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How did the East India Company attain such a great political
infuence in India in the 2
nd
half of the Eighteenth Century?
By 1800 the East India Company had established policical, military
and commercial dominance over large areas of India <more details
of success> !ne reason for this "as their ability to transfer po"er
bet"een these areas #hat is to say, the Company "as very s$illed
in utili%ing their economic po"er to gain greater political po"er,
thus increasing their overall in&uence 'o
Behind these economic, political and military successes "ere
deeper factors "hich enhanced the Company(s general ability to
function )uch factors included
!ne method "as military #he English, *rench and +utch "ere
fairly evenly matched in their military technology and tactics, but
all "ere more advanced in them than Indian leaders European
infantrymen "ere far more tightly disciplined, enabling them to
"ithstand the cavalry charges "hich characterised Indian tactics in
the eighteenth century Indian generals gave little thought to
infantry, and respected only cavalry forces
,o"ever, it "ould be entirely "rong to claim that the English
attained in&uence through superior military force #he si%e of
English forces "as al"ays small, and the East India Company "as
initially reluctant to provide si%eable funding for armies #his
di-iculty could partly be circumvented by training Indian
footsoldiers, "ho demanded little pay #his military advantage
remained at the end of the eighteenth century, "hen .ord /ellesley
and the +u$e of /ellington "ere able to lead a successful
campaigna gainst #ipu )ultan
0ll this gave the British an advantage over thier Indian rivals, but
their advantage over the other European trading companies "as
less certain #he *rench, under the governor 1oseph *rancois
+uplei2, "ere 3uic$er to adapt to the di-iculties of 4ghting in India
by training Indian footsoldiers 5overnor +uplei2 also arguably
provided *rance "ith better diplomatic leadership, and 0dmiral .a
Bourdonnais commanded the navy "ith e3ual s$ill ,o"ever, these
advantages changed some"hat during the 1670s *rench military
plans "ere crippled by lac$ of support from the *rench
government, "hich "as concerned by the immediate decline in
trade revenue Both .a Bourdonnais and +uplei2 "ere recalled to
*rance, and the former "as even imprisoned Even "hen the
*rench decided to resume military con&ict "ith the British, they
undermined their position by appointing a general, .ally, "ho had
no e2perience of India
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!n the English side, the return of 8obert
Clive to India, and the luc$ "ith "hich he succeeded in the ris$y
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venture of counting on a defection by :ir 1a-ar to defeat the
na"ab of Bengal at hte battel of ;lassey
#rade "as, of course, central to the success of trading companies
#he British had an advantage over the *rench in their greater
access to capital
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#he British also bene4ted from close connections "ith Indian
merchants and other po"er<holders ;artly this "as a result of the
private activities of Company merchants, "ho "ere banned from
trade "ith England and so diverted their attentions to inland trade
!ther relationships < such as those "ith the ban$ing houses of
!michand and 1agat )eth < resulted from the British position in
Bengal
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#he Company also "or$ed to e2ert direct control over te2tile


supplies, and they obtained control over producers and small<scale
merchants
>

d
;olitics also bene4tted the British ;art of this advantage "as luc$
in e2periencing favourable conditions in "hich their interests
coincided "ith those of other Indian po"ers *or e2ample the 5reat
:ughal believed he could increase his o"n political po"er by
allo"ing po"er to the British in Bengal #he British "ere in fact
luc$y to survive in India, given that in their early years there they
could easily have been crushed by the main Indian po"ers 0 far
greater part, though, came from the s$ill "ith "hich the British
manipulated the political situation Bur$e in particular ?and in
de4ance of censure in ;arliament from Edmund Bur$e and others@
entered into diplomatic adventures involving both the immediate
neighbours of the British, and also $ingdoms across India
#his should not, though, diminish the numerous political
miscalculations made by the British #heir ruthless e2traction of
funds from Bengal after 16A0 made them fe" friends
#he organisation of the East India Company "as, at least initially,
more a handicap than an advantage #he Company "as designed
for trading, not for empire, and "as plagued by endemic
corruption
#his corruption, or at least the private trading "ith "hich it "as
closely lin$ed, had a bene4cial side #he ban on private trade
bet"een India and Europe forced individual merchants to
concentrate on trade "ithin India #his built up the contacts
bet"een them and their Indian counterparts, and increased their
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usefulness for Indian rulers
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?for "hom ta2es on internal trade
"ere a vital revenue source@
!ne advantage of the Company(s organisation "as the e2tent
Cnder this heading might also be considered some of the
individuals "hose personal abilities massively increased the
capabilities of the Company !ne "as /arren ,astings, "hose
diplomatic and commercial ability, and $no"ledge of Indian
languages, enabled him to succeed as governor of Bengal
Cnderlying the military and commercial sucesses of the East India
Company "as its superior collection and use of information It "as
their intentional policy, from the governor<generalship of .ord
Corn"allis, to increase sources of information for the British, and
to close do"n lines of communciation bet"een their enemies
Corn"allis, for e2ample, discouraged the state of 0"adh from
positioning ne"s"riters in :aratha, and later the British tried to
isolate the court of +elhi
A
#he British improved internal postal
communications, replacing e2isting postal services "ith their o"n
da$s ?routes@, and stablishing a regular post bet"een Calcutta,
;atna and Banaras by 1667
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Early Company attempts at obtaining military information "ere


hampered by un"illingness to pay
#he British came to respect providers of information 0ccording to
one contemporary, Dthe head harcara or head spy, in several of the
best English houses, never fails to become their :aEor +omo and
the hinge on "hich turn most transactionsF
8
Ever<e2panding
net"or$s of Indian informers "ere controlled by s$illed Company
o-icers such as 5eorge Cherry, 'eil Edmonstone and :ountstart
Elphinstone
B
.i$e other states and organisation, the English received
information from ne"s"riters and informants at the courts of their
rivals, "ith senior o-icials personally reading the ;ersian
ne"sletters
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#hey tried to reduce the e-ectiveness of their
opponents( ne"s"riters by providing misinformation to
ambassadors
)uch diligence brought its re"ards
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9, p 78
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9, p 78
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5hulam ,ussain, 3uoted in 9, p A8
B
9, p 8B
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#he British "ere not alone in their concern for intelligence #he
rulers of :ysore had, according to Bayly, Da po"erful intelligence
serviceF, and too$ advantage of defections from the East India
Company to improve their $no"ledge
Gey to all this "as the favour of Indian rulers, although such favour
"as rarely given "ithout some form of pressure or inducement
Bengal "as the foundation for British e2pansion in India ,ere, the
British gradually e2panded their po"er throughout the eighteenth
century by both formal and informal means #he granting of the
divani to the Company in 16A7, although important, did not in itself
give the Company complete po"er, since the 'a%imaat "as, in
theory at least, separate from the di"ani ,o"ever in practise the
British ensured that most of the duties of the 'a%im "ere carried
out by a naib ?deputy@ appointed by the Company
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, although this
arrangement "as not formalised until 16B0 /ell before then the
'a"ab had been stripped of any practical po"er In 1660 their
local agents "ere removed, and in 166A the 'a"ab "as
encouraged to disband most of his army
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Connecting the right to
administer civil Eustice "ith the di"ani, the British too$ control of
this from 16A7
1=
#his control of Bengal "as both an e2ample of the
Company(s success in obtaining in&uence ?itself driven by British
military superiority@ and a stepping<stone to further dominance
*urther British e2pansion "as funded by land revenue from
Bengal
1>
Bibliography
1 , Gul$e H + 8othermund 0 history of India
9 C Bayly Empire and Information
= ;1 :arshall BengalI the British Bridgehead
J'C,I II9K
> C Bayly Indian society and the ma$ing
of the British empire J'C,I II1K
baylyI british defeated *rench through superior naval po"er and
capital
bengal land revenue
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