Contents:

- Beltran vs. People - Dreamwork vs. Janiola

- Phil. Agila Satellite vs. Lichauco - Landbank vs. Jacinto
- Omictin vs. CA - Pimentel vs. Pimentel
- Magestrado vs. People - Quimiging vs. ICAO
- Coca Cola vs. SSC - Continental Steel vs. Montao
- Yap vs. Cabales


BELTRAN vs. PEOPLE
GR. No. 137567

FACTS:
Meynardo Beltran (petitioner) and his wife Charmaine Felix were married on June
16, 1973. After four years of marriage, Meynardo filed a petition for nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Charmaine alleged that
Meynardo was the one who abandoned their home and cohabited with another
woman. She then filed a criminal suit for concubinage against Meynardo.

Petitioner Meynardo filed a motion to deter the proceedings on the ground that the
pending civil case for the declaration of the nullity of marriage raises a prejudicial
question. He further argued that he should be acquitted of the crime of concubinage
should his marriage be declared null and void.

ISSUE:
WON the pendency of the petition for the declaration for nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question to the case of
concubinage.

HELD:
No, it is not a prejudicial question. The elements of prejudicial question are as
follows: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The pendency of the declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question to
the case of concubinage because for the civil case to be considered prejudicial to the
criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final
determination of the civil case, it must appear that the said civil case involves the
same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based and the resolution
is determinative of the innocence or guilt of the accused.

In his contention that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his
marriage be declared null and void is not a defense. If a man cohabits with a
woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of the nullity of marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The court, therefore, has not erred in
ruling that the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage does not pose a
prejudicial question in the criminal case of concubinage.
PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE, INC. vs. LICHAUCO

FACTS:
On June 6, 1994, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was entered into by a
group of private telecommunications carriers and the Department of Transportation
and Communication (DOTC). The private telecom carriers formed a corporation
and adopted a corporate name Philippine Agila Satellite, Inc. (PASI).

By letter dated June 28, 1996, the president of PASI, Rodrigo Silverio, requested
the Secretary of the DOTC, Amado Lagdameo, for official government
confirmation of the assignment of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to
PASI for its AGILA satellites.

By letter dated July 3, 1996, Lagdameo confirmed the assignment of the orbital
slots to PASI, who thereafter undertook preparations for the launching and
operations of its satellites.

On December 3, 1996, PASI president and CEO Michael de Guzman, informed
Jesli Lapuz, president and CEO of Landbank of the Philippines, of the governments
assignment to PASI of the orbital slots. He requested the banks confirmation of its
participation in a club loan amounting to $11 million, the proceeds of which would
be applied to PASIs interim satellite.

Lapuz sent a copy of De Guzmans letter to the DOTC Undersecretary, Josefina
Lichauco, who wrote to Lapuz stating that:
1. There is no basis for De Guzman to allege that the DOTC assigned two (2)
slots to PASI. Slot 153E was to be used for the migration of the Russian
satellite in time for the APEC Leaders Summit, thus it could no longer be
assigned to PASI.
2. PASI is interested in pursuing their interim satellite project and are
applying for a loan with Landbank. The DOTC supports this venture but
they will be getting only one orbital slot for both the Interim Satellite
Project and for the Launch Project.
3. As regards the use of the name Agila, Mr. de Guzmans allegation that
PASI has registered Agila as a corporate alias/trademark, is FALSE.
There is no such thing as registration of a corporate alias.

However, on December 1997, Lichauco subsequently issued a Notice of Offer for
several orbital slots including 153E. Another company, whose identity had not
been disclosed, had submitted a bid and won the award for slot 153E.

PASI, claiming that the offer was without its knowledge, filed on January 23, 1998
before the RTC a complaint against Lichauco and the unknown awardee for
injunction to enjoin the award of 153E, declare its nullity, and for damages.

On February 23, 1998, PASI also filed a complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman against Lichauco, for gross violation of Sec.3(e) of RA 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which states:

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of officers or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

The Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) of the Office of
the Ombudsman, by evaluation report dated April 15, 1998, found the existence of
a prejudicial question, saying that the civil case filed in the Ombudsman is
premature since the issues involved herein are now subject of litigation in
the case filed with the RTC.

ISSUES:
1. WON there exists a prejudicial question in the civil case filed with the
Ombudsman, in relation to the criminal case filed with the RTC.
2. If so, WON the dismissal of the complaint in the Ombudsman is correct.

HELD:
1. Yes, there exists a prejudicial question because if the award to
the undisclosed bidder of the orbital slot 153E is declared valid for being
within Lichaucos scope of authority to thus free her from liability for
damages, there would be no prohibited act to speak of nor would there be
basis for undue injury claimed to have been suffered by petitioner. Thus,
whether or not the criminal case can proceed is dependent upon the
judgment of the civil case. This constitutes a prejudicial question.

2. No, according to Yap v. Paras, Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
directs that the proceedings may only be suspended, not dismissed, and
that it may be made only upon petition, and not at the instance of the judge
alone or the investigating officer.

A complaint at the evaluation stage may be dismissed outright only for
lack of palpable merit, which means that there is no basis for the charges.
However, if the complaint has prima facie merit, the investigating officer shall
recommend the adoption of any of the actions enumerated in Rule II, Section
2 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.


MAGESTRADO vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:
A criminal case of perjury was filed against petitioner, Francisco Magestrado by
private respondent, Elena M. Librojo. Respondent alleged that petitioner falsely
claimed that he lost his Owner's Duplicate for the Title of a property and had
subscribed and swore to a duly notarized Affidavit of Loss. Said title has been
surrendered to private respondent as security for a loan availed by petitioner from
her.

Civil cases to recover a sum of money and for cancellation of mortgage and delivery
of title, and damages were also filed, so petitioner filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings of the criminal case against him on the ground that the civil cases pose
a prejudicial question, hence they must first be resolved.

The trial court denied the motion for the reason that the outcome of the civil cases
would not determine, petitioner's guilt or innocence in the perjury case. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, and then an appeal, but both the RTC and the CA
found no merit in his petition.

ISSUE:
WON the civil cases to recover a sum of money and for cancellation of mortgage
and delivery of title, and damages were also filed, so petitioner filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings of the criminal case against him on the ground that the
civil cases pose a prejudicial question to the criminal case of perjury

HELD:
NO. The Civil cases are principally for the determination of whether a loan was
obtained by petitioner from private respondent and whether petitioner executed a
real estate mortgage involving the property covered by the title claimed to have
been lost by petitioner. On the other hand, the criminal case involves the
determination of whether petitioner committed perjury in executing an affidavit of
loss to support his request for issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of the same
title. It is evident that whatever the resolution of the civil cases will be, shall have
no bearing and won't determine the guilt or innocence of the petitioner in
committing perjury. This goes to show that the civil cases and the criminal cases
may proceed independently of each other. There is no prejudicial question to be
settled first.

Petition was dismissed.


COCA COLA BOTTLERS vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION
Prejudicial Question

FACTS:
Petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. Is a corporation engaged in manufacture and
sale of softdrink beverages. Co-petitioner Eric Montinola was the general manager
of its plant in Bacolod City. Respondent Dr. Dean Climaco was a former
retainer physician at the companys plant in Bacolod City.

In 1988, the petitioner company entered into a Retainer Agreement with Dr.
Climaco with a compensation and he can also charge separately professional fees
for professional services. The contract includes that either party may terminate the
contract upon giving 30 day notice written notice to either party. Explicit in the
contract is the provision that there is no employer-employee relationship.

Meantime, on 1994, Dr. Climaco inquired with Department of Labor and
Employment and the SSS whether he was an employee of the company or not. Both
agencies replied affirmative. As a result, Dr. Climaco filed a complaint before the
NLRC, he sought recognition as a regular employee demanding 13
th
month
pay, COLA, Holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, Christmas bonus and
other benefits.

During the pendency of the complaint, the petitioner company terminated the
retainer agreement with Dr. Climaco. Thus, Dr. Climaco filed another complaint for
on the ground of Illegal Dismissal. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioner
company. The first complaint was dismissed as the company did not have the power
of control over Dr. Climacos performance of his duties and responsibilities. Second
complaint was likewise dismissed in view of the dismissal of the first complaint.

Meantime, while the NLRC cases were pending, Dr. Climaco filed with the SSC a
petition praying, among others, that the petitioner Coca-cola bottlers be ordered to
report him for compulsory social security coverage. Petitioner moved for dismissal.

The Court notes that petitioners, in their petition, averred that the appeal from the
NLRC and CA dispositions on the illegal dismissal of respondent Climaco is still
pending with this Court. Upon verification, however, it was unveiled that the said
case had already been decided by this Courts First Division on February 5, 2007.

ISSUE:
WON the action for regularization and/or illegal dismissal poses a prejudicial
question in the case at bench.

HELD:
No prejudicial question exist.

There is prejudicial question when;
(a) The previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and
(b) The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

In the case at bar there is no pending criminal case. Therefor there is no prejudicial
question to talk about. The consolidated NLRC cases cannot be considered as
previously instituted civil action. In Berbari v. Concepcion,
[40]
it was held that a
prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which must precede the
criminal action, that which requires a decision with which said question is closely
related.

In addition, the issue in the case filed by Dr.Climaco with the SSC involves a
question regarding his employment subject to coverage in SSS. On the contrary,
case filed in the NLRC involves different issue, which is the recognition as a regular
employee of the company. Thus, the issues in the NLRC cases are not determinative
of whether or not the SSC should proceed. It is settled that the question claimed to
be prejudicial in nature must be determinative of the case before the court.


YAP vs. CABALES
GR. No. 159186

FACTS:
Jesse Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are engaged in the real estate business
through their company Primetown Property Group. In 1996, they purchased several
real properties from Evelyn Te. In consideration of the said purchases, Jesse issued
several BPI postdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses Orlando and Mergyl
Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and Jovit Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks from
Evelyn.

In the beginning, the first few checks were honored by the bank, but in the early
part of 1997, when the remaining checks were deposited with the drawee bank,
they were dishonored because the account was closed. Demands were made by
spouses Mirabueno and spouses Dimalanta to the petitioner to make good of the
checks. Despite this, Yap failed to pay the amounts represented by the said checks.

Spouses Mirabueno filed a civil action for collection of sum of money, damages and
attorney's fees with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
against Yap before the trial court. Spouses Dimalanta followed suit and instituted a
similar action.

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed several information for violation
of BP 22 against Yap. In the criminal cases, petitioner filed separate motions to
suspend proceedings an account of the existence of a prejudicial question and
motion to exclude the private prosecutor from participating in the proceedings. Yap
prayed that the proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended until the civil cases
pending before RTC were finally resolved.

ISSUE:
WON there exists a prejudicial question that necessitates the suspension of the
criminal proceedings.

HELD:
No prejudicial question exists. A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the
civil action an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may
proceed and the resolution will be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. This is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has 2
essential elements: a. The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the criminal action; and b. The resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The issue in the criminal cases is whether Yap is guilty of violating BP 22, while in
the civil cases, it is whether the spouses Mirabueno and spouses Dimalanta are
entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the checks that they
have rediscounted from Evelyn Te. The resolution of the said issue raised in the civil
action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case against him, and there is no necessity that the civil cases should be resolved
first resulting to the suspension if the criminal cases.

In the aforementioned civil actions, even if the petitioner is declared nit liable for
the payment of the value of the checks and damages, he cannot be adjudged free
from criminal liability for violation of BP 22. The mere issuance of worthless checks
with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself an
offense.

It is clear that the determination of the issues involved in the criminal action for
collection of sum of money and damages is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of
Yap in the criminal cases for violation of BP 22. In addition, Yap's claim of lack of
consideration may be raised as a defense during the trial of the criminal cases
against him. The validity and merits of a party's defense and accusation, as well as
the admissibility and weight of testimonies and evidence brought before the court
are better ventilated during the trial proper.


DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. vs. JANIOLA

FACTS:
On February 2, 2005, petitioner, through its President and VP, filed before the
MTC, a criminal information against Cleofe Janiola for violation of BP 22.

On September 20, 2006, Janiola and her husband filed before the RTC, a civil
complaint against petitioner for the rescission of an alleged construction
agreement between the parties, as well as for damages.

Notably, the checks, subject of the criminal case before the MTC, were issued in
consideration of the construction agreement.

On July 25, 2007, respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings of the
criminal case, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues
similar or intimately related, and thereby claiming that the civil case posed a
prejudicial question against the criminal case.

The MTC granted the motion to suspend proceedings, reasoning that one of the
elements of a prejudicial question is that there must be a previously instituted
civil action which raises issues against a subsequent criminal action. In this
case, the criminal case preceded the civil case.

ISSUE:
WON the MTC erred when it ruled to suspend proceedings in the criminal case on
the basis of prejudicial question.

HELD:
Yes, the MTC erred in its ruling since there is no prejudicial question.

1. The court ruled that the civil action must precede the filing of the criminal
action, for a prejudicial question to exist.

The circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of the civil
action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason
of the presence of a prejudicial question were a mere afterthought, and
instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.

The civil case was filed 2 years after the institution of the criminal complaint
and from the time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment
from the job site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was instituted more
than 2 years from the time that private respondent allegedly stopped
construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. More importantly, the
civil case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack of
consideration was filed more than 3 years from the execution of the
construction agreement.

2. The court also ruled that the resolution of the civil case is not
determinative of the prosecution of the criminal case.

Even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is
still no prejudicial question.

The mere fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the
issuance of the check/s, or that the checks were issued for valuable
consideration, does not make up the elements of the crime. The agreement
surrounding the issuance of dishonoured checks is irrelevant to the
prosecution for the violation of BP 22.

The law punishes the mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose for
which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. Thus,
even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement
between the parties is void, this would not affect the prosecution of the
respondent in the criminal case.


LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMON JACINTO

FACTS:
The First Womens Credit Corporation (FWCC) obtained a loan from Land Bank in
the amount of P400 million, evidenced by a Credit Line Agreement dated August 22,
1997. As security for the loan, respondent Ramon P. Jacinto, President of FWCC,
issued in favor of Land Bank 9 postdated checks amounting to P465 million and
drawn against FWCCs account at the Philippine National Bank. Later, before the
checks matured, petitioner and respondent executed several letter
agreements which culminated in the execution of a Restructuring
Agreement on June 3, 1998. When FWCC defaulted in the payment of the loan
obligation under the terms of their restructured agreement, petitioner presented for
payment to the drawee bank the postdated checks as they matured. However, all
the checks were dishonored or refused payment for the reason of insufficient
funds. Respondent also failed to make good the checks despite demands.

On January 13, 1999, Land Bank filed before the Makati City Prosecutors Office a
Complaint-Affidavit against respondent for violation of B.P. 22. Respondent filed
his Counter-Affidavit denying the charges and averring that the complaint
is baseless and utterly devoid of merit as the said loan obligation has been
extinguished by payment and novation by virtue of the execution of the
Restructuring Agreement. Respondent also invoked the proscription in the May
28, 1998 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 133 in
Special Proceedings No. M-4686 for Involuntary Insolvency which forbade FWCC
from paying any of its debts.

The complaint against respondent was dismissed finding that the letter-
agreements between Land Bank and FWCC restructured and novated the original
loan agreement. It was held that there being novation, the checks issued
pursuant to the original loan obligation had lost their efficacy and validity
and cannot be a valid basis to sustain the charge of violation of B.P. 22.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.

Petitioner elevated the matter to the DOJ for review. The DOJ issued a Resolution
dismissing the appeal. However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner,
the DOJ reversed its ruling and issued a Resolution holding that novation is
not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability. Thus, the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Makati City is directed to file the appropriate information for violation of
BP 22against respondent. Respondent moved for reconsideration but was denied.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

The CA reversed the Resolution of the DOJ and reinstated the Resolution
dismissing the complaint. While the CA ruled that novation is not a mode of
extinguishing criminal liability, it nevertheless held that novation may prevent
criminal liability from arising in certain cases if novation occurs before
the criminal information is filed in court because the novation causes doubt
as to the true nature of the obligation. Also, the CA found merit in respondents
assertion that a prejudicial question exists in the instant case because the issue of
whether the original obligation of FWCC subject of the dishonored checks has been
novated by the subsequent agreements entered into by FWCC with Land Bank, is
already the subject of the appeal in Civil Case No. 98-for Declaration of Novation
pending before the CA. The CA also gave consideration to respondents assertion
that the Order of the RTC proscribing FWCC from paying its debts constitutes as a
justifying circumstance which prevents criminal liability from attaching. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration from the said decision having been denied, petitioner
filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
1. WON the CA erred in reversing the Resolution of the DOJ.
2. WON the CA erred when it ruled that the element of a prejudicial
question exists in the case.
3. WON the CA erred when it ruled that the order dated May 1998 of the RTC
constitutes as a justifying circumstance that prevents criminal liability from
attaching.

RULING:
YES, the CA erred in reversing the resolution of the DOJ and a prejudicial question
does not exist in this case.

Petitioner asserts that the restructuring Agreement did not release FWCC from its
obligation with Land Bank. Whether there was novation or not is also not
determinative of respondents responsibility for violation of B.P. 22, as the said
special law punishes the act of issuing a worthless check and not the purpose for
which the check was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.
Respondent counters that there was novation which occurred prior to the institution
of the criminal complaint against him and that if proven, it would affect his criminal
liability. The payment of the obligation supposedly already depended on the terms
and conditions of the Restructuring Agreement and no longer on the respective
maturity dates of the subject checks as the value or consideration of the subject
checks had been rendered inexistent by the subsequent execution of the
Restructuring Agreement. He maintains that the subject checks can no longer be
the basis of criminal liability since the obligation for which they were issued had
already been novated or abrogated.

A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must
be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. If the resolution of the
issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the
accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no
necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the
criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither
is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to
law, proceed independently of each other. In the instant case, the court find
that the question whether there was novation of the Credit Line Agreement
or not is not determinative of whether respondent should be prosecuted for
violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.

There was no express stipulation in the Restructuring Agreement that respondent is
released from his liability on the issued checks and in fact the letter-agreements
between FWCC and Land Bank expressly provide that respondents JSS
(Joint and Several Signatures) continue to secure the loan obligation and
the postdated checks issued continue to guaranty the obligation. If indeed
respondents liability on the checks had been extinguished upon the execution of the
Restructuring Agreement, then respondent should have demanded the return of the
checks. However, there was no proof that he had been released from his obligation.

On the contrary, the Restructuring Agreement contains a proviso which
states that This Agreement shall not novate or extinguish all previous
security, mortgage, and other collateral agreements, promissory notes,
solidary undertaking previously executed by and between the parties and
shall continue in full force and effect modified only by the provisions of this
Agreement.

Thus, the Court has held that the agreement surrounding the issuance of
dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of B.P. 22.
Even if it be subsequently declared that novation took place between the FWCC and
petitioner, respondent is not exempt from prosecution for violation of B.P. 22.

Lastly, the said order of May 1998 of the RTC Makati does not constitute a justifying
circumstance. As stated at the outset, the said order forbids FWCC from paying its
debts as well as from delivering any property belonging to it to any person for its
benefit. Respondent cannot invoke this Order which was directed only upon FWCC
and is not applicable to him. Therefore, respondent, as surety of the loan is not
exempt from complying with his obligation for the issuance of the checks.

PIMENTEL vs. PIMENTEL

FACTS:
On October 25, 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel, private respondent, filed an
action for frustrated parricide against her husband Joselito R. Pimentel, the
petitioner, and sometime in February, 2005, she filed an action for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
psychological incapacity.

A few days after receiving the summons for the pre-trial of the civil case, petitioner
filed an urgent motion to suspend the criminal case proceedings contending that the
outcome of the civil case would affect the criminal case, since, if he would be
declared as not married to Maria, then his criminal case would no longer be
frustrated parricide.

The RTC denied the motion on the ground that there is no prejudicial question in the
civil case that would warrant the suspension of the proceeding of the parricide case.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. He filed an appeal in
the CA, but his petition was not granted.

ISSUE:
WON the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the proceedings for the parricide case

HELD:
NO. Annulment of Marriage is not a prejudicial question in the criminal case for
parricide because:

a. the outcome of the annulment case would not determine whether or not
petitioner is guilty of frustrated parricide. Even if the marriage would later be
dissolved, the fact remains that the crime was committed during the
subsistence of the marriage, and the nullity of the marriage would not affect
the resolution of the criminal case.

b. the procedural rule on prejudicial question is that the civil case must first be
instituted before the filing of the civil case, not the other way around. In the
case at bar, the criminal case was filed on October, 1994, while the civil case
was filed in 1995.


QUIMIGING vs. ICAO
Personality

FACTS:
The appellant, Quimiging, sue Icao for support and damages. The parties are
neighbor in Dapitan. It was alleged that the appellee, Icao, engaged into carnal
intercourse with the appellant by the use of force and intimidation and without her
consent, as a result, the appellant become pregnant.

Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since
the complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and after hearing
arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the
complaint.

Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the
intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining
defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original
complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to
this Court.

ISSUE:
WON the appellant be entitled for support and damages even though the baby is not
yet born.

HELD:
YES, the appellant is entitled for support.

Applying Article 40 of the new civil code that a conceived child, although unborn is
given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it.
Therefore, the unborn child has the right for support from its progenitors, in this
case, the appellee.

Second reason of reversal of decision is grounded on Article 20 of the same code
that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred
in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his
victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused.


CONTINENTAL STEEL vs. HON. ALLAN S. MONTAO
G.R. No. 182836; October 13, 2009

FACTS:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel, filed a claim for Paternity
Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent,
pursuant to the CBA. The claim was for Hortillanos unborn child who died.
Hortillanos wife had a premature delivery while she was on her 38
th
week of
pregnancy. The female fetus died during the labor. The company granted
Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave
and death benefits. Hortillano claimed that the provision in CBS did not specifically
state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired
juridical personality. Petitioner argued that the said provision of CBA did not
contemplate death of an unborn child or a fetus without legal personality. They also
claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement of the benefit: 1) death;
and 2) status of legitimate dependent. None which existed in Hortillanos case. They
further contend that the only one with civil personality could die, based on Art 40-
42 of Civil Code. Hence, according to petitioner, the unborn child never died. Labor
Arbiter Montana argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents
from the very moment he/she was conceived. Petitioner appealed to CA but CA
affirmed Labor Arbiters decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
W/N only one with juridical personality, as defined in Art. 41-42, NCC, can die.

HELD:
No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for
the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child
acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is
considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by
death. The issue of civil personality is irrelevant in this case. Arts 40-42 do not
provide at all definition of death. Life is not synonymous to civil personality. One
need not acquire civil personality first before s/he could die. The Constitution in fact
recognizes the life of the unborn from conception.