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Phenomenology
Week
4:
Temporality
-
the
flow
of
time
(Husserl)
1.
The
Problem
Events,
such
as
melodies,
are
'stretched
out'
in
time,
having
temporal
parts
or
phases.
How
is
it
that
the
temporal
parts
of
a
melody
are
experienced
as
parts
of
one
and
the
same
continuous
thing?
How
is
it
that
we
have
an
experience
of
succession
(of
temporal
parts),
rather
than
simply
a
succession
of
experiences?
That
is,
what
accounts
for
the
fact
that
experience
presents
us
with
temporally
extended
events
as
temporally
extended?
This
might
seem
an
especially
hard
question
to
answer
if
we
think
that
we
can
only
be
perceptually
aware
of
the
present
instant.
For
then,
at
any
one
time,
experience
will
present
us
with
only
that
temporal
part
of
an
event
that
occurs
at
that
time.
2.
The
Specious
Present
A
popular
view
has
been
that
we
are
simultaneously
aware
of
more
than
an
instant.
According
to
William
James,
the
practically
cognized
present
is
no
knife-edge,
but
a
saddle-back,
with
a
certain
breadth
of
its
own
on
which
we
sit
perched,
and
from
which
we
look
in
two
directions
into
time.
The
unit
of
composition
of
our
perception
of
time
is
a
duration
(James,
Principles
of
Psychology,
Vol.1,
p.609)
The
doctrine
of
the
specious
present
holds
that
we
are
experientially
aware
of
a
span
of
time
that
includes
the
present
and
past
(and
perhaps
future).
The
specious
present
is
present
in
the
sense
that
the
experienced
phases
of
the
event
are
experienced
as
occurring
now.
The
specious
present
is
specious
in
that
those
phases
of
the
event
that
occur
at
times
other
than
the
present
instant
are
not
really
present.
The
Simultaneity
Problem:
the
view
would
seem
to
have
the
consequence
that
we
experience
the
successive
phases
of
an
event
as
simultaneous
The
Repetition
Problem:
given
that
our
experience
at
each
instant
would
span
a
duration
longer
than
that
instant,
it
seems
that
we
would
experience
everything
more
than
once.
In
a
sequence
of
two
notes
d,
e
we
would
experience
d
at
the
time
at
which
d
occurs,
and
then
again
at
the
time
at
which
e
occurs.
But,
of
course,
we
only
experience
each
note
once.
3.
Husserl
on
Time-Consciousness
Husserls
position
is
not
entirely
unlike
the
specious
present
view.
He
maintains
that
at
any
one
instant
one
has
experience
of
the
phase
occurring
at
that
instant,
the
phase
that
has
just
occurred,
and
that
phase
that
is
just
about
to
occur.
His
labels
for
these
three
aspects
of
experience
are
primal
impression,
retention
and
protention.
All
three
must
be
in
place
for
the
proper
experience
of
a
temporal
object.
Primal
impression:
an
intentional
awareness
of
the
present
event
as
now
happening.
Retention
(primary
memory):
an
intentional
awareness
of
the
past
event
as
having
just
happened.
Protention
(expectational
intuition):
an
intentional
awareness
of
the
future
event
as
about
to
happen.
In
the
experience
of
an
event,
not
only
is
the
past
phase
of
that
event
retained,
so
is
the
4.
Criticisms
1. Husserls
account
is
not
really
perceptual.
o Surely
the
phenomenon
in
question
is
given
perceptually
(otherwise
we
are
left
with
the
original
problem).
But,
on
Husserls
picture
the
duration
of
events
is
not
strictly
speaking
perceptually
given.
Husserls
narrow
conception
of
perception
is
an
awareness
of
the
present
instant
only
and
memory
just
isnt
the
sort
of
thing
that
can
truly
be
called
perceptual.
If
retention
is
a
form
of
memory,
then
it
ought
to
bear
some
phenomenological
similarity
to
other
forms
of
memory
(including
recollection),
and
they
merely
presentify
objects.
o In
response
it
might
be
claimed
that
there
are
other
similarities
between
retention
and
recollection.
For
example,
both
involve
the
retaining
of
some
cognitive
achievement:
retention
involves
the
automatic
retaining
of
perceptual
contact
(primal
impression),
recollection
involves
the
retaining
of
extended
episodes
of
experience.
2. The
repetition
problem
again
o If
Husserls
account
is
genuinely
perceptual,
then
it
faces
the
repetition
problem
again.
First
we
hear
c
as
present,
then
we
once
again
hear
c
as
past.
Adding
that
we
hear
it
as
past
does
not
change
the
fact
that
we
hear
it
twice.
o Husserl
is
aware
of
this,
taking
pains
to
distinguish
retention
from
reverberation,
but
has
he
really
explained
how
he
can
solve
the
problem
whilst
still
allowing
that
retention
forms
a
part
of
the
perceptual
process
itself?
3. Can
Husserl
account
for
complex
succession?
o There
is
a
difference
between
hearing
b,
c,
d
and
hearing
c,
b,
d.
But
when
I
have
already
heard
b
and
c,
and
am
hearing
d,
I
retain
the
experience
of
b
and
c
in
both
cases.
How
can
Husserls
account
explain
the
difference?
o Husserls
answer
to
this
(given
in
18)
is
that
I
retain
not
only
b
and
c
but
also
the
experience
of
c-following-on-from-b
(which
he
writes
as
b
c).
What
I
am
retaining
here
is
the
experience
of
c
whilst
d
was
retained.
Thus,
retentions
are
nested,
and
the
problem
is
solved
by
pointing
out
that
in
the
first
experience
I
retain
b
c
and
in
the
second
I
retain
c
b.
o In
response
it
might
be
thought
that
this
makes
temporal
experience
too
complex.
Is
it
phenomenologically
accurate
to
require
that
the
experience
of
the
passing
of
time
requires
us
to
retain
not
just
a
sequence
of
events
but
also
a
sequence
of
the
retentions
of
those
events?
Also,
is
this
consistent
with
Husserl's
way
of
distinguishing
retention
from
recollection?