LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs.

AQUINO
(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)

FACTS:
1. On February 25, 1986, Presi dent Corazon Aqui no
i ssued Procl amati on No. 1 announci ng that she and
Vice President Laurel were taking power.
2. On March 25, 1986, procl amati on No.3 was i ssued
provi di ng the basi s of the Aqui no government
assumption of power by stating that the "new government
was installed through the direct exercise of the power of the
Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of
the Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is
legitimate.
HELD:
Yes.The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where
only the people are the judge. The Court further held that:
1. The peopl e have accepted the Aqui no government
whi ch i s i n effecti ve control of the enti re country;
2. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a
de jure government; and
3. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of
the new government
De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987
(En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was
elected Barangay Captain together with the other petitioners
as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of
Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay
Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a
Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by
respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8,
1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as
Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other
respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same
Barangay and Municipality.

Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject
Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void
and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their
positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.

Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of
office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7,
1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have
elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position that
with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution,
respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to
replace them and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of
office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and
that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3
of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term of
six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the
Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay
officials to six years must be deemed to have been repealed
for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional
Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to
replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year
period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.

Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued
by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating
respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen
of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and
effect.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2,
1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be
deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative,
respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3,
thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions
occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987
Constitution further provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years x x x."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been
determined by aw, therefore, the term of office of 6 years
provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still
govern.
Estrada vs. Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
Estrada vs. Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001

Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph
Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the
beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by
problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4,
2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of
the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and friends
of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose
immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13,
2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of
Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than
1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to
the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally
opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January
16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against
the opening of the second envelope which allegedly
contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion
in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The
ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit
the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces
and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada
government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries,
assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their
posts.

On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide
administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of
the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press
statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the
sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the
nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a
letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he
was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office
and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-
President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter
was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President
Pimentel on the same day.

After his fall from the power, the petitioners legal problems
appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against
him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable
to act as President

Held: Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he
suffers from a permanent disability.

Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid
resignation, there must be an intent to resign and the intent
must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a
resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to
form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can
be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given
legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner
did not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving
Malacanang Palace. Consequently, whether or not petitioner
resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions
before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of
prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the
issue. The Court had an authoritative window on the state of
mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec.
Angara serialized in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first
stage of negotiation between Estrada and the opposition, the
topic was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of
power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. During
the second round of negotiation, the resignation of the
petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only
unsettled points at that time were the measures to be
undertaken by the parties during and after the transition
period. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner
cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacanang. In the press release containing his final
statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the
respondent as President of the Republic, but with the
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation.
He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of
inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as
soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his
gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4)
he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge
that may come ahead in the same service of the country; and
(5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of
a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that
he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and
duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave.
The inability claim is contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of
petitioner sent to Senate Pres. Pimentel and Speaker
Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of Representatives
passed a resolution supporting the assumption into office by
Arroyo as President. The Senate also passed a resolution
confirming the nomination of Guingona as Vice-President.
Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo
as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the
premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of
inability. The Court cannot pass upon petitioners claim of
inability to discharge the powers and duties of the
presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed
solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue
which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing
the principle of separation of powers.
Marbury v. Madison
5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)

Facts: On his last day in office, President John Adams named
forty-two justices of the peace and sixteen new circuit court
justices for the District of Columbia under the Organic Act.
The Organic Act was an attempt by the Federalists to take
control of the federal judiciary before Thomas Jefferson took
office.
The commissions were signed by President Adams and sealed
by acting Secretary of State John Marshall (who later became
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and author of this
opinion), but they were not delivered before the expiration of
Adamss term as president. Thomas Jefferson refused to
honor the commissions, claiming that they were invalid
because they had not been delivered by the end of Adamss
term.
William Marbury (P) was an intended recipient of an
appointment as justice of the peace. Marbury applied directly
to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of
mandamus to compel Jeffersons Secretary of State, James
Madison (D), to deliver the commissions. The Judiciary Act of
1789 had granted the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to
issue writs of mandamus to any courts appointed, or
persons holding office, under the authority of the United
States.
Issues
Does Marbury have a right to the commission?
Does the law grant Marbury a remedy?
Does the Supreme Court have the authority to review acts of
Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional
and therefore void?
Can Congress expand the scope of the Supreme Courts
original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article III of
the Constitution?
Does the Supreme Court have original jurisdiction to issue
writs of mandamus?
Holding and Rule (Marshall)
Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.

The order granting the commission takes effect when the
Executives constitutional power of appointment has been
exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last
act required from the person possessing the power has been
performed. The grant of the commission to Marbury became
effective when signed by President Adams.
Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy.The very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an
injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that
protection.

Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights
depend upon the performance of that duty, the individual
who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law
for a remedy. The President, by signing the commission,
appointed Marbury a justice of the peace in the District of
Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by
the Secretary of State, is conclusive testimony of the verity of
the signature, and of the completion of the appointment.
Having this legal right to the office, he has a consequent right
to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain
violation of that right for which the laws of the country afford
him a remedy.
Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of
Congress and determine whether they are unconstitutional
and therefore void.

It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say
what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases
must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two
laws conflict with each other, the Court must decide on the
operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution,
and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the
legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must
govern the case to which they both apply.
No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme
Courts original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in Article
III of the Constitution.

The Constitution states that the Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall
be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction. If it had been intended to leave it in
the discretion of the Legislature to apportion the judicial
power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to
the will of that body, this section is mere surplusage and is
entirely without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to
give this court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution
has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original
jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be
appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the
Constitution, is form without substance.
No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to
issue writs of mandamus.

To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be
shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be
necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.

It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it
revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already
instituted, and does not create that case. Although,
therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to
issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in
effect, the same as to sustain an original action for that
paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.
Disposition
Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesnt
get the commission.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission
63 PHIL 143

FACTS: In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A.
Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo,
and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of
members of the National Assembly for the first district of
Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers
proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly
and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution
No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election
protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and
praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared
elected Member of the National Assembly or that the
election of said position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the
Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating
that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9.

Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards
the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly
and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear
the case.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over
the Electoral Commision and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the
affirmative,
(2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the
herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
of such election by resolution of the National Assembly

RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a
system of government. It obtains not through a single
provision but by actual division in our Constitution that each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from that fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely restrained and independent
of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government.

In case of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine
the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral and constituent units
thereof.

As any human production, our Constitution is of course
lacking perfection and perfectability, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting through their
delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has
established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of
checks and balances and subject to the specific limitations
and restrictions provided in the said instrument.

The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of
the judiciary as the rational way. When the judiciary mediates
to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in
what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution.

Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity
of argument by the parties and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented.
Courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution, but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must respect the wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of government.

In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual
controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave
constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the
one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other.
Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered
with, when and while acting wihtin the limits of its authority,
it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it
is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral
Commission is not a separate department of the government,
and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the
fundamental law between departmental powers and
agencies of the government are necessarily determined by
the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases.

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose
of determining the character, scope, and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
On the issue of jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission
The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to
remedy certain errors of which the framers of our
Constitution were cognizant. The purpose was to transfer in
its totality all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its
members, to an independent and impartial tribunal.

The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation,
invested with the necessary authority in the performance and
exercise of the limited and specific function assigned to it by
the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our tripartite
scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes,
when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent
organ.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in
the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the
Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of
that power by the National Assembly. And thus, it is as
effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an
express prohibition in the Constitution.

The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex
necessitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the
time within which protests instructed to its cognizance should
be filed. Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such
rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power
to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be
deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in
the Electoral Commission.

It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met
for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as
the last day for the filing of election protests. When,
therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec.
3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the
National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet
met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been
organized.

While there might have been good reason for the legislative
practice of confirmation of the election of members of the
legislature at the time the power to decide election contests
was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the
legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral
Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional
power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time
for the filing of said election protests.

HELD:
The Electoral Commission is acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro
Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly on
Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing
protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of
protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.
Government vs Milton Springer
FACTS: Act 2705 created the National Coal Company. It was
amended by Act 2822 which provided that the officers of NCC
may be voted upon by a select committee comprising of the
senate president, house speaker and the governor general [as
ex officio officers]. The GG excepted and he issued EO 37
which declared the amendments introduced by Act 2822 as
null and void. The GG then ordered that he have the sole
power to appoint pursuant to his appointing power as
provided in the Administrative Code. The voting committee
however ignored the EO and proceeded to the election w/o
the GG and they elected Springer et al as officers of the NCC.
The government then filed suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amendments introduced by Act
2822 is constitutional.
HELD: Section 22 of the Organic Act, "That all executive
functions of the government must be directly under the
Governor-General or within one of the executive
departments under the supervision and control of the
Governor-General." The Philippine Legislature, as we have
seen is authorized to create corporations and offices. The
Legislature has lawfully provided for the creation of NCC, but
has unlawfully provided for two of its members to sit in the
committee for the same is considered as a public office.
Hence, section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of
Act No. 2822, as purports to vest the voting power of the
government-owned stock in the National Coal Company in
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, is unconstitutional and void.
DISSENTING OPINION: (Avancea CJ, Villamor & Villareal JJ)
The only prohibition to the appointment of members of the
Philippine Legislature to executive public offices is that
contained in section 18 of the Jones Law, which says that "No
Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he
may have been elected, be eligible to any office the election
to which is vested in the Legislature, nor shall be appointed to
any office of trust or profit which shall have been created or
the emoluments of which shall have been increased during
such term." The present Speaker of the House of
Representatives is clearly not within said prohibition, as Act
No. 2705 creating said committee was enacted in 1917,
before his term of office began in 1922; so the now President
of the Senate, for which the said Act was passed during his
term of office, that term had already expired in 1922, and he
is not serving another term (1922-1928).
Therefore, the Philippine Legislature may not only create the
voting committee but designate the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives as ex-officio
members of said committee, always granting, for the sake of
argument, that membership therein is a public office.
The minority averred that:
1. That the National Coal Company is not an agency or
instrumentality of the Government of the Philippine Islands.
2. That the Government of the Philippine Islands, as mere
corporator, if it had to vote its own stock would have to do so
in the capacity of a private citizen, and not in its sovereign
capacity.
3. That the voting committee in exercising the power
delegated to it does so in the same capacity as its principal.
4. That the voting of the stock of the Government is a private
act, and the committee in doing so performs a private
function, and therefore membership therein is a private and
not a public office.
5. That membership in the voting committee being a private
position and not a public office, the designation by the
Philippine Legislature of the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives as ex-officio
members thereof was not an encroachment upon the power
of supervision and control over all executive functions of the
Government vested in the Governor-General.
6. That even granting that membership in said committee is a
public office, still the Philippine Legislature has the power to
designate the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives as ex-officio members of said
committee, by virtue of the residuum of power placed in its
hands by the Congress of the United States.
7. That whether we consider the delegation of the voting
power as for public or private purposes, the Governor-
General alone cannot exercise that power as it requires
discretion and judgment, and at least a majority must
concur.
8. That, finally, the Congress of the United States by its
reserved power and authority to annul any law of the
Philippine Legislature, has by its silence impliedly ratified Act
No. 2705, as amended by Act No. 2822.
NOTE: The Administrative Code provides the following: "In
addition to his general supervisory authority, the Governor-
General shall have such specific powers and duties as are
expressly conferred or imposed on him by law and also, in
particular, the powers and duties set forth," including the
special powers and duties "(a) To nominate and appoint
officials, conformably to law, to positions in the service of the
Government of the Philippine Islands. (b) To remove officials
from office conformably to law and to declare vacant the
offices held by such removed officials. For disloyalty to the
Government of the United States, the Governor-General may
at any time remove a person from any position of trust or
authority under the Government of the Philippine Islands."
(Sec. 64 [a], [b].) The Administrative Code lists the officers
appointable by the Governor-General. (Sec. 66.)
Francisco Vs. House Of Representatives
[415 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 160261; 10 Nov 2003]

Facts: Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme
Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy
poised in front of the Court was the constitutionality of the
subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the
rules of impeachment provided for by law.
Issue: Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the
House of Representatives falls within the one year bar
provided in the Constitution and whether the resolution
thereof is a political question has resulted in a political
crisis.
Held: In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our
Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this
controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally
pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to
extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither
necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and
protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not
departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the
controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth
that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the
legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by
no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge
by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it
by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and
balances which has been carefully calibrated by the
Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three
branches must be given effect without destroying their
indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis
for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks
and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a
whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another." Both are integral components of the calibrated
system of independence and interdependence that insures
that no branch of government act beyond the powers
assigned to it by the Constitution.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner
assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and
personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or
any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is
in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some
right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere
fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is
a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement
of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke
the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically
prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would
sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the
questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has
merely a general interest common to all members of the
public.
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether
or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. This Court opts
to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their
allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the
Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief
Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public
funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity
of any official action which he claims infringes his
prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House
of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in his office.


The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in
its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor
proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate
impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to
delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does
not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a
complaint does.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a
body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section
3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is
a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle
of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment
cases" with "impeachment proceeding."
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of
filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing
by at least one-third of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the
meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period.
The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial
scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of
whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the
Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-
year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming
jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn
justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because
it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial
dominance over the other two great branches of the
government.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic
precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all
men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority
and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to
its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch
or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that
principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court
which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications
through its application to numerous cases especially of the
high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief
Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member
of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not
imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The
law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his
station in life.
Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
which were approved by the House of Representatives on
November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the
second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article
XI of the Constitution.
Biragao v. Philippine Truth Commission
G.R. 192935 and 193036

FACTS
The petitioners raised in Court that E.O. No. 1, which created
the Truth Commission, should be declared unconstitutional
and to enjoin PTC from performing its functions. The
petitioners alleged that E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of
powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a
public office and appropriate funds for its operation. They
also asserted the fact that the role of the president, as stated
in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, to achieve economy,
simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create
an entirely new public office, which was inexistent before, the
"Truth Commission". According to them, the said Executive
Order violates the principle of separation of powers by
usurping the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate
funds for public offices, agencies and commissions.

The respondents, on the other hand, contested that E.O. No.
1 did not arrogate the powers of the Congress to create a
public office because the President's executive power and
power of control necessarily includes the inherent power to
conduct investigations to ensure laws are faithfully executed.
More so, it does not violate the principle of separation of
powers as alleged by the petitioners. They strongly argue that
the said Executive Order, is valid and constitutional.

ISSUE
Does E.O. No. 1 transgress on the power of Congress to
appropriate funds for the operation of a public office?

HELD
No. E.O. No 1 does not transgress on the power of the
Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a public
office. In the said E.O., there will be no appropriation but only
an allotment or allocations existing funds already
appropriated. Thus, there is no usurpation on the part of the
Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate funds.
According to the Solicitor General, "whatever funds the
Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be
the very source of the funds for the commission," and thus,
will be subject to auditing rules and regulations. However, the
Court stressed that, "The end does not justify the means." No
matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of
an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing its
goals is simply irreconcilable with the constitutional
parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. The Court cannot
just run a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to
uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles. The
Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1
of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that
"includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." Hence, the petitions
were granted.