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The Arab Spring (Arabic: , ar-rab al-arab) is a

revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests (both non-violent and
violent), riots, and civil wars in the Arab world that began on 18 December
2010.
By December 2013, rulers had been forced from power in Tunisia,[3] Egypt
(twice),[4] Libya,[5] and Yemen;[6] civil uprisings had erupted in Bahrain[7]
and Syria;[8] major protests had broken out in Algeria,[9] Iraq,[10]
Jordan,[11] Kuwait,[12] Morocco,[13] and Sudan;[14] and minor protests
had occurred in Mauritania,[15] Oman,[16] Saudi Arabia,[17] Djibouti,[18]
Western Sahara,[19] and the Palestinian territories.
Weapons and Tuareg fighters returning from the Libyan Civil War stoked a
simmering conflict in Mali which has been described as "fallout" from the
Arab Spring in North Africa.[20] The sectarian clashes in Lebanon were
described as a spillover of violence from the Syrian uprising and hence the
regional Arab Spring.[21]
The protests have shared some techniques of civil resistance in sustained
campaigns involving strikes, demonstrations, marches, and rallies, as well as
the effective use of social media[22][23] to organize, communicate, and
raise awareness in the face of state attempts at repression and Internet
censorship.[24][25]
Many Arab Spring demonstrations have been met with violent responses
from authorities,[26][27][28] as well as from pro-government militias and
counter-demonstrators. These attacks have been answered with violence
from protestors in some cases.[29][30][31] A major slogan of the
demonstrators in the Arab world has been Ash-sha`b yurid isqat an-nizam
("the people want to bring down the regime")

The Arab Spring is widely believed to have been instigated by dissatisfaction
with the rule of local governments, though some have speculated that wide
gaps in income levels may have had a hand as well.[45] Numerous factors
have led to the protests, including issues such as dictatorship or absolute
monarchy, human rights violations, political corruption (demonstrated by
Wikileaks diplomatic cables),[46] economic decline, unemployment, extreme
poverty, and a number of demographic structural factors,[47] such as a
large percentage of educated but dissatisfied youth within the
population.[48] Also, some - like Slovenian philosopher Slavoj iek - name
the 20092010 Iranian election protests as an additional reason behind the
Arab Spring.[49] The Kyrgyz Revolution of 2010 might also have been a
factor influencing its beginning.[50] Catalysts for the revolts in all Northern
African and Persian Gulf countries have included the concentration of wealth
in the hands of autocrats in power for decades, insufficient transparency of
its redistribution, corruption, and especially the refusal of the youth to
accept the status quo.[51] Increasing food prices and global famine rates
have contested but peaceful elections, fast-growing but liberal economy,
secular constitution but Islamist government, created a model (the Turkish
model) if not a motivation for protestors in neighbouring states.[52]

Tunisia experienced a series of conflicts over the past three years, the most
notable occurring in the mining area of Gafsa in 2008, where protests
continued for many months. These protests included rallies, sit-ins, and
strikes, during which there were two fatalities, an unspecified number of
wounded, and dozens of arrests.[53][54] The Egyptian labor movement had
been strong for years, with more than 3,000 labor actions since 2004.[55]
One important demonstration was an attempted workers' strike on 6 April
2008 at the state-run textile factories of al-Mahalla al-Kubra, just outside
Cairo. The idea for this type of demonstration spread throughout the
country, promoted by computer-literate working class youths and their
supporters among middle-class college students.[55] A Facebook page, set
up to promote the strike, attracted tens of thousands of followers. The
government mobilized to break the strike through infiltration and riot police,
and while the regime was somewhat successful in forestalling a strike,
dissidents formed the "6 April Committee" of youths and labor activists,
which became one of the major forces calling for the anti-Mubarak
demonstration on 25 January in Tahrir Square.[55]
In Algeria, discontent had been building for years over a number of issues.
In February 2008, United States Ambassador Robert Ford wrote in a leaked
diplomatic cable that Algeria is 'unhappy' with long-standing political
alienation; that social discontent persisted throughout the country, with food
strikes occurring almost every week; that there were demonstrations every
day somewhere in the country; and that the Algerian government was
corrupt and fragile.[56] Some have claimed that during 2010 there were as
many as '9,700 riots and unrests' throughout the country.[57] Many protests
focused on issues such as education and health care, while others cited
rampant corruption.[58]
In Western Sahara, the Gdeim Izik protest camp was erected 12 kilometres
(7.5 mi) south-east of El Aain by a group of young Sahrawis on 9 October
2010. Their intention was to demonstrate against labor discrimination,
unemployment, looting of resources, and human rights abuses.[59] The
camp contained between 12,000 and 20,000 inhabitants, but on 8 November
2010 it was destroyed and its inhabitants evicted by Moroccan security
forces. The security forces faced strong opposition from some young Sahrawi
civilians, and rioting soon spread to El Aain and other towns within the
territory, resulting in an unknown number of injuries and deaths. Violence
against Sahrawis in the aftermath of the protests was cited as a reason for
renewed protests months later, after the start of the Arab Spring.[60]
The catalyst for the current escalation of protests was the self-immolation of
Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi. Unable to find work and selling fruit at a
roadside stand, on 17 December 2010, a municipal inspector confiscated his
wares. An hour later he doused himself with gasoline and set himself afire.
His death on 4 January 2011[61] brought together various groups
dissatisfied with the existing system, including many unemployed, political
and human rights activists, labor, trade unionists, students, professors,
lawyers, and others to begin the Tunisian Revolution.[53]

The killing of Ambassador Stevens and three other Americans in Libya is
brutal proof that the turbulence that has shaken the Middle East since the
Arab Spring began has dangerous consequences for the United States.
Libya, of course, is a country that the United States helped liberate from
Qaddafis tyranny, and Americans understandably expected that gratitude,
not murder, would be the result. Counter-demonstrations in Tripoli suggest
that many Libyans remain thankful for U.S. support and oppose the violence,
but the scale of demonstrations in Libya as well as large protests in Egypt
and Yemen suggest that the region remains a dangerous place for Americans
and that many people in these countries have a hostile view of the United
States.
The collapse of authority in many countries has led to lawlessness.
Dictatorship, for all its brutality and many faults, meant that American
officials were not harmed by angry mobsunless the government wanted
the mobs to do so. Dictators fell, but strong regimes have not always taken
their place. Power vacuums replaced tyrannies in Iraq, Libya, and Yemen.
Should Assad go, Syria too will probably have a weak government at best.
As a result, even a small group of militants can wreak havoc.

THE CAUSES OF THE ARAB SPRING
William Quandt has astutely argued that authoritarian regimes base their
survival on four ingredients: ideology, repression, payoffs, and elite
solidarity. In Tunisia and Egypt the ideological justifications for rule had long
since failed to have any purchase on the population. The acceptance of
neoliberal rhetoric by the governing elite stripped them of their socialist and
developmental justification for authoritarian rule. In its place they
increasingly resorted to a conspiratorial nationalism, blaming economic
failure on a shadowy and shifting coalition of external actors. Given Hosni
Mubaraks close working relationship with the Israeli government and
Egypts financial dependence on American aid, the use of nationalist
paranoia as a justification for rule was bound to have a limited appeal. This
was especially the case amongst an increasingly youthful population who
had no memory of the post-colonial glory of Nasser in Egypt or Bourgiba in
Tunisia.
The increasingly brazen nature of regime corruption in both Egypt and
Tunisia was enabled through the exclusion of the majority of the population
from the economy. Family members of the ruling elite flaunted their wealth
in the streets of Tunis and Cairo as standards of living for the majority of the
population stagnated. The constituency for revolutionary change steadily
expanded as the percentage of the population between 15 and 29 years-old
rose, by 50 percent in
Tunisia and 60 percent in Egypt since 1990. Finally, as the membership of
the coalition of the dispossessed increased, the ability of the Egyptian and
Tunisian regimes to provide pay-offs was also put under increasing pressure.
In order to buy off its population the Egyptian government was reportedly
spending $3 billion a year subsidising the price of bread (Egypt is the worlds
largest importer of wheat with Tunisia coming in at number seventeen).
Through 2007 and 2008 the world price of wheat steadily rose, causing a
thirty-seven percent increase in the price of bread in Egypt.
Although the death of Mohamed Bouazizi acted as a catalyst for the
sustained protest against the formerly robust dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt
and then Libya and Syria, the structural drivers had long been in place.
Finally, in the face of extended street protests Quandts fourth pillar of
regime stability, elite solidarity cracked. In Tunisia, Ben Ali ordered Rachid
Ammar, the head of the army to fire on protestors. With a strategic eye on
the presidents increasing unpopularity and his own place in any future post-
regime change Tunisia Anwar refused, and sealed the fate of Ben Alis rule. A
similar dynamic was soon at work in Egypt, where Field Marshall Mohamed
Hussein Tantawi refused to order the army to fire on demonstrators, thus
guaranteeing his survival after the regime change that inevitably followed
his refusal to sanction violence.
Unlike the arrival in the Middle East of the World Bank and the IMF in the
1980s or the demonstration effect of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
liberation of Kuwait in 1989 and 1991, the Arab Spring of 2011 was a wholly
indigenous movement driven forward by the brave agency of young people
in Cairo and Tunisia. The contrast between the hesitant, contradictory and
reactive approach of the Obama administration and the dynamic behaviour
of the Arab Street only served to highlight that it was Arabs once again
making their own history, in spite and not because of the international
dynamics that had long been predicted to bring change to the region.
11

Caus
es
Authoritarianism
Demographic structural factors
Political corruption
Human rights violations
Inflation
Kleptocracy
Sectarianism
Unemployment
Self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi
Higher Food Prices due to the Russian
export ban on its remaining 2010
harvest which was damaged by wild
fires[1][2]
Goals Democracy
Free elections
Human rights
Employment
Regime change
Islamism
Secularism
Meth
ods
Civil disobedience
Civil resistance
Defection
Demonstrations
Insurgency
Internet activism
Protest camps
Revolution
Riots
Self-immolation
Sit-ins
Strike actions
Urban warfare
Uprising

s of September 2012, governments have been overthrown in four countries.
Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on 14 January
2011 following the Tunisian Revolution protests. In Egypt, President Hosni
Mubarak resigned on 11 February 2011 after 18 days of massive protests,
ending his 30-year presidency. The Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was
overthrown on 23 August 2011, after the National Transitional Council (NTC)
took control of Bab al-Azizia. He was killed on 20 October 2011, in his
hometown of Sirte after the NTC took control of the city. Yemeni President
Ali Abdullah Saleh signed the GCC power-transfer deal in which a
presidential election was held, resulting in his successor Abd al-Rab Mansur
al-Hadi formally replacing him as the president of Yemen on 27 February
2012, in exchange for immunity from prosecution.

Inspired by the uprising in Tunisia and prior to his entry as a central figure in
Egyptian politics, potential presidential candidate Mohamed ElBaradei
warned of a "Tunisia-style explosion" in Egypt.[195]
Protests in Egypt began on 25 January 2011 and ran for 18 days. Beginning
around midnight on 28 January, the Egyptian government attempted,
somewhat successfully, to eliminate the nation's Internet access,[25] in
order to inhibit the protesters' ability use media activism to organize through
social media.[196] Later that day, as tens of thousands protested on the
streets of Egypt's major cities, President Hosni Mubarak dismissed his
government, later appointing a new cabinet. Mubarak also appointed the
first Vice President in almost 30 years.
The U.S. embassy and international students began a voluntary evacuation
near the end of January, as violence and rumors of violence
escalated.[197][198]
On 10 February, Mubarak ceded all presidential power to Vice President
Omar Suleiman, but soon thereafter announced that he would remain as
President until the end of his term.[199] However, protests continued the
next day, and Suleiman quickly announced that Mubarak had resigned from
the presidency and transferred power to the Armed Forces of Egypt.[200]
The military immediately dissolved the Egyptian Parliament, suspended the
Constitution of Egypt, and promised to lift the nation's thirty-year
"emergency laws". A civilian, Essam Sharaf, was appointed as Prime Minister
of Egypt on 4 March to widespread approval among Egyptians in Tahrir
Square.[201] Violent protests however, continued through the end of 2011
as many Egyptians expressed concern about the Supreme Council of the
Armed Forces' perceived sluggishness in instituting reforms and their grip on
power.[202]
Hosni Mubarak and his former interior minister Habib al-Adli were convicted
to life in prison on the basis of their failure to stop the killings during the first
six days of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution.[203] His successor, Mohamed
Morsi, was sworn in as Egypt's first democratically elected president before
judges at the Supreme Constitutional Court.[204] Fresh protests erupted in
Egypt on 22 November 2012. On 3 July 2013, the military overthrew the
replacement government and President Morsi was removed from
power.[205]

Emergency law[edit]
Main article: Emergency law in Egypt
An emergency law (Law No. 162 of 1958) was enacted after the 1967 Six-
Day War. It was suspended for 18 months in the early 1980s[55] and has
otherwise continuously been in effect since President Sadat's 1981
assassination.[56] Under the law, police powers are extended, constitutional
rights suspended, censorship is legalised,[57] and the government may
imprison individuals indefinitely and without reason. The law sharply limits
any non-governmental political activity, including street demonstrations,
non-approved political organizations, and unregistered financial
donations.[55] The Mubarak government has cited the threat of terrorism in
order to extend the emergency law,[56] claiming that opposition groups like
the Muslim Brotherhood could come into power in Egypt if the current
government did not forgo parliamentary elections and suppress the group
through actions allowed under emergency law.[58] This has led to the
imprisonment of activists without trials,[59] illegal undocumented hidden
detention facilities,[60] and rejecting university, mosque, and newspaper
staff members based on their political inclination.

Police brutality[edit]
Further information: Law enforcement in Egypt
According to a report from the U.S. Embassy in Egypt, police brutality has
been common and widespread in Egypt.[64] In the five years prior to the
revolution, the Mubarak regime denied the existence of torture or abuse
carried out by the police. However, many claims by domestic and
international groups provided evidence through cellphone videos or first-
hand accounts of hundreds of cases of police abuse.[65

Corruption in government elections[edit]
Corruption, coercion to not vote, and manipulation of election results
occurred during many of the elections over 30 years.[77] Until 2005,
Mubarak was the only candidate to run for the presidency, on a yes/no
vote.[78] Mubarak won five consecutive presidential elections with a
sweeping majority. Opposition groups and international election monitoring
agencies accused the elections of being rigged. These agencies have not
been allowed to monitor the elections. The only opposing presidential
candidate in recent Egyptian history, Ayman Nour, was imprisoned before
the 2005 elections.[79] According to a 2007 UN survey, voter turnout was
extremely low (around 25%) because of the lack of trust in the corrupt
representational system.[

Demographic and economic challenges[edit]
Unemployment and reliance on subsidized goods[edit]
Further information: Demographics of Egypt, Demographic trap and Youth
bulge


Population pyramid in 2005. Many of those 30 and younger are educated
citizens who are experiencing difficulty finding work.
The population of Egypt grew from 30,083,419 in 1966[80] to roughly
79,000,000 by 2008.[81] The vast majority of Egyptians live in the limited
spaces near the banks of the Nile River, in an area of about 40,000 square
kilometers (15,000 sq mi), where the only arable land is found. In late 2010
around 40% of Egypt's population of just under 80 million lived on the fiscal
income equivalent of roughly US$2 per day, with a large part of the
population relying on subsidized goods.[1]
According to the Peterson Institute for International Economics and other
proponents of demographic structural approach (cliodynamics), a basic
problem in Egypt is unemployment driven by a demographic youth bulge:
with the number of new people entering the job force at about 4% a year,
unemployment in Egypt is almost 10 times as high for college graduates as
it is for people who have gone through elementary school, particularly
educated urban youththe same people who were out in the streets during
the revolution.[82][83]


A poor neighbourhood in Cairo.
Poor living conditions and economic conditions[edit]
Further information: Economy of Egypt
Egypt's economy was highly centralised during the tenure of President
Gamal Abdel Nasser but opened up considerably under President Anwar
Sadat and Mubarak. From 2004 to 2008 the Mubarak-led government
aggressively pursued economic reforms to attract foreign investment and
facilitate GDP growth, but postponed further economic reforms because of
global economic turmoil. The international economic downturn slowed
Egypt's GDP growth to 4.5% in 2009. In 2010 analysts said the government
of Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif would need to restart economic reforms to
attract foreign investment, boost growth, and improve economic conditions.
Despite high levels of national economic growth over the past few years,
living conditions for the average Egyptian remained relatively poor,[84]
though better than many other countries in Africa[82] where no significant
social explosions were observed, which indicates that poverty cannot be
regarded as a real cause of the Egyptian revolution.
Corruption among government officials[edit]
Further information: Crime in Egypt
Political corruption in the Mubarak administration's Ministry of Interior rose
dramatically due to the increased level of control over the institutional
system necessary to prolong the presidency.[85] The rise to power of
powerful businessmen in the NDP, in the government, and in the People's
Assembly led to massive waves of anger during the years of Prime Minister
Ahmed Nazif's government. An example is Ahmed Ezz's monopolising the
steel industry in Egypt by holding more than 60% of the market share.[86]
Aladdin Elaasar, an Egyptian biographer and an American professor,
estimated that the Mubarak family was worth from $50 to
$70 billion.[87][88]
The wealth of Ahmed Ezz, the former NDP Organisation Secretary, was
estimated to be 18 billion Egyptian pounds;[89] the wealth of former
Housing Minister Ahmed al-Maghraby was estimated to be more than
11 billion Egyptian pounds;[89] the wealth of former Minister of Tourism
Zuhair Garrana is estimated to be 13 billion Egyptian pounds;[89] the wealth
of former Minister of Trade and Industry, Rashid Mohamed Rashid, is
estimated to be 12 billion Egyptian pounds;[89] and the wealth of former
Interior Minister Habib al-Adly was estimated to be 8 billion Egyptian
pounds.[89]
The perception among Egyptians was that the only people to benefit from
the nation's wealth were businessmen with ties to the National Democratic
Party; "wealth fuels political power and political power buys wealth."[90]
During the Egyptian parliamentary election, 2010, opposition groups
complained of harassment and fraud perpetrated by the government.
Opposition and civil society activists called for changes to a number of legal
and constitutional provisions which affect elections.
[
citation needed
]

In 2010, Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)
report assessed Egypt with a CPI score of 3.1, based on perceptions of the
degree of corruption from business people and country analysts (with 10
being clean and 0 being totally corrupt).[91]
Lead-up to the protests[edit]
To prepare for a possible overthrow of Mubarak, opposition groups studied
the work of Gene Sharp on non-violent revolution and worked with leaders
of Otpor!, the student-led Serbian uprising of 2000. Copies of Sharp's list of
198 non-violent "weapons", translated into Arabic and not always attributed
to him, were circulated in Tahrir Square during its occupation.[92][93]
Tunisian revolution[edit]
Main article: Tunisian revolution
Further information: Arab Spring
After the ousting of Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali due to mass
protests, many analysts, including former European Commission President
Romano Prodi, saw Egypt as the next country where such a revolution might
occur.[94] The Washington Post commented, "The Jasmine Revolution [...]
should serve as a stark warning to Arab leaders beginning with Egypt's 83-
year-old Hosni Mubarak that their refusal to allow more economic and
political opportunity is dangerous and untenable."[95] Others held the
opinion that Egypt was not ready for revolution, citing little aspiration of the
Egyptian people, low educational levels, and a strong government with the
support of the military.[96] The BBC said, "The simple fact is that most
Egyptians do not see any way that they can change their country or their
lives through political action, be it voting, activism, or going out on the
streets to demonstrate."[97]
Self-immolation[edit]


A protester holds an Egyptian flag during the protests that started on 25
January 2011 in Egypt
Following the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia on 17
December, a man set himself ablaze on 17 December in front of the Tunisian
parliament;[98] and about five more attempts of self-immolation
followed.[96]
National Police Day protests[edit]
Opposition groups planned a day of revolt for 25 January, coinciding with the
National Police Day. The purpose was to protest against abuses by the police
in front of the Ministry of Interior.[99] These demands expanded to include
the resignation of the Minister of Interior, an end to State corruption, the
end of Egyptian emergency law, and term limits for the president.
Many political movements, opposition parties, and public figures supported
the day of revolt, including Youth for Justice and Freedom, Coalition of the
Youth of the Revolution, the Popular Democratic Movement for Change, the
Revolutionary Socialists and the National Association for Change. The April 6
Youth Movement was a major supporter of the protest and distributed
20,000 leaflets saying "I will protest on 25 January to get my rights". The
Ghad El-Thawra Party, Karama, Wafd and Democratic Front supported the
protests. The Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's largest opposition group,[100]
confirmed on 23 January that it would participate.[100][101] Public figures
including novelist Alaa Al Aswany, writer Belal Fadl, and actors Amr Waked
and Khaled Aboul Naga announced they would participate. However, the
leftist National Progressive Unionist Party (the Tagammu) stated it would not
participate. The Coptic Church urged Christians not to participate in the
protests.[100]
Twenty-six-year-old Asmaa Mahfouz was instrumental[102] in sparking the
protests.[103][104] In a video blog posted a week before National Police
Day,[105] she urged the Egyptian people to join her on 25 January in Tahrir
Square to bring down Mubarak's regime.[106] Mahfouz's use of video
blogging and social media went viral[107] and urged people not to be
afraid.[108] The Facebook group set up for the event attracted 80,000
attendees.

In the 1960s an American political scientist, Malcolm Kerr, coined the phrase
the Arab Cold War to describe the regional rivalry between two blocks of
Arab states each backed by superpower patrons. Mr Kerr accepted that this
rivalry ended in the 1970s but in the first decade of the 21st century several
commentators claimed that, following increased US intervention after 9/11,
once again the Middle East was being divided into two blocks and a new
Middle Eastern Cold War was taking shape. This bipolarity saw one camp led
by the US and its principle allies Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt face
down a second, self-styled resistance camp composed of Iran, Syria,
Lebanons Hezbollah and the Palestinian militia/party, Hamas. As in the
1950s and 60s, these two blocks found themselves competing in numerous
minor conflicts, political battles and the media, in a bid to dominate the
region, with Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine forming the key battlegrounds.
The Arab Spring has changed this. While Israel and Saudi Arabia persist with
their old narrative about the threat from Iran, in reality the popular uprisings
of 2011 has changed the environment around all three states. New actors
that had previously stood back from the region, such as Turkey and Qatar,
stand to increase their influence and clout as a consequence of the unrest
while formerly influential states such as Egypt and Syria look set for
prolonged instability and weakness. Alongside this the global context has
changed. The emerging BRICS powers have enhanced their influence and
importance, at the very moment that the US and EU appear weaker
following internal economic turmoil. The result is that instead of two clear
blocks competing, the Middle East after the Arab Spring looks set to be
multi-polar, with many different regional and global powers vying for
influence in the different political and, possibly, military conflicts that the
uprisings have created.

The idea that social forces such as ideas, norms and rules influence states
identities and interests has gained increased acknowledgement in the study
of the current international system, as mainstream international relations
theories seem to offer only limited applications to contemporary events. As
Nicholas Onuf argues, international politics is a world of our making; there
is a process of interaction between agency and structure and the
international system is constituted by ideas, not material forces (Onuf,
1989:341). Using the Arab Spring as a case study throughout this essay, it
will be argued that social constructivism can explain events in the
international system due to its ontological position that emphasizes that
structures not only constrain; they also constitute the identity of actors

Many of the mainstream international relations theories assume that all
states concerned have a level of similarity resulting in fixed generalization
and theory construction (Fierke in Dunne, 2010:179). However, despite the
generalization, these theories failed to predict and explain international
politics in times such as the outbreak of the Cold War, post-Cold War events,
and recently the Arab Spring. Social constructivism, on the other hand,
differs from these generalizations as it emphasizes the importance of social
dimensions and gives more meaning to norms, language, rules and identities
(Barnett, 2011:151-153). These make the international system a constant
process of construction and interaction, where structures are shaped by
agency and vice versa and are not fixed through generalizations. As
Alexander Wendt wrote: Anarchy is what states make of it; unlike the
rationalists, who emphasize that structures constrain, norms and identity
have constitutive roles in relation to the relationship between agency and
structure (Wendt, 1992). Therefore, constructivists see knowledge as
constructed as opposed to created. Epistemologically, social constructivism
is in-between positivist and post-positivist perspectives, making it adaptive,
organized and constrained at the same time.

One of the interpretations of the origins of the Arab Spring is that it erupted
in Tunisia, a small country that was more educated than the Arab norm and
with strong links to Europe (BBC, 2013). Social constructivism can explain
this as the proliferation of democratic norms, largely brought about through
media technologies and social networks interactions, often labeled as the
concept of globalization, which led the youth in the Middle East to become
the main agent and force of change during the Arab Spring. It can be argued
that the Arab Spring would not have happened without social interaction, as
these exchanges both on the domestic and international level mutually
constituted conflict. Contrary to Samuel P. Huntingtons The Clash of
Civilizations theory (Huntington, 1993), Arabs did not despise Western
liberty but they instead desired it (Mogahed, 2012). Ideas of human rights,
freedom, social equity and dignity flooded the Middle East and weakened the
structure that had been established in the area for centuries. Even though
structure clearly sets parameters in a political system, these parameters are
not bound to be irreversible. Indeed, it might be because many leaders in
the Middle East assumed that their set parameters were irreversible, that
they believed in the durability of their political authoritarianism (El-Mahdi,
2012:13). Because they felt reassured in their supposedly safe identity and
structure, the increased influx of ideas and Western norms through a
process of globalization was not deemed as a threat. But the agents of
political socialization were adept at influencing the peoples consciousness,
especially through media (El-Mahdi, 2012:63). The more frequent the social
interactions became, through the help of social platforms such as Facebook,
Twitter and BlackBerry Messenger, the more the people were ready to
reconstruct their social identities. As Toby Dodge wrote: The demands for
full citizenship, for the recognition of individual political rights, were a
powerful unifying theme across the Arab revolutions (Dodge, 2012). This
human consciousness was one of the most powerful tools for the structural
change, where the relationship between material forces and ideas
consequently led to the people questioning the origins of what they had
accepted as a fact of their lives, resulting in the idea to establish an
alternative pathway, an alternative world in the Middle East
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