h
a
k
i
n
g
,

a
n
d

t
o

a
s
s
e
s
s

t
h
e

l
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

h
a
z
a
r
d
.
S
O
U
R
C
E
S
D
e
t
a
i
l
e
d

E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e

S
t
u
d
y

A
r
e
a
:
-

T
h
e

E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e

H
a
z
a
r
d

i
n

C
h
r
i
s
t
c
h
u
r
c
h

E
l
d
e
r

e
t

a
l

(
E
Q
C
)

1
9
9
1
A
r
e
a

N
o
r
t
h

o
f

d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d

S
t
u
d
y

A
r
e
a
:
-

W
a
t
e
r

W
e
l
l

D
a
t
a

S
h
e
e
t

S
7
6
/
7
-
8

B
e
l
f
a
s
t

-

S
t
y
l
e

B
r
o
w
n

N
Z
G
S

1
9
7
5

W
a
t
e
r

W
e
l
l

D
a
t
a

S
h
e
e
t

S
7
6
/
4
-
5

K
a
i
a
p
o
i
-
K
a
i
r
a
k
i

B
r
o
w
n

N
Z
G
S

1
9
7
6
S
H
A
K
IN
G
Z
O
N
E
S
L
IQ
U
E
F
A
C
T
IO
N
Z
O
N
E
S
Z
O
N
E
1
Z
O
N
E
2
Z
O
N
E
3
Z
O
N
E
2
A
Z
O
N
E
2
B
Z
O
N
E
3
A
Z
O
N
E
3
B
B
e
d
r
o
c
k
a
t s
h
a
llo
w
d
e
p
th
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
II-
V
ii
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
le
s
s
th
a
n
5
0
m
d
e
e
p
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
II
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
5
0
-
8
0
0
m
d
e
p
th
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
III-
IX
, h
ig
h
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
o
f g
r
o
u
n
d
m
o
tio
n
.
W
ith
in
Z
o
n
e
3
th
e
r
e
w
ill b
e
a
r
e
a
s
o
f p
r
o
n
o
u
n
c
e
d
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
a
n
d
in
te
n
s
ity
IX
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
0
-
3
0
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
1
0
-
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
-
-
3
0
%
fo
Z
o
n
e
3
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
1
0
-
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
3
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
S
E
I
S
M
I
C

K
E
Y
P
l
e
a
s
e

n
o
t
e

t
h
e

l
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s

o
f

t
h
i
s

m
a
p
,

a
s

o
u
t
l
i
n
e
d

o
n

p
a
g
e

2
8
3
S
P

1
1

k
V

D
i
s
t
r
i
c
t

S
u
b
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
S
P

3
3

k
V

D
i
s
t
r
i
c
t

S
u
b
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
S
P

6
6

k
V

D
i
s
t
r
i
c
t

S
u
b
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
T
r
a
n
s
p
o
w
e
r

6
6

k
V

S
u
b
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
T
r
a
n
s
p
o
w
e
r

2
2
0

k
V

S
u
b
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
S
P

1
1

k
V

F
e
e
d
e
r

O
/
H
S
P

1
1

k
V

F
e
e
d
e
r

U
/
G
S
P

3
3

k
V

F
e
e
d
e
r

O
/
H
S
P

3
3

k
V

F
e
e
d
e
r

U
/
G
E
C
N
Z

6
6

k
V

F
e
e
d
e
r

O
/
H
S
P

6
6

k
V

F
e
e
d
e
r

O
/
H
S
P

6
6

k
V

F
e
e
d
e
r

U
/
G
E
C
N
Z

2
2
0

k
V

F
e
e
d
e
r

O
/
H
K
E
Y
E
x
t
e
n
t

o
f

D
e
t
a
i
l
e
d
E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e

H
a
z
a
r
d

S
t
u
d
y

A
r
e
a
B
R
I
G
H
T
O
N
P
A
G
E
S
B
R
O
M
L
E
Y
D
A
L
L
I
N
G
T
O
N
P
A
G
E
S
-
K
E
A
R
N
E
Y
S
L
I
N
W
O
O
D
P
O
R
T
M
A
N
H
E
A
T
H
C
O
T
E
B
A
R
N
E
T

P
A
R
K
S
I
M
E
O
N
H
O
O
N

H
A
Y
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
S
P
R
E
Y
D
O
N
M
I
L
T
O
N
M
I
D
D
L
E
T
O
N
S
O
C
K
B
U
R
N
M
O
N
T
R
E
A
L
O
X
F
O
R
D
-
T
U
A
M
A
R
M
A
G
H
K
N
O
X
F
E
N
D
A
L
T
O
N
A
D
D
I
N
G
T
O
N
M
c
F
A
D
D
E
N
S
G
R
I
M
S
E
Y
S
-
W
I
N
T
E
R
S
H
A
R
R
I
S
B
I
S
H
O
P
D
A
L
E
P
A
P
A
N
U
I
H
A
W
T
H
O
R
N
D
E
N
H
A
R
E
W
O
O
D
S
H
A
N
D
S

R
O
A
D
H
O
R
N
B
Y
M
O
F
F
E
T

S
T
I
S
L
I
N
G
T
O
N
T
W
I Z
E
L
S
P
R
I N
G
S
T O
N
L
I V
I N
G
S
T
O
N
T
E
K
A
P
O
B
H
O
R
O
R
A
T
A
KIKIW
A
WAIPARA
B
R
O
M
L
E
Y
Maps 299
Map 16: Electricity Network
B
R
I
G
H
T
O
N
P
A
G
E
S
B
R
O
M
L
E
Y
D
A
L
L
I
N
G
T
O
N
P
A
G
E
S
-
K
E
A
R
N
E
Y
S
L
I
N
W
O
O
D
P
O
R
T
M
A
N
H
E
A
T
H
C
O
T
E
B
A
R
N
E
T

P
A
R
K
S
I
M
E
O
N
H
O
O
N

H
A
Y
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
S
P
R
E
Y
D
O
N
M
I
L
T
O
N
M
I
D
D
L
E
T
O
N
S
O
C
K
B
U
R
N
M
O
N
T
R
E
A
L
O
X
F
O
R
D
-
T
U
A
M
A
R
M
A
G
H
K
N
O
X
F
E
N
D
A
L
T
O
N
A
D
D
I
N
G
T
O
N
M
c
F
A
D
D
E
N
S
G
R
I
M
S
E
Y
S
-
W
I
N
T
E
R
S
H
A
R
R
I
S
B
I
S
H
O
P
D
A
L
E
P
A
P
A
N
U
I
H
A
W
T
H
O
R
N
D
E
N
H
A
R
E
W
O
O
D
S
H
A
N
D
S

R
O
A
D
H
O
R
N
B
Y
M
O
F
F
E
T

S
T
I
S
L
I
N
G
T
O
N
T
W
I Z
E
L
S
P
R
I N
G
S
T
O
N
L
I
V
I
N
G
S
T
O
N
T
E
K
A
P
O
B
H
O
R
O
R
A
T
A
K
IK
IW
A
WAIPARA
B
R
O
M
L
E
Y
S
P

1
1

k
V

D
i
s
t
r
i
c
t

S
u
b
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
S
P

3
3

k
V

D
i
s
t
r
i
c
t

S
u
b
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
S
P

6
6

k
V

D
i
s
t
r
i
c
t

S
u
b
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
T
r
a
n
s
p
o
w
e
r

6
6

k
V

S
u
b
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
T
r
a
n
s
p
o
w
e
r

2
2
0

k
V

S
u
b
s
t
a
t
i
o
n
S
P

1
1

k
V

F
e
e
d
e
r

O
/
H
S
P

1
1

k
V

F
e
e
d
e
r

U
/
G
S
P

3
3

k
V

F
e
e
d
e
r

O
/
H
S
P

3
3

k
V

F
e
e
d
e
r

U
/
G
E
C
N
Z

6
6

k
V

F
e
e
d
e
r

O
/
H
S
P

6
6

k
V

F
e
e
d
e
r

O
/
H
S
P

6
6

k
V

F
e
e
d
e
r

U
/
G
E
C
N
Z

2
2
0

k
V

F
e
e
d
e
r

O
/
H
K
E
Y
Map 17: Seismic Hazard Broadcasting Services
1
0
1
2
k
m
N
P
R
E
S
T
O
N
S
R
O
A
D
W
IN
T
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
S
A
W
Y
E
R
S
A
R
M
S
R
O
A
D
H
A
R
E
W
O
O
D
R
O
A
D
M
A
I N
N
O
R
T
H
R
O
A
D
B
L
I G
H
S
R
O
A
D
W
A
IR
A
K
E
I
R
O
A
D
W
A
IR
A
K
E
I
R
O
A
D
G
R
A
H
A
M
S
R
O
A
D
N
O
R
T
H
C
O
T
E
R
O
A
D
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L
A
V
E
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L
A
V
E
A
V
O
N
H
E
A
D
R
O
A
D
AVONHEAD ROAD
R U S S L E Y R O
A D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
B
U
C
H
A
N
A
N
S
R
O
A
D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
B
U
C
H
A
N
A
N
S
R
O
A
D
C A R M
E N S R O A D
M
A
IN
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
S
H
A
N
D
S
R
O
A
D
S
P
R
I N
G
S
R
O
A
D
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
J
U
N
C
T
IO
N
R
O
A
D
A
W
A
T
E
A
R
O
A
D
D
U
N
B
A
R
S
R
O
A
D
H A L S W
E L L R O
A D
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
O
A
D
H A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
O
A
D
S
P
A
R
K
S
R
O
A
D
S
P
A
R
K
S
R
O
A
D
H
O
O
N
H
AY
ROAD
B
A
R
R
IN
G
T
O
N
S
T
R
E
E
T
M
I L
T
O
N
S
T
DYE
R
S
P
A
S
S
R
O
AD
B
R
O
U
G
H
A
M
S
T
R
E
E
T
S
O
U
T
H
E
R
N
M
O
T
O
R
W
A
Y
C
U
R
L
E
T
T
S
R
O
A
D
B
L
E
N
H
E
I M
R
O
A
D
B
L
E
N
H
E
IM
R
D
M
A
I N
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
R
I C
C
A
R
T
O
N
R
O
A
D
K
I L
M
A
R
N
O
C
K
S
T
R
E
E
T
D E A N S A V E
C
A
S
H
M
E
R
E
R
O
A
D
F
E
N
D
A
L
T
O
N
R
D
H
A
R
P
E
R
A
V
E
R
O
S
S
A
L
S
T
S
T
R
E
E
T
H
E
A
T
O
N
C
R
A
N
F
O
R
D
S
T
R
E
E
T
S
T
R
E
E
T
I N
N
E
S
R
O
A
D
C
R
A
N
F
O
R
D
S
H
IR
L
E
Y
MARSHLANDS ROAD
MARSHLANDS ROAD
R
O
A
D
BURWOOD ROAD M
A
R
I E
H
A
U
R
D
B
U
R
W
O
O
D
R
O
A
D
B
E
A
C
H
R
O
A
D
T
R
A
V
IS
R
O
A
D
FROSTS
ROAD
BOWER AVE
N
E
W
B
R
I G
H
T
O
N
R
O
A
D
A V O N D A L E
R O A
D
B
R
E
E
Z
E
S
R
O
A
D
B
R
E
E
Z
E
S
R
O
A
D
P
A
G
E
S
R
O
A
D
MARINE PARADE
H
A
W
K
E
S
T
S
E
A
V
I E
W
R
D
B
R
I D
G
E
S
T
MARINE PARADE
ESTUARY ROAD
M
A
IN
R
O
A
D
M
A
IN
R
O
A
D
M
O
N
C
K
S
S
P
U
R
R
O
A
D
HORNBROOK RD
BRIDLE PATH RD
F
E
R
R
Y
R
D
TUNNEL ROAD
P
O
R
T
H
IL
L
S
R
D
O
PA
W
A
R
O
A
D
F
E
R
R
Y
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
H
A
R
G
O
O
DS
T
D
Y
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
B
U
C
K
L
E
Y
S
R
O
A
D
W
A
I N
O
I R
O
A
D
W
A
I N
O
I
R
O
A
D
GAYHURST RD
A
L D
W
I N
S
R
D
G
R
E
E
R
S
R
D
S
T
E
N
S
O
R
S
R
D
S
T
M
A
R
T
I N
S
R
O
A D
W
ILSO
N
S
R
D
WALTHAM ROAD
W
O
R
D
S
W
O
R
T
H
B
R
O
U
G
H
A
M
S
T
R
E
E
T
W
O
O
D
H
A
M
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
STANMORE ROAD
HILLS ROAD
E
D
G
E
W
A
R
E
R
O
A
D
B
E
A
L
E
Y
A
V
E
P
E
T
E
R
B
O
R
O
U
G
H
S
T
A
R
M
A
R
G
H
K
IL
M
O
R
E
S
T
W
O
R
C
H
E
S
T
E
R
S
T
C
A
S
H
E
L
S
T
S
T
A
S
A
P
H
S
T
M
O
O
R
H
O
U
S
E
A
V
E
R
O
LLESTON AVE
A N T I G U A S T
M O N T R E A L S T
D U R H A M S T
C O L O M B O S T
S
T
R
E
E
T
G
L
O
U
C
E
S
T
E
R
S
T
H
E
R
E
F
O
R
D
S
T
L
IC
H
F
IE
L
D
S
T
Z
O
N
E
1
:
Z
O
N
E
2
:
Z
O
N
E
3
:
B
e
d
r
o
c
k
a
t s
h
a
llo
w
d
e
p
th
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
II-
V
III
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
le
s
s
th
a
n
5
0
m
d
e
e
p
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
III
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
5
0
-
8
0
0
m
d
e
p
th
In
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
III-
IX
; h
ig
h
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
o
f g
r
o
u
n
d
m
o
tio
n
. W
ith
in
Z
o
n
e
3
th
e
r
e
w
ill b
e
a
r
e
a
s
o
f p
r
o
n
o
u
n
c
e
d
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
a
n
d
In
te
n
s
ity
IX
+
Z
O
N
E
2
A
:
Z
O
N
E
2
B
:
Z
O
N
E
3
A
:
Z
O
N
E
3
B
:
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
0
%
to
3
0
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
. 1
0
%
to
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
0
%
to
3
0
%
0
f Z
o
n
e
3
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
. 1
0
%
to
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
3
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
C
h
r
i
s
t
c
h
u
r
c
h

E
n
g
i
n
e
e
r
i
n
g

L
i
f
e
l
i
n
e
s

S
t
u
d
y

1
9
9
4
S
e
i
s
m
i
c

H
a
z
a
r
d

a
n
d

B
r
o
a
d
c
a
s
t
i
n
g

S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
P
l
e
a
s
e

n
o
t
e

t
h
e

l
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s

o
f

t
h
i
s
m
a
p
,

a
s

o
u
t
l
i
n
e
d

o
n

p
a
g
e

2
8
3
Maps 301
Map 18: Seismic Hazard Stormwater System
H
E
A
T
H
C
O
T
E
A
V
O
N
D
U
D
L
E
Y
C
R
E
E
K
S
T
Y
X
W
A
I M
A
K
A
R
I R
I
E
S
T
U
A
R
Y
N
3
k
m
2
1
0
1
S
T
O
R
M
W
A
T
E
R

K
E
Y
S
H
A
K
I
N
G

Z
O
N
E
S
L
I
Q
U
E
F
A
C
T
I
O
N

Z
O
N
E
S
Z
O
N
E
1
Z
O
N
E
2
Z
O
N
E
3
Z
O
N
E
2
A
Z
O
N
E
2
B
Z
O
N
E
3
A
Z
O
N
E
3
B
B
e
d
r
o
c
k
a
5
s
h
a
llo
w
d
e
p
th
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
II-
V
ii
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
le
s
s
th
a
n
5
0
m
d
e
e
p
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
II
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
5
0
-
8
0
0
m
d
e
p
th
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
III-
IX
, h
ig
h
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
o
f g
r
o
u
n
d
m
o
tio
n
.
W
ith
in
Z
o
n
e
3
th
e
r
e
w
ill b
e
a
r
e
a
s
o
f p
r
o
n
o
u
n
c
e
d
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
a
n
d
in
te
n
s
ity
IX
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
0
-
3
0
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
1
0
-
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
-
-
3
0
%
fo
Z
o
n
e
3
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
1
0
-
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
3
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
S
E
I
S
M
I
C

K
E
Y
I
M
P
O
R
T
A
N
T

N
O
T
E
1
.

T
h
e

Z
o
n
e

b
o
u
n
d
a
r
i
e
s

o
n

t
h
i
s

m
a
p

a
r
e

a
p
p
r
o
x
i
m
a
t
e

o
n
l
y
.

A
c
c
u
r
a
c
y

c
a
n

v
a
r
y

f
r
o
m

2
0
m

i
n

a

f
e
w

a
r
e
a
s

w
i
t
h

c
l
o
s
e
d

s
p
a
c
e
d

b
o
r
e
l
o
g
s

t
o

3
0
0
m

i
n

a
r
e
a
s

w
i
t
h

f
e
w

w
i
d
e
l
y

s
p
a
c
e
d

b
o
r
e
l
o
g
s
.
2
.

F
o
r

i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t

s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
s

a

s
i
t
e

s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c

s
t
u
d
y

i
s

n
e
e
d
e
d

t
o

a
c
c
u
r
a
t
e
l
y

d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e

t
h
e

s
o
i
l

p
r
o
f
i
l
e
,

t
h
e

d
e
g
r
e
e

o
f

l
i
k
e
l
y

s
h
a
k
i
n
g
,

a
n
d

t
o

a
s
s
e
s
s

t
h
e

l
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

h
a
z
a
r
d
.
S
O
U
R
C
E
S
D
e
t
a
i
l
e
d

E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e

S
t
u
d
y

A
r
e
a
:
-

T
h
e

E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e

H
a
z
a
r
d

i
n

C
h
r
i
s
t
c
h
u
r
c
h

E
l
d
e
r

e
t

a
l

(
E
Q
C
)

1
9
9
1
A
r
e
a

N
o
r
t
h

o
f

d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d

S
t
u
d
y

A
r
e
a
:
-

W
a
t
e
r

W
k
k

D
a
t
a

S
h
e
e
t

S
7
6
/
7
-
8

K
a
i
a
p
o
i
-
K
a
i
r
a
k
i

B
r
o
w
n

N
Z
G
S

1
9
7
6
S
T
O
R
M
W
A
T
E
R

P
U
M
P
I
N
G

S
T
A
T
I
O
N
S
E
x
t
e
n
t

o
f

d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d
e
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e

h
a
z
a
r
d

s
t
u
d
y
a
r
e
a
P
l
e
a
s
e

n
o
t
e

t
h
e

l
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s

o
f

t
h
i
s

m
a
p
,

a
s

o
u
t
l
i
n
e
d

o
n

p
a
g
e

2
8
3
T
R
A
V
IS
R
O
A
D
P
A
G
E
S
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
W
IN
T
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
J
O
H
N
S
R
O
A
D
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L A
V
E
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
O
A
D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
M
A
I N
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
ROAD TUNNELL
W
IG
R
A
M
C
O
R
S
A
IR
B
A
Y
L
Y
T
T
E
L
T
O
N
G
O
V
E
R
N
O
R
S
B
A
Y
A
IR
P
O
R
T
T
R
I
B
U
T
A
R
Y

W
A
T
E
R
W
A
Y
,

O
P
E
N

D
R
A
I
N
S
P
I
P
E
D

W
A
T
E
R
W
A
Y
,

G
R
E
A
T
E
R

T
H
A
N

4
5
0
P
I
P
E
D

W
A
T
E
R
W
A
Y
,

B
R
I
C
K

B
A
R
R
E
L
S
Map 19: Seismic Hazard Foulwater Sewer and Pressure Mains
H
E
A
T
H
C
O
T
E
A
V
O
N
D
U
D
L
E
Y
C
R
E
E
K
S
T
Y
X
W
A
I M
A
K
A
R
I R
I
E
S
T
U
A
R
Y
I
M
P
O
R
T
A
N
T

N
O
T
E
1
.

T
h
e

Z
o
n
e

b
o
u
n
d
a
r
i
e
s

o
n

t
h
i
s

m
a
p

a
r
e

a
p
p
r
o
x
i
m
a
t
e

o
n
l
y
.

A
c
c
u
r
a
c
y

c
a
n

v
a
r
y

f
r
o
m

2
0
m

i
n

a

f
e
w

a
r
e
a
s

w
i
t
h

c
l
o
s
e
d

s
p
a
c
e
d

b
o
r
e
l
o
g
s

t
o

3
0
0
m

i
n

a
r
e
a
s

w
i
t
h

f
e
w

w
i
d
e
l
y

s
p
a
c
e
d

b
o
r
e
l
o
g
s
.
2
.

F
o
r

i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t

s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
s

a

s
i
t
e

s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c

s
t
u
d
y

i
s

n
e
e
d
e
d

t
o

a
c
c
u
r
a
t
e
l
y

d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e

t
h
e

s
o
i
l

p
r
o
f
i
l
e
,

t
h
e

d
e
g
r
e
e

o
f

l
i
k
e
l
y

s
h
a
k
i
n
g
,

a
n
d

t
o

a
s
s
e
s
s

t
h
e

l
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

h
a
z
a
r
d
.
S
O
U
R
C
E
S
D
e
t
a
i
l
e
d

E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e

S
t
u
d
y

A
r
e
a
:
-

T
h
e

E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e

H
a
z
a
r
d

i
n

C
h
r
i
s
t
c
h
u
r
c
h

E
l
d
e
r

e
t

a
l

(
E
Q
C
)

1
9
9
1
A
r
e
a

N
o
r
t
h

o
f

d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d

S
t
u
d
y

A
r
e
a
:
-

W
a
t
e
r

W
e
l
l

D
a
t
a

S
h
e
e
t

S
7
6
/
7
-
8

B
e
l
f
a
s
t

-

S
t
y
l
e

B
r
o
w
n

N
Z
G
S

1
9
7
5

W
a
t
e
r

W
e
l
l

D
a
t
a

S
h
e
e
t

S
7
6
/
4
-
5

K
a
i
a
p
o
i
-
K
a
i
r
a
k
i

B
r
o
w
n

N
Z
G
S

1
9
7
6
S
H
A
K
I
N
G

Z
O
N
E
S
L
I
Q
U
E
F
A
C
T
I
O
N

Z
O
N
E
S
Z
O
N
E
1
Z
O
N
E
2
Z
O
N
E
3
Z
O
N
E
2
A
Z
O
N
E
2
B
Z
O
N
E
3
A
Z
O
N
E
3
B
B
e
d
r
o
c
k
a
t s
h
a
llo
w
d
e
p
th
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
II-
V
ii
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
le
s
s
th
a
n
5
0
m
d
e
e
p
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
II
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
5
0
-
8
0
0
m
d
e
p
th
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
III-
IX
, h
ig
h
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
o
f g
r
o
u
n
d
m
o
tio
n
.
W
ith
in
Z
o
n
e
3
th
e
r
e
w
ill b
e
a
r
e
a
s
o
f p
r
o
n
o
u
n
c
e
d
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
a
n
d
in
te
n
s
ity
IX
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
0
-
3
0
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
1
0
-
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
-
-
3
0
%
fo
Z
o
n
e
3
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
1
0
-
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
3
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
S
E
I
S
M
I
C

K
E
Y
F
O
U
L
W
A
T
E
R

K
E
Y
G
R
A
V
I
T
Y

M
A
I
N
S
S
E
W
A
G
E

P
U
M
P
I
N
G

S
T
A
T
I
O
N
S
P
U
M
P
I
N
G

S
T
A
T
I
O
N

N
U
M
B
E
R
L
Y
T
T
E
L
T
O
N

W
A
T
E
R
M
A
I
N
S
7
8
B
R
I
C
K

B
A
R
R
E
L

S
E
W
E
R
S
E
W
E
R

O
V
E
R
F
L
O
W
S
S
E
W
A
G
E

T
R
E
A
T
M
E
N
T

A
R
E
A
S
E
x
t
e
n
t

o
f

D
e
t
a
i
l
e
d
E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e

H
a
z
a
r
d

S
t
u
d
y

A
r
e
a
P
l
e
a
s
e

n
o
t
e

t
h
e

l
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s

o
f

t
h
i
s

m
a
p
,

a
s

o
u
t
l
i
n
e
d

o
n

p
a
g
e

2
8
3
T
R
A
V
IS
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
W
IN
T
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
J
O
H
N
S
R
O
A
D
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L A
V
E
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
O
A
D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
M
A
I N
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
ROAD TUNNEL
W
IG
R
A
M
A
IR
P
O
R
T
C
O
R
S
A
IR
B
A
Y
P
O
R
T
O
F
L
Y
T
T
E
L
T
O
N
G
O
V
E
R
N
O
R
S
B
A
Y
P
A
G
E
S
R
O
A
D
P
R
IV
A
T
E
P
R
IV
A
T
E
7
6
7
7 7
8
3
8
1
2
0
5
6
6
3
4
6
3
5
4
5
3
7
5
5
3
0
3
1
3
4
7
0
7
1
2
7
5
2
5
9
5
7
4
8
1
5
4
4
1
9
2
0
1
8
1
2
1
3
1
1
1
4
1
0 9
5
1
2
8
2
7
2
6
3
9
5
4
2
5
4
0
7
6
4
1
5
8
5
3 7
4
6
2
7
5
8 5
4
3
2
2
1
2
2
2
3
4
3
6
8
4
2
6
6
6
0
8
1
6
1
7
3
6
7
6
5
8
2
7
9
8
0
3
3
5
0
Maps 303
Map 20: Seismic Hazard Water Services (Major Pipelines in Metropolitan Area)
H
E
A
T
H
C
O
T
E
A
V
O
N
D
U
D
L
E
Y
C
R
E
E
K
S
T
Y
X
W
A
I M
A
K
A
R
I R
I
E
S
T
U
A
R
Y
E
x
t
e
n
t

o
f

D
e
t
a
i
l
e
d
E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e

H
a
z
a
r
d

S
t
u
d
y

A
r
e
a
P
l
e
a
s
e

n
o
t
e

t
h
e

l
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s

o
f

t
h
i
s

m
a
p
,

a
s

o
u
t
l
i
n
e
d

o
n

p
a
g
e

2
8
3
N
3
k
m
2
1
0
1
I
M
P
O
R
T
A
N
T

N
O
T
E
1
.

T
h
e

Z
o
n
e

b
o
u
n
d
a
r
i
e
s

o
n

t
h
i
s

m
a
p

a
r
e

a
p
p
r
o
x
i
m
a
t
e

o
n
l
y
.

A
c
c
u
r
a
c
y

c
a
n

v
a
r
y

f
r
o
m

2
0
m

i
n

a

f
e
w

a
r
e
a
s

w
i
t
h

c
l
o
s
e
d

s
p
a
c
e
d

b
o
r
e
l
o
g
s

t
o

3
0
0
m

i
n

a
r
e
a
s

w
i
t
h

f
e
w

w
i
d
e
l
y

s
p
a
c
e
d

b
o
r
e
l
o
g
s
.
2
.

F
o
r

i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t

s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
s

a

s
i
t
e

s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c

s
t
u
d
y

i
s

n
e
e
d
e
d

t
o

a
c
c
u
r
a
t
e
l
y

d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e

t
h
e

s
o
i
l

p
r
o
f
i
l
e
,

t
h
e

d
e
g
r
e
e

o
f

l
i
k
e
l
y

s
h
a
k
i
n
g
,

a
n
d

t
o

a
s
s
e
s
s

t
h
e

l
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

h
a
z
a
r
d
.
S
O
U
R
C
E
S
D
e
t
a
i
l
e
d

E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e

S
t
u
d
y

A
r
e
a
:
-

T
h
e

E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e

H
a
z
a
r
d

i
n

C
h
r
i
s
t
c
h
u
r
c
h

E
l
d
e
r

e
t

a
l

(
E
Q
C
)

1
9
9
1
A
r
e
a

N
o
r
t
h

o
f

d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d

S
t
u
d
y

A
r
e
a
:
-

W
a
t
e
r

W
e
l
l

D
a
t
a

S
h
e
e
t

S
7
6
/
7
-
8

B
e
l
f
a
s
t

-

S
t
y
l
e

B
r
o
w
n

N
Z
G
S

1
9
7
5

W
a
t
e
r

W
e
l
l

D
a
t
a

S
h
e
e
t

S
7
6
/
4
-
5

K
a
i
a
p
o
i
-
K
a
i
r
a
k
i

B
r
o
w
n

N
Z
G
S

1
9
7
6
W
A
T
E
R

S
E
R
V
I
C
E
S

K
E
Y
W
A
T
E
R
M
A
I
N

G
R
E
A
T
E
R

T
H
A
N

2
0
0
P
U
M
P
I
N
G

S
T
A
T
I
O
N
R
E
S
E
R
V
O
I
R
L
Y
T
T
E
L
T
O
N

W
A
T
E
R
M
A
I
N
S
S
H
A
K
I
N
G

Z
O
N
E
S
L
I
Q
U
E
F
A
C
T
I
O
N

Z
O
N
E
S
Z
O
N
E
1
Z
O
N
E
2
Z
O
N
E
3
Z
O
N
E
2
A
Z
O
N
E
2
B
Z
O
N
E
3
A
Z
O
N
E
3
B
B
e
d
r
o
c
k
a
t s
h
a
llo
w
d
e
p
th
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
II-
V
ii
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
le
s
s
th
a
n
5
0
m
d
e
e
p
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
II
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
5
0
-
8
0
0
m
d
e
p
th
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
III-
IX
, h
ig
h
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
o
f g
r
o
u
n
d
m
o
tio
n
.
W
ith
in
Z
o
n
e
3
th
e
r
e
w
ill b
e
a
r
e
a
s
o
f p
r
o
n
o
u
n
c
e
d
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
a
n
d
in
te
n
s
ity
IX
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
0
-
3
0
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
1
0
-
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
-
-
3
0
%
fo
Z
o
n
e
3
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
1
0
-
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
3
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
S
E
I
S
M
I
C

K
E
Y
T
R
A
V
IS
R
O
A
D
P
A
G
E
S
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
W
IN
T
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
J
O
H
N
S
R
O
A
D
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L A
V
E
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
O
A
D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
M
A
I N
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
ROAD TUNNEL
W
IG
R
A
M
C
O
R
S
A
IR
B
A
Y
L
Y
T
T
E
L
T
O
N
G
O
V
E
R
N
O
R
S
B
A
Y
A
IR
P
O
R
T
Map 21: Seismic Hazard Petroleum Products
H
E
A
T
H
C
O
T
E
A
V
O
N
D
U
D
L
E
Y
C
R
E
E
K
S
T
Y
X
W
A
I M
A
K
A
R
I R
I
S
H
A
K
I
N
G

Z
O
N
E
S
L
I
Q
U
E
F
A
C
T
I
O
N

Z
O
N
E
S
Z
O
N
E
1
Z
O
N
E
2
Z
O
N
E
3
Z
O
N
E
2
A
Z
O
N
E
2
B
Z
O
N
E
3
A
Z
O
N
E
3
B
B
e
d
r
o
c
k
a
5
s
h
a
llo
w
d
e
p
th
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
II-
V
ii
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
le
s
s
th
a
n
5
0
m
d
e
e
p
S
h
a
k
in
g
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
II
S
e
d
im
e
n
ts
5
0
-
8
0
0
m
d
e
p
th
in
te
n
s
ity
M
M
V
III-
IX
, h
ig
h
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
o
f g
r
o
u
n
d
m
o
tio
n
.
W
ith
in
Z
o
n
e
3
th
e
r
e
w
ill b
e
a
r
e
a
s
o
f p
r
o
n
o
u
n
c
e
d
a
m
p
lific
a
tio
n
a
n
d
in
te
n
s
ity
IX
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
0
-
3
0
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
1
0
-
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
2
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
a
n
d
s
2
-
1
0
m
d
e
p
th
2
-
-
3
0
%
fo
Z
o
n
e
3
A
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
P
r
e
d
o
m
in
a
n
tly
s
ilts
a
n
d
s
a
n
d
y
s
ilts
2
-
5
m
d
e
p
th
1
0
-
1
5
%
o
f Z
o
n
e
3
B
c
o
u
ld
liq
u
e
fy
S
E
I
S
M
I
C

K
E
Y
I
M
P
O
R
T
A
N
T

N
O
T
E
1
.

T
h
e

Z
o
n
e

b
o
u
n
d
a
r
i
e
s

o
n

t
h
i
s

m
a
p

a
r
e

a
p
p
r
o
x
i
m
a
t
e

o
n
l
y
.

A
c
c
u
r
a
c
y

c
a
n

v
a
r
y

f
r
o
m

2
0
m

i
n

a

f
e
w

a
r
e
a
s

w
i
t
h

c
l
o
s
e
d

s
p
a
c
e
d

b
o
r
e
l
o
g
s

t
o

3
0
0
m

i
n

a
r
e
a
s

w
i
t
h

f
e
w

w
i
d
e
l
y

s
p
a
c
e
d

b
o
r
e
l
o
g
s
.
2
.

F
o
r

i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t

s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
s

a

s
i
t
e

s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c

s
t
u
d
y

i
s

n
e
e
d
e
d

t
o

a
c
c
u
r
a
t
e
l
y

d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e

t
h
e

s
o
i
l

p
r
o
f
i
l
e
,

t
h
e

d
e
g
r
e
e

o
f

l
i
k
e
l
y

s
h
a
k
i
n
g
,

a
n
d

t
o

a
s
s
e
s
s

t
h
e

l
i
q
u
e
f
a
c
t
i
o
n

h
a
z
a
r
d
.
S
O
U
R
C
E
S
D
e
t
a
i
l
e
d

E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e

S
t
u
d
y

A
r
e
a
:
-

T
h
e

E
a
r
t
h
q
u
a
k
e

H
a
z
a
r
d

i
n

C
h
r
i
s
t
c
h
u
r
c
h

E
l
d
e
r

e
t

a
l

(
E
Q
C
)

1
9
9
1
A
r
e
a

N
o
r
t
h

o
f

d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d

S
t
u
d
y

A
r
e
a
:
-

W
a
t
e
r

W
e
l
l

D
a
t
a

S
h
e
e
t

S
7
6
/
7
-
8

B
e
l
f
a
s
t

-

S
t
y
l
e

B
r
o
w
n

N
Z
G
S

1
9
7
5

W
a
t
e
r

W
e
l
l

D
a
t
a

S
h
e
e
t

S
7
6
/
4
-
5

K
a
i
a
p
o
i
-
K
a
i
r
a
k
i

B
r
o
w
n

N
Z
G
S

1
9
7
6
P
E
T
R
O
L
E
U
M

K
E
Y
L
I
Q
U
I
G
A
S

P
I
P
E
L
I
N
E
M
O
B
I
L

O
I
L

P
I
P
E
L
I
N
E
E
S
T
U
A
R
Y
W
IG
R
A
M
A
IR
P
O
R
T
C
H
R
IS
T
C
H
U
R
C
H
IN
T
E
R
N
A
T
IO
N
A
L
A
IR
P
O
R
T
(
H
A
R
E
W
O
O
D
)
N
3
k
m
2
1
0
1
P
O
R
T
O
F
L
Y
T
T
L
E
T
O
N
C
O
R
S
A
IR
B
A
Y
P
l
e
a
s
e

n
o
t
e

t
h
e

l
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s

o
f

t
h
i
s

m
a
p
,

a
s

o
u
t
l
i
n
e
d

o
n

p
a
g
e

2
8
3
T
R
A
V
IS
R
O
A
D
P
A
G
E
S
R
O
A
D
L
IN
W
O
O
D
A
V
E
W
IN
T
E
R
S
R
O
A
D
J
O
H
N
S
R
O
A
D
M
E
M
O
R
IA
L A
V
E
H
A
L
S
W
E
L
L
R
O
A
D
Y
A
L
D
H
U
R
S
T
R
O
A
D
M
A
I N
S
O
U
T
H
R
O
A
D
ROAD TUNNEL
G
O
V
E
R
N
O
R
S
B
A
Y
Bibliography 305
Bibliography
quakes. Wellington Case Study Project Report, Au-
gust 1991.
Centre for Advanced Engineering. Risk Assessment of
Industrial and Natural Hazards. Proceedings of a
Workshop 21-22 August 1991.
Christchurch Swamp to City. A Short History of the
Christchurch Drainage Board 1875-1989.
Cotton, Elden A. Board of Water and Power Commis-
sioners Report on Increased Seismic Risk to Power
System Facilities. Published in Los Angeles, Califor-
nia in July 1 1994.
Dames & Moore. The Northridge Earthquake January
17 1994. California, 1994.
Earthquake and Geological Hazard. Mitigation Strat-
egy. December 1995. Policy and Planning Depart-
ment. Wellington Regional Council.
Earthquake Business Plan. A Planning Guide for
Commercial Organisations. Ministry of Civil De-
fence.
Earthquake Business Plan. Planning Guide for Cor-
porate Organisations. Ministry of Civil Defence.
Earthquake Business Plan. Saving Your Goods and
Chattels. Ministry of Civil Defence.
Earthquake Damage Evaluation Data for California.
ATC Applied Technology Council 1985.
Earthquake Engineering Research Institute. Northridge
Earthquake January 17, 1994. Published in California
in March 1994.
Earthquake Engineering Research Institute. Northridge
Earthquake January 17, 1994. Preliminary Recon-
naissance Report.
Earthquake Engineering Research Institute. Slides of
the January 17, 1994 Northridge Earthquake. Pro-
duced in California, 1994.
East Bay Municipal Utility Department. Personal and
Family Emergency Programme Package. Published
in California in 1991.
East Bay Municipal Utility District. Emergency Op-
erations Plan. Published in Oakland, California in
1994.
Advisory Notes on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering..
A Report prepared by the Technical Committees of the
ASCE Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake En-
gineering.
Benuska, Lee. Earthquake Spectra. The Profes-
sional Journal of the Earthquake Engineering Re-
search Institute, Supplement to Volume 6, Loma Prieta
Earthquake Reconnaissance Report. Published in
California in 1990.
Berrill J.B., Mulqueen P.C., Pautre J.-L.,. Ooi E.T.C,
March 1994.. Liquefaction at Kaiapoi in the 1901
Cheviot, N.Z., Earthquake Department of Civil Engi-
neering, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New
Zealand. Research Report.
Brown, L.J, .and Weeber. J.B. Geology of the Christ-
church Urban Area, Institute of Geological and Nu-
clear Sciences 1992.
Buckle,I.G. (Editor). The Northridge California Earth-
quake of January 17 1994: Performance of Highway
Bridges, National Centre for Earthquake Engineering
Research, State University of New York at Buffalo.
Published Buffalo, New York, March 24, 1994.
Bulletin of New Zealand National Society for Earth-
quake Engineering, Volume 27, No.4, December 1994.
Northridge Earthquake Reconnaissance Report. Pub-
lished in Waikanae, New Zealand in 1994.
California Office of Emergency Services. Folder con-
taining miscellaneous pamphlets mainly relating to the
Northridge Earthquake and methods of obtaining as-
sistance after the earthquake.
California Office of Emergency Services. Model Or-
dinances for Post Disaster Recovery and Reconstruc-
tion. Published in California.
Caltrans. Accelerat Caltrans Action Plan to get all
our Freeways moving again. Spring 1994. Published
in Los Angeles, California.
Caren, M.D. Pacific Bell California Joint New Zea-
land/Los Angeles Workshop (paper only). Published
in California in 1994.
Centre for Advanced Engineering. Integrated Risk
Management Conference Abstracts, Wellington 12-13
March 1997.
Centre for Advanced Engineering. Lifelines in Earth-
East Bay Municipal Utility District. G. & E. Systems
Inc. East Bay Municipal Utility District Seismic Evalu-
ation Program Final Report. Published in California,
January 21 1994.
East Bay Municipal Utility District. The Mokelumne
Aqueduct Seismic Upgrade Project. Published in
California, 1994.
Engineering Lifelines Study. Bridge Strengthening
Programme. Design Services Unit, Christchurch City
Council, February 1996.
EQE Engineering. January 17, 1994 Northridge,
California Earthquake. Published in California in
1994.
EQE Engineering. Summary of the 1987 Bay of Plenty,
New Zealand Earthquake. Published in California in
1987.
EQE Engineering. The April 22, 1991, Valle de la
Estrella Costa Rica Earthquake. Published in Califor-
nia in 1991.
EQE Engineering. The December 7, 1988 Armenia,
USSR Earthquake . Published in California, 1989.
EQE Engineering. The July 16, 1990, Philippines
Earthquake. Published in California in 1990.
EQE Engineering. The October 17, 1989 Loma Prieta
Earthquake, October 1989. Published in California,
1989.
EQE International. Review for 1993 Hokkaido Nansei
- Oki Earthquake of July 12 1993.
EQE International. Risk Safety Engineering World-
wide.
EQE International. The January 17, 1995 Kobe Earth-
quake and EQE Summary Report.
Estimating Losses from Earthquakes in China in the
Forthcoming 50 Years. Department of Seismic Hazard
Prevention. State Seismological Bureau, China, 1992.
Federal Emergency Management Agency. When Dis-
aster Strikes. A Handbook for Media. Published in
Washington, D.C. December 1990.
Field Manual Post Earthquake Safety Evaluation of
Buildings. ATC 20 - 1, April 1994.
Gas Company. Quick Reference Guide. Published in
Los Angeles, California in 1994/1993.
Gilbert, Jerome B. Bay Area Water Utilities Response
to Earthquake (Paper only). Published in California in
1989.
Giles, Robert. Joint New Zealand/Los Angeles Life-
lines Workshop, August 15/16 1994, Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power. Published in Los
Angeles, California in 1994.
Gough Janet D. Risk and Uncertainty. July 1988.
Information Paper No.10. Centre for Resource Man-
agement.
Gough, Janet D A Review of the Literature Pertaining
to Perceived Risk and Acceptable Risk and the
Methods used to estimate them. May 1990. Informa-
tion Paper No. 14. Centre for Resource Management.
Gough, Janet D. Risk Communication: The Implica-
tions for Risk Management. December 1991. Informa-
tion Paper No. 33. Centre for Resource Management.
Governors Office of American Emergency Services.
Earthquake Recovery: A Survival Manual for Local
Government. Published in California in September
1993.
Governors Office of Emergency Services. Northridge
Earthquake, January 17 1994. Interim Report. Cali-
fornia, April 1994.
Greater Los Angeles Press Club. Earthquake Manual
- a Manual for the News Media on the first 72 Hours.
Published in California in March 1990.
Guilhem, Olivier and Berrill, John. Canterprise. Project
No. CP/2245. Cone Penetrometer Results and Esti-
mates of Liquefaction Potential at Some Key Lifeline
Sites. August 1993.
Hopkins, David C. Extending the Lifespan of Struc-
tures. San Francisco. August 1995. Report by King-
ston Morrison.
Hopkins, David C. Fourth US Conference on Lifeline
Earthquake Engineering. San Francisco. August
1995. Report by. Kingston Morrison.
Hutt City Council. Emergency Response Plan. Part 2.
Earthquake Emergency Water Supply.
Institution of Engineers, Australia. Are You At Risk?
Imagine Expectations. November 1990.
Jones, B.S. Los Angeles Earthquake Report, New
Zealand Fire Service, Wellington, March 1994.
Lamb, John. Christchurch Engineering Lifelines
Project - Short Paper presented at the Joint New
Zealand/Los Angeles Lifelines Workshop. Published
in Christchurch, New Zealand on 11 August 1994.
Latipow, Katherine Boxer. Paper presented to the
Joint New Zealand/Los Angeles Lifelines Workshop
Bibliography 307
regarding state of California Governors Office of
Emergency Services (paper only). Published in Los
Angeles, California in 1994.
Le Val Lund. Technical Council on Lifeline Earth-
quake Engineering. A.S.C.E. Northridge Earthquake,
January 17, 1994. Lifeline Performance.
Lifelines Workshop Programme. Joint New Zealand/
Los Angeles Workshop 15/16 August 1994. Published
in Los Angeles, California in 1994.
Local Authority Engineering. Various articles on the
Edgecumbe earthquake, March 2, 1987.
Lopez, Marciano and Tognazzini, Ron and Minor,
Lawren. Impact of the 1994 Northridge Earthquake on
the Los Angeles Electrical System (paper only). Pub-
lished in Los Angeles, California, 29 April 1994.
Lund, Le Val. Northridge Earthquake, January 17,
1994. Lifeline Introduction, Water and Waste Water
Lifeline Performance, ASCE - TCLEE Draft Report.
Published in California, August 15, 1994.
May, John et al. The Southern California Gas Com-
pany Response to the Northridge Earthquake (paper
only). Published in Los Angeles, California, August
15/16, 1994.
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California.
The Northridge Earthquake, January 17, 1994. Jensen
Filtration Plant Report. Published in Los Angeles,
California in 1994.
N.Z. National Society for Earthquake Engineering,
Volume 27, No.3, September 1994.
N.Z. National Society for Earthquake Engineering.
Draft Guidelines for Assessing and Strengthening
Earthquake Risk Buildings. 10 February 1995.
National Research Council. Practical Lessons from
the Loma Prieta Earthquake. Published by National
Academy Press, Washington D.C. in 1994.
Norton, Bruce. Background Reports on Northridge
Earthquake. California by California Seismic Safety
Commission, August 1994.
Norton, John and Hopkins, David. US/NZ Lifelines
Workshop - Short Paper. Published in Wellington,
New Zealand in 1994.
Official Commuter Action Guide by Southern Califor-
nia Transportation Providers (pamphlet only). Pub-
lished in Los Angeles, California in February 1994.
Ostrom, Dennis. A Summary of the January 17
Northridge Earthquake. Impact on Edison facility (pa-
per only). Published in Los Angeles, California, 1994.
Owens F, Kirk R.M., .Bell D.H, Cowan H., Pettinga J.
and Todd D. Hazards in Canterbury. Canterbury
Regional Council, June 1994.
Pacific Gas and Electric Company. Programme for
Reducing Earthquake Vulnerability of Gas and Elec-
tric Systems by the Year 2000. 1993 Report. Published
in California, June 1994.
tric Systems by the Year 2000. Published in California,
December 1990.
Park, Professor Robert Standard Risk Management
AS/NZS 4360:1995 N.Z. Engineering March 1995.
The Great Hanshin Earthquake.
Procedures for Earthquake Safety Evaluation of Build-
ings. Governors Office of Emergency Services. State
of California. ATC 20 1994.
Proceedings of the 6
th
US Japan Workshop on Earth-
quake Disaster Prevention for Lifeline Systems, July
18-19, 1995. Public Works Research Institute, Minis-
try of Construction.
Pyle, Eric and Gough, Janet D. Environmental Risk
Assessment for New Zealand. July 1991. Information
Paper No. 29. Centre for Resource Management.
Review of the Seismological Work in China. State
Seismological Bureau, 1992.
Schiff, Anshel J. Joint New Zealand/Los Angeles
Lifelines Workshop, Federation, Professional and Pri-
vate Initiatives in Lifelines Earthquake Preparedness
(paper only). Published in Los Angeles, California in
1994.
Schiff, Anshel J. Earthquake Spectra. The Profes-
sional Journal of the Earthquake Engineering Research
Institute, Supplement A to Volume 7, Philippines
Earthquake Reconnaissance Report. Published in Cali-
fornia in 1991.
Schiff, Anshel J. Guide to Post Earthquake Investiga-
tion of Lifelines, Technical Council on Lifeline Earth-
quake Engineering, Monograph No.3, August 1991.
Published in New York in 1991.
Schiff, Anshel J. (Editor). Guide to Post Earthquake
Investigation of Lifelines, Technical Council on Life-
line Earthquake Engineering. August 1991.
Seismic Vulnerability and Impact of Disruption of
Lifelines in the Conterminous United States. ATC
Applied Technology Council 1985.
Solorzano, Rafael et al. Sewer Damage from the
Northridge Earthquake (paper only). Published in Los
Angeles, California, in 1994.
State of California Office of Emergency Services,
Division of Utilities. Several Mutual Aid Agreements.
Published in California in 1994.
State/Federal Hazard Mitigation Survey Team. Report
for the October 17 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake
California. Published in California in January 1990.
Stewart, Jonathan P. et. al. Preliminary Report on the
Principal Geotechnical Aspects of the January 17,
1994, Northridge Earthquake (index only). Earth-
quake Engineering Research Centre, College of Engi-
neering, University of California at Berkeley. Pub-
lished in California in June 1994.
Taber, John and Cowan, Hugh A. Measurement of
Earthquake Ground Shaking at Characteristic Sites in
Christchurch, Report prepared for the Earthquake Com-
mission and Canterbury Regional Council.
TEPHRA June 1996. Articles on Risk Management
and Natural Disasters. Ministry of Civil Defence.
Trifunac, M.D. et al. A Note on Distribution of Uncor-
rected Peak Ground Accelerations During the
Northridge, California Earthquake of 17 January 1994.
Published at the University of South California, Los
Angeles in 1994.
Wellington Earthquake Lifelines Group, 1993 Report.
Wellington Regional Bulk Water Department. Emer-
gency Response Plan. 1994.
Works Development Services Corporation (NZ) Ltd.
Report for New Zealand Earthquake and War Dam-
ages Commission on the Effects of Tsunamis in New
Zealand, August 1988.
Yates, R. Northridge Earthquake. Transportation
Response After Action Report. Published in Los Ange-
les, California, in March 1994.
Participant Contact Details 309
Project Team Participants
Contact Details
Steering
Committee
Mr John Lamb
Project Manager
Christchurch Engineering Lifelines
42 Lynfield Avenue
CHRISTCHURCH 8004
Phone: (03) 358 5884
Mr Kevin OKane
Manager, Mitigation Research &
Development
Ministry of Civil Defence
PO Box 5010
WELLINGTON
Phone: (04) 495 6836
Fax: (04) 473 7369
Email: okanek@actrix.cren.nz
Mr Brian Hasell
Chief Executive
PO Box 94
ASHBURTON
(formerly Group Manager Corporate Policy,
Canterbury Regional Council)
Phone: (03) 308 5139
Fax: (03) 308 1820
Email: brianh@ashburtondc.govt.nz
Mr Allan Watson
Manager Water Services
PO Box 237
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 371 1303
Fax: (03) 371 1387
Email: watsona@ccc.govt.nz
Mr Stephen Franklin
Engineering Consultant
PO Box 1473
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 353 3035
Fax: (03) 353 3041
Email:stephen.franklin@telecom.co.nz
Mr Mark Gordon
City Streets Manager
PO Box 237
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: 025 220 7250
Fax: (09) 575 0919
Email: mark.gordon@ccc.govt.nz
Mr John Lumsden
Projects Director
Private Bag 4800
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 364 2219
Fax: (03) 364 2069
Email: j.lumsden@cae.canterbury.ac.nz
Mr Richard Keys
Otago Regional Council
Private Bag
DUNEDIN
(formerly Development Engineer
Phone: (03) 474 0827
Fax: (03) 479 0015
Email: richardk@orc.govt.nz
Mr Ian McCahon
Manager
PO Box 13 052
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 379 8432
Fax: (03) 366 7780
Mr Jim Williamson
Director of Operations
PO Box 237
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 371 1607
Fax: (03) 371 1786
Email: jim.williamson@ccc.govt.nz
Task Group 1
Hazards
Mr Ian McCahon
The Manager
PO Box 13 052
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 379 8432
Fax: (03) 366 7780
Mr David Bell
Senior Lecturer in Engineering Geology
Department of Geology
Private Bag 4800
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 364 2717
Fax: (03) 364 2769
Email: d.bell@geol.canterbury.ac.nz
Mr Tony Boyle
Structures & Hazards Planning Manager
PO Box 345
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 365 3828
Fax: (03) 365 3194
Email: tony@crc.govt.nz
Dr Ian Owens
Senior Lecturer in Geography
Department of Geography
Private Bag 4800
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 364 2927
Fax: (03) 354 2907
Email: ian@geog.canterbury.ac.nz
Mr Derek Todd
Tonkin & Taylor
PO Box 13055
CHRISTCHURCH
(formerly Coastal Investigations Officer
Phone: (03) 365 3703
Fax: (03) 365 3742
Email: tontay@chchplanet.org.nz
Mr John Weeber
Hydrogeologist
PO Box 345
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 365 3828
Fax: (03) 365 3194
Email: johnw@crc.govt.nz
Hazards Task Group
Other Advisors
Dr John Berrill
Reader in Civil Engineering
Department of Civil Engineering
Private Bag 4800
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 366 7001
Fax: (03) 364 2758
Email: berrill@civl.canterbury.ac.nz
Dr Neil Cherry
Department of Natural Resources
Engineering
Lincoln University
PO Box 94
LINCOLN UNIVERSITY
Phone: (03) 325 3828
Fax: (03) 325 3845
Email: cherry@kea.lincoln.ac.nz
Mr Ken Couling
Land Drainage Manager
Water Services Unit
PO Box 237
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 371 1388
Fax: (03) 371 1387
Email: ken.couling@ccc.govt.nz
Dr Derek Goring
National Institute of Water & Atmospheric
Research
PO Box 8602
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 343 7868
Fax: (03) 348 5548
Email: d.goring@niwa.cri.nz
Professor Bob Kirk
H.O.D.
Department of Geography
Private Bag 4800
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 364 2893
Fax: (03) 364 2907
Email: bob@geog.canterbury.ac.nz
Mr Mark Yetton
Geotech Consulting Limited
Charteris Bay
R D 1
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 329 4044
Fax: (03) 329 4044
Task Group 2 Civil
Services
Mr Allan Watson
Manager Water Services
PO Box 237
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 371 1303
Fax: (03) 371 1387
Email: watsona@ccc.govt.nz
Mr Neil Bennett
Principal Consultant
SERCO
PO Box 19 683
CHRISTCHURCH
(formerly Asset Manager
Banks Peninsula District Council)
Phone: (03) 384 5974
Fax: (03) 384 1985
Email: ntbennett@clear.net.nz
Mr Neville Stewart
Senior Engineering Officer
Waste Management Unit
PO Box 237
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 371 1366
Fax: (03) 371 1384
Email: neville.stewart@ccc.govt.nz
Mr Mike Berry
Liquid Wastes Engineer
Waste Management Unit
PO Box 237
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 371 1365
Fax: (03) 371 1384
Email: mike.berry@ccc.govt.nz
Mr Ken Couling
Land Drainage Manager
Water Services Unit
PO Box 237
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 371 1388
Fax: (03) 371 1387
Email: ken.couling@ccc.govt.nz
Mr Allan Dowie
Installation Manager
Shell NZ Limited
PO Box 24
LYTTELTON
(Rep. of Petrol Industry
Emergency Action Committee)
Phone: (03) 328 7395
Fax: (03) 328 7452
Mr Dave May
Civil Engineer
Water Services
PO Box 237
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 371 1329
Fax: (03) 371 1387
Email: mayd@ccc.govt.nz
Mr Alan Marshall
Engineer (Protection Systems)
PO Box 1473
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 363 8448
Fax: (03) 363 8015
Email: alan.marshall@telecom.co.nz
Mr Bob Watts
Planning Manager
Water Services Unit
PO Box 237
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 371 1393
Fax: (03) 371 1387
Task Group 3 Electrical
& Communications
Networks
Mr Stephen Franklin
Engineering Consultant
PO Box 1473
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 353 3035
Fax: (03) 353 3041
Email: stephen.franklin@telecom.co.nz
Mr Ray Basher
Operations Support Manager
Transpower New Zealand Limited
PO Box 21 154
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 365 6948
Fax: (03) 379 1525
Email: basherr@transpower.co.nz
Mr Peter Brash
(formerly Administration Manager
Television NZ Limited
PO Box 1945)
CHRISTCHURCH
Mr Roger Smithies
Engineer (Planning)
Telecom NZ Limited
PO Box 1473
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 353 3634
Fax: (03) 366 3818
Email: rbss@telecom.co.nz
Mr Russ Botting
Senior Engineering Consultant
Fire Protection
PO Box 1473
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 353 3569
Fax: (03) 366 9127
Mr Bud Chapman
Specialist
Communications Centres
PO Box 6147
Marion Square
WELLINGTON
Phone: (04) 801 8939
Mobile: 021 377 874
Mr John Coleman
Supervising Technician
NZ Police Engineering Workshop
PO Box 2109
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 363 7640
Fax: (03) 365 3515
Email: johnc@tpnet.co.nz
Mr Noel Maginnity
Technical Centre
Radio Network
PO Box 1484
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 379 9600
Fax: (03) 365 5635
Mr John MacKenzie
Senior Engineer
Montgomery Watson Limited
PO Box 13052
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 343 8715
Fax: (03) 366 7780
Email: peter.crellan@xtra.co.nz
Participant Contact Details 311
Mr Grant Roberts
Assistant Manager
Lincrad Aerials
17 Washbournes Road
CHRISTCHURCH
(formerly Director of Resources
Canterbury Television Limited)
Phone: (03) 348 0659
Fax: (03) 348 4043
Mr John ODonnell
Network Asset Manager
Southpower
Private Bag 4999
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 363 9781
Fax: (03) 363 9707
Email: odonnellj@southpower.co.nz
Task Group 4
Transportation
Mr Mark Gordon
City Streets Manager
PO Box 237
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: 025 2207 250
Fax: (09) 575 0919
Email: mark.gordon@ccc.govt.nz
Mr David Bates
Regional Highways Engineer
Transit NZ
PO Box 1479
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 366 4455
Fax: (03) 365 6576
Email: dbates@transitnz.govt.nz
Mr Tony Barnett
(formerly Transport Planning Engineer
Christchurch City Council)
PO Box 237
CHRISTCHURCH
Mr John Robb
(formerly Transportation Engineer
PO Box 345
CHRISTCHURCH
Mr Russell Herbert
Operations Group
Tranz Rail Limited
Private Bag 4723
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 372 8425
Fax: (03) 372 8282
Mr Ken McAnergney
Airport Planner
Christchurch International Airport Limited
PO Box 14001
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 353 7716
Fax: (03) 353 7730
Email: kmcanergney@cial.co.nz
Mr Mike McGlinchey
Maintenance Manager
Private Bag 501
LYTTELTON
(formerly Engineering Services Manager,
Christchurch International Airport Limited)
Phone: (03) 328 8198
Fax: (03) 328 7828
Email: mike.mcglinchey@lpc.co.nz
Mr Neil McLennan
Engineering Services Manager
Private Bag 501
LYTTELTON
Phone: (03) 328 8198
Fax: (03) 328 7828
Email: neil.mclennan@lpc.co.nz
Mr John Reynolds
Design Engineer Civil
Opus International Consultants Limited
PO Box 1482
CHRISTCHURCH
(formerly Works Consultancy Services
Limited)
Phone: (03) 365 1530
Fax: (03) 365 7858
Email: john.reynolds@opus.co.nz
Mr Graeme Wilson
Programme Manager
City Streets Unit
(formerly Road Programming & Pavements
Engineer)
PO Box 237
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 371 1656
Fax: (03) 371 1864
Email: graeme.wilson@ccc.govt.nz
Task Group 5 Fire
Services
Mr Barry G J Shields
Assistant Area Chief Fire Officer
NZ Fire Services
PO Box 13 747
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 371 3603
Fax: (03) 371 3622
Task Group 6 Building
Services
Mr Iain Drewett
Consulting Engineer
24C Bowenvale Avenue
CHRISTCHURCH 2
Phone: (03) 332 0133
Mr Grant Wilkinson
Director
Holmes Consulting Group Limited
PO Box 701
CHRISTCHURCH
Phone: (03) 366 3366
Fax: (03) 379 2169
Email: grant@holmes.co.nz

Lifelines Risk Realities

Transféré par

Informations du document

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Lifelines Risk Realities

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Please Note:

. Furthermore, with the

during subsequent cy-

is effective overburden stress in kPa.

given by the expres-

is found in the chart repro-

. Using this result

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi