fi58

PRACTICE OF AUCIllTECTUllE. Book III.

to iioinciichitiire in tl)c arts, in which the (Jerniaii writers abound, and in its application to
irchitectuie of least value; because in tliat art I'orni is frcm construction so limited by
necessity, that sentiment can scarcely be said to be further coiuiected with the art than is
necessary for keeping the subordinate parts of the same character as tiie greater ones under
which they are combined ;
and, further, for thereby avoiding incongruities.
'2-i94. It is well known that all art in relation to nature is subject to those laws by which
nature herself is goverr.ed, and if we were certain that those rules of art which resulted
from reason were necfPrarily and actually connected with sensrition, there would be nc
difficulty in framing a code of laws whereon the ])rincipks of any art might be firmly
founded.
"
Principles in ait," as well defined by Payne Knight, '-are no other than the
trains of ideas whioli arise in the mind of the artist out of a just and ade(juate consider-
ation of all those local, temj)orary, or accidental circumstances ujion which their jiropriety
or imi)roprlety, their congruity or incongruity, wholly depend." Ey way of illustrating
the observation just made, we will merely allude to that maxim in architecture which
inculcates the proi)riety of placing openings over ojjenings and piers over piers, disallowing,
in otiier words, the ])lacing a pier over an opening without the exhibition of such pre-
paration below as shall satisfy the mind that security has lieen consulted. There can be
no doubt that a departure from the maxim creates an unpleasant sensation in the mind,
which would seem to be immediately and intimately connected with the laws of reason;
but tiiere is great difficulty in satisfying one's self of the precise manner in which tliis
operates on the mind, without a recurrence to t!ie primitive types in architecture, and
tiience pursuing the intjuiry. But in the otiier arts the types are found in nature herself,
and hence in them no difficulty occurs in tiie establishment of laws, because we have that
!,;ime nature whereto reference may be made. AVe shall have to ret'irn to this subject in
the section on the Orders of Architecture, to which we must refer the reader, instead ot
pursuing the subject here.
2495. Tiirougliout nature beauty seems to follow the adoption of forms suitable to the
t'X])rossion of the end. In the human form there is no part, considered in respect to the
end for which it was formed by the great Creator, that in the eye of the artist, or rather,
in this case the better judge, the anatomist, is not admirably calculated for the function it
lias to discharge ; and without the accurate representation of those jjarts in di^charge of
their several functions, no artist by means of mere expression, in the ordinary meaning of
that word, can hope for celebrity. This arises from an inadequate re])resentation having
the appearance of incompetency to discharge the given functions; or, in other words, they
appear unfit to answer the end.
i:49&". We are thus led to the consideration o? fitness, which, after all, will be found to be
the basis of all proportion, if not ])rop()rtioii itself. Alison, in his Esxii/ on Tdbte, says,
'
I apprehend that the beauty of ))roportion in forms is to be ascribed to this cause,"
(fitness) "and that certain proi)ortions affect us with the emotion of beauty, not from any
original capacity in such (jualities to excite this emotion, but from their being exjiressive
to us of the fitness of the parts to the end designed." Hogarth, who well understood the
subject, concurs with Alison in considering that the entotion of pleasure which jnoportion
affords does not resemble the jjleasure of sensation, but rather that feeling of satisfatiion
arising from means properly adapted to their end. In his Analysis
of
Beaiitij tliat great
))aiiiter places the (|uestion in its best and truest light, when, speaking of chairs and tables,
or other common objects of furniture, he considers them merely as fitted from their pro-
portions to the end they have to serve. In the same manner, says Alison, "the effect of
disproportion seems to me to bear no resemblance to that immediate jiainful sensation
which we feel from any disagreeable sound or smell, but to resemble that kind of dissatis-
faction which we feel when means are unHtted to their end. Thus the disiiroportion of a
chair or tabla does not affect us with a simple sensation of pain, but with a very observ-
able emotion of dissatisfaction or discontent, from the unsuitableness of their construction
for the purposes the objects are intended to serve. Of the truth of this every man must
judge from his own ex))erience." We cannot refrain from continuing our extracts from
this most intelligent author.
"
The habit," he says,
"
which we have in a great many
familiar cases of immediately conceiving this fitness from the mere appearance of the form,
leads us to imagine, as it is expressed in common language, that we determine ))roportion by
the eye, and this quality of fitness is so immediately expressed by the material form, that we
are sensibie of little difference between such judgments and a mere determination of sense;
yet every man must have observed that in those cases where either the object is not
familiar to us or the construction intricate our judgment is by no means speedy, and that
we never discover the proportion until we previously discover the principle of the machine
or tlie means by which the end is produced."
2497. The nature of the terras in which we converse shows the dependence of proportion
on fitness, for it is the sign of the quality. The natural answer of a person asked why the
pro.portion of any building or machine pleased him, would be, because the oijject by such
j)roporti()n was fit or proper for its end. Indeed, proportion is but a synouyme of fitueoS,