Koha Digest # 28 (1994)

DOSSIER

BLOOD, SOIL AND TEARS

by VETON SURROI / Prishtina

Until the first half of the next century, says the author of the most recent book on Kosova, dr.
Krstic, half of Serbia's population (he includes Kosova here) will be Serb and the other half
Albanian. That is, continues the author, it may happen that half of the members of the Serbian
parliament might be Albanians, and then institutionally they will ethnically dominate in the
future Serbian state (this implies, for example that in 2061, the members of the Serbian
parliament will vote for the unification of Serbia with Albania, as one of its provinces).

This projection, which was made by the Serbian demographers, will really make the
projection of the Serbian interest about the future of Kosova and the Albanians. According to
this projection, it is in the future ethnic Serbian interest to eliminate the direct presence of the
Albanians in the Serbian state. And this interest should be explained and complemented with
an ideological platform: about the historic Kosova.

The whole analysis of Krstic's book, equipped with the most sophisticated facto-graphic
instruments in Serbia so far, in fact closes a series of combinations of Serbian old political
arguments (Kosova is the historical-cultural-state cradle of Serbia and Serbianism), of threats
to Serbs (the Albanians will increase their numbers and they will dominate; the loss of the
central Serbian control over Kosova is a matter of days) and threats to Albanians (we know
that you will detach in one way or the other from the Serbian control, but you can't do this
with the whole of Kosova; you can control only the part that we will give you).

Krstic's historical and demographic arguments were already confronted in the two previous
texts from Prishtina. What remains to be said, according to me, are only some conspicuous
political theses of the author which don't go along with democracy, the human rights, the
legality of human development, ie. the universal human values.

If it were even true that there is a dominating number of Serbian historical monuments in
Kosova (which is very disputable), a dilemma always remains: what is the Serbian national
interest? It is to cultivate museums, and based on other historical-cultural monuments develop
a society of one custos and archaeologist per Serb, or is it to think about the educational,
economic, health-care and other needs of the Serbs. As long as there is no answer to what the
Serbs want in Kosova, there can be no rationalization of any solution in Kosova.

A thesis, predominating throughout the book is centered in the need that historical values that
Kosova represents for the Serbs be fulfilled with the human dimension (with people, with

The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by Veton
Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha
soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the
name of Koha Ditorë. W ith the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on
http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org.
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Serbs). Everywhere in the world this is known as colonialism (the books takes the example of
Israel) and the attempt to colonize is known in the UN documents as the change (alteration)
of the ethnic composition of the regions (states).

Even more, the change of the ethnic structure has not had a peaceful experience so far, and
the proposals on population transfers (having Albanians moving from one region to the
other), would be one of the most terrible moments of the dismantlement of Yugoslavia. In the
UN documents, this process is defined as genocide.

There is one more question in respect to this issue: if the historical monuments (the historic
principle) are enough for the Serbian statehood and the domination over Kosova, why is there
a need to have dominating Serbian population, or settle Serbs in Kosova? In order to claim
that from the moment Serbs make the majority in Kosova, the ethnic principle will be
applicable, apart from the historical principle (and the author claims that it is losing
importance on a daily basis)?

If the Albanians insist to keep Kosova as it is , there will be war, says Krstic. Albanians have
insisted always to have Kosova as a whole, even as a whole for all the population, and have
not started a war. This means that in order to change this situation, in order to divide Kosova
(the territorial redefinition, as the author says) the war must be started by the interested party.
Since this is the interest of the Serbs to make this redefinition as claims Krstic, then the Serbs
should start the war. The war is the easiest way to make the transfer of population and the
ethnic redistribution of the territories, as it is evident in Bosnia.

Any other principle but that of violence, is irrelevant for the ascertainment of the author: the
ones who possess the largest amount of weapons, have the biggest arguments. This is why
this book could have had only one page: Kosova should be divided according to the proposed
maps or there will be war.

Kosova as a territorial and administrative unit was invented by the Communists and therefore
it should be dismantled, would be a comprised thesis of the author. Even if such a thing were
true (and it isn't) there are two ways to dismantle it: legally, where the ones who have the
constitutional rights give up on them, and illegally when according to the laws of violence
one party takes away the rights of the other party. The majority of the citizens of Kosova have
not given up on their constitutional rights, but these were suspended by force and in an
anti-constitutional way by the Serbian regime.

From any legalist starting point, finding a solution for Kosova could start only from the
juridical-constitutional precedent of Kosova, and not the violence applied against it. (If there
were a wish to analyze the "minority" prism which wants to be implemented as an approach,
the same results would come out in the package of rights of the European Council and the
CSCE).

When the Kingdom of Serbs-Croats-Slovenes was established, the "Albanian national

minority did not apply for political and territorial autonomy", says Krstic, in his main thesis
which should prove that the need of the citizens of Kosova to administer their own life was
imposed by someone else. This cardinal mistake, which will be repeated throughout the
whole book and the results, symbolize the cardinal mistake of any analysis on Kosova. The
citizens of Kosova not only didn't have the possibility to apply for anything in that Kingdom
(its non-democratic structure didn't allow any possibility of free expression to many people),

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but they weren't asked whether they wanted to be part of it or not. The consequences of the
lack of the right to self-determination are the essence of the present problem. And this is
illustrated also with the pretensions for the state and juridical continuity of Yugoslavia.

For Krstic, the Kosova crisis must be solved within the state framework of the so called FRY
and the Republic of Serbia. However, since the FRY is a non-existing state from the
international law point of view (and it is also lacking domestic legitimacy), while Serbia is an
administrative unit of this non-existing state, the only legal framework for the solution of
Kosova's problem is for the time being, the socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia,
which is treated as a disintegrating state until the matter of succession is not solved. The
eighth column of this country without a successor used to be the former Socialist
Autonomous Province of Kosova, the Republic of Kosova for 90% of its present population
and the Province of Kosovo and Metohija for 10% of its population.

Finally, the crisis of Kosova will be solved when the first sin is eliminated, the cardinal one
which has been dragged in the past 80 years: when the wish of the population of Kosova of
how they want to construct their future is respected with democratic mechanisms, bilateral
and multilateral agreements, and not dividing maps.

DOSSIER

THE BOOK OF DIVISION

"Kosovo izmedju istorijskog i etnickog prava" (Kosovo between the historical and ethnic
right) a book written by Branislav Krstic was promoted as a book that offers an original
option for the solution of Kosova's problem, and as such, was offered considerable space in
the Serbian media. In fact, this "originality" is an old recipe elaborated from Cosic and up to
the Academy of Sciences and Arts of Serbia in their attempts for the division of Kosova. The
idea is old, however Krstic's efforts in this projects suggest that his work is the most serious
attempt to make a "territorial redefinition" of Kosova.

This attempt was a strong reason for the "KOHA" Editorial Board to publish some of its parts
and allow some space for counter-arguments and start a debate.

(Excerpts of Branislav Krstic's book "Kosova between the historical and ethnic right)

THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT OF THE TWO

RIGHTS

Clear principles should be determined in order to solve the conflict of the rights of the people.
These are general rules which must be respected. Horace used to say: What good will do us to
have many laws, if we don't have any principles? The principles force all the influence of
partial interests of the parties in conflict, but also all others to subjugate to the rights; without
principles, the opposing interests endanger the right.

Starting from the idea that in essence (which doesn't mean exclusively) the conflict in Kosovo
and Metohija is a conflict between two rights: the Serbian historical right and the ethnic right
of the Albanian national community - supposing that we have explained the grounds of both

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rights in the two previous chapters - we will try to define the principles of the solution of the
conflict between the two rights.

PRINCIPLE I. Both rights are legitimate.

The historical right of the people in the original territories of its culture and state has not been
contested in the international level, except in the occupying wars. The ethnic right of the
national community has been regulated, in essence, with the international law and national
legislation of the territorial state, in accordance with its international obligations.

The lands on which the Serbian state has created its state, the churches and cultures which
preserve the respective historic monuments, can't be taken away from the Serbian people on
any grounds. The Albanian national community must have all the rights it is entitled to,
according to the international law, especially the UN Declaration on minority communities,
and since it has a specific territorial concentration in FRY, these rights should be solved in a
specific way and with the national legislation.

PRINCIPLE II. None of these rights is valid if it has not been legally accomplished.

The rights of the Serbian and Montenrgin state in Yugoslavia, over Kosovo and Metohija, has
been gained through history and was recognized by international agreements and this right, as
a legal one, is not being disputed by anyone. The Autonomous Region of Kosovo and
Metohija had been established with the 1946 Constitution, as a territorial and administrative
region of the whole population of Kosovo and Metohija. The 1963 Constitution determined
that the "Republic can...establish an autonomy with its Constitution". The elected
representatives of the republic in which this autonomy was established, never declared
themselves constitutionally about the territorial autonomy, or about the province with the
rights similar to those of the Republic.

PRINCIPLE III. None can realize its rights harming the others.

This is among others, a presupposition of the realization of human rights.

The ethnic rights of the Albanians, same as the historical rights of the Serbs and
Montenegrins, can't be accomplished by the violation of human, historical or ethnic rights of
the others. This means that neither the historical nor the ethnic right could be accomplished,
for example through the forcible emigration, the restriction in the right to labor, education,
the illegal purchase of land or the creation of ethnically pure localities. I presuppose that the
previous chapters contain the bases for the determination of the regions where some rights
were accomplished by damaging the others.

PRINCIPLE IV. Both rights have been created in certain territories, during a longer period of
time, therefore their solution must be grounded on those territories, and not on the territories
where these rights were not taken into account.

The right of the Serbian and Montenegrin people to safeguard the territories, where the
Serbian state and culture has existed and which were recognized by international contracts as
the territories of Serbia and Montenegro, as the integral part of their state and the right of the
Albanian community in which the dominant Albanian majority has existed to have the largest
part in the legislative, executive and judicial power can be accomplished if the territories are

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defined in a special way. This means that one specific right can be accomplished in the
determined territory, and not two rights in the same territory, because this would be
impossible. This seeks the territorial interpretation of the rights, and thus the conditioned
division. This division should be accepted by both parties, in order to find a peaceful and
permanent solution.

PRINCIPLE V. No one has the right to seek one own's right if one is not willing to respect
the right of the other.

The Serbs and Montenegrins can't request the undisputable Serbian historical territories if
they are not willing to recognize the traditional territories of the Albanians. It's the same in
the case of the Albanians who can't request their traditional territories, if they are not willing
to recognize the right of the Serbs and Montenegrins on their historical territories. The clear
definition and the division of rights of ones from the rights of the others becomes the
presupposition of any solution. The requests of this type can't be of absolute character,
because they depend from one another.

The presented principles are an attempt to establish the rules based on which, in a peaceful
way, the relations between Serbs and Montenegrins on one side and Albanians on the other
side, in Kosovo and Metohija, could be solved. Based on these principles, the exploration of
possibilities of the peaceful solution of the conflict between the historical and the ethnic right
in Kosovo and Metohija.

X. Possibilities of reconciliation of the historical and ethnic right

(...)

Criterions for the redefinition of the territories

Since the two rights are legitimate, first the key regions for the realization of both rights must
be determined, and then they should be expanded in a way that none of the rights would be
disputed, or in a way the dispute is as minimal as possible.

From the positions of the historical right, the key regions would be Mitrovica/Zvecan and
Novobrdo as the most vital territory of the medieval state, which witnessed the war of two
worlds, Prizren as the capital, Pec as a Patriarchy and territories which define the medieval
Serbian state. From the positions of the ethnic right, the key regions would be the regions
with Albanian cultural monuments and in which the Albanian population has been living
since long time ago, respectively, the territories where the Albanians make the dominating
majority.

The starting point, therefore, are the territories in which the historical right of the Serbs and
Montenegrins is accomplished and where the ethnic right of the Albanian national community
is realized, meaning that it shouldn't be equalled with the total territory of the Province as it
was established.

Practically, the historical right would be accomplished fully with the definition of the
maximum of cultural monuments of the Serbian medieval state and the adequate relation of
the Serbian/Montenegrin and the Albanian population integrated in the fatherland of the Serbs
and Montenegrins. While the ethnic right will fully be accomplished by defining the

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territories with the maximum of the Albanian population and the minimum of Serbian
cultural monuments - as a region of territorial autonomy with a special status. During this, the
referent level of the Albanian population would not include the situation in previous periods,
not even the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, but would also not include the situation imposed after
the demographic expansion and the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins. Thus, the census
of 1961 would serve as basis, and along with it, the population in 1981 would be presented.

These criterions should be enforced with the facts which, while the research on the cultural
monuments was conducted, have been proven to be important for the territorial interpretation
of both rights.

First of all, this is the fact that the territories of the Serbian cultural monuments are part of the
historic and ethnic integrity of the Serbian and Montenegrin lands. In the same way, the
territories of the Albanian cultural monuments are part of the historic and ethnic integrity of
the Albanian lands.

During the survey, the inevitable importance of lands was determined but the lack of facts has
made it impossible to include this as one of the criteria proposed; therefore, changes will be
compulsory.

The criterion, which after the explorations becomes necessary, has to do with the reduction of
the possibility of the minority community to dominate over the constitutive people. The
verified experience proves that "it must be admitted that the best solution is when within the
borders of one state there is the less possible number of the members of a national minority".
The importance of this criterion, has especially been elaborated in Chapter 12.

Regardless of how will the redefinition of these territories be done, the regions to be defined
as historical Serbian territories or as territories with dominant Albanian population, they must
be able to function normally, economically, culturally and infrastructurally. This territory and
the population have the right to developing regeneration. We ascertained that they were one
of the vital central spaces of the Balkans. Once again they should become central and cease
existing as peripheral territories. Before all, this means that they should open as much as
possible, to be connected to the West (traffic from Prizren and Djakovica with the Adriatic,
and Rugova with Montenegro), the East (Krusevac, Leskovac, Kumanovo) as well as the
North (Ibar) and South (Kacanik). It is implied that the mutual bounds are thus not reduced.

It is obvious then that the criterions for the redefinition of the territories imply three phases:

- safeguarding the historical rights of the Serbs and Montenegrins along with the integration
with the fatherland and the regulation of respective territories as historic regions,

- the realization of Albanian ethnic lands with the right to have larger numbers (of people)
enjoy the political and territorial autonomy and

- the creation of preconditions for the creation of the prospering development of the whole
population of Kosovo and Metohija.

The sole procedure of the redefinition of the territories is also based on the results of the
survey. The territories of the Serbian monuments and those of the Albanian monuments are
not the same, and with the exclusion of some examples, do not overlap. This fact gives strong

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bases, therefore these territories are taken as a undisputable starting point. Those, during the
procedure, are expanded pursuant the rights as long as, as it was said, they are not disputed.
Therefore the author started with what he considers undisputable and step by step went
towards the possible agreement. This procedure is illustrated with maps.

The procedure starts with the ascertainment that the rights can be most easily accomplished if
it is possible to divide the territories. Therefore the two "steps" ("a" and "b") will present parts
of the "solutions" which according to the explorations don't seem to be disputable. After this,
we will aspire towards the division of these territories, as much as it is possible. Thus, two
options of conciliating the rights ("c" and "d") will be created, attempting to fulfil the criteria.
The aim is not to propose the final solution, but only to determine the "proving procedure"
that the solution is possible.

The Western territories of the dominating Albanian population - step A

The idea of the first step (map 16) starts, as it was stated, from the territories containing
Albanian cultural monuments. This implies (look map 5 and tables 4 and 5) the
municipalities of Djakovica, Decane (without the monasteries), Orahovac, but also parts of
the territories of Prizren and Pec. These territories contain all the Albanian monuments of the
I-rst and II-nd category, apart from one (the region of Kosovska Mitrovica). This region is
further expanded to the territories of Metohija which, according to the 1961 census, was
dominated by the Albanian population. These are the municipalities of Klina, Srbica (its
largest part), Glogovac, Suvareka (partially) Zjum and Opolje (part of the municipality of
Dragas): these municipalities, even according to 1931 census comprise more than 80% of the
population, apart from Orahovac and Klina (70%). These municipalities, and according to the
same criteria, Vucitrn, Pristina and Lipljan, compose an integrity.

This are was inhabited (according to the 1961 census) by 235 thousand Albanians, later by
436 thousand Albanians in 1981 or about 92,4% of the population of the region. This region
was inhabited by 35 thousand (1961) and 22.600 Serbs and Monetenrgins (1981) respectively
and they contain one Serbian cultural monument of the I-rst category (the ruins of the Devic
monastery in Lausa) and four of the II-nd category.

The Western territories of the Albanian population comprise a very important part of the
Albanian population of the Province, almost one third (1981) and only 9,6% of the total
Serbian and Montenrgin population. Apart from the five mentioned monuments, these
territories don't contain any of the other Serbian monuments of historical importance. They
comprise a very important functional integrity, well bounded with the Northern, Eastern and
Southern regions, widespread along Albania, with Djakovica as an important town in the
center.

Western and Southern territories of the dominant Albanian population - step B

The idea of the second "step" (map 17) contains the defined Western territories of the
Albanian population and it includes the remaining Albanian territories with cultural
monuments (map 5, tables 4 & 5) and those are Kacanik and the respective areas of Vitina.
This region is further on expanded to the municipality of Urosevac (apart from several
localities) where the Albanians are the dominating population; the municipalities of Kacanik
and Urosevac have had the dominant Albanian population according to 1931 census (93%
and 70% respectively). According to same criteria, a part of the Gnjilane municipality makes

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part of this region. The Western and Southern territories with dominating Albanian
population would comprise a integrity with the creation of a more certain corridor
Crnoljevo-Stimlje (which could be part of the Srbica-Glogovac-Komorane-Stimlje-Urosevac
transversal).

The expansion of the territories of the Albanian population with the Southern territories,
would presuppose that the road from Kacanik to Skoplje, Veles and Greece has the Southern
direction as an alternative. After professional consultations and the inquiries in the field, the
evaluation is that this could be accomplished with the reconstruction of the existing paved
roads through Gnjilane and Presevo. This doesn't reduce the importance of the corridor
through Kacanik; it must not be forgotten that it looses the sense it had in the European traffic
network (E-65), since the Adriatic highway towards Greece, after some time, will continue
from Albania towards the South.

In this region as a whole, there were 317 thousand Albanians in 1961 and 589 thousand in
1981, or about 91,6% of the whole population. The region was populated also by 56 thousand
Serbs and Montenegrins in 1961 and 36.300 in 1981, and they contain only two Serbian
cultural monuments of the second category (the ruins of the Pteric town and the Church of St.
Archangel in Nerodimlje).

If the Western and Southern territories of the Albanian population are defined thus, they
comprise almost half of the Albanian population of the Province (1981) and only 15,3% of all
the Serbs and Montenegrins. These territories don't hold important Serb cultural monuments,
apart from the mentioned. They safeguard the existing bounds with the neighboring regions,
especially the vital corridor Lipljan-Urosevac-Kacanik-Skoplje and are equipped with its
center in Urosevac. The redefinition in the first step of the procedure (steps "a" & "b"), proves
that the Western and Southern territories of the Albanian population do not contain important
Serbian cultural monuments of the first and second category, with the exception of 7
monuments (Srbica, Klina, Urosevac and Orahovac). These territories don't include any
municipality which had been mainly inhabited by Serbs and Montenegrins before the 1961
census, apart from Vucitrn and Suvareka.

Therefore, the Albanian Western and Southern territory, and the Serbian historic territory,
basically, are not disputed, and this is the main proof of this research.

However, the data presented show that about 329 thousand (1961) and 637 thousand
Albanians (1981) remain inside the Serbian historic territories. Out of three key criterions:

1. that the Serbian historic lands comprise the important Serbian places and monuments and
thus safeguard the Serbian and Montenegrin people,

2. that the largest part of the Albanian people accomplishes the territorial autonomy,

3. "that the least possible number" of Albanians remains in Serbian historic lands,

only the first one would be fulfilled. It is not hard to conclude, therefore, that such a
definition of the Western and Southern territories, none of the sides gains a durable and
satisfying solution of the problem of Kosovo and Metohija. Now it is clear why have I placed
the redefinition of the territories as the first step of the procedure. The other part remains - the
alternatives of the possible solutions.

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The redefinition of the territories with the division of Pec and Prizren - alternative C

The alternatives to the solution will be found in the conceptual observation of the territories,
or rather saying it professionally, the space regulation of these territories. Three options could
be discussed.

One is that municipalities inhabited by the Albanian majority be attached to the Western
territories. These are the municipalities of Istok (1961-56% Albanians 1981-72%), Srbica
(88%; 97%), Vucitrn (72%; 87%) and Podujevo (81% and 96%). It is not hard to see that this
line would go through the column of the Serbian medieval state (Kosovo), which would
divide the sites and historical monuments of importance from the territorial integrity of
Serbia, but definitely would divide the Serbian and Montenegrin republic in its southern area
(which would be the most southern option of the "Sandzak"). At the south of this line would
be a part of territories which have been ethnically usurped since 1961 (according to data II,
this is the majority of the municipalities of Pristina, Kamenica, Gnjilane, Vitina and Prizren)
and at the same time it would exclude the traffic links of the South-Western areas of FRY
(Montenegro, Raska) with the south of the Balkans (in direction of Pristina). It is real to
suppose that this option would not offer a real possibility to find a solution.

The second possibility is having the region of Prizren and the Zupas of the Sar mountain, and
the South-West of the Province attach to the Western and Southern teritories of Albanians.
These would comprise three ancient and unique ethnic-cultural integrates, Zupa of Srinic
inhabited by the oldest and most stable Serbian population of the province, the Sredacka Zupa
inhabited by Serbian-speaking Muslims, and Gora of the Sar mountain, inhabited by Gorans,
an ethnicity or Slavic origin and language and Islamic confession. These would divide the
Serbian important sites and historic monuments, from Serbia: 5 monuments of the first
category including the capital Prizren, Dusan's Monastery, Saint Archangel's monastery, and
the Bogorodica Leviska Church. If these territories were included to the Albanian territories,
then 201 thousand Serbs would be comprised and relatively a small number of Albanians 45
thousand (according to 1961 census), and 202 thousand Serbs and 83 thousand Albanians, but
also 16 thousand Gorans (1981). This solution evades the two of the three key criterions.

The third possibility is that the largest towns inhabited by the majority of the Albanian
population expand towards the Western Albanian territories. According to the 1961 and 1981
censuses, these towns would be Pec with 16.582 and 36.660 Albanians (out of 26.721 and
54.4497 inhabitants in total) Pristina with 19.060 and 75.803 Albanians (out of 38.593 and
108.083 inhabitants) and Prizren with 14.933 and 39.412 Albanians out of (28.062 and
61.801 people). From the position of the criteria of the historical sites and monuments, the
three towns are key for the Serbian history; Pec and Prizren are the historical towns
recognized by Austria and Italy (1921) and have determined the border between the
Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom and Albania. However, from the Albanian position, as the first
criteria, Pec according to the 1931 census and then the two towns according to the 1961
census have the majority of Albanian population (58.5% and 53.3%), and especially after the
1981 census. In Prishtina's aspect, the situation is different. A key and undisputable Serbian
territory, Pristina (in Kosovo Polje) according to the 1931 and 1961 censuses has not had a
majority of Albanian population (1931- 12,8% and 1961- 49,4%). It's population grows after
the demographic changes, in which the Serb population grows (until 1981) for only one third,
whilst the Albanian population quadruples (from 19.060 to 75.803!); the facts about the
ownership deeds will only prove this drastic change. Since, as a principle, we have taken as
grounds for the predomination of the population the 1961 census, then it comes out that

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Pristina can't be put together with Pec and Prizren. These two towns were inhabited by 31.515
Albanians in 1931 and 76.072 Albanians in 1981.

From the presented facts and evaluations it is clear that the solution which would take as
grounds the "opening" of some towns towards the Albanian Western territories (from steps
"a" and "b") goes towards the fulfilment of the three key criterions: two large concentration of
Albanians in the Province can have territorial autonomy, no Serbian site or historic
monument has to belong to the Albanian territories, and the condition of having "the least
number possible of Albanians" in Serbian territories is fulfilled. The fulfilment of both rights
in these territories would mean a specific division of the towns of Pec and Prizren in their
Serbian and Albanian side. This is not a division that I imply as a division between two states,
but joint towns which would have one administration and open borders. This would be
especially important for Prizren, not because of the indivisibility of the monuments, but also
because of the bounds of its population. This division, among others, doesn't derive from this
survey. It finds support in the traditional division of these two towns described in the books
of Branislav Kojic, known as a scholar of the towns of these regions. Accepting such a
division, would mean a guarantee for the general peaceful solution. However complicated this
division might seem, it has been recognized in the world when it comes to the relations
between ethnic communities. The idea of this division is presented on map 18.

Accepting this possibility (the third one) as an alternative solution (c) we are in a position to
show the territorial redefinition of Kosovo and Metohija.

Continuing with the "two-step" procedure, the Western and Southern territories with
dominating Albanian population "open up" towards the towns of Pec and Prizren. This
comprises a region which was inhabited by 372 thousand Albanians (1961), respectively 653
thousand Albanians (1981), meaning 91% of the total population of the region. This region
was also inhabited by 64.900 (1961) and 40.400 (1981) Serbs and Montenegrins.

Depending on this, thus are the Serbian historical territories determined inhabited by 199.800
(1961) and 196 thousand Serbs and Montenegrins (1981), with 20 Serbian monuments of the
first category and 37 monuments of the second category, respectively 574 thousand Albanians
(1981) with one second category monument in Mitrovica.

Alternative "c" would give territorial autonomy to 53.32% of the Albanians of the Province
(1981), and the ratio between the Serbs/Montenegrins and Albanians in the Serbian historical
territories would be 22.6% : 66% (1981) and 38.7% : 53% (1961). Both regions would be
fulfilling the criteria on the bounds with neighboring countries as well as the communication
links, and will be supported by respective fatherlands. Any region would "function"
economically and culturally. It is very important that this alternative gives the Serbians
historical territories historic grounds on development, Prizren and Pec (the adequate parts),
Pristina and Mitrovica as well as Gnjilane, and the Albanian territories would get part of the
important towns of Prizren and Pec, as well as Djakovica and Urosevac, which comprise the
so called poles of development.

However, the facts prove that alternative "c" does not fulfil the key criterions. The territorial
autonomy would be gained by a little bit more than half of the Albanian population, and this
region of Serbia would then be inhabited by 574 thousand Albanians (1981) to which other
60.300 Albanians from Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedje should be added. The ratio
between these two populations in the historical territories of Kosovo and Metohija will not

- 10 -
change essentially from the times when the requests for territorial autonomy first appeared
(1968). And if this ratio remains, then the strong presuppositions that the situation which will
not satisfy any of the parties will be repeated, also remain. This is why the criteria "of the
least number of Albanians" in Serbia strengthens.

The redefinition of the territories with the division of Pec and Prizren and the Lab
region - alternative D

This refers to the possibility of having the Lab region, ie. the Podujevo municipality inhabited
by 95% of Albanians (72.092 Albanians in 1981), and where the Serbs have no important
cultural monuments, attached to the territories with the dominating Albanian population. This
alternative seeks a better acquaintance with the region. Lab is a separate valley at the
North-Eastern side of the Province, surrounded by Kopaonik and the Radan mountain and
opened by the Lab river towards Kosovo Polje. There are no important Serbian historical
monuments of the first and second category, and out of eight registered monuments of the
third category, six are ruins of the Churches dating from the 14-th to the 16-th century and
two archaeological sites (16-th century), all of them abandoned. From this it can be evaluated
that Lab has been a peripheral region of the Serbian medieval state, which neither in the times
of the Romans nor the Byzantine Empire, and even later in the times of the Ottoman Empire
was not outstanding. Lab was inhabited, according to the 1931 census with over 76% of
Albanian population, even though after 1981 has been colonized with Serbian population.
The large number of Albanians in this territory is interpreted as a colonization of Albanians
but also the Cerkez by the Turks, and later with the arrival of the "muhadjers" (Turkish
expression for "refugees") from Toplica and Jablanica when these territories were attached to
Serbia based on the decision of the Berlin Congress (1878). To have a complete picture on
this region, I took the data on all localities from the books of A. Urosevic, completing them
according to the figures of the 1981 censuses. I suppose that the presented facts need no
comment.

The redefinition of the territories which comprise also the region of Lab, doesn't change the
solution from alternative "c", but contributes to the realization of the three key criterions. This
region would then be linked, adequately, with the Western Albanian territories from the
valley of the Lab river and on. This idea is shown on map 19.

The redefinition of the territory of the Province, as a whole, gains a new quality in the aspect
of the ratio of the population. The regions with dominating Albanian population were
inhabited by 415 thousand (1961) and 735 thousand Albanians (1981) respectively and
71.900 (1961) and 43.600 Serbs/Montenegrins (1981). The ratio between the
Serb/Montenegrin and the Albanian population was 14,5% : 83,5% in 1961 and 5,4% : 91,7%
in 1981.

The historical territories of the Serbs and Montenegrins were inhabited by 191.900 Serbs and
Montenegrins in 1961 and 192.900 in 1981. The ratio between the Serb/Montenegrin and
Albanian population was 41,2% : 49,7% in 1961 and 24,6% : 62,8% in 1981.

Alternative "d" creates the possibility to, according to 1981 census, give territorial autonomy
to two thirds of the Albanian population of the province (59,9%), and on the Serbian
historical territories the ratio between the Serb/Montenegrin and the Albanian population is
34,6% : 62,8%. All advantages which have been presented in alternative "c" still remain. In
reality, the territory of Lab, almost "ethnically pure" Albanian is within the Serbian territory.

- 11 -
The solutions offered as alternatives "c" and "d" are not supposed to be understood as
proposals for the solution; because of the simple reason that they were created within the
framework of the presented research of the contradiction of the historical and ethnic rights in
Kosovo and Metohija and the possibilities for their conciliation. From the positions of this
research these are attempts not only to remain in the presentation of the compilation of the
conditioned situations, but also, in the event of the research to prove that there is a possibility
to unknot the situation. The alternative solutions are a necessary conclusion of the research
and they have fulfilled their task if they have proven that the two rights can be acquiesced (...)

DOSSIER

WHEN BABIES ERUPT

by HIVZI ISLAMI / Prishtina

In the discourse of the Kosova issue and the demographic problems of the Albanians, many
"experts" emerged, who, referring to the "historical rights" and the "demographic argument",
first came out with the thesis that Albanians, who now live in their ethnic lands, must be
deprived of their historical rights, including the rights they must have nowadays. "The
historical rights' to live and rule in Kosova, according to them, are entitled only to Serbs,
while the Albanians can't have these rights, because they are "an alien element", "they have
come to Kosova" in the past two or three centuries, and even after 1941 they are "usurpers" of
the territories "of the heart of the Serbian medieval state", etc.

A special interest to deal with different aspects of the issue of Kosova and the demographic
problem inside it, was also shown by a retired architect from Belgrade, Branislav Krstic. In
his book "Kosovo between the historical and the ethnic right", discussing the retrospective
and actual demographic situation, with a calmness which he tries to preserve, differs from the
other Serbian authors who have written many books and pamphlets on Kosova and the
Albanians after 1981. However, his conclusions and solutions he offers, without any doubt,
represent the most dangerous book published so far.

In the chapter "Demographic expansion of the Albanian population", based on an extensive

presentation of data since 1931 and up to now, he will try to conclude how the Albanian
population in Kosova, after the 60-ies will increase rapidly because of political interests,
because the "request for the constitution of Kosovo and Metohija as a Province" will be based
on the "domination of the Albanian population" (page 89), while the number of
Serbs/Montenegrins will decrease after 1961, as a consequence of the "population expansion
of the Albanians" and the "independent and autonomous position, with elements of statehood
of Kosovo" (p. 113, 159, 245). Even though he tries not to use terms with ideological
connotations, he will present this phenomenon as an "expansion" and "explosion", terms of
the times of colonialist dominations, which were used and are used by Greater-Serbs, Cvijic,
Cubrilovic, Cosic, Macura, Ivic, etc, when referring to Albanians.

Krstic is not satisfied with the results and the methodology of the 1948 census, in which for
the first time, according to the subjective criterion (nationality), the national appertaining had
been determined, and he likes the results of the 1921 and 1931 censuses, and even evaluates
the latter as "excellent" (p. 89). In these two censuses, as it is known, the populations was

- 12 -
registered only according to the religious and language appertaining, while nationality,
because of the unitary Serbian policy had been ignored. These two censuses, apart from the
methodological defects (because they had been accomplished according to the conception of
the present population) were characteristic because of the many speculations on the
non-Slavic population, especially the Albanian population. On table 9, Krstic doesn't present
the results of the 1921 census (which were once published) when the Albanian population in
Kosova, even despite the weaknesses of this census, had a larger percentage in population
(64,1%) in 1921 than in 1931 (60,4%) when the data was not published.

Krstic claims that "Turks in Kosovo had not been registered in many municipalities in 1948"
or "they had registered as Albanians" (p. 90), because their number, from 1.315 people in
1948 increased to 34.583 in 1953, whilst the percentage of Albanians decreases from 68,5%
in 1948 to 64,9% in 1953. The opposite variables of these two populations, and the fact that
the number of Albanians had decreased in Macedonia too (from 197.389 in 1948 to 162.524
in 1953) and the enormous increase of the number of Turks in the former Yugoslavia (from
97.954 in 1948 to 259.535 in 1953) are not clear evidence of the declaration of Turks as
Albanians, as claims Krstic, but of Albanians as Turks, in order to emigrate to Turkey under
the psychosis of intimidation and insecurity as well as massive tortures their were subjugated
to (the action of the weapons' collection, the creation of "hostile irredentist groups", invention
of preparation of armed insurrection and unification with Albania, the persecution of the
intellectuals, the reduction of the anyways restricted civil and national rights of Albanians, as
was the ban on the use of the Albanian language in public life as well as the use of national
symbols, the close-down of the Institute of Albanology, the Peoples' Library of Kosova, the
close-down of Albanian schools and up to the physical liquidation of Albanians). The native
language, which is an advantage according to Krstic for the determination of the national
appertaining, is another indicator which denies the thesis of the author regarding the
declaration of the Turks as Albanians. According to the 1953 census, 53.583 people declared
themselves as Turks, while 25.103 people had declared that their native language was
Turkish, in Macedonia, this non-conformity was 203.938 : 153.160, while in the former
Yugoslavia, out of 259.535 people declared as Turks, only 181.887 or about 70% claimed
Turkish was their mother tongue. In the 1961 census, this non-conformity increases even
more: out of 182.964 Turks in the Former Yugoslavia, only 90.883 or 50% spoke Turkish.

Krstic prefers the municipality as a comparative unit to study the movements of population,
and on this basis presents the movement of the population in Kosova from 1931-1991. He
justly concludes that following the situation in municipalities is difficult because of the often
territorial political divisions which happened in the former Yugoslavia. But, Krstic's
ascertainment "that in no other place in the Former Yugoslavia were the divisions made so
often as the way they took place in Kosovo and Metohija" and that such changes "were not
done because of the needs of the population and the better territorial organization of
government, but because of the change in the relations of force in the solution of the national
issue in Kosovo and Metohija" (p. 93). A real absurd! Who had the power in Kosova until
midst 1960's, and when have there been big territorial and administrative changes in the
whole of Former Yugoslavia? In 1948 Kosova had 18 regions and towns (Serbia 81,
Yugoslavia 338) and 235 Local Peoples' Councils (Serbia 1.968, Yugoslavia 8.063); in 1953
it had 18 regions and 201 municipalities (Serbia 87 and 1.678 and Yugoslavia 351 and
4.139); in 1961, the regions in Kosova were suppressed (Serbia had 15, Vojvodina 6,
Yugoslavia 75), while the number of municipalities was reduced to 28 (Serbia 155,
Yugoslavia 774). Today, Kosova has 31 municipalities, while Serbia has 168 municipalities.

- 13 -
It is interesting that Krstic doesn't see the increase of the Albanian population and the
decrease of the Serbian population as a result of the level of economic, cultural, urban,
educational, sanitary development as well as the emancipation of the women especially, but
mainly as a result of Kosova being an autonomous and constitutive unit of the ex-Yugoslav
Federation and also a result of a long-term well planned policy, and even states that "in their
conscience, the Serbs and Montenegrins don't feel the Autonomous Province as theirs, while
the Albanians do" (p. 84) This is why he concentrates on the analysis of the movement of the
Albanian and Serb/Montenegrin populations in the period of the decentralization of the
ex-Federation and the strengthening of the autonomy of Kosova, aiming at concluding that
the opposite trend of both populations is to be blamed on the autonomy of Kosova, with
statehood elements. However, no data speak in favor of the thesis that Serbs and
Montenegrins, in the times when the autonomy functioned, had been discriminated against.
For example, the number of Serbs, employed in the public sector was constantly increasing:
in 1970 - 32.739, in 1980 45. 183 and in 1986 - 48.429. Therefore, in the period between
1970 and 1986, when Milosevic came to power through Kosova, the increase in their
employment reached 47.9%. Or let's take for example the public owned apartments:
according to the 1981 census, out of the total number of apartments in Prishtina (8.075
apartments or 1/3 of the total number in Kosova), 49% belonged to Serbs and Montenegrins,
who participated in the total population with 19,4%, while Albanians had at their disposal
only 41% of the apartments, and participated in the population with 70,1%. However, the
main problem for the Serbian chauvinists is the equality of the Albanians to the
Serbs/Montenegrins and their affirmation in the times of the existence of the autonomy of
Kosova.

In order to strengthen the thesis on the opposite direction of the population movements of
Serbs and Albanians, Krstic also compares the increase of the Albanian population in Kosova
and Albania, stating that "the population movement in Albania is similar to the developing
states, while the population in Kosova is an exemption" (p. 114) and that the differences
between these two, in the rising demographic trend increase after the '60-ies. And, according
to Krstic, in the example of the Albanian population in the Balkans it can be concluded that
"the nation, religion, traditions, way of life, geographic region, can't explain these unexpected
differences" (p. 114). And on, in order to stress even more this thesis, he claims that "the
increase of the number of Albanians in Montenegro is closer to the Montenegrins in this
republic, than the Albanians in Kosovo" and that this phenomenon is explained "with the high
level of integration of the Albanians and the other population in Montenegro" (p. 109).

We will agree with Krstic that the differences in the volume of births and the increase of the
population of one nation are not ethnically and confessionally determined, and this thesis was
opposed by many Serbian political circles, demographers, sociologists, etc., but the
differences in the movement of the Albanian population in Kosova and Albania are mainly
result of a different social-cultural status of the woman in Albania (active in economic life,
education, etc.), of the fact that the population of Albania has entered the process of
demographic transition and the sphere of mortality and natality much earlier. While the
reduction of the birth rate and the decrease of the raise of the Albanian population in
Montenegro is not only a result of its integration in the Montenegrin society, but exclusively
result of the massive emigration of youngsters, of reproductive age, first to Kosova and then
to the USA, a process which has started 30 years ago and is getting worrying dimensions.
Finally, there are also big differences of the birth rate level and the demographic increase of
the population between the Serbs in Kosova and the Serbs in Vojvodina and Serbia. During
the whole post-war period, the Serbs had a several times higher birth rate: in 1981 the average

- 14 -
number of alive children given birth by one Serbian woman in Kosova was 3,52, in Serbia it
was 1,85 and in Vojvodina it was 1,87 children. The reasons for this differentiated
reproductive attitude of the Serbs are well known.

The increase of the Albanian population in Kosova, Macedonia, Preshevë, etc. is explained
with the fact that the intensive social-urban and cultural changes have slowly and very late
reached the main sectors of reproduction: the woman, as the main factor of biological
reproduction, the family as the decisive framework of the birth process, bio-social
reproduction and the village as the dominating structure of the Albanian society. The
rural-agrarian population in Kosova and the other Albanian regions carry the main burden of
population reproduction. This population, until recently, had faced a situation where the
demographic balance between birth and extinction was achieved through enormous loses of
people because of the high mortality rate, as in the pre-industrial populations. On the other
hand, birth rate is a multi-dimensional phenomenon and its movement from a high level to a
low level can't be done rapidly.

Krstic dedicates a considerable part of the book to the emigration of Serbs from Kosova and
the "occupation" their territories by Albanians, and even qualifies the emigration process of
the Serbs as an exodus (p. 84), while he doesn't even mention the forcible emigrations of the
Albanians, not even those to Turkey, nor the quiet ethnic cleansing which is being conducted
the past years by the occupying Serbian regime, through systematic terror and repression!

He gives "inflated" data on the emigration of Serbs (p. 83), and the way he elaborates this
problem, it comes out that the Albanians and the autonomy of Kosova have expelled the
Serbs: "the Albanian population with its population expansion has made the
Serb/Montenegrin population leave" (p. 153). Between 1961 and 1990, is the time in which
according to Krstic, the autonomy has forced out 140 thousand Serbs and Montenegrins,
while since 1951 to 1981 around 103 thousand! (p.83). According to our evaluation, and
based on the censuses from 1966-1981, around 52 thousand Serbs have fled Kosova. M.
Roux (1994), based on the results of the 1981 census, evaluates that the negative result in
Kosova in all periods (until 1981) is around 65 thousand Serbs and according to him, when
the mortality of the emigrated is calculated, then the clean loss might reach 72 thousand
Serbs. According to Krstic, in the period between 1981 and 1990, 49 thousand Serbs have
fled Kosova (p.83), while according to the data provided by the serbian police, gathered from
the specialized services of the municipal secretariats of internal affairs (presented by every
migrant personally), and which were published by the Statistical Institution of Kosova as an
internal document, from June 1, 1983 to Dec. 31, 1988, a total of 19.571 Serbs/Montenegrins
fled Kosova. Out of this number, 46% emigrated because of economic reasons, 6% left
because of education, and 48% because of familial reasons. The majority of the emigrated
went to Serbia, mainly to the urban zone of Belgrade (about 40%) and other towns. The
emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosova after 1966, excluding cases, was not a
phenomenon caused because of the political pressure of the Albanians against them, the
Albanians' demographic "expansion" and the functioning of the autonomy, but because they
had lost the privileges they had until then, because they couldn't tolerate the national equality,
because of the feeling of insecurity of those Serbs who belonged to the political and police
apparatus and who had done too much harm to the Albanians in times of Rankovic, then
because of the better economic situation in Serbia, and the gain of enormous amounts of
money from the owned property sold before leaving, as well as familial and individual
reasons, since the majority of them had come to Kosova in the first and second wave,
respectively, of the colonization of Kosova, and others. The movement of population in the

- 15 -
areas used to be massive in former Yugoslavia: according to 1981 9.184.451 people had
changed their place of birth, and 1.760.333 people had crossed the republican and provincial
borders, usually members of those nationalities which had "their fatherlands" in other federal
units. The population of every nationality was mainly oriented towards the space where the
language, religion, traditions, culture and other ethnic specifics were the same or similar
especially if the immigrating regions offered much more economically and culturally.

Events following Tito's death, especially the war of the Serbs against all the others, will prove
that the movements of the population were influenced by the increase of nationalism,
conflicts and others.

Krstic claims that "the constitutional position of Kosova" which is interpreted as

"Greater-Albanian nationalism", has been "a source of inter-ethnic tensions", "the persecution
of Serbs and Montenegrins" and the "threat to the Serbian territorial integrity" (!), a thesis
which doesn't differ at all from the Serbian nationalists, as for example that of the Serbian
theologist D. Bogdanovic in his book "The Book about Kosovo" (1985), who literally stated:
"...it was proven that the problem of Kosovo is not primarily a matter of the hostile activity
and counter-revolution, but is much more than that - it is the problem of the constitution of
the province as a form of statehood of Albanians with a tendency towards the creation of the
independent republic in the Yugoslav federation" (p.242).

Milosevic came to power in 1986 and he did that by using Kosova, while the autonomy of
Kosova was ruined at the beginning of 1989. Kosova turned into a classic colony, however
the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins kept going on, even with a higher intensity in the
past years, which means that today, excluding the members of the police, administrative and
military apparatus, there is not more than 140 thousand Serbs/Montenegrins in Kosova.
However, the Serbian government doesn't make a problem out of this, because it can't blame
it in the Albanians any longer. If this government would recognize the fact of the migration of
Serbs after the full annexation and occupation of Kosova, this would mean that it publicly
would accept its failed politics in Kosova.

"The specifics of the population movement of Kosova relies also on the fact that the greater
immigrations are evidenced municipalities with mixed population rather than municipalities
with dominating Albanian population" (p.156), claims Krstic and continues: "As grounds for
this, is the province as it is defined" (p. 158). This thesis takes us directly to the conclusion
that the arrival of Albanians to these municipalities was done in order to pressure the
Serbs/Montenegrins, a thesis which characterized the anti-Albanian campaign of the Serbian
political and scientific circles in the '80-ies. But the facts that Krstic himself presents in table
35 (p. 157) do not prove such a tendency, because there were more Albanians coming to
municipalities inhabited by over 90% of Albanians. The compared municipalities have almost
similar number of total population. But, did the Albanians, not only from Kosova, but also
Montenegro, Macedonia and Southern Serbia, come to Prishtina, the most attractive center in
times when the autonomy functioned, only "to force the Serbs and Montenegrins out" or
because they tried to find a job, get education or maybe had a familial reason?

Within the frame of the "occupation of the territory", Krstic is especially concentrated on the
real estate of the Serbs which had been taken over by Albanians. He claims "that the largest
number of real-estate sales took place in the '60-ies" (p. 168) and that "the first sales of the
land and the houses in a village were paid enormously high prices, in order to make the
owners decide to sell-out, while later, when the village would have only several Serbian

- 16 -
households, the price would go extremely down. My collocutors tell me that when the land
was bought, there had not been any competition among the buyers" (p. 171), which means
that, according to him, the purchase of the real-estate and the houses was organized!. None of
these ascertainments can stand: the price of real-estate in Kosova has always increased when
there was a lower offer, while the competition, in the restricted life space in Kosova, in the
conditions of industrial underdevelopment, the high agrarian density and the collection of
agrarian overplus, has always been higher. Krstic stresses "that Albanian bought the houses
and land from the Serbs, because they are richer" (p. 169), however he doesn't state that the
Albanians gain their money working hard in the West.

The emigration of the Serbs from Kosova, the purchase of lands and the non-solved
juridical-ownership relations in Kosova are closely linked to the agrarian reformation and the
colonization of Kosova between two wars. It is not true that the colonization of Kosova was
done "only to assure the reintegration of this region in the new state" (p. 76) as claims Krstic
when referring to his father's book. Colonization and the agrarian reform aimed at not really
solving the social-economic situation of the Serbian colonizers and the autochthonous people
in Kosova and the southern parts of Yugoslavia, but rather the destruction of the territorial
compactness of the Albanian people and the creation of a ethnically clean Serbian territory in
the regions inhabited by Albanians, by forcing them to emigrate to Turkey and Albania. This
is the main aim which gathered the leading, ruling, cultural and scientific Serbian circles, and
especially the ideologists of the creation of ethnically clean territories: Cubrilovic, Andric,
Moljevic, Draza Mihailovic's chetniks, etc. Djordje Krstic was also one of the ideologists of
the agrarian reform, and this is why he had written a book in 1928, called "Colonization in
Southern Serbia". The conclusion of Krstic father and son that "Kosova had a lot of land and
that the interests of the locals were not endangered" (p.94) can't stand. Another author, M.
Obradovic, in his book "The Agrarian Reform and the Colonization in Kosovo 1918-1941",
which was published in 1981, claims that after 1923, after the circumstances were well
studied, and when new decree-laws were adopted on the colonization, even in places where
there was no free space in any municipality of the state, the government would try to get as
much land as possible from the Albanians. Then, many Albanian families were left without
any land or just some land in front of the houses" (p. 231).

For the information regarding the agrarian reform and colonization, Krstic has not consulted
this book and it is not included in the bibliography, which so far, is the most complete and
objective work on these problems, and he doesn't use M. Roux's maps (and he quotes him so
often in the book) on the territorial position of the colonizing Serbs/Montenegrins in Kosova
between two wars, which were elaborated on the facts presented by the surveys conducted by
Obradovic (pp 235-348).

"Kosovo still, has the unsolved problem of the lands of the church", and the agrarian reform
of the land in 1946 has taken away from the churches a total of 1.282 hectares of land" and
that "during the Yugoslav Kingdom the church owned between 1500 to 1800 hectares" (p.
180), claims Krstic. He must know that the ones taking advantage of the agrarian reform,
apart from the colonists, communards, chetniks, volunteers, the trustworthy organs of the
reform, were also the orthodox churches and monasteries, the army and gendarmery,
educational, cultural, economic and other institutions. According to Obradovic, between the
two wars, the churches were given a total of 246 hectares of land (p. 217).

It is unbelievable how this author has written this book with such cold blood, using no myths
or pejorative expressions against Albanians, which is an exclusion in the Serbian publications

- 17 -
and science. However, this is not a book with human messages nor is it engaged to safeguard
the stability and peace in the Balkans. On the contrary, his conclusions make this the
publication a book with the most tragical messages for the Albanians and Kosova, but also for
Serbs and the Balkans. Kosova, historically, geographically, ethnically, demographically,
juridically and politically is one, and indivisible.

The author proposes the division of Kosova, as the only solution to conciliate the "historical
right" and the "ethnic right", which is the worst proposal possible, which if realized will cause
only conflicts and massive bloodshed.

The division according to the Krstic would convert Kosova a territory of around 11.000
squared kilometres with circa 2.200.000 people, how big it is today, in a region of 4.600
squared kilometres, which would be inhabited by 850 thousand inhabitants. Where and how
would the other 1.300.000 Albanians live, including those from Preshevë, Bujanoc and
Medvegjë, as well as those of Montenegro?

DOSSIER

TERRITORIES FOR CHURCHES

by YLBER HYSA / Prishtina

Krstic's work, however original might seem, in reality is an old/new attempt to territorially
divide Kosova between the Serbs and Albanians, "between the historical and the ethnic right".
This idea was more seriously proclaimed by Cosic, then by Milosevic's economic counsellor
Markovic, or a group of geographers and demographers of the Serbian Academy of Sciences
and Arts, in cooperation with "Nova Demokratija", always suggested the division of Kosova,
be it as "final Serb-Albanian bordering", as Cosic thought - meaning a creation of new
borders between Serbia and Albania with the divided Kosova, or even other forms presented
as "differentiated autonomy" with the Serbian and Albanian administrative parts under the
umbrella of the Serbian sovereignty, or any other alternative form. Krstic, as an architect and
scholar of the cultural-historical monuments who had been working for some time in
UNESCO, is at first sights lead by a more "human" principle, choosing the cultural-historical
monuments as the criterion to conciliate the "Serbian historical right" and the "Albanian
ethnic right", in order to reach to the conclusion that "the territorial redefinition of Kosova" is
necessary, therefore, a conclusion heard many times before. However personal it might be
presented, Krstic's work is full of data gathered from surveys conducted by state institutions,
which do not make it an "individual" effort, as the author presents it in the beginning of the
book.

In the introduction of his work, Krstic presents a description of the historical development of
Kosova, insisting on the thesis that Kosova has never been an separately organized
administrative unit, and that such a thing is a direct result of the Communist policy which
voluntarily, through the re-organization of the party structure, has achieved to recompose the
"autonomous province", which reached the position of a "republic" with the 1974
Constitution, thus threatening the integrity of Serbia. Krstic, in reality, is a typical case of the
"national-romantic" way of taking history, who metaphysically makes the selection between
the "good" and "praising" parts of history - the period of the Nemanjic's in Kosova,

- 18 -
interrupted by the Ottoman darkness which causes the idyllic of the national history, which
reopened five centuries later when the "liberating Serb/Montenegrin armies" entered Kosova
in the times of the Balkans' wars. It seems as if there were no histroy before, nor after these
periods, as if time would have stopped. Krstic considers that in the times of the Romans and
the Byzantine, the territory of Kosova had never been a special administrative unit, and the
same thing occurred in the times of the Nemanjic's, who didn't consider Kosova as any
specific territorial or military unit!

In fact, the present territory of Kosova was known in the Roman and Byzantine period as
"Dardania", and more or less comprised the territory of present Kosova, Shkupi and Nish.
Later, with the Slavic penetration to the Balkans, and especially before the Nemanjic's
penetrated Kosova, definitely before the first fall of Constantinople in 1204, the territory of
Kosova was actually the border between the Byzantine Empire and the Serbs, more precisely,
this border was in Zveçan, which coincidentally is the same border between Kosova and
Serbia. Mali Zigos, mentioned in Byzantine chronicles, was the borderline between the
Byzantine Empire and the Serbs. Only after the destruction of this border and the fall of the
Byzantine Empire, when the penetration of crusaders from the West occurred, Nemanjic
Serbia achieved to takeover this territory and annexed it as the most developed part of the
Serbian kingdom. It is not surprising why precisely this important bordering territory, of great
riches and with an organized military-administrative structure, served as "alpha" of the
erection of the Serbian medieval state. This was the place where the mines and much fertile
land were, and the church was very well organized. From the sources of that time, it is known
that some old byzantine hierarchy was replaced by a Serbian one, as happened to Prizren's
bishop at the beginning of 13-th century. Apart from the Deçan church, none of the biggest
and well known Serbian churches and monasteries has not been constructed in a new place,
but rather on the same site where the Byzantine churches used to be, as is the case with
Graçanica, Bogorodica Levishka or the Peja Patriarchy itself. The continuation of the cult on
one place is a logic that aimed to inherit the previous Byzantine Emprie and the ancient
Christian traditions on these territories. Such a thing is seen with the adaptation of Flor and
Laur, who as early Christian martyrs of Ulpiana are presented in the frescoes of the Serbian
churches in Kosova. With the arrival of the Turks, the territory of Kosova was reorganized in
three Sanxhaks: Vushtrri, Prizren and Dukagjin, meaning that the name clearly states that
these regions are not subordinated to any neighboring region, outside Kosova, and the
territories inhabited by Albanians. In the 19-th century, this territory finally is regulated
within the administrative-territorial unit known as the "Kosova Villayet", which included
some of the neighboring localities, and whose center was in Shkup but also in Prishtina.
Finally the requests of the "Prizren League" are that this villayet, together with other three:
Yanina, Shkodra and Manastir become part of the "independent Albania", as Krstic himself
states it. This means that the "Villayet of Kosova", or the territory of Kosova, is known as the
bordering territory of the ethnic Albanian lands, and which had been organized as a separate
administrative-territorial unit! This border also meant the division of the Ottoman empire
from the Serbian kingdom.

The author's comment that Kosova was not recognized as a separate unit of the old-first
Yugoslavia, but was divided in three banovinas, is really lacking seriousness. The unitary
concept of such a state of the Southern Slavs didn't acknowledge such administrative
formations and the division was done according to the regions which were
regional-geographically named, and not according to the ethnic principle. Therefore, there
was no Serbian banovina, nor any other, therefore no Kosova banovina either! Following this
logic, accusing the Communists of having committed the sin of creating Kosova as a special

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region is really nonsense. However, Krstic, is following the "trends", and all existing
problems in the former Yugoslavia are being blamed on the Communists, including Kosova
as a specific administrative unit. The author probably calculated that such a definition can
"pass" in the West, which is delicate about the artificially created problems by any
Communists and, even more, this thesis must function as the premise of his main thesis - to
conciliate the "Serbian historical right" and the "Albanian ethnic right", which, put in
concrete words, means the "territorial redefinition of Kosova".

The solution of Kosova's problem as one of the key problems in the Balkans, as Krstic's
states, would be done by the "redefinition of the territories" which would be grounded on the
cultural-historical heritage, or saying in better words, the cultural-historical monuments. And
whilst the "architectural heritage" is "a preserved proof of the historic territories", "the
historic territories of one people are the lands where the state has been created and developed,
where the seat and the representative buildings have been constructed and where the main
events which have determined the history of one people and state occurred" - are original
definitions of the author. But, the question arises- What are national cultural monuments?
Serb seem to be all churches, monuments that signify military buildings, fortresses, seats, etc.
The monuments of Illyrian, Byzantine, Turk origin, are the so called "mutual objects". For
example, the author considers that "byzantine objects" emerge from the territory and the
people of that land, while Turkey took them over and preserved them as an occupier. The
Byzanth is the heir of the Hellenic meaning of the land, while Turkey is the occupier. The
Serbian buildings and towns followed the Byzantine ones. These two "emerge" from the
people and the land, those belong to them; they are not conquered. This goes also for the
Albanian buildings in certain territories. When the concepts which considers the Ottoman
buildings as "theocratic", then the confusion is even bigger. Thus, the Serbian buildings and
churches constructed on the foundations of Byzantine churches are simply Serbian, while on
the other side, Gjakova has a "Turkish bazaar", or Prishtina has only a couple of preserved
houses, as is Emin Gjiku's house from the 17-th century! If according to this logic the "King's
Mosque" is to be considered Turkish according to the "theocratic" principle, and because the
Turks were the conquering force even in case of the Albanians, as the author claims, then
according to the same principle, this mosque is an Albanian cultural monument, if a very
important historic event is taken into account, such was the case of the Albanian national hero
Archbishop Pjetër Bogdani, who was buried in this mosque in the times of the
Turkish-Austrian wars, when this mosque converted into the Church of the Saint Saviour!

These are some other contradictions: the Valentin fortress is considered as a Serbian cultural
monument. The author of this article has personally participated in the archaeological
explorations in this very important locality, and the conclusion would be that this is a
town-fortress, a several-layer locality from the times of the Dardans, Romans, Byzantine
Empire, Nemanjics, a place in which there is no doubt that was once inhabited by German
miners and in which location, apart from the Orthodox Church, a Catholic one existed. The
fact that Albanians are considered as part of Dusan's multi-ethnic and multi-cultural state, but
not as owners of the cultural monuments of this state is especially contradicting!

The author insists in the fact that "the Serbian historical territories" were flooded by
Albanians as a result of the withdrawal and emigration of Serbs, and the increase, and the
domination of the demographic situation in favor of Albanians, thus many of the cultural and
historic monuments of the Serbs are surrounded by Albanians. The Serbian state, as the
author thinks, has never made any effort to preserve them in the past or the present, whilst
"all the Albanian cultural historical monuments are preserved". If this is the principle on

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which the author grounds his ascertainment, that one state has to take under its protection
such monuments, then here appears a special contradiction. The "Serbian state" was
non-existing for five centuries, and all the monuments were preserved precisely by Albanians
and the special institution of the "Vojvodas" of the churches. On the contrary, after the
"liberation" many adventures of non-professionals took place, and they have partially
damaged the floor of the Graçanica Monastery by placing instead the floor of the Prishtina
Hammam (Bath), or as it happened on the occasion of the celebration of the 600 anniversary
of the Kosova Battle, when a huge machine destroyed the archaeological layers at the
entrance of the monastery, in times when there was no autonomy of Kosova any longer.

After the war, in the name of the construction of the new life, the whole Bazaar of Prishtina
was destroyed, the LLokaq Mosque (16-th century) was destroyed, as well as the Catholic
Church and the Synagogue, but not the Orthodox church. Based on this, it could be said that
the Albanians proved themselves best preservers of the cultural inheritance of Kosova than
the Serbian state itself, as Krstic himself argues, but who also explains the "territorial
redefinition" grounded precisely on this principle (which finds grounds on Cvijic's
"anti-ethnographic necessity").

In fact, all what is absolutely disputable in this whole effort of the author is the tendency to
understand cultural heritage with national prerogatives, to define the buildings and historical
and cultural objects as of "the people and the land", and those of the "conqueror". Even more
tragical and comical comes out to be the fact that this is instrumentalized for the need of
"territorial redefinitions". But, having into account the Yugoslav modern drama, when the
principles of the division were often ridiculous and departed from "the percentage of
land-owners based on property deeds", as happened in Bosnia, then the tragedy and the
comedy merge into one: the tragedy, which is translated into wars and blood!

One thing is well known, that the "territorial redefinitions" of Kosova inhabited by 90%
Albanians, can take place only by force and there will be no safety for the cultural
monuments. Therefore, the logic is very simple - the ones who seek "territorial redefinitions"
are not lovers of the cultural heritage after all! Even more, when it is taken into account that
any division or "territorial redefinition" which would take place in Kosova, can't cover all the
monuments of one or the other ethnicity. If Krstic and the others are really worried about the
preservation of the cultural-historical monuments in Kosova, then there are other ways of
solving this issue, either with international agreements or bilateral agreements, and this could
not serve as means for political blackmail or any territorial gain. Many cultural-historical
objects in the world prove the historical existence of kingdoms and people which are not
where they used to be, but it crosses no one's mind to make "territorial redefinitions"!

The well known Almond's book on Yugoslavia, published this year, contains a part on
Kosova with a significative title: "The Myth at the service of the aggression". Krstic's
creativity goes beyond his predecessors - the historical-cultural monuments as a premise of
the "territorial redefinitions"! If this premise fails, what will then remain? Maybe only the
epic cycle: wherever the songs on the "Kosova Battle" are sung, there is Serbia!

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EDITORIAL

ON MONDAY WE'LL UNDERSTAND THAT WE EXIST

by VETON SURROI

The same vision came back to me. As I was walking down the Scanderbeg square, while I
was queuing for bread at "Qerim's" in Prishtina, as I was riding on Basel's clean tram, as I was
waiting for the train in Munich, as well as in the best "kebab shop" in Shkup...There is almost
no place to where I have been in the past years that has not made me think of KOHA, and the
right of having this magazine read the same day, in the majority of the places where
Albanians live.

While I am writing these sentences, I still don't know whether this is possible. In the editorial
board we have planned, organized, debated about it and finally we have made efforts to have
this magazine in the hands of the readers in Shkup, Tirana, Frankfurt, Zurich, Geneva, Vienna
on Monday... To be in the hands of the readers, with the same content, everywhere, to have
no differences in articles or authors.

This is not a new attempt. The same thing was attempted, at least in the Albanian space, in
1991. And, while KOHA could be read in Prishtina and Shkup by all those who wanted to do
this, in Tirana, at that time, the privileged were only the warehousemen of the corresponding
ministry, whose task was to make it impossible for the readers to get hold of the magazine.

It this article is read in Prishtina, Shkup, Tirana, Zurich, Geneva, Munich, Vienna...this
Monday, it means that we have managed to cross the borders. In a very strange way. In the
border where we will face the biggest problems (the Kosovan-Macedonian border, I believe)
the border is used to remind us of the restriction of human rights, restrictions immediately
linked to Albanians. The place where it will go over most easily (the German-Swiss border),
the border practically means a demarcation line between two tax-collecting authorities, more
or less.

But, if we cross the borders this week, will it be possible to cross them next Monday? Who
knows, there are no guarantees on this, in this space. This is also an absolute characteristic of
this space: the total insecurity.

For us who work in this magazine, thus, Monday will seem to be the sign of the
re-confirmation of our existence.

These bad times will pass. Someday we will remember that we have recognized ourselves
from Monday to Monday.

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KOSOVA

RESIGNATION FORGOTTEN IN THE COMPUTER

by B.H. / Tirana

The fact that there were really misunderstandings between President Rugova, the LDK and
Prime-minister Bukoshi is proven by a facsimile of the letter of resignation of Prime-minister
Bukoshi, signed on July 1, 1994. This is confirmed by Anton Kolaj, representative of
Kosova's Office in Tirana and the ex-representative Skënder Zogaj. Kolaj had declared that
all documents had been removed from the office, however Bukoshi's resignation still
remained in the computer files, which Zogaj couldn't remove when he was ousted from
office. Zogaj himself confirmed this, and claims that the resignation came after Bukoshi
underwent a harsh campaign of political liquidation. Bukoshi had wanted to take this step
even before, because there was a lack of cooperation between the base in Prishtina and his
office in Frankfurt. Zogaj also states that in the past year he had been completely boycotted by
Bukoshi's cabinet and that the exchange of informations was reduced to almost none. On the
other hand, Kolaj claims that in times when Bukoshi wanted to resign from his post, he had
followed closely the movements in the Albanian political scene, and that in the last moment
he withdrew it. Finally, the office in Tirana, because of the very bad relations between
Bukoshi and Kolaj, is not being financed by the Government, therefore the source of
financing for this office is the LDK in Germany. It is expected that this misunderstandings
will be overcome soon, because the office is almost not functioning at all, since its
representatives can't meet the diplomats and state officials in Albania. One thing is certain,
claims Zogaj, and this is that prime-minister Bukoshi has in his possession all the signed
documents about the expenses so far. Bukoshi is also sure of the fact that there is much to talk
about if the created problems are discussed in public. The problems between Bukoshi and
Rugova as well as Bukoshi and the LDK are best proven by the facsimiles of the Office of the
Republic of Kosova in Tirana.

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COMMUNIQUE

I inform the Albanian public opinion, especially the political subjects and the organs and
institutions of the Republic of Kosova, that I irrevocably resign from the post of
Prime-minister of the Republic of Kosova.

I hope this resignation be taken into consideration as a moral act and a sense of
responsibility regarding the created situation in Kosova. Apart from being characterized by
the Serbian violence, it is also characterized by the dismantlement of the Albanian political
organization. The Serbian occupation has brought the total degradation of the life in
Kosova and this dismantlement is making effective opposition against the wild occupation
impossible. The essence of my resignation is not the disagreement with the basic principles
of the politics of the Albanians in Kosova, but the way how this politics is managed. This
has brought as a consequence several serious disagreements between myself and the
political leadership of Kosova, including President Rugova. From time to time, I was
subject to discrediting political campaigns. With a lot of restraint, and especially because of
the responsibility towards the situation, I have tried to overcome all odds. I never requested
more than a bigger effectiveness in the realization of what was our unique purpose.

All my long-lasting and best efforts have not helped the situation to improve. Thus, I would
want my resignation to be understood as an act aimed towards the better organization of the
political leadership of Kosova, and not as a reason for division, polemics and dealing with
oneself.

For my work as President of the Government, I am willing to be held responsible, when

this is requested by my by those who are authorized according to the Constitution.
President Rugova has always been informed and consulted about everything I have done in
this post.

As an individual, I remain strong on the side of the struggle of my people for

independence, for the independence of Kosova, as a step closer to our mutual ideal - the
national unity, and always, within my possibilities, I will fight for it.

On this occasion I especially want to thank my collaborators who showed much sacrifice
during the whole term we worked together. I also want to thank all those in Kosova,
Albania and the diaspora who have supported me in this difficult and responsible post.

I have informed President Rugova about this resignation, and have determined July 1 as the
date of the turnover of the function.

B.B.

(This is the signed letter of resignation of Dr. Bujar Bukoshi, found in the Office of the
Republic of Kosova in Tirana)

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