Jenie San Juan dela Cruz vs Ronald Paul S.

Gracia, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar

G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009
FACTS: Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the Affidavit to use the Surname of the
Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the signature of the deceased father, and because he was born out of wedlock
and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child.
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The trial court held that even if
Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express recognition
of paternity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can be considered as a
recognition of paternity.
RULING: Yes.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter
had previously recognized him/her as his offspring through an admission made in a pubic of private handwritten instrument.
Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative father in the private handwritten
instrument.
The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of
filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other
evidence.
Republic v. Feliciano
FACTS:
Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985 reversing the order of the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980, which dismissed the complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the State.
On January 22, 1970, Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the RP, represented by
the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregate area
of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Feliciano alleged that he bought
the property in question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale
on October 30, 1954; that Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said
property was evidenced by an informacion posesoria that upon his purchase of the property, he took actual possession of the same,
introduced various improvements therein and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by the Director of
Lands on October 24, 1954.
On November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement purposes, under the
administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of
Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started sub-dividing and
distributing the land to the settlers; that the property in question, while located within the reservation established under Proclamation
No. 90, was the private property of Feliciano and should therefore be excluded therefrom. Feliciano prayed that he be declared the
rightful and true owner of the property in question consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of ownership based on informacion
posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all
awards to the settlers.
ISSUE: WON the State can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land
RULING: NO
RATIONALE:
A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued,
either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts
sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings.
Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be construed in strictissimi juris (of strictest
right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority.
Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.
Addtl: Worthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, that the informacion posesoria registered in the Office of the
Register of Deed of Camarines Sur on September 23, 1952 was a "reconstituted" possessory information; it was "reconstituted from the
duplicate presented to this office (Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo Feliciano," without the submission of proof that the alleged duplicate
was authentic or that the original thereof was lost. Reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original. These
circumstances raise grave doubts as to the authenticity and validity of the "informacion posesoria" relied upon by respondent Feliciano.
Adding to the dubiousness of said document is the fact that "possessory information calls for an area of only 100 hectares," whereas
the land claimed by respondent Feliciano comprises 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to 701-9064 hectares. Courts should be wary
in accepting "possessory information documents, as well as other purportedly old Spanish titles, as proof of alleged ownershi p of lands.
34 Phil 311 Civil Law Torts and Damages Liability of the State for acts of special agents
Political Law Non-Suability of the State Waiver of Non-Suability is Not Admission of Liability
The facts of the case took place in the 1910s. E. Merritt was a constructor who was excellent at his work. One day, while he was riding
his motorcycle along Calle Padre Faura, he was bumped by a government ambulance. The driver of the ambulance was proven to have
been negligent. Because of the incident, Merritt was hospitalized and he was severely injured beyond rehabilitation so much so that he
could never perform his job the way he used to and that he cannot even earn at least half of what he used to earn.
In order for Merritt to recover damages, he sought to sue the government which later authorized Merritt to sue the government by virtue
of Act 2457 enacted by the legislature (An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and
authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit). The lower court then determined the amount of damages and
ordered the government to pay the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the government is liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance.
HELD: No. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or
create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce
a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. It follows
therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor
even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of its
agents. The State can only be liable if it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are
employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him.
In the case at bar, the ambulance driver was not a special agent nor was a government officer acting as a special agent hence, there
can be no liability from the government. The Government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or
agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would
be subversive of the public interest.
Phil Agila Satellite v. Lichauco
FACTS: On June 6, 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding1 (MOU) was entered into by a consortium of private telecommunications
carriers and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), they formed a corporation and adopted the corporate
name Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI). They requested the then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr. for official government
confirmation of the assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161Eand 153E to PASI for its AGILA satellites by a letter dated June 28,
1996.When it was confirmed, PASI undertook preparations for the launching, operation and management of its satellites by, among
other things, obtaining loans, increasing its capital, conducting negotiations with its business partners, and makingan initial payment.
When they requested the Land banks confirmation of its participation in a club loan for the governments assignment to PASI of
orbital slots 161E and 153E, DOTC Undersecretary Josefina T. Lichauco sent a letter to the bank controverting the said assignment,
clearly stating that orbital slot 153E can no longer be assigned toPASI. She subsequently issued a Notice of Offer for several orbital
slots including 153E in December 1997.PASI, claiming that the offer was without its knowledge and that it subsequently came to
learn that another company whose identity had not been disclosed had submitted a bid and won the award for orbital slot 153E,
filed on January 23,1998 a complaint7before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City against Lichauco and the "Unknown
Awardee," for injunction to enjoin the award of orbital slot 153E, declare its nullity, and for damages. PASI filed on February 23,
1998 a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Secretary Josefina Trinidad Lichauco. In his affidavit-complaint, de
Guzman charged Lichauco with gross violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, reading:(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of
officers or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. Because a prejudicial
question was found by the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB), the criminal suit was dismissed and
reconsideration was denied by Order dated July 17, 1998. Hence, PASI is in petition for review on certiorari, arguing that the
Ombudsman erred in dismissing the complaint.
ISSUE: WON there exists a prejudicial question, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the dismissal of the complaint on that
account is in order
RULING: Yes, there exists a prejudicial question because if the award to the undisclosed bidder of the orbital lot 153Eis, in the civil
case declared valid for being within Lichaucos scope of authority to thus free her from liability for damages, there would be no
prohibited act to speak of nor would there be basis for undue injury claimed to have been suffered by petitioner. No, according to
Yap v. Paras, Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court directs that the proceedings may only be suspended, not dismissed, and that
it may be made only upon petition, and not at the instance of the judge alone or the investigating officer. It would sanction the
extinguishment of the criminal liability, if there be any, through prescription under Article 89 vis a vis Article 90 and 91 of the RPC.
The Order dismissing OMB Case No. 0-98-0416 dated July 17, 1998 against Lichauco was set aside. The Ombudsman was Ordered to
reinstate the case for further proceedings.
RATIONALE: When a public officer acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, any injury caused by him is his own personal liability and
cannot be imputed to the State. (p.34, Political Law, Isagani Cruz)
Minucher v CA
Doctrine:
Filing a motion to quash, which, in effect already waives any defect in the service of summons by earlier asking an extension to file time
to file an Answer and filing an Answer with Counterclaim.
Facts:
Khosrow Minucher is the Labor Attach of the Embassy of Iran in the Phil. Arthur Scalzo, then connected with the American Embassy
in Manila, was introduced to him by Jose Inigo (an informer belonging to the military intelligence community).
Accdg. to Inigo, Scalzo was interested in buying Iranian products like caviar and carpets. Minucher complained to Scalzo about his
problems with the American Embassy regarding the expired visas of his wife, Abbas Torabian. Offering help, Scalzo gave Minucher a
calling card showing that the former is an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) assigned to the American Embassy in
Manila. As a result, Scalzo expressed his intent to buy caviar and further promised to arrange the renewal of the visas.
Scalzo went to Minucher's residence and asked to be entrusted with Persian silk carpets, for which he had a buyer. The next day,
Scalzo returned and claimed that he had already made arrangements with his contacts concerning the visas and asked for $2,000.
It turned out that Scalzo prepared a plan to frame-up a Minucher and wife for alleged heroin trafficking. Both were falsely arrested and
charged with violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Minucher prays for actual and compensatory damages. However, counsel for Scalzo filed a motion to quash summons alleging that the
defendant is beyond the processes of the Philippine court for the action for damages is a personal action and that Scalzo is outside the
Philippines.
TC denied the motion. CA dismissed the motion for lack of merit on the basis of the erroneous assumption that because of the
Diplomatic Note (advising the DFA that Scalzo is a member of the US diplomatic mission investigating Minucher for drug trafficking),
Scalzo is clothed with diplomatic immunity.
Issue:
Whether or not a complaint for damages be dismissed in the sole basis of a statement complained in a Diplomatic Note.

Held:
No. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired by either voluntary appearance or by the service of summons. In the case,
Scalzo's counsel filed a motion to quash, which, in effect already waived any defect in the service of summons by earlier asking an
extension to file time to file an Answer and filing an Answer with Counterclaim.

The complaint for damages cannot be dismissed. Said complaint contains sufficient allegations which indicate that Scalzo committed
imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and functions. The TC gave credit to Minucher's theory
that he was a victim of frame-up hence, there is a prima facie showing that Scalzo could be held personally liable for his acts. Further,
Scalzo did not come forward with evidence to, prove that he acted in his official capacity.

GTZ VS CA
FACTS
On 1971, the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the Philippines ratified an Agreement
concerning Technical Co-operation (Agreement) in Bonn, capital of what was then West Germany.
The Agreement affirmed the countries common interest in promoting the technical and economic development of their States,
and recognized the benefits to be derived by both States from closer technical co-operation, and allowed for the conclusion of
arrangements concerning individual projects of technical co-operation.
Pursuant to such Agreement, both governments affirmed their common commitment to promote jointly a project called, Social
Health InsuranceNetworking and Empowerment (SHINE), which was designed to enable Philippine familiesespecially poor onesto
maintain their health and secure health care of sustainable quality.
In the arraignment, both governments likewise named their respective implementing organizations for SHINE. The Philippines
designated the DOH and Philhealth with the implementation of SHINE. For their part, the German government charged the Deustche
Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) with the implementation of its contributions.
Private respondents were engaged as contract employees hired by GTZ to work for SHINE on various dates between
December of 1998 to September of 1999.
In September of 1999, Nicolay, a Belgian national, assumed the post of SHINE Project Manager. Disagreements eventually
arose between Nicolay and private respondents in matters such as proposed salary adjustments, and the course Nicolay was taking in
the implementation of SHINE different from her predecessors.
It was claimed that SHINE under Nicolay had veered away from its original purpose to facilitate the development of social
health insurance by shoring up the national health insurance program and strengthening local initiatives, as Nicolay had refused to
support local partners and new initiatives on the premise that community and local government unit schemes were not sustainablea
philosophy that supposedly betrayed Nicolays lack of understanding of the purpose of the project.
The letter ended with these ominous words:
The issues that we [the private respondents] have stated here are very crucial to us in working for the project. We could no
longer find any reason to stay with the project unless ALL of these issues be addressed immediately and appropriately
In response, Nicolay wrote each of the private respondents a letter:
You have firmly and unequivocally stated in the last paragraph of your 8th June 2000 letter that you and the five other staff
could no longer find any reason to stay with the project unless ALL of these issues be addressed immediately and appropriately.
Under the foregoing premises and circumstances, it is now imperative that I am to accept your resignation, which I expect to receive as
soon as possible.


Taken aback, private respondents replied with a common letter, clarifying that their earlier letter was not intended as a
resignation letter, but one that merely intended to raise attention to what they perceived as vital issues.
Each of the private respondents received a letter from Nicolay dated 11 July 2000, informing them of the pre-termination of
their contracts of employment on the grounds of serious and gross insubordination, among others, resulting to loss of confidence and
trust.
On 21 August 2000, the private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC.
GTZ, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the case, as its
acts were undertaken in the discharge of the governmental functions and sovereign acts of the Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany.
This was opposed by private respondents with the arguments that GTZ had failed to secure a certification that it was immune
from suit from the Department of Foreign Affairs, and that it was GTZ and not the German government which had implemented the
SHINE Project and entered into the contracts of employment.
On 27 November 2000, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss. The Order cited, among others, that
GTZ was a private corporation which entered into an employment contract; and that GTZ had failed to secure from the DFA a
certification as to its diplomatic status.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision granting the complaint for illegal dismissal. The Decision concluded that respondents
were dismissed without lawful cause, there being a total lack of due process both substantive and procedural.GTZ was faulted for
failing to observe the notice requirements in the labor law.
The Decision proceeded to discuss the jurisdictional aspect, in this wise:
It imperative to be immune from suit, respondents should have secured from the Department of Foreign Affairs a certification
of respondents diplomatic status and entitlement to diplomatic privileges including immunity from suits. Having failed in this regard,
respondents cannot escape liability from the shelter of sovereign immunity.
GTZ opted to assail the decision by way of a special civil action for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals.
Issue: W/N GTZ enjoys immunity from suit
Held: No.
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file a Comment on the petition. In its Comment, the OSG took
the side of GTZ, with the prayer that the petition be granted on the ground that GTZ was immune from suit, citing in particul ar its
assigned functions in implementing the SHINE programa joint undertaking of the Philippine and German governments which was
neither proprietary nor commercial in nature.
On the other hand, Counsel for GTZ characterizes GTZ as the implementing agency of the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany, a depiction similarly adopted by the OSG. Assuming that characterization is correct, it does not automaticall y
invest GTZ with the ability to invoke State immunity from suit. The distinction lies in whether the agency is incorporated or
unincorporated. The following lucid discussion from Justice Isagani Cruz is pertinent:
Where suit is filed not against the government itself or its officials but against one of its entities, it must be ascertained whether or not
the State, as the principal that may ultimately be held liable, has given its consent to be sued. This ascertainment will depend in the first
instance on whether the government agency impleaded is incorporated or unincorporated.
An incorporated agency has a charter of its own that invests it with a separate juridical personality, like the Social Security System, the
University of the Philippines, and the City of Manila. By contrast, the unincorporated agency is so called because it has no separate
juridical personality but is merged in the general machinery of the government, like the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Mines and
the Government Printing Office.

If the agency is incorporated, the test of its suability is found in its charter. The simple rule is that it is suable if its charter says so, and
this is true regardless of the functions it is performing. Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the
State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless,
they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provides that they can sue and be sued.
State immunity from suit may be waived by general or special law. The special law can take the form of the original charter of
the incorporated government agency. Jurisprudence is replete with examples of incorporated government agencies which were rul ed
not entitled to invoke immunity from suit, owing to provisions in their charters manifesting their consent to be sued.
Is GTZ an incorporated agency of the German government? There is some mystery surrounding that question. Neither GTZ
nor the OSG go beyond the claim that petitioner is the implementing agency of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.
On the other hand, private respondents asserted before the Labor Arbiter that GTZ was a private corporation engaged in the
implementation of development projects.
There is no doubt that the 1991 Agreement designated GTZ as the implementing agency in behalf of the German
government.
GTZ itself provides a more helpful clue, inadvertently, through its own official Internet website. In the Corporate Profile GTZ
describes itself as a federally owned, a federal enterprise, and founded in 1975 as a company under private law.
GTZ clearly has a very meaningful relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany, which apparently owns it. At the same
time, it appears that GTZ was actually organized not through a legislative public charter, but under private law, in the same way that
Philippine corporations can be organized under the Corporation Code even if fully owned by the Philippine government.
This self-description of GTZ in its own official website gives further cause for pause in adopting petitioners argument that GTZ
is entitled to immunity from suit because it is an implementing agency.
The above-quoted statement does not dispute the characterization of GTZ as an implementing agency of the Federal
Republic of Germany, yet it bolsters the notion that as a company organized under private law, it has a legal personality independent
of that of the Federal Republic of Germany.
The Federal Republic of Germany, in its own official website, also makes reference to GTZ and describes it as a private
company owned by the Federal Republic of Germany.
Taking the description on face value, the apparent equivalent under Philippine law is that of a corporation organized under the
Corporation Code but owned by the Philippine government, or a government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter.
And it bears notice that Section 36 of the Corporate Code states that every corporation incorporated under this Code has the power
and capacity x x x to sue and be sued in its corporate name.
It is entirely possible that under German law, an entity such as GTZ or particularly GTZ itself has not been vested or has been
specifically deprived the power and capacity to sue and/or be sued. Yet in the proceedings below and before this Court, GTZ has failed
to establish that under German law, it has not consented to be sued despite it being owned by the Federal Republic of Germany. We
adhere to the rule that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same
as those of the Philippines, and following the most intelligent assumption we can gather, GTZ is akin to a governmental owned or
controlled corporation without original charter which, by virtue of the Corporation Code, has expressly consented to be sued.
In Holy See v. Del Rosario provided a template on how a foreign entity desiring to invoke State immunity from suit could duly
prove such immunity before our local courts. The principles enunciated in that case were derived from public international law. We
stated then:
In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a forei gn
court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an executive
endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity.
It is to be recalled that the Labor Arbiter, in both of his rulings, noted that it was imperative for petitioners to secure from the
Department of Foreign Affairs a certification of respondents diplomatic status and entitlement to diplomatic privileges including
immunity from suits. The requirement might not necessarily be imperative. However, had GTZ obtained such certification from the
DFA, it would have provided factual basis for its claim of immunity that would, at the very least, establish a disputable evidentiary
presumption that the foreign party is indeed immune which the opposing party will have to overcome with its own factual evidence.
We do not see why GTZ could not have secured such certification or endorsement from the DFA for purposes of this case.
Would the fact that the Solicitor General has endorsed GTZs claim of States immunity from suit before this Court sufficiently
substitute for the DFA certification? Note that the rule in public international law quoted in Holy See referred to endorsement by the
Foreign Office of the State where the suit is filed, such foreign office in the Philippines being the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Nowhere in the Comment of the OSG is it manifested that the DFA has endorsed GTZs claim, the Comment filed by the OSG does not
inspire the same degree of confidence as a certification from the DFA would have elicited.
The Court thus holds and so rules that GTZ consistently has been unable to establish with satisfaction that it enjoys the
immunity from suit generally enjoyed by its parent country, the Federal Republic of Germany.

VIGILAR VS AQUINO
Facts:
Angelito M. Twano, petitioner, the OIC District Engr. of DPWH 2nd Engineering District of Pampanga sent an Invitation to bid to
respondent Arnulfo D. Aquino (owner if AD Aquino Construction and supplies). The bidding was for the construction of a dike by bull-
dozing a part of the Porac River. On July 7, 1992, the project was awarded to respondent and a "Contract Agreement" has been
executed with amount of Php 1,873,790.69, to cover the project cost. On. July 9, 1992, the project was completed. Respondent Aquino,
however claimed that Php 1,262,696.20 was still due to him, but petitioners refused to pay. He then, filed a complaint fort the collection
of sum of money with damages before RTC of Guagua. Petitioners has the following contentions, that the Complaint was a suit against
the State, respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies, Contract of Agreement was void for violating PD 1445 (Government
Auditing Code) - appropriation and Certificate of Availability of Funds.
On November 28,2003, lower court ruled in favor of the respondent. The lower court ordered DPWH to play Aquino the amount for the
completion of the project, Php 50,000 attorney's fees and cost if thus unit. On appeal, CA reversed and set aside the decision. It said
that Contract Agreement is declared null and void. Dissatisfied with the Decision the Court of Appeals, petitioners are seeking for the
reversal of the appellate court's decision and dismissal of the Complain in civil case
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the complaint for failure or respondent to exhaust all administrative
remedies
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the COA to allow payment to Respondent on a Quantum Meruit Basis despite
the latter's failure to comply with the requirements of PD 1445
Whether state immunity from suit could be invoked by petitioners.
Held:
The one involved in the case is the validity and enforceability of the contract of agreement which are questions purely of law and
clearly beyond expertise of COA or DPWH.
The Final Decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of Administrative remedies does not
apply, because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done.
The issue does not require technical knowledge and experience but one that would involve the interpretation and application of law.
Even if the contracts were void for failing to meet requirements mandated by law, the respondent should be compensated for services
rendered and work done.
In the case of Eslao it was stated that "to deny the payment to the contractor of the two buildings which were are almost fully
completed and presently occupied by the university would be to allow the government to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another.
Justice and equity demand compensation on the basis of quantum merut."Niether, can the petitioners escape the obligation to
compensate respondent for services rendered and work done by invoking state's immunity from suit. The doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. Justice and equity sternly demand that the
State's cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this particular instance and that the contractors be duly compensated.
WHERFORE, PETITION DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT.

People v. Versoza
PETITION: The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this Petition assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals. The questioned
Decision affirmed the trial courts directing the reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).

FACTS:
- On January 3, 2001, Gertrudes B. Verzosa (herein petitioner-appellee) filed a petition for reconstitution of the original copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) which was raffled to Branch 218 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
- In support thereof, Verzosa alleged that she and Edna Verzosa Garcia are the registered owners of a parcel of land.
- However, the original copy of their title was burned when the Quezon City Hall was gutted by fire on June 11, 1988 while the
owners Duplicate Certificate thereof was lost as shown by the Affidavit of Loss executed by her co-owner, Edna Garcia.
- She also claimed that the said title was in full force and effect and that no deed or other instrument involving the said property
has been presented or pending registration with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, at the time the title was destroyed.
- Verzosa posited that the current real estate taxes on the property have been paid.
- Thus, she prays that after due notice, publication and hearing, the subject title be reconstituted and thereafter, a second
owners duplicate copy be issued to the registered owners.
- The RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, set the case for hearing on May 18, 2001 and ordered the
publication
- On the scheduled date of hearing on May 18, 2001, only the representative from the Office of the Solicitor General appeared.
- Petitioners counsel presented and marked his evidence to establish the jurisdictional requirements.
- Thereafter, on her counsels motion, Verzosa was allowed to present further evidence before the Commissioner.
- On the date set for the presentation of petitioners evidence on June 7, 2001, however, the hearing was reset on the ground,
among others, of the need to amend the petition to implead petitioners co-owner, Edna Garcia, who is also her sister.
- On July 18, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for leave to present evidence ex-parte without impleading her co-owner, citing the
irreconcilable differences between them which the RTC granted in the Resolution dated August 22, 2001.
- The Land Registration Authority (LRA) submitted to the RTC a Report dated October 30, 2001 stating that:
(2) Our records show that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 140606 covering Lot 7, Block 8 of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC)
Pes-1011. registered in the name of Edna Verzosa Garcia and Gertrudes B. Verzosa (sic) is also applied for Administrative
Reconstitution Proceedings (Republic Act 6732), however, no Administrative Order has as yet been issued for the aforesaid TCT.
(3) The plan and technical description of Lot 7, Block 8 of the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pes-1011, were verified correct by
the Authority to represent the aforesaid lot and the same have been approved under (LRA) PR-18966 pursuant to the provisions of
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26.
x x x
- On November 19, 2001, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
reconstitute TCT No. 140606.
- Hence, the instant appeal by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, based on the following
assignment of errors, to wit:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PRESENT PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION BECAUSE APPELLEE FAILED
TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTIONS 12 AND 13 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
26 IN RELATION TO SECTION 110 OF P.D. NO. 1529.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR RECONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL COPY OF TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 140606 FOR FAILURE OF APPELLEE TO PRESENT CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT
SHE IS THE OWNER OF SAID PARCEL OF LAND.4

- According to CA, the petition for reconstitution was filed under Sec. 3(f) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 26 which grants the court
the authority to consider other documents which it finds sufficient and proper bases for the reconstitution prayed for.
- In this case, the documentary evidence presented by respondent Gertrudes B. Verzosa, coupled with the Report submitted by
the Land Registration Authority (LRA) confirming the previous existence of TCT No. 140606, is sufficient basis to grant the
reconstitution.
- The OSG, however, argues that the photocopy of TCT No. 140606 presented by respondent is not among the documentary
evidence required by R.A. No. 26 and cannot be considered competent evidence, especially because respondent did not prove that she
had exerted honest efforts to secure the documents enumerated in the law and had failed to find them.
- Respondents Comment/Opposition to Petition dated 7 June 2007, for the most part, merely reproduces the pertinent portions
of the Decision of the appellate court, but adds that petitioner is already estopped from assailing the sufficiency of the evidence
presented by respondent because it did not raise a timely objection to the evidence before the trial court.
- The OSG filed a Reply dated 15 November 2007, contending that the doctrine of estoppel does not operate against the
government for the acts of its agents, and reiterating that a petition for reconstitution based on a mere photocopy of the certificate of
title is only regarded as "reconstitution petition based on plainly inferior evidence."
ISSUE: ESTOPPEL, W/N the Government is estopped?
- It is a well-settled rule that the state cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents, especially
absent any showing that it had dealt capriciously or dishonorably with its citizens.
- Thus, the OSGs failure to raise an effective objection to the evidence presented in support of the petition does not bar
petitioner from assailing the propriety of the reconstitution ordered by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
- The reconstitution of a lost or destroyed certificate of title may be done judicially, in accordance with the special procedure laid
down in R.A. No. 26, or administratively, in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 6732.
- The petition in this case sought the judicial reconstitution of TCT No. 140606.
Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 26 enumerates the sources upon which the reconstitution of transfer certificates of title shall be based. It provides:
Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the
following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of titles;
(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) The deed of transfer or other document on file in the registry of deeds, containing the description of the property, or an authenticated
copy thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was
issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said documents, is
mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost destroyed certificate
of title.
In relation to the foregoing, Sec. 12 of the same law provides:
SEC. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in Sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act,
shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the
property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owners duplicate of the certificate of title had
been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owners, mortgagees or lessees duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same
had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or
improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or
improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining
properties and of all persons who may have interest in the property; (f) a detailed decription of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the
property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or, if there
be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced
in evidence in support to the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That i n case the
reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in Section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further
accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration, or with a
certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.
The petition for reconstitution, in this case, was accompanied by the following documents:
1. a copy of TCT No. 140606;
2. the Certification from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City that the original copy thereof was among those burned during the fire that
razed the Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1988;
3. a certified copy of the Affidavit of Loss executed by respondents co-owner, Edna V. Garcia, attesting to the loss of the same;
4. the duly approved technical description and survey plan of the subject property;
5. the Order dated December 3, 1999 issued by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 93; and
6. the corresponding Tax Declaration and Tax Receipts.
- Among the sources enumerated in Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 26, the owners duplicate of the transfer certificate of title is given
primacy because such document is, by all accounts, an exact reproduction of the original copy of the transfer certificate of title.
- It is required, however, that the owners duplicate certificate itself, and not a mere photocopy thereof, be presented to the
court.
- This is to preclude any question as to the genuineness and authenticity of the owners duplicate certificate and bar the
possibility of reconstitution based on a fraudulent or forged owners duplicate certificate.
- In this case, only a photocopy of the owners duplicate was presented to the court. Both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals agree, however, that the petition may be treated as one filed under Sec. 3(f) of R.A. No. 26.
- Even petitioner concedes this point, but argues that the rule on admission of secondary evidence under Sec. 5, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court should have first been complied with.
- While, indeed, the petition for reconstitution may be considered as having been filed under Sec. 3(f) of R.A. No. 26, the
photocopy of the owners certificate of title presented by respondent in support of her petition is still considered secondary evidence.
- As such, it is inadmissible unless respondent proves any of the exceptions provided in Sec. 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
and establishes the conditions for their admissibility under Section 5 of the same rule.
- The Court explained the order of presentation of secondary evidence under Sec. 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as
existence, execution, loss, contents. The order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court.
- The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an allegedly lost document lies within the judicial
discretion of the trial court under all the circumstances of the particular case.
- Respondent also duly proved the loss of the owners copy of the certificate through the Affidavit of Loss dated
December 29, 1988 executed by her sister, Dr. Edna V. Garcia.
- The foregoing documents on record already constitute sufficient bases for reconstituting the lost certificate of title,
even without the photocopy of the title which is disparaged by petitioner as "plainly inferior evidence."
- However, this caveat should not be taken to the extent of depriving a person who had already fully complied with
the jurisdictional requirements set forth in R.A. No. 26 from being granted the reconstitution prayed for.
- When a court, after hearing of a petition for reconstitution, finds that the evidence presented is sufficient and
proper to grant the same, that the petitioner therein is the registered owner of the property, and that the certificate sought
to be reconstituted was in force at the time it was lost, it becomes the duty of the court to issue the order of reconstitution.
This duty is mandatory.
- The law does not give the court discretion to deny the reconstitution if all the basic requirements have been
complied with.
HELD: Petition DENIED, decision AFFIRMED

Bases Conversion and Development Authority vs. Commission on Audit [vol. 580, Feb 26, 2009]
Ponente: Carpio. J
Facts: -On March 13, 1992, RA No. 7227 was approved, creating the Bases Conversion and Development Authority
(BCDA). Section 9 states that the BCDA Board of Directors (Board) shall exercise the powers and functions of BCDA.
Section 10 then states that function of the Board also includes the adoption of a compensation and benefit scheme at
least equivalent to the Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas. -On 20 Dec. 1996, the Board adopted a new compensation and benefit
scheme that grants year-end benefits to each contractual employee, regular employee, and Board member. Aside from
this, they also granted it to full-time consultant later on. -On 25 Aug. 1997, Board Chairman Basco recommended to
President Ramos the approval of the new scheme. It was approved on 9 Oct. 1997. -On 20 Feb 2003, COA issued Audit
Observation Memorandum No. 2003-004 stating that the grant of year-end benefits to Board members was contrary to
Department of Budget and Management Circular Letter No. 2002-2. On 8 Jan. 2004, COA issued a Notice of
Disallowance No. 03-001-BCDA-(02) to disallow the year-end benefit to the Board members and Full Time Consultants.
BCDA filed a notice of appeal dated 8 Sept. 2004 and an appeal memorandum dated 23 Dec. 2004 to COA. -In Decision
No. 2007-020, the COA affirmed the disallowance of the year-end benefit granted to Board members and full-time
consultants and held that good faith did not apply to them. As stated in DBM Circular letter No. 2002-02, the members and
ex officio members of the Board of Directors are not entitled to YEB, they being not salaried officials of the government.
Good faith is in question because despite the prior notice, the BCDA still enacted a new benefit scheme including them in
it. -Thus the petition for certiorari is filed. It seeks to nullify Decision No. 2007-020 dated 12 April 2007 of COA.
Issue: Whether or not Art.2, Sec. 5 and 18 of the constitution are binding as a legal basis for the claim of granting year-
end benefit?
No. Held: The court dismissed the claim. Article 2, based on its title, is only a statement of general ideological principles
and policies. The said provision of Article 2 is not a source of enforceable rights. In a previous similar case (Tondo
Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals), the court held that Sec. 5 and 18, Art. 2 of the Constitution
are not self-executing provisions. Thus, the said provisions are not a legal basis for the said claim.
SHELL vs. JALOS
This case is about a question of jurisdiction over an action against a petroleum contractor, whose pipeline operation has
allegedly driven the fish away from coastal areas, inflicting loss of earnings among fishermen.
FACTS:
1. On December 11, 1990 petitioner Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. (Shell) and the Republic of the Philippines entered
into Service Contract 38 for the exploration and extraction of petroleum in northwestern Palawan.
2. Two years later, Shell discovered natural gas in the Camago-Malampaya area and pursued its development of the well
under the Malampaya Natural Gas Project, which entailed the construction and installation of a pipeline from Shells
production platform to its gas processing plant in Batangas. The pipeline spanned 504 kilometers and crossed the
Oriental Mindoro Sea.
3. On May 19, 2003, respondents Efren Jalos, Joven Campang, Arnaldo Mijares, and 75 other individuals (Jalos, et al)
filed a complaint for damages against Shell before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, Pinamalayan, Oriental
Mindoro. Jalos, et al claimed that they were all subsistence fishermen from the coastal barangay of Bansud, Oriental
Mindoro whose livelihood was adversely affected by the construction and operation of Shells natural gas pipeline.
4. Jalos, et al claimed that their fish catch became few after the construction of the pipeline. As a result,their average net
income per month fell from a high of P4,848.00 to only P573.00. They said that thepipeline greatly affected biogenically
hard-structured communities such as coral reefs and led [to]stress to the marine life in the Mindoro Sea. They now have
to stay longer and farther out at sea to catch fish, as the pipelines operation has driven the fish population out of coastal
waters.
5. Instead of filing an answer, Shell moved for dismissal of the complaint. It alleged that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the action, as it is a pollution case under Republic Act (R.A.) 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) 984
or the Pollution Control Law. Under these statutes, the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has primary jurisdiction over
pollution cases and actions for related damages.
6. Shell also claimed that it could not be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state immunity without the States consent. Shell
said that under Service Contract 38, it served merely as an agent of the Philippine government in the development of the
Malampaya gas reserves.
7. Moreover, said Shell, the complaint failed to state a cause of action since it did not specify any actionable wrong or
particular act or omission on Shells part that could have caused the alleged injury to Jalos, et al.
8. On March 24, 2004 the RTC dismissed the complaint. It ruled that the action was actually pollution-related, although
denominated as one for damages. The complaint should thus be brought first before the PAB, the government agency
vested with jurisdiction over pollution-related cases.
9.Jalos, et al assailed the RTCs order through a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). The latter court
reversed such order and upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC over the action. It said that Shell was not being sued for
committing pollution, but for constructing and operating a natural gas pipeline that caused fish decline and considerable
reduction in the fishermens income. The claim for damages was thus based on a quasi-delict over which the regular
courts have jurisdiction.
10.The CA also rejected Shells assertion that the suit was actually against the State. It observed that the government was
not even impleaded as party defendant. 11. The CA also held that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable wrong.
Jalos, et al invoked their right to fish the sea and earn a living, which Shell had the correlative obligation to respect.
Failure to observe such obligation resulted in a violation of the fishermens rights and thus gave rise to a cause of action
for damages.
12. Finally, the CA held that Jalos, et al substantially complied with the technical requirements for filing the action. But
since they failed to prove the requisites of a class suit, only those who have verified the complaint should be deemed
party plaintiffs. Shell moved for reconsideration of the CAs decision but the same was denied. Hence, it filed this petition
for review under Rule 45.
Issues
1. Whether or not the complaint is a pollution case that falls within the primary jurisdiction of the PAB;
2. Whether or not the complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action against Shell; and
3. Whether or not the suit is actually against the State and is barred under the doctrine of state immunity.
Rulings
1. Yes. While the complaint in this case sufficiently alleges a cause of action, the same must be filed with the PAB, which
is the government agency tasked to adjudicate pollution-related cases. Executive Order 192 (1987) transferred to the PAB
the powers and functions of the National Pollution and Control Commission provided in R.A. 3931, as amended by P.D.
984. These empowered the PAB to determine the location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects of water
pollution. Among its functions is to serve as arbitrator for the determination of reparation, or restitution of the damages
and losses resulting from pollution. In this regard, the PAB has the power to conduct hearings, impose penalties for
violation of P.D. 984, and issue writs of execution to enforce its orders and decisions. The PABs final decisions may be
reviewed by the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
2. Yes. The complaint said that the natural gas pipelines construction and operation greatly affected the marine
environment, drove away the fish, and resulted in reduced income for Jalos, et al. True, the complaint did not contain
some scientific explanation regarding how the construction and operation of the pipeline disturbed the waters and drove
away the fish from their usual habitat as the fishermen claimed. But lack of particulars is not a ground for dismissing the
complaint.
A cause of action is the wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the
plaintiff. Its elements consist of:
(1) a right existing in favor of the plaintiff,
(2) a duty on the part of the defendant to respect the plaintiffs right, and
(3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of such right.
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, however, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does
not exist and not only that the claim was defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. Thus, the construction
and operation of the pipeline may, in itself, be a wrongful act that could be the basis of Jalos, et als cause of action. The
rules do not require that the complaint establish in detail the causal link between the construction and operation of the
pipeline, on the one hand, and the fish decline and loss of income, on the other hand, it being sufficient that the complaint
states the ultimate facts on which it bases its claim for relief.
3. . Shell is not an agent of the State and may thus be sued before that body for any damages caused by its operations.
The parties may appeal the PABs decision to the CA. But pending prior determination by the PAB, courts cannot take
cognizance of the complaint. Shell is not an agent of the Republic of the Philippines. It is but a service contractor for the
exploration and development of one of the countrys natural gas reserves. While the Republic appointed Shell as the
exclusive party to conduct petroleum operations in the Camago-Malampayo area under the States full control and
supervision, it does not follow that Shell has become the States agent within the meaning of the law. Shells main
undertaking under Service Contract 38 is to perform all petroleum operations and provide all necessary technology and
finance as well as other connected services to the Philippine government.
Shells primary obligation under the contract is not to represent the Philippine government for the purpose of transacting
business with third persons. Rather, its contractual commitment is to develop and manage petroleum operations on behalf
of the State. Shell is not an agent of the Philippine government, but a provider of services, technology and financing for
the Malampaya Natural Gas Project. It is not immune from suit and may be sued for claims even without the States
consent. Notably, the Philippine government itself recognized that Shell could be sued in relation to the project. This is
evident in the stipulations agreed upon by the parties under Service Contract 38.
Petition granted.
ATO v RAMOS
POINT: The States immunity from suit does not extend to the petitioner because it is anagency of the State engaged in an enterprise
that is far from being the States exclusive prerogative.
NOTE (Difference of Govermental v. Proprietary)
A governmental function includes services that only the government does, such as restaurant inspection, animal control, health and
safety permits and licenses, sanitation, vital statistics, and related functions.
A proprietary function is one that a private entity can perform, and is not uniquely forthe benefit of the general public. The
discretionary function defense applies todiscretionary governmental functions, but not for proprietary (or ministerial) functions.
FACT:
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos (respondents) discovered that a portion of their landregistered in the Baguio City was being
used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office
(ATO).
The respondents (Spouses Ramos) agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in
consideration of the amount of P778,150.00.
However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands.

The respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials inthe RTC
In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby
President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the respondents affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport.
They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the States consent considering that the deed of sale
had been entered into in the performance of governmental functions.
The RTC denied the ATOs motion for a preliminary hearing of the affirmative defense.
ATO commenced a special civil action for certiorari in the CA to assail the RTCs orders.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, however, upon its finding that the assailed orders were not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
The RTC rendered its decision on the merits, ORDERING the defendant Air Transportation Office to pay the plaintiffs DAVID and
ELISEA RAMOS
CA AFFIRMED.
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: The only issue presented for resolution is whether the ATO could be sued without the States consent.
Ruling: The petition for review has no merit. The Court denies the petition for review on certiorari, and affirms the decision promulgated
by the Court of Appeals.
Ratio: The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunityor non-suability of the State, is expressly
provided in Article XVI of the 1987Constitution, viz:
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a sovereign, cando no wrong.
Practical considerations dictate the establishment of an immunity from suit in favor of the State.
Otherwise, and the State is suable at the instance of every other individual, government service may be severely obstructed and
public safety endangered because of the number of suits that the State has to defend against.
According to Father Bernas, a recognized commentator on Constitutional Law, to wit:
[A] continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused
private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far