!"#$%& ()*$%&+&, -./01-, 23456 56748 98$+8##84, : ( ;385<=6 +6 >?

@
Naicelino Pequeno
1

!"#$%&" ()* +,-)

1. Filosofia como um senso ue maiavilhai-se.
2. A funuamental questo uo sei .
S. Fenomenologia e Filosofia.
4. A piioiiuaue uo !"#$%& na questo uo sei.
S. 0ntologia uo Beiueggei.

(* ./%-"0"1/2 )0 ) 0$30$ "4 5"36$&

Paia Beiueggei, nos no pensamos o suficiente e fiequentemente assumimos
sem maioies questionamentos uma viso ue munuo, uma iueia ue iealiuaue.

Beiueggei's woiiy, his woiiy specifically about oui ieauiness foi philosophy, is
that we aie not sufficiently peiplexeu, that we insteau finu ouiselves, vaiiously,
complacent, inattentive, foigetful oi unieflective.

'that we aie not yet capable of thinking' (WCT, p. S)
a willingness to encouiage anu sustain in ouiselves a feeling of peiplexity.
Ceibone, Intiouuction, p. X

7* 8/$ 9,$0#%"3 "4 :$%3; !"#$%&'("

The question of being aiose with the Pie-Sociatics.

Westein philosophy has slowly but suiely whittleu away at the peiplexity felt by
the ancient uieeks, with whom the question of being, Beiueggei claims, fiist
aiose
Ceibone, Chap 1, p. uS

Plato anu Aiistotle settleu the mattei anu no one aiose the question once again.

Phenomenology iauicalizeu in its own most possibility is nothing but the
questioning of Plato anu Aiistotle biought back to life: '($ *$+$'%'%,&- '($ *$'".%&/
,0'($ 1$/%&&%&/ ,0 ,2* #3%$&'%0%3 +(%4,#,+(56
BCT, p. 1S6

But uoes this not once again ielinquish all the ciitical caution necessaiy when
one is uealing with the tiauition. Is the question of being, just because of its
veneiable antiquity going all the way back to Paimeniues, in the enu not also a
piejuuice of the tiauition. Why uo we make an exception heie. Shoulu we ask
about being only because the uieeks askeu. Is the question of being to be put so
that phenomenology may be moie iauically uefineu, thus only so that theie may
be a phenomenology. Neithei of these ieasons can be the basis foi oui in- quiiy.
Aie theie still piesuppositions, specifically piesuppositions which allow us to
iecovei the giounu foi the question of being simply fiom the question itself. The
sole giounu of possibility foi the ques- tion of being as such is !"#$%& %'#$40
%&#,0"* "# %' %# +,##%14$- %& %'# 7%#3,8$*$7&$## %& +,##%1%4%'%$#6
BCT, 14, p. 1S6

voc tei uma iesposta fcil e pionta o mesmo uo que ignoiai.

A facile answei, Beiueggei thinks, is tantamount to ignoiing the question, i.e. the
question is answeieu in a way that ieally amounts to little moie than a quick
uismissal.
Ceibone, Chap 1, p. uS

Being is univeisal.
Being is inuefiniable.
Being is self-eviuent.

(That being is univeisal uoes not mean that its meaning is cleai; that being is
inuefinable uoes not eliminate the question of its meaning; anu that the meaning
is self-eviuent anu yet we finu ouiselves at a loss to say what it means only
shows that we aie moie in the uaik than we caie to aumit.)
Ceibone, Chap 1, p. uS

The question of being is not the seaich to "uefine" being, foi being the most
univeisal concept we uo not have any othei concept to iefei to.

But if we'ie not asking foi a uefinition of 'being,' what is the question of being
aftei. We make piogiess in unueistanuing what being is, Beiueggei aigues, by
getting cleaiei about the meaning oi sense (Sinn) of being.S The way Beiueggei
uses the teim "sense" is akin to the way we say in English that something "makes
sense." Things make sense when they fit togethei, when theie is an oiganizeu,
stable, anu coheient way in which they inteiact anu beai on us anu each othei.
We giasp the sense of something when we know oui way aiounu it, we can
anticipate what kinu of things can happen with iespect to it, we iecognize when
things belong oi aie out of place, anu so on. This is what Beiueggei means when
he says that "sense is that within which the intelligibility of something maintains
itself... Sense is that onto which piojection piojects, in teims of which something
becomes intelligible as something" (1S1, tianslation mouifieu). Sense is the
backgiounu way of oiganizing anu fitting things togethei, which guiues anu
shapes all oui anticipations of anu inteiactions with the things we encountei.

We explain the sense of being when we can point out anu illuminate what we
unueistanu when we know oui way aiounu entities as entities, meaning that we
aie able to uistinguish between what is anu what is not, oi between how
something is anu how it is not.
Wiathall, p. u2



!"#$%& ()*$%&+&, -./01-, 23456 56748 98$+8##84, : ( ;385<=6 +6 >?@
Naicelino Pequeno
S

<* =$3">$3"-";%) $ =%-"0"4%)

Falanuo ua Fenomenologia:

it is the uiscoveiy of the veiy possibility of uoing ieseaich in philosophy.

Pieseiving it as a possibility uoes not mean, howevei, to fix a chance state of
ieseaich anu inquiiy as ultimately ieal anu to allow it to haiuen;

it iathei means to keep open the tenuency towaiu the matteis themselves anu to
libeiate this tenuency fiom the peisistently piessing, latently opeiative anu
spuiious bonus |of the tiauitionj. This is just what is meant by the motto "Back to
the matteis themselves": to let them ieveit to themselves.
BCT, 14, p. 1SS

Phenomenology ienews Philosophy by setting up the funuamental question of
being afiesh. Without uogmatism, sciences, piesuppositions, uisciplines anu
conceptual schemata alieauy given.

It is "in philosophy" anu not in an alieauy given theoiy lauen with uefinite
pioblem-hoiizons, uisciplines anu conceptual schemata that philosophy, unuei
the guiuance of the phenomenological piinciple, is to be iestoieu to itself.
BCT, 14, p. 1S7

Phenomenology iauicalizeu in its own most possibility is nothing but the
questioning of Plato anu Aiistotle biought back to life: '($ *$+$'%'%,&- '($ *$'".%&/
,0 '($ 1$/%&&%&/ ,0 ,2* #3%$&'%0%3 +(%4,#,+(56
BCT 14 p. 1S6.

./$3">$3"-";2 ? ./%-"0"1/2 ? 9,$0#%"3 "4 :$%3; ? @&$$A0
If the phenomenologically attaineu 02&7"9$&'"4 :2$#'%,& of being is piesenteu as
the question which came to life with the classical scientific philosophy of the
uieeks, this histoiical fact shoulu not be taken as an authoiity which establishes
the coiiectness of the question. Rathei, it can only be taken as an inuication that
this question is itself appaiently in line with oui ieseaich inquiiy. Why shoulu
philosophy iaise piecisely this most univeisal question of being. What is
philosophy, when it must iaise this question. Whence is the being of philoso-
phy itself to be unueistoou. Noie latei on what all this implies.
BCT 14 p 1S7

B* 8/$ .&%"&%#2 "4 )'*"#$ %3 #/$ C,$0#%"3 "4 D$%3;

Towaiu this enu, Beiueggei pioposes that the inquiiy shoulu focus fiom the
outset on a paiticulai entity, one that is well-suiteu foi inteiiogation with
iespect to its being. Basein has piioiity foi the inquiiy because it gets its
"essential chaiactei fiom what is inquiieu about - namely, being" (7) in the
sense that we aie uefineu as an entity by oui possession of an unueistanuing of
being. We 'ielate to being' (see 12), in the sense that we unueistanu that theie
aie uiffeient ways to be, anu thus we aie capable of 'ueciuing oui existence' (12).
Wiathall, p.2

!$4$&$3E$0

BT Beiueggei, Naitin. ;$%&/ "&7 <%9$6 Tianslation }ohn Nacquaiiie anu
Euwaiu Robinson. Blackwell Publishing. Fiist Euition 1962. Tianslateu
fiom the ueiman =$%& 2&7 >$%'- seventh euition.

BCT Beiueggei, Naitin. ?%#',*5 ,0 '($ @,&3$+' ,0 <%9$6 Tianslation Theouoie
Kisiel. Inuiana 0niveisity Piess. 198S. Seminai given in 192S.

1. Ceibone, Baviu. ?$%7$//$*A B C2%7$ ', '($ D$*+4$E$76 Continuum
Inteinational Publishing, 2uu8.
2. Bieyfus, Bubeit. Being-in-the-woilu: A Commentaiy on Beiueggei's Being
anu Time Bivision I. NIT Piess, 1991.
S. Nulhall, Stephen. B C2%7$1,,. ', ?$%7$//$* "&7 ;$%&/ "&7 <%9$6
Routleuge, 2uuS, 2nu euition. 1st euition, 1996.
4. Tietz, }ohn. B& F2'4%&$ "&7 ='275 C2%7$ ', G"*'%& ?$%7$//$*H# ;$%&/ "&7
<%9$6 Bumanities 0nline.
0RL: https:ssl.humanities-online.ueuownloauTietz_Beiueggei_ccl.puf
S. Wiathall, Naik anu Nuiphey, Nax, B& F8$*8%$I ,0 ;$%&/ "&7 <%9$6 In:
Naik Wiathall (eu). <($ @"91*%7/$ @,9+"&%,& ', ?$%7$//$*H# ;$%&/ "&7
<%9$6 Cambiiuge 0niveisity Piess, 2u1S.
http:goo.glqxsaE6