Del val vs del val

The contract of life insurance is a special contract and the destination of the proceeds thereof is
determined by special laws which deal exclusively with that subject. The Civil Code has no provisions
which relate directly and specifically to life- insurance contracts or to the destination of life insurance
proceeds. That subject is regulated exclusively by the Code of Commerce which provides for the terms
of the contract, the relations of the parties and the destination of the proceeds of the policy.
B! vs osadas
By virtue of the foregoing, we are of opinion and so hold" #$% That the proceeds of a life-insurance
policy payable to the insured&s estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership,
constitute community property, and belong one-half to the husband and the other half to the wife,
exclusively' #(% that if the premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the
proceeds are li)ewise in li)e proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in part' and #*% that the
proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured&s estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the
testamentary administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under probate
administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter, if they belong to the
assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these !slands or
outside.1awphil.net
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(. !n essence, a life insurance policy is no different from a civil donation insofar as the beneficiary is
concerned. Both are founded upon the same consideration" liberality. / beneficiary is li)e a donee,
because from the premiums of the policy which the insured pays out of liberality, the beneficiary will
receive the proceeds or profits of said insurance. /s a conse4uence, the proscription in /rticle 5*6 of
the new Civil Code should e4ually operate in life insurance contracts. The mandate of /rticle (7$(
cannot be laid aside" any person who cannot receive a donation cannot be named as beneficiary in the
life insurance policy of the person who cannot ma)e the donation.
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-nder /merican law, a policy of life
insurance is considered as a testament and in construing it, the courts will, so far as possible treat it as
a will and determine the effect of a clause designating the beneficiary by rules under which wins are
interpreted.
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*. olicy considerations and dictates of morality rightly justify the institution of a barrier between
common law spouses in record to roperty relations since such hip ultimately encroaches upon the
nuptial and filial rights of the legitimate family There is every reason to hold that the bar in donations
between legitimate spouses and those between illegitimate ones should be enforced in life insurance
policies since the same are based on similar consideration /s above pointed out, a beneficiary in a fife
insurance policy is no different from a donee. Both are recipients of pure beneficence. ,o long as
manage remains the threshold of family laws, reason and morality dictate that the impediments imposed
upon married couple should li)ewise be imposed upon extra-marital relationship. !f legitimate
relationship is circumscribed by these legal disabilities, with more reason should an illicit relationship be
restricted by these disabilities.
8/+-9/CT-0!+: .!92 !+,-0/+C2 1, 8220
The cash value or cash surrender value is therefore an amount which the insurance company holds in
trust
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for the insured to be delivered to him upon demand. !t is therefore a liability of the company to the
insured. +ow then, when the company&s credit for advances is paid out of the cash value or cash
surrender value, that value and the company&s liability is thereby dismissed pro tanto. Conse4uently, the
net assets of the insurance companyincreased corresponding' for it is plain mathematics that the
decrease of a person&s liabilities means a corresponding increase in his net assets.
T!3 ;<2 C<!3 1, C/
!f the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity
for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of interest agreed upon,
and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest which is six per cent per annum.
20./ C38/+!/ 1, /+C<2T/
There is no option of insurer to claim no fault liability from. The use of the word shall means that the
passengers=occupants can only sue the insurer of the vehicle they were riding. #Perla v Ancheta%
That said vehicle might not be the one that caused the accident is of no moment since the law itself
provides that the party paying the claim under ,ec. *5> may recover against the owner of the vehicle
responsible for the accident. This is precisely the essence of ?no fault indemnity? insurance which was
introduced to and made part of our laws in order to provide victims of vehicular accidents or their heirs
immediate compensation, although in a limited amount, pending final determination of who is
responsible for the accident and liable for the victims&injuries or death. !n turn, the ?no fault indemnity?
provision is part and parcel of the !nsurance Code provisions on compulsory motor vehicle ability
insurance @,ec. *5*-*>6A and should be read together with the re4uirement for compulsory passenger
and=or third party liability insurance @,ec. *55A which was mandated in order to ensure ready
compensation for victims of vehicular accidents.
BB The !nsurance Code uses the :eneral term ?occupant? to distinguish from a ?passenger,? who is ?any
fare paying person being transported and conveyed in and by a motor vehicle for transportation of
passengers for compensation, including persons expressly authoriCed by law or by the vehicle&s
operator or his agents to ride without fare,? and a &third party,? who is ?any person other than a
passenger as defined in this section? @,ee. *5*A Thus, as used in ,ec. *5>, ?occupant? includes both a
?passenger? and a ?third party,? so long as they are riding in or mounting of dismounting from a motor
vehicle.
9!0,T D-2E3+ C!TF 1, C/
The insurance company clearly passed the maximum limit of the petitioner&s liability for damages arising
from death or bodily injury at $(,777.77 per passenger and its maximum liability per accident at
G7,777.77. ,ince only one passenger was injured in the accident, the insurer&s liability for the damages
suffered by said passenger is pegged to the amount of $(,777.77 only. Hhat does the limit of
G7,777.77 per accident meanI !t means that the insurer&s liability for any single accident will not
exceed G7,777.77 regardless of the number of passengers )illed or injured therein. 9or example, if ten
#$7% passengers had been injured by the operation of the insured bus, the insurer&s liability for the
accident would not be $(7,777.77 #at the rate of $(,777.77 per passenger% but would be limited to
3nly G7,777.77 for the entire accident, as provided in the insurance
Contract.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The bus company may not recover from the insurance company #herein petitioner% more than
$(,777.77 per passenger )illed or injured, or fifty thousand #G7,777.77% pesos per accident even if
under the judgment of the court, the erring bus operator will have to pay more than $(,777.77 to each
injured passenger. The trial court&s interpretation of the insurance contract was the correct
interpretation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
20./ C38/+!/ D2 ,2:-03 1, 0/83.2T2
The garnishment of property to satisfy a writ of execution operates as an attachment and fastens upon
the property a lien by which the property is brought under the jurisdiction of the court issuing the writ. !t
is brought into custodia legis, under the sole control of such
court. 18 #2mphasis supplied%
!n the present case, there can be no doubt, therefore, that the trial court actually ac4uired jurisdiction
over petitioner erla when it was served with the writ of garnishment of the third-party liability insurance
policy it had issued in favor of judgment debtor +elia 2nri4ueC. erla cannot successfully evade liability
thereon by such a contention.
2very interest which the judgment debtor may have in property may be subjected to execution.
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The injured for whom the contract of insurance is intended can sue directly the insurer. The general
purpose of statutes enabling an injured person to proceed directly against the insurer is to protect
injured persons against the insolvency of the insured who causes such injury, and to give such injured
person a certain beneficial interest in the proceeds of the policy, and statutes are to be liberally
construed so that their intended purpose may be accomplished. !t has even been held that such a
provision creates a contractual relation which inures to the benefit of any and every person who may be
negligently injured by the named insured as if such injured person were specifically named in the
policy. #, JJ6 5 /m. Kur., (d, pp. $$>-$$6%L
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<owever, although the victim may proceed directly against the insurer for indemnity, the third party
liability is only up to the extent of the insurance policy and those re4uired by law. Hhile it is true that
where the insurance contract provides for indemnity against liability to third persons, and such third
persons can directly
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sue the insurer, the direct liability of the insurer under indemnity contracts against
third party liability does not mean that the insurer can be held liable in solidum with the insured and=or
the other parties found at fault.
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9or the liability of the insurer is based on contract' that of the insured
carrier or vehicle owner is based on tort.
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The liability of :,!, based on the insurance contract is direct,
but not solidary with that of the +9/. The latterNs liability is based separately on /rticle ($>7
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of the
Civil Code.
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