PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

BASED ON THE SYLLABUS OF ATTY. AGUIRRE Lupo Atienenza v. Judge Brillantes to Alcazar v. Alcazar

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
28, Manila, respondent.

QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of
Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are
living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro
Manila. He stays in said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in
Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent
sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy
that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not
bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving
instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even
alienated the affection of his children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with
whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements
of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused his
arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De Castro
inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro
and that the filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's
claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was
even a witness to the withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De
Castro against complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro
who called the police to arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits
having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went
through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25,
1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the
request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage
ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a
marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their
children to his care and custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles,
California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal
intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was
solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage.
Article 40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not
apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was
governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took
place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage.
Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with
Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested
right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may
not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive
application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229
[1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA
674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery
of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a
woman, who beget him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the
practice of law in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage
ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any
marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is
necessary before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to
correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the
second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two occasions
betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for
membership in the legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a
Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De
Castro began and continued when he was already in the judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free
of a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial
duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of
morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and
in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be
overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229
SCRA 690 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all
leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any
branch, instrumentality, or agency of the government, including government-
owned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,
Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002]
ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner, vs. CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad
litem for the minor ADRIAN BERNABE, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate
children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect cannot be
impaired or taken away. The minors have up to four years from attaining
majority age within which to file an action for recognition.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, praying for (1) the nullification of the July 7, 1999 Court of
Appeals[2] (CA) Decision[3] in CA-GR CV No. 51919 and the October 14, 1999
CA Resolution[4] denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, as well as (2)
the reinstatement of the two Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasay City (Branch 109) concerning the same case. The dispositive portion of
the assailed Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court dismissing
Civil Case No. 94-0562 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this
case be remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits.[5]
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this
wise:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary
of twenty-three (23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was
born on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe
died on August 13, 1993, while his wife Rosalina died on December 3 of the
same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint
praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal
Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes estate,
which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that
under the provisions of the Family Code as well as the case of Uyguangco vs.
Court of Appeals, the complaint is now barred x x x.[6]
Orders of the Trial Court
In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted Ernestina
Bernabes Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts Decision and ordered
the dismissal of the Complaint for recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family
Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative father had barred the action.
In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the
putative father had not acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing,
the action for recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the
alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs
filiation.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of
justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of
Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in 1981, his rights are governed by
Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for recognition to be filed
within four years after the child has attained the age of majority. The subsequent
enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.
Hence, this appeal.[7]
Issues
In her Memorandum,[8] petitioner raises the following issues for our
consideration:
I
Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against
petitioner, the legitimate daughter of the putative father, for recognition and
partition with accounting after the putative fathers death in the absence of any
written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.
II
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
respondents had four years from the attainment of minority to file an action for
recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the Civil Code, in complete disregard of
its repeal by the [express] provisions of the Family Code and the applicable
jurisprudence as held by the Honorable Court of Appeals.
III
Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petition[er] is fatally
defective for failure to implead the Court of Appeals as one of the
respondents.[9]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First and Second Issues: Period to File Action for Recognition
Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall discuss
them jointly.
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for
recognition, because Article 285 of the Civil Code has been supplanted by the
provisions of the Family Code. She argues that the latter Code should be given
retroactive effect, since no vested right would be impaired. We do not agree.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for
recognition as follows:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought
only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child,
in which case the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the attainment of his
majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document
should appear of which nothing had been heard and in
which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding
of the document.
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have
however been omitted by Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which
we quote:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during
his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die
during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a
period of five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the
death of either or both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent.
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child
must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code
makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter
died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute
the claim, considering that illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised
in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. x x x
The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the
childs filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead.[10]
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have
already vested prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as
follows:
ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws.
The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrians right to an
action for recognition, which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had
already vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Our answer is
affirmative.
A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and
unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency x x
x.[11] Respondent however contends that the filing of an action for recognition
is procedural in nature and that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to
[or] arise from procedural laws.[12]
Bustos v. Lucero[13] distinguished substantive from procedural law in
these words:
x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this
respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which
includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the
disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which
creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties
which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are
established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their
invasion.[14] (Citations omitted)
Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,[15] the Court laid down the test for
determining whether a rule is procedural or substantive:
[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the
practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any
substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is,
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction
of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule
creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive
matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the
rule deals merely with procedure.[16]
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the
Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for
recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family
Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to file an action for recognition,
because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.
Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals[17] is not applicable to the case at bar,
because the plaintiff therein sought recognition as an illegitimate child when he
was no longer a minor. On the other hand, in Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals[18]
the Court ruled that an action for recognition filed while the Civil Code was in
effect should not be affected by the subsequent enactment of the Family Code,
because the right had already vested.
Not Limited to Natural Children
To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for
recognition of natural children. Thus, petitioner contends that the provision
cannot be availed of by respondent, because at the time of his conception, his
parents were impeded from marrying each other. In other words, he is not a
natural child.
A natural child is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were
not disqualified by any legal impediment from marrying each other. Thus, in De
Santos v. Angeles,[19] the Court explained:
A childs parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the
time of conception for him to qualify as a natural child.[20]
A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been frowned
upon by this Court in the aforesaid case of Aruego, which allowed minors to file
a case for recognition even if their parents were disqualified from marrying each
other. There, the Complaint averred that the late Jose Aruego Sr., a married
man, had an extramarital liason with Luz Fabian. Out of this relationship were
born two illegitimate children who in 1983 filed an action for recognition. The
two children were born in 1962 and 1963, while the alleged putative father died
in 1982. In short, at the time of their conception, the two childrens parents were
legally disqualified from marrying each other. The Court allowed the Complaint
to prosper, even though it had been filed almost a year after the death of the
presumed father. At the time of his death, both children were still minors.
Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v. Rovira,[21] the Court said
that the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment of natural children,
as well as the prescriptive period for filing such action, may likewise be applied
to spurious children. Pertinent portions of the case are quoted hereunder:
The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural
children, commonly known as bastards, include those adulterous children or
those born out of wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with a man other
than her husband or to a married man cohabiting with a woman other than his
wife. They are entitled to support and successional rights. But their filiation must
be duly proven.
How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the
investigation of the paternity or maternity or spurious children under the
circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The
implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are
applicable to spurious children.
Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The
rules on proof of filiation of natural children or the rules on voluntary and
compulsory acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious
children.
That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as that
term is used with respect to natural children. What is simply meant is that the
grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to
establish the filiation of spurious children.
A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. These are the
modes of voluntary recognition of natural children.
In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child,
then his filiation may be established by means of the circumstances or grounds
for compulsory recognition prescribed in the aforementioned articles 283 and
284.
The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the
case of natural children, as provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code, applies
to spurious children.[22] (Citations omitted, italics supplied)
Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional
rights over spurious ones.[23] However, Rovira treats them as equals with
respect to other rights, including the right to recognition granted by Article 285.
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the
Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority
are thus given the right to seek recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil Code)
for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right
was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.
Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of
minors who could not have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their
putative parents. As respondent aptly points out in his Memorandum,[24] the
State as parens patriae should protect a minors right. Born in 1981, Adrian was
only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and only twelve when
his alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court.
Third Issue: Failure to Implead the CA
Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court, it is no longer
required to implead the lower courts or judges x x x either as petitioners or
respondents. Under Section 3, however, the lower tribunal should still be
furnished a copy of the petition. Hence, the failure of petitioner to implead the
Court of Appeals as a party is not a reversible error; it is in fact the correct
procedure.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision
and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., no part. Relationship with family.




EN BANC


MANUEL O. FUENTES and G.R. No. 178902
LETICIA L. FUENTES,

v.

CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R.
JOSON, ROSE MARIE R. CRISTOBAL
and PILAR MALCAMPO, Promulgated:
Respondents.
April 21, 2010
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:


This case is about a husbands sale of conjugal real property,
employing a challenged affidavit of consent from an estranged wife. The buyers
claim valid consent, loss of right to declare nullity of sale, and prescription.

The Facts and the Case

Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar,
Zamboanga City. On October 11, 1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca
(Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale.[1] But Tarciano did not for the
meantime have the registered title transferred to his name.

Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners
Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They arranged to meet at
the office of Atty. Romulo D. Plagata whom they asked to prepare the
documents of sale. They later signed an agreement to sell that Atty. Plagata
prepared[2] dated April 29, 1988, which agreement expressly stated that it was
to take effect in six months.

The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a
down payment of P60,000.00 for the transfer of the lots title to him. And,
within six months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and
secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the
sale. Upon Tarcianos compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses
were to take possession of the lot and pay him an additional P140,000.00 or
P160,000.00, depending on whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the
house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these conditions,
the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the lot without any further
formality and payment.

The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then
worked on the other requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went
to see Rosario in one of his trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of
consent.[3] As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions, Atty. Plagata
notarized Rosarios affidavit in Zamboanga City. On January 11, 1989 Tarciano
executed a deed of absolute sale[4] in favor of the Fuentes spouses. They then
paid him the additional P140,000.00 mentioned in their agreement. A new title
was issued in the name of the spouses[5] who immediately constructed a
building on the lot. On January 28, 1990 Tarciano passed away, followed by his
wife Rosario who died nine months afterwards.

Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely,
respondents Conrado G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, and Rose Marie R.
Cristobal, together with Tarcianos sister, Pilar R. Malcampo, represented by her
son, John Paul M. Trinidad (collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment
of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City in Civil Case 4707. The Rocas
claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarcianos wife, Rosario, did
not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been
forged. They thus prayed that the property be reconveyed to them upon
reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.[6]

The spouses denied the Rocas allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata
who testified that he personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence in
Paco, Manila, on September 15, 1988. He admitted, however, that he notarized
the document in Zamboanga City four months later on January 11, 1989.[7] All
the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery was
personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year
prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.

Both the Rocas and the Fuentes spouses presented handwriting experts
at the trial. Comparing Rosarios standard signature on the affidavit with those
on various documents she signed, the Rocas expert testified that the signatures
were not written by the same person. Making the same comparison, the
spouses expert concluded that they were.[8]

On February 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, dismissing the case. It
ruled that the action had already prescribed since the ground cited by the Rocas
for annulling the sale, forgery or fraud, already prescribed under Article 1391 of
the Civil Code four years after its discovery. In this case, the Rocas may be
deemed to have notice of the fraud from the date the deed of sale was
registered with the Registry of Deeds and the new title was issued. Here, the
Rocas filed their action in 1997, almost nine years after the title was issued to
the Fuentes spouses on January 18, 1989.[9]

Moreover, the Rocas failed to present clear and convincing evidence of
the fraud. Mere variance in the signatures of Rosario was not conclusive proof of
forgery.[10] The RTC ruled that, although the Rocas presented a handwriting
expert, the trial court could not be bound by his opinion since the opposing
expert witness contradicted the same. Atty. Plagatas testimony remained
technically unrebutted.[11]

Finally, the RTC noted that Atty. Plagatas defective notarization of the
affidavit of consent did not invalidate the sale. The law does not require spousal
consent to be on the deed of sale to be valid. Neither does the irregularity
vitiate Rosarios consent. She personally signed the affidavit in the presence of
Atty. Plagata.[12]

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision. The CA
found sufficient evidence of forgery and did not give credence to Atty. Plagatas
testimony that he saw Rosario sign the document in Quezon City. Its jurat said
differently. Also, upon comparing the questioned signature with the specimen
signatures, the CA noted significant variance between them. That Tarciano and
Rosario had been living separately for 30 years since 1958 also reinforced the
conclusion that her signature had been forged.

Since Tarciano and Rosario were married in 1950, the CA concluded that
their property relations were governed by the Civil Code under which an action
for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent may be brought
by the wife during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction.
Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within
10 years of the January 11, 1989 sale.

Considering, however, that the sale between the Fuentes spouses and
Tarciano was merely voidable, the CA held that its annulment entitled the
spouses to reimbursement of what they paid him plus legal interest computed
from the filing of the complaint until actual payment. Since the Fuentes spouses
were also builders in good faith, they were entitled under Article 448 of the Civil
Code to payment of the value of the improvements they introduced on the lot.
The CA did not award damages in favor of the Rocas and deleted the award of
attorneys fees to the Fuentes spouses.[13]

Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the Fuentes spouses came to this court
by petition for review.[14]

The Issues Presented

The case presents the following issues:

1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of
consent to her husband Tarcianos sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes
spouses was forged;

2. Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity
of that sale to the spouses already prescribed; and

3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not
had, could bring the action to annul that sale.

The Courts Rulings

First. The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosarios signature
on the document of consent had been forged. For, if the signature were
genuine, the fact that she gave her consent to her husbands sale of the
conjugal land would render the other issues merely academic.

The CA found that Rosarios signature had been forged. The CA
observed a marked difference between her signature on the affidavit of
consent[15] and her specimen signatures.[16] The CA gave no weight to Atty.
Plagatas testimony that he saw Rosario sign the document in Manila on
September 15, 1988 since this clashed with his declaration in the jurat that
Rosario signed the affidavit in Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989.

The Court agrees with the CAs observation that Rosarios signature
strokes on the affidavit appears heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her specimen
signatures, on the other hand, are consistently of a lighter stroke and more fluid.
The way the letters R and s were written is also remarkably different. The
variance is obvious even to the untrained eye.

Significantly, Rosarios specimen signatures were made at about the
time that she signed the supposed affidavit of consent. They were, therefore,
reliable standards for comparison. The Fuentes spouses presented no evidence
that Rosario suffered from any illness or disease that accounted for the variance
in her signature when she signed the affidavit of consent. Notably, Rosario had
been living separately from Tarciano for 30 years since 1958. And she resided
so far away in Manila. It would have been quite tempting for Tarciano to just
forge her signature and avoid the risk that she would not give her consent to
the sale or demand a stiff price for it.

What is more, Atty. Plagata admittedly falsified the jurat of the
affidavit of consent. That jurat declared that Rosario swore to the document
and signed it in Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989 when, as Atty. Plagata
testified, she supposedly signed it about four months earlier at her residence in
Paco, Manila on September 15, 1988. While a defective notarization will merely
strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument,
that falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of forgery in the signature,
dooms such document as proof of Rosarios consent to the sale of the land.
That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of
Rosarios consent does not matter. The sale is still void without an authentic
consent.

Second. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that
applies to this case is the Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano
and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the
Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took
effect on August 3, 1988.

When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of
conjugal partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165
made Tarciano the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166[17]
prohibited him from selling commonly owned real property without his wifes
consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wifes consent, the sale is not void
but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have the sale
annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing
in that, she or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the
value of the property that Tarciano fraudulently sold. Thus:

Art. 173. The wife may, during
the marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for
the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent,
when such consent is required, or any act or
contract of the husband which tends to
defraud her or impair her interest in the
conjugal partnership property. Should the
wife fail to exercise this right, she or her
heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage,
may demand the val ue of property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.

But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded
Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property Relations Between Husband and
Wife.[18] Further, the Family Code provisions were also made to apply to
already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights.[19]
Thus:

Art. 105. x x x The provisions of
this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established
between spouses before the effectivity of
this Code, without prejudice to vested
rights already acquired in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in
Article 256. (n)

Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on
January 11, 1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already the
Family Code.

In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family
Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no consent
may assail her husbands sale of the real property. It simply provides that
without the other spouses written consent or a court order allowing the sale,
the same would be void. Article 124 thus provides:

Art. 124. x x x In the event that
one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of administration.
These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. x
x x

Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void
or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. And this
rule applies to contracts that are declared void by positive provision of law,[20]
as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the other spouses written
consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in
civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription.[21]

But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is
taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have been performed, an action to
declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given
under it.[22] This action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not
prescribe. Thus:

Art. 1410. The action or defense for
the declaration of the inexistence of a
contract does not prescribe.

Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997
for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold
without their mothers (his wifes) written consent. The passage of time did not
erode the right to bring such an action.

Besides, even assuming that it is the Civil Code that applies to the
transaction as the CA held, Article 173 provides that the wife may bring an
action for annulment of sale on the ground of lack of spousal consent during the
marriage within 10 years from the transaction. Consequently, the action that the
Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the January 11, 1989
sale. It did not yet prescribe.

The Fuentes spouses of course argue that the RTC nullified the sale
to them based on fraud and that, therefore, the applicable prescriptive period
should be that which applies to fraudulent transactions, namely, four years from
its discovery. Since notice of the sale may be deemed given to the Rocas when
it was registered with the Registry of Deeds in 1989, their right of action already
prescribed in 1993.

But, if there had been a victim of fraud in this case, it would be the
Fuentes spouses in that they appeared to have agreed to buy the property
upon an honest belief that Rosarios written consent to the sale was genuine.
They had four years then from the time they learned that her signature had
been forged within which to file an action to annul the sale and get back their
money plus damages. They never exercised the right.

If, on the other hand, Rosario had agreed to sign the document of
consent upon a false representation that the property would go to their
children, not to strangers, and it turned out that this was not the case, then she
would have four years from the time she discovered the fraud within which to
file an action to declare the sale void. But that is not the case here. Rosario was
not a victim of fraud or misrepresentation. Her consent was simply not obtained
at all. She lost nothing since the sale without her written consent was void.
Ultimately, the Rocas ground for annulment is not forgery but the lack of written
consent of their mother to the sale. The forgery is merely evidence of lack of
consent.

Third. The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to Rosario, whose
consent was not obtained, that the law gave the right to bring an action to
declare void her husbands sale of conjugal land. But here, Rosario died in
1990, the year after the sale. Does this mean that the right to have the sale
declared void is forever lost?

The answer is no. As stated above, that sale was void from the
beginning. Consequently, the land remained the property of Tarciano and
Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on the ownership of
the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas.[23] As lawful owners, the Rocas
had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from
its enjoyment and disposal.

In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be
entitled, among other things, to recover from Tarcianos heirs, the Rocas, the
P200,000.00 that they paid him, with legal interest until fully paid, chargeable
against his estate.

Further, the Fuentes spouses appear to have acted in good faith in
entering the land and building improvements on it. Atty. Plagata, whom the
parties mutually entrusted with closing and documenting the transaction,
represented that he got Rosarios signature on the affidavit of consent. The
Fuentes spouses had no reason to believe that the lawyer had violated his
commission and his oath. They had no way of knowing that Rosario did not
come to Zamboanga to give her consent. There is no evidence that they had a
premonition that the requirement of consent presented some difficulty. Indeed,
they willingly made a 30 percent down payment on the selling price months
earlier on the assurance that it was forthcoming.

Further, the notarized document appears to have comforted the
Fuentes spouses that everything was already in order when Tarciano executed a
deed of absolute sale in their favor on January 11, 1989. In fact, they paid the
balance due him. And, acting on the documents submitted to it, the Register of
Deeds of Zamboanga City issued a new title in the names of the Fuentes
spouses. It was only after all these had passed that the spouses entered the
property and built on it. He is deemed a possessor in good faith, said Article
526 of the Civil Code, who is not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

As possessor in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no
obligation to pay for their stay on the property prior to its legal interruption by a
final judgment against them.[24] What is more, they are entitled under Article
448 to indemnity for the improvements they introduced into the property with a
right of retention until the reimbursement is made. Thus:

Art. 448. The owner of the land on
which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
planting, after payment of the indemnity
provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to
oblige the one who built or planted to pay
the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy
the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the building or trees. In such
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the
owner of the land does not choose to
appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree
upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall x the terms
thereof. (361a)

The Rocas shall of course have the option, pursuant to Article 546 of
the Civil Code,[25] of indemnifying the Fuentes spouses for the costs of the
improvements or paying the increase in value which the property may have
acquired by reason of such improvements.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS WITH
MODIFICATION the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 00531
dated February 27, 2007 as follows:

1. The deed of sale dated January 11, 1989 that Tarciano T.
Roca executed in favor of Manuel O. Fuentes, married to Leticia L. Fuentes, as
well as the Transfer Certificate of Title T-90,981 that the Register of Deeds of
Zamboanga City issued in the names of the latter spouses pursuant to that deed
of sale are DECLARED void;

2. The Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City is DIRECTED to
reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title 3533 in the name of Tarciano T. Roca,
married to Rosario Gabriel;

3. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose
Marie R. Cristobal, and Pilar Malcampo are ORDERED to pay petitioner spouses
Manuel and Leticia Fuentes the P200,000.00 that the latter paid Tarciano T.
Roca, with legal interest from January 11, 1989 until fully paid, chargeable
against his estate;

4. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose
Marie R. Cristobal, and Pilar Malcampo are further ORDERED, at their option,
to indemnify petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes with their expenses
for introducing useful improvements on the subject land or pay the increase in
value which it may have acquired by reason of those improvements, with the
spouses entitled to the right of retention of the land until the indemnity is made;
and

5. The RTC of Zamboanga City from which this case originated
is DIRECTED to receive evidence and determine the amount of indemnity to
which petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes are entitled.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916
ELOISA GOITIA DE LA CAMARA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA, defendant-appellee.
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Felix Socias for appellant.
Sanz, Opisso and Luzuriaga for appellee.

TRENT, J.:
This is an action by the wife against her husband for support outside of the
conjugal domicile. From a judgment sustaining the defendant's demurrer upon
the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a cause of
action, followed by an order dismissing the case after the plaintiff declined to
amend, the latter appealed.
It was urged in the first instance, and the court so held, that the defendant
cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it
be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the
defendant.
The parties were legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and
immediately thereafter established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino,
where they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the
home of her parents. The pertinent allegations of the complaint are as follows:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the
plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his
genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the
defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid
cohabitation; that the defendant, since that date had continually on other
successive dates, made similar lewd and indecorous demands on his wife, the
plaintiff, who always spurned them, which just refusals of the plaintiff
exasperated the defendant and induce him to maltreat her by word and deed
and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face and different parts of her body; and
that, as the plaintiff was unable by any means to induce the defendant to desist
from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged to
leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is a contract entered into in the manner and with the
solemnities established by General Orders No. 68, in so far as its civil effects are
concerned requiring the consent of the parties. (Garcia vs. Montague, 12 Phil.
Rep., 480, citing article 1261 of Civil Code.) Upon the termination of the
marriage ceremony, a conjugal partnership is formed between the parties. (Sy
Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion, 16 Phil. Rep., 137.) To this extent a marriage partakes
of the nature of an ordinary contract. But it is something more than a mere
contract. It is a new relation, the rights, duties, and obligations of which rest not
upon the agreement of the parties but upon the general law which defines and
prescribes those rights, duties, and obligations .Marriage is an institution, in the
maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation
for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of any
contract they may make .The reciprocal rights arising from this relation, so long
as it continues, are such as the law determines from time to time, and none
other. When the legal existence of the parties is merged into one by marriage,
the new relation is regulated and controlled by the state or government upon
principles of public policy for the benefit of society as well as the parties. And
when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance
intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable. With these principles to
guide us, we will inquire into the status of the law touching and governing the
question under consideration.
Articles 42 to 107 of the Civil Code are not in force in the Philippine Islands
(Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34). Articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil
Marriage of 1870, in force in the Peninsula, were extended to the Philippine
Islands by royal decree on April 13, 1883 (Ebreo vs. Sichon, 4 Phil. Rep., 705).
Articles 44, 45, and 48 of this law read:
ART. 44. The spouses are obliged to be faithful to each other and to mutually
assist each other.
ART. 45. The husband must live with and protect his wife. (The second
paragraph deals with the management of the wife's property.)
ART. 48. The wife must obey her husband, live with him, and follow him when
he charges his domicile or residence.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing paragraph, the court may for
just cause relieve her from this duty when the husband removes his residence to
a foreign country.
And articles 143 and 149 of the Civil Code are as follows:
ART. 143. The following are obliged to support each other reciprocally to the
whole extent specified in the preceding article.
1. The consorts.
x x x x x x x x x
ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it,
either by paying the pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining
in his own home the person having the right to the same.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give
support shall cease. The failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one of
them.
The above quoted provisions of the Law of Civil Marriage and the Civil Code fix
the duties and obligations of the spouses. The spouses must be faithful to,
assist, and support each other. The husband must live with and protect his wife.
The wife must obey and live with her husband and follow him when he changes
his domicile or residence, except when he removes to a foreign country. But the
husband who is obliged to support his wife may, at his option, do so by paying
her a fixed pension or by receiving and maintaining her in his own home. May
the husband, on account of his conduct toward his wife, lose this option and be
compelled to pay the pension? Is the rule established by article 149 of the Civil
Code absolute? The supreme court of Spain in its decision of December 5,
1903, held:.
That in accordance with the ruling of the supreme court of Spain in its decisions
dated May 11, 1897, November 25, 1899, and July 5, 1901, the option which
article 149 grants the person, obliged to furnish subsistence, between paying
the pension fixed or receiving and keeping in his own house the party who is
entitled to the same, is not so absolute as to prevent cases being considered
wherein, either because this right would be opposed to the exercise of a
preferential right or because of the existence of some justifiable cause morally
opposed to the removal of the party enjoying the maintenance, the right of
selection must be understood as being thereby restricted.
Whereas the only question discussed in the case which gave rise to this appeal
was whether there was any reason to prevent the exercise of the option granted
by article 149 of the Civil Code to the person obliged to furnish subsistence, to
receive and maintain in his own house the one who is entitled to receive it; and
inasmuch as nothing has been alleged or discussed with regard to the parental
authority of Pedro Alcantara Calvo, which he ha not exercised, and it having
been set forth that the natural father simply claims his child for the purpose of
thus better attending to her maintenance, no action having been taken by him
toward providing the support until, owing to such negligence, the mother was
obliged to demand it; it is seen that these circumstances, together with the fact
of the marriage of Pedro Alcantara, and that it would be difficult for the mother
to maintain relations with her daughter, all constitute an impediment of such a
nature as to prevent the exercise of the option in the present case, without
prejudice to such decision as may be deemed proper with regard to the other
questions previously cited in respect to which no opinion should be expressed
at this time.
The above was quoted with approval in United States and De Jesus vs. Alvir (9
Phil. Rep., 576), wherein the court held that the rule laid down in article 149 of
the Civil Code "is not absolute." but it is insisted that there existed a
preexisting or preferential right in each of these cases which was opposed to
the removal of the one entitled to support. It is true that in the first the person
claiming the option was the natural father of the child and had married a woman
other than the child's mother, and in the second the right to support had
already been established by a final judgment in a criminal case.
Notwithstanding these facts the two cases clearly established the proposition
that the option given by article 149 of the Civil Code may not be exercised in
any and all cases.
Counsel for the defendant cite, in support of their contention, the decision of
the supreme court of Spain, dated November 3, 1905. In this case Don Berno
Comas, as a result of certain business reverses and in order no to prejudice his
wife, conferred upon her powers to administer and dispose of her property.
When she left him he gave her all the muniments of title, mortgage credits,
notes, P10,000 in accounts receivable, and the key to the safe in which he kept
a large amount of jewels, thus depriving himself of all his possessions and being
reduced in consequence to want. Subsequently he instituted this civil action
against his wife, who was then living in opulence, for support and the revocation
of the powers heretofore granted in reference to the administration and
disposal of her property. In her answer the wife claimed that the plaintiff (her
husband) was not legally in a situation to claim support and that the powers
voluntarily conferred and accepted by her were bilateral and could not be
canceled by the plaintiff. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff the defendant
wife appealed to the Audencia Territorial wherein, after due trial, judgment was
rendered in her favor dismissing the action upon the merits. The plaintiff
appealed to the supreme court and that high tribunal, in affirming the judgment
of the Audencia Territorial, said:
Considering that article 143, No. 1, of the Civil Code, providing that the
spouses are mutually obliged to provide each other with support, cannot but be
subordinate to the other provisions of said Code which regulates the family
organization and the duties of spouses not legally separated, among which
duties are those of their living together and mutually helping each other, as
provided in article 56 of the aforementioned code; and taking this for granted,
the obligation of the spouse who has property to furnish support to the one
who has no property and is in need of it for subsistence, is to be understood as
limited to the case where, in accordance with law, their separation has been
decreed, either temporarily or finally and this case, with respect to the husband,
cannot occur until a judgment of divorce is rendered, since, until then, if he is
culpable, he is not deprived of the management of his wife's property and of
the product of the other property belonging to the conjugal partnership; and
Considering that, should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would
allow married persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each
other of their own free will, thus establishing, contrary to the legal provision
contained in said article 56 of the Civil Code, a legal status entirely
incompatible with the nature and effects of marriage in disregard of the duties
inherent therein and disturbing the unity of the family, in opposition to what the
law, in conformity with good morals, has established; and.
Considering that, as the spouses D. Ramon Benso and Doa Adela Galindo are
not legally separated, it is their duty to live together and afford each other help
and support; and for this reason, it cannot be held that the former has need of
support from his wife so that he may live apart from her without the conjugal
abode where it is his place to be, nor of her conferring power upon him to
dispose even of the fruits of her property in order therewith to pay the
matrimonial expenses and, consequently, those of his own support without
need of going to his wife; wherefore the judgment appealed from, denying the
petition of D. Ramon Benso for support, has not violated the articles of the Civil
Code and the doctrine invoked in the assignments of error 1 and 5 of the
appeal.
From a careful reading of the case just cited and quoted from it appears quite
clearly that the spouses separated voluntarily in accordance with an agreement
previously made. At least there are strong indications to this effect, for the court
says, "should the doctrine maintained in the appeal prevail, it would allow
married persons to disregard the marriage bond and separate from each other
of their own free will." If this be the true basis upon which the supreme court of
Spain rested its decision, then the doctrine therein enunciated would not be
controlling in cases where one of the spouses was compelled to leave the
conjugal abode by the other or where the husband voluntarily abandons such
abode and the wife seeks to force him to furnish support. That this is true
appears from the decision of the same high tribunal, dated October 16, 1903. In
this case the wife brought an action for support against her husband who had
willfully and voluntarily abandoned the conjugal abode without any cause
whatever. The supreme court, reversing the judgment absolving the defendant
upon the ground that no action for divorce, etc., had been instituted, said:
In the case at bar, it has been proven that it was Don Teodoro Exposito who left
the conjugal abode, although he claims, without however proving his
contention, that the person responsible for this situation was his wife, as she
turned him out of the house. From this state of affairs it results that it is the wife
who is party abandoned, the husband not having prosecuted any action to keep
her in his company and he therefore finds himself, as long as he consents to the
situation, under the ineluctable obligation to support his wife in fulfillment of
the natural duty sanctioned in article 56 of the Code in relation with paragraph 1
of article 143. In not so holding, the trial court, on the mistaken ground that for
the fulfillment of this duty the situation or relation of the spouses should be
regulated in the manner it indicates, has made the errors of law assigned in the
first three grounds alleged, because the nature of the duty of affording mutual
support is compatible and enforcible in all situations, so long as the needy
spouse does not create any i l l i ci t si tuati on of the court above
described.lawphil.net
If we are in error as to the doctrine enunciated by the supreme court of Spain in
its decision of November 3, 1905, and if the court did hold, as contended by
counsel for the defendant in the case under consideration, that neither spouse
can be compelled to support the other outside of the conjugal abode, unless it
be by virtue of a final judgment granting the injured one a divorce or separation
from the other, still such doctrine or holding would not necessarily control in this
jurisdiction for the reason that the substantive law is not in every particular the
same here as it is in Spain. As we have already stated, articles 42 to 107 of the
Civil Code in force in the Peninsula are not in force in the Philippine Islands. The
law governing the duties and obligations of husband and wife in this country are
articles 44 to 78 of the Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 .In Spain the complaining
spouse has, under article 105 of the Civil Code, various causes for divorce, such
as adultery on the part of the wife in every case and on the part of the husband
when public scandal or disgrace of the wife results therefrom; personal violence
actually inflicted or grave insults: violence exercised by the husband toward the
wife in order to force her to change her religion; the proposal of the husband to
prostitute his wife; the attempts of the husband or wife to corrupt their sons or
to prostitute their daughters; the connivance in their corruption or prostitution;
and the condemnation of a spouse to perpetual chains or hard labor, while in
this jurisdiction the only ground for a divorce is adultery. (Benedicto vs. De la
Rama, 3 Phil .Rep., 34, 45.) This positive and absolute doctrine was announced
by this court in the case just cited after an exhaustive examination of the entire
subject. Although the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States and the judgment rendered by this court was there reversed, the reversal
did not affect in any way or weaken the doctrine in reference to adultery being
the only ground for a divorce. And since the decision was promulgated by this
court in that case in December, 1903, no change or modification of the rule has
been announced. It is, therefore, the well settled and accepted doctrine in this
jurisdiction.
But it is argued that to grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to
granting divorce or separation, as it necessitates a determination of the
question whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for living separate
from her husband; and, consequently, if a court lacks power to decree a divorce,
as in the instant case, power to grant a separate maintenance must also be
lacking. The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that the power to
grant support in a separate action is dependent upon a power to grant a
divorce. That the one is not dependent upon the other is apparent from the
very nature of the marital obligations of the spouses. The mere act of marriage
creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This
obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the
contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an
obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself
that the laws will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in
driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for
separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a
penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a
judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of
the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the
public peace and the purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base
demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro
tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an
impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred
and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a stronger policy overruling a weaker
one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of
preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any
respect whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife
in the situation of a feme sole.
The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and order for
judgment, heretofore filed in this case, rest.
Torres, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.



Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 109454 June 14, 1994
JOSE C. SERMONIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Eleventh Division, HON. DEOGRACIAS
FELIZARDO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, and
JOSEPH SINSAY, respondents.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Pea and Nolasco for petitioner.
Ponciano L. Escuadra for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent
marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.
1
Bigamy carries with it the imposable
penalty of prision mayor. Being punishable by an afflictive penalty, this crime
prescribes in fifteen (15) years.
2
The fifteen-year prescriptive period commences
to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents . . .
3

That petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage seems impliedly admitted.
4
At
least, it is not expressly denied. Thus the only issue for resolution is whether his
prosecution for bigamy is already time-barred, which hinges on whether its
discovery is deemed to have taken place from the time the offended party
actually knew of the second marriage or from the time the document
evidencing the subsequent marriage was registered with the Civil Registry
consistent with the rule on constructive notice.
The antecedents: In an information filed on 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C.
Sermonia was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br.
151, for contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975
while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid and subsisting.
5

Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal
liability for bigamy has been extinguished by prescription.
In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to quash.
On 27 October 1992, he likewise denied the motion to reconsider his order of
denial.
Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals through a
petition for certiorari and prohibition. In the assailed decision of
21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
6

In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has
been obliterated by prescription. He avers that since the second marriage
contract was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975,
7
such
fact of registration makes it a matter of public record and thus constitutes notice
to the whole world. The offended party therefore is considered to have had
constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription
commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was registered. For this
reason, the corresponding information for bigamy should have been filed on or
before 1990 and not only in 1992.
Petitioner likewise takes issue with the "alleged concealment of the bigamous
marriage" as declared by the appellate court, insisting that the second marriage
was publicly held at Our Lady of Nativity Church in Marikina on
15 February 1975, and adding for good measure that from the moment of
registration the marriage contract was open to inspection by any interested
person.
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does
not begin from the commission of the crime but from the time of discovery by
complainant which was in July 1991.
While we concede the point that the rule on constructive notice in civil cases
may be applied in criminal actions if the factual and legal circumstances so
warrant,
8
we agree with the view expounded by the Court of Appeals that it
cannot apply in the crime of bigamy notwithstanding the possibility of its being
more favorable to the accused. The appellate court succinctly explains
Argued by the petitioner is that the principle of constructive notice should be
applied in the case at bar, principally citing in support of his stand, the cases of
People v. Reyes (175 SCRA 597); and People v. Dinsay (40 SCRA 50).
This Court is of the view that the principle of constructive notice should not be
applied in regard to the crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the
fact that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by the offender in
secrecy from the spouse of the previous subsisting marriage. Also, a bigamous
marriage is generally entered into in a place where the offender is not known to
be still a married person, in order to conceal his legal impediment to contract
another marriage.
In the case of real property, the registration of any transaction involving any
right or interest therein is made in the Register of Deeds of the place where the
said property is located. Verification in the office of the Register of Deeds
concerned of the transactions involving the said property can easily be made by
any interested party. In the case of a bigamous marriage, verification by the
offended person or the authorities of the same would indeed be quite difficult
as such a marriage may be entered into in a place where the offender is not
known to be still a married person.
Be it noted that in the criminal cases cited by the petitioner wherein
constructive notice was applied, involved therein were land or property disputes
and certainly, marriage is not property.
The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive
notice is not contrary to the well entrenched policy that penal laws should be
construed liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the prescriptive period
for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to almost
absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the
bigamous marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its
registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the
officiating authority and those concerned the existence of his previous
subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still a married person.
He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous marriage. And for
these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known to
be still a married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under which
circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult
and would take time. It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for
the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said
crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agency (sic).
Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the offender, if the
prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy were to be counted from the date
of registration thereof, the prosecution of the violators of the said offense would
almost be impossible. The interpretation urged by the petitioner would
encourage fearless violations of a social institution cherished and protected by
law.
9

To this we may also add that the rule on constructive notice will make
de rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of the marriages listed in the
National Census Office and in various local civil registries all over the country to
make certain that no second or even third marriage has been contracted
without the knowledge of the legitimate spouse. This is too formidable a task to
even contemplate.
More importantly, while Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree)
provides for constructive notice to all persons of every conveyance, mortgage,
lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered
land filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or
city where the land to which it relates lies from the time of such registering,
filing or entering, there is no counterpart provision either in Act
No. 3753 (Act to Establish a Civil Register) or in Arts. 407 to 413 of the Civil
Code, which leads us to the conclusion that there is no legal basis for applying
the constructive notice rule to the documents registered in the Civil Register.
Finally, petitioner would want us to believe that there was no concealment at all
because his marriage contract with Ms. Unson was recorded in the Civil Registry
which is open to all and sundry for inspection. We cannot go along with his
argument because why did he indicate in the marriage contract that he was
"single" thus obviously hiding his true status as a married man? Or for that
matter, why did he not simply tell his first wife about the subsequent marriage in
Marikina so that everything would be out in the open. The answer is obvious:
He knew that no priest or minister would knowingly perform or authorize a
bigamous marriage as this would subject him to punishment under the Marriage
Law.
10
Obviously, petitioner had no intention of revealing his duplicity to his
first spouse and gambled instead on the probability that she or any third party
would ever go to the local civil registrar to inquire. In the meantime, through the
simple expedience of having the second marriage recorded in the local civil
registry, he has set into motion the running of the fifteen-year prescriptive
period against the unwary and the unsuspecting victim of his philandering.
Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in all
likelihood we would be playing right into the hands of philanderers. For we
would be equating the contract of marriage with ordinary deeds of conveyance
and other similar documents without due regard for the stability of marriage as
an inviolable social institution, the preservation of which is a primary concern of
our society.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the questioned decision of the
Court of Appeals, the same is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-28248 March 12, 1975
LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL PIROTE, INOCENCIA
PERIDO, ALBENIO PERIDO, PAULINO PERIDO, LETIA PERIDO, joined by
husband BIENVENIDO BALYAO, LETICIA PERIDO, joined by husband FELIX
VILLARUZ, EUFEMIA PERIDO, CONSOLACION PERIDO, ALFREDO
PERIDO, GEORGE PERIDO, AMPARO PERIDO, WILFREDO PERIDO,
MARGARITA PERIDO, ROLANDO SALDE and EDUARDO SALDE,
petitioners,
vs.
MARIA PERIDO, SOFRONIO PERIDO, JUAN A. PERIDO, GONZALO
PERIDO, PACITA PERIDO, MAGDALENA PERIDO, ALICIA PERIDO,
JOSEFINA PERIDO, FE PERIDO, TERESA PERIDO and LUZ PERIDO,
respondents.
Januario L. Jison, Jr. for petitioners.
Antonio T. de Jesus for respondents.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:+.wph!1
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in its
CA-G.R. No. 37034-R, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 6529.
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his
lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3)
children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina
Baliguat, with whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and
Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943.
Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita Perido is
still living. Her deceased brother, Felix Perido, is survived by his children
Inocencia, Leonora, Albinio, Paulino, Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed
Perido. Nicanora Perido, another daughter of Felix, is also deceased, but is
survived by two (2) sons, Rolando and Eduardo Salde.
Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his children,
namely: Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and Amparo. Susano Perido, another
son of Ismael, is dead, but survived by his own son George Perido.
Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are already dead,
namely: Eusebio and Juan. Eusebio is survived by his children Magdalena
Perido, Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido,
and Luz Perido, while Juan is survived by his only child, Juan A. Perido.
On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second
marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document denominated as "Declaration
of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition," whereby they partitioned among
themselves Lots Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and 808, all of the
Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Occidental Negros.
Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had
second thoughts about the partition. On March 8, 1962 they filed a complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, which complaint was later
amended on February 22, 1963, against the children of the second marriage,
praying for the annulment of the so-called "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-
Judicial Partition" and for another partition of the lots mentioned therein among
the plaintiffs alone. They alleged, among other things, that they had been
induced by the defendants to execute the document in question through
misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent means; that the lots which
were partitioned in said document belonged to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, and that the five children of Lucio
Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate and therefore had no
successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido, who died in 1942. The
defendants denied the foregoing allegations.
After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1965, annulling
the "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition." However, it did not
order the partition of the lots involved among the plaintiffs exclusively in view of
its findings that the five children of Lucio Perido with his second wife, Marcelina
Baliguat, were legitimate; that all the lots, except Lot No. 458, were the
exclusive properties of Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged to
the conjugal partnership of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina
Baliguat. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:t.hqw
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment as follows:
declaring the following as the legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs of
Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong: Felix Perido, deceased; grandchildren:
Inocencia Perido, Leonora Perido, Albinio Perido, Paulino Perido, Letia Perido,
Leticia Perido, Eufemia Perido; Nicanora Perido, deceased; great grandchildren:
Rolando Salde and Eduardo Salde; Ismael Perido, deceased; grandchildren:
Consolacion Perido, Alfredo Perido, Susano Perido, deceased; great grandson:
George Perido; Amparo Perido and Wilfredo Perido; and, Margarita Perido; (2)
declaring the following as the legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs of
Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat: Eusebio Perido, deceased; grandchildren:
Pacita Perido, Magdalena Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido,
Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido; Juan B. Perido, deceased; grandson, Juan A.
Perido; Maria Perido; Sofronia Perido; and Gonzalo Perido; (3) declaring all lots
(471, 506, 511, 509, 513-part, 807, and 808) except Lot No. 458 as exclusive
properties of Lucio Perido so that each of them should be divided into eight (8)
equal parts: 1/8 belongs to Felix Perido, but because of his death leaving eight
(8) children, the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/64 to
Inocencia Perido of age, widow; 1/64 to Leonora Perido, of age, married to
Manuel Pirote; 1/64 to Albinio Perido, of age, married to Honorata Villasana;
1/64 to Paulino Perido, of age, married to Norma Villalba 1/64 to Letia Perido,
of age, married to Bienvenido Balyac; 1/64 to Leticia Perido, of age, married to
Felix Villaruz; 1/64 to Eufemia Perido, of age, single; 1/64 to Nicanora Perido,
but because she is now dead the same should be divided and alloted as
follows: 1/128 to Rolando Salde, of age, single; and 1/128 to Eduardo Salde, of
age, single; 1/8 belongs to Ismael Perido, but because he is already dead
leaving five children, the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/40 to
Consolacion Perido, of age, widow; 1/40 to Alfredo Perido, of age married to
Trinidad Tamargo; 1/40 to Susano Perido, but he is already dead with one son,
the same goes to George Perido, of age, single; 1/40 to Wilfredo Perido, of
age, single; 1/8 belongs to Margarita Perido, of age, widow; 1/8 belongs to
Eusebio Perido, but because he is already dead with seven children, the same
should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/56 goes to Pacita Perido, of age,
single; 1/56 goes to Magdalena Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Alicia
Perido, of age, married to Isaias Ruiz; 1/56 goes to Josefina Perido, of age,
married to Leopoldo Doloroso; 1/56 goes to Fe Perido, of age, single; 1/56
goes to Teresa Perido, of are single; 1/56 goes to Luz Perido, of age, married to
Fidel de la Cruz; 1/8 belongs to Juan B. Perido, but because he is already dead
with one child, the same 1/8 goes to Juan A. Perido, of age, married to Salud
Salgado 1/8 goes to Maria Perido. of age, married to Julio Pirote; 1/8 goes to
Sofronia Perido, of age, widow; and, 1/8 goes to Gonzalo Perido, of age,
married to Lacomemoracion Estiller; (4) declaring the 11/12 shares in Lot No.
458 as conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat,
which should be divided and alloted as follows: 11/24 goes to Lucio Perido to
be divided into eight (8) equal shares and 11/24 goes to Marcelina Baliguat to
be divided into five (5) equal shares or 11/120 for each of the children and again
to be divided by the children of each child now deceased; (6) declaring Fidel
Perido owner of 1/12 share in Lot 458 to be divided among his heirs to be
determined accordingly later; and (6) declaring null and void Exhibit "J" of the
plaintiffs which is Exhibit "10" for the defendants, without costs and without
adjudication with respect to the counterclaim and damages, they being
members of the same family, for equity and justice.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court
erred: (1) in declaring that Eusebio Perido, Juan Perido, Maria Perido, Sofronia
Perido and Gonzalo Perido, were the legitimate children of Lucio Perido and his
second wife, Marcelina Baliguat; (2) in declaring that Lucio Perido was the
exclusive owner of Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-Part, 807, and 808 of
Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, and in not declaring that
said lots were the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his first
wife, Benita Talorong; and (3) in holding that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal
partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.
Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the Court of
Appeals affirmed it in toto. The appellants moved to reconsider but were turned
down. Thereupon they instituted he instant petition for review reiterating in
effect the assignments of error and the arguments in the brief they submitted to
the appellate court.
The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of Lucio Perido with
Marcelina Baliguat. The petitioners insist that said children were illegitimate on
the theory that the first three were born out of wedlock even before the death
of Lucio Perido's first wife, while the last two were also born out of wedlock and
were not recognized by their parents before or after their marriage. In support
of their contention they allege that Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the first
three children were born, as testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido and
corroborated by petitioner Leonora Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido
was still a widower, as shown on the face of the certificates of title issued to him
in said year; and Lucio Perido married his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only
in 1925, as allegedly established through the testimony of petitioner Leonora
Perido.
The petition cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals found that there was
evidence to show that Lucio Perido's wife, Benita Talorong, died during the
Spanish regime. This finding conclusive upon us and beyond our power of
review. Under the circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to marry
Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first child in 1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title
issued to him in 1923, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the statement
was not conclusive to show that he was not actually married to Marcelina
Baliguat. Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that
persons living together husband and wife are married to each other. This
presumption, especially where legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case,
may be overcome only by cogent proof on the part of those who allege the
illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee
1
this Court explained
the rationale behind this presumption, thus: "The basis of human society
throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is
not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the
law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the
common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would he living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure
is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage."
While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend to rebut the
presumption of marriage arising from previous cohabitation, it is to be noted
that both the trial court and the appellate court did not even pass upon the
uncorroborated testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido on the matter. The
reason is obvious. Said witness, when asked why she knew that Marcelina
Baliguat was married to Lucio Perido only in 1925, merely replied that she knew
it because "during the celebration of the marriage by the Aglipayan priest (they)
got flowers from (their) garden and placed in the altar." Evidently she was not
even an eyewitness to the ceremony.
In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the
five children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were born during their
marriage and, therefore, legitimate.
The second assignment of error refers to the determination of whether or not
Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509-513-Part, 807 and 808 were the exclusive
properties of Lucio Perido. In disposing of the contention of the petitioners that
said lots belong to the conjugal partnership of spouses Lucio Perido and Benita
Talorong, the Court of Appeals said:t.hqw
... We cannot agree again with them on this point. It is to be noted that the
lands covered by the certificates of title (Exhs. B to G) were all declared in the
name of Lucio Perido. Then there is evidence showing that the lands were
inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother (t.s.n., p. 21, Feb. 20, 1964). In
other words, they were the exclusive properties of the late Lucio Perido which
he brought into the first and second marriages. By fiat of law said Properties
should be divided accordingly among his legal heirs.
The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate court that the
aforementioned lots were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother and
contend that they were able to establish through the testimonies of their
witnesses that the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong acquired them
during their lifetime. Again, the petitioners cannot be sustained. The question
involves appreciation of the evidence, which is within the domain of the Court
of Appeals, the factual findings of which are not reviewable by this Court.
The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of the Court of Appeals
sustaining the finding of the trial court that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal
partnership property of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat.
Said the appellate court:t.hqw
With respect to Lot No. 458 which is now covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 21769 issued in 1925 the same should be considered conjugally owned by
Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The finding of the lower
court on this point need not be disturbed. It is expressly stated in the certificate
of title (Exh. L) that Lucio Perido, the registered owner, was married to Marcelina
Baliguat unlike in the previous land titles. If the law presumes a property
registered in the name of only one of the spouses to be conjugal (Guinguing vs.
Abutin, 48 Phil. 144; Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 288, Escutin vs. Escutin, 60 Phil.
922), the presumption becomes stronger when the document recites that the
spouse in whose name the land is registered is married to somebody else, like
in the case at bar. It appearing that the legal presumption that the No. 458
belonged to the conjugal partnership had not been overcome by clear proofs to
the contrary, we are constrained to rule, that the same is the conjugal property
of the deceased spouses Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.
In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners maintain that they were able
to prove that 6/12 of said Lot 458 was the conjugal property of spouses Lucio
Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong, and that the purchase price of the
additional 5/12 of said lot came from the proceeds of sale of a lot allegedly
belonging to Lucio Perido and his three children of the first marriage. As in the
second assignment of error, the issue raised here also involves appreciation of
the evidence and, consequently, the finding of the appellate court on the matter
is binding on this Court. Indeed, a review of that finding would require an
examination of all the evidence introduced before the trial court, a
consideration of the credibility of witnesses and of the circumstances
surrounding the case, their relevancy or relation to one another and to the
whole, as well as an appraisal of the probabilities of the entire situation. It would
thus abolish the distinction between an ordinary appeal on the one hand and
review on certiorari on the other, and thus defeat the purpose for which the
latter procedure has been established.
2

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the petitioners.
Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.1wph1.t
Muoz Palma, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them
male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices
coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us
out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden,
the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a
male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong)
and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the
law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and
counseling with regard to a persons sex? May a person successfully petition for
a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result
of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a
petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No.
02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the
spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His
name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of
live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but
feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with
girls since childhood.
1
Feeling trapped in a mans body, he consulted several
doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself
to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex
reassignment surgery
2
in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr.
Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the
Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in
fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from
"Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples
Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three
consecutive weeks.
3
Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established.
No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz,
Jr. and his American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision
4
in favor of petitioner. Its
relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of
making his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-
assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman,
now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped
in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against
him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting
the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the
petitioner and her [fianc] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the
present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State,
through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and
ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the
Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioners first name from
"Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioners gender from "Male" to FEMALE.
5

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG,
filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
6
It alleged that there is no
law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex
alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals
7
rendered a decision
8
in favor of
the Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no
law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the
ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals
granted the Republics petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and
ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied.
9
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth
certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
10

The petition lacks merit.
A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for
change of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of
making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female,
he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification.
11
A change of name is a privilege, not a right.
12

Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.
13
In this connection,
Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In
particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of
First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and
change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with
the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.
14
It vests the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction
over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is
first filed and subsequently denied.
15
It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue,
16
form
17
and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be
allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for
change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used
by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or
nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he
thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of
name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status.
18
RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than
avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose
may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.
19
In addition,
he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
20
In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might
suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of
petitioners first name was not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the
petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming
it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy
was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the
wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since
the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these
reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition in so far
as the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certicate As To Sex On
the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal
issue and the court must look to the statutes.
21
In this connection, Article 412 of
the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA
9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or
change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings
and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.
22
Rule 108
now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.
23

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall
mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry
in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or
misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to
the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve
the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis
supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is
not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the
Civil Code:
24

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and
(16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil
Code include even those that occur after birth.
25
However, no reasonable
interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error
from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of the
same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."
26
The birth certificate
of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is
necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain
acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and
naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and
judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations
of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship,
civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These
acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon
the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly
sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or
events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by
any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum
total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality
and his family membership.
27

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations,
more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will,
such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The
comprehensive term status include such matters as the beginning and end of
legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its
various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage,
divorce, and sometimes even succession.
28
(emphasis supplied)
A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part
of a persons legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the
Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment
and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician
or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of
either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a
birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary
stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days
after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by
either parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following
facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names,
citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the
mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and
(f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts
as they existed at the time of birth.
29
Thus, the sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the
time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,
30
is immutable.
31

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and
ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words
"sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws
concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative
intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of
peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female"
32
or
"the distinction between male and female."
33
Female is "the sex that produces
ova or bears young"
34
and male is "the sex that has organs to produce
spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."
35
Thus, the words "male" and "female" in
everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex
reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at
the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense
unless the context compels to the contrary."
36
Since the statutory language of
the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it
cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable
through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual to be included in the category "female."
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the
change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no
legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certicate As to First Name or Sex Be
Changed on the Ground of Equity
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would
cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and
public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the
petition was but petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to his male
fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.
37
One of its
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a
male and a female.
38
To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will
allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex
reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are
various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the
Labor Code on employment of women,
39
certain felonies under the Revised
Penal Code
40
and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
41
among others. These laws underscore the
public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioners petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of
the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation.
The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so,
to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of
sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly
important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name
and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be
filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what
procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person
who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex
to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a
person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this
Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The
Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the
written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness,
contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that.
The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation
do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention
and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies
petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.


Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila


THIRD DIVISION


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,



- versus -


VICTORIANO DELA CRUZ y LORENZO,
Appellant.

G.R. No. 187683

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:




Before this Court is an Appeal,[1] seeking the reversal of the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision[2] dated October 31, 2008, which affirmed with
modification the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,

Bulacan, Branch 11, dated August 15, 2005, convicting appellant Victoriano
dela Cruz y Lorenzo[4] (Victoriano) of the crime of Parricide.

The Facts

Victoriano was charged with the crime of Parricide in an Information[5]
dated January 2, 2003, which reads:

That on or about the 18
th
day of August,
2002, in the municipality of Malolos, province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill his
wife Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, with whom
he was united in lawful wedlock, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, use personal violence and stab
the said Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, hitting
the latter on her trunk and on the different
parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her
serious physical injuries which directly caused
her death.

Contrary to law.


Upon arraignment, Victoriano, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty
to the offense charged.[6] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of
the trial, two varying versions arose.

Version of the Prosecution

Joel Song (Joel) testified that between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. on
August 18, 2002, he and two others, including the aunt of Victoriano,
were playing a card game known as tong-its just three to four arms
length away from the latters house.


While playing, Joel saw Victoriano punching and kicking his wife, herein
victim Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz[7] (Anna), in front of their house. Joel knew
the wifes name as Joan. Victoriano then dragged Anna inside the house by
pulling the latter's hair, then slammed the door. Joel overheard the couple
shouting while they were already inside the house.[8]

Suddenly, Victoriano and Anna came out of the house,
together with their young daughter. Victoriano was behind Anna, with
his arms wrapped around her. He asked for Joels help. Joel noticed
blood spurting out of Annas mouth. He took the couples daughter
and gave her to Victoriano's aunt. He then went with them to the
Bulacan Provincial Hospital (hospital) on board a tricycle. However,
Anna died.[9]

On the same day, at about 6:30 p.m., Senior Police Officers
1 Condrado Umali and Eligio Jose, responding to the call of duty,
went to the hospital for investigation. There, Victoriano was turned
over to the police officers by the hospital's security guard on duty.[10]

The Certificate of Death,[11] prepared by Police Senior Inspector
and Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Ivan Richard Viray (Dr. Viray), showed
that Victorianos wife died of hemorrhagic shock as a result of a stab
wound, trunk. Moreover, in his Medico-Legal Report[12] dated August
21, 2002, Dr. Viray had the following findings:

HEAD and NECK:
1) Hematoma, frontal region,
measuring 3 x 3 cm, 3 cm right of the
anterior midline.
2) Hematoma, left orbital region,
measuring 2 x 2 cm, 3 cm from the
anterior midline.

CHEST and ABDOMEN:
1) Stab wound, penetrating, right
shoulder region, measuring 2 x .5 cm, 2
cm right of the posterior midline, about
12 cm deep, directed lateralwards
and slightly downwards, piercing the
underlying tissues and muscle,
lacerating the upper lobe of the right
lungs.
x x x x
> There are about 2000 cc of
blood and blood clots at the
thoracic cavity.

UPPER and LOWER EXTREMITIES:
1) Hematoma, distal 3
rd
of the left
f or ear m, measur i ng 7 x 4 cm,
bisected by its posterior midline, with
superimposed abrasion, measuring
1.5 x 7 cm, along its anterior midline.

Version of the Defense

Victoriano testified that, at around 6:30 p.m. on August 18, 2002,
he came home very drunk from a friend's house. Before he could
enter their house, his wife, Anna, started nagging him saying, Hindi
ka naman pala namamasada, nakipag-inuman ka pa. He asked her to
go inside their house but she refused. Thus, Victoriano slapped Anna
and dragged her inside their house.

Due to the continuous nagging of Anna, Victoriano pushed her
aside so he could go out of the house. However, she fell on a jalousie
window, breaking it in the process. When he helped her stand up,
Victoriano noticed that her back was punctured by a piece of
shattered glass of the jalousie. He brought her outside immediately
and asked the help of his neighbors who were playing tong-its nearby.
Victoriano admitted that Joel accompanied him and his wife to the
hospital.

At the hospital, Victoriano was taken into custody by policemen
for questioning. It was only in the following morning that Victoriano
learned of his wifes passing.

Victoriano also testified that he does not usually drink; that he
consumed hard liquor at the time of the incident; that Anna was not
immediately treated in the hospital; that he loved his wife; and that he
did not intentionally hurt her.[13]

The Lower Courts Ruling


On August 15, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the
accused Victoriano L. dela Cruz Guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Parricide under Art. 246 of
the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and to pay the heirs of the late Anna Liza
Caparas-dela Cruz the following sums of
money, to wit:

1. P60,000.00 as civil liability
2. P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
3. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.[14]


Aggrieved, Victoriano appealed to the CA.[15]


On October 31, 2008, the CA affirmed with modification the
findings of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 15
August 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Third
Judicial Region, Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 11,
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
The award of civil indemnity is reduced to
P50,000.00 and the award of exemplary
damages is deleted.

SO ORDERED.[16]


Hence, this appeal.


In its Manifestation[17] filed before this Court, appellee, People of the
Philippines, as represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, intimated that
it was no longer filing any Supplemental Brief in support of its position.

Meanwhile, in his Supplemental Brief,[18] Victoriano, as represented by
the Public Attorney's Office, claimed that the CA erred in appreciating Joel's
testimony, since the latter merely testified on the non-mortal wounds that Anna
suffered when the couple were outside the house. Insofar as the actual killing
was concerned, Joel's testimony was merely circumstantial. Moreover,
Victoriano averred that he did not intend to commit so grave a wrong against
his wife, evident from the facts that he carried the injured body of his wife; that
he sought for help after the accident; and that he brought her to the hospital for
medical treatment. Furthermore, Victoriano asseverated that he was very drunk
at the time. Thus, he prayed that these mitigating circumstances be appreciated
in his favor.

Our Ruling

The instant appeal is bereft of merit.

The crime of Parricide is defined and punished under Article 246
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), to wit:

Art. 246. Parricide. Any person who
shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse,
shall be guilty of parricide and shall be
punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death.


It is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is
killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the
accused. The key element in Parricide # other than the fact of killing
# is the relationship of the offender to the victim. In the case of
Parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the
accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate. In this
case, the testimony of the accused that he was married to the victim, in
itself, is ample proof of such relationship as the testimony can be taken
as an admission against penal interest.[19] Clearly, then, it was
established that Victoriano and Anna were husband and wife.

Victoriano claims that Joel's testimony coincides with his own,
which refers to the slapping incident that occurred outside their house.
It does not at all point to him as the actual perpetrator of the crime.
Thus, Victoriano submits that Joels testimony is merely circumstantial.

But circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction, as we
ruled in People v. Castillo:[20]

Direct evidence of the commission of the
offense is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial
court may draw its conclusions and finding of
guilt. Conviction can be had on the basis of
circumstantial evidence provided that: (1)
there is more than one circumstance; (2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. While
no general rule can be laid down as to the
quantity of circumstantial evidence which will
suffice in a given case, all the circumstances
proved must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesi s except that of gui l t. The
circumstances proved should constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to only one fair
and reasonable conclusion that the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty
person. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not mean the degree of proof excluding the
possibility of error and producing absolute
certainty. Only moral certainty or "that degree
of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind" is required.[21]


In this case, we note the presence of the requisites for
circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction. First, immediately
preceding the killing, Victoriano physically maltreated his wife, not
merely by slapping her as he claimed, but by repeatedly punching and
kicking her. Second, it was Victoriano who violently dragged the victim
inside their house, by pulling her hair. Third, in Dr. Viray's Report, Anna
sustained injuries in different parts of her body due to Victoriano's acts
of physical abuse. Fourth, the location and extent of the wound
indicated Victoriano's intent to kill the victim. The Report revealed that
the victim sustained a fatal stab wound, lacerating the upper lobe of
her right lung, a vital organ. The extent of the physical injury inflicted
on the deceased manifests Victoriano's intention to extinguish life.
Fifth, as found by both the RTC and the CA, only Victoriano and Anna
were inside the house, other than their young daughter. Thus, it can be
said with certitude that Victoriano was the lone assailant. Sixth, we
have held that the act of carrying the body of a wounded victim and
bringing her to the hospital # as Victoriano did # does not
manifest innocence. It could merely be an indication of repentance or
contrition on his part.[22]

The foregoing circumstances are proven facts, and the Court
finds no reason to discredit Joels testimony and Dr. Viray's Report.
Besides, well-entrenched is the rule that the trial court's assessment of
the credibility of witnesses is accorded great respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal, inasmuch as the court below was in a position to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying. The Court
does not find any arbitrariness or
error on the part of the RTC as would warrant a deviation from this
well-entrenched rule.[23]


Even if, for the sake of argument, we consider Victorianos claim that the
injury sustained by his wife was caused by an accident, without fault or intention
of causing it, it is clear that Victoriano was not performing a lawful act at the
time of the incident. Before an accused may be exempted from criminal liability
by the invocation of Article 12 (paragraph 4) of the RPC, the following elements
must concur: (1) a person is performing a lawful act (2) with due care, and (3) he
causes an injury to another by mere accident and (4) without any fault or
intention of causing it. For an accident to become an exempting circumstance,
the act that causes the injury has to be lawful.[24] Victoriano's act of physically
maltreating his spouse is definitely not a lawful act. To say otherwise would be a
travesty -- a gross affront to our existing laws on violence against women. Thus,
we fully agree with the apt findings of the CA, to wit:

With the foregoing avowal, We find
that the death of appellants wife was not
caused by mere accident. An accident is an
occurrence that happens outside the sway of
our will, and although it comes about through
some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of
humanly foreseeable consequences. It
connotes the absence of criminal intent. Intent
is a mental state, the existence of which is
shown by a persons overt acts.


In the case at bench, evidence
disclosed that appellant started beating his
wife outside their house and was even the one
who dragged her inside. This, to Our mind,
contradicts his theory that he only pushed her
so as to go out of the house to avoid any
further quarrel. Such incongruity whittles down
appellants defense that he did not deliberately
kill his wife.[25]


Finally, a person pleading intoxication to mitigate penalty must present
proof of having taken a quantity of alcoholic beverage prior to the commission
of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of obfuscating reason.[26] In short,
the defense must show that the intoxication is not habitual, and not subsequent
to a plan to commit a felony, and that the accused's drunkenness affected his
mental faculties. In this case, the absence of any independent proof that his
alcohol intake affected his mental faculties militate against Victorianos claim
that he was so intoxicated at the time he committed the crime to mitigate his
liability.[27]

In sum, Victoriano failed to sufficiently show that the CA committed any
reversible error in its assailed Decision. His guilt was sufficiently established by
circumstantial evidence.

The penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed, considering that
there was neither any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance. The heirs of the
victim are entitled to a civil indemnity ex delicto of P50,000.00, which is
mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the victim and the culpability of
the accused for such death. Likewise, moral damages, in the amount of
P50,000.00, should be awarded even in the absence of allegation and proof of
the emotional suffering of the victim's heirs, because certainly the family
suffered emotional pain brought about by Anna's death.

However, the CA erred when it deleted the award of exemplary damages.
In line with current jurisprudence, it is but fitting that exemplary damages, in the
sum of P30,000.00, be awarded, considering that the qualifying circumstance of
relationship is present, this being a case of Parricide.[28]

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 01575, finding appellant, Victoriano dela Cruz y Lorenzo, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim, Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 178221 December 1, 2010
MAY D. AONUEVO, ALEXANDER BLEE DESANTIS and JOHN DESANTIS
NERI, Petitioners,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF RODOLFO G. JALANDONI, represented by
BERNARDINO G. JALANDONI as Special Administrator, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J.:
On appeal
1
is the Decision
2
dated 31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 00576. In the said decision, the Court of Appeals nullified, on
certiorari, the Orders
3
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, of Negros
Occidental (intestate court) allowing herein petitioners and their siblings
4
to
intervene in the estate proceedings of the late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.
5
The
decretal portion of the decision of the appellate court reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the assailed
Orders dated July 2, 2004 and January 26, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court in
Spec. Proc. No. 338 are hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and a permanent
injunction is hereby issued enjoining respondents [petitioners], their agents and
anyone acting for and in their behalves, from enforcing the assailed Orders. No
costs.
6

The antecedents are:
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni (Rodolfo) died intestate on 20 December 1966.
7
He died
without issue.
8

On 28 April 1967, Bernardino G. Jalandoni (Bernardino), the brother of Rodolfo,
filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration
9
with the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, to commence the judicial settlement of the
latters estate. The petition was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 338 and is currently
pending before the intestate court.
10

On 17 January 2003, the petitioners and their siblings filed a Manifestation
11

before the intestate court. In the Manifestation, they introduced themselves as
the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis (Sylvia)who, in turn, was revealed to be
the daughter of Isabel Blee (Isabel) with one John Desantis.
12

The petitioners and their siblings contend that their grandmotherIsabelwas,
at the time of Rodolfos death, the legal spouse of the latter.
13
For which reason,
Isabel is entitled to a share in the estate of Rodolfo.
Seeking to enforce the right of Isabel, the petitioners and their siblings pray that
they be allowed to intervene on her behalf in the intestate proceedings of the
late Rodolfo G. Jalandoni.
14
As it was, by the time the Manifestation was filed,
both Sylvia and Isabel have already passed away with the former predeceasing
the latter.
15

To support their cause, the petitioners and their siblings appended in their
Manifestation, the following documents:
a.) Two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo;
16

b.) The birth certificate of their mother, Sylvia;
17
and
c.) Their respective proof of births.
18

It is the assertion of the petitioners and their siblings that the foregoing pieces
of evidence sufficiently establish that Isabel was the spouse of Rodolfo, and that
they are her lawful representatives.
The respondent intestate estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni, now represented by
Bernardino as its Special Administrator, however, begged to differ. It opposed
the intervention on the ground that the petitioners and their siblings have failed
to establish the status of Isabel as an heir of Rodolfo. The very evidence
presented by the petitioners and their siblings showed that Isabel had a
previous and subsisting marriage with John Desantis at the time she was
purportedly married to Rodolfo.
In its Comment to the Manifestation,
19
the respondent called attention to the
entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia, who was born on 14 February 1946.
20
As
it turned out, the record of birth of Sylvia states that she was a "legitimate"
child of Isabel and John Desantis.
21
The document also certifies the status of
both Isabel and John Desantis as "married."
22
The respondent posits that the
foregoing entries, having been made in an official registry, constitute prima facie
proof of a prior marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
23

According to the respondent, Isabels previous marriage, in the absence of any
proof that it was dissolved, made her subsequent marriage with Rodolfo
bigamous and void ab initio.
24

On 2 July 2004, the intestate court issued an order allowing the petitioners and
their siblings to take part in the settlement proceedings.
25
The intestate court
was convinced that the evidence at hand adequately establish Isabels status as
the legal spouse of Rodolfo and, by that token, permitted the petitioners and
their siblings to intervene in the proceedings on her behalf.
26

The intestate court also held that the birth certificate of Sylvia was insufficient to
prove that there was a previous marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
27
It
ventured on the possibility that the entries in the birth record of Sylvia regarding
her legitimacy and the status of her parents, may have been made only in order
to save Isabel and her family from the social condemnation of having a child out
of wedlock.
28

The respondent sought for reconsideration, but was denied by the intestate
court in its order dated 26 January 2006.
29
Undeterred, the respondent hoisted
a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and nullified the
orders of the intestate court.
30

In coming to its conclusion, the Court of Appeals found that it was an error on
the part of the intestate court to have disregarded the probative value of Sylvias
birth certificate.
31
The appellate court, siding with the respondent, held that
Sylvias birth certificate serves as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated
which includes the civil status of her parents.
32
Hence, the previous marriage
of Isabel with John Desantis should have been taken as established.
The Court of Appeals added that since the petitioners and their siblings failed
to offer any other evidence proving that the marriage of Isabel with John
Desantis had been dissolved by the time she was married to Rodolfo, it then
follows that the latter marriagethe Isabel-Rodolfo unionis a nullity for being
bigamous.
33
From that premise, Isabel cannot be considered as the legal
spouse of Rodolfo. The petitioners and their siblings, therefore, failed to show
that Isabel has any interest in the estate of Rodolfo.
Hence, the instant appeal.
34

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Appeals erred when it
nullified the orders of the intestate court allowing the petitioners and their
siblings to intervene in the settlement proceedings.
The petitioners answer in the affirmative. They proffer the following arguments:
One. The Court of Appeals exceeded the limits of review under a writ of
certiorari.
35
In nullifying the intestate courts order, the appellate court did not
confine itself to the issue of whether the same was issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
36
Rather, it chose to re-assess the evidence and touch upon the issue
pertaining to Isabels right to inherit from Rodolfo.
37

Had the appellate court limited itself to the issue of whether grave abuse of
discretion exists, it would have found that the intestate court did not act
whimsically or capriciously in issuing its assailed orders.
38
Grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the intestate court is belied by the fact that the said
orders may be supported by the two (2) marriage certificates between Isabel
and Rodolfo.
39

Second. Assuming ex-gratia argumenti that the Court of Appeals was correct in
addressing the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that
Isabel has a right to inherit from Rodolfo, it nevertheless erred in finding that
there was none.
40
A proper evaluation of the evidence at hand does not support
the conclusion that Isabel had a previous marriage with John Desantis.
41

To begin with, the respondent was not able to produce any marriage certificate
executed between Isabel and John Desantis.
42
The conspicuous absence of
such certificate can, in turn, only lend credibility to the position that no such
marriage ever took place.
Moreover, the entries in the birth certificate of Sylvia do not carry the necessary
weight to be able to prove a marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
43
In
assessing the probative value of such entries, the Court of Appeals should have
taken note of a "typical" practice among unwed Filipino couples who, in order
to "save face" and "not to embarrass their families," concoct the illusion of
marriage and make it appear that a child begot by them is legitimate.
44

Since the alleged previous marriage of Isabel with John Desantis was not
satisfactorily proven, the Court of Appeals clearly erred in finding that her
marriage with Rodolfo is bigamous.
We are not impressed.
First Argument
The first argument raised by the petitioners is specious at best. The question of
whether the intestate court gravely abused its discretion is intricately linked with
the issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to establish Isabels status as
the legal spouse of Rodolfo.
A courts power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is
circumscribed by the basic demand of sound judicial procedure that only a
person with interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed to intervene.
45

Otherwise stated, a court has no authority to allow a person, who has no
interest in an action or proceeding, to intervene therein.
46

Consequently, when a court commits a mistake and allows an uninterested
person to intervene in a casethe mistake is not simply an error of judgment,
but one of jurisdiction. In such event, the allowance is made in excess of the
courts jurisdiction and can only be the product of an exercise of discretion
gravely abused. That kind of error may be reviewed in a special civil action for
certiorari.
Verily, the Court of Appeals was acting well within the limits of review under a
writ of certiorari, when it examined the evidence proving Isabels right to inherit
from Rodolfo. The sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence determines
whether the petitioners and their siblings have successfully established Isabels
interest in Rodolfos estatewhich, as already mentioned, is an indispensable
requisite to justify any intervention. Ultimately, the re-assessment of the
evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings will tell if the assailed
orders of the intestate court were issued in excess of the latters jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion.
We now proceed to the second argument of the petitioners.
Second Argument
The second argument of the petitioners is also without merit. We agree with the
finding of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners and their siblings failed to
offer sufficient evidence to establish that Isabel was the legal spouse of Rodolfo.
The very evidence of the petitioners and their siblings negates their claim that
Isabel has interest in Rodolfos estate.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous
marriage between Isabel and John Desantis was adequately established. This
holds true notwithstanding the fact that no marriage certificate between Isabel
and John Desantis exists on record.
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital
union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.
47

Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence other than the marriage certificate.
48
Hence, even a persons birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between
his parents.
49

In the present case, the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the
competent evidence of marriage between Isabel and John Desantis. As
mentioned earlier, it contains the following notable entries: (a) that Isabel and
John Desantis were "married" and (b) that Sylvia is their "legitimate" child.
50
In
clear and categorical language, Sylvias birth certificate speaks of a subsisting
marriage between Isabel and John Desantis.
Pursuant to existing laws,
51
the foregoing entries are accorded prima facie
weight. They are presumed to be true. Hence, unless rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence, they can, and will, stand as proof of the facts attested.
52
In
the case at bench, the petitioners and their siblings offered no such rebuttal.
The petitioners did no better than to explain away the entries in Sylvias birth
certificate as untruthful statements made only in order to "save face."
53
They
urge this Court to take note of a "typical" practice among unwed Filipino
couples to concoct the illusion of marriage and make it appear that a child
begot by them is legitimate. That, the Court cannot countenance.
The allegations of the petitioners, by themselves and unsupported by any other
evidence, do not diminish the probative value of the entries. This Court cannot,
as the petitioners would like Us to do, simply take judicial notice of a supposed
folkway and conclude therefrom that the usage was in fact followed. It certainly
is odd that the petitioners would themselves argue that the document on which
they based their interest in intervention contains untruthful statements in its vital
entries.
Ironically, it is the evidence presented by the petitioners and their siblings
themselves which, properly appreciated, supports the finding that Isabel was,
indeed, previously married to John Desantis. Consequently, in the absence of
any proof that such marriage had been dissolved by the time Isabel was married
to Rodolfo, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous
and, therefore, void ab initio.
The inability of the petitioners and their siblings to present evidence to prove
that Isabels prior marriage was dissolved results in a failure to establish that she
has interest in the estate of Rodolfo. Clearly, an intervention by the petitioners
and their siblings in the settlement proceedings cannot be justified. We affirm
the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the decision dated
31 May 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00576 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and A.C. No. 9081
- versus -
ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAA,
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa
(Espinosa) and Maximo A. Glindo (Glindo) against Atty. Julieta A. Omaa
(Omaa).

The Antecedent Facts

Complainants Espinosa and Glindo charged Omaa with violation of her oath as
a lawyer, malpractice, and gross misconduct in office.

Complainants alleged that on 17 November 1997, Espinosa and his wife Elena
Marantal (Marantal) sought Omaas legal advice on whether they could legally
live separately and dissolve their marriage solemnized on 23 July 1983. Omaa
then prepared a document entitled Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay (contract)
which reads:

REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS
BAYAN NG GUMACA
LALAWIGAN NG QUEZON

KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY

KAMI, ELENA MARANTAL AT RODOLFO ESPINOSA, mga Filipino,
may sapat na gulang, dating legal na mag-asawa, kasalukuyang
naninirahan at may pahatirang sulat sa Brgy. Buensoceso, Gumaca,
Quezon, at COMELEC, Intramuros, Manila ayon sa pagkakasunod-
sunod, matapos makapanumpa ng naaayon sa batas ay
nagpapatunay ng nagkasundo ng mga sumusunod:

1. Na nais na naming maghiwalay at
magkanya-kanya ng aming mga buhay ng
walang pakialaman, kung kayat bawat isa sa
a mi n a y ma a a r i n g h u ma n a p n g
makakasama sa buhay;
2. Na ang aming mga anak na sina Ariel John
Espinosa, 14 na taong gulang; Aiza
Espinosa, 11 taong gulang at Aldrin
Espinosa, 10 taong gulang ay namili na
kung kanino sasama sa aming dalawa. Si
Ariel John at Aiza Espinosa ay sasama sa
kanilang ama, Rodolfo Espinosa, at ang
bunso, Aldrin Espinosa at sasama naman sa
ina na si Elena;
3. Na dahil sina Ariel John at Aiza ay
nagsisipag-aral sa kasalukuyan sila ay
pansamantalang mananatili sa kanilang ina,
habang tinatapos ang kanilang pag-aaral.
Sa pasukan sila ay maaari ng isama ng ama,
sa lugar kung saan siya ay naninirahan;
4. Na ang mga bata ay maaaring dalawin ng
sino man sa aming dalawa tuwing may
pagkakataon;
5. Na magbibigay ng buwanang gastusin o
suporta ang ama kay Aldrin at ang
kakulangan sa mga pangangailangan nito
ay pupunan ng ina;
6. Na lahat ng mga kasangkapan sa bahay
tulad ng T.V., gas stove, mga kagamitan sa
kusina ay aking (Rodolfo) ipinagkakaloob
kay Elena at hindi na ako interesado dito;
7. Na lahat ng maaaring maipundar ng sino
man sa amin dalawa sa mga panahong
darating ay aming mga sari-sariling pag-aari
na at hindi na pinagsamahan o conjugal.

BILANG PATUNAY ng lahat ng ito, nilagdaan namin ito ngayong
ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon.


(Sgd) (Sgd)
ELENA MARANTAL RODOLFO ESPINOSA
Nagkasundo Nagkasundo

PINATUNAYAN AT PINANUMPAAN dito sa harap ko ngayong
ika-17 ng Nobyembre, 1997, dito sa Gumaca, Quezon

ATTY. JULIETA A. OMAA
Notary Public
PTR No. 3728169; 1-10-97
Gumaca, Quezon

Doc. No. 482;
Page No. 97;
Book No. XI;
Series of 1997.

Complainants alleged that Marantal and Espinosa, fully convinced of the validity
of the contract dissolving their marriage, started implementing its terms and
conditions. However, Marantal eventually took custody of all their children and
took possession of most of the property they acquired during their union.

Espinosa sought the advice of his fellow employee, complainant Glindo, a law
graduate, who informed him that the contract executed by Omaa was not
valid. Espinosa and Glindo then hired the services of a lawyer to file a complaint
against Omaa before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD).

Omaa alleged that she knows Glindo but she does not personally know
Espinosa. She denied that she prepared the contract. She admitted that
Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract but
she told him that it was illegal. Omaa alleged that Espinosa returned the next
day while she was out of the office and managed to persuade her part-time
office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff forged her signature and
notarized the contract. Omaa presented Marantals Sinumpaang
Salaysay (affidavit) to support her allegations and to show that the complaint
was instigated by Glindo. Omaa further presented a letter of apology from her
staff, Arlene Dela Pea, acknowledging that she notarized the document
without Omaas knowledge, consent, and authority.

Espinosa later submitted a Karagdagang Salaysay stating that Omaa arrived
at his residence together with a girl whom he later recognized as the person
who notarized the contract. He further stated that Omaa was not in her office
when the contract was notarized.

The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline

In its Report and Recommendation
1
dated 6 February 2007, the IBP-CBD stated
that Espinosas desistance did not put an end to the proceedings. The IBP-CBD
found that Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The IBP-CBD stated that Omaa had
failed to exercise due diligence in the performance of her function as a notary
public and to comply with the requirements of the law. The IBP-CBD noted the
inconsistencies in the defense of Omaa who first claimed that it was her part-
time staff who notarized the contract but then later claimed that it was her
former maid who notarized it. The IBP-CBD found:


Respondent truly signed the questioned document, yet she still
disclaimed its authorship, thereby revealing much more her
propensity to lie and make deceit, which she is deserving [of]
disciplinary sanction or disbarment.

The IBP-CBD recommended that Omaa be suspended for one year from the
practice of law and for two years as a notary public.

In a Resolution dated 19 September 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Omaa filed a motion for reconsideration.

In a Resolution dated 26 June 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied
Omaas motion for reconsideration.
The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether Omaa violated the Canon of Professional
Responsibility in the notarization of Marantal and Espinosas Kasunduan Ng
Paghihiwalay.

The Ruling of this Court

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

This case is not novel. This Court has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of
the conjugal partnership without judicial approval is void.
2
The Court has also
ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage
and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially
dissolving the conjugal partnership,
3
which is exactly what Omaa did in this
case.

In Selanova v. Judge Mendoza,
4
the Court cited a number of cases where the
lawyer was sanctioned for notarizing similar documents as the contract in this
case, such as: notarizing a document between the spouses which permitted the
husband to take a concubine and allowed the wife to live with another man,
without opposition from each other;
5
ratifying a document entitled Legal
Separation where the couple agreed to be separated from each other mutually
and voluntarily, renouncing their rights and obligations, authorizing each other
to remarry, and renouncing any action that they might have against each other;
6

preparing a document authorizing a married couple who had been separated
for nine years to marry again, renouncing the right of action which each may
have against the other;
7
and preparing a document declaring the conjugal
partnership dissolved.
8


We cannot accept Omaas allegation that it was her part-time office staff who
notarized the contract. We agree with the IBP-CBD that Omaa herself
notarized the contract. Even if it were true that it was her part-time staff who
notarized the contract, it only showed Omaas negligence in doing her notarial
duties. We reiterate that a notary public is personally responsible for the entries
in his notarial register and he could not relieve himself of this responsibility by
passing the blame on his secretaries
9
or any member of his staff.


We likewise agree with the IBP-CBD that in preparing and notarizing a void
document, Omaa violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Omaa knew fully well that the
Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay has no legal effect and is against public policy.
Therefore, Omaa may be suspended from office as an attorney for breach of
the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
10


WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Julieta A. Omaa from the practice of law
for ONE YEAR. We REVOKE Atty. Omaas notarial commission, if still existing,
and SUSPEND her as a notary public for TWO YEARS.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Omaas personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all
chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,
vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court,
assailing the 31 August 2005 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 79444, which reversed the 25 March 2003 Decision
2
of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a complaint for Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.
The Facts
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been
validly married to the same man, now deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda.
de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the
deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her complaint, Tecla alleged that
her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon,
Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her,
the fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to
World War II, records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification
3
was issued by
the LCR.
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquios union, they begot four (4)
children, namely: Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H.
Avenido, born on 23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and
Eustaquio H. Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December 1952. Sometime in 1954,
Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla and
her children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another
woman by the name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977 without
any issue.
In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another
woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared
null and void for being bigamous an action she sought to protect the rights of
her children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with
counterclaim,
4
essentially averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of
Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage having
been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City. She also
contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she
owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.
Trial ensued.
Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:
1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco)
and Tecla herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid marriage
with (sic) Eustaquio;
2) Documentary evidence such as the following:
a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;
5

b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office
of the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay
Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;
6

c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that
were actually filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila,
started only in 1932;
7

d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil
Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally
destroyed during the liberation of Manila;
8

e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;
9

f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;
10

g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;
11

h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the
Parish Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942;
12

i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second
World War issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that
they cannot furnish as requested a true transcription from the Register of Birth
of Climaco Avenido;
13

j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March
1943 to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla;
14

k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina.
15

On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to
Eustaquio that took place in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and
how she took care of Eustaquio when he already had poor health, as well as her
knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was once a common law wife of
Eustaquio.
16
Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence to substantiate
her allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to wit:
1) Marriage Contract
17
between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the
date of marriage on 3 March 1979;
2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single
when he contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a common
law relation with one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely:
Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido;
18

3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte;
19
and
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as
the Civil Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.
20

In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was
initiated in bad faith so as to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own
right and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement to damages and
attorneys fees.
On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision
21
denying Teclas petition, as
well as Peregrinas counter-claim. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE" filed by petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent
PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby DENIED.
The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against
petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED.
22

Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial courts alleged
disregard of the evidence on the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.
In its 31 August 2005 Decision,
23
the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the
validity of her marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other hand, the
marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and
void. The CA ruled:
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the
testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she
personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO
and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son
of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to
his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence
mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the
loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non, for
the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very
evidence the trial court has disregarded.
24

Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the
failure of the CA to appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its
part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Memorandum
25
dated 5
June 2008, raises the following legal issues:
1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to
overturn the validity of a subsequent marriage;
2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken
cognizance of, without proof of the execution or existence and the cause of the
unavailability of the best evidence, the original document;
and
3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative
value to prove the existence of a valid marriage without the priest who issued
the same being presented to the witness stand.
26

Our Ruling
Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented
during the trial proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
The trial court, in ruling against Teclas claim of her prior valid marriage to
Eustaquio relied on Teclas failure to present her certificate of marriage to
Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial court considered as useless the
certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no
more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was
said as regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of
Manila. The trial court observed:
Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it,
likewise, issued a Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the
liberation of Manila on February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office
are records from the latter part of 1945 to date, except for the city of Manila
which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way of verifying and could not
issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage between
[Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942,
in Talibon, Bohol.
27

In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to
the testimony of Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-
serving assertions. Superior significance was given to the fact that Tecla could
not even produce her own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying on
Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court
declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful
marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as
husband and wife and begot four (4) children. Such presumption, supported by
documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the
trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina
Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of
marriage. Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the CA found that its appreciation
of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.
We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite
recently, in Aonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,
28
we said,
citing precedents, that:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital
union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.
Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between
his parents.
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no
other proof of the fact can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de
Jacob v. Court of Appeals.
29
Thus:
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have
disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and
loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court
clarified this misconception thus:
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of
the execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the
execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which may
not be proven by secondary evidence when the
instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the
existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such
proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as
foundation for the inroduction of secondary evidence of the contents.
x x x x
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily
collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers.
Even when the document is actually produced, its authencity is not necessarily,
if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence.
At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its
execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the
admissibility of such evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this
issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that
"marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by
the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the
parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the
execution thereof. The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any
person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the
judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose
custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has
made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the
instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela
Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself
as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and
the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent
and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence
testimonial and documentarymay be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
30

As correctly stated by the appellate court:
In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and
EUSTAQUIO was established by the testimonial evidence furnished by [Adelina]
who appears to be present during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself
as a living witness to the event. The loss was shown by the certifications issued
by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are relevant, competent and
admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence
testimonial and documentary may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and
relevant evidence. The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by
one of the witnesses to the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove
the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also
competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
x x x x
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the
testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she
personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO
and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son
of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to
his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence
mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the
loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non for
the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very
evidence the trial court has disregarded.
31

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,
32
this Court has elucidated
on the rationale behind the presumption:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
1wphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in
the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be
in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if
the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would
be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always
presume marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by
the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications
of marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of
Talibon, Bohol.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between
petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is
hereby declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
Regino Hermosisima for petitioner.
F.P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a
decision of Court of Appeals modifying that of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint,
filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral
damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of
child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever
promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered
petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite,
P50.00 a month, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month.
In due course, later on, said court rendered a decision the dispositive part of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris
Hermosisima, as the natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order
pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the
sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every month
sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum
of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum
of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs
against defendant.
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision,
except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages,
which were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under our
laws, for breach of promise to marry. The pertinent facts are:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then
a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who
was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together and
were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage
prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance
underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the
petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they
had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escao," to which he was
then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner
that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child,
Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic.
However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita
Perez. Hence, the present action, which was commenced on or about October
4, 1954.
Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code
of Spain permitted the recovery of damages for breach to marry. Article 43 and
44 of said Code provides:
ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to
contract marriage. No court shall entertain any complaint by which the
enforcement of such promise is sought.
ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or
by a minor with the concurrence of the person whose consent is necessary for
the celebration of the marriage, or if the banns have been published, the one
who without just cause refuses to marry shall be obliged to reimburse the other
for the expenses which he or she may have incurred by reason of the promised
marriage.
The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers
must be brought within one year, computed from the day of the refusal to
celebrate the marriage.
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled
in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promises to
marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or
property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". The Code Commission
charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deem it
best, however, to change the law thereon. We quote from the report of the
Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:
Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But
these articles are not enforced in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the
Proposed Civil Code not only as to the aspect treated of in said articles but also
in other particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some
questions that might arise relative to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed
are: That authorizing the adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach of
promise of marriage, and that creating liability for causing a marriage
engagement to be broken.1awphl.nt
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code,
under Chapter I, Title III, Book I thereof:
Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly.
Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future
spouses.
Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the
parent or guardian, be entered into by a male between the ages of sixteen and
twenty years or by a female between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years.
Without such consent of the parents or guardian, the engagement to marry
cannot be the basis of a civil action for damages in case of breach of the
promise.
Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen
years is not civilly actionable, even though approved by the parent or guardian.
Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil
responsibility of a male for seduction shall not be affected.
Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be
brought.
Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the
aggrieved party even though a minor without the assistance of his parent or
guardian. Should the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian may
institute the action.
Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material
and pecuniary losses but also compensation for mental and moral suffering.
Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents,
of the affianced parties, who cause a marriage engagement to be broken shall
be liable for damages, both material and moral, to the engaged person who is
rejected.
Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the
engagement shall be obliged to return what he or she has received from the
other as gift on account of the promise of the marriage.
These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set
forth in the report of the corresponding Senate Committee, from which we
quote:
The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is
not actionable has been definitely decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58
Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to
the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of the
American States.
See statutes of:
Florida 1945 pp. 1342 1344
Maryland 1945 pp. 1759 1762
Nevada 1943 p. 75
Maine 1941 pp. 140 141
New Hampshire 1941 p. 223
California 1939 p. 1245
Massachusetts 1938 p. 326
Indiana 1936 p. 1009
Michigan 1935 p. 201
New York 1935
Pennsylvania p. 450
The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression
trend in legislation when it provided for breach of promise to marry suits. But it
is clear that the creation of such causes of action at a time when so many States,
in consequence of years of experience are doing away with them, may well
prove to be a step in the wrong direction. (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No.
79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)
The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the
light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction
actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages made by
the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals said award:
Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power,
plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual
desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold
that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral
damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219,
paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the
paragraphs preceding and those following the one cited by the Court of
Appeals, and the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the
"seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as
such in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does
not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is
morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years
younger than the complainant who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as
highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent
are supposed to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that,
complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her
love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement
even before they had the benefit of clergy."
The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a
monthly pension of P30.00 for the support of the child: (2) P4,500, representing
the income that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy
and shortly after the birth of the child, as actual and compensation damages; (3)
P5,000, as moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The Court of
Appeals added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25 consisting of
P144.20, for hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection with the
parturiation, and the balance representing expenses incurred to support the
child and increased the moral damages to P7,000.00.
With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without special
pronouncement as to cost in this instance. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed
by appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration
and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of
love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On
September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet
Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the
Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why That would only
create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE
MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.
Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on
April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;
P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment
and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved
to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their
attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the
proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that
should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition
thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the
following day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on
defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with
defendant in Cagayan de Oro City the latter's residence on the possibility
of an amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25,
1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had
expired on September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to
appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of
July 6, 1956 calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956.
This time. however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of
settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid
petition. Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955
in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set
aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no
answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating
facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's
affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has
a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry
the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or
circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere
conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim,
L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29,
1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact
unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set
aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before the
clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962,
this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as
commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the
Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did
not have to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had no
standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance,
L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts
that the judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no
provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to
marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept.
30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that
"mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed
out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code
the provisions that would have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary
to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said
Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a
license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their
wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-
be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were
purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were
prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers
were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days
before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note
for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it ...
" He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before
the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon."
But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only
to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21
aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were
excessive. No question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What
defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and
exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages
are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to
exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged
against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition
precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under
the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a
"wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however,
is that considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower
court's judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18630 December 17, 1966
APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.
P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner.
Antonio V. Bonoan for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R)
revoking an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No.
Q-4797) dismissing appellant's action for support and damages.
The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from December,
1957, the defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff,
Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that "defendant expressed and
professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time
reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration of defendant's promise
of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal
knowledge; that regularly until December 1959, through his protestations of
love and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in having carnal access to
plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a child; that due to her
pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had
to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving
P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to support herself and
her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the
latter suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the
defendant to recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her
not less than P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby, plus
P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's fees.
Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately
decided the case, holding with the lower court that no cause of action was
shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its support, but
decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for damages, premised
on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, prescribing as follows:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal
and directing the court of origin to proceed with the case.
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a
promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings
of this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-14733, September 30, 1960; Hermosisima
vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962; and De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58
Phil. 886.
We find this appeal meritorious.
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under
Article 21 above mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from
the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in
1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of
the draft (now Article 21 of the Code), the Commission stated:
But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined
or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has
deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed
Civil Code the following rule:
"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage."
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been
made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present
laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can
any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the
grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family
have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any
action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would
have such a right of action.
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in
the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially
the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the
part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27
Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from
mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She
must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of
arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that
effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual
embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recover.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire
or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed
opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow
a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex,
and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would
be swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)
Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material
allegations there are as follows:
I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E. Diliman,
Quezon City, while defendant is also of legal age, single and residing at 525
Padre Faura, Manila, where he may be served with summons;
II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each other
sometime in December, 1957 and soon thereafter, the defendant started visiting
and courting the plaintiff;
III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due time the
defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection for the
plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings;
IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the defendant as are
wont of young people in love had frequent outings and dates, became very
close and intimate to each other and sometime in July, 1958, in consideration of
the defendant's promises of marriage, the plaintiff consented and acceded to
the former's earnest and repeated pleas to have carnal knowledge with him;
V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for a
short period in December, 1958 when the defendant was out of the country, the
defendant through his protestations of love and promises of marriage
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the plaintiff;
VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started conceiving
which was confirmed by a doctor sometime in July, 1959;
VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff informed the
defendant and pleaded with him to make good his promises of marriage, but
instead of honoring his promises and righting his wrong, the defendant stopped
and refrained from seeing the plaintiff since about July, 1959 has not visited the
plaintiff and to all intents and purposes has broken their engagement and his
promises.
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole
year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age,
maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly
there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his
embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the
alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon
finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, we conclude
that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of
action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in
dismissing the complaint.
Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever
actions may correspond to the child of the plaintiff against the defendant-
appellant, if any. On that point, this Court makes no pronouncement, since the
child's own rights are not here involved.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
review and set aside the Decision
1
of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of
Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil
Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be
recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel,
filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint
2
for damages against the
petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She
alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino
and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her
community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the
Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a
medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before
20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his
love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get
married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year;
petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Baaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August
1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she
was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the
complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated
and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained
injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of
Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the
petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her
damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual
expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her
such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,
3
petitioner admitted only the personal
circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of
the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his
Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed
marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither
sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his
apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place
because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and
passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the
barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless
and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into
court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a
besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous
expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial
Order
4
embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to
wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan,
while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano
Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan
City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez
Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school
graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the
Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the
plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code,
rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision
5
favoring the private respondent. The
petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos
at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied.
6

The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a)
petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a
woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual
advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses,
promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to
marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents in accordance with
Filipino customs and traditions made some preparations for the wedding that
was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not
fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a
foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of
morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to
the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had
the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and
reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.
7

The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of
the evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by
the respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she
never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days
after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times and she
accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on
which same day he went with her to her hometown of Baaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their
relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to
"E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or
with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told
plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her during
the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he
was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their
daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with
plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and
defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in
defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant
would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave
her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day and
night until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff
became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus.
Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his
promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do so because he was
already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left
defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who
accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer,
her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk
to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that
he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City,
although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant
is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed
them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the
wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens,
and even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming
wedding.
8

Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of
Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,
9
he
contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of
factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision
10
affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the
trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was
already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It
is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with
defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a
barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and
certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise
made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that
plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have
thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not
have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in public in so (sic)
loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E".
We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody
to him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in
fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Baaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54,
tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager and
employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and
on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to
marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan
City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's
hometown in Baaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special
relationship between them? And this special relationship must indeed have led
to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not
only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the
restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed
marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's proposal of
marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned
from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp.
6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral
character and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino
women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City for
several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan
City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other
words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that
woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so
little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry
plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her.
11

and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's
fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff
that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him
on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and
undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even
gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do
from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking
advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning,
defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had
caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case.
12

Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March
1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil
Code applies to the case at bar.
13

It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not
committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public
policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact
that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs,
traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and
Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the
subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his
Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly
allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof,
the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral character.
Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their
marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to
his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that
even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the
private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit
arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed
arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also
promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special
circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable.
14

On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the
petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments
in support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the
issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this
jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to
the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and
having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of
testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or
value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.
15

Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial
courts had overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the
result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function
of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the
parties before the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to
this rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr.,
16
this Court took the time, again, to
enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15
[1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil.
453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts
(Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v.
Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and
Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court
(Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142
SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth
in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted
by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the
above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the
trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong.
17
Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code
the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the
report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We
quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is
not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia.
18

The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has
shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing
women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the
abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the
American states. . . .
19

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books.
20

As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined
or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has
deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed
Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been
made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present
laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can
any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the
grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have
suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for
damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such
a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the
statutes.
21

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or
intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil
law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is
much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but
international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment
and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by
the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and
malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal
Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the
Civil Code.
22
In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in
the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills
that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil
wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-
American law on torts.
23

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion,
and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause
of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that
promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto
him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying
her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to
entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act,
could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful
injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential,
however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
"fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live
with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and
it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made
plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage."
24
In short, the private respondent surrendered her
virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust
but because of moral seduction the kind illustrated by the Code Commission
in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for
criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the
Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a
breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction.
Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
25
this Court denied recovery of
damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction,
not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the
complainant who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are
supposed to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that,
complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her
love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement
even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals,
26
while this Court likewise hinted at possible
recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied
because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The following
enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the
Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been
seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual
intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the
idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part
of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil.
121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from
mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She
must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of
arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that
effect, and which result in her person to ultimately submitting her person to the
sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or
deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire
of curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed
opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow
a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex,
and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would
be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole
year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain
intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such
conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of
the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for
one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage,
and would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did
not intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we
conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other
cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First
Instance in dismissing the complaint.
27

In his annotations on the Civil Code,
28
Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who
recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry
where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to
mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra
vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248,
Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the
EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or
moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the
other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here
mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for
the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino
29
is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos,
30
still subsists,
notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article
31
in the Code. The
example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not
necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when
the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of
abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly
given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the
basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action
lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to
deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act which would
deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an
experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act
and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not
punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an acquittal or
dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect
that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private
respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both
parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code
and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos,
32
the private respondent
cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as
stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in
their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing,
33
for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor
sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere
employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a
luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her
economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp.
51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a
proposition that may have been offered by the petitioner.
34

These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is
clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private
respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational
background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith
and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have
even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to
marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and
deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would
want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted
satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love
and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security.
Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied
the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that
the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19
of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone
his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and
traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private
respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she
eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but
because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of
conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the
petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore,
in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar
offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault."
35
At most, it could be
conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of
the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where
his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud.
36

In Mangayao vs. Lasud,
37
We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no
action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however,
has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more
or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent
and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it
not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in
letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after
giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the
honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and
dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant
petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.


Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Baguio City


THIRD DIVISION


MARY JANE ABANAG, A.M. No. P-11-2922

- versus -
VILLARAMA, JR., and
NICOLAS B. MABUTE,

D E CI S I O N

BRION, J.:


We resolve the administrative case against Nicolas B. Mabute
(respondent), Court Stenographer I in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)
of Paranas, Samar, filed by Mary Jane Abanag (complainant) for Disgraceful and
Immoral Conduct.

In her verified letter-complaint dated September 19, 2003, the
complainant, a 23-year old unmarried woman, alleged that respondent courted
her and professed his undying love for her. Relying on respondents promise
that he would marry her, she agreed to live with him. She became pregnant, but
after several months into her pregnancy, respondent brought her to a
manghihilot and tried to force her to take drugs to abort her baby. When she
did not agree, the respondent turned cold and eventually abandoned her. She
became depressed resulting in the loss of her baby. She also stopped schooling
because of the humiliation that she suffered.

In his comment on the complaint submitted to the Office of the
Court Administrator, the respondent vehemently denied the complainants
allegations and claimed that the charges against him were baseless, false and
fabricated, and were intended to harass him and destroy his reputation. He
further averred that Norma Tordesillas, the complainants co-employee, was
using the complaint to harass him. Tordesillas resented him because he had
chastised her for her arrogant behavior and undesirable work attitude. He
believes that the complainants letter-complaint, which was written in the
vernacular, was prepared by Tordesillas who is from Manila and fluent in
Tagalog; the respondent would have used the waray or English language if
she had written the letter-complaint.

The complainant filed a Reply, insisting that she herself wrote the
letter-complaint. She belied the respondents claim that she was being used by
Tordesillas who wanted to get even with him.

In a Resolution dated July 29, 2005, the Court referred the letter-
complaint to then Acting Executive Judge Carmelita T. Cuares of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan City, Samar for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The respondent sought Judge Cuares inhibition from the case,
alleging that the Judge was partial and had bias in favor of the complainant; the
complainant herself had bragged that she personally knew Judge Cuares. The
Court designated Judge Esteban V. dela Pea, who succeeded Judge Cuares as
Acting Executive Judge, to continue with the investigation of the case.[1]
Eventually, Judge Agerico A. Avila took over the investigation when he was
designated the Executive Judge of the RTC of Catbalogan City, Samar.

In his Report/Recommendation dated June 7, 2010,[2] Executive
Judge Avila reported on the developments in the hearing of the case. The
complainant testified that she met the respondent while she was a member of
the Singles for Christ. They became acquainted and they started dating. The
relationship blossomed until they lived together in a rented room near the
respondents office.

The respondent, for his part, confirmed that he met the complainant
when he joined the Singles for Christ. He described their liaison as a dating
relationship. He admitted that the complainant would join him at his rented
room three to four times a week; when the complainant became pregnant, he
asked her to stay and live with him. He vehemently denied having brought the
complainant to a local manghihilot and that he had tried to force her to abort
her baby. He surmised that the complainants miscarriage could be related to
her epileptic attacks during her pregnancy. The respondent further testified that
the complainants mother did not approve of him, but the complainant defied
her mother and lived with him. He proposed marriage to the complainant, but
her mother did not like him as a son-in-law and ordered the complainant to
return home. The complainant obeyed her mother. They have separated ways
since then, but he pledged his undying love for the complainant.

The Investigating Judge recommends the dismissal of the complaint
against the respondent, reporting that:

Normally the personal affair of a court
empl oyee who i s a bachel or and has
maintained an amorous relation with a woman
equally unmarried has nothing to do with his
public employment. The sexual liaison is
between two consenting adults and the
consequent pregnancy is but a natural effect of
the physical intimacy. Mary Jane was not
forced to live with Nicolas nor was she
i mpel l ed by some devi ous means or
machination. The fact was, she freely acceded
to cohabit with him. The situation may-not-be-
so-ideal but it does not give cause for
administrative sanction. There appears no law
which penalizes or prescribes the sexual
activity of two unmarried persons. So, the
accusation of Mary Jane that Nicolas initiated
the abortion was calculated to bring the act
within the ambit of an immoral, disgraceful and
gross misconduct. Except however as to the
self-serving assertion that Mary Jane was
brought to a local midwife and forced to take
the abortifacient, there was no other evidence
to support that it was in fact so. All pointed to
a harmonious relation that turned sour. In no
small way Mary Jane was also responsible of
what befell upon her.[3]

The Court defined immoral conduct as conduct that is willful,
flagrant or shameless, and that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the community.[4] To justify suspension or
disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral.[5] A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal act or an act so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.[6]

Based on the allegations of the complaint, the respondents
comment, and the findings of the Investigating Judge, we find that the acts
complained of cannot be considered as disgraceful or grossly immoral conduct.

We find it evident that the sexual relations between the complainant
and the respondent were consensual. They met at the Singles for Christ, started
dating and subsequently became sweethearts. The respondent frequently
visited the complainant at her boarding house and also at her parents
residence. The complainant voluntarily yielded to the respondent and they
eventually lived together as husband and wife in a rented room near the
respondents office. They continued their relationship even after the
complainant had suffered a miscarriage.

Mere sexual relations between two unmmaried and consenting
adults are not enough to warrant administrative sanction for illicit behavior.[7]
The Court has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a man and a
woman who are not married, where both are not under any impediment to
marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled act
that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary action.[8]

While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, to a
certain extent, private conduct, it is not within our authority to decide on
matters touching on employees personal lives, especially those that will affect
their and their familys future. We cannot intrude into the question of whether
they should or should not marry.[9] However, we take this occasion to remind
judiciary employees to be more circumspect in their adherence to their
obligations under the Code of Professional Responsibility. The conduct of court
personnel must be free from any taint of impropriety or scandal, not only with
respect to their official duties but also in their behavior outside the Court as
private individuals. This is the best way to preserve and protect the integrity and
the good name of our courts.[10]

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to DISMISS the present
administrative complaint against Nicolas B. Mabute, Stenographer 1 of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Paranas, Samar, for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992
MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI
and PAULINA MARIATEGUI, respondents.
Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.
Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of the late Maria del
Rosario Mariategui.
Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of
Appeals dated December 24, 1980 in CA-G.R. No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto
Mariategui, et al. v. Maria del Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the
judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII ** at Pasig,
Metro Manila.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents,
Rollo, pp. 116; 8). During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3)
marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8,
1904, he begot four (4) children, namely: Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana
and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was survived by her children named Antero,
Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina.
Ireneo also died and left a son named Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana
Montellano, he begot a daughter named Cresenciana who was born on May 8,
1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in
1930. They had three children, namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian,
born on February 16, 1931 and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco
Mariategui died in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid).
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he
acquired when he was still unmarried (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4).
These properties are described in the complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and
156 of the Muntinglupa Estate (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39).
On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages,
namely, Maria del Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui
and Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all
surnamed Espina, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they
adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter,
Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary registration proceedings filed by the
adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land registration court issued a decree
ordering the registration of the lot. Thus, on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was
issued in the name of the above-mentioned heirs. Subsequently, the registered
owners caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for
which separate transfer certificates of title were issued to the respective parties
(Rollo, ibid).
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco
(Jacinto, Julian and Paulina) filed with the lower court an amended complaint
claiming that Lot No. 163 together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were
owned by their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication
of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they (children of the third marriage) were
deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for partition of the
estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial
partition dated December 2, 1967 (Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia Mariategui
Abas, Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded in the
complaint as unwilling defendants as they would not like to join the suit as
plaintiffs although they acknowledged the status and rights of the plaintiffs and
agreed to the partition of the parcels of land as well as the accounting of their
fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8; Record on Appeal, p. 4).
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended
Record on Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of lack of cause of action and prescription. They specifically contended
that the complaint was one for recognition of natural children. On August 14,
1974, the motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court, in an order the
dispositive portion of which reads:
It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of the Civil
Code cited by counsel for the defendants are of erroneous application to this
case. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).
However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners'
counterclaim were dismissed by the trial court, in its decision stating thus:
The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or recognition
of their continuous enjoyment and possession of status of children of their
supposed father. The evidence fails to sustain either premise, and it is clear that
this action cannot be sustained. (Ibid, Rollo, pp. 67-68)
The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the
trial court committed an error ". . . in not finding that the parents of the
appellants, Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in
holding (that) they (appellants) are not legitimate children of their said parents,
thereby divesting them of their inheritance . . . " (Rollo, pp. 14-15).
On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all
the children and descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto,
Julian and Paulina (children of the third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in
the estate of Lupo Mariategui; directing the adjudicatees in the extrajudicial
partition of real properties who eventually acquired transfer certificates of title
thereto, to execute deeds of reconveyance in favor, and for the shares, of
Jacinto, Julian and Paulina provided rights of innocent third persons are not
prejudiced otherwise the said adjudicatees shall reimburse the said heirs the fair
market value of their shares; and directing all the parties to submit to the lower
court a project of partition in the net estate of Lupo Mariategui after payment of
taxes, other government charges and outstanding legal obligations.
The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but
it was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was given due course
by the court on December 7, 1981.
The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not
prescription barred private respondents' right to demand the partition of the
estate of Lupo Mariategui, and (b) whether or not the private respondents, who
belatedly filed the action for recognition, were able to prove their successional
rights over said estate. The resolution of these issues hinges, however, on the
resolution of the preliminary matter, i.e., the nature of the complaint filed by the
private respondents.
The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of
the deceased spouses Lupo Mariategui . . . and Felipa Velasco"; that "during
his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui had repeatedly acknowledged and confirmed
plaintiffs as his children and the latter, in turn, have continuously enjoyed such
status since their birth"; and "on the basis of their relationship to the deceased
Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with the law on intestate succession,
plaintiffs are entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing estate (Record on Appeal,
pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among others, that plaintiffs be declared as children and
heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication in favor of plaintiffs their lawful shares
in the estate of the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).
A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the
action is principally one of partition. The allegation with respect to the status of
the private respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the
estate of the deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly adopted the
settled rule that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts
alleged in the complaint constituting the cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo,
158 SCRA 282 [1988]).
It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be
granted under the law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of
plaintiffs' action, and the relief to which plaintiff is entitled based on the facts
alleged by him in his complaint, although it is not the relief demanded, is what
determines the nature of the action (1 Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed., citing Baguioro
vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of
the estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private
respondents are legitimate children of the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married
in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo
Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was
able to mention to (him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married
before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported
themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such.
Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was
likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no
record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all
requisites for its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106
[1984]).
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place
between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman,
deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce,
absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened
according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life
(Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA
567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978];
Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]).
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded
on the following rationale:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence
of any counterpresumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society and if the
parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be
living in the constant violation of decency and of
law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in Alavado
vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]).
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and
such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being
married must be admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra).
The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be
proven. However, considering the effectivity of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the case at bar must be decided under a new if not entirely
dissimilar set of rules because the parties have been overtaken by events, to use
the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October
26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there are only two classes of
children legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types
of illegitimate children have been eliminated (Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173
SCRA 656 [1989]).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may
be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child.
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents.
Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again,
no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced
before the lower court. In the case of the two other private respondents, Julian
and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the documents
required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of
Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and
lacking in substance as to certain dates and names of relatives with whom their
family resided, these are but minor details. The nagging fact is that for a
considerable length of time and despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the private
respondents and Lupo lived together until Lupo's death in 1953. It should be
noted that even the trial court mentioned in its decision the admission made in
the affidavit of Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners herein, that
" . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay pawang mga kapatid ko sa
ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private
respondents are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore,
the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is
inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run against private
respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the
heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly
repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for
partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by
the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]
citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the
other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated
to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]).
Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be
barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On the other hand,
an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-
ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they
executed the extrajudicial partition excluding the private respondents and
registered the properties in their own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20).
However, no valid repudiation was made by petitioners to the prejudice of
private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of the subject lot in
1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set
in when private respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition
(Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552 [1990]).
In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands,
petitioners, except the unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed and
refused to acknowledge and convey their lawful shares in the estate of their
father (Record on Appeal, p. 6). This allegation, though denied by the
petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never successfully refuted by them.
Put differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge of their
relationship to private respondents who are therefore their co-heirs, petitioners
fraudulently withheld private respondent's share in the estate of Lupo
Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he had been inquiring
from petitioner Maria del Rosario about their (respondents) share in the property
left by their deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria del
Rosario) not to worry because they will get some shares. As a matter of fact,
sometime in 1969, Jacinto constructed a house where he now resides on Lot
No. 163 without any complaint from petitioners.
Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate
as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157
SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]), the Court held:
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have
been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in
turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-
ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-
owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in
possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
the property for the period required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title,
but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish shield
for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of registration is
equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding
the long-standing rule that registration operates as a universal notice of title.
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their
co-heirs prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time
private respondents discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs.
Court of Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by
petitioners because private respondents commenced the instant action barely
two months after learning that petitioners had registered in their names the lots
involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.C. No. 4431 June 19, 1997
PRISCILLA CASTILLO VDA. DE MIJARES, complainant,
vs.
JUSTICE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ (Retired), respondent.

REGALADO, J.:
Doubly distressing as the subject of administrative recourse to this Court is the
present case where the cause celebre is a star-crossed marriage, and the
unlikely protagonists are an incumbent and a retired member of the Judiciary.
In a sworn complaint for disbarment filed with this Court on June 6, 1995,
complainant Judge Priscilla Castillo Vda. de Mijares charged respondent Onofre
A. Villaluz, a retired Justice of the Court of Appeals, with gross immorality and
grave misconduct.
1

After an answer
2
and a reply
3
were respectively filed by respondent and
complainant, the Court, in its Resolution dated February 27, 1996, resolved to
refer the administrative case to Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima of the Court
of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
On March 4, 1997, Justice Purisima submitted his Report to this Court, with the
following recommendation:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing and without prejudice to the outcome of
the aforesaid Criminal Case No. 142481 for Bigamy, it is respectfully
recommended that the respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz, be found
guilty of gross misconduct, within the contemplation of Rule 138 of the Revised
Rules of Court on removal or suspension of attorneys, and therefor(e), he be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, commencing
from the finality of the Decision in this case, with a warning that a repetition of
the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely.
On the bases of the evidence adduced by the parties, Justice Purisima
summarized the antecedent facts in his aforestated Report and which we feel
should be reproduced hereunder so that his disposition of this case may be duly
appreciated:
Complainant is the Presiding Judge of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court,
Pasay City, while respondent former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz is a consultant at
the Presidential Anti Crime Commission (PACC) headed by Vice-President
Joseph E. Estrada.
Widowed by the death of her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, complainant
commenced Special Proceeding No. 90-54650 and therein obtained a decree
declaring the said Primitivo Mijares presumptively dead, after an absence of
sixteen (16) years.
Complainant narrated that on January 7, 1994, she got married to respondent
in a civil wedding before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, then Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite and now Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. Their marriage was the
culmination of a long engagement. They met sometime in 1977, when
respondent, as Presiding Judge of the Criminal Circuit Court in Pasig, Metro
Manila, was trying a murder case involving the death of a son of Judge Mijares.
Since then, respondent became a close family friend of complainant (TSN, p.
14; April 10, 1996). After the wedding, they received their guests at a German
restaurant in Makati. With the reception over, the newlywed(s) resumed their
usual work and activities. At 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day,
respondent fetched complainant from her house in Project 8, Quezon City, and
reached the condominium unit of respondent two hours later at which time, she
answered the phone. At the other end of the line was a woman offending her
with insulting remarks. Consternated, complainant confronted respondent on
the identity of such caller but respondent simply remarked "it would have been
just a call at the wrong number". What followed was a heated exchange of
harsh words, one word led to another, to a point when respondent called
complainant a "nagger", saying "Ayaw ko nang ganyan! Ang gusto ko sa
babae, yong sumusunod sa bawa't gusto ko". Get that marriage contract and
have it burned." Such unbearable utterances of respondent left complainant no
choice but to leave in haste the place of their would-be honeymoon. Since then,
the complainant and respondent have been living separately because as
complainant rationalized, contrary to her expectation respondent never got in
touch with her and did not even bother to apologize for what happened (TSN,
p. 13, April 10, 1996.
Several months after that fateful encounter of January 7, 1994, in a Bible Study
session, the complainant learned from Manila RTC Judge Ramon Makasiar, a
member of the Bible Group, that he (Judge Makasiar) solemnized the marriage
between former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz and a certain Lydia Geraldez.
Infuriated and impelled by the disheartening news, complainant lost no time in
gathering evidence against respondent, such that, on June 6, 1995 she filed the
instant Complaint for Disbarment against him (Exh. "A").
On August 7, 1995, when she discovered another incriminatory document
against respondent, the complainant executed against respondent her
"Supplemental Complaint Affidavit for Falsification" (Exhs. "D" and "D-1").
Exhibit "C", marriage contract of respondent and Lydia Geraldez, dated May
10, 1994, was offered by complainant to prove that respondent immorally and
bigamously entered into a marriage, and to show that the respondent distorted
the truth by stating his civil status as SINGLE, when her married Lydia Geraldez.
This, the respondent did, to lead an immoral and indiscreet life. He resorted to
falsification to distort the truth, complainant lamented. Also presented for
complainant were: Marriage Contract between her and respondent (Exh. "B");
Order declaring her first husband, Primitivo Mijares, presumptively dead (Exh.
"E"); and Affidavit of Judge Myrna Lim Verano, who solemnized the marriage
between her (complainant) and respondent (Exhs. "F" and "F-1").
Respondent gave a different version. According to him, what he inked with the
complainant on January 7, 1994 was merely but a "sham marriage". He
explained that he agreed as, in fact, he voluntarily signed the Marriage Contract
marked Exh. "B", in an effort to help Judge Mijares in the administrative case
for immorality filed against her by her Legal Researcher, Atty. Joseph Gregorio
Naval, Jr., sometime in 1993. Respondent theorized that when his marriage with
complainant took place before Judge Myrna Lim Verano, his marriage with
Librada Pea, his first wife, was subsisting because the Decision declaring the
annulment of such marriage had not yet become final and executory, for the
reason that said Decision was not yet published as required by the Rules, the
service of summons upon Librada Pea having been made by publication, and
subject Decision was not yet published. To this effect was the Certification by
Mrs. Nelia B. Rosario, Acting Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 37 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (Exh. "4").
After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds itself in full accord with
the findings and recommendation of Justice Purisima. Herein respondent is
undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. He has made a
mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution of demanding respect and
dignity.
4
He himself asserts that at the time of his marriage to herein
complainant, the decision of the court annulling his marriage to his first wife,
Librada Pea, had not yet attained finality. Worse, four months after his
marriage to petitioner, respondent married another woman, Lydia Geraldez, in
Cavite, after making a false statement in his application for marriage license that
his previous marriage had been annulled.
Respondent's subterfuge that his marriage to petitioner was just a "sham"
marriage will not justify his actuations. Even if the said marriage was just a caper
of levity in bad taste, a defense which amazes and befuddles but does not
convince, it does not speak well of respondent's sense of social propriety and
moral values. This is aggravated by the fact that he is not a layman nor even just
an ordinary lawyer, but a former Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court and,
thereafter, a Justice of the Court of Appeals who cannot but have been fully
aware of the consequences of a marriage celebrated with all the necessary legal
requisites.
5

On this score, we rely once again on the perceptive findings and discussion of
Investigating Justice Purisima which we quote with approval:
That, on January 7, 1994 respondent knowingly and voluntarily entered into and
signed a Marriage Contract with complainant before Judge Myrna Lim Verano,
then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona, Cavite,
competent under the law to solemnize a civil marriage, is beyond cavil. As
stated under oath by respondent himself, he could not be forced to do anything
not of his liking (TSN, April 2, 1996, p. 15a).
That what complainant and respondent contracted was a valid marriage is
borne out by law and the evidence. To be sure, all the essential and formal
requisites of a valid marriage under Articles 2 and 3 of the Family Code, i.e.,
legal capacity of the contracting parties, who must be a male and a female;
consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer; authority of the
solemnizing officer; a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of Title I on marriage, Family Code; and a marriage ceremony with
the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer, and
their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife, in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age, were satisfied and
complied with.
The theory of respondent that what (was) solemnized with complainant was
nothing but a "sham" marriage is too incredible to deserve serious
consideration. According to respondent, he entered into subject marriage in an
effort to save the complainant from the charge of immorality against her. But, to
repeat: regardless of the intention of respondent in saying "I do" with
complainant before a competent authority, all ingredients of a valid marriage
were present. His consent thereto was freely given. Judge Myrna Lim Verano
was authorized by law to solemnize the civil marriage, and both contracting
parties had the legal capacity to contract such marriage.
Without in anyway pre-empting whatever the Regional Trial Court of Manila will
find in the criminal case of Bigamy against herein respondent, and even
assuming for the sake of argument that the judgment in Civil Case No.
93-67048 decreeing the annulment of the marriage between respondent and
Librada Pena had not attained complete finality due to non publication of said
judgment in a newspaper of general circulation; that circumstance, alone, only
made subject marriage voidable and did not necessarily render the marriage
between complainant and respondent void.
Besides, as stressed upon by complainant, respondent stated under oath that
his marriage with Librada Pena had been annulled by a decree of annulment,
when he (respondent) took Lydia Geraldez as his wife by third marriage, and
therefore, he is precluded, by the principle of estoppel, from claiming that when
he took herein complainant as his wife by a second marriage, his first marriage
with Librada Pea was subsisting and unannulled.
But, anyway, as it is not proper to make here a definitive findings as to whether
or not respondent can be adjudged guilty of bigamy under the attendant facts
and circumstances, a crucial issue pending determination in Criminal Case No.
142481 before Branch 12 of the Manila Regional Trial Court, even assuming
arguendo that what respondent contracted with complainant on January 7,
1994 was a "sham" marriage, as he terms it, the ineluctible conclusion is that
what respondent perpetrated was a gross misconduct on his part as a member
of the Philippine Bar and as former appellate Justice, at that. Even granting that
the immorality charge against herein complainant in the administrative case
instituted against her by Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr., is unfounded,
respondent was not justified in resorting to a "sham" marriage to protect her
(complainant) from said immorality charge. Being a lawyer, the respondent is
surely conversant with the legal maxim that a wrong cannot be righted by
another wrong. If he never had any immoral love affair with Judge Priscilla
Castillo Vda. de Mijares and therefore, he felt duty bound to help her in
ventilating the whole truth and nothing but the truth, respondent could have
testified in her favor in said administrative case, to assure all and sundry that
what Atty. Joseph Gregorio Naval, Jr. complained of in said administrative case
was without any factual and legal basis.
In this only Christian country of the Far East, society cherishes and protects the
sanctity of marriage and the family as a social institution. Consequently, no one
can make a mockery thereof and perform a sham marriage with impunity. To
make fun of and take lightly the sacredness of marriage is to court the wrath of
the Creator and mankind. Therefore, the defense of respondent that what was
entered into by him and complainant on January 7, 1994 was nothing but a
"sham" marriage is unavailing to shield or absolve him from liability for his gross
misconduct, nay sacrilege.
From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent dismally fails to meet the
standard of moral fitness for continued membership in the legal profession. The
nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of
good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent for
admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.
6
Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. The commission of grossly immoral conduct and deceit are
grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers.
7

However, considering that respondent is in the declining years of his life; that his
impulsive conduct during some episodes of the investigation reveal a degree of
aberrant reactive behavior probably ascribable to advanced age; and the
undeniable fact that he has rendered some years of commendable service in the
Judiciary, the Court feels that disbarment would be too harsh a penalty in this
peculiar case. Hence, a suspension of two years, as recommended, would
suffice as a punitive but compassionate disciplinary measure.
WHEREFORE, finding herein respondent, former Justice Onofre A. Villaluz,
GUILTY of immoral conduct in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
two (2) years effective upon notice hereof, with the specific WARNING that a
more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same or a similar
offense hereafter.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., J.J., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., took no part.
Bellosillo and Francisco, JJ., are on leave.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the
alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven
according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999 Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999
Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case
No. 3026AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and
Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as
dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws
to any and/or both parties.[3]
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted
Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.[4] They lived together as
husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown
by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by the Australian government.
[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in
Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.[7] In their application
for a marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino.[8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance
with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.[9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy -- respondent
allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January
12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondents marriage to Editha
Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had
revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.[11] He
contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly
dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and
while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending -- respondent was able
to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the
marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down.[13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on
the ground that it stated no cause of action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor
General agreed with respondent.[15] The court marked and admitted the
documentary evidence of both parties.[16] After they submitted their respective
memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.[17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the
divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It
deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential
element of the marriage; that is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to
remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by
respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no
more marital union to nullify or annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
1
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in
Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha
Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the
petitioner.
2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a
certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial
requisite voiding the petitioners marriage to the respondent
3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in
this case.
4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35,
40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by
the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry,
without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree
before our courts.[19]
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall
concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent
and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be
legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two,
there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between
respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,[20]
petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may
be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1)
the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree
itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the
place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the
Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the
marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage
was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off
points for our discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce;
hence, our courts cannot grant it.[21] A marriage between two Filipinos cannot
be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15[22] and
17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 26[25] of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.[26] A divorce obtained abroad
by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.[27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and
proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law.[28] Therefore, before a
foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it.[29] Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in
evidence, it must first comply with the registration requirements under Articles
11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties
shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local
civil registrar which shall specify the following:
x x x x x x x x x
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage
was dissolved or annulled;
x x x x x x x x x
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married,
the applicant shall be required to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married,
the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal
certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the
deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial
decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x
x.
ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of
the childrens presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil
registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their
persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce
decree is a public document -- a written official act of an Australian family court.
Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is
given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence.[30] A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce
decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.[31]
The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign country.[32]
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested[33] by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to
be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.[35] However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18,
1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local
Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.[36] The trial court ruled that it was admissible,
subject to petitioners qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly
rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of
Sydney, Australia.[38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code
is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws
after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.[39] Naturalization is the legal
act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen.[40] Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak
of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming
an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the
vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law
falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a
foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of
the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because
she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the
Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may
take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who
alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense
of an action.[41] In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer
when they introduce new matters.[42] Since the divorce was a defense raised by
respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls
squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws.[43] Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.[44] The power of judicial
notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce,
respondent was legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994. Hence, she
concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly
admitted in evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under
Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce
means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage.
But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce
or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first
kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond
in full force.[45] There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was
procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a
conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a
separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after
the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.[46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some
foreign statutes and practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other
jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a
divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from
marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good
behavior.[47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction
that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again
before this decree becomes absolute (unless the
other party has died) commits the offence of
bigamy.[48]
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by
respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal
capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for
the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian
divorce ipso facto restored respondents capacity to remarry despite the paucity
of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a
disputable presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on
Section 48, Rule 39[49] of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof
has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under
Australian laws.
Signicance of the Certicate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article
21 of the Family Code was not submitted together with the application for a
marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not
have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is
determined by the national law of the party concerned. The certificate
mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to
establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A
duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal
capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.[50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review of the records before
this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the
lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit A Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B
Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian) and
Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;
[52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino)
and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;
[53] (d) Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City
Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recio and
Editha D. Samson was in its records;[54] and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of
Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1
-- Amended Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3
Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d) Exhibit 4
Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia
Certificate;[59] and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation
Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.
[60]
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who
was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioners contention that the
court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed
respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce
sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or
at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to
respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out
that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a
direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious
course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which
show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the
court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of
bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates,
which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila
dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial
justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving
evidence which conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties marriage void on the
ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 126746 November 29, 2000
ARTHUR TE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LILIANA CHOA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the
Decision of the Court of Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31 August 1994 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 23971
1
and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178
2
and the Resolution dated
October 18, 1996 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil
rites on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the marriage
although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private
respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting
her.
3

On May 20, 1990, while his marriage with private respondent was subsisting,
petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella).
4

On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in
June 1990, when she learned about petitioners marriage to Santella, an
information charging petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City on August 9, 1990.
5
This case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409.
6

Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an
action for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent on the ground
that he was forced to marry her. He alleged that private respondent concealed
her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and that she was
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.
7

On November 8, 1990, private respondent also filed with the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative case against petitioner and
Santella for the revocation of their respective engineering licenses on the
ground that they committed acts of immorality by living together and
subsequently marrying each other despite their knowledge that at the time of
their marriage, petitioner was already married to private respondent. With
respect to petitioner, private respondent added that he committed an act of
falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he was still
single.
8

After the prosecution rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner
filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court and motion to inhibit the trial
court judge for showing antagonism and animosity towards petitioners counsel
during the hearings of said case.
The trial court denied petitioners demurrer to evidence in an Order dated
November 28, 1990 which stated that the same could not be granted because
the prosecution had sufficiently established a prima facie case against the
accused.
9
The RTC also denied petitioners motion to inhibit for lack of legal
basis.
10

Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C.
Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards petitioners
counsel; (2) violating the requirements of due process by denying petitioners
[motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to evidence even before the filing of
the same; (3) disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate guidelines
for judges promulgated by the Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in a criminal
case only "prima facie evidence" is sufficient for conviction of an accused. This
case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 23971.
11

Petitioner also filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board),
where the administrative case for the revocation of his engineering license was
pending, a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendency
of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and
criminal case for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98, respectively of the RTC of
Quezon City.
12
When the Board denied the said motion in its Order dated July
16, 1991,
13
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for
certiorari, contending that the Board gravely abused its discretion in: (1) failing
to hold that the resolution of the annulment case is prejudicial to the outcome
of the administrative case pending before it; (2) not holding that the
continuation of proceedings in the administrative case could render nugatory
petitioners right against self-incrimination in this criminal case for bigamy
against him; and (3) making an overly-sweeping interpretation that Section 32 of
the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals does not allow the suspension of the administrative proceeding
before the PRC Board despite the pendency of criminal and/or administrative
proceedings against the same respondent involving the same set of facts in
other courts or tribunals. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178.
14

The two petitions for certiorari were consolidated since they arose from the
same set of facts.
On 31 August 1994, the Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed
decision in the consolidated petitions. The appellate court upheld the RTCs
denial of the motion to inhibit due to petitioners failure to show any concrete
evidence that the trial court judge exhibited partiality and had prejudged the
case. It also ruled that the denial of petitioners motion to suspend the
proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord with law.
15
The
Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the RTCs denial of the demurrer to evidence
filed by petitioner for his failure to set forth persuasive grounds to support the
same, considering that the prosecution was able to adduce evidence showing
the existence of the elements of bigamy.
16

Neither did the appellate court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Boards Order denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings in the
administrative case on the ground of prejudicial question. Respondent court
held that no prejudicial question existed since the action sought to be
suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action involved is a civil
case.
17

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Court of Appeals but the same was denied.
18

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO
SUSPEND THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS
DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED
AN ERROR OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED
HIMSELF.
19

The petition has no merit.
While the termination of Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioners
marriage to private respondent has rendered the issue of the propriety of
suspending both the criminal case for bigamy before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 98 and the administrative case for revocation of petitioners engineering
license before the PRC Board moot and academic, the Court shall discuss the
issue of prejudicial question to emphasize the guarding and controlling precepts
and rules.
20

A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action,
it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of
the accused would necessarily be determined.
21
The rationale behind the
principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions.
22

The Court of Appeals did not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil
case for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent
did not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal
case for bigamy be suspended until said civil case is terminated.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to private
respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or
guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge
of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the
second marriage is contracted.
23
Petitioners argument that the nullity of his
marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before
the criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their
marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability,
is untenable. The ruling in People vs. Mendoza
24
and People vs. Aragon
25
cited
by petitioner that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
marriage which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is
found in Article 40 of the Family Code, which was already in effect at the time of
petitioners marriage to private respondent in September 1988. Said article
states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked for
purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding.
26
In Landicho vs. Relova,
27
we held that:
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when
the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as
there is no such declaration the presumption of marriage exists.
28

It is clear from the foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment
of petitioners marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial
question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case for bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their
marriage was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.
Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension
of the administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As discussed above,
the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case. We have
previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is
administrative and the other is civil.
29

Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation
and Practice of Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the
administrative proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding
the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving the
same facts as the administrative case:
The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an
administrative case in another judicial body against an examinee or registered
professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed or to be
filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter
case. The Board shall proceed independently with the investigation of the case
and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of the
courts or quasi-judicial body.
It must also be noted that the allegations in the administrative complaint before
the PRC Board are not confined to the issue of the alleged bigamous marriage
contracted by petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is also charged with immoral
conduct for continued failure to perform his obligations as husband to private
respondent and as father to their child, and for cohabiting with Santella without
the benefit of marriage.
30
The existence of these other charges justified the
continuation of the proceedings before the PRC Board.
Petitioner also contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial
courts denial of his demurrer to evidence in the criminal case for bigamy,
arguing that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of both the first
and second marriages beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner claims that the
original copy of marriage contract between him and private respondent was not
presented, the signatures therein were not properly identified and there was no
showing that the requisites of a valid marriage were complied with. He alleges
further that the original copy of the marriage contract between him and Santella
was not presented, that no proof that he signed said contract was adduced, and
that there was no witness presented to show that a second marriage ceremony
participated in by him ever took place.
31

We are not persuaded. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to
the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be
disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion.
32
In this case, the
Court of Appeals did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court, which based its denial of the demurrer on two grounds: first, the
prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner;
and second, petitioners allegations in the demurrer were insufficient to justify
the grant of the same. It has been held that the appellate court will not review in
a special civil action for certiorari the prosecutions evidence and decide in
advance that such evidence has or has not yet established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.
33
In view of the trial courts finding that a
prima facie case against petitioner exists, his proper recourse is to adduce
evidence in his defense.
34

The Court also finds it necessary to correct petitioners misimpression that by
denying his demurrer to evidence in view of the existence of a prima facie case
against him, the trial court was already making a pronouncement that he is
liable for the offense charged. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the
order of the RTC denying the demurrer was not an adjudication on the merits
but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to
determine whether or not a full-blown trial would be necessary to resolve the
case.
35
The RTCs observation that there was a prima facie case against
petitioner only meant that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to
sustain its proposition that petitioner had committed the offense of bigamy, and
unless petitioner presents evidence to rebut the same, such would be the
conclusion.
36
Said declaration by the RTC should not be construed as a
pronouncement of petitioners guilt. It was precisely because of such finding
that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner may present
evidence in his defense and allow said court to resolve the case based on the
evidence adduced by both parties.
Lastly, petitioner contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal
Case No. Q-90-14409 should have been granted since said judge exhibited
partiality and bias against him in several instances. First, when petitioner
manifested that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the denial of his
motion to suspend the proceedings in said case, the judge said such motion
was dilatory and would be denied even though the motion for reconsideration
had not yet been filed. Second, when petitioners counsel manifested that he
had just recovered from an accident and was not physically fit for trial, the judge
commented that counsel was merely trying to delay the case and required said
counsel to produce a medical certificate to support his statement. Third, when
petitioner manifested that he was going to file a demurrer to evidence, the
judge characterized the same as dilatory and declared that he would deny the
same. According to petitioner, the judges hostile attitude towards petitioners
counsel as shown in the foregoing instances justified the grant of his motion to
inhibit.
We agree with the appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against
Judge Peralejo did not conclusively show that the latter was biased and had
prejudged the case.
37
In People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,
38
this
Court held that while bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons
for the voluntary inhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the
rudimentary rule is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough.
There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of bias and
partiality.
39

Furthermore, since the grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are
not among those expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound discretion of
Judge Peralejo. Said provision of law states:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any
case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review,
without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered
upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in the case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Thus, it was not mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and
deciding the case.
This Court does not find any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in
denying petitioners motion to inhibit. The test for determining the propriety of
the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a fair and impartial
trial.
40
The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly exhibited antagonism and
partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel did not deprive him of a fair and
impartial trial. As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of petitioners
motion to suspend the criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in
accord with law and jurisprudence. Neither was there anything unreasonable in
the requirement that petitioners counsel submit a medical certificate to support
his claim that he suffered an accident which rendered him unprepared for trial.
Such requirement was evidently imposed upon petitioners counsel to ensure
that the resolution of the case was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified
delays, in keeping with the judges duty to disposing of the courts business
promptly.
41

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191425

ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR.,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

G.R. No. 191425 is a petition for review
1
assailing the Decision
2
promulgated on
30 September 2009 as well as the Resolution
3
promulgated on 23 February
2010 by the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31538. The
appellate court affirmed the 19 November 2007 Decision
4
of Branch 215 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial court) in Criminal Case No.
Q-04-129031.

The trial court found accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) guilty of bigamy
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment. Co-accused Rowena Geraldino (Geraldino) was acquitted for the
prosecutions failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Facts

The appellate court recited the facts as follows:

On August 24, 2004, Assistant City Prosecutor Raymond Jonathan B. Lledo filed
an Information against Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Nollora) and Rowena P.
Geraldino (Geraldino) for the crime of Bigamy. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:

That on or about the 8
th
day of December 2001 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR.,
being then legally married to one JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA, and as
said marriage has not been legally dissolved and still subsisting, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
subsequent or second marriage with her [sic] co-accused ROWENA
P. GERALDINO, who knowingly consented and agreed to be
married to her co-accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. knowing
him to be a married man, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA.

Upon his arraignment on April 18, 2005, accused Nollora assisted by counsel,
refused to enter his plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered by the Court
for him. Accused Geraldino, on the other hand, entered a plea of not guilty
when arraigned on June 14, 2005. On even date, pre-trial conference was held
and both the prosecution and defense entered the following stipulation of facts:

1. the validity of the first marriage between Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
and Jesusa Pinat Nollora solemnized on April 6, 1999 at Sapang
Palay, San Jose del Monte;
2. that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. contracted the second marriage with
Rowena P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 in Quezon City;

3. that in the Counter-Affidavit of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., he
admitted that he contracted the second marriage to Rowena P.
Geraldino;

4. that Rowena P. Geraldino attached to her Counter-Affidavit the
Certificate of Marriage with Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. dated December
8, 2001;

5. the fact of marriage of Rowena P. Geraldino with Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. as admitted in her Counter-Affidavit.

The only issue thus proffered by the prosecution for the RTCs resolution is
whether or not the second marriage is bigamous. Afterwards, pre-trial
conference was terminated and the case was set for initial hearing. Thereafter,
trial ensued.

Evidence for the Prosecution

As culled from the herein assailed Decision, the respective testimonies of
prosecution witnesses were as follows:

xxx (W)itness Jesusa Pinat Nollora xxx testified that she and
accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. met in Saudi Arabia while she was
working there as a Staff Midwife in King Abdulah Naval Base
Hospital. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. courted her and on April 6, 1999,
they got married at the [IE]MELIF Chruch [sic] in Sapang Palay, San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan (Exhibit A). While working in said hospital,
she heard rumors that her husband has another wife and because of
anxiety and emotional stress, she left Saudi Arabia and returned to
the Philippines (TSN, October 4, 2005, page 10). Upon arrival in the
Philippines, the private complainant learned that indeed, Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. contracted a second marriage with co-accused Rowena
P. Geraldino on December 8, 2001 (Exhibit B) when she secured a
certification as to the civil status of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. (Exhibit
C) from the National Statistics Office (NSO) sometime in
November 2003.

Upon learning this information, the private complainant confronted
Rowena P. Geraldino at the latters workplace in CBW, FTI, Taguig
and asked her if she knew of the first marriage between complainant
and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to which Rowena P. Geraldino allegedly
affirmed and despite this knowledge, she allegedly still married
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. because she loves him so much and because
they were neighbors and childhood friends. Private complainant
also knew that Rowena P. Geraldino knew of her marriage with
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., because when she (private complainant) was
brought by Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. at the latters residence in Taguig,
Metro Manila and introduced her to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.s parents,
Rowena P. Geraldino was there in the house together with a friend
and she heard everything that they were talking about.

Because of this case, private complainant was not able to return to
Saudi Arabia to work as a Staff Midwife thereby losing income
opportunity in the amount of P34,000.00 a month, more or less.
When asked about the moral damages she suffered, she declared
that what happened to her was a tragedy and she had entertained
[thoughts] of committing suicide. She added that because of what
happened to her, her mother died and she almost got raped when
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. left her alone in their residence in Saudi
Arabia. However, she declared that money is not enough to assuage
her sufferings. Instead, she just asked for the return of her money in
the amount of P50,000.00 (TSN, July 26, 2005, pages 4-14).

Prosecution witness Ruth Santos testified that she knew of the
marriage between the private complainant and Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr., because she was one of the sponsors in said wedding.
Sometime in November 2003, she was asked by the private
complainant to accompany the latter to the workplace of Rowena P.
Geraldino in FTI, Taguig, Metro Manila. She declared that the
private complainant and Rowena P. Geraldino had a confrontation
and she heard that Rowena P. Geraldino admitted that she (Rowena)
knew of the first marriage of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. and the private
complainant but she still went on to marry Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
because she loves him very much (TSN, October 24, 2005, pages
3-5).

Evidence for the Defense

The defenses version of facts, as summarized in the herein assailed Decision, is
as follows:

Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. admitted having contracted two (2)
marriages, the first with private complainant Jesusa Pinat and the
second with Rowena P. Geraldino. He, however, claimed that he was
a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even before he
contracted the first marriage with the private complainant. As a
[M]uslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry four (4) wives as
allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief.


To prove that he is a Muslim convert even prior to his marriage to
the private complainant, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. presented a
Certificate of Conversion dated August 2, 2004 issued by one Hadji
Abdul Kajar Madueo and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A.
Alyamin wherein it is stated that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. allegedly
converted as a Muslim since January 19, 1992 (Exhibit 2, 3 and
4). Aside from said certificate, he also presented a Pledge of
Conversion dated January 10, 1992 issued by the same Hadji Abdul
Kajar Madueo and approved by one Khad Ibrahim A. Alyamin
(Exhibit 7).

He claimed that the private complaint knew that he was a Muslim
convert prior to their marriage because she [sic] told this fact when
he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the reason why said private
complainant filed the instant case was due to hatred having learned
of his second marriage with Rowena P. Geraldino. She [sic] further
testified that Rowena P. Geraldino was not aware of his first
marriage with the private complainant and he did not tell her this
fact because Rowena P. Geraldino is a Catholic and he does not
want to lose her if she learns of his first marriage.

He explained that in his Marriage Contract with Jesusa Pinat, it is
indicated that he was a Catholic Pentecostal but that he was not
aware why it was placed as such on said contract. In his Marriage
Contract with Rowena P. Geraldino, the religion Catholic was also
indicated because he was keeping as a secret his being a Muslim
since the society does not approve of marrying a Muslim. He also
indicated that he was single despite his first marriage to keep said
first marriage a secret (TSN, January 30, 2006, pages 2-13).

Defense witness Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueo testified that he is the
founder and president of Balik Islam Tableegh Foundation of the
Philippines and as such president, he has the power and authority to
convert any applicant to the Muslim religion. He alleged that
sometime in 1992, he met accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. in Mabini
(Manila) who was then going abroad. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. applied
to become a Muslim (Exhibit 14) and after receiving the
application, said accused was indoctrinated regarding his
obligations as a Muslim. On January 10, 1992, Atilano O. Nollora,
Jr. embraced the Muslim faith. He was then directed to report every
Sunday to monitor his development.

In the year 2004, Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. visited him and asked for a
certification because of the filing of the instant case. On October 2,
2004, he issued a Certificate of Conversion wherein it is stated that
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. is a Muslim convert since January 10, 1992.
Apart from the above-mentioned document, their Imam also
issued a Pledge of Conversion (Exhibit 7). He declared that a
Muslim convert could marry more than one according to the Holy
Koran. However, before marrying his second, third and fourth wives,
it is required that the consent of the first Muslim wife be secured.
Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim, there is no necessity to secure
her consent (TSN, October 9, 2006, pages 2-12).

During his cross-examinations, he declared that if a Muslim convert
gets married not in accordance with the Muslim faith, the same is
contrary to the teachings of the Muslim faith. A Muslim also can
marry up to four times but he should be able to treat them equally.
He claimed that he was not aware of the first marriage but was
aware of the second. Since his second marriage with Rowena P.
Geraldino was not in accordance with the Muslim faith, he advised
Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. to re-marry Rowena P. Geraldino in
accordance with Muslim marriage celebration, otherwise, he will not
be considered as a true Muslim (TSN, June 25, 2007, pages 3-7).

Accused Rowena P. Geraldino alleged that she was only a victim in
this incident of bigamous marriage. She claimed that she does not
know the private complainant Jesusa Pinat Nollora and only came
to know her when this case was filed. She insists that she is the one
lawfully married to Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., having been married to
the latter since December 8, 2001. Upon learning that Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. contracted a first marriage with the private complainant,
she confronted the former who admitted the said marriage. Prior to
their marriage, she asked Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. if he was single and
the latter responded that he was single. She also knew that her
husband was a Catholic prior to their marriage but after she learned
of the first marriage of her husband, she learned that he is a Muslim
convert. She also claimed that after learning that her husband was a
Muslim convert, she and Atilano O. Nollora, Jr., also got married in
accordance with the Muslim rites. She also belied the allegations of
the private complainant that she was sought by the private
complainant and that they had a confrontation where she admitted
that she knew that Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. was married to the private
complainant and despite this knowledge, she went on to marry him
because she loved him very much. She insisted that she only came
to know the private complainant when she (private complainant)
filed this case (TSN, August 14, 2007, pages 2-8).
5




The Trial Courts Ruling

In its Decision
6
dated 19 November 2007, the trial court convicted Nollora and
acquitted Geraldino.

The trial court stated that there are only two exceptions to prosecution for
bigamy: Article 41
7
of the Family Code, or Executive Order No. 209, and Article
180
8
of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, or Presidential
Decree No. 1083. The trial court also cited Article 27 of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides the qualifications for allowing
Muslim men to have more than one wife: [N]o Muslim male can have more
than one wife unless he can deal with them in equal companionship and just
treatment as enjoined by Islamic Law and only in exceptional cases.

In convicting Nollora, the trial courts Decision further stated thus:

The principle in Islam is that monogamy is the general rule and polygamy is
allowed only to meet urgent needs. Only with the permission of the court can a
Muslim be permitted to have a second wife subject to certain requirements.
This is because having plurality of wives is merely tolerated, not encouraged,
under certain circumstances (Muslim Law on Personal Status in the Philippines
by Amer M. Bara-acal and Abdulmajid J. Astir, 1998 First Edition, Pages 64-65).
Arbitration is necessary. Any Muslim husband desiring to contract subsequent
marriages, before so doing, shall notify the Sharia Circuit Court of the place
where his family resides. The clerk of court shall serve a copy thereof to the wife
or wives. Should any of them objects [sic]; an Agama Arbitration Council shall
be constituted. If said council fails to secure the wifes consent to the proposed
marriage, the Court shall, subject to Article 27, decide whether on [sic] not to
sustain her objection (Art. 162, Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines).

Accused Atilano Nollora, Jr., in marrying his second wife, co-accused Rowena P.
Geraldino, did not comply with the above-mentioned provision of the law. In
fact, he did not even declare that he was a Muslim convert in both marriages,
indicating his criminal intent. In his converting to the Muslim faith, said accused
entertained the mistaken belief that he can just marry anybody again after
marrying the private complainant. What is clear, therefore, is [that] a Muslim is
not given an unbridled right to just marry anybody the second, third or fourth
time. There are requirements that the Sharia law imposes, that is, he should
have notified the Sharia Court where his family resides so that copy of said
notice should be furnished to the first wife. The argument that notice to the first
wife is not required since she is not a Muslim is of no moment. This obligation to
notify the said court rests upon accused Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is not for him to
interpret the Sharia law. It is the Sharia Court that has this authority.

In an apparent attempt to escape criminal liability, the accused recelebrated
their marriage in accordance with the Muslim rites. However, this can no longer
cure the criminal liability that has already been violated.

The Court, however, finds criminal liability on the person of accused Atilano
Nollora, Jr., only. There is no sufficient evidence that would pin accused Rowena
P. Geraldino down. The evidence presented by the prosecution against her is
the allegation that she knew of the first marriage between private complainant
and Atilano Nollora, Jr., is insufficient[,] being open to several interpretations.
Private complainant alleged that when she was brought by Atilano Nollora, Jr.,
to the latters house in Taguig, Metro Manila, Rowena P. Geraldino was there
standing near the door and heard their conversation. From this incident, private
complainant concluded that said Rowena P. Geraldino was aware that she and
Atilano Nollora, Jr., were married. This conclusion is obviously misplaced since it
could not be reasonably presumed that Rowena P. Geraldino understands what
was going on between her and Atilano Nollora, Jr. It is axiomatic that (E)very
circumstance favoring accuseds innocence must be taken into account, proof
against him must survive the test of reason and the strongest suspicion must not
be permitted to sway judgment (People vs. Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This Court,
therefore, has to acquit Rowena P. Geraldino for failure of the prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
a) Finding accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
This court hereby renders judgment imposing upon him a prison term of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum of his
indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by law.

b) Acquitting accused ROWENA P. GERALDINO of the crime of Bigamy for
failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Costs against accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.

SO ORDERED.
9


Nollora filed a notice of appeal and moved for the allowance of his temporary
liberty under the same bail bond pending appeal. The trial court granted
Nolloras motion.

Nollora filed a brief with the appellate court and assigned only one error of the
trial court:

The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime
charged despite the prosecutions failure to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
10



The Appellate Courts Ruling

On 30 September 2009, the appellate court dismissed Nolloras appeal and
affirmed the trial courts decision.
11


The appellate court rejected Nolloras defense that his second marriage to
Geraldino was in lawful exercise of his Islamic religion and was allowed by the
Quran. The appellate court denied Nolloras invocation of his religious beliefs
and practices to the prejudice of the non-Muslim women who married him
pursuant to Philippine civil laws. Nolloras two marriages were not conducted in
accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, hence the Family Code of
the Philippines should apply. Nolloras claim of religious freedom will not
immobilize the State and render it impotent in protecting the general welfare.

In a Resolution
12
dated 23 February 2010, the appellate court denied Nolloras
motion for reconsideration. The allegations in the motion for reconsideration
were a mere rehash of Nolloras earlier arguments, and there was no reason for
the appellate court to modify its 30 September 2009 Decision.

Nollora filed the present petition for review before this Court on 6 April 2010.

The Issue


The issue in this case is whether Nollora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of bigamy.


The Courts Ruling

Nolloras petition has no merit. We affirm the rulings of the appellate court and
of the trial court.

Elements of Bigamy

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 349. Bigamy. $ The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

The elements of the crime of bigamy are:

1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.
13



The circumstances in the present case satisfy all the elements of bigamy. (1)
Nollora is legally married to Pinat;
14
(2) Nollora and Pinats marriage has not
been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second marriage; (3) Nollora
admitted the existence of his second marriage to Geraldino;
15
and (4) Nollora
and Geraldinos marriage has all the essential requisites for validity except for
the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his prior marriage.
16


The marriage certificate
17
of Nollora and Pinats marriage states that Nollora and
Pinat were married at Sapang Palay IEMELIF Church, Sapang Palay, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan on 6 April 1999. Rev. Jonathan De Mesa, Minister of the
IEMELIF Church officiated the ceremony. The marriage certificate
18
of Nollora
and Geraldinos marriage states that Nollora and Geraldino were married at
Maxs Restaurant, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, Metro Manila on 8 December
2001. Rev. Honorato D. Santos officiated the ceremony.

A certification dated 4 November 2003 from the Office of the Civil Registrar
General reads:

We certify that ATILANO JR O. NOLLORA who is alleged to have been born on
February 22, 1968 from ATILANO M. NOLLORA SR and FLAVIANA OCLARIT,
appears in our National Indices of Marriage for Groom for the years 1973 to
2002 with the following information:

Date of Marriage
Place of Marriage

a) April 06, 1999
b) SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN
a) December 08, 2001
b) QUEZON CITY, METRO MANILA (2nd District)
19


Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora put up his Muslim religion as his
sole defense. He alleged that his religion allows him to marry more than once.
Granting arguendo that Nollora is indeed of Muslim faith at the time of
celebration of both marriages,
20
Nollora cannot deny that both marriage
ceremonies were not conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. The applicable Articles in the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws read:

Art. 14. Nature. - Marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its
nature, consequences and incidents are governed by this Code and the Sharia
and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements to a certain
extent fix the property relations of the spouses.

Art. 15. Essential Requisites. - No marriage contract shall be perfected unless
the following essential requisites are complied with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent
persons after the proper guardian in marriage (wali) has given his consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent
persons.
Art. 16. Capacity to contract marriage. - (1) Any Muslim male at least fifteen
years of age and any Muslim female of the age of puberty or upwards and not
suffering from any impediment under the provisions of this Code may contract
marriage. A female is presumed to have attained puberty upon reaching the
age of fifteen.
x x x.

Art. 17. Marriage Ceremony. - No particular form of marriage ceremony is
required but the ijab and the qabul in marriage shall be declared publicly in the
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and the two competent
witnesses. The declaration shall be set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed
or marked by the contracting parties and said witnesses, and attested by the
person solemnizing the marriage. One copy shall be given to the contracting
parties and another sent to the Circuit Registrar by the solemnizing officer who
shall keep the third.

Art. 18. Authority to solemnize marriage. - Marriage maybe solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;
(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent
under Muslim law to solemnize marriage; or
(c) By the judge of the Sharia District Court or Sharia Circuit Court or any
person designated by the judge, should the proper wali refuse without
justifiable reason, to authorize the solemnization.

Art. 19. Place of solemnization. - Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any
mosque, office of the Sharia judge, office of the Circuit Registrar, residence of
the bride or her wali, or at any other suitable place agreed upon by the parties.

Art. 20. Specification of dower. - The amount or value of dower may be fixed by
the contracting parties (mahr-musamma) before, during or after the celebration
of marriage. If the amount or the value thereof has not been so fixed, a proper
dower (mahr-mithl) shall, upon petition of the wife, be determined by the court
according to the social standing of the parties.

Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that [i]n case
of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the [Family Code of the
Philippines, or Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the
Philippines] shall apply. Nolloras religious affiliation is not an issue here.
Neither is the claim that Nolloras marriages were solemnized according to
Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim
exemption from liability for the crime of bigamy.
21


Nollora asserted in his marriage certificate with Geraldino that his civil status is
single. Moreover, both of Nolloras marriage contracts do not state that he is a
Muslim. Although the truth or falsehood of the declaration of ones religion in
the marriage certificate is not an essential requirement for marriage, such
omissions are sufficient proofs of Nolloras liability for bigamy. Nolloras false
declaration about his civil status is thus further compounded by these omissions.

[ATTY. CALDINO:]
Q: In your marriage contract, Mr. Witness, with Jesusa Pinat, you indicated here
as your religion, Catholic Pentecostal, and you were saying that since January
10, 1992, you are already a [M]uslim convert. . . you said, Mr. Witness, that you
are already a [M]uslim convert since January 10, 1992. However, in your
marriage contract with Jesusa Pinat, there is no indication here that you have
indicated your religion. Will you please go over your marriage contract?

[NOLLORA:]
A: When we got married, they just placed there Catholic but I didnt know why
they did not place any Catholic there.

x x x

Q: Now, Mr. Witness, I would like to call your attention with respect to
your marriage contract with your co-accused in this case, Rowena
Geraldino, x x x will you please tell us, Mr. Witness, considering that you
said that you are already a [M]uslim convert on January 10, 1992, why in
the marriage contract with Rowena Geraldino, you indicated there your
religion as Catholic, Mr. Witness?
A: Since I was a former Catholic and since I was then keeping, I was
keeping it as a secret my being my Balik-Islam, thats why I placed there
Catholic since I know that the society doesnt approve a Catholic to marry
another, thats why I placed there Catholic as my religion, sir.

Q: How about under the column, civil status, why did you indicate there
that youre single, Mr. Witness?

A: I also kept it as a secret that I was married, earlier married.
22
(Emphasis
supplied)

x x x

[PROSECUTOR TAYLOR:]
Q: Would you die for your new religion, Mr. Nollora?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: If you would die for your new religion, why did you allow that your faith be
indicated as Catholic when in fact you were already as you alleged [M]uslim to
be put in your marriage contract?

x x x

[A:] I dont think there is anything wrong with it, I just signed it so we can get
married under the Catholic rights [sic] because after that we even got married
under the [M]uslim rights [sic], your Honor.

x x x

Q: Under your Muslim faith, if you marry a second wife, are you required under
your faith to secure the permission of your first wife to get married?

A: Yes, maam.

Q: Did you secure that permission from your first wife, Jesusa Nollora?

A: I was not able to ask any permission from her because she was very mad at
me, at the start, she was always very mad, maam.
23



In his petition before this Court, Nollora casts doubt on the validity of his
marriage to Geraldino. Nollora may not impugn his marriage to Geraldino in
order to extricate himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we would be opening
the doors to allowing the solemnization of multiple flawed marriage
ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals:
24

There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise
would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of
futurity and commitment.


WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 31538 promulgated on 30 September 2009 and the Resolution
promulgated on 23 February 2010 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Atilano O.
Nollora, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy in Criminal Case No.
Q-04-129031 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment with a
term of two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as minimum
to eight years and one day of prision mayor as maximum of his indeterminate
sentence, as well as the accessory penalties provided by law.

Costs against petitioner Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970
AURORA A. ANAYA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FERNANDO O. PALAROAN, defendant-appellee.
Isabelo V. Castro for plaintiff-appellant.
Arturo A. Romero for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from an order of dismissal, issued motu proprio by the Juvenile &
Domestic Relations Court, Manila, of a complaint for annulment of marriage,
docketed therein as Civil Case No. E-00431, entitled "Aurora A. Anaya, plaintiff
vs. Fernando O. Palaroan, defendant."
The complaint in said Civil Case No. E-00431 alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff
Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on 4 December 1953; that
defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January
1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and
intimidation, which action was docketed in the Court of First Instance of Manila
as Civil Case No. 21589; that judgment was rendered therein on 23 September
1959 dismissing the complaint of Fernando, upholding the validity of the
marriage and granting Aurora's counterclaim; that (per paragraph IV) while the
amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated "to settle the judgment,"
Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he
had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his; and that "the non-
divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of
defendant that definitely wrecked their marriage, which apparently doomed to
fail even before it had hardly commenced ... frank disclosure of which, certitude
precisely precluded her, the Plaintiff herein from going thru the marriage that
was solemnized between them constituted 'FRAUD', in obtaining her consent,
within the contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of the Civil Code" (sic) (Record
on Appeal, page 3). She prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for
moral damages.
Defendant Fernando, in his answer, denied the allegation in paragraph IV of the
complaint and denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative;
he averred that under no circumstance would he live with Aurora, as he had
escaped from her and from her relatives the day following their marriage on 4
December 1953; that he denied having committed any fraud against her. He set
up the defenses of lack of cause of action and estoppel, for her having prayed
in Civil Case No. 21589 for the validity of the marriage and her having enjoyed
the support that had been granted her. He counterclaimed for damages for the
malicious filing of the suit. Defendant Fernando did not pray for the dismissal of
the complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral damages."
Plaintiff Aurora filed a reply with answer to the counterclaim, wherein she
alleged:
(1) that prior to their marriage on 4 December 1953, he paid court to her, and
pretended to shower her with love and affection not because he really felt so
but because she merely happened to be the first girl available to marry so he
could evade marrying the close relative of his whose immediate members of her
family were threatening him to force him to marry her (the close relative);
(2) that since he contracted the marriage for the reason intimated by him, and
not because he loved her, he secretly intended from the very beginning not to
perform the marital duties and obligations appurtenant thereto, and
furthermore, he covertly made up his mind not to live with her;
(3) that the foregoing clandestine intentions intimated by him were prematurely
concretized for him, when in order to placate and appease the immediate
members of the family of the first girl (referent being the close relative) and to
convince them of his intention not to live with plaintiff, carried on a courtship
with a third girl with whom, after gaining the latter's love cohabited and had
several children during the whole range of nine years that Civil Case No. 21589,
had been litigated between them (parties); (Record on Appeal, pages 10-11)
Failing in its attempt to have the parties reconciled, the court set the case for
trial on 26 August 1966 but it was postponed. Thereafter, while reviewing the
expendiente, the court realized that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally
insufficient to invalidate her marriage, and, on the authority of Brown vs.
Yambao, 102 Phil. 168, holding:
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense.
Nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a
decree of legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest,
and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if any legal
obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
the court a quo required plaintiff to show cause why her complaint should not
be dismissed. Plaintiff Aurora submitted a memorandum in compliance
therewith, but the court found it inadequate and thereby issued an order, dated
7 October 1966, for the dismissal of the complaint; it also denied
reconsideration.
The main issue is whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of
his pre-marital relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of
marriage.
We must agree with the lower court that it is not. For fraud as a vice of consent
in marriage, which may be a cause for its annulment, comes under Article 85,
No. 4, of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at
the time of the marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may be;
This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or
species of fraud enumerated in Article 86, as follows:
ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in
number 4 of the preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime
involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two
years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity
shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage.
The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud
as ground for annulment of marriage to the foregoing three cases may be
deduced from the fact that, of all the causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85,
fraud is the only one given special treatment in a subsequent article within the
chapter on void and voidable marriages. If its intention were otherwise,
Congress would have stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud in general is
already mentioned therein as a cause for annulment. But Article 86 was also
enacted, expressly and specifically dealing with "fraud referred to in number 4
of the preceding article," and proceeds by enumerating the specific frauds
(misrepresentation as to identity, non-disclosure of a previous conviction, and
concealment of pregnancy), making it clear that Congress intended to exclude
all other frauds or deceits. To stress further such intention, the enumeration of
the speci fi c frauds was fol l owed by the i nterdi cti on: "No other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage."
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is
not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for
annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article,
providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give
ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-
disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into
giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her
grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into
an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The
lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to give effect to the same,
whether it agrees with the rule or not.
But plaintiff-appellant Anaya emphasizes that not only has she alleged "non-
divulgement" (the word chosen by her) of the pre-marital relationship of her
husband with another woman as her cause of action, but that she has, likewise,
alleged in her reply that defendant Fernando paid court to her without any
intention of complying with his marital duties and obligations and covertly made
up his mind not to live with her. Plaintiff-appellant contends that the lower court
erred in ignoring these allegations in her reply.
This second set of averments which were made in the reply (pretended love and
absence of intention to perform duties of consortium) is an entirely new and
additional "cause of action." According to the plaintiff herself, the second set of
allegations is "apart, distinct and separate from that earlier averred in the
Complaint ..." (Record on Appeal, page 76). Said allegations were, therefore,
improperly alleged in the reply, because if in a reply a party-plaintiff is not
permitted to amend or change the cause of action as set forth in his complaint
(Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445), there is more reason not to allow such party to
allege a new and additional cause of action in the reply. Otherwise, the series of
pleadings of the parties could become interminable.
On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any
secret intention on the husband's part not to perform his marital duties must
have been discovered by the wife soon after the marriage: hence her action for
annulment based on that fraud should have been brought within four years after
the marriage. Since appellant's wedding was celebrated in December of 1953,
and this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already barred.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is hereby affirmed. No
costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo
and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006
ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA,
respondents.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January
26, 1998 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming
with modification the Decision
2
dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial
Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a)
dismissing petitioner's petition for the annulment of his marriage to private
respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and costs. Also assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution
3
denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva
got married on April 13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17,
1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage
alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who
was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage;
that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned
that private respondent's child died during delivery on August 29, 1988.
4

In her answer with compulsory counterclaim,
5
Lilia prayed for the dismissal of
the petition, arguing that petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that
petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their marriage;
that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which
private respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the
progress of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely.
Private respondent also prayed for the payment of moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys fees and costs.
On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion
of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of
P100,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's
fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
6

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts dismissal of the petition and the
award of attorneys fees and costs, but reduced the award of moral and
exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of
Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, hence, the instant
petition for review based on the following assigned errors:
I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE
CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN OBTAINED BY FRAUD,
INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE AND IMPROPER PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE
PLUS THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO COHABITATION WHATSOEVER
BETWEEN PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR IN
AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S
FEES, SAID AWARDS NOT BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY LAW.
7

The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be annulled
on the ground of vitiated consent; and (b) whether petitioner should be liable
for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees and costs.
The petition is partly granted.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of
the trial court, as in the instant case, are generally binding on this Court.
8
We
affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily
married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or
violence compelled him to do so, thus
To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the
alleged coerced consent which supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia
on April 13, 1988, it was only on November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less
than four (4) years and eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to have
the same marriage annulled. Unexplained, the prolonged inaction evidently
finds basis in Lilias allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando
solely in the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster his defense,
if not altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy which
was then already pending against him. Unfortunately, however, let alone the fact
that the criminal case was admittedly decided ahead with a judgment of
conviction against Orlando x x x even the very outcome of the present case
disappointed his expectation. At this late, with his appeal in the bigamy case
still pending with this Court x x x Orlando must be hoping against hope that
with a decree of annulment ensuing from this Court, he may yet secure an
acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in this perspective, the instant
appeal is, therefore, understandable.
But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground
that he did not freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several
incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an
imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone
calls from the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three
men at the premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and
the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New
Peoples Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by appellee and
who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her.
The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to his
person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a
contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being
harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment
at that time, it is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of
self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harms
way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear upon
appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security
personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were
threatening him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament
prior to solemnizing their marriage.
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe
by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married.
Appellants excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee because
he did not have an erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie
at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with
the appellee. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client
had a sexual relationship with the appellee x x x. He also narrated x x x that
sometime in January 1988, he and the appellee went to a hotel where "the
sexual act was consummated, with the defendant on top" x x x.
Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant
resorted to undermining the credibility of the latter by citing her testimony that
her child was born, and died, on August 29, 1989, a year off from August 29,
1988, the date of fetal death as appearing in the registry of deaths of the Office
of the Civil Registrar of Puerto Princesa City x x x.
To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because it is
inconsequential, as there is no controversy regarding the date of death of
appellees fetus. Nevertheless, during the continuation of the cross-examination
of the appellee, she declared that her child was prematurely born on August 29,
1988, matching the date in the certification of the Civil Registrar x x x. The
Court is not prepared to disbelieve the appellee and throw overboard her entire
testimony simply on account of her confusion as to the exact date of the death
of the fetus, especially when she herself had presented documentary evidence
that put August 29, 1988 as the date her fetus died.
Appellants propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the appellees
evidence continues in his argument that if indeed there is truth to her claim that
she was impregnated sometime in December 1987, then she could not have a
premature delivery on August 29, 1988, as she had testified during the trial,
because the 35-week period of pregnancy is complete by that time. Whether
the appellees impression that she had delivered prematurely is correct or not
will not affect the fact that she had delivered a fetus on August 29, 1988. In the
light of appellants admission that he had a sexual intercourse with his wife in
January 1988, and his failure to attribute the latters pregnancy to any other
man, appellant cannot complain that he was deceived by the appellee into
marrying her.
Appellant also puts in issue the lower courts appreciation of the letters
allegedly written by him to the appellee. During his cross-examination, when
confronted with thirteen (13) letters, appellant identified the seven (7) letters
that he sent to the appellee, but denied the remaining six (6) x x x. The letters
admitted by the appellant contained expressions of love and concern for his
wife, and hardly the rantings of a man under duress. During the re-direct
examination, however, appellant suddenly changed mind and denied
authorship of those seven (7) letters, claiming that he was forced to admit them
because he was threatened with harm by the appellee. If he was laboring under
duress when he made the admission, where did he find the temerity to deny his
involvement with the remaining six (6) letters? The recantation can only be
motivated by a hindsight realization by the appellant of the evidentiary weight
of those letters against his case.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his marriage
should be annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between him and his
wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage.
Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses
who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to
cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of
the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent,
insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed
to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of those grounds, the
validity of his marriage must be upheld.
9

We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorneys fees. Article 2208
(11) of the Civil Code provides that attorneys may be awarded where the court
deems it just and equitable under the circumstances, as in the instant case.
We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of
factual and legal basis. There is nothing in the records or in the appealed
decision that would support an award of moral damages. In justifying the award,
the Court of Appeals merely said thus:
It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the baseless
portrayal of her by the appellant as the perpetrator of fraudulent schemes to
trap an unwilling mate. x x x
10

However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference to any
testimony of private respondent detailing her alleged physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to moral
damages.
In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,
11
we held that:
In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and
proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While respondent
alleged in his complaint that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to prove them during the trial.
Indeed, respondent should have taken the witness stand and should have
testified on the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and other
emotional and mental suffering he purportedly suffered to sustain his claim for
moral damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by
clear and convincing proof. No other person could have proven such damages
except the respondent himself as they were extremely personal to him.
As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not
entitled to exemplary damages. This is clear in Article 2234 of the Civil Code,
which provides:
ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved,
the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not
exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been
agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in order that such
liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may
consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated
damages, the plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate
or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated
damages.
Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such
that no exemplary damages can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes
his clear right to moral damages.
12
In the instant case, private respondent failed
to satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages, thus she is not likewise
entitled to exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832 affirming with
modification the January 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 dismissing
petitioners petition for the annulment of his marriage with private respondent,
is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and exemplary damages is
DELETED for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-
Nazario, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960
JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REMEDIOS CAIZARES, defendant.
Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant.
Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro
for appellant.
Climaco, Ascarraga and Silang for appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
the plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the
defendant Remedios Caizares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of
the municipal court of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the office of her
genitals or vagina was to small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis
for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as described above existed at
the time of marriage and continues to exist; and that for that reason he left the
conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been married. On 14
June 1955 the wife was summoned and served a copy of the complaint. She did
not file an answer. On 29 September 1956, pursuant to the provisions of article
88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to
inquire whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the State to see that the
evidence for the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 17
December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit
to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her
physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten days from receipt of
the order, a medical certificate on the result thereof. On 14 March 1957 the
defendant was granted additional five days from notice to comply with the
order of 17 December 1956 with warning that her failure to undergo medical
examination and submit the required doctor's certificate would be deemed lack
of interest on her part in the case and that judgment upon the evidence
presented by her husband would be rendered.
After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 1957 the
Court entered a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the
defendant. On 26 April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration
of the decree thus entered, upon the ground, among others, that the
defendant's impotency has not been satisfactorily established as required by
law; that she had not been physically examined because she had refused to be
examined; that instead of annulling the marriage the Court should have
punished her for contempt of court and compelled her to undergo a physical
examination and submit a medical certificate; and that the decree sought to be
reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want to end their
marriage to collude or connive with each other by just alleging impotency of
one of them. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed or that the wife be
subjected to a physical examination. Pending resolution of his motion, the city
attorney timely appealed from the decree. On 13 May 1957 the motion for
reconsideration was denied.
The question to determine is whether the marriage in question may be annulled
on the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and
testified that his wife was and is impotent. The latter did not answer the
complaint, was absent during the hearing, and refused to submit to a medical
examination.
Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply
interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity,
continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely
dependent upon it. It is the interest of each and every member of the
community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that would shake its
foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status are
governed by law, not by will of the parties. The law specifically enumerates the
legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul a
marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was
decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was expected to give
testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he
sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to
have been satisfactorily established, becase from the commencement of the
proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part
therein. Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show
indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of
the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of
this country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a
physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the
Court may do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-
incrimination. She is not charged with any offense. She is not being compelled
to be a witness against herself.
1
"Impotency being an abnormal condition
should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency."
2
The lone
testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of sexual
intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them
together as husband and wife.
The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Gutierrez David, and Dizon, JJ. concur.



THIRD DIVISION


VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR,
Petitioner,




- versus -




REY C. ALCAZAR,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 174451

Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 13, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x


D E C I S I O N


CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:


This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision[1]
dated 24 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, affirming
the Decision dated 9 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos
City, Branch 85, in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, which dismissed petitioner
Veronica Cabacungan Alcazars Complaint for the annulment of her marriage to
respondent Rey C. Alcazar.

The Complaint,[2] docketed as Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, was filed by
petitioner before the RTC on 22 August 2002. Petitioner alleged in her
Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11 October 2000 by Rev.
Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latters residence. After their wedding,
petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
the hometown of respondents parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to
Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latters abode at 2601-
C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent
left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in
a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate
with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five
times but respondent never answered. About a year and a half after respondent
left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to
come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not
advised by respondent of his arrival.

Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent
arrived in the Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C
Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to
his parents house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that
respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to see her
brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not
aware of respondents whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been living with his
parents since his arrival in March 2002.

Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the
Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that
respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her,
providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph
5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was
also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.

Per the Sheriffs Return[3] dated 3 October 2002, a summons,
together with a copy of petitioners Complaint, was served upon respondent on
30 September 2002.[4]

On 18 November 2002, petitioner, through counsel, filed a
Motion[5] to direct the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation of the case
pursuant to Article 48 of the Family Code.

As respondent did not file an Answer, the RTC issued on 27
November 2002 an Order[6] directing the public prosecutor to conduct an
investigation to ensure that no collusion existed between the parties; to submit
a report thereon; and to appear in all stages of the proceedings to see to it that
evidence was not fabricated or suppressed.

On 4 March 2003, Public Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de Guzman (De
Guzman) submitted her Report manifesting that she had conducted an
investigation of the case of petitioner and respondent in January 2003, but
respondent never participated therein. Public Prosecutrix De Guzman also
noted that no collusion took place between the parties, and measures were
taken to prevent suppression of evidence between them. She then
recommended that a full-blown trial be conducted to determine whether
petitioners Complaint was meritorious or not.

Pre-trial was held and terminated on 20 May 2003.

On 21 May 2003, the RTC received the Notice of Appearance of the
Solicitor General.

Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita
Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as
witnesses.

Petitioner first took the witness stand and elaborated on the
allegations in her Complaint. Cabacungan corroborated petitioners testimony.

Petitioners third witness, Tayag, presented the following psychological
evaluation of petitioner and respondent:

After meticulous scrutiny and
careful analysis of the collected data, petitioner
is found to be free from any underlying
personality aberration neither (sic) of any
serious psychopathological traits, which may
possibly impede her normal functioning (sic) of
marriage. On the other hand, the undersigned
arrived to (sic) a firm opinion that the sudden
breakdown of marital life between petitioner
and respondent was clearly due to the
diagnosed personality disorder that the
respondent i s harbori ng, maki ng hi m
psychologically incapacitated to properly
assume and comply [with] essential roles (sic) of
obligations as a married man.

The pattern of behaviors displayed
by the respondent satisfies the diagnostic
criteria of a disorder clinically classified as
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, a condition
deemed to be grave, severe, long lasting in
proportion and incurable by any treatment.

People suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder are known to have a
pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or
behavior), need for admiration, and lack of
empathy, beginning by early adulthood and
present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by
five (or more) of the following:

1. has a gr andi ose of sel f -
importance (e.g. exaggerates achievements
and talents, expect to be recognized as
superior without commensurate achievements)

2. is preoccupied with fantasies of
unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty or
ideal love

3. believes that he or she is
special and unique and can only be
understood by, or should associate with, other
special or high status people (institutions)

4. requires excessive admiration

5. has sense of entitlement, i.e.,
unreasonable expectations of especially
favorable treatment or automatic compliance
with his or her expectations

6. is interpersonally exploitative,
i.e., takes advantage of others to achieve his or
her own ends

7. lacks empathy: is unwilling to
recognize or identify with the feelings and
needs of others

8. is often envious of others or
believes that others are envious of him or her

9. shows ar rogant , haught y
behavior or attitudes.

The root cause of respondents
personality disorder can be attributed to his
early childhood years with predisposing
psychosocial factors that influence[d] his
devel opment . I t was r ecount ed t hat
respondent is the first child of his mothers
second family. Obviously, unhealthy familial
constel l ati on composed hi s i mmedi ate
envi ronment i n hi s growi ng up years.
Respondent had undergone a severe longing
for attention from his father who had been
unfaithful to them and had died early in life,
that he was left alone to fend for the family
needs. More so that they were coping against
poverty, his caregivers failed to validate his
needs, wishes or responses and overlooked the
love and attention he yearned which led to
develop a pathological need for self-object to
help him maintain a cohesive sense of self-such
so great that everything other people offer is
consumed. Hence, he is unable to develop
relationship with other (sic) beyond this need.
There is no capacity for empathy sharing, or
loving others.

The psychological incapacity of the
respondent is characterized by juridical
antecedence as it already existed long before
he entered into marriage. Since it already
started early in life, it is deeply engrained
within his system and becomes a[n] integral
part of his personality structure, thereby
rendering such to be permanent and incurable.
[7]


Tayag concluded in the end that:


As such, their marriage is already
beyond repair, considering the fact that it has
long been (sic) ceased to exist and have their
different life priorities. Reconciliation between
them is regarded to be (sic). The essential
obligations of love, trust, respect, fidelity,
authentic cohabitation as husband and wife,
mutual help and support, and commitment,
did not and will no lon[g]er exist between
them. With due consideration of the above-
ment i oned f i ndi ngs, t he under si gned
recommends, the declaration of nullity of
marriage between petitioner and respondent.
[8]


On 18 February 2004, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence.
Public Prosecutrix Myrna S. Lagrosa (Lagrosa), who replaced Public Prosecutrix
De Guzman, interposed no objection to the admission of petitioners evidence
and manifested that she would no longer present evidence for the State.

On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioners
Complaint for annulment of her marriage to respondent, holding in substance
that:

In the case at bar, the Court finds
that the acts of the respondent in not
communicating with petitioner and not living
with the latter the moment he returned home
from Saudi Arabia despite their marriage do
(sic) not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no
showing that his defects were already
present at the inception of their marriage or
that these are incurable.

That being the case, the Court
resolves to deny the instant petition.

W H E R E F O R E , p r e m i s e s
considered, the Petition for Annulment of
Marriage is hereby DENIED.[9]


Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[10] but it was denied
by the RTC in an Order[11] dated 19 August 2004.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84471. In a Decision[12] dated 24 May 2006, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision dated 9 June 2004. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the RTC did not err in finding that petitioner failed to prove
respondents psychological incapacity. Other than petitioners bare allegations,
no other evidence was presented to prove respondents personality disorder
that made him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state. Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,[13] the appellate court ruled
that the evidence should be able to establish that at least one of the spouses
was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that said person could not have
known the marital obligations to be assumed; or knowing the marital
obligations, could not have validly assumed the same. At most, respondents
abandonment of petitioner could be a ground for legal separation under Article
5 of the Family Code.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution[14] dated 28 August 2008.

Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED
BY THE LAW AND JURI SPRUDENCE,
RESPONDENT I S PSYCHOLOGI CALLY
I NCAPACI TATED TO PERFORM THE
ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATONS.[15]


At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally filed by
petitioner before the RTC was for annulment of marriage based on Article 45,
paragraph 5 of the Family Code, which reads:

ART. 45. A marriage may be
annulled for any of the following causes,
existing at the time of the marriage:

x x x x

(5) That either party was
physically incapable of consummating
the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be
incurable; x x x.


Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate.
[16] Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of
the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse.[17] Non-
consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the husband or of the wife
and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of
the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising in
whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by
psychogenic causes, where such mental block or disturbance has the result of
making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage act.[18]

No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that
respondent was in any way physically incapable to consummate his marriage
with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her cross-examination that she
and respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before
respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no physical incapacity on
respondents part, then, there is no ground for annulling petitioners marriage to
respondent. Petitioners Complaint was, therefore, rightfully dismissed.

One curious thing, though, caught this Courts attention. As can be
gleaned from the evidence presented by petitioner and the observations of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner was actually seeking
the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the latters
psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint before
the RTC to her former counsels mistake or gross ignorance.[19] But even said
reason cannot save petitioners Complaint from dismissal. It is settled in this
jurisdiction that the client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of the counsel in
the realm of procedural technique.[20] Although this rule is not a hard and fast
one and admits of exceptions, such as where the mistake of counsel is so gross,
palpable and inexcusable as to result in the violation of his clients substantive
rights,[21] petitioner failed to convince us that such exceptional circumstances
exist herein.

Assuming for the sake of argument that we can treat the Complaint as
one for declaration of nullity based on Article 36 of the Family Code, we will still
dismiss the Complaint for lack of merit, consistent with the evidence presented
by petitioner during the trial.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.


In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court declared that
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.[23]

The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in
Republic v. Court of Appeals,[24] to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally
inviolable, thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be protected by
the state.

The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.

( 2) The r oot c aus e of t he
psychological incapacity must be a) medically
or clinically identified, b) alleged in the
complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and
d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36
of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that
the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them,
could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
r oot caus e mus t be i dent i f i ed as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven
to be existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of
the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached
at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be
shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise
of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but may not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/
her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
the same Code in regard to parents and their
chi l dr en. Such non- compl i ed mar i t al
obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts. x x x.


Being accordingly guided by the aforequoted pronouncements in
Republic v. Court of Appeals, we scrutinized the totality of evidence presented
by petitioner and found that the same was not enough to sustain a finding that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated.

Petitioners evidence, particularly her and her mothers testimonies,
merely established that respondent left petitioner soon after their wedding to
work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a year
and a half later, he directly went to live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, and not with petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did
not contact petitioner at all since leaving for abroad. These testimonies though
do not give us much insight into respondents psychological state.

Tayags psychological report leaves much to be desired and hardly
helps petitioners cause. It must be noted that Tayag was not able to personally
examine respondent. Respondent did not appear for examination despite
Tayags invitation.[25] Tayag, in evaluating respondents psychological state, had
to rely on information provided by petitioner. Hence, we expect Tayag to have
been more prudent and thorough in her evaluation of respondents
psychological condition, since her source of information, namely, petitioner, was
hardly impartial.

Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder, traceable to the latters experiences during his
childhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft of the basis for the said conclusion.
Tayag did not particularly describe the pattern of behavior that showed that
respondent indeed had a Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Tayag likewise failed
to explain how such a personality disorder made respondent psychologically
incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband. We emphasize that the
burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that respondent suffers from a
psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder renders him
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.[26] Psychological
incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal, or a neglect in
the performance of some marital obligations.

In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence
adduced, to peek into petitioners marital life and, as a result, we perceive a
simple case of a married couple being apart too long, becoming strangers to
each other, with the husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching
himself as much as possible from his wife.

To be tired and give up on ones situation and on ones spouse are
not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be
so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot
to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is
not available to us under our laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses only
a very specific situation a relationship where no marriage could have validly
been concluded because the parties; or where one of them, by reason of a
grave and incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was
celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could
not have validly entered into a marriage.[27]

An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we
stated in Marcos v. Marcos[28]:

Article 36 of the Family Code, we
stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duti es and responsi bi l i ti es of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x
x.


Resultantly, we have held in the past that mere irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological
incapacity.[29]

As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared
null, petitioner pleads abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent. In a
Manifestation and Motion[30] dated 21 August 2007 filed before us, petitioner
claims that she was informed by one Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing in the
same barangay as respondent in Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is living-
in with another woman named Sally.

Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Again, petitioner must
be able to establish that respondents unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state.[31]

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation
of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its
mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.[32]
Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio.[33] In the case at bar, petitioner failed to persuade us that
respondents failure to communicate with petitioner since leaving for Saudi
Arabia to work, and to live with petitioner after returning to the country, are
grave psychological maladies that are keeping him from knowing and/or
complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

We are not downplaying petitioners frustration and misery in
finding herself shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working.
Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can
provide the specific answers to every individual problem.[34]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The 24 May 2006 Decision
and 28 August 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
84471, which affirmed the 9 June 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos City, Branch 85, dismissing petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazars
Complaint in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.