Greece 1944-45

Greek King George II and his ministers went into exile in Egypt with the retreating
British forces in 1941 !lmost immediately" Greek resistance gro#ps formed $f the
%ario#s resistance mo%ements that had appeared d#ring the German occ#pation" the
largest was the &ational 'i(eration )ront *E!+," with the &ational -eople.s 'i(eration
!rmy as its military wing /elations were poor (etween it and the &ational /ep#(lican
Greek 'eag#e Indeed" act#al fighting (roke o#t (etween the two gro#ps in the winter of
194011944" altho#gh a tr#ce was arranged in )e(r#ary 1944 !s in 2#gosla%ia" the
comm#nist-dominated E!+ apparently en3oyed wider s#pport than the nationalist
#ndergro#nd 4hen the Germans p#lled o#t of Greece" E!+ held the %ast ma3ority of the
co#ntry Greek society was fract#red into three factions5 the monarchists" rep#(licans"
and comm#nists
!t approximately the same time" in $cto(er 1944 6h#rchill 3o#rneyed to +oscow to
meet with 7o%iet leader 8osef 7talin 6h#rchill str#ck a (argain with 7talin concerning
predominance in %ario#s Balkan states" #nder the terms of which Britain was to ha%e 99
percent predominance in Greece :he Greek comm#nists" who had carried the (r#nt of
resistance against the !xis and now controlled the ma3ority of territory" #nderstanda(ly
resented this imperial arrangement str#ck in +oscow and were #nwilling to s#(mit to it
4hen the &a;is withdrew" George -apandreo#" a left-of-center statesman" headed a
go%ernment of national #nity )earing the comm#nist #ndergro#nd" howe%er" he
re<#ested British troops" who (egan arri%ing early in $cto(er 1944 4hen the British
called on the g#errilla forces to disarm and dis(and" E!+ <#it the ca(inet" called a
general strike" and held protest demonstrations In this serio#s sit#ation" 6h#rchill took
the impet#o#s decision to fly with foreign secretary !nthony Eden to !thens on
6hristmas =ay 1944 :ho#gh the go%ernment and E!+ reached accord early in 1945" it
<#ickly (roke down E!+ mem(ers took to the hills with their weapons
>
)rom the %ery (eginning of the !xis occ#pation" the Balkans were a theater for g#errilla
warfare #ntil the /ed !rmy in%aded in !#g#st 1944 In (oth Greece and 2#gosla%ia"
there were 6omm#nist and non-6omm#nist resistance gro#ps" which often fo#ght among
themsel%es as well as against their Greek and Italian occ#piers In Greece" the lead was
taken (y the &ational -eople.s 'i(eration !rmy *E'!7," which came to (e dominated (y
the 6omm#nists" and the &ational /ep#(lican Greek 'eag#e *E=E7, In 2#gosla%ia" the
6hetniks were led (y former army officers 7oon" a ri%al resistance gro#p" known as the
-artisans" came to the fore" dominated (y the 6omm#nists !s in Greece" these two
gro#ps wo#ld (ecome (itter enemies" e%en to the point of fighting one another
?ltimately" the British" who o%ersaw !llied aid to the 2#gosla% resistance" decided to
1
(ack only the -artisans" a decision that helped (ring 8osip Bro; *:ito, to power in
2#gosla%ia after the war :he 2#gosla% resistance largely freed the co#ntry from German
control
4hen Italy left the war in 7eptem(er 1940" Germany had to pro%ide the occ#pying forces
on its own" se%erely straining reso#rces in men and material :he !llies also cond#cted a
n#m(er of commando raids in the Balkans" incl#ding the German-occ#pied islands of the
eastern +editerranean
In late !#g#st 1944" the /ed !rmy.s @nd and 0rd ?krainian )ronts la#nched an offensi%e
in /omania against !rmy Gro#p 7Ad#kraine /omania and B#lgaria soon capit#lated and
then switched sides" declaring war on Germany In the case of /omania" these e%ents
occ#rred on @0 !#g#st and 4 7eptem(er" and for B#lgaria" they took place on @5 !#g#st
and B =ecem(er 1944 In Greece" the 6omm#nists made three attempts to sei;e power5
the first came d#ring the 194011944 !xis occ#pation in anticipation of an early end to the
warC the second occ#rred in !thens in =ecem(er 1944C and the third effort came in the
form of a (loody and prolonged ci%il war from 194D to 1949 4orld 4ar II in the Balkans
was extremely costly in terms of h#man cas#alties" (oth directlyEin act#al military
losses and ci%ilian cas#alties res#lting from warfareEand indirectly" stemming from
shortages of food and other necessities
In the immediate postwar period" the alignment of the Balkans act#ally worked o#t (y
and large along the lines of the agreement made (etween 6h#rchill and 7talin at +oscow
in $cto(er 1944 :he 7o%iet ?nion dominated /omania and B#lgaria" whereas Greece
ended #p in the 4estern camp 2#gosla%ia" which was to ha%e (een a fifty-fifty
arrangement" freed itself from +oscow.s grip in 1949
:#rkish ?niforms of the 6rimean Era5 -art 1
!pril 09" @919
4ritten (y 6! &orman
$f all the armies that fo#ght in the 6rimean 4ar the :#rks are certainly the most o(sc#re"
as anyone who has e%er attempted to research them can attest 4hile there has (een the
occasional attempt to o#tline the str#ct#re and organi;ation of the :#rkish army *nota(ly
+arcel /o#(icek.s excellent little (ook F+odern $ttoman :roops 1G9G-1915H," their
#niforms seldom rate more than a few sentences f#ll of generalities :he reason for this is
not diffic#lt to disco%erC there are no dress reg#lations a%aila(le to pro%ide g#idelines *so
far as I can disco%er" at least," and preser%ed #niforms from this period are %irt#ally non-
existent !(o#t the only material readily a%aila(le is the occasional appearance of a few
:#rkish fig#res in the (ackgro#nd of contemporary prints or sketches" #s#ally more to
pro%ide local colo#r than to present acc#rate information
@
)ort#nately there is a rather good so#rce a%aila(le in the sketches and notes of General
Ianson" who ser%ed in the 6rimea as a yo#ng staff officer 4hile Ianson.s sketches of
British" )rench" and e%en /#ssian" troops ha%e (een reprod#ced in a n#m(er of recent
p#(lications" his fairly extensi%e :#rkish material remains almost #nexploited :his does
not" of co#rse" pro%ide any sort of definiti%e st#dy of :#rkish #niforms Ianson did not
speak :#rkish and was #na(le to <#estion his s#(3ects as to the meaning of this item of
#niform or that (it of insignia )or the most part he simply sketched what he saw" or
descri(ed it in his notes" with the occasional g#ess *hopef#lly Finformed., as to what it all
might mean :he material is extensi%e eno#gh to at least pro%ide a sort of (asic
framework" tho#gh many <#estions remain #nanswered" and m#ch of the following is
necessarily spec#lati%e Ianson did few colo#r sketches of the :#rks" tho#gh he did
pro%ide a fair n#m(er of colo#r notes ?nfort#nately" his handwriting is not always of the
(est" so his extensi%e notes can often (e diffic#lt to decipher" not helped (y his fre<#ent
#se of a sort of personal Fshorthand. which can often (e <#ite o(sc#re &e%ertheless" he
stands head and sho#lders a(o%e any other so#rce
!%aila(le information s#ggests that at the time of the 6rimean 4ar :#rkish #niforms
were in the process of transition from a more traditional Fnational. style to a more modern
4estern E#ropean style (ased largely on )rench patterns" which I will refer to hereafter
as the Fold. and Fnew. #niforms" respecti%ely It is" of co#rse" impossi(le to 3#dge 3#st how
far this process had gone (y 1B54-55" (#t (oth Fold. and Fnew. #niforms seem to ha%e
(een extensi%ely worn in the 6rimea 8#dging solely (y those sketches and notes Ianson
(othered to date there wo#ld seem to ha%e (een a preponderance of Fold. #niforms d#ring
the earlier part of the war" tho#gh the (alance might well ha%e shifted (y the end of the
war !lso" it sho#ld (e noted that Ianson.s material is slanted hea%ily in fa%o#r of
infantry and artillery" with only limited information on ca%alry" and %irt#ally nothing on
other (ranches
:he Fold. #niform" as worn (y other ranks" consisted of a waist-length 3acket with
standing collar and sho#lderstraps" generally fastened down the front with hooks and
eyes" tho#gh rare examples are depicted with (#ttons :his wo#ld #s#ally (e worn with
loose knee-length F:#rkish. tro#sers and nati%e shoes or slippers" the (are lower legs
(eing co%ered (y either stockings or a sort of t#(e-like gaiter of ro#gh woollen material
which was p#lled on o%er the foot *a sort of Fhose top.,
)or infantry and artillery (oth 3acket and tro#sers were normally of coarse dark (l#e
wool" the 3acket.s collar" sho#lderstraps and ro#nd c#ffs (eing generally trimmed with red
tape in a n#m(er of relati%ely minor %ariations *possi(ly reflecting #nit practiceJ, $nly
rarely was the collar solid red" the c#ffs almost ne%er
6a%alry #niforms of the Fold. pattern seem to ha%e %aried somewhat more as to colo#r"
#s#ally ha%ing solid-colo#r collar and c#ffs" and with the 3acket front often (raided in
Fh#ssar. styleC they seem to ha%e almost in%aria(ly worn F4estern.-style tro#sers
:he Fnew. #niform for infantry and artillery comprised a dark (l#e single-(reasted t#nic
with skirts to mid-thigh and fastened with (#ttons" and long dark (l#e tro#sers of 4estern
0
E#ropean c#t" #s#ally worn long o%er western-style (oots :he t#nic was generally
trimmed with red tape in m#ch the same fashion as the old 3acket" except that the c#ffs
had rectang#lar dark (l#e flaps edged with red tape and decorated with (#ttons *normally
0" sometimes only @, on the o#ter side" reminiscent of the )rench army c#ff
:ro#sers seem to ha%e (een normally plain for infantry" artifiery commonly ha%ing a red
*or rarely (lack, stripe down the o#ter seam :he normal headgear with (oth old and new
#niforms was the red fe; with a dark (l#e or (lack tassel attached to the top (y a (rass
(#tton :he Fnew. ca%alry #niform is somewhat more pro(lematic Ianson did depict a
few mo#nted fig#res wearing a long-skirted t#nic or F!ftila. with (raiding on the (reast"
which pro(a(ly represents the Fnew. ca%alry #niform" tho#gh in no case did he gi%e any
colo#r details :his is pro(a(ly the #niform (eing referred to (y the correspondent
6onstanfin G#ys" who descri(ed :#rkish ca%alry as follows5 K:he men ha%e a sort of
t#nic with 0 rows of (#ttons and (l#e lace *a la h#ssarde,LMC the t#nic itself was
pres#ma(ly dark (l#e as a later segment descri(es ca%alry officers as wearing (l#e coats
with astrakhan collar and c#ffs
Greatcoats ha%e #s#ally (een referred to as Fhooded. in 4estern p#(lications In fact a
wide %ariety of types seem to ha%e (een #sed" some with attached hoods" some witho#t
Ianson fre<#ently refers to them as (eing made of coarse grey or dark grey wool" tho#gh
that does not precl#de the #se of other colo#rs as well ! few typical examples are
depicted in the fig#res following 6a%alry seem to ha%e worn similar garments" generally
longer and looser
E<#ipment was e<#ally %aried Ianson depicted a n#m(er of infantrymen wearing a (lack
waist(elt e<#ipment which appears to (e of the latest )rench patternC this is almost
in%aria(ly shown (eing worn with the Fnew. #niform" and I s#spect it may ha%e (een
iss#ed to picked #nits +ore common was a mixed e<#ipment consisting of a cartridge
po#ch on a (andolier o%er the left sho#lder" com(ined with a waist(elt :his e<#ipment
appears in (oth (lack and white leather" often with a cap po#ch worn either on the front
of the waist(elt or attached to the po#ch(elt 'ess fre<#ently cross(elt e<#ipment is worn"
generally of white leather $ne gets the impression of a n#m(er of generations of
e<#ipment models scro#nged from the maga;ines for the occasion
E<#ipment for artillerymen seems too %aried to arri%e at any common denominator" and
the ca%alry material is too limited to really 3#dge" tho#gh it seems to ha%e (een similar to
that in #se in 4estern armies !rmament appears e<#ally di%erse Ianson refers on a
n#m(er of occasions to o(ser%ing old )rench arms and items of e<#ipment in #se *some
apparently dating (ack to the &apoleonic wars," while some of the swords and sa(res
depicted match no pattern I ha%e e%er seen (efore and might well (e locally-prod#ced
Fpse#do-4estern. types $n at least two occasions Ianson noted seeing mo#nted
artillerymen wearing sword(elts with dependent slings" (#t witho#t swords" which
s#ggests there might ha%e (een serio#s shortages
:he artillery" in partic#lar" often gi%e the impression of ha%ing (een gi%en whate%er may
ha%e (een left o%er after e%eryone else had (een armed and e<#ipped 7ome of the more
4
poorly dressed and armed men in the sketches might well ha%e (een from mo(ili;ed
F/edif. or reser%e #nits" which seem to ha%e (een p#t into the line alongside the reg#lars
It seems to ha%e (een not too #ncommon to see a mixt#re of Fold. and Fnew. elements
worn togetherC most commonly the Fold. 3acket worn with Fnew.-style tro#sers" the
re%erse seems to ha%e (een rather rare :his appears to ha%e (een more common in the
artillery than the infantry" while ca%alry almost in%aria(ly wear 4estern-style tro#sers
regardless of their #pper garment 6ontemporary prints fre<#ently depict :#rks wearing
white s#mmer tro#sers *pres#ma(ly of linen or cotton,C Ianson also depicted a few
examples" and there might well (e more in the sketches (#t simply not noted as s#ch
$fficers" (y contrast" seem to ha%e generally worn a more-or-less standardi;ed #niform"
regardless of what their men might (e wearing :his approximates to the men.s Fnew.
#niform" with a single-(reasted dark (l#e t#nic *tho#gh the skirts are at times almost long
eno#gh to descri(e them as frock coats, and 4estern-style tro#sers :he t#nic wo#ld
normally (e trimmed with red tape" often in a pattern similar to that worn (y their men
(#t not in%aria(ly so" with the exception that officers seem ne%er to ha%e worn the
Fflapped. c#ff of the men.s Fnew. #niform *they are in%aria(ly depicted with plain ro#nd
c#ffs" e%en when their men ha%e Fflaps., :he #niform was fre<#ently somewhat more
ela(orately trimmed than that of the other ranks" fre<#ently with a red piping or tape
down the front opening of the t#nic or on the tro#ser seams
$fficers also seem to ha%e more commonly worn entirely red collars and" less commonly"
c#ffs" tho#gh these still remained a distinct minority $fficers almost in%aria(ly wore a
Fpassant. or epa#let loop of gold lace on either sho#lder near the slee%e seam" which
seems to ha%e ser%ed as a mark of officer stat#s *there are no indications that epa#lets
were e%er attached to these" except possi(ly in some G#ard #nits, !part from these
simple de%ices there is no indication of any system of officer.s rank insignia in #se in the
:#rkish armyC (oth Ianson and 6onstantin G#ys commented on the apparent lack of any
form of rank insignia among :#rkish officers $fficer.s tro#sers wo#ld either (e worn
loose or t#cked into knee-length (lack (oots" tho#gh Ianson did depict a co#ple of
officers wearing the distincti%e :#rkish gaiters !rmament wo#ld #s#ally (e restricted to
a sword" either an oriental scimitar or a %ariety of 4estern types" #s#ally sa(res tho#gh
the occasional straight-(laded sword appears :his was carried on a narrow waist(elt"
either on slings or in a frog Neadgear wo#ld" of co#rse" (e the fe;
:he exception to the a(o%e wo#ld (e ca%alry officers" and" to some extent" mo#nted
officers generally" who wore a somewhat wider range of garments +any seem to ha%e
worn waist-length 3ackets or a sort of long-skirted patrol 3acket" commonly (raided on the
(reast in h#ssar-style G#ys descri(ed ca%alry officers as wearing dark (l#e frock coats
with astrakhan collar and c#ffs It sho#ld (e emphasised" howe%er" that many ca%alry
officers wore the Fstandardi;ed. #niform descri(ed a(o%e +ost sketches s#ggest that
mo#nted officers wo#ld normally wear their sword(elt #nder their coat with the sword
hanging on slings" with some form of po#ch(elt or (andolier
5
Ianson did not depict any officers wearing greatcoats or mantles" tho#gh he did depict
some wearing capes or cloaks of a %ariety of types Ne sketched one officer wearing two
t#nics" the o#ter one left open to show a second t#nic (eing worn #nderneath :he
astrakhan-trimmed frockcoats mentioned (y G#ys might also (e intended as cold-weather
wear -res#ma(ly officers s#ited themsel%es in regard to winter gear
/eprod#ced from F7oldiers of the O#een." iss#e B5
:#rkish ?niforms of the 6rimean Era5 -art @
:#rkish ?niforms of the 6rimean Era5 -art 0
:#rkish ?niforms of the 6rimean Era5 -art 4
:he :#rkish !rmy in the 6rimea 4ar
:he origins of the modern $ttoman army date to the destr#ction of the 3anissaries (y
7#ltan +ahm#d II *8#ne 1B@D, +ahm#d then laid the fo#ndation for a new military
organi;ation (ased on 4estern models Its centerpiece was a E#ropean-style infantry
corps" the :rained Iictorio#s :roops of +#hammad *+#allem !sakir-i +ans#re-yi
+#hammadiye" +ans#re for short, $ther military ser%icesEca%alry" artillery" and
transportEwere esta(lished mainly (y reforming existing military #nits +ahm#d also
created a modern corps of imperial g#ards o#t of the Bostanci corps" which had g#arded
imperial palaces
:here also were attempts to centrali;e the command str#ct#re :he a#thority of the
commander in chief *ser asker, of the +ans#re was grad#ally extended o%er the other
ser%ices and (ranches :h#s his head<#arters *Ba(-i 7er !sker, grad#ally came to
D
com(ine the roles of a ministry of war and general staff" and e%ent#ally was in charge of
all land forces
?nder +ahm#d II the military engineering schools were re3#%enated and reformed Ne
also esta(lished a military medical school *1B@G, and an officer school *1B04, /#ssia
and Britain sent military instr#ctors +ost #sef#l ser%ices were rendered (y a -r#ssian
military mission that grew from one officer *Nelm#th %on +oltke, in 1B05 to twel%e in
1B0G
In the 1B09s +ahm#d so#ght to strengthen the army 'arge permanent #nits with reg#lar
commanding officers and staffs were formed In 1B04 a pro%incial militia *redif, was
esta(lished to pro%ide reser%e forces Nowe%er" the commissary system co#ld not s#pport
the rapid increase of the military Epidemics were rife" and o%er a <#arter of all recr#its
s#cc#m(ed to disease =esertion was %ery common !ltho#gh the army had (een
s#ccessf#lly employed as an instr#ment of coercion and centrali;ation" as a military force
it remained relati%ely small and poorly organi;ed" trained" and e<#ipped By the end of
+ahm#d.s reign there were only some 99"999 men in all the ser%ices :he wars with
/#ssia *1B@B11B@9, and with +#hammad !li.s Egypt *1B0111B00" 1B09, res#lted in
hea%y losses and the disr#ption of the army.s de%elopment
=#ring the :an;imat period *1B0911BGD, the army consolidated and (#ilt on the shaky
fo#ndations laid in the pre%io#s era :he Ba(-i 7er !sker contin#ed to ac<#ire new
departments :he army steadily grew" and recr#itment and training impro%ed In 1B40 the
army" renamed the /eg#lar Imperial :roops *!sakir-i &i;amiye-yi 7"ahane" &i;amiye for
short," was organi;ed in permanent territorial commands" each consisting of an army
corps *ord#, #nder a field marshal *mAs"ir, :he field marshals" directly responsi(le to the
ser asker" had wide 3#risdiction in all military matters :his limited the pro%incial
go%ernors. a(ility to inter%ene in military affairs" and was intended to centrali;e f#rther
the military organi;ation and strengthen the a#thority of the ser asker )i%e territorial
army corps were esta(lished" with head<#arters in Istan(#l" PskAdar" +onastir" 7i%as"
and =amasc#s In 1B4B a sixth corps was esta(lished with head<#arters in Baghdad In
1B49 the &i;amiye had some 1@9"999 men and the redif" 59"999 4ith local and
semireg#lar organi;ations" the empire.s land forces n#m(ered some @59"999 men
'ate-Eighteenth 6ent#ry Oing !rmy
Emperor Oianlong in ceremonial armo#r" with his sa(er" (ow and arrowsL
! 6hinese military post" 1G9D
G
Emperor Oianlong on Inspection :o#r
4hen the )rench /e%ol#tion took place in 1GB9" 6hina.s last dynasty *the Oing" 1D441
191@, had (een in power for nearly a cent#ry and a half and #nder Emperor Oianlong *r
1G0511G9D, was at the height of its power economically" c#lt#rally" and perhaps e%en
militarily 6hinese infl#ence in E#rope was strong" and E#ropean scholars from the Baron
de +ontes<#ie# to Ioltaire all showed great interest in 6hina :he )rench coined the
word chinoiserie to express their enth#siasm a(o#t the co#ntry" the eighteenth-cent#ry
English garden took on many of the characteristics attri(#ted to 6hinese gardens" and
)rench rococo art was pro(a(ly also infl#enced (y 6hinese styles :he enth#siasm for
6hina and its c#lt#re e%en led E#ropean kings to copy the rit#al plowing of the earth
performed (y the 6hinese emperors e%ery spring" after Ioltaire praised the 6hinese
practice 6hina also (enefited from its interaction with E#rope" and E#ropean arts and
sciences" especially 4estern astronomy" cartography" and mathematics" had a ma3or
impact on intellect#al acti%ity in 6hina
>
:he eastern +ongols or Khalka had (een allied to the +anch#s since (efore the +anch#
con<#est of 6hina" (#t in the west a gro#p of independent tri(es known as the $irats had
occ#pied the :arim Basin and :i(et and esta(lished an aggressi%e ri%al empire In 1DBD
their leader" Galdan Khan" attacked the Khalka" pro%oking war with the Oing In 1D9D
K.ang-hsi himself led an expedition into +ongolia Galdan attempted to a%oid (attle" (#t
was trapped (etween con%erging col#mns and defeated at 8ao +odo" near present-day
?lan Bator :he khan escaped" (#t was h#nted down the following year
:his %ictory ga%e the Oing control of most of what is now +ongolia" (#t f#rther west one
of the $irat clans" the 8#ngars" was grad#ally re(#ilding its strength In 1G55 war (roke
o#t again" and two years later a +anch# army #nder 6hao N#i in%aded the Ili %alley :he
8#ngars were %irt#ally wiped o#t" and the +#slims of the :arim Basin" who had
s#pported the 8#ngars" were also defeated" in 1G59 :he Oing frontier was p#shed
forward as far as 'ake Balkhash and the -amir +o#ntains" where 6hinese armies had not
penetrated since the days of the :.ang
-art of the reason for the +anch# s#ccess was their own affinity with the 6entral !sian
nomads5 their ca%alry fo#ght in the same style" as highly mo(ile mo#nted archers" and the
Oing armies co#ld o#tmanoe#%re the +ongols on the steppe 1 something traditional
6hinese forces had seldom managed to do )#rthermore" the nomads" who had for
cent#ries relied on the %ast spaces of the steppe for protection" co#ld no longer retreat
(eyond the reach of armies (ased in 6hina" for the /#ssians were ad%ancing from the
opposite direction" into what is now Ka;akhstan
$ther infl#ences were also at work to weaken the +ongols5 those #nder Oing r#le had
(een impo%erished (y the go%ernment.s policy of restricting them to specific gra;ing
gro#nds" which in time of dro#ght were #na(le to s#pport their horse herdsC tri(es (eyond
B
the frontier s#ffered from chronic political dis#nity and a de%astating series of epidemics"
pro(a(ly transmitted (y farmers and traders mo%ing into their lands as the settled
pop#lation increasedC and the spread of B#ddhism may also ha%e enco#raged some
+ongols to a(andon their traditional warlike p#rs#its ! com(ination of factors"
therefore" lay (ehind the s#dden e%aporation of the +ongol menace which had dominated
6hinese military policy for so long
7#ccess on other fronts led to the 6h.ien-l#ng reign (eing remem(ered for its F:en Great
Iictories." altho#gh they were not all of e<#al significance :i(et had (een red#ced to
%assalage in 1G@9" and nominal Oing a#thority was maintained thereafter (y sporadic
expeditions In 1 G99 G#rkhas from &epal in%aded :i(et and looted the rich monastery of
:ashilh#npo :he =alai 'ama asked 6h.ien-l#ng for help" and an army of B9"999 men
was despatched #nder the +anch# general )# K.ang )# <#ickly dro%e o#t the in%aders"
p#rs#ed them o%er the Nimalayan passes and defeated them at &awakot" not far from
Katmand# F:he G#rkhas agreed to pay tri(#te to -eking" which they contin#ed to do
#ntil 199B In %iew of the well-known prowess of the G#rkhas in their later enco#nters
with the British" this campaign pro%ides an interesting insight into the performance of
6hinese armies in the late 1Bth cent#ry It is clear that they were still in the front rank of
!sian powers" in terms not 3#st of n#merical strength" (#t also of strategic mo(ility and
effecti%eness on the (attlefield
>
By the 1Bth cent#ry the ma3ority of nati%e 6hinese troops were to (e fo#nd in the l#-ying"
or Green 7tandard army :his had originally (een a garrison force It consisted of more
than a tho#sand ying" or (attalions" of widely %arying strength scattered thro#gho#t the
pro%inces" lea%ing the +anch#s concentrated aro#nd -eking" on the northern frontier and
in the more important towns
:he 6hinese were not regarded (y the +anch#s as %ery good soldiers" and their loyalty
was often s#spect !t 2#ng-p.ing in 1D09 they fo#ght with signs reading F&ew 7oldier.
pinned to their (acks so that the +anch#s co#ld keep an eye on them :hey were often
acc#sed of standing (ack and allowing the +anch#s to do all the fighting" and of hiring
incapa(le s#(stit#tes to ser%e in their place a practice which had spread to the +anch#s
themsel%es as early as the 1D09s
E%en in the 19th cent#ry foreign %isitors o(ser%ed that the +anch# troops were m#ch
(etter than the 6hinese" and that it was to the ad%antage of the regime to keep it that way
Nowe%er" 6hinese n#m(ers" along with their expertise with ships and artillery" meant that
it was impossi(le to do witho#t them 6hinese officers had held high positions in Oing
armies as early as the 1D@9s" when hereditary ranks were gi%en to the most loyal 'i
2#ng-fang" who s#rrendered the town of )#-sh#n in 1D1B" was the first defector of rank"
and was e%ent#ally gi%en command of a Banner Nis sons all (ecame officers in the
6hinese Bl#e Banner
9
4# 7an-k#ei and the other F)e#datories." along with lesser colla(orators" were of %ital
importance to the +anch# con<#est of 6hina after 1D44" and were rewarded with
genero#s grants of land and political pri%ileges" which at first amo#nted to %irt#al
independence E%en after 4#.s re%olt" in 1DG0" 6hinese generals s#ch as 6hao 'iang-
t#ng remained loyal to the Oing and led armies against the re(els =#ring the 6h.ien-l#ng
reign +anch#s and +ongols (egan to replace nati%es in the high command" (#t this
process was ne%er completed" and indeed was re%ersed after the middle of the 19th
cent#ry
B!'K!& 4!/7 -art I
!pril @B" @919
critcalmass Nolding Nistory 'ea%e a comment
-hotograph of the 7er(ian 1st !rmy staff d#ring the Balkan wars" made in 191@ :he staff
of 1 !rmi3a $n the left side is the army commander" 6rown -rince !lexander" the army
chief of staff" 6olonel -etar Bo3o%iQ" is sitting next to him
7er(ian artillery at siege of !drianople
:he Balkan 4ars of 191@1 1910 initiated a period of conflict in E#rope that wo#ld last
#ntil 191B and wo#ld end#re in one form or another #ntil 1999 :hese Balkan wars
originated in the aspirations of the small nationalist states of so#theastern E#rope" already
ha%ing achie%ed independence from the $ttoman Empire d#ring the nineteenth cent#ry"
to incorporate mem(ers of their nationalities remaining #nder $ttoman r#le and th#s
achie%e their maxim#m nationalist claims In this way" the states of B#lgaria" Greece"
+ontenegro" and 7er(ia so#ght to em#late the nineteenth-cent#ry nationalist s#ccesses of
Germany and Italy
6ompeting claims to $ttoman-held territories" especially +acedonia" had long pre%ented
the Balkan states from cooperating against the $ttomans 4hen the 2o#ng :#rks
threatened to rein%igorate the $ttoman Empire after their 199B co#p" the leaders of the
Balkan states (egan to seek ways to o%ercome their ri%alries /#ssian diplomacy
facilitated their efforts :he /#ssians wanted to compensate for their set(ack in the
Bosnian 6risis of 199B11999 (y esta(lishing a pro-/#ssian Balkan alliance intended to
impede any f#rther !#stro- N#ngarian ad%ances in the region In +arch 191@" the
B#lgarians and 7er(s concl#ded an alliance #nder the aegis of /#ssia 6ontained within
this alliance agreement was a plan for the settlement of the +acedonian pro(lem"
incl#ding a pro%ision for /#ssian mediation :he B#lgarians and 7er(s then made
19
indi%id#al agreements with the Greeks and +ontenegrins" who themsel%es reached an
agreement By 7eptem(er 191@ this loose confederation" the Balkan 'eag#e" was ready to
achie%e its goals
:NE )I/7: B!'K!& 4!/
+ontenegro (egan the )irst Balkan 4ar on B $cto(er 191@ (y declaring war on the
$ttoman Empire Before the other allies co#ld 3oin in" the $ttomans declared war on 1G
$cto(er on the Balkan 'eag#e :he $ttomans were confident that their army" recently
#pgraded with the help of German ad%isers" wo#ld <#ickly pre%ail against their Balkan
ad%ersaries
:he main theater of the ens#ing conflict was :hrace 4hile one B#lgarian army (esieged
the ma3or $ttoman fortress at !drianople *Edirne," two others achie%ed ma3or %ictories
against the $ttomans at Kirk Kilisse and at B#ni NisarR '#le B#rgas :he latter was the
largest (attle in E#rope (etween the )ranco--r#ssian 4ar of 1BG911BG1 and 4orld 4ar I
:he $ttomans rallied at the 6hatald;ha" the last lines of defense (efore 6onstantinople
!n attack (y the exha#sted and epidemic-ridden B#lgarians on 1G &o%em(er against the
$ttoman positions failed Both sides then settled into trench warfare at 6hatald;ha
Elsewhere the 7er(ian army (roke the western $ttoman army at K#mano%o on @0
$cto(er :he 7er(s then ad%anced against diminishing resistance into +acedonia"
Koso%o" and on into !l(ania" reaching the !driatic coast in =ecem(er :he Greek na%y
pre%ented the $ttomans from shipping reinforcements from !natolia to the Balkans :he
Greek army ad%anced in two directions" entering 7alonika on B &o%em(er" and f#rther
west" (ringing the town of 8anina #nder siege +ontenegrin forces ad%anced into the
7an3ak of &o%i -a;ar and (esieged 7c#tari
:he $ttomans signed an armistice with B#lgaria" +ontenegro" and 7er(ia on 0
=ecem(er Greek military operations contin#ed By this time" $ttoman E#rope was
limited to the three (esieged towns of !drianople" 8anina" and 7c#tariC the Gallipoli
penins#laC and eastern :hrace (ehind the 6hatald;ha lines !s a res#lt of the $ttoman
collapse" a gro#p of !l(anian nota(les" s#pported (y !#stria and Italy" declared !l(anian
independence on @B &o%em(er 191@ 4hile delegations from the Balkan allies attempted
to negotiate a final peace with the $ttomans in 'ondon" a conference of Great -ower
am(assadors met also in 'ondon to ens#re that the interests of the -owers wo#ld pre%ail
in any Balkan settlement
! co#p on @0 8an#ary 1910 (ro#ght a 2o#ng :#rk go%ernment to power in
6onstantinople :his go%ernment was determined to contin#e the war" mainly in order to
retain !drianople :hey deno#nced the armistice on 09 8an#ary Nostilities recommenced"
to the detriment of the $ttomans 8anina fell to the Greeks on D +arch and !drianople to
the B#lgarians on @D +arch
:he siege of 7c#tari" howe%er" inc#rred international complications :he !#strians
demanded that this largely !l(anian inha(ited town (ecome a part of the new !l(anian
11
state Beca#se of this demand" 7er(ian forces aiding the +ontenegrin siege withdrew
:he +ontenegrins persisted in the siege" howe%er" and s#cceeded in taking the town on
@@ !pril ! Great -ower flotilla off the !driatic coast forced the +ontenegrins to
withdraw less than two weeks later" on 5 +ay
+eanwhile in 'ondon" peace negotiations res#lted in the preliminary :reaty of 'ondon"
signed on 09 +ay 1910 (etween the Balkan allies and the $ttoman Empire By this
treaty" the $ttoman Empire in E#rope consisted of only a narrow (and of territory in
eastern :hrace defined (y a straight line drawn from the !egean port of Enos to the Black
7ea port of +idya
B!'K!& 4!/7 -art II
!pril @B" @919
critcalmass Nolding Nistory 'ea%e a comment
7E6$&= B!'K!& $/ I&:E/!''IE= 4!/
=#ring the )irst Balkan 4ar" while the B#lgarians contended with the ma3or portion of
the $ttoman army in :hrace" the 7er(s had occ#pied most of +acedonia !#strian
prohi(itions had pre%ented the 7er(s from reali;ing their am(itions to an !driatic port in
northern !l(ania :he 7er(s then so#ght to strengthen their hold on +acedonia in
compensation for the loss of an !l(anian port :he Greeks had ne%er agreed to any
settlement o%er +acedonia" and also indicated that they wo#ld retain the +acedonian
areas they had occ#pied :he B#lgarians had fo#ght the $ttomans for +acedonia :hey
remained determined to o(tain this area Nostilities among the allies o%er the +acedonian
<#estion escalated thro#gho#t the spring of 1910 from exchanges of notes to act#al
shooting /#ssian attempts at mediation (etween B#lgaria and 7er(ia were fee(le and
fr#itless
$n the night of @9109 8#ne 1910" B#lgarian soldiers (egan local attacks against 7er(ian
positions in +acedonia :hese attacks (ecame the signal for the o#t(reak of general war
:he initial Greek and 7er( co#nterattacks p#shed the B#lgarians (ack past their old
frontiers 8#st as the B#lgarian army (egan to sta(ili;e the sit#ation" /omanian and
$ttoman soldiers in%aded the co#ntry :he /omanians so#ght to o(tain so#thern
=o(r#d;ha to (roaden their Black 7ea coast and to (alance B#lgarian gains elsewhere in
the Balkans :he $ttomans wanted to retake !drianople :he B#lgarian army" already
hea%ily engaged against the Greeks and 7er(s" was #na(le to resist the /omanians and
$ttomans ?nder these circ#mstances" B#lgaria had to s#e for peace By the res#lting
:reaty of B#charest signed on 19 !#g#st" B#lgaria lost most of +acedonia to Greece and
7er(ia" and so#thern =o(r#d;ha to /omania :he :reaty of 6onstantinople" signed on 09
7eptem(er 1910" ended B#lgaria.s (rief control of !drianople
6$&7EO?E&6E7
1@
:he Balkan 4ars res#lted in h#ge military cas#alties :he B#lgarians lost aro#nd D5"999
men" the Greeks 9"599" the +ontenegrins 0"999" and the 7er(s at least 0D"999 :he
$ttomans lost as many as 1@5"999 In addition" tens of tho#sands of ci%ilians died" from
disease and other ca#ses =eli(erate atrocities occ#rred thro#gho#t e%ery theater of war"
especially in Koso%o
:he conse<#ences of the Balkan 4ars inflamed the nationalist appetites of all
participants :he Greeks so#ght additional gains in !sia +inor" the 7er(s in Bosnia" and
the B#lgarians seethed with a desire" still #nreali;ed" for +acedonia :he $ttomans also
wanted to regain power lost in the Balkan 4ars (y participating in 4orld 4ar I :hese
p#rs#its led to catastrophes for all d#ring or after 4orld 4ar I
:he Great -owers str#ggled to manage the Balkan 4ars :he am(itions of the 7er(s to
northern !l(ania and the !driatic coast and of the +ontenegrins to 7c#tari ca#sed some
tensions among them" partic#larly (etween !#stria-N#ngary s#pporting !l(ania and
/#ssia s#pporting +ontenegro and 7er(ia :he -owers themsel%es coped with these
tensions at the 'ondon !m(assadors 6onference :hey e%en cooperated to e3ect the
+ontenegrins from 7c#tari
$ne important conse<#ence of the Balkan 4ars was the alienation of B#lgaria from
/#ssia ?p #ntil 1910" B#lgaria had (een /#ssia.s most important connection in the
Balkan region B#lgaria.s proximity to 6onstantinople" especially after the gains of the
)irst Balkan 4ar" afforded /#ssia with a %al#a(le (ase from which to (ring press#re
#pon this %ital area :he fail#re of /#ssian diplomacy to mediate the B#lgaro-7er(ian
disp#te o%er the disposition of +acedonia led to B#lgaria.s catastrophic defeat in the
7econd Balkan 4ar and B#lgaria.s t#rn to the :riple !lliance for redress :his left 7er(ia
as /#ssia.s only ally in the Balkans 4hen !#stro-N#ngarian chastisement threatened
7er(ia in 8#ly 1914" the /#ssians had to act to protect 7er(ia or else lose the Balkans
completely
:he am(itions of the +ontenegrins and 7er(s in !l(ania greatly increased !#stro-
N#ngarian antipathy toward these two so#th 7la%ic states :he Iiennese go%ernment
(ecame determined that the 7er( power sho#ld not increase in the Balkans $n three
separate occasions" in =ecem(er 191@" in !pril 1910" and again after the Balkan 4ars in
$cto(er 1910" the !#stro-N#ngarians came into conflict with the 7er(s and +ontenegrins
o%er !l(anian iss#es E%en tho#gh war res#lted in the s#mmer of 1914 from an e%ent in
Bosnia" the conflicts o%er !l(ania facilitated the !#strians. decision to fight the 7er(s
4orld 4ar I was not the :hird Balkan 4arC rather the Balkan 4ars were the (eginning of
4orld 4ar I &ationalist conflicts persisted in the region from 191@ to 191B -ro(lems of
nationalism" especially in Koso%o and +acedonia" end#red o%er the rest of the twentieth
cent#ry
BIB'I$G/!-N2 Erickson" Edward 8 =efeat in =etail5 :he $ttoman !rmy in the
Balkans" 191@11910 4estport" 6onn" @990 Nall" /ichard 6 :he Balkan 4ars 191@1
19105 -rel#de of the )irst 4orld 4ar 'ondon" @999 Nellenic !rmy General 7taff !
10
6oncise Nistory of the Balkan 4ars" 191@11910 !thens" 199B Nelmreich" E 6 :he
=iplomacy of the Balkan 4ars" 191@110 &ew 2ork" 19D9
:he 7alonika 6ampaign
B#lgarian Infantry
:he railway from the strategically important port city of 7alonika *:hessaloniki, in
northern Greece to Belgrade %ia 7kop3e *?sk#(, offered a direct ro#te to em(attled
7er(ia In 7eptem(er 1915" with B#lgaria mo(ilising for an attack on 7er(ia" Britain and
)rance accepted an offer from the pro-Entente Greek prime minister Ele#therios
*Elephferios, Ieni;elos to land troops at 7alonika :he force at 7alonika was initially
composed of !nglo-)rench #nits" many of which had come from Gallipoli It was
reinforced (y the 7er(ian army in exile on 6orf#" Italians and a small /#ssian contingent
It remained #ntil the war.s end
:he force landed on 5 $cto(er 1915" the same day that the pro-German Greek king"
6onstantine I 1 who was married to the Kaiser.s sister 1 forced Ieni;elos to resign $n D
$cto(er 1915" the 6entral -owers in%aded 7er(ia !nglo-)rench #nits at 7alonika p#shed
north #p the Iardar *!xios, ri%er %alley to help the 7er(s It was too little" too late :he
7er(s retreated thro#gh !l(ania to the !driatic coast while the 7alonika force retired (ack
to the city B#lgarian and German forces *with some :#rkish #nits, then gathered along
the Greek1 7er(ian and Greek1B#lgarian (orders" while the Greek army" s#pposedly
ne#tral" handed Greece.s )ort /#ppel" which commanded the 7tr#ma *7trimSn, %alley" to
the B#lgarians *@D +ay 191D, In response to these threats" the s#preme commander at
7alonika" the )rench general +a#rice 7arrail" transformed the city into a fortress
14
s#rro#nded (y fieldwork defences Ne took f#ll control of the city from the Greeks in
mid-191D" esta(lishing the city as an alternati%e centre for pro-Entente Greek forces and
politicians" a policy that em(roiled the garrison in internal Greek politics
4hile )rance was keen on the 7alonika operation" senior British military ad%isers to the
British go%ernment" s#ch as 4illiam /o(ertson" 6hief of the Imperial General 7taff" were
ne%er con%inced of the #sef#lness of peripheral operations s#ch as 7alonika" which took
troops away from the main western front By early 191D the n#m(er of British troops at
7alonika exceeded 159"999 /o(ertson %igoro#sly #rged a withdrawal from 7alonika (#t
political factors made this diffic#lt :he defeat at Gallipoli had lowered !nglo-)rench
prestige in the Balkans and the Entente co#ld ill-afford for Greece to 3oin the 6entral
-owers
7arrail.s record of military achie%ement against the 6entral -owers was not impressi%e
$n 19 !#g#st 191D" Entente troops (egan preliminary attacks at 'ake =orian *=o3ran,
(efore a general a#t#mn 191D offensi%e German- B#lgarian forces pre-empted this with
attacks on the western and eastern extremities of 7arrail.s line In the west" the
reconstit#ted 7er(ian army in the )lSrina sector retreated to 'ake $stro%o *IegorrTtis,
)ighting then contin#ed along the 6rno *6rna, ri%er east of )lSrina In the eastern sector
of the front" the B#lgarians took the Greek town of 7erres *7Urrai, in the 7tr#ma %alley on
@5 !#g#st" threatening the port of Ka%ala *Ka%Vlla, whose Greek garrison s#rrendered
witho#t a fight on 14 7eptem(er 191D ?nder press#re" 7arrail p#t a halt to the faltering
offensi%e at 'ake =orian
4hen 7arrail.s troops did finally attack towards 7kop3e in 7eptem(er 191D" he hoped that
this wo#ld relie%e the hard-pressed /#manians 7arrail.s forces took +onastir *Bitola, in
the western sector of the front on 19 &o%em(er 191D (#t they ad%anced no f#rther !s the
15
British str#ggled #p the 7tr#ma %alley" operations descended into western front-style
trench deadlock 6hecked" allied troops sat o#t the winter doing little By early 191G"
7arrail had some D99"999 men at his disposal 1 a mixt#re of )rench" British" 7er(ians"
Italians and /#ssians that made command and control diffic#lt :his force was more
nominal than real as the #nhealthy" swampy climate of 7alonika was a (reeding gro#nd
for diseases s#ch as malaria" paratyphoid and dysentery" which left m#ch of 7arrail.s
force in hospital and red#ced his fighting strength to a(o#t 199"999
7arrail attacked again in +arch 191G ! )ranco-7er(ian force ad%anced on a line (etween
+onastir and 'ake -respa" while the British spearheaded an attack at 'ake =orian
!d%ances were minimal5 a few h#ndred metres were won at the cost of some 15"999
cas#alties By the end of +ay" with /#ssian #nits in m#tiny" 7arrail called off the
offensi%e" and the front (ecame static +arie G#illa#mat replaced the #npop#lar 7arrail in
=ecem(er 191G In 8#ly 191B" another )rench commander" 'o#is )ranchet d.Esperey"
replaced G#illa#mat In 8#ne 191G" with Ieni;elos (ack in power" Greece entered the war
*@9 8#ne 191G," adding @59"999 men to the 7alonika force $n 15 7eptem(er 191B" at the
war.s end" the 7alonika force la#nched the Iardar offensi%e against weary and ill-
e<#ipped B#lgarian opposition :he B#lgarians (roke" and (y @5 7eptem(er their retreat
had (ecome a ro#t :he 7alonika force ad%anced deep into enemy territory" reaching the
=an#(e (y the armistice 7er(ian forces re-occ#pied Belgrade on 1 &o%em(er 191B" (y
which time B#lgaria had s#rrendered *09 7eptem(er,
:his final %ictory sho#ld not o%ershadow the fact that the 7alonika expedition did %ery
little" except tie #p large n#m(ers of Entente troops that co#ld ha%e (een #sed more
fr#itf#lly elsewhere !ltho#gh (attle cas#alties were low 1 a reflection of the general
inacti%ity of the front for most of the war 1 cas#alties from disease" nota(ly malaria"
in%alided some 499"999 men :he Germans were right to d#( the front Fthe greatest
internment camp in the world.
7ta(ilisation of the 4estern )ront 1 1914
Belgian !rmy 1914
British !rmy 1914
)ollowing the esta(lishment of static trench lines from the ri%er !isne eastwards" (oth
sides attempted to sec#re %ictory (y t#rning the open western flank of the (attlefront
Between mid-7eptem(er and mid-$cto(er 1914 di%isions were h#rried westwards" (#t
neither side co#ld sec#re decisi%e strategic ad%antage in this Frace to the sea. By
&o%em(er 1914 the solid trench front had consolidated all the way to the 6hannel coast
1D
In 7eptem(er German strategy was #nfoc#ssed :he new German commander" Erich %on
)alkenhayn" p#shed at the left and centre of the main )rench front" at Ierd#n and
7oissons" while at the same time deploying forces to the north to en%elop the exposed
)rench left wing &one of these operations pro%ed decisi%e
:he allies hoped to #se their ad%antage in ca%alry to make a wide o#tflanking mo%ement
across Belgi#m :o this end the BE) was relocated from the ri%er !isne to )landers in
early $cto(er )alkenhayn too wished to sweep westwards to the 6hannel coast" (#t
(efore he co#ld do so the key fortress of !ntwerp" ref#ge of the Belgian field army after
it had (een separated from its allies in !#g#st" had to (e red#ced 4hether the British and
)rench armies co#ld re-deploy northwards (efore !ntwerp fell" and rest their flank on
that sec#re (astion" was cr#cial !llied disagreements on the strategy to (e followed
pro%ed ac#te" pre%enting decisi%e action on the northern flank
&othing epitomised the chaos in allied command more than the impro%ised and
#ns#ccessf#l defence of !ntwerp :he British wanted to march directly to the city.s relief"
fearing that the Belgians wo#ld a(andon this %ital port if not rapidly assisted 8offre.s
priority was to defeat the German forces ad%ancing into )rance (y an offensi%e towards
'ille" and he felt that first line troops co#ld not (e spared for !ntwerp !t the (eginning
of $cto(er British /oyal +arines and na%al reser%ists" the only a%aila(le troops" were
despatched to reinforce the Belgian defences 4inston 6h#rchill" the )irst 'ord of the
!dmiralty" h#rried to !ntwerp to enco#rage the exha#sted Belgians to hang on #ntil more
s#(stantial reinforcements arri%ed Britain.s last reg#lar di%ision" the Gth =i%ision" was to
follow" he promised" along with a corps of )rench marines and territorials In the first
week of $cto(er the s#per-hea%y German artillery which had s#(d#ed Belgi#m.s frontier
fortresses in !#g#st was (ro#ght to (ear on !ntwerp.s defences" and the o#tlying defence
works were systematically red#ced 4itho#t cons#lting his allies 8offre di%erted the
promised )rench corps to co%er the redeployment of the BE) aro#nd BUth#ne :he Gth
=i%ision co#ld not relie%e !ntwerp aloneC its task was now to co%er the escape of the
exha#sted Belgian field army along the coast !ntwerp s#rrendered on 19 $cto(er" (efore
8offre.s offensi%e commenced
!s British and )rench di%isions arri%ed in the north they were thrown into allied
operations to ad%ance eastward and capt#re 'ille Initial progress against a weak German
ca%alry screen was not s#stained as new German di%isions" released (y the fall of
!ntwerp" came into line General )och" assigned the task of coordinating the actions of
the )rench" British and Belgian armies" hastily esta(lished a defensi%e line from &ie#port
on the coast to !rras" to hold off repeated German p#shes to (reak thro#gh to the 6hannel
ports :he fighting centred aro#nd the Belgian town of 2pres :o the north the Belgians
took #p position on the extreme left of the allied line (ehind the ri%er 2ser Nard pressed
(y the enemy they protected their thinly-held line (y in#ndating the ri%er.s flood plain
Between mid-$cto(er and mid-&o%em(er s#ccessi%e German assa#lts were la#nched
against !nglo-)rench positions f#rther so#th )ighting was partic#larly hea%y in the
BE).s sectors at 2pres and !rmentiWres" where the (attalions of Britain.s pre-war reg#lar
army sacrificed themsel%es in the allied ca#se British and )rench formations (ecame
1G
inextrica(ly mixed in a conf#sed and costly mXlUe that (ecame known as the )irst Battle
of 2pres In this conf#sed tactical engagement the actions of indi%id#als and small #nits
co#ld pro%e decisi%e $n 01 $cto(er the recapt#re of the Ghel#%elt crossroads (y the @nd
(attalion of the 4orcestershire regiment pre%ented a decisi%e German (reakthro#gh Both
sides were (y now desperate for reser%es" Britain throwing newly arri%ed Indian !rmy
di%isions into the (attle" and #ltimately sending (attalions of her second-line :erritorial
!rmy across the 6hannel to (olster the defence :he fighting reached its climax on 19
&o%em(er" when yo#ng" enth#siastic (#t ill-trained %ol#nteers from the German
#ni%ersities attempted to r#sh British machine g#ns at 'angemarck German cas#alties"
some G9Y" were horrendo#s5 the 'angemarck (lood-sacrifice was to (ecome the most
potent patriotic myth which s#stained the German nation thro#gh fo#r f#rther years of
war
4ith this fail#re and the onset of cold weather the (attle settled down into watchf#l
defence :he opposing armies had fo#ght themsel%es to a standstill ! half-hearted
!nglo-)rench attempt to (reak thro#gh the German line in the north in mid-=ecem(er
came to nothing" and allied leaders pa#sed for tho#ght Now wo#ld they restore mo(ility
to a static (attlefield in the new campaigning seasonJ
:he cas#alties of the mo(ile (attles of 1914 were the hea%iest of the whole war :he
Germans lost B9"999 at 2pres" the British 54"999 in the same (attle and 99"999 since the
o#t(reak of war :he )rench lost @D5"999 killed in 1914 !rmies took to trenches in the
interest of self-preser%ation in the face of m#rdero#s firepower ! new type of static siege
warfare had (eg#n
6!/B$&!/I
!pril @5" @919
)ilippo Gi#seppe +aria '#do%ico B#onarroti
:he 6ar(onari were one of the many secret societies that proliferated in the years after
the )rench /e%ol#tion" and especially after the Bo#r(on /estoration Indeed" the secret
societies and the fears of secret conspiracies were skillf#lly exploited (y legitimist
go%ernments after 1B14 to 3#stify often extreme meas#res of political repression and the
c#rtailment of indi%id#al li(erties
$/IGI&7
7ince the n#m(ers of the secret societies and the often impossi(le actions attri(#ted to
them were deli(erately exaggerated as m#ch (y their s#pporters as (y opponents" it is
often still diffic#lt to disting#ish fact from fiction B#t the secret societies existed" among
them the 6ar(onari" which were prominent and especially prolific in so#thern Italy 'ike
1B
nearly all the other secret societies" the 6ar(onarist lodges were modeled on the
freemasonic lodges that had spread widely in E#rope in the late eighteenth cent#ry and
were officially promoted thro#gho#t &apoleon.s empire *1B9411B14R15, !s opposition
to )rench imperialism grew" howe%er" the secret societies offered the emperor.s
opponents a less %isi(le alternati%e to freemasonry
:he first references to the 6ar(onari in so#thern Italy came at precisely the moment when
relations (etween &apoleon I and his (rother-in-law 8oachim +#rat *1GDG11B15," were
(reaking down +#rat had r#led &apoleon.s satellite Kingdom of &aples since 1B9B" (#t
relations with -aris deteriorated to the point that in 1B11 he nearly lost his throne !s
+#rat.s position in the imperial enterprise weakened" he (ecame more dependent on his
&eapolitan s#pporters" who in t#rn pressed for a constit#tion
:his (ecame the principal political platform of the 6ar(onarist lodges" whose name was
adopted from the 6har(onnerie" an informal secret association among the charcoal
(#rners *char(onniers, of the 8#ra +o#ntains (etween )rance and 7wit;erland :he name
seems to ha%e (een taken at random (y a gro#p of )rench officers" hostile to &apoleon"
whose regiment took part in the con<#est of so#thern Italy in 1B9D $ne of the first
6ar(onarist lodges was fo#nded in 6ala(ria (y -ierre-8oseph Briot" a senior )rench
official who was also an #nreconstr#cted 8aco(in and a longtime opponent of Bonaparte.s
dictatorship
:he 6ar(onarists had adopted two alternati%e political pro3ects $ne was the constit#tion
conceded (y the king of 7pain to the 6ortes *legislati%e assem(ly, of 6adi; in 1B1@" and
the other was the %ery different constit#tion that the British had imposed on 7icily in the
same year 7#pport for these demands spread <#ickly" and an ins#rrection in the !(r#;;i
in 1B10 re%ealed strong s#pport in the army as well :he go%ernment immediately (anned
the 6ar(onarist lodges" and in +ilan" &apoleon.s %iceroy E#geZne Bea#harnais did the
same B#t when in 1B14 +#rat defected from the empire" on three separate occasions his
generals demanded a constit#tion as the condition for their s#pport
/E7:$/!:I$&
In so#thern Italy the 6ar(onarist lodges played an important role in the transition of
power after the fall of &apoleon and +#rat and the restoration of the Bo#r(on monarchy
in 1B15 :heir great hope was that the Bo#r(ons wo#ld extend the 7icilian constit#tion to
the whole kingdom" (#t instead it was a(olished !s a res#lt" the lodges (egan to spread
(oth on the mainland and now also in 7icily m#ch to the alarm of the a#thorities
:hose fears were shared more widely as n#mero#s new and old secret societies (egan to
appear all o%er E#rope :hey had a (ewildering panoply of names and pro3ects5 the
!delfi" the =ecisi" the -erfect 7#(lime +asters" the 6alderai" to name only a few 7ome
s#pported the legitimist restorations" others opposed them" and others had their own
pro3ects" like the /#ssian =ecem(rists" the -olish -atriotic 7ociety" and the Greek Netaira
-hilike[ ! growing so#rce of p#(lic alarm" the presence of these conspiracies" real or
imagined" pro%ided the a#thorities with pretexts for draconian p#(lic sec#rity meas#res"
whereas for an in%eterate conspirator like )ilippo +ichele B#onarroti *1GD11 1B0G," a
conspirator in the 1G9D FF6onspiracy of E<#als.. in -aris and now in the safety of Gene%a"
these fears ga%e s#(stance to a re%ol#tionary threat that he knew did not exist (#t dearly
wanted to create
In so#thern Italy the Bo#r(on go%ernment was paraly;ed (y its fear of the 6ar(onari :he
fears grew when an ins#rrection at +acerata in the -apal 7tate in 1B1G was attri(#ted to
19
the 6ar(onari" (#t in &aples the generals reported that the lodges were too many and too
powerf#l for a frontal attack 4hen the 7panish re%ol#tion took place in 8an#ary 1B@9"
so#thern Italy at first seemed calm B#t when a protest (egan in the ca%alry (arracks at
&ola at the (eginning of 8#ly" within days the protest spread to other regiments )aced
with a general m#tiny the monarchy was forced to concede the 7panish constit#tion
:he re%ol#tions in &aples and 7icily in 1B@9 s#cceeded (eca#se the constit#tional
program had o%erwhelming s#pport in the army" (#t there is strong e%idence to s#ggest
that they were planned in the 6ar(onarist lodges" where the constit#tional pro3ect was
prepared and which d#ring the nine months of constit#tional go%ernment played an
important role in maintaining order B#t it was hardly s#rprising that the 6ar(onarist
re%ol#tion in &aples and 7icily rang fresh alarms thro#gh /estoration E#rope and many
now claimed that the secret societies were the in%isi(le hand that linked the re%ol#tions in
7pain" &aples" and 7icily to the 6ato 7treet conspiracy in 'ondon" the m#rder of the d#c
de Berri in )rance and of the 3o#rnalist !#g#st %on Kot;e(#e in Germany in 1B19" which
was the immediate pretext for the draconian 6arls(ad =ecrees
In &o%em(er" -rince 6lemens %on +etternich *1GG011B59, s#mmoned the E#ropean
r#lers to meet at :roppa# in $cto(er to coordinate action against the forces of re%ol#tion
=#ring the meeting" when the tsar" !lexander I" was informed of a m#tiny in one of the
7t -eters(#rg regiments" he immediately detected the work of the secret societies 4ith
the willing complicity of the king of &aples" an !#strian army was dispatched to so#thern
Italy in +arch 1B@1" and the re%ol#tions were cr#shed :he 6ar(onarist lodges were
closed" and their mem(ers arrested or placed #nder police s#r%eillance" dismissed from
p#(lic office" and (anned from the professions
!ccording to +etternich" the 6ar(onari were FFprelates" priests and citi;ens of
disting#ished rank.. In fact" they also incl#ded many artisans and lesser landowners" (#t
o%erwhelmingly the 6ar(onarist lodges ga%e political %oices for the first time to the
pro%incial gentry" of which they were now depri%ed Nowe%er" the police records also
show that their n#m(ers were m#ch smaller than the a#thorities liked to (elie%e" and their
s#ppression ser%ed primarily to 3#stify political p#rges that extended to the entire army"
p#(lic officials" and the clergy
=espite the defeat of the re%ol#tions in &aples and 7icily" elsewhere in E#rope fear of the
secret societies now reached a peak In =ecem(er 1B@1 the 6ar(onari were (anned (y the
pope" (#t the disco%ery of plans (y a )rench 6har(onnerie to stage re%olts in Belfort and
7a#m#r in =ecem(er 1B@1 ca#sed new alarms that were exacer(ated when fo#r sergeants
who were p#t on trial at 'a /ochelle for complicity ref#sed to di%#lge any information
=E6'I&E $) 7E6/E: 7$6IE:IE7
By 1B@4 the panic was s#(siding" E#rope was not in flames" and +etternich decided that
the threat had (een grossly exaggerated all along By now the re%ol#tionaries were also
losing patience" and the failed ins#rrections that took place in the -apal 7tate in 1B01
were the last strike of the 6ar(onari ! year later Gi#seppe +a;;ini *1B9511BG@, fo#nded
2o#ng Italy" the re%ol#tionary society that explicitly re3ected the tradition of secret
conspiracy +a;;ini had (eg#n his career as a mem(er of the 6ar(onari in Genoa" (#t
now he called on Italian re%ol#tionaries to declare themsel%es openly and to proselyti;e
the yo#ng to the national ca#se" acc#sing the 6ar(onari of adhering to the re%ol#tionary
strategies of the )rench 8aco(ins that he (elie%ed to (e o#tdated and #nworka(le
@9
:he 6ar(onari now disappeared as <#ickly as they had materiali;ed ?nder attack from
the re%ol#tionaries and #nder growing press#re from the police" the secret societies came
to (e seen as anachronistic )ormer 6ar(onarists fo#nd new (erths in a %ariety of political
mo%ements" some more some less militant" while others re%erted to mainstream
freemasonry In )rance" for example" the 6har(onnerie made a (rief reappearance d#ring
the 8#ly /e%ol#tion in 1B09 (#t were s#(se<#ently a(sor(ed into the rep#(lican
mo%ement Nowe%er" while the political threat they posed was certainly exaggerated" the
6ar(onari and other secret societies ena(led E#ropean go%ernments to impose e%en
tighter controlsEo%er the press and p#(lic associations (#t also on army officers" p#(lic
ser%ants" the clergy" and the independent professionsEthat remained in force down to
1B4B" and in many cases well (eyond
BIB'I$G/!-N2 =a%is" 8 ! &aples and &apoleon5 /eform" /e%ol#tion" and Empire in
7o#thern Italy" 1G5911B@9 $xford" ?K" forthcoming /o(erts" 8ohn +orris :he
+ythology of the 7ecret 7ocieties &ew 2ork" 19G@ 7pit;er" !lan B $ld Natreds and
2o#ng Nopes5 :he )rench 6ar(onari against the Bo#r(on /estoration 6am(ridge" +ass"
19G1
6!/'7B!= =E6/EE7
:he 6arls(ad =ecrees were a series of meas#res adopted (y the German 6onfederation in
1B19 that esta(lished se%ere limitations on academic and press freedoms and set #p a
federal commission to in%estigate all signs of political #nrest in the German states
:he &apoleonic 4ars had sp#rred the growth of a small (#t infl#ential nationalist
mo%ement in Germany" which garnered some of its most fer%ent s#pporters from among
st#dents and professors !fter the anti-&apoleonic campaigns of 1B101 1B15" st#dent
%eterans ret#rned to their #ni%ersities and fo#nded a series of nationalist fraternities or
B#rschenschaften" which were intended to promote the %al#es of FFGermanness"
militancy" honor" and chastity.. 4hile the B#rschenschaften were acti%e thro#gho#t
Germany.s -rotestant #ni%ersities" the radical h#( of the mo%ement was 8ena :here
st#dents and like-minded professors took ad%antage of the new press freedoms granted in
7axony-4eimar.s 1B1D constit#tion to promote li(eral and nationalist positions and
criti<#e the slow pace of reform in Germany since the 6ongress of Iienna 7axony-
4eimar was also the site of the 4art(#rg )esti%al *$cto(er 1B1G," in which st#dents
gathered to sing nationalist hymns" iss#e %ag#e demands for freedom and #nity" and (#rn
a list of (ooks they deemed reactionary or anti- German :hese de%elopments were
%iewed with alarm (y the !#strian chancellor 6lemens %on +etternich" who saw the
st#dent mo%ement as a serio#s threat to the /estoration order esta(lished at Iienna
+etternich maintained that s#ch radicalism was enco#raged (y an o%erly lenient attit#de
among go%ernment officials in -r#ssia and (y the (roader p#sh toward constit#tional
go%ernment in Baden" Ba%aria" 4Arttem(erg" and 7axony- 4eimar
+etternich was already seeking to clamp down on the B#rschenschaften and their
s#pporters when they pro%ided him with a perfect pretext $n @0 +arch 1B19 the st#dent
@1
Karl 7and assassinated the conser%ati%e playwright !#g#st %on Kot;e(#e in his
apartment in +annheim Kot;e(#e had (een a %ocifero#s critic of the radical nationalist
mo%ement *one of his (ooks was on the list (#rned at the 4art(#rg )esti%al,C moreo%er"
as a prolific and highly s#ccessf#l a#thor of light comedies he was widely seen as the
em(odiment of $ld /egime fri%olity and lasci%io#sness /ecently it had (ecome known
that Kot;e(#e was sending reports on German c#lt#ral affairs to the /#ssian tsar 7and" a
st#dent of theology at 8ena and a mem(er of the local B#rschenschaft" resol%ed to take
matters into his own hands" striking down this FFtraitor.. to the German nation 4ith
Kot;e(#e dead" 7and attempted to kill himself (#t was instead arrested" tried" and
e%ent#ally exec#ted +eanwhile" a deranged st#dent had made an attempt on the life of a
district official in &assa#" adding to the sense of #nrest and imminent re%ol#tion
7and.s act represented a s#(stantial re%ersal for the reform party in -r#ssia" as moderates
like Karl !#g#st %on Narden(erg and Karl %on !ltenstein lost infl#ence with )rederick
4illiam III *r 1G9G11B49, to more reactionary mem(ers of his ca(inet !t a meeting in
:eplit; on 1 !#g#st" +etternich and the -r#ssian king agreed that their states wo#ld take
a common hardline policy against the FFre%ol#tionary party.. in Germany :he o#tlines of
that policy were hammered o#t two weeks later at a conference of ministers from ten
leading German states" which took place in the resort locale of 6arls(ad :he conference
drafted a series of decrees" which were then appro%ed #nanimo#sly at a meeting of the
)ederal =iet on @9 7eptem(er 1B19
:he 6arls(ad =ecrees consisted of fo#r laws :he ?ni%ersity 'aw esta(lished a state
plenipotentiary for each #ni%ersity" who was responsi(le for maintaining proper
discipline and morality :he state go%ernments were o(ligated to remo%e any teacher who
ta#ght s#(%ersi%e doctrines or otherwise a(#sed his a#thority and to enforce existing laws
against secret st#dent organi;ations *that is" the B#rschenschaften, -rofessors fired (y
one #ni%ersity co#ld not (e hired (y another" and st#dents fo#nd g#ilty of in%ol%ement
with the B#rschenschaften were (anned from f#t#re employment in p#(lic office :he
-ress 'aw re<#ired that all (ooks and periodicals shorter than 0@9 pages (e appro%ed (y
a censorship (oard (efore they co#ld (e p#(lished -eriodicals that harmed the interests
of a German state co#ld (e sh#t down and their editors (anned from p#(lishing for as
long as fi%e years !n In%estigati%e 'aw set #p a federal in%estigati%e (ody that was
charged with examining and reporting on all e%idence of political #nrest in Germany
*tho#gh prosec#tion of s#spects was left to the indi%id#al states, )inally" the -ro%isional
Exec#tion $rder granted the 6onfederation the a#thority to take action against states that
failed to s#ppress re%ol#tionary acti%ities within their (orders
:he immediate effect of the 6arls(ad =ecrees was a stifling of li(eral political expression
in Germany :he B#rschenschaften were (anned" li(eral professors were fired" and
st#dents s#spected of illegal acti%ities fo#nd the path to go%ernment office (locked :h#s
-r#ssia and !#stria were a(le to impose an effecti%e conser%ati%e hegemony within the
6onfederation" hampering efforts toward li(eral or constit#tional reform $nce the
decrees attained permanent stat#s in 1B@4" go%ernment spying and censorship (ecame a
way of life in Germany" often lamented in the writings of Neinrich Neine and '#dwig
B\rne 2et the impact of the 6arls(ad =ecrees sho#ld not (e o%erstated !pplication of
these laws was always #ne%en" and opposition fig#res (ecame <#ite skillf#l in skirting the
censors +oreo%er" the /e%ol#tion of 1B09 in )rance wo#ld #nleash a new wa%e of
political #nrest in Germany" which led to new constit#tions in Nanno%er and 7axony and
@@
li(eral reforms in a n#m(er of other states 7till" it re<#ired another re%ol#tion *that of
1B4B, (efore the 6arls(ad =ecrees were finally repealed (y the )ederal =iet in !pril
1B4B
BIB'I$G/!-N2 BAssem" E(erhard =ie Karls(ader Beschl#] sse %on 1B195 =ie
endgAltige 7ta(iliser#ng der resta#rati%en -olitik im =e#tschen B#nd nach dem 4iener
Kongress 1B14R15 Nildesheim" Germany" 19G4 N#(er" Ernst /#dolf =e#tsche
Ierfass#ngsgeschichte seit 1GB9 Iol 15 /eform #nd /esta#ration 1GB9 (is 1B09
7t#ttgart" Germany" 195G 7heehan" 8ames 8 German Nistory" 1GG911BDD $xford" ?K"
19B9 4illiamson" George 7 FF4hat Killed !#g#st %on Kot;e(#eJ5 :he :emptations of
Iirt#e and the -olitical :heology of German &ationalism" 1GB911B19.. 8o#rnal of
+odern Nistory G@" no 4 *@999,5 B991940
6athars
+on#ment memorial in )ield of the B#rned in +ontseg#r" 6athar co#ntry" )rance
In 1@9B" -ope Innocent III *c 11D111@1D, declared the 6athars" a sect of 6hristianity
*also known as the !l(igenses," to (e heretical and condemned the citi;ens of Be;iers"
-erpignan" &ar(onne" :o#lo#se" and 6arcassone to death as Kenemies of the 6h#rchM
7imon de +ontfort *c 11D511@1B," an accomplished military leader" was appointed to
cond#ct a cr#sade against fellow 6hristians" c#lt#red men and women of what is today
so#thern )rance" who the pope had deemed a greater threat to 6hristianity than the
Islamic warriors who had p#mmeled the 6r#saders !ltho#gh it took him nearly @9 years
of warfare against the (eleag#ered !l(igenses" de +ontfort managed to exterminate
199"999 men" women" and children" (efore he himself was killed d#ring the siege of
:o#lo#se in 8#ne 1@1B
!ccording to many contemporary scholars" the 6athars. or !l(igenses. real offense" their
Kheresy"M was their opposition to the sacramental materialism of the medie%al ch#rch
:he gro#p had no fixed" religio#s doctrine" and was known (y %ario#s names :hey
called themsel%es the :r#e 6h#rch of God" and most of the few man#scripts that s#r%i%ed
the flames of siege were all written in -ro%encal" the old lang#age of so#thern )rance"
with e%en fewer written in 'atin !l(i was the town in the pro%ince of 'ang#edoc in
which an ecclesiastical ch#rch co#ncil condemned them as heretics" hence the !l(igenses
designation :he c#lt#ral life of the !l(igenses far o#t-shone that of any other locality in
the E#rope of their day In manners" morals" and learning" o(3ecti%e historians state the
!l(igenses deser%ed respect to a greater extent than the orthodox (ishops and clergy It is
now generally conceded among researchers that the co#rt of :o#lo#se (efore the ra%ages
of 7imon de +ontfort.s siege was the center of a higher type of ci%ili;ation than existed
anywhere else in E#rope at that time
@0
+ost experts on this historical period agree that the nearly 49 years of warfare against the
6athars r#ined the most ci%ili;ed nation in thirteenth-cent#ry E#rope :he pitiless cr#elty
and (r#tal licentio#sness" which was ha(it#al among the 6r#saders" achie%ed new depths
of inh#manity against the !l(igenses &o man was spared in their wrath &o woman was
spared their %iolence It has (een o(ser%ed that no /oman" N#nnish" +#slim" or +ongol
con<#eror e%er annihilated a 6hristian comm#nity with greater sa%agery
7ince most of the !l(igensian comm#nities were first sacked" then (#rned" their records
and their li(raries were destroyed Beca#se the testimony of exactly what the 6athars
really (elie%ed was wr#ng o#t #nder extreme pain from those who s#r%i%ed the
massacres and endless sieges long eno#gh to (e tort#red and (#rned at the stake" it has
(een diffic#lt to gain access to their tr#e (elief str#ct#re #ntil recent times /esearch now
indicates that far from the de%il-worshipping heretics that -ope Innocent III decreed
warranted extermination" the !l(igenses were de%o#t" chaste" tolerant 6hristian
h#manists" who loathed the material excesses of the medie%al ch#rch :hey were
metaphysicians" spirit#al alchemists" her(alists" healers" and social acti%ists with a
pragmatic t#rn of mind 7imiliar expressions of their (elief concepts may (e fo#nd in the
Gnostic Gospels" in the Essenic teachings disco%ered at O#mran" and in the Egyptian
mystery schools
It wo#ld appear that the greatest heresy to the 6hristian 6h#rch lay in the 6athars. denial
that 6hrist e%er li%ed as a man" (#t was a (eing of spirit" m#ch like an angel :hey also
(elie%ed that it was 7atan who created the material world after his exp#lsion from hea%en
when God the )ather" taking pity on his once (right star '#cifer" allowed him se%en days
to see what he might create :he (odies of !dam and E%e were animated (y fallen angels
and directed (y 7atan to (eget children who wo#ld follow the ways of the serpent :o
co#nter the l#st of the flesh inspired (y the de%il" the 6athars preached a(stinence (efore
marriage" chastity" %egetarianism" and non%iolence :hey (elie%ed in a progressi%e
doctrine of reincarnation with the spirits of animals e%ol%ing into h#mans In their %iew"
it was a d#alistic #ni%erse" with good and e%il ha%ing e<#al strength" and they considered
their time in the world as a str#ggle to resist 7atan.s power
In 1@44 +ontseg#r" the last center of !l(igensian resistance" fell" and h#ndreds of
6athars were (#rned at the stake :he head<#arters of the In<#isition was now
esta(lished in the once highly c#lt#red !l(igensian city of :o#lo#se" and the few 6athars
who had managed to escape death d#ring the (loody decades of the cr#sade that had (een
la#nched against them were now at the mercy of the relentless witch and heretic h#nters
+ore /eading Baigent" +ichael" 'eigh" /ichard" and 'incoln" Nenry Noly Blood" Noly
Grail &ew 2ork5 =ell -#(lishing 6o" 19B0 6lifton" 6harles 7 Encyclopedia of Neresies
and Neretics &ew 2ork5 Barnes ^ &o(le" 199@ =elaforge" Gaetan :he :emplar
:radition -#tney" It5 :hreshold Books" 19BG 'ea" Nenry 6harles :he In<#isition of the
+iddle !ges &ew 2ork5 6itadel -ress" 19D0 :re%or-/oper" N / :he E#ropean 4itch-
6ra;e &ew 2ork5 Narper ^ /ow" 19DG
@4
!lfred the Great.s defence against the Iikings
!pril @5" @919
critcalmass Nistory Nistory 'ea%e a comment
! reasona(le attempt at ill#strating the larger si;ed English ships and therefore their
crew.s ad%antage in (attle !lfred responded to the threat (y constr#cting a fleet of large
long(oats" each of which co#ld carry a h#ndred men" to meet and fight off the in%aders
(efore they landed :his na%y.s first (attle was against fo#r =anish ships in the 7to#r
Est#ary in BB@" (#t it was his %ictory o%er the in%ading forces in the :hames est#ary and
off the coast of Essex in B9G that won !lfred the epithet Fthe Great. King !lfred is now
considered to (e" in a way" the fo#nder of the /oyal &a%y
:he treaty with G#thr#m ga%e !lfred the (reathing space he needed to fortify and
re%itali;e 4essex !s the last o#tpost of independent England" it was essential for 4essex
to ha%e an efficient military
:hro#gho#t his realm" !lfred (#ilt strongholds known in !nglo-7axon as (#rhs *the
origin of the modern English word K(oro#ghM, Each held a garrison of a(o#t 1D9 men"
pl#s an #ndetermined n#m(er of ser%ants to do all the cooking" cleaning" and tending of
horses :raditionally the English army mo%ed on foot" (#t !lfred reali;ed that gi%en the
speed with which the Iikings str#ck English targets" the English m#st (e a(le to respond
<#ickly" too :he (#rh garrisons" therefore" were all ca%alrymen )or the same reason" the
king esta(lished his (#rhs in close proximityEnone was more than @9 miles away from
another
:he expense of maintaining the (#rhs fell #pon the local lords" e%en if that lord was a
(ishop *Nigh ch#rchmen had always insisted that they o#ght to (e exempted from s#ch
o(ligations" (#t in times of crisis English kings compelled the (ishops to ass#me their
share of the cost of defending the realm,
!lfred also reorgani;ed 4essex.s army" keeping half of the men on d#ty at any gi%en
time !nd altho#gh !lfred is famo#s as the father of the English &a%y" kings (efore
!lfred had #sed war ships &onetheless" recogni;ing that swift ships were 3#st one more
ad%antage the Iikings held o%er the English" !lfred (ro#ght o%er from )risia *modern-
day Nolland, skilled shipwrights to (#ild his new na%y
/esponding to the sad state of religio#s and intellect#al life in England" !lfred refo#nded
r#ined a((eys and con%ents" (ro#ght o%er learned monks from )rance to reesta(lish
schools" and set the example for the re%i%al of literacy in the land (y personally
translating religio#s and sec#lar (ooks from 'atin into English
G#thr#m ga%e !lfred se%en years to re(#ild his kingdom" (#t then the do#(le-dealing
Iiking (roke the treaty and in%aded 4essex in BB5 and laid siege to /ochester B#t
!lfred.s new military defensi%e meas#res worked +o(ili;ing his standing army" his (#rh
garrisons" and his na%y" he (roke the =anish siege easily" then sent his fleet #p the /i%er
:hames to capt#re 'ondon
In BBD" after se%enteen years of occ#pation #nder the Iikings" 'ondon was in English
hands again !lfred pressed his ad%antage (y re<#iring" in a new treaty with G#thr#m"
that English 6hristians #nder Iiking r#le in the =anelaw en3oy the same legal protections
@5
as the settlers from 7candina%iaC (eaten and h#miliated" G#thr#m agreed )o#r years
later" G#thr#m" apparently witho#t gi%ing !lfred any more tro#(le" died in Nadleigh
:he In%asions 6ontin#e
In spite of G#thr#m.s defeat and death" the Iikings contin#ed to mo#nt sporadic raids on
!lfred.s territory B#t a serio#s in%asion with eighty ships was mo#nted from )rance in
B9@" led (y a Iiking chief named Nastein who had (een terrori;ing the inha(itants of the
'oire Ialley Ne ordered part of his force to disem(ark in Kent" then (eached his ships at
Benfleet in Essex =anes from East !nglia and 2ork 3oined Nastein.s army" (#t once
again !lfred.s military pro%ed its worth :he infantry harried the Iikings" while !lfred.s
na%y destroyed many of Nastein.s long ships in a (attle off the coast of =e%on in B90
!fter se%eral more re%erses on land" Nastein and most of his army retreated #p the old
/oman road" 4ading 7treet" to 6hester
Bad l#ck p#rs#ed Nastein.s army for another three years :he Iikings a(andoned 6hester
in B94 and in%aded northern 4ales" (#t the ferocio#s resistance of the 4elshmen and the
lack of s#pplies forced the Iikings to retreat :he next year they attempted to esta(lish a
(ase on the /i%er 'ea north of 'ondon" no do#(t positioning themsel%es to take the city
(ack from !lfred" (#t the English hit them so hard that the Iikings had to retreat for
safety into the =anelaw" lea%ing their dragon ships (ehind In B9D" the Iikings were
encamped along the 7e%ern when !lfred attacked again :he Iikings scattered5 7ome
went north to 2ork" and others sailed (ack to )rance in hope of easier pl#nder
!s the sole English king of the old stock" !lfred (ecame an inspiration and arg#a(ly e%en
a rallying point for the English" especially for the English in the =anelaw Ne had come
(ack strongly from almost certain annihilation" smashed his enemies" reclaimed his
kingdom" and made that kingdom so strong it co#ld dri%e off or defeat e%ery Iiking
in%asion for the rest of his life
B#t !lfred also reali;ed that there was more to a nation than military strength 7o he
re%i%ed learning and literat#re" reformed the English legal code" fo#nded new
monasteries to replace the ones destroyed (y the Iikings" and (ro#ght o%er monks from
the 6ontinent to get the new comm#nities off to a strong start
/arely has a co#ntry teetered so closely on the (rink of destr#ction than did England in
BGB /arer still has it fallen to one man to (ring his nation (ack from near-disaster 2et
that was the destiny of King !lfredC witho#t him" England as we know it wo#ld not exist
)remde Neeres $st *)oreign !rmies East,
!pril @5" @919
@D
critcalmass Nolding Intelligence 'ea%e a comment
?nder the leadership of 'ie#tenant 6olonel /einhard Gehlen" )oreign !rmies East
directed military espionage against the 7o%iet ?nion It (ecame infamo#s for (l#nders
and contri(#ted to the #ltimate defeat of German in%asion and occ#pation forces in the
7o%iet ?nion
4here the /#ssians really fooled the Germans was in the lead #p to $peration Bagration"
which destroyed !rmy Gro#p 6enter in 8#ne-!#g#st 1944 :he Germans expected the
attack against !rmy Gro#p 7o#th" and had strengthened it at the expense of !G 6enter
:he week (efore the /#ssian assa#lt" 6ol Gehlen predicted a <#iet s#mmer in !G
6enter.s sector 7omehow" he o%erlooked the incident in his memoirs
Beyond do#(t the greatest achie%ement of K+askiro%kaM on a larger scale was to lea%e
the German intelligence #nder Gehlen in ignorance that 7talin had mo%ed 9 armies and 1
tank-corps from 7:!IK!-reser%e to strengthen the central p#sh in -oland :his res#lted
a s#periority of 5-G5 1 *Glant;" 19B9" 49B,
In 8an#ary 1945 German Intelligence represented !rmy Gro#p-! in -oland as facing
odds of 150" whereas the tr#e proportion (y 8an#ary was an altogether o%erwhelming 155
*Gehlen missed the mo%ement of armies from 7:!IK! reser%e" #nderestimating the
n#m(er of /#ssian formations concentrated in and immediately (ehind the 0 Iist#la
(ridgeheads (y wide margin,
&ot that 7o%iet so#rces were any more acc#rate $KN *!rmy Nigh 6ommand, strength
reports show ro#ghly @1 million German soldiers on the Eastern )ront on 1 &o%em(er
1944 pl#s a(o#t @99"999 men in !llied forces :he 7o%iets claim they were opposed (y
01 million -men $n 8an#ary 1945 7o%iet so#rces cite German armor strength at 4"999
tanks and self-propelled g#ns German records show a(o#t 0"599 tanks and self-propelled
g#ns :he 7o%iets credit the Germans with @B"599 g#ns and mortars while German
records show a fig#re of 5"G99 7imilar discrepancies (etween 7o%iet and German data
exist thro#gho#t the war B#t this another moti%e altogetherL
$peration =/?+BE!:" *10 8an#ary119 8#ly 194@,
!pril @5" @919
critcalmass Nolding s#(marine 'ea%e a comment
German ?-(oat offensi%e cond#cted off the ?7 East 6oast" in the 6ari((ean" in the G#lf
of +exico" and off Bra;il
@G
6ommander of German ?-(oats Ii;eadmiral *%ice admiral, Karl =\nit; welcomed the
entry of the ?nited 7tates into the war in =ecem(er 1941 as an opport#nity to widen the
?-(oat offensi%e in the !tlantic In planning $peration -!?KE&76N'!G
*=/?+BE!:," =\nit; intended to operate against the ?nited 7tates and into the
6ari((ean larger :ype I_ ?-(oats with greater operational range Ne wo#ld employ
shorter-range :ype III ?-(oats off &ewfo#ndland and &o%a 7cotia" which were m#ch
closer to his ?-(oat (ases =\nit; re<#ested 1@ :ype I_ (oats from the &a%al 4ar
6ommand for the operation (#t was informed on 19 =ecem(er that he wo#ld ha%e only
D !ltho#gh s#(marine constr#ction had accelerated" there were still too few ?-(oats
a%aila(le Bad weather in the Baltic had also disr#pted ?-(oat training" and the &a%al
4ar 6ommand insisted on maintaining a large n#m(er of ?-(oats in the +editerranean to
assist !xis operations in &orth !frica In the end" :ype I_ %essel ?-1@B was not ready at
the start of the operation" so =\nit; had less than half the force he had re<#ested
$peration =/?+BE!: (egan with only fi%e :ype I_ ?-(oats from the G#lf of 7aint
'awrence to 6ape Natteras" &orth 6arolina 7e%en :ype III ?-(oats went to
&ewfo#ndland and &o%a 7cotia !ll were in place (y mid-8an#ary 194@" and
=/?+BE!: ne%er in%ol%ed more than a do;en German s#(marines at any one time :o
keep the !mericans off (alance" a month after =/?+BE!: was la#nched =\nit;
switched its foc#s to the 6ari((ean" where se%eral Italian s#(marines 3oined operations
:he first %ictim of =/?+BE!:" the British freighter 6yclops" fell %ictim to ?-1@0" a
:ype I_ (oat" on 1@ 8an#ary 194@ $ther sinkings <#ickly followed :he ?nited 7tates
was totally #nprepared for the ?-(oat attacks 6oastal cities were a(la;e with lights at
night" silho#etting the merchant ships plying the coast and making them easy targets
:here were also few escort %essels a%aila(le" and merchant ships sailed independently in
the h#ndreds (eca#se 6hief of &a%al $perations Ernest King ref#sed to instit#te a
con%oy system" (elie%ing that an inade<#ately protected con%oy system was worse than
none !ll this meant that thro#gh !pril 194@" German s#(marines sank @1D %essels
aggregating 1@ million tons in the &orth !tlantic" the %ast ma3ority of these in waters for
which the ?7 &a%y was responsi(le
:his so-called Ksecond happy timeM or Kthe !merican t#rkey shootM for German
s#(marines finally came to an end thro#gh a mandatory (lacko#t of coastal ?7 cities"
the instigation of con%oys and antis#(marine training schools" the relocation of air assets
to antis#(marine d#ties" and the addition of antis#(marine warships &ot only did
merchant shipping losses drop off" (#t increasing n#m(ers of ?-(oats were s#nk
$n 19 8#ly 194@" =\nit; withdrew his last two ?-(oats from the East 6oast of the ?nited
7tates" relocating his s#(marine assets (ack to the mid-!tlantic and signaling an end to
the campaign !merican #npreparedness had come at a high price $peration
=/?+BE!: was arg#a(ly Germany.s most s#ccessf#l s#(marine operation of the entire
war" res#lting in the sinking of some 0 million tons of shipping ?ndo#(tedly" =\nit;
wo#ld ha%e en3oyed e%en greater s#ccess had he (een a(le to employ more ?-(oats at the
offset of the campaign
@B
/eferences Blair" 6lay Nitler.s ?-Boat 4ar Iol 1" :he N#nters" 19091194@ &ew 2ork5
/andom No#se" 199D Gannon" +ichael $peration =r#m(eat5 :he =ramatic :r#e 7tory
of Germany.s )irst ?-Boat !ttacks along the !merican 6oast in 4orld 4ar II &ew 2ork5
Narper and /ow" 1999 +orison" 7am#el Eliot Nistory of ?nited 7tates &a%al
$perations in 4orld 4ar II Iol 1" :he Battle of the !tlantic" 194111940 Boston5 'ittle"
Brown" 1949
4illiam 7holto =o#glas" *)irst Baron =o#glas of Kirtleside, *1B90119D9
!pril @5" @919
critcalmass Nolding Biography 'ea%e a comment
British air chief marshal Born on @0 =ecem(er 1B90 at Neadington" $xfordshire"
4illiam =o#glas was raised in 'ondon Ne attended $xford ?ni%ersity (#t left to 3oin the
/oyal )ield !rtillery at the start of 4orld 4ar I =o#glas soon transferred to the /oyal
)lying 6orps" where he <#alified as a fighter pilot By the end of the war he rose to
s<#adron commander
In 1919" =o#glas left the military to (ecome a test pilot with the Nandley -age !ircraft
6ompany Ne was dissatisfied with ci%ilian life and ret#rned to the /oyal !ir )orce
*/!), in 19@9 as a s<#adron commander Ne attended the Imperial =efense 6ollege In
190D" =o#glas was named director of staff st#dies at the !ir +inistryC he was the only
fighter pilot on the senior staff !d%anced to air %ice marshal" in 190B he (ecame assistant
chief of the air staff with responsi(ility for training
=o#glas was a leading critic of the tactics employed (y head of )ighter 6ommand !ir
6hief +arshal N#gh =owding $n @5 &o%em(er 1949" =o#glas s#cceeded =owding as
head of )ighter 6ommand as air marshal !mong his inno%ations was the Big 4ing
concept of large formations of fighters employed in massi%e sweeps Ne also enco#raged
de%elopment of night-fighting e<#ipment and techni<#es !ltho#gh his new tactics
en3oyed some s#ccess" critics complained that they left m#ch of the British homeland
#nprotected
In =ecem(er 194@" =o#glas was promoted to air chief marshal and assigned to the
+iddle East !ir )orce *+E!), as dep#ty to !ir +arshal !rth#r :edder 4ith the
reorgani;ation of !llied air forces in !pril 1940" =o#glas ass#med command of the
+E!) =#ring the 8#ne 1944 !llied landings in &ormandy" =o#glas was chief of 6oastal
6ommand and commander of British Expeditionary !ir )orce with the mission of
sec#ring control of the English 6hannel
4ith the ret#rn of peace" =o#glas commanded the British !ir )orces of $cc#pation and
was knighted -romoted to marshal of the /!)" in 8#ne 194D he followed )ield +arshal
Bernard +ontgomery as commander of British forces in E#rope and military go%ernor of
the British occ#pation ;one in Germany
@9
=o#glas retired from acti%e d#ty in 194B and was awarded a peerage as )irst Baron
=o#glas of Kirtleside Ne ass#med a seat in the No#se of 'ords and ser%ed on the (oards
of the two British state airlines !fter completing two a#to(iographies" 4illiam 7holto
=o#glas died in &orthampton on @9 $cto(er 19D9
/eferences =o#glas" 4illiam 7holto" with /o(ert 4right 7holto =o#glasE6om(at and
6ommand5 :he 7tory of an !irman in :wo 4orld 4ars &ew 2ork5 7imon and 7ch#ster"
19DD $li%er" =a%id /!) )ighter 6ommand 'ondon5 :rafalgar 7<#are -#(lishers" @999
/ichards" =enis" and Nilary 7t George 7a#nders :he /oyal !ir )orce" 190911945 /e%
ed 0 %ols 'ondon5 Ner +a3esty.s 7tationery $ffice" 19G4119G5
=ixie +ission to 2an.an *2enan, *8#ly 19441+arch 194G,
!pril @5" @919
critcalmass ?ncategori;ed 6hina 'ea%e a comment
:he =ixie +ission in `hongshan s#its" a gift from their hosts- no do#(t finishing their
innocence in the 3a#ndiced eyes of 7enator +c6arthy
?7 !rmy $(ser%er Gro#p sent to 2an.an *2enan," 6hina" to esta(lish a liaison with
6hinese 6omm#nist forces :he =ixie +ission (egan in 8#ly 1944 when a nine-man ?7
!rmy team flew to the head<#arters of 6hinese 6omm#nist leader +ao `edong *+ao
:se-t#ng, at 2an.an in 7haanxi *7hensi, -ro%ince in north central 6hina 6olonel =a%id
= Barrett" a K6hina handM who had st#died the lang#age and ser%ed as a military attachU
to 6hina" headed the mission" which wo#ld contin#e thro#gh 194G It incl#ded officer and
enlisted personnel from all three ser%ices as well as representati%es of the ?7 7tate
=epartment Barrett.s mission was to collect information a(o#t 8apanese and their
Kp#ppetM 6hinese forces order of (attle and operations Ne was also to determine the
extent of the 6omm#nist military effort in the war against 8apan and to coordinate the
search and resc#e of downed !llied pilots in 6omm#nist-controlled areas
! ?7 military mission to the 6omm#nists had first (een s#ggested in mid-1940
'ie#tenant General 8oseph 7tilwell.s political ad%iser" 8ohn -aton =a%ies" (elie%ed
strongly that ?7 ad%isers to +ao.s head<#arters co#ld make a difference (y
coordinating with 6hinese 6omm#nists who were fighting the 8apanese =a%ies drew
parallels to the effort of the !llies to assist the -artisans of :ito *8osip Bro;, in
2#gosla%ia )earing that !merican s#pplies and e<#ipment wo#ld (e di%erted to the
6omm#nists and that ?7 leadership might de%elop a more fa%ora(le %iew of the
6hinese 6omm#nist mo%ement and operations in the territories held (y them"
Generalissimo 8iang 8ieshi *6hiang Kai-shek, strongly opposed the mission to 2an.an
)or the next year" the ?nited 7tates contin#ed to press#re 8iang to allow this mission to
go forward" (#t not #ntil after the 8#ne 1944 %isit of ?7 Iice -resident Nenry !
4allace co#ld s#fficient press#re (e exerted on 8iang to allow the liaison mission to
(egin
6omm#nist official representati%e to the national go%ernment at 6hong<ing *6h#ngking,
`ho# Enlai *6ho# En-lai," who saw potential in a f#t#re colla(oration (etween the ?nited
7tates and the /ed !rmy in the fight against the 8apanese" s#pported an increase in
09
!merican presence and the liaison effort By !#g#st 1944" Barrett and a team that
e%ent#ally n#m(ered more than @9 people" incl#ding 7tate =epartment officials 8ohn 7
7er%ice and /aymond - '#dden" (egan to meet with the most senior political and
military leadership of the 6omm#nist mo%ement and to gather information a(o#t the
8apanese and their allies as well as the 6hinese 6omm#nists :he mission also pro%ided
the opport#nity in &o%em(er for +a3or General -atrick 8 N#rley" in his capacity as a
special emissary of ?7 -resident )ranklin = /oose%elt" to (egin an effort to get the two
6hinese factions to foc#s their efforts on fighting the 8apanese rather than each other
=#ring the co#rse of the mission" the =ixie gro#p sec#red the resc#e and ret#rn of more
than 199 !merican pilots
:he mission ser%ed perhaps its most important f#nction after the war as a (ridge (etween
the ?nited 7tates and the 6hinese 6omm#nists ! mission headed (y General George 6
+arshall (ro#ght the two sides to the negotiating ta(le in an effort to sec#re a sol#tion to
the infighting in 6hina that had (een going on for decades :he collapse of the +arshall
mission in 8an#ary 194G led to the end of the o(ser%er mission
/eferences Barrett" =a%id = =ixie +ission5 :he ?nited 7tates !rmy $(ser%er Gro#p in
2enan" 1944 6hina /esearch +onograph &#m(er 7ix Berkeley5 ?ni%ersity of
6alifornia -ress" 19G9 6arter" 6arolle 8 +ission to 2enan5 !merican 'iaison to the
6hinese 6omm#nists" 19441194G 'exington5 ?ni%ersity -ress of Kent#cky" 199G
/oman#s" 6harles )" and /iley 7#nderland 7tilwell.s 6ommand -ro(lems 4ashington"
=65 ?7 Go%ernment -rinting $ffice" 19B5
'I&K
Strategic Egypt
!pril @5" @919
critcalmass Nistory 6olonial" Nistory 'ea%e a comment
! col#mn of !xis prisoners capt#red in 'i(ya nearing the massi%e walls of the 6itadel of
6airo" showing the +ohamed !li +os<#e *a(o%e, and the +os<#e of 7#ltan Nassan
7trategically located in northeast !frica" Egypt was %ital to the British effort in 4orld
4ar II to protect the 7#e; 6anal and lines of comm#nication to +iddle East oil fields In
1909" Egypt had a pop#lation of a(o#t 1D million people
:he British had taken control of Egypt in 1BB@ to sec#re the 7#e; 6anal 7#pposedly"
they had inter%ened to Krestore order"M (#t the British stayed 'ondon ended its
protectorate in 19@@ and granted Egypt independence as a constit#tional monarchy with
ad#lt male s#ffrage" (#t it did not relin<#ish a#thority in key areas Great Britain retained
control o%er defense" imperial comm#nications *the 7#e; 6anal," protection of foreign
interests and minorities" and the 7#dan In !#g#st 190D" the same year King )aro#k came
to the throne" Britain signed a treaty with Egypt where(y it retained the right to defend
the 7#e; 6anal #ntil the Egyptian army co#ld do so :he Egyptian go%ernment also
agreed that" in the e%ent of war" it wo#ld grant f#ll #se of Egyptian facilities to the
British
01
:hro#gho#t 4orld 4ar II" -ort 7aid and !lexandria remained ma3or British (ases for
operations in the eastern +editerranean !s head<#arters of the +iddle East 7#pply
6enter" the Egyptian capital of 6airo was the transit point for half a million British and
6ommonwealth troops 6airo was also the head<#arters of the +iddle East 6ommand"
and the city remained a ha%en for agents and spies Egyptian nationalists were acti%e"
with many Egyptians" incl#ding )aro#k and -rime +inister !li +ahir" hoping for an !xis
military %ictory in the war and f#ll independence for Egypt
!ltho#gh )aro#k was the constit#tional monarch" British !m(assador +iles 'ampson
exercised real power !t the (eginning of the war" the British insisted on the imposition of
martial law and strict censorship and the arrest of German nationals :he Egyptian
go%ernment ended diplomatic relations with Germany" (#t Egypt did not declare war
against Germany or" later" Italy $nly rel#ctantly did !li +ahir allow the confiscation of
Italian property in Egypt Ne also ref#sed permission for (order g#ards to fire on Italian
troops In 8#ne 1949" the British insisted that )aro#k replace !li +ahir Nis replacement
was Nasan 7a(ri" a moderate
$n 1G 7eptem(er 1949" Italian forces in%aded Egypt =espite a pledge that it wo#ld
declare war if this happened" the Egyptian go%ernment merely declared a state of
non(elligerency In &o%em(er 1949" -rime +inister 7a(ri died and was replaced (y
N#sayn 7irry" who headed a coalition go%ernment !xis air attacks on 6airo in 8#ne 1941
killed some D99 people" (#t Egyptian sentiment remained hea%ily anti- British :hat
winter" conditions in Egypt worsened with se%ere shortages of many goods" incl#ding
food Bread riots occ#rred in 6airo in 8an#ary 194@ 4ith General Erwin /ommel.s
forces closing on 6airo" nationalist demonstrations in the capital occ#rred in fa%or of an
!xis %ictory" and 7irry resigned in early )e(r#ary :he British then insisted that )aro#k
appoint as -rime +inister +#stafa &ahas" the pro- British head of the 4afd nationalist
party 4hen )aro#k hesitated" British armored cars and troops s#rro#nded the palace" and
'ampson demanded his a(dication )aro#k then ac<#iesced" and &ahas formed a
go%ernment
:hro#gho#t 194@" pro-!xis sentiment remained strong" e%en among the elites and the
Egyptian army )ollowing the &o%em(er 194@ Battle of El !lamein" (oth the !xis threat
to Egypt and British a#thority s#(sided =espite )aro#k.s repeated efforts to remo%e him
from office" &ahas remained as prime minister #ntil $cto(er 1944" when the British
allowed )aro#k to replace him with 7aadist leader !hmad +ahir :he new prime minister
sec#red Egyptian declarations of war against Germany and 8apan" (#t he was
assassinated shortly thereafter" in )e(r#ary 1945 :he declarations of war were formally
proclaimed on @D )e(r#ary 1945" allowing Egypt to (ecome a fo#nding mem(er of the
?nited &ations
!s elsewhere in !frica and the +iddle East" 4orld 4ar II heightened nationalism and
anti-colonialism )ollowing )aro#k.s a(dication in 195@" the last British troops departed
the co#ntry in 1954 Egypt did not gain its f#ll so%ereignty" howe%er" #ntil 195D and the
7#e; de(acle
/eferences B#tt" Gerald :he 'ion in the 7and5 :he British in the +iddle East 'ondon5
Blooms(#ry" 1995 6ooper" !rtemis 6airo in the 4ar" 190911945 'ondon5 N Namilton"
19B9 Iatikiotis" E 8 :he +odern Nistory of Egypt 'ondon5 4eidenfeld and &icolson"
19B9
0@
Battle of Leyte
General =o#glas +ac!rth#r" s#preme !llied commander in the -acific" was eager to
(egin the campaign to retake the -hilippines" which he had (een forced to a(andon at the
(eginning of the war Nis forces had capt#red +orotai" (etween &ew G#inea and
+indanao" e%en as the III +arine 6orps had con<#ered -eleli# and !nga#r in the central
-acific :his p#t ?7 land forces in a position to (egin the recon<#est of the -hilippines
Nowe%er" after !dmiral 4illiam KB#llM Nalsey" in command of the :hird ?7 )leet"
enco#ntered little 8apanese opposition at the Battle of +indanao d#ring 7eptem(er 9119"
1944" +ac!rth#r resol%ed to (ypass the so#thern -hilippines and make a direct assa#lt
on 'eyte" in the center of the -hilippine island gro#p 7#pporting the in%asion was the
spectac#lar na%al Battle of 'eyte G#lf
:he in%asion was to (e carried o#t (y the 7ixth ?7 !rmy #nder 4alter Kr#eger with
__II 6orps *8ohn Nodge, and _ 6orps *)ranklin 7i(ert, $pposing Kr#eger was the
:hirty-fifth 8apanese !rmy *7#;#ki 7osak#, :he ?7 landings were carried o#t (y the
?7 7e%enth )leet *:homas Kinkaid, with air defense s#pplied (y na%al a%iators as well
as the 7o#thwest -acific !ir )orces *George Kenney,
$n $cto(er 1G11B" army /angers took the small islands g#arding the eastern entrance to
'eyte G#lf :he na%y la#nched a two-ho#r (om(ardment on $cto(er @9" after which fo#r
infantry di%isions landed on the east coast of 'eyte (etween :aclo(an and =#lag" 1G
miles to the so#th :wo di%isions of _ 6orps on the right and two di%isions of __II
6orps on the left fo#ght inland from the (eachheads in a fo#r-day (attle that sec#red
operational airfields It was &o%em(er @ (efore 7ixth !rmy gained control of the 'eyte
Ialley" from 6arigara on the north coast to !(#yog in the so#theast !fter this" on the left"
the Gth Infantry crossed the island to Bay(ay on the west coast
-rogress had (een slow (#t s#(stantial Nowe%er" torrential rains and increased resistance
from consolidated 8apanese forces in the mo#ntaino#s interior (ro#ght the !merican
ad%ance to a crawl =etermined to pre%ent the !mericans from taking the -hilippines"
2amashita :omoy#ki" the 8apanese commander in charge of the islands" f#nneled
reinforcements to 'eyte from s#rro#nding islands Between $cto(er @0 and =ecem(er
11" a(o#t 45"999 8apanese troops landed at $rmoc on the island.s west coastEe%en
tho#gh the ?7 &a%y had decimated 8apanese sea forces
/ecogni;ing the #rgent necessity of stopping the 8apanese (#ild#p" General Kr#eger
la#nched a two-pronged offensi%e into the $rmoc Ialley (eginning in &o%em(er $n the
right" _ 6orps" reinforced (y the 0@nd Infantry =i%ision" attacked the %illage of 'imon"
which was the northern entryway into the %alley 'imon did not fall #ntil =ecem(er 19
$n the left" the 11th !ir(orne =i%ision 3oined __II 6orps" as the Gth Infantry made a
thr#st across the island" at Balogo" on &o%em(er @@ :wo weeks after this" the main
assa#lt on $rmoc got #nder way when the GGth Infantry landed at Ipil $rmoc was
00
sec#red (y =ecem(er 19" and the GGth made contact with the Gth =i%ision :he two #nits
now ad%anced #p (oth ends of the $rmoc Ialley and con%erged at 'i(#ngao on
=ecem(er @9 7ix days later" on 6hristmas =ay" -alompon" the last 8apanese-held port on
'eyte" fell $n =ecem(er @D" the Eighth ?7 !rmy */o(ert Eichel(erger, ass#med
command on the island *as __II 6orps left for the $kinawa 6ampaign, and spent the
next fo#r months in diffic#lt mop-#p operations
Iictory on 'eyte cost the !mericans 15"5B4 cas#alties" incl#ding 0"5B4 killedC 8apanese
losses totaled more than G9"999 men
)#rther reading5 6#tler" :homas 8 :he Battle of 'eyte G#lf5 @01@D $cto(er 1944
!nnapolis" +d5 &a%al Instit#te -ress" @991C Iego" +ilan & Battle for 'eyte" 19445
!llied and 8apanese -lans" -reparations" and Exec#tion !nnapolis" +d5 &a%al Instit#te
-ress" @995C 4illmott" N - :he Battle of 'eyte G#lf5 :he 'ast )leet !ction
Bloomington5 Indiana ?ni%ersity -ress" @995
'I&K
:he Battle of 'eyte G#lf
!pril @4" @919
critcalmass Nolding &a%al Battle 'ea%e a comment
:he Battle of 'eyte G#lf was fo#ght d#ring $cto(er @01@D" 1944" in response to the
attempt of 8apanese na%al forces to disr#pt and destroy ?7 landings on the -hilippine
island of 'eyte :he Battle of 'eyte G#lf de%eloped into the largest na%al (attle of any
war and was also disting#ished (y the first kamika;e attacks
'earning where the !merican landings on 'eyte were to take place" !dmiral :oyoda
7oem#" commander in charge of the 8apanese 6om(ined )leet" la#nched $peration 7ho-
Go *Iictory," (y which he intended to draw the :hird ?7 )leet *#nder !dmiral 4illiam
KB#llM Nalsey, into (attle north of 'eyte G#lf so that the 8apanese na%al forces co#ld
catch the landing forces as well as the smaller 7e%enth ?7 )leet *#nder Iice !dmiral
:homas Kinkaid," which was co%ering the landing" in a massi%e do#(le en%elopment" or
pincers 4hereas in pre%io#s (attles" ?7 &a%y commanders had en3oyed the ad%antage
of ?ltra decrypts" which ga%e them extensi%e knowledge of 8apanese radio
comm#nications" the 8apanese changed codes (efore 'eyte G#lf and maintained a high
degree of radio silence :oyoda.s trap %ery nearly s#cceeded
:oyoda assigned Iice !dmiral $;awa 8isa(#ro" commander in charge of the +o(ile
)orce" tactical command of $peration 7ho-Go $;awa di%ided his ships" incl#ding the
04
two largest (attleships e%er (#ilt" 2amato and +asashi" fi%e con%entional (attleships" and
1D cr#isers" into two striking forces" #nder Iice !dmirals K#rita :akeo and Kiyohicle
7hima $;awa himself led a decoy fleet" incl#ding fo#r aircraft carriers" to l#re Nalsey to
the north while K#rita and 7hima closed the pincers ! portion of 7hima.s force" in
company with a n#m(er of K#rita.s ships *#nder Iice !dmiral 7he3o &ishim#ra," were
detailed to sail into the 'eyte G#lf %ia 7#rigao 7trait" while K#rita approached the g#lf (y
way of the 7an Bernardino 7trait :he rest of 7hima.s force escorted 8apanese troop
reinforcements to 'eyte Island
$n $cto(er @4" :ask )orce 0B" #nder Iice !dmiral +arc +itscher" la#nched air strikes
against K#rita as his ships crossed the 7i(#yan 7ea" sinking one (attleship" damaging
others" and prompting K#rita to re%erse co#rse for a time K#rita.s excess of ca#tion p#t
him (ehind sched#le" (#t Nalsey o%erestimated the damage that had (een done to him
and disco#nted K#rita as a threat :his played into the 7ho-Go plan 4ith K#rita
apparently o#t of the way" Nalsey p#rs#ed $;awa.s decoy fleet
:he trap was set" (#t ?7 -: (oats *followed (y destroyers" then (attleships and cr#isers,
attacked &ishim#ra as he entered 7#rigao 7trait on the night of $cto(er @4 &ishim#ra
was killed and all ships (#t a single destroyer of his force were s#nk 7hima" who had
(een following &ishim#ra" withdrew witho#t 3oining the fight :h#s one arm of the
8apanese pincer was destroyed &e%ertheless" the other arm" K#rita.s force" was still
intactC K#rita sailed into the g#lf %ia the 7an Bernardino 7trait on the morning of $cto(er
@5 ! ?7 escort carrier gro#p #nder /ear !dmiral 6lifton 7prag#e sighted the force off
7amar Island Both the !merican and the 8apanese commanders were taken (y s#rprise"
(#t K#rita ass#med that 7prag#e.s ships were part of a m#ch larger force and therefore
ordered his ships to attack independently rather than risk committing his entire force Nad
he #sed all that was a%aila(le to him" he co#ld easily ha%e destroyed 7prag#e.s
o#tn#m(ered" o#tg#nned escort carriers !s it t#rned o#t" howe%er" in independent action
7prag#e.s aircraft s#nk two 8apanese cr#isers" and torpedo fire from a ?7 destroyer
damaged a third cr#iser 7prag#e lost two of his escort carriers" one of them to a
kamika;e attack :wo of his destroyers and a destroyer escort were also s#nk" while a
n#m(er of other ships s#stained serio#s damage It was perhaps the most desperate na%al
engagement of the -acific war" (#t K#rita" pres#ma(ly short on f#elEand do#(tless still
fearing the presence of a larger forceEs#ddenly (roke off the engagement and withdrew
In the meantime" !dmiral Kinkaid had radioed Nalsey" who was in fighting p#rs#it of
$;awa" for aid Nalsey responded (y sending one of +itscher.s task gro#ps so#th to
engage K#rita 2et he apparently did not f#lly reali;e the desperate nat#re of the sit#ation
in 'eyte G#lf and therefore retained some ships #nder /ear !dmiral 4illis ! 'ee to
contin#e the fight against $;awa *who had already lost fo#r carriers to +itscher," rather
than send them so#th to c#t off K#rita.s escape $nly after 'ee was within range of what
remained of $;awa did Nalsey" at last waking to the f#ll danger to the 'eyte landings and
the ?7 7e%enth )leet" order 'ee to (reak off and steam so#th as well ! smaller force
contin#ed to p#rs#e $;awa" and two more ships were s#nk" (#t $;awa ne%ertheless
managed to escape complete annihilation !s for 'ee" the delay imposed (y Nalsey meant
that he arri%ed in the g#lf too late to intercept K#rita
05
:he Battle of 'eyte G#lf was a great !merican %ictory" al(eit flawed (y Nalsey.s
mis3#dgment :he 8apanese lost three (attleships" fo#r aircraft carriers" 19 cr#isers" and
nine destroyers as well as many aircraft +ost important" the 8apanese failed to disr#pt
the 'eyte landings" there(y %irt#ally ens#ring that the !mericans wo#ld retake the
-hilippines
)#rther reading5 6#tler" :homas 8 :he Battle of 'eyte G#lf5 @01@D $cto(er 1944
!nnapolis" +d5 &a%al Instit#te -ress" @991C 4illmott" N - :he Battle of 'eyte G#lf5
:he 'ast )leet !ction Bloomington5 Indiana ?ni%ersity -ress" @995
Battle of '#;on
!pril @4" @919
critcalmass Nolding Battles 'ea%e a comment
Iictory on land at the Battle of 'eyte" in concert with the na%al %ictory in the Battle of
'eyte G#lf" was the opening act in =o#glas +ac!rth#r.s promised ret#rn to the
-hilippines :hese two (attles allowed +ac!rth#r to la#nch an amphi(io#s in%asion of
'#;on" the principal island of the %ast -hilippine archipelago
-reliminary to the in%asion of '#;on was the landing (y ?7 Eighth !rmy #nits #nder
/o(ert Eichel(erger on +indoro" so#th of '#;on" on =ecem(er 15" 1945 !t 7an 8osU"
the infantry sec#red a large (eachhead and immediately scratched o#t two airfields to
accommodate air s#pport for the '#;on operation
$n '#;on" 8apanese general 2amashita :omoy#ki prepared his defenses (y di%iding the
)o#rteenth 8apanese !rmy into three defensi%e gro#ps5 7ho(# *149"999 men, in the
north" Kem(# *09"999, in the center" and 7him(# *B9"999, in the so#th :he 8apanese also
#nleashed a massi%e kamika;e campaign against the ships of the :hird )leet *#nder
4illiam Nalsey," which f#rnished carrier-la#nched air s#pport" and the 7e%enth )leet
*:homas Kinkaid," which pro%ided principal transport for the ?7 7ixth !rmy in%aders
#nder 4alter Kr#eger Kamika;e attacks sank @9 ?7 ships and se%erely damaged
another @4
Kr#eger landed at 'ingayen G#lf on 8an#ary 9" 1945EDB"999 men in that first dayEand
immediately (egan a dri%e inland" penetrating 49 miles (y 8an#ary @9 I 6orps" which
p#shed eastward" enco#ntered the hea%iest initial opposition from 2amashita.s 7ho(#
Gro#p Eichel(erger kept po#ring in reinforcements" incl#ding the 15Bth /egiment" the
0D
@5th Infantry =i%ision" and the 0@nd Infantry =i%ision *&ota(ly" d#ring this titanic
(attle" a detachment of army /angers staged a raid (ehind 8apanese lines to li(erate
se%eral h#ndred !llied prisoners at 6a(anat#an,
4hile I 6orps and its reinforcements sl#gged it o#t with 7ho(# gro#p" _II 6orps" to the
right of I 6orps" ad%anced rapidly so#thward across the 6entral -lain of '#;on It
reached 6lark )ieldEheld (y the 8apanese since the (eginning of the warEon 8an#ary
@0 and" within a week" sec#red this ma3or (ase installation while also penetrating @5
miles farther so#th to 6al#mpit
:o the right of _II 6orps" _I 6orps landed at 7an !ntonio on 8an#ary @9 and s<#ared off
against Kem(# gro#p )ighting in concert with )ilipino g#errillas" the 0Bth and @4th
Infantry di%isions of _I 6orps sealed off the Bataan -enins#la after Bataan and
6orregidor had (een li(erated $n )e(r#ary @" Kr#eger sent _II 6orps on a rapid
ad%ance to +anila" the 1st 6a%alry =i%ision reaching the o#tskirts of the )ilipino capital
on the night of )e(r#ary 014" li(erating 0"599 !llied prisoners held at 7anto :omas
?ni%ersity $n the following night" the 0Gth Infantry ad%anced into northwestern +anila
and li(erated another 1"099 prisoners from Bili(id -rison
:he 8apanese withdrew (ehind the -asig /i%er" where they mo#nted a desperate
resistance" holding off the ?7 ad%ance for a month and" in the process" ra;ing most of
+anila In this com(at of attrition" 1D"999 8apanese defenders died (efore +anila fell to
?7 forces on +arch 4
=#ring the fight for +anila" I 6orps" to the north" str#ggled against the 7ho(# gro#p
defenses in r#gged mo#ntaino#s terrain :he Dth Infantry (roke thro#gh Bonga(on to the
east coast on )e(r#ary 14" 1945" then mo%ed to the +anila front Bag#io" the -hilippine
s#mmer capital" fell on !pril @G" followed (y 7anta )e" a ma3or 8apanese comm#nications
center" on +ay @G :hese two cities taken" the 0Gth =i%ision ad%anced down 6agayan
Ialley" (y 8#ne @D splitting the 7ho(# gro#p in two" rendering (oth fragments incapa(le
of mo#nting any significant co#nterattack
In the meantime" to the so#thEeast of +anilaE_I 6orps confronted the 7him(# gro#p.s
defensi%e line :he Dth and 40rd Infantry and the 1st 6a%alry (ecame all (#t stalled in the
7ierra +adre" p#shing (ack 8apanese defenders (y inches Elements of _II 6orps also
dro%e so#theast toward and down the Bicol -enins#la" where resistance was not ended
#ntil 8#ne 1
$n 8#ly 1 the Eighth !rmy took o%er the campaign on '#;on" freeing #p the 7ixth !rmy
for the planned in%asion of 8apan sched#led to (egin in the fall $n 8#ly 4" General
+ac!rth#r declared '#;on sec#re
)#rther reading5 +orison" 7am#el Eliot Nistory of ?nited 7tates &a%al $perations in
4orld 4ar II5 :he 'i(eration of the -hilippinesE'#;on" +indanao" the Iisayas" 19441
1945 ?r(ana5 ?ni%ersity of Illinois -ress" @999
0G
-yaw(we 1945
!pril @0" @919
critcalmass ?ncategori;ed B#rma 'ea%e a comment
:ho#gh the !llied force had ad%anced s#ccessf#lly into central B#rma" it was %ital to
capt#re of the port of /angoon (efore the monsoon rains (egan :he temporarily
#pgraded o%erland ro#tes from India wo#ld disintegrate #nder hea%y rain" which wo#ld
also c#rtail flying and red#ce the amo#nt of s#pplies which co#ld (e deli%ered (y air
)#rthermore" 7o#th East !sia 6ommand had (een notified that many of the !merican
transport aircraft allocated to the theatre wo#ld (e withdrawn in 8#ne at the latest :he
#se of /angoon wo#ld (e necessary to meet the needs of the large army force and *as
importantly, the food needs of the ci%ilian pop#lation in the areas li(erated
:he British @nd =i%ision and British 0Dth =i%ision were withdrawn to India to red#ce the
demand for s#pplies :he Indian ___III 6orps" consisting of the Indian Gth =i%ision and
Indian @9th =i%ision" mo#nted )o#rteenth !rmy.s secondary dri%e down the Irrawaddy
/i%er %alley" against stiff resistance from the 8apanese :wenty-Eighth !rmy Indian II
6orps made the main attack" down the K/ailway IalleyM" which was also followed (y the
7ittang /i%er

British !rmy -atrol at the Battle of the 7ittang Bend
:he Indian 1Gth =i%ision and @55th !rmo#red Brigade (egan II 6orps. ad%ance on D
!pril (y striking from all sides at the delaying position held (y the remnants of 8apanese
:hirty-:hird !rmy #nder 'ie#tenant General Nonda at -yaw(we" while a flanking
col#mn *nicknamed K6la#dcolM, of tanks and mechani;ed infantry c#t the main road
(ehind them and attacked their rear :his col#mn was initially delayed (y the remnants of
the 8apanese 49th =i%ision defending a %illage" (#t (ypassed them to defeat the remnants
of the 8apanese 50rd =i%ision and destroy the last tanks remaining to the 8apanese 14th
:ank regiment !s they then t#rned north against the town of -yaw(we itself" they
attacked Nonda.s head<#arters (#t were not aware of the presence of an army
head<#arters and (roke off the attack" to capt#re the town instead
:he 9th Battalion :he Border /egiment at -yaw(we
By 8an#ary 1945 the Battalion was at f#ll strength again and on its way (ack at Imphal"
this time no longer in its 'ight role" (#t as +otorised Infantry working with -ro(ynZs
Norse of @55 :ank Brigade
:he o(3ecti%e was +eiktila" some 559 miles f#rther 7o#th" and in )e(r#ary 1945 it
crossed the Irrawaddy near -agan and swept on to +eiktila" where" after some se%ere
fighting with the remainder of the 1Gth =i%ision it esta(lished itself and c#t off the
8apaneseZs main comm#nication with +andalay
General 6owan was not the man to sit tight and let the enemy attack him Instead he
so#ght to destroy the enemy (efore they were ready to attack" and this he achie%ed (y
0B
attacking them in their forming #p places " with com(ined Infantry and :ank Battle
Gro#ps
:he 9th Battalion :he Border /egiment took part in se%eral s#ch actions" nota(ly at
4etlet" 2indaw" Kinde and -ywa(we It was after the last (attle that the enemy finally
(roke and made for the 7ittang /i%er" a(andoning its hold on /angoon :he Battalion
p#rs#ed the enemy some @99 miles to -eg# when it ga%e #p the chase with the onset of
the monsoon and the conse<#ent flooding of the -eg# /i%er It then ret#rned northwards
to -enwegon to pre%ent some 15"999 of the enemy" who were c#t off (y o#r rapid
ad%ance" from crossing the main +eikilaR-eg# road" and from reaching safety on the east
(ank of the 7ittang /i%er
7ittang Breako#t
@B !rmy had retreated into the -eg# 2omas" a range of low 3#ngle-co%ered hills (etween
the Irrawaddy and 7ittang ri%ers" after withdrawing from !rakan and resisting ___III
6orps It planned to (reak o#t and re3oin B#rma !rea !rmy :o co%er this (reako#t"
Kim#ra ordered Nonda.s 00 !rmy to mo#nt a di%ersionary offensi%e across the 7ittang
altho#gh the entire army co#ld m#ster the strength of (arely a regiment $n 8#ly 0"
Nonda.s troops attacked British positions in the K7ittang BentM !fter a (attle for co#ntry
which was almost entirely #nder chest-high water" (oth the 8apanese and Indian B9th
Brigade withdrew on 8#ly 19
Nonda had attacked too early 7ak#rai.s @B !rmy was not ready to start the (reako#t #ntil
8#ly 1G :he (reako#t was a disaster :he British had capt#red the 8apanese plans from an
officer killed making a final reconnaissance and had placed am(#shes or artillery
concentrations on the ro#tes they were to #se N#ndreds of men drowned trying to cross
the swollen 7ittang on impro%ised (am(oo floats and rafts B#rma &ational !rmy #nder
General !#ng 7an already had re(elled against 8apan in +arch 7o B#rmese g#erillas
also killed stragglers east of the ri%er :he (reako#t cost the 8apanese nearly 19"999 men"
half the strength of @B !rmy !nd after this" many of those s#r%i%ors had to keep
straggling witho#t knowing the 8apanese s#rrender on !#g#st 15" 1945
>
By the (eginning of !#g#st 1945 the Battalion was stationed at 4aw" 3#st west of the
7ittang /i%er" where it recei%ed the welcome" (#t to them the #n(elie%a(le news of the
8apanese 7#rrender By then a f#rther 5 $fficers and D9 $ther /anks had lost their li%es"
and 9 $fficers and 1@@ $ther /anks had (een wo#nded
In 7eptem(er the Battalion (egan the task of disarming some @"999 8apanese and
controlling the acti%ity of dacoits on the +okpalin and Bilin areas $n the 1st =ecem(er
1945 the Battalion amalgamated with the 4th Battalion" taking on the name of the latter
:h#s after fi%e and a half years the Battalion ceased to exist
=#ring its short life the Battalion contri(#ted to the adding of D Battle Nono#rs to the
/egiments 'ist
't 6ol 8ohn -etty was awarded the +6 when +a3or of KBM 6ompany 9 Border at
-2!4B4E
Nis citation said"
=#ring the whole engagement +a3or -ettyZs tactical skill" flexi(ility in planning" and
personal example were o#tstanding Ne seemed to (e ha%ing the time of his life and all
ranks in his 6ompany were im(#ed with the highest confidence in themsel%es and in their
6ompany 6ommander
09
:he cas#alty fig#res for KBM 6ompany for the day were 9@ 8aps killed for 19 wo#nded in
the 6ompany" six of them in the shelling (efore KNM ho#r
49
!llied /e-con<#est of B#rma
!pril @0" @919
critcalmass ?ncategori;ed B#rma" 6olonial 'ea%e a comment
In +arch 1940" 't Gen Kawa(e +asaka;# ass#med command of the 8apanese )ifteenth
!rmy" and" in !#g#st" B#rmese independence *#nder strict 8apanese control, was
proclaimed )or their part" in $cto(er" the !llies reorgani;ed the 6BI (y forming the
7o#th-East !sia 6ommand *7E!6, #nder 7lim ! (rilliant" reso#rcef#l" and aggressi%e
commander" 7lim planned what he hoped wo#ld (e a comprehensi%e co#nteroffensi%e
against the many 8apanese ad%ances In !rakan" a long" narrow strip of land along the
eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal in so#thern B#rma" British 't Gen 7ir !lexander
)rank -hilip 6hristison wo#ld take _I 6orps so#th against !kya( 7im#ltaneo#sly"
!merican 't Gen 8oseph ! KIinegar 8oeM 7tilwell wo#ld lead ?7 and ?7-trained
6hinese forces *&orthern !rea 6om(at 6ommand, in coordination with forces #nder
6hiang Kai-shek to occ#py +yitkyina" a northern B#rmese stronghold of the 8apanese
:he o(3ecti%e of this ad%ance" which wo#ld also (e s#pported (y 6hindits #nder British
commander $rde 4ingate" was to allow the completion of the 'edo /oad" an alternati%e
s#pply ro#te into 6hina intended to replace the B#rma /oad" which the 8apanese now
controlled 6oordinated with these two operations was a third" on the !ssam front in
central B#rma :he 1Gth and @9th Indian =i%isions" commanded (y 't Gen Geoffrey
7coones" ad%anced on reconnaissance patrols deep into 8apanese-held co#ntry
:he 8apanese responded (y creating a new army in !rakan" the :wenty-eighth" and" in
northern B#rma" the :hirty-third $peration Na-Go was la#nched in !rakan to s#rro#nd
the !llied forces there It s#pplemented the Imphal $ffensi%e" a plan to in%ade India from
B#rma :o the profo#nd shock of the 8apanese" howe%er" (oth operations were defeated"
the fail#re of the Imphal $ffensi%e in +arch 1944 pro%ing to (e the worst defeat in
8apanese military history to that time
8#st to the north of the !ssam front" 7tilwell led two 6hinese di%isions and the !merican
%ol#nteer rangers code named Galahad (#t (etter known as +errill.s +ara#ders *see
)rank =ow +errill, E%en as the 8apanese were s#ffering defeat in their Imphal
$ffensi%e" in +arch 1944" 7tilwell p#shed them o#t of the N#kawng Ialley By hard
pers#asion" 7tilwell managed to wring from the grasp of 6hiang Kai-shek another fi%e
6hinese di%isions" and he called on 4ingate.s 6hindits to disr#pt 8apanese
comm#nication to his so#th !fter %ery (itter fighting" 7tilwell sec#red the airfield at
+yitkyina on +ay 1G
In 8an#ary 1945" 4est !frican colonials attacked and capt#red B#thida#ng" then o%erran
a key 8apanese comm#nications center at +yoha#ng on 8an#ary @5 :he @5th Indian
=i%ision landed on the island of !kya( d#ring this month" only to find that the 8apanese
had already withdrawn :his cleared the way for a steady !llied ad%ance thro#gh !rakan"
which was sec#red early in the year" there(y ena(ling the constr#ction of airstrips to
s#pport an all-o#t assa#lt on /angoon
:he campaign to retake /angoon was 4illiam 7lim.s masterpiece Ne deployed his
forces with the aplom( of a magician thoro#ghly %ersed in the art of deception (y
41
misdirection In mid-8an#ary" 7lim sent the 19th Indian =i%ision across the Irrawaddy
/i%er toward +andalay" which it approached from the north :he @nd British and @9th
Indian =i%isions" as well as the Gth Indian =i%ision" crossed the ri%er elsewhere d#ring
)e(r#ary" p#lling off the longest opposed ri%er crossing of the war" crossing points where
the ri%er.s width %aried from 1"999 to 4"599 yards 4hile these crossings were (eing
effected" the @9th =i%ision s#ddenly %eered so#thward and c#t rail and road ro#tes to
/angoon 7lim sent the @nd =i%ision eastward to approach +andalay from the so#th"
e%en as the 19th =i%ision act#ally attacked and took it from the north on +arch @9"
st#nning the thoro#ghly conf#sed 8apanese defenders
2et 7lim was also s#rprised Ne had expected the 8apanese" as #s#al" to make a s#icidal
stand rather than see +andalay" f#ll of sym(olic as well as strategic import" fall Instead"
't Gen Kim#ra Nyotaro withdrew and regro#ped 7lim responded deftly Ne was not
sed#ced (y taking +andalay Ne #nderstood that a tr#ly decisi%e (attle wo#ld ha%e to
destroy the 8apanese presence" not merely take e%en so important a city :herefore" 7lim
deployed so#th of +andalay and fo#ght Kim#ra at +eiktila" central B#rma :he (attle
lasted fo#r weeks" d#ring )e(r#ary thro#gh +arch" and res#lted in a 8apanese defeat and
withdrawal on +arch @B :his opened the way to /angoon" except for a (rief *and fierce,
8apanese stand at -yaw(we By !pril @9" 7lim.s 1Gth =i%ision was on the edge of -eg#"
3#st 59 miles from /angoon Nea%y rains delayed the final p#sh" and when the !nglo-
Indian forces arri%ed in the capital" they were #nopposed :he 8apanese had p#lled o#t
=#ring the s#mmer" 8apanese forces exec#ted a long fighting retreat :he 8apanese
:wenty-eighth !rmy hammered fiercely against the British di%isions arrayed along the
+andalay-/angoon road" (#t (eca#se 8apanese (attle plans had (een intercepted" the
British were a(le to p#t themsel%es where%er the 8apanese wanted to (e" and the :wenty-
eighth !rmy s#ffered some 1G"999 cas#alties in the space of 19 8#ly days" whereas the
British lost 3#st 95 men It was almost certainly the most lopsided %ictory of the entire
war
!fter the !llies retook /angoon" the B#rma 6ampaign was essentially won" except that
the 8apanese contin#ed to fightEfiercely" in the case of the :wenty-eighth !rmy" (#t
more sporadically elsewhere It was !#g#st @B" 1945" two weeks after Emperor Nirohito
had (roadcasted his s#rrender message to the people of 8apan" (efore preliminary
s#rrender doc#ments were signed in B#rma
!t the (eginning of the -acific war" the 8apanese had taken B#rma at comparati%ely
slight cost5 @"999 dead in B#rma" another 0"599 in +alaya 4ith this" the 8apanese
effecti%ely (egan the dismantling of the British Empire" altho#gh they themsel%es were
destined to lose their con<#ests (y the s#mmer of 1945
4@
Imphal $ffensi%e
!pril @0" @919
critcalmass ?ncategori;ed 6olonial" India 1 6omment
:his was the key t#rning point in the B#rma 6ampaign 'ie#tenant General +#tag#chi
/enya led his )ifteenth 8apanese !rmy in a high-stakes attack from B#rma into India"
targeting the !llied s#pply (ases at Imphal in +anip#r Nis immediate o(3ecti%e in this
action was to preempt an offensi%e (y 4illiam 7lim.s )o#rteenth British !rmy" (#t his
longer-term goal was to gain a p#rchase for the 8apanese-controlled Indian &ational
!rmy and there(y incite a re%olt against the British ra3 *colonial go%ernment, in India
Nad the Imphal $ffensi%e s#cceeded" the British might well ha%e lost control of India"
and with India lost" 6hina wo#ld ha%e (een doomed +#tag#chi knew that he was
o#tn#m(ered and lacked air s#periority Nis only hope" he decided" was to achie%e
complete tactical s#rprise and to mo%e with great speed :o e%en the odds as (est he
co#ld" +#tag#chi preceded the offensi%e (y ordering 'ie#tenant General Kawa(e
+asaka;# to attack !rakan in )e(r#ary" there(y drawing off some of 7lim.s reser%es
+#tag#chi form#lated a plan intended to di%ide and dil#te 7lim.s forces $n +arch G" his
00rd =i%ision attacked from the so#th" p#shing 7lim.s 1Gth =i%ision from its position at
:iddim and into a fighting retreat 7im#ltaneo#sly" +#tag#chi.s 2amamoto )orce
attacked the @9th =i%ision near :am# (#t was checked at 7henam 7addle :he following
week" +#tag#chi sent his 15th and 01st =i%isions across the 6hindwin /i%er in an
attempt to catch 7lim in a pincers action and create a decisi%e do#(le en%elopment of his
forces :his might well ha%e worked" had it not (een for the defeat of the earlier 8apanese
!rakan offensi%e 4ith this attack ne#trali;ed" 7lim airlifted his 5th and Gth =i%isions to
Imphal (eginning on +arch 19
By this time" the main (ody of the 8apanese ad%ance was a mere 09 miles away B#t this
was not the only cliff-hanger of the campaign !ltho#gh 7lim had anticipated that
Kohima" 3#st northwest of Imphal" wo#ld (e attacked" he relied on the r#gged terrain here
to impede s#ch an action Ne calc#lated that the 8apanese wo#ld (e #na(le to deploy
more than a single regiment in the attack :his pro%ed to (e a nearly catastrophic
assessment as" asto#ndingly" 'ie#tenant General 7ato Kot#k# was a(le to field his entire
01st =i%ision" which engaged the %astly o#tn#m(ered 59th Indian -arach#te Brigade at
7angshak and took Kohima on !pril 0 $n !pril 1@" +#tag#chi.s 15th =i%ision se%ered
the road (etween Kohima and Imphal and positioned itself a(o%e 7lim.s 4th 6orps
:he achie%ements of (oth 7ato and +#tag#chi were extraordinary and certainly exploited
the element of s#rprise to the #tmostC howe%er" tra%el and (attle o%er the hostile terrain
took a terri(le toll on the attackers" %ictorio#s tho#gh they were" and +#tag#chi.s men
were simply too exha#sted to press their hard-won ad%antages In a co#nterattack that
relied hea%ily on armor *against which the 8apanese" lacking armor themsel%es" were
powerless," 7lim p#shed (ack +#tag#chi (#t co#ld not reco%er #se of the Kohima-
Imphal road :herefore" 7lim relied wholly on airlift to maintain s#pply of his now
isolated forces =esperate as this sit#ation was" 7lim knew that +#tag#chi was in an e%en
to#gher spot 7tar%ed for s#pplies" +#tag#chi o%er-extended his forces in an attack on
40
=imap#r 7lim checked this effort and forced +#tag#chi into a contest of attrition" which
fa%ored 7lim !s the misera(le monsoon encroached in +ay" +#tag#chi.s men" star%ing
and assailed (y tropical diseases" melted away !t last" on 8#ly 1B" +#tag#chi withdrew
(ack across the 6hindwin /i%er !ltho#gh 7lim.s forces were s#(3ect to many of the
same miseries" they were not in nearly as dire straits 7lim p#rs#ed the withdrawing
8apanese and transformed the 8apanese retreat into a ro#t :he res#lt was disaster for the
8apanese in B#rma $f B5"999 8apanese troops committed there" 50"999 (ecame
cas#alties 7ome 09"999 were killed in com(at" and tho#sands more died of disease and
pri%ation -recio#s weapons and hea%y e<#ipment had to (e a(andoned !s for the Indian
&ational !rmy" the re%ersal of the Imphal $ffensi%e permanently remo%ed it as a threat
+#tag#chi had gam(led (oldly and lost decisi%ely
)#rther reading5 !stor" Gerald :he 8#ngle 4ar5 +a%ericks" +ara#ders and +admen in
the 6hina-B#rma-India :heater of 4orld 4ar II &ew 2ork5 4iley" @994C =#p#y" :re%or
& !siatic 'and Battles5 !llied Iictories in 6hina and B#rma &ew 2ork5 )ranklin 4atts"
19D0C Nogan" =a%id 4 India-B#rma *:he ?7 !rmy 6ampaigns of 4orld 4ar II,
6arlisle" -a5 !rmy 6enter of +ilitary Nistory" 1991C 4e(ster" =ono%an :he B#rma
/oad5 :he Epic 7tory of the 6hina-B#rma-India :heater in 4orld 4ar II &ew 2ork5
)arrar" 7tra#s and Giro#x" @990
4!/7!4 -!6:
!pril @0" @919
critcalmass Nolding Nistory 'ea%e a comment
7o%iet !rtillery 7#pporting /i%er 6rossing
(y /ichard 8 :erry" 19B@
+oscow p#rs#ed a comprehensi%e program of #pgrading its artillery fire s#pport and
deployed a new 1@@-mm self-propelled howit;er" the @71" to 6entral E#rope (eginning in
the 19B9s :he n#clear-capa(le" technically ad%anced @71 co#ld keep pace with the tank
and motori;ed rifle #nits of the /ed !rmy
:he 4arsaw -act was a formal alliance esta(lished on +ay 14" 1955" (y the 4arsaw
:reaty of )riendship" 6ooperation" and +#t#al !ssistance (etween !l(ania" B#lgaria"
6;echoslo%akia" East Germany" N#ngary" -oland" /omania" and the 7o%iet ?nion
)ollowing the principles laid o#t in !rticle 51 of the ?nited &ations 6harter" the pact was
designed for collecti%e self-defense of the mem(er states against external aggression :he
7o%iet ?nion claimed that it was formed in response to the )ederal /ep#(lic of Germany
44
3oining the &orth !tlantic :reaty $rgani;ation *&!:$, :he pact also facilitated 7o%iet
political control of Eastern E#rope (y a#thori;ing the 7o%iet ?nion to station forces in
4arsaw -act territory 7o%iet policy pro%ided the main directi%e to 4arsaw -act plans
thro#gh the -olitical 6ons#ltati%e 6ommittee *-66, as the highest alliance organ"
altho#gh the pact stated that relations among the signatories were (ased on e<#ality and
respect for national so%ereignty and independence 7o%iet political intentions and its
disrespect for national so%ereignty and independence were clearly demonstrated"
howe%er" in 19DB"when the pact employed military force for the only time against one of
its own mem(ers" 6;echoslo%akia :he forces that entered 6;echoslo%akia in !#g#st
19DB to halt the re%ol#tionary mo%ement toward democracy were made #p of twenty-
three 7o%iet di%isions with only six di%isions from other mem(ers
:he dUtente period in the 19G9s witnessed relati%ely sta(le 7o%iet1East E#ropean
relations 8oint 4arsaw -act exercises d#ring this time emphasi;ed offensi%e capa(ilities
In the late 19G9s" 7o%iet deployment of 77-@9 intermediate-range (allistic missiles
*I/B+s, in 4arsaw -act co#ntries increased tensions in E#rope" and the ?nited 7tates
responded (y deploying -ershing II I/B+s
:he 4arsaw -act had a larger gro#nd force of infantry" tanks" and artillery than &!:$
and was largely made #p of 7o%iet armed forces +any (elie%ed that the 4arsaw -act
co#ld ha%e defeated &!:$ in a con%entional war :he 7o%iet and 4arsaw -act aim was
for Keffecti%e occ#pationM of 6entral E#rope within ho#rs of an offensi%e as a means of
<#ickly ac<#iring territorial (argaining co#nters in the e%ent of a ceasefire 7o%iet
military strategists planned to defeat &!:$ decisi%ely (efore its political and military
command str#ct#re co#ld decide how to respond to a 7o%iet attack 4arsaw -act forces
#ndertook extensi%e n#clear" (iological" and chemical *&B6, training" and tactical
n#clear strikes at key targets may ha%e (een considered 4arsaw -act mane#%ers
centered on the post-n#clear phase of hostilities" a clear indicator of what was expected
Gi%en the desire for speedy ac<#isition of territory" pact strategists may ha%e tho#ght that
a chemical and (iological attack co#ld red#ce the danger of a n#clear co#nterattack
against 4arsaw -act troops" lea%ing the economic potential of 4estern E#rope relati%ely
intact
By the mid-19B9s" the f#t#re of the 4arsaw -act hinged on 7o%iet premier +ikhail
Gor(ache%.s emerging policy of li(erali;ation toward Eastern E#rope !t the ?77/.s
:wenty-7e%enth -arty 6ongress in 19BD" Gor(ache% acknowledged that differences
existed among the 7o%iet allies In 19BG" the 4arsaw -act" #nder 7o%iet t#telage" adopted
a defense-oriented military doctrine In 8#ly 1991" as the 6old 4ar was ending" the
mem(ers agreed to terminate their thirty-six year alliance
/eferences 6lawson" /o(ert 4" and 'awrence 7 Kaplan" eds" :he 4arsaw -act5
-olitical -#rpose and +ilitary +eans *4ilmington" =E5 7cholarly /eso#rces" 19B@,
'ewis"4illiam 8" :he 4arsaw -act5 !rms" =octrine" and 7trategy *&ew 2ork5+cGraw-
Nill" 19B@,
45
4!/)IGN:I&G 7:/!:EG2
!pril @0" @919
critcalmass Nolding =octrine 'ea%e a comment
:he Iang#ard of $peration =esert
7hieldR7torm
K4arfighting strategyM is a term #sed to descri(e the strategy of a political entity.s armed
forces for cond#cting warfare !ltho#gh lacking an official definition" it has gained
acceptance as a way to express the means (y which military force is employed to achie%e
o(3ecti%es within the context of an expected or act#al armed conflict =#ring the 6old
4ar" those who ad%ocated a n#clear co#nterforce targeting strategy %ers#s a co#nter%al#e
n#clear doctrine were said to s#pport a partic#lar warfighting strategy :hey (elie%ed that
it was possi(le for the ?nited 7tates to emerge significantly (etter off than the 7o%iet
?nion from a n#clear conflict 4arfighting theorists (elie%ed that the (est n#clear
deterrent was (ased on a n#clear warfighting strategy that held at risk 7o%iet n#clear and
con%entional military forces and did not simply generate a risk of m#t#al ass#red
destr#ction
7trategy relates ends to means 4arfighting" like warfare" is a means to achie%e ends that
in%ol%es the exchange of act#al or threatened lethal force (etween ad%ersaries o%er time
Nistorically" the means of a warfighting strategy ha%e incl#ded the f#ll range of military
capa(ilities" from sword-(earing infantry to missile-deli%ered weapons of mass
destr#ction 'ikewise" the ends ha%e reflected the entire spectr#m of political o(3ecti%es
espo#sed (y city-states" fe#dal kingdoms" nation-states" and others !ro#nd 599 B6" for
example" 7#n :;# artic#lated a warfighting strategy for the 6hinese Kingdom of 4# that
emphasi;ed the #se of deception to disr#pt an ad%ersary.s plans and alliances in order to
achie%e %ictory" ideally witho#t e%en fighting =#ring 4orld 4ar II" the &a;i regime of
Germany implemented a warfighting strategy known as KBlit;kriegM that integrated land
and air forces to o%erwhelm the ad%ersary thro#gh speed and force &orth Iietnam
effecti%ely employed a g#errilla warfare strategy against )rance and the ?nited 7tates"
and !l Oaeda" the %iolent non-state actor centered in the +iddle East" relies on terrorism
as a warfighting strategy
In its c#stomary #sage" warfighting strategy is a form of military strategy" which is the art
and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to sec#re the o(3ecti%es of the
national policy (y the application of force or threat of force +ilitary strategy is deri%ed
4D
from national strategy" which is the art and science of de%eloping and #sing political"
economic" military" and informational powers d#ring peace and war to sec#re policy
o(3ecti%es 4arfighting strategy has application at all le%els of war5 strategic" operational"
and tactical !t the strategic le%el" it links the military capa(ilities of a nation-state to
specific sec#rity o(3ecti%es as artic#lated in glo(al or regional strategic plans It g#ides
the de%elopment and str#ct#ring of military forces" incl#ding s#ch o%erarching
operational concepts as n#clear deterrence" power pro3ection with con%entional forces" or
information s#periority It is more often #sed to refer to warfare at the operational le%el It
g#ides the planning and cond#ct of act#al military campaigns and ma3or operations In
addition to reflecting (road concepts s#ch as offense" defense" mo(ility" and asymmetry"
warfighting strategy addresses the role of specific capa(ilities" s#ch as airpower" in
achie%ing o#tcomes" s#ch as air s#premacy" in relation to o%erall campaign o(3ecti%es"
s#ch as the annihilation of an enemy.s armed forces Its #se at the operational le%el
impacts the tactical le%el (y shaping when and how specific (attles will (e fo#ght
/eferences -aret" -eter" ed" :he +akers of +odern 7trategy5 )rom +achia%elli to the
&#clear !ge *-rinceton" &85 -rinceton ?ni%ersity -ress" 19BD, 4arfighting" ?7+arine
6orps =octrinal -#(lication 1- 1" 199G
GE$/GE B/I=GE7 /$=&E2 *c 1G1B11G9@,
:he 1GB0 oil on can%as :he Battle of the 7aints" 1@ !pril 1GB@5 s#rrender of the Iille de
-aris (y :homas 4hitcom(e
George Bridges /odney :he British admiral" in an engra%ing (ased on a 1GD1 painting
(y 8osh#a /eynolds
)irst (aron /odney" British admiral and politician George /odney was (apti;ed on 14
)e(r#ary 1G1B at 7t Giles-in-the-)ields" +iddlesex" on the edge of 'ondon Nis soldier
father lost hea%ily in the 7o#th 7ea B#((le and George (ecame dependent #pon wealthier
relati%es" an experience which may partly explain his later eye for pri;e money Ed#cated
at Narrow 7chool he 3oined N+7 7#therland as a FF%ol#nteer per order".. a yo#ng
prospecti%e officer" on G 8#ly 1G0@ Ne (ecame a lie#tenant in 1G49 and a post captain on
01 +arch 1G40 /odney disting#ished himself in Nawke.s FFgeneral chase.. action off
?shant on 14 $cto(er 1G4G and was commodore and go%ernor of &ewfo#ndland *1G491
1G5@," after which he t#rned to politics and the gaming ta(les =#ring the 7e%en 2ears.
4G
4ar he con%eyed !mherst to the siege of 'o#is(#rg *1G5B, and" promoted to rear
admiral" (om(arded and (lockaded a )rench in%asion flotilla at 'e Na%re !ppointed to
the 'eeward Islands station" he cooperated with +onckton in the con<#est in 1G59 of
+artini<#e" 7t '#cia" Grenada" and 7t Iincent 4hen ordered to s#pport the attack on
Na%ana he kept (ack some ships to co%er 8amaica" a foretaste of his way with orders he
tho#ght inappropriate or #nwise )ort#nately for him" the expedition was an o#tstanding
s#ccess In 1GD0 he was made a (aronet and" two years later" go%ernor of Greenwich
Nospital
/odney now fell into serio#s financial tro#(le" and not entirely (eca#se of his addiction
to gam(ling Ne had (een a mem(er of -arliament from 1G5@ to 1G54 and again from
1GD1" (#t #p to 1GDB his election expenses had (een defrayed (y patrons Nowe%er" he
had to find thirty tho#sand po#nds for the election in 1GDB o#t of his own pocket which"
com(ined with a foolish agreement with a loan shark" r#ined him :he )alkland Islands
crisis of 1GG1 (ro#ght him command of the 8amaica s<#adron" (#t he was not allowed to
keep the Greenwich go%ernorship and its income Ne ret#rned home in 1GG4 to find his
pay fro;en o%er some #na#thori;ed dockyard expendit#re 4hen -arliament was
dissol%ed /odney" ha%ing lost his imm#nity from arrest" o(tained lea%e of a(sence and
fled to )rance
4hen war with )rance (roke o#t in 1GGB" /odney was eager for command (#t dared not
lea%e that co#ntry #ntil the d#c de Biron genero#sly lent him one tho#sand lo#is to co%er
his de(ts In +ay 1GGB he ret#rned to 'ondon" where his arrears of pay were released to
him and he repaid his English creditors )inally" in =ecem(er 1GG9 he was appointed
commander in chief in the 'eeward Islands" with orders to relie%e Gi(raltar on the way
&E4 :!6:I67
$n G 8an#ary 1GB9 he capt#red most of a large 7panish con%oy off 6ape 7t Iincent and
nine days later %irt#ally destroyed a smaller 7panish s<#adron in the famo#s +oonlight
Battle /odney then took his own con%oy safely into Gi(raltar and sailed to the 4est
Indies with fo#r ships of the line to add to the se%enteen #nder Nyde -arker and 8osh#a
/owley $n G !pril /odney led this com(ined fleet against the comte de G#ichen off
+artini<#e" aiming to concentrate on either the enemy.s %an or rear ?nfort#nately" he
had not f#lly explained his tactics to his officers" many of whom st#ck to the formal line
of (attle and rendered the engagement inconcl#si%e /odney learned the lesson and
drilled the fleet in his new tactics In enco#nters on 15 and 19 +ay the fleet responded
(etter" only to (e thwarted (y the wind and G#ichen.s ref#sal to engage closely
&e%ertheless" /odney had (ecome a leader in the growing re%ol#tion in na%al tactics
?nwilling to enco#rage indi%id#al initiati%e or scrap the official fighting instr#ctions" he
had ne%ertheless adapted the general chase techni<#e to concentrate on parts of an enemy
line and" where possi(le" to (reak it
-$$/ /E'!:I$&7 4I:N 7?B$/=I&!:E7
4B
!s the h#rricane season approached" /odney.s penchant for arrogant and tactless
handling of s#(ordinates came to the fore It was c#stomary for s<#adrons to lea%e the
4est Indies at this time of the year and /odney" fearing that all or part of the )rench fleet
might go to &orth !merica" sailed for &ew 2ork :his mo%e" while it %iolated the letter of
his orders" followed !dmiralty expectations that the !merican stations wo#ld s#pport
each other ?nfort#nately" /odney tactlessly asserted his technical seniority o%er Iice
!dmiral !r(#thnot" interfered with his dispositions" appointed his own followers into
!r(#thnot.s ships" and claimed the commander in chief .s share of pri;e money $n his
ret#rn to the 4est Indies in &o%em(er" /odney alienated -eter -arker (y demanding a
monopoly of the o%erstretched 8amaica dockyards to repair his storm-damaged ships
)inally" on G 8an#ary 1GB1 /odney.s erstwhile protUgU[" rear admiral 7ir 7am#el Nood"
arri%ed to (e second in command Nood was as opinionated and to#chy as /odney and
e%er ready to criticise his s#periors Nis first opport#nity came on 0 )e(r#ary" when
/odney and General 8ohn Ia#ghan took from the =#tch that empori#m of contra(and" 7t
E#stati#s /odney immediately claimed the (ooty" m#ch of it (elonging to British
merchants" as pri;e and shipped it for home in a special con%oy Nood acc#sed /odney of
neglecting his strategic priorities in order to co%er this con%oy against any )rench sorties
from +artini<#e :h#s were laid the seeds of the calamito#s fail#re of cooperation of
1GB1
In !pril" =e Grasse (ro#ght twenty more ships of the line to the 4est Indies !ltho#gh
warned" /odney did not attempt to intercept him with his whole fleet Nood" with a
detachment" engaged =e Grasse indecisi%ely on @9 !pril and the two fleets did not fight
again" apart from a single indecisi%e enco#nter off :o(ago on 5 8#ne =#ring this time
and later" /odney failed to keep close track of =e Grasse.s mo%ements and to keep in
to#ch with !r(#thnot 4hen the h#rricane season came ro#nd again" /odney had
intelligence that =e Grasse wo#ld sail northwardsC (#t he neither ga%e !r(#thnot.s
s#ccessor" :homas Gra%es" ade<#ate information nor sent to him timely and ade<#ate
reinforcements Instead" complaining of ill health and fretting a(o#t the lost 7t E#stati#s
con%oy" which had (een intercepted (y the )rench in E#ropean waters" he sailed for home
on 1 !#g#st Ne left Nood in command with instr#ctions to send to Gra%es help which
t#rned o#t to (e too little and too late
=E)E!: $) =E G/!77E
!t home he retired to Bath and proceeded" as the news of Gra%es.s fail#re and
6ornwallis.s s#rrender filtered thro#gh" to compose his own %ersion of e%ents Nis
famo#s Bath letter of 19 $cto(er" he for example" ga%e a %ery misleading %iew of the
intelligence he was s#pposed to ha%e sent to Gra%es :he go%ernment still tho#ght highly
eno#gh of /odney to send him (ack to the 6ari((ean with reinforcements to co#nter a
new )rench offensi%e $n 19 )e(r#ary he re3oined Nood at 7t '#cia to find 7t E#stati#s"
=emerara" 7t Kitts" and +ontserrat already lost 4ith 8amaica known to (e =e Grasse.s
next target" /odney deployed his fleet to stop =e Grasse at +artini<#e 3oining the rest of
the in%asion force at Naiti" mo%es which Nood characteristically deno#nced as disastro#s
Ne was <#ite wrong
49
$n 9 !pril 1GB@ /odney intercepted =e Grasse near the islets called the 7aints (etween
G#adelo#pe and =ominica )or three days /odney str#ggled to close with the )rench as
they worked their way to windward $n 1@ !pril he s#cceeded" forming line of (attle and
engaging the )rench center soon after B !+ :he wind now %eered fo#r points" creating
openings in the )rench line /odney at once ordered his ships thro#gh the gaps" (reaking
the )rench line into fragments !ll afternoon /odney p#rs#ed the disorgani;ed s#r%i%ors
and (y e%ening his ships had already taken six ships of the line" a frigate" and a sloop
4hen =e Grasse.s flagship" the 119-g#n Iille de -aris" str#ck" /odney finally called off
the chase In theory" as Nood was all too <#ick to point o#t" a chase thro#gh the night
might ha%e destroyed the )rench fleet entirely /odney" howe%er" had to take acco#nt of
the damage to his own ships and the dangers of collisions in the darkC his decision was
pro(a(ly wise
:he %ictory re-esta(lished British s#premacy in the 6ari((ean" preser%ed 8amaica" and
strengthened Britain.s hand in the -aris peace negotiations In +ay" 6harles 8ames )ox
mo%ed a %ote of thanks in the No#se of 6ommons" th#s em(arrassing the new
/ockingham administration" which had already sent -igot to replace /odney :he
go%ernment responded (y gi%ing /odney a (arony" enco#raging the 6ommons to %ote
him two tho#sand po#nds per ann#m" and winding #p a committee of in<#iry into the 7t
E#stati#s affair In theory" /odney sho#ld ha%e ret#rned home in 7eptem(er to find
himself a wealthy national hero
It was not to (e Nis fail#re to p#rs#e the )rench into the night was p#(licly attacked (y
Nood" who claimed that /odney was too preocc#pied with sec#ring the )rench flagship
to see the (igger pict#re $thers s#ggested that the idea of (reaking the )rench line came
from /odney.s flag captain" 6harles =o#glas )inally" while the 6ommons in<#iry had
folded" the merchants with claims against /odney.s 7t E#stati#s sei;#res contin#ed to
p#rs#e him in the co#rts E%ent#ally their claims amo#nted to more than the total %al#e of
the lost con%oy" and /odney spent the last ten years of his life str#ggling to meet them
!77E77+E&:
George /odney was an inspired (#t flawed leader :here is no do#(ting his arrogance and
tactlessness" his fail#re to cooperate properly with Gra%es d#ring the 2orktown crisis" and
his near-o(session with pri;e money Ne was #nrecepti%e to the new tactical ideas of
Nowe" Kempenfelt" and Gra%es" (#t his own tactical ideas" which reached tri#mphant
mat#rity at the 7aints" were far ahead of their time :he matter of who act#ally s#ggested
(reaking the line on 1@ !pril 1GB1 is immaterial" for /odney.s ideas and training lay
(ehind it" and it was /odney.s instantaneo#s decision that carried it into exec#tion :hose
who critici;e /odney for not (eing &elson forget that witho#t the 7aints" there might
ha%e (een no :rafalgar
BIB'I$G/!-N2 Breen" Kenneth FF=i%ided 6ommand in the 4est Indies and &orth
!merica" 1GB91B1.. In :he British &a%y and the ?se of &a%al -ower in the Eighteenth
6ent#ry Edited (y 8eremy Black and -hilip 4oodfine 'eicester" ?K5 'eicester
59
?ni%ersity -ress" 19BB 7yrett" =a%id :he /oyal &a%y in !merican 4aters" 1GG511GB0
!ldershot" ?K5 7cholar -ress" 19B9
British !rmy !rtilleryE19th 6ent#ry :actics
!pril @@" @919
critcalmass Nolding =octrine 'ea%e a comment
$rdnance B' 15 po#nder 6irca 1B9G - /)! g#n crew with B' 15 po#nder" apparently on
mano#e%res
It may (e differentiated from the 1@ po#nder G cwt (y the 10-spoke wheels
Experienced commanders fre<#ently mis#nderstood the capa(ilities and #ses of artillery
and conse<#ently limited its tactical role on the (attlefield In addition" artillery tactics
d#ring the nineteenth cent#ry failed to keep pace with technological ad%ances in
weaponry
:he primary role of artillery #ntil the middle of the nineteenth cent#ry was to s#pport the
infantry In the attack" artillery (atteries co#ld (e positioned on the wings of the infantry
where they wo#ld not disr#pt the cohesion of the infantry line and at the same time
protect the flanks :he split or m#ltiple (atteries forced the enemy to fire at m#ltiple
targets" while the British artillery firing co#ld still con%erge on a single point :he o(li<#e
angle of firing wo#ld expose the largest portion of the enemy line to concentrated fire
!n alternate method was to mass the artillery (ehind the infantry and fire o%er their heads
d#ring the assa#lt $ne arg#ment against this tactic was that a do#(le target *ie" infantry
and artillery, was then %#lnera(le to enemy fire In addition" some commanders were
concerned that o%erhead fire intimidated their own troops :he allocation of two
howit;ers per each six- g#n (attery" howe%er" enco#raged s#ch o%erhead firing
In an offensi%e operation" massed artillery co#ld concentrate its fire on one decisi%e point
to (reach the enemy.s line and make an opening for the infantry attack !rtillery
preparations in themsel%es were contro%ersial in the post- 4aterloo years" with some
commanders (elie%ing s#ch tactics re%ealed their plans to the enemy
:he field artillery" generally D-po#nders" was manned (y crews generally on foot" mo%ing
at @ miles per ho#rE too slow to react to s#dden changes in the tactical sit#ation Norse
artillery was considered a reser%e force that mo%ed rapidly aro#nd the (attlefield as
needed
51
In defensi%e operations" it was initially not considered part of the artillery.s mission to
engage in co#nter-(attery fire against the enemy.s g#ns In operations in India in the
1B49s" a hea%y preparatory artillery (om(ardment was shown to minimi;e friendly
cas#alties :he large-scale employment of artillery also made the (attle shorter and more
decisi%e" and limited cas#alties :o maximi;e the effects of the g#ns" proponents arg#ed
that they sho#ld (e massed and sho#ld fire at the enemy at a range of G991B99 yards
6o#nter-(attery fire then (ecame an accept a(le tactic +oreo%er" the ratio of g#ns per
1"999 men in the force increased from @ to D
By 1BDB the /oyal !rtillery had adopted rifled g#ns Battery commanders were
a#thori;ed independent action in an 1BG5 artillery man#al 7hortly thereafter seats were
added to g#ns so all crew mem(ers wo#ld ride" which increased the speed of mo%ement
of the g#ns
In 1BB0" the 1@-po#nder was introd#ced for (oth the Norse and /oyal *)ield, !rtillery
By 1B95 the 15-po#nder" #sing smokeless powder" was the standard g#n of the )ield
!rtillery
:he first artillery tactical man#al was iss#ed in 1B9@ )o#r years later" )ield !rtillery
=rill was p#(lished" which stated the role of the artillery was to Ks#pport other arms (y
fire esta(lishing s#ch a fire s#premacy in the (attle area that the enemy can neither
interfere with operations nor de%elop his own effecti%elyM* +arix E%ans @999" p 19, :o
help in the concentration of fire d#ring the 7econd Boer 4ar" artillery di%isions of three
(atteries each were organi;ed =istant to medi#m artillery ranges were set at @"599 to
0"599 yards" and infantry fire at ranges o%er 1"999 yards was disco#nted G#ns were
s#pposed to (e on firm gro#nd with a clear %iew of the target 4hen coming into action"
they were to (e positioned @99 yards in front of the lim(ers and amm#nition wagons"
with @9-yard inter%als (etween g#nsE and well (ehind the attacking infantry Indirect
fireE which co#ld exploit the potential of smokeless powder" minimi;e g#nner expos#re
to rifle fire" and s#stain effecti%e concentrated fireE was not explicitly a#thori;ed :he
artillery tactics employed d#ring the 7econd Boer 4ar were (asically the same as those
#sed at 4aterloo5 #nprotected g#nners fired their g#ns" #sing open sights" against a
%isi(le enemy If the artillery failed to (e positioned far eno#gh to the rear of the friendly
infantry and o#tside the range of enemy small arms and artillery fire" the res#lt was
fre<#ently disaster" as happened at the Battle of 6olenso" 15 =ecem(er 1B99
Inade<#ate artillery pieces and tactic s were replaced after the 7econd Boer 4ar ! new
<#ick-firing 1B-po#nder" with g#n shields" sights" and hydra#licRspring (#ffer was
introd#ced It was originally employed in two-g#n sections #ntil (attery firing was again
shown to (e more effecti%e and efficient
5@
6apt#re of +agdala" *10 !pril 1BDB,
!pril @@" @919
critcalmass Nolding 7iege 'ea%e a comment
British expeditionary force mo%ing artillery across the Ethiopian highlands into position
at !rogye
K:he fortress of +agdala (#rning after the British expeditionary force defeated :ewodros
of EthiopiaM
:he mission of the British expeditionary force sent to !(yssinia in 1BDG11BDB" #nder the
command of 'ie#tenant General *later )ield +arshal 'ord, 7ir /o(ert 6 &apier" was to
free the hostages held (y !(yssinian Emperor :heodore *:ewodros, and to p#nish him
for his pet#lance and actions
:he ad%ance party of the British force arri%ed at `#la on !nnesley Bay" so#th of
+assawa" on @1 $cto(er 1BDG+ost of the soldiers were ashore (y =ecem(er 1BDG" and
&apier and his staff arri%ed on @ 8an#ary 1BDB By this time" it had (een ascertained that
:heodore" with B"999 warriors" his hostages" and artillery" was mo%ing to his mo#ntain
fortress at +agdala :he British force deployed from `#la toward +agdala on @5 8an#ary
1BDB :he ro#gh terrain and large s#pport element made mo%ement slow" with the main
(ody arri%ing at !ntalo" @99 miles from the coast" on @ +arch 1BDB !fter a
reorgani;ation of the force into assa#lt *1st, and s#pport *@nd, di%isions and a ten- day
halt" the force contin#ed marching toward +agdala on 1@ +arch 1BDB
:he force entered =ildi" from which they co#ld see +agdala" on @4 +arch 1BDB :he
r#gged terrain re<#ired a meandering D9-mile march (efore the o(3ecti%e was reached
+agdala was an imposing fortress sit#ated on a peak rising 099 feet a(o%e the so#thern
end of the Islam gee platea# :hree of the sides were sheer" almost #nscala(le cliffs"
altho#gh on the eastern flank the land rose grad#ally in three large terraces :here were
two other peaks on the Islam gee platea#5 7elassie to the north of +agdala" and )ala to
the west of 7elassie
In early !pril 1BDB" &apier sent a formal demand for s#rrender to :heodore" (#t the
#ltimat#m was ignored $n B !pril" the lead (rigade was 1@ miles from +agdala and
halted to cond#ct final coordination :wo days later" the British ad%anced to reconnoiter
the ro#te to the !rogi platea#" the pro(a(le assa#lt position for the attack on the Islam gee
50
platea# 4ith a small escort" 6olonel / -hayre" dep#ty <#artermaster- general" <#ickly
reached the defile leading to the !rogi platea# :he infantry" howe%er" d#e to the rock-
strewn terrain and scorching heat" had lagged (ehind the rest of the force -hayre
apparently did not reali;e this when he signaled to &apier that the pass was #ndefended
and then sec#red" and that the (aggage animals and g#ns co#ld (e sent #p the KKing.s
/oadM immediately
:he s#pply trains (egan to mo%e forward" as did &apier" who o(ser%ed that the infantry
was not holding the %#lnera(le pass as he had (een led to (elie%e Ne immediately
ordered an engineer #nit to sec#re the pass" and at a(o#t the same time :heodore.s
cannons th#ndered !(yssinians (egan to stream down the slopes to attack :heodore had
o(ser%ed what he tho#ght was an #nprotected (aggage train and wanted to take
ad%antage of his foe.s %#lnera(ility (y sending D"599 of his remaining soldiers to attack
and loot the British s#pply col#mn &apier ordered his rockets to a firing position
o%erlooking the !rogi platea#" (#t the (#rsting rockets did not stop the !(yssinians
British and Indian infantry (attalions deployed into skirmishing order and opened fire at
159 yards :he British soldiers had the new 7nider- Enfield (reech 1 loading rifle" and
after a(o#t an ho#r" their effecti%e and rapid fire" com(ined with spirited co#nter attacks
and artillery (om(ardments" defeated :heodore.s soldiers :he !(yssinians lost a(o#t
G99 killed and 1"599 wo#nded" while the British s#ffered @9 wo#nded *of whom @ died
later,
:heodore" his confidence shaken" tried to negotiate on 11 !pril 1BDB&apier demanded
:heodore immediately release the hostages :he emperor %acillated (#t freed all the
hostages the following day $ne o(3ecti%e of the campaign had (een accomplished
:heodore" howe%er" ref#sed to s#rrender" o(%io#sly preparing a last 1 ditch defense
&apier" concerned that :heodore might escape" la#nched his final assa#lt on 10 !pril
1BDB after an agreed-on armistice had expired :he only practical plan was to clear and
occ#py the high gro#nd of )ala and 7elassie" from which s#pporting fire co#ld (e
pro%ided and then" from the Islamgee platea#" cond#ct a front al assa#lt #p a narrow path
and thro#gh the front gate of the +agdala fortress !gainst stalwart defenders" this
operation wo#ld ha%e (een extremely diffic#lt" if not impossi(le By this time" howe%er"
:heodore was demorali;ed and his followers were deserting him
:he 1st =i%ision assem(led on the !rogi platea# as if on parade :he ad%ance (egan at
B509 !+" with the sappers carrying scaling ladders in the %an" followed (y the 00rd
)oot *=#ke of 4ellington.s," clim(ing #p a steep path from the west !rtillery pieces
were positioned near the path to pro%ide s#pporting fire :he ad%ance contin#ed to and
thro#gh the saddle (etween )ala and 7elassie :hree Indi an infantry companies
scram(led #p a sp#r to their right and occ#pied )ala" and two companies of the 00rd )oot
clim(ed 7elassie Both peaks were occ#pied after midday" and artillery was displaced to
the forward slope of 7elassie British troops occ#pied the Islam geeplatea#
7hortly after 0599 -+" the British artillery started their (om(ardment of +agdala" and
the final assa#lt (egan a(o#t an ho#r later :wo companies of the 00rd )oot deployed in
54
skirmishing order to the foot of the 099-foot high cliff face and (egan to fire to s#ppress
the enemy o%erhead :he 19th 6ompany" /oyal Engineers" followed (y K 6ompany"
+adras 7appers and +iners" carrying scaling ladders" powder charges to (low #p the
gates" picks" and so on" passed thro#gh them and (egan clim(ing the path as it (egan to
rain 7ix companies of the 00rd )oot" with a f#rther two companies and other #nits in
reser%e" followed
:he lower of two gates was reached easily when it was disco%ered that the engineers had
failed to (ring or had lost their explosi%es and e<#ipment :o maintain the impet#s of the
attack" two companies of the 00rd )oot shifted to the right to try to find another way into
the (astion ! soldier #sed his (ayonet to c#t a hole in the thorn (#sh a(o%e the stone
rampart and helped another soldier o%er the top *Both soldiers later recei%ed the Iictoria
6ross, In spite of hea%y fire" more British soldiers entered the (reach into the fortress
and soon there were eno#gh soldiers to attack the lower gate from the inside :he
retreating !(yssinians failed to close the #pper gate" which the British soon fo#nd
#ndefended and po#red thro#gh !(yssinian resistance melted away" and the soldiers
heard a single shot5 :heodore had p#t his pistol in his mo#th and killed himself :he
Battle of +agdala was o%er British cas#alties were two officers and 15 men wo#nded
:wo days later" the engineers destroyed :heodore.s artillery and the fortress itself
&apier.s force had accomplished its mission
8ameson /aid *@9 =ecem(er 1B951 @ 8an#ary 1B9D,
:he 8ameson /aid was an ill-fated attempt to s#pport an #prising that wo#ld topple the
:rans%aal *7o#th !frican /ep#(lic, Go%ernment to ens#re foreign *mainly British,
immigrants *#itlanders, were gi%en f#ll political rights :he raid was also intended to
eliminate :rans%aal resistance to plans to federate all of 7o#th !frica
?itlander grie%ances were s#(3ect to exploitation (y British imperialists" s#ch as 6ecil 8
/hodes" the diamond and gold magnate /hodes stated that the #itlanders " Kpossessing
more than half the land" nine 1 tenths of the wealth " and paying nineteen 1 twentieths of
the taxesM *Nensman 1999" p 1," sho#ld (e allowed some %oice in the go%ernment Ne
had earlier sec#red Bech#analand *modern- day Botswana, as a British protectorate and
the charter for the British 7o#th !frica 6ompany in 1BB9 In the following year" /hodes
(ecame prime minister of the 6ape 6olony and en%isioned British imperial holdings
stretching Kfrom the 6ape to 6airo"M with a federated 7o#th !frica
:he :rans%aal was opposed to this strategy /hodes concei%ed a plan" apparently with the
tacit appro%al of the 6olonial 7ecretary" 8oseph 6ham(erlain" and assisted (y his
colleag#e =r 'eander 7tarr 8ameson" to force :rans%aal compliance :he plan was for an
#itlander re(ellion that wo#ld force the :rans%aal to grant f#ll political rights to themC
then in the next election the #itlanders wo#ld %ote for a go%ernment that wo#ld s#pport
/hodes.s scheme
55
8ameson" with a force of a(o#t D99 mo#nted troopers" six +axim g#ns" two G-po#nder
mo#ntain g#ns" and a 1@5- po#nder artillery piece" assem(led within the 6ape 6olony
(order :he #itlander re%olt in 8ohannes (#rg was sched#led to take place near the end of
=ecem(er 1B95" (#t it soon (ecame apparent the rising Khad fi;;led o#t like a damp
s<#i(M * Nensman 1999" p 5, $n @9 =ecem(er 1B95" 8ameson made the decision to dash
to 8ohannes(#rg to instigate the #itlander re(ellion
4hen the raiders crossed into the :rans%aal " they c#t a n#m(er of telegraph wires to
pre%ent early warning of their approach" (#t in the conf#sion apparently did not c#t the
wire to -retoria $n 1 8an#ary 1B9D" 8ameson and his men met Boer opposition at
Kr#gersdorp" and on the following day" they were s#rro#nded at =oornkop :he 8ameson
/aiders attempted to fight their way o#t of Boer encirclement and lost 1D men killed and
49 wo#nded (efore s#rrendering to the Boers E who had one man killed
:he fiasco of 8ameson.s #ns#ccessf#l raid had far-reaching reperc#ssions 8ameson and
fi%e of the raiders were ret#rned to England" tried" and imprisonedC /hodes was forced to
resign as prime minister of 6ape 6olony Kr#ger.s prestige was enhanced in 7o#th !frica
as well as in E#rope ! treaty of m#t#al assistance (etween the :rans%aal and the $range
)ree 7t ate was concl#ded in 1B9G" and (oth rep#(lics moderni;ed the capa(ilities of
their sec#rity forces )inally" tr#st (etween Britain and the Boers was shattered" with
some people (elie%ing that war was ine%ita(le
Iro<#ois 6onfederacy *Na#denosa#nee,
! powerf#l alliance of se%eral Iro<#oian-speaking tri(es in northeastern &orth !merica
:he Iro<#ois 6onfederacy" or Iro<#ois 'eag#e" was originally a #nion of fi%e tri(esE
7E&E6!" +$N!4K" 6!2?G!" $&EI=!" and $&$&=!G! :hey occ#pied what is
today #pper &ew 2ork 7tate and the 'ake $ntario region of 6anada In the early 1G99s" a
sixth tri(e" the :?76!/$/! *who migrated from &orth 6arolina," 3oined the
confederacy
!ccording to legend" N?/$& prophet =eganawidah" the s#pernat#ral (enefactor of the
Iro<#ois" grie%ed (eca#se the Iro<#ois tri(es were fighting among themsel%es :his left
the Iro<#ois %#lnera(le to their enemies =eganawidah chose Niawatha" a +ohawk chief"
to (#ild a #nion among fi%e of the Iro<#ois-speaking tri(es :he alliance was in place (y
the late 1599s" sometime (efore E#ropeans arri%ed in their territory
5D
:he tri(es met reg#larly in a Kgreat co#ncilM to disc#ss and make decisions on iss#es
cr#cial to all 4omen of each tri(e chose the sachems" or chiefs" who ser%ed on this 59-
mem(er co#ncil :he co#ncil go%erned the confederacy and dealt with matters of
intertri(al war" peace" and diplomacy :he confederacy had no %oice in the affairs of the
indi%id#al tri(es except to act as a mediator in internal disp#tes
In the early 1D99s" the =#tch in &ew &etherland employed the Iro<#ois in the f#r trade"
f#rnishing them with g#ns and amm#nition in exchange for f#rs !rmed and skillf#l
warriors" the Iro<#ois soon (ecame one of the most powerf#l Indian military forces in
colonial !merica and <#ickly s#(3#gated s#rro#nding tri(es :he Iro<#ois had poor
relations with the )rench" who had esta(lished a f#r-trading alliance with the Iro<#ois.s
traditional enemies" the N#ron :he N#ron pers#aded )rench explorers 7am#el de
6hamplain to wage war against Iro<#ois gro#ps in the 7aint 'awrence %alley region
)rom that time the Iro<#ois 6onfederacy were in%eterate enemies of the )rench :he
hea%ily armed Iro<#ois fre<#ently raided )rench settlements and attacked the Indian
allies of the )rench" persisting in their efforts #ntil they had wrested control of the N#ron
f#r trade +oreo%er" the Iro<#ois.s formida(le presence s#ccessf#lly (locked the
so#thward expansion of the )rench" who were forced to di%ert their trade westward In
1DD4" the English took control of the =#tch colony of &ew &etherland" renamed it &ew
2ork" and incl#ded the Iro<#ois 6onfederacy within their f#r-trading networks !ro#nd
1G10" the :#scarora 3oined their kinsmen in the 6onfederacy *thereafter known as the 7ix
&ations,C they had left their homeland in the 6arolinas following de%astating attacks on
them (y colonial and Indian forces from the 2!+!7EE" 6NE/$KEE" and other
so#thern tri(es *see :?76!/$/! 4!/" 1G11110,
=#ring the )/E&6N !&= I&=I!& 4!/ *1G541D0," the Iro<#ois 'eag#e fo#ght on the
side of the British :hey maintained this alliance #ntil the 7eneca 3oined with the pro-
)rench $::!4! 6hief -$&:I!6 d#ring -$&:I!6.7 /EBE''I$& *1GD01D4, :he
British" eager to regain their loyalty" s#ccessf#lly reincorporated the 7eneca after
-ontiac.s defeat
!t the (eginning of the !+E/I6!& /EI$'?:I$& *1GG51B1," the British ad%ised the
Iro<#ois 6onfederacy to remain ne#tral Before long" howe%er" (oth the British and
!mericans were trying to recr#it the Indians =i%ided loyalties soon split the
6onfederacy" and the :#scarora" $neida" and a small n#m(er of +ohawk sided with the
colonists" while the 7eneca" $nondaga" 6ay#ga" and most of the +ohawk fo#ght on the
side of the British :he 6onfederacy irrepara(ly (roke when (rother fo#ght against
(rother at the (attle of $/I7K!&2 6/EEK *1BGG, in ?pper &ew 2ork
5G
=#ring 1GBB and 1GB9" a com(ined force of British led (y 6olonel 8ohn B#tler and
Iro<#ois forces led (y +ohawk :hayendanegea" known (y the British as 8$7E-N
B/!&:" attacked o#tlying &ew 2ork settlements General GE$/GE 4!7NI&G:$&
sent General 8$N& 7?''II!& to retaliate Ne fo#ght a pitched (attle with part of the
confederacy and their British allies near Elmira" &ew 2ork Ne then marched thro#gh the
large 7eneca towns" destroying ho#ses" orchards" and e%erything in his path +any
Indians th#s went witho#t food and shelter that winter" and h#ndreds died :he
conse<#ent split #ltimately (roke the confederacy as a formida(le military force *It
remained" howe%er" as a focal point of Iro<#ois c#lt#re" and still remains so today, !t the
end of the !merican /e%ol#tion" significant n#m(ers of Iro<#ois mo%ed to 6anada :he
ma3or portion" howe%er" li%e today on %ario#s reser%ations in &ew 2ork 7tate
)ort )rontenac
)ort )rontenac at 6atara<#i" 1DB5
)ort )rontenac was a )rench trading post and military fort (#ilt in 1DG0 in Kingston"
$ntario" 6anada It was positioned at the mo#th of the 6atara<#i /i%er where the 7t
'awrence /i%er lea%es 'ake $ntario *at what is now the western end of the 'a 7alle
6a#seway," in a location traditionally known as 6atara<#i :he original fort" a cr#de"
wooden palisade str#ct#re" was called )ort 6atara<#i (#t was later named for 'o#is de
B#ade de )rontenac" Go%ernor of &ew )rance *6o#nt )rontenac," who was responsi(le
for (#ilding the fort :he fort" howe%er" was still often referred to as )ort 6atara<#i
Esta(lishment and early #se
5B
:he intent of )ort )rontenac was to control the l#crati%e f#r trade in the Great 'akes
Basin to the west and the 6anadian 7hield to the north It was one of many )rench
o#tposts that wo#ld (e esta(lished thro#gho#t the Great 'akes and #pper +ississippi
regions :he fort was meant to (e a (#lwark against the English who were competing
with the )rench for control of the f#r trade !nother f#nction of the fort was the pro%ision
of s#pplies and reinforcements to other )rench installations on the Great 'akes and in the
$hio Ialley to the so#th )rontenac hoped that the fort wo#ld also help f#lfill his own
(#siness aspirations
:he fort was (#ilt (eside a small sheltered (ay that the )rench co#ld #se as a har(o#r for
large lake-going (oats ?nlike the $ttawa /i%er f#r trade ro#te into the interior" which
was only accessi(le (y canoes" larger %essels co#ld easily na%igate the lower lakes :he
cost of transporting goods s#ch as f#rs" trade items" and s#pplies thro#gh at least the
lower Great 'akes wo#ld (e red#ced :he fort wo#ld protect this har(o#r
/enU-/o(ert 6a%elier" 7ie#r de 'a 7alle" the original administrator and commander of the
fort" (#ilt many additional (#ildings and e%en (ro#ght in domestic animals with the hope
of ind#cing settlers to come to the 6atara<#i o#tpost Ne (egan replacing the wooden fort
with a more sec#re stone fort in 1DG5 ! description of the fort written in the 1Gth cent#ry
mentions that5
K:hree <#arters of it are of masonry or hardstone" the wall is three feet thick and twel%e
high :here is one place where it is only fo#r feet" not (eing completed :he remainder is
closed in with stakes :here is inside a ho#se of s<#ared logs" a h#ndred feet long :here
is also a (lacksmith.s shop a g#ardho#se" a ho#se for the officers" a well" and a cow-
ho#se :he ditches are fifteen feet wide :here is a good amo#nt of land cleared and sown
aro#nd a(o#t" in which a h#ndred paces away or almost there is a (arn for storing the
har%est :here are <#ite near the fort se%eral )rench ho#ses" an Iro<#ois %illage" a con%ent
and a /ecollet ch#rchM
'a 7alle #sed )ort )rontenac as a con%enient (ase for his explorations into the interior of
&orth !merica
:he Iro<#ois siege
)#r trade ri%alries res#lted in the Iro<#ois 4ars :he )rench and Iro<#ois were ne%er on
%ery friendly terms ! peace treaty was signed in 1DDG" (#t the war was renewed in the
1DB9s" and this renewal of war affected )ort )rontenac In 1DBG the +ar<#is de
=enon%ille (egan a campaign against the Iro<#ois and gathered an army to tra%el into the
7eneca territory so#th of 'ake $ntario :o <#ell s#spicion a(o#t his moti%es" =enon%ille
said he was merely tra%elling to a peace co#ncil at )ort )rontenac !s =enon%ille and his
army mo%ed #p the 7t 'awrence toward the fort" se%eral Iro<#ois" incl#ding women and
children" many of whom were friendly to the )rench" were capt#red and imprisoned at
)ort )rontenac (y intendant de 6hampigny ostensi(ly to pre%ent them from re%ealing
59
=enon%ille.s troops. location 7ome were sent to )rance to (e #sed as galley sla%es
=enon%ille.s troops and nati%e allies went on to attack the 7eneca
In retaliation for these incidents the Iro<#ois attacked a n#m(er of )rench settlements"
incl#ding )ort )rontenac :he fort and the settlement at 6atara<#i were (esieged for two
months in 1DBB !ltho#gh the fort was not destroyed" the settlement was de%astated and
many defenders died" mostly from sc#r%y :he )rench a(andoned and destroyed the fort
in 1DB9" claiming that its remoteness pre%ented proper defense and that it co#ld not (e
ade<#ately s#pplied :he )rench again took possession of the fort in 1D95 and it was
re(#ilt
!((asid /e%ol#tion *G4G1G51,
! %iolent re%ol#tion in medie%al Islam that replaced the !ra(-dominated ?mayyad
6aliphate with a more open" m#ltic#lt#ral system that sym(oli;ed the #nity of Islam for
fi%e cent#ries
:he ?mayyad family had sei;ed control of the Islamic empire in DD1$%er the next G9
years" ?mayyad caliphs presided o%er the con<#est of an empire that spread from the
Ind#s Ialley to the -yrenees +o#ntains :hey created a #nified state" a %igoro#s
commerce" and a resol#te military (ased #pon !ra( tri(es :heir leaders r#led as patrons
of the Islamic religion" and of !ra(ic c#lt#re" (#t (y G49 ?mayyad policies had se%erely
polari;ed their s#(3ects and generated widespread hostility to their a#thority !ra( armies
on the frontiers resented their low pay" constant campaigning" and the pri%ileges of more
fa%ored tri(es :ho#sands of non-!ra( con%erts to Islam seethed at discriminatory taxes"
mistreatment" and ?mayyad hypocrisy 7hia +#slims" committed to the r#le of the
descendants of the -rophet +#hammad.s son-in- law !li" saw the ?mayyads as
oppressi%e #s#rpers
:he s#ccess of the !((asids deri%ed from their a(ility to mo(ili;e these animosities and
create a re%ol#tionary mo%ement ?nlike the ?mayyads" the !((asids co#ld claim a
family tie to the -rophet thro#gh his #ncle !((as :hey also asserted that a mem(er of
!li.s family willed his right to the caliphate to the !((asids :heir anti-?mayyad
propaganda pro%ed especially appealing in Kh#rasan" the northeastern frontier of Iran"
where (oth !ra( and non-!ra( +#slims har(ored intense gr#dges against the state
6onspiratorial cells also made recr#its in Ira<" -alestine" and 7yria !dditionally" the
?mayyads had 3#st passed thro#gh a dynastic war" and the new caliph" +arwan II" had
alienated traditional friends of the regime
D9
In G4G" the !((asids la#nched their re%olt in Kh#rasan :o rally s#pport" they #nf#rled
(lack flags" sym(ols of the +ahdi" a messianic fig#re in pop#lar Islam :hey spoke of
their mo%ement in terms of a millennial" di%inely ordained #phea%al" to sweep away the
wicked +arwan
7ei;ing the frontier town of +ar% in )e(r#ary G4B" the !((asid commanders !(# 7alama
and !(# +#slim (egan their westward ad%ance -icking #p moment#m and s#pport as
they ad%anced" the !((asids reached central Iran in !#g#st :he next year" most of Ira<
fell and the head of the mo%ement" !(# al-F!((as" declared himself caliph at K#fa In
8an#ary G59" !((asid forces met +arwan.s army along the (anks of the `a( /i%er in
northern Ira<" and shattered the dispirited ?mayyads :he defeated caliph" ho#nded from
7yria to Egypt" finally fell into !((asid hands" and was killed se%en months later
:he esta(lishment of the !((asid 6aliphate was a tr#e re%ol#tion" not 3#st a change of
administrations 6aliph !(# al-F!((as and his s#ccessor" 6aliph al-+ans#r" ended ethnic
and economic discriminations against non-!ra( +#slims" esta(lishing the f#ndamental
principle that all +#slims were e<#al (efore the state as well as (efore God )reed of
?mayyad elitism" Islam experienced a dramatic s#rge in con%ersions :hey also
massacred ?mayyads" and former s#pporters of <#estiona(le loyalty" with re%ol#tionary
;eal :heir 7hiite partners were honored" (#t denied power :o dramati;e the newness and
p#rity of their go%ernment" the !((asids a(andoned the ?mayyad capital of =amasc#s"
and (#ilt themsel%es a new center in Ira<" Baghdad Nere the !((asid co#rt welcomed
+#slims of all ethnic (ackgro#nds" laying the fo#ndations of an intellect#al"
philosophical" and scientific renaissance
/eferences and f#rther reading5 Kennedy" N#gh :he -rophet and the !ge of the 6aliphs
'ondon5 'ongman -ress" 19BD 7ha(an" +! :he !((asid /e%ol#tion 6am(ridge" ?K5
6am(ridge ?ni%ersity -ress" 19G9 7haron" +oshe Black Banners from the East
8er#salem5 +agnes -ress" 19B0
Nar#n al-/aschid *GDD1B99,
7#ltan of the !((asid Empire +em(er of the dynasty that had o%erthrown the
?mayyads" and esta(lished themsel%es as the s#ccessors of +#hammad and r#lers of a
rich empire centered on Baghdad" Nar#n al-/aschid is primarily known as a patron of the
arts and sciences 4ith extraordinary re%en#es from trade" Nar#n al-/aschid s#pported a
spectac#lar co#rt that inspired the :ho#sand and $ne &ights and perfected the p#rs#its of
D1
falconry" polo" and chess Ne was one of the first s#ltans to make diplomatic contact with
western E#rope" sending 6harlemagne an elephant as a gift and esta(lishing himself as
the protector of 6hristian pilgrims to the holy land
&onetheless" Nar#n al-/aschid.s r#le was far from peacef#l 6onstantly on the alert
against internal threats" he maintained an ela(orate secret police network Nis system of
regional emirs contri(#ted to constant re%olts of Ber(ers" and Egyptians" as well as
Kha;ars" who colla(orated with the By;antines -#(lic works pro3ects s#ch as hospitals
and #ni%ersities were offset (y large-scale military fortress (#ilding on the (orders"
garrisoned (y fanatical gha;is :he By;antines were Nar#n al-/aschid.s greatest enemy"
altho#gh despite the #se of Greek fire" there were few permanent gains for either side
(eca#se of prisoner exchanges and tr#ces ?nfort#nately" the excesses of his co#rt and the
internal dynamics of his family g#aranteed that the empire was pl#nged into destr#cti%e
ro#nds of fratricide and ci%il war when Nar#n al-/ashid died
/eferences and f#rther reading5 !#disio" Ga(riel Nar#n al-/aschid" 6aliph of Baghdad
&ew 2ork5 +cBride ^ 6ompany" 1901 Bekrine" +#stapha Naro#n al-/aschid !lgir5
7&E=" 19G1
'I&K
'I&K
'I&K
Book /e%iew5 F4ar Beneath the 4a%es.
!pril @9" @919
critcalmass Nolding 'ea%e a comment
By 6) )oster

F4ar Beneath the 4a%es.
!#thor5 =on Keith
=ata5 &!' 6ali(er" a@495
:his is a story that remained hidden for D9 years5 a story of command politics and co%er-
#p" a story of incapacitating fear and dogged tenacity" and a story of extraordinary
co#rage and %alor that was e%ent#ally rewarded
In K4ar Beneath the 4a%es"M =on Keith takes #s (ack to 4orld 4ar II in the -acific :he
Balao-class s#(marine Billfish is on its second patrol o#t of !#stralia #nder 6apt
D@
)rederic '#cas $n its way to the 8apanese shipping lanes in the 7o#th 6hina 7ea" it
comes #nder attack (y se%eral enemy patrol (oats
Indecision (y the captain" who was s#ffering an incapacitating panic attack" forced
yo#ng" inexperienced di%ing officer 't 6harlie /#sh to take command 7ixteen ho#rs
later after s#r%i%ing a (r#tal depth charge attack that ca#sed hea%y damage" flooding and
s#(se<#ent loss of power" the Billfish" thanks to the heroic efforts (y two chiefs and the
crew" was finally a(le to s#rface for a desperately needed (reath of fresh air
:he reco%ered captain res#med command and" once repairs were made" the s#(marine
contin#ed on its assigned patrol with its sister s#(" the Bowfin 'ater in the patrol" after
another incident in which the captain ref#sed to attack enemy shipping and t#rned the
(oat away to lea%e" a(andoning Bowfin" /#sh confronted him and threatened to take
control again :o a%oid confrontation" '#cas t#rned (ack Ne also promised /#sh that" if
nothing was said a(o#t these incidents" he wo#ld resign his command after the mission
/#sh" worried a(o#t charges of m#tiny" agreed
Ironically" after the patrol" in which the Billfish ret#rned with @9 of its @4 torpedoes
a(oard and no enemy ships s#nk" it was awarded the 7#(marine 6om(at Insignia (y the
fleet (rass Bowfin ret#rned with no torpedoes and credit for sinking 14 %essels" Kthe
largest ha#l for any patrol #p to that point in the warM
4hen /#sh ret#rned from lea%e for the next patrol" the Billfish had a new captain '#cas
had kept his word and resigned his command witho#t admitting any wrong-doing Ne
later captained se%eral s#rface ships and had a disting#ished career #ntil retiring in 19D9
Ne died in @999
/#sh went on to his own disting#ished career" retiring as a captain in 19D1" all the time
keeping silent a(o#t the patrol" (#t nagged with the tho#ght that the men who had risked
their li%es helping him sa%e the (oat" and had also kept silent" had not (een properly
rewarded )inally" 5B years later" Ko%er (eers and +exican food"M he told the story to
&a%al !cademy classmate" 8ack Bennett" a &a%y 6ross recipient Bennett" after
confirming /#sh.s story" felt these men needed to (e honored for their actions and (egan
the citation process
K6harlie" I think yo# deser%e the +edal of Nonor" (#t after all this time" I think we wo#ld
(e #nwise to go that ro#te"M he told /#sh KI am going to t#rn in a citation for yo# for a
&a%y 6rossM /#sh protested Ne only wanted a medal for 6hief 8ohn /endernick and a
citation for 6hief 6harley $dom" whose heroic actions" he felt" had sa%ed the (oat and
the li%es all a(oard
B#t the process was almost sc#ttled5 K/#le 1! re<#ires that the actions of the person who
is to recei%e a reward m#st (e witnessed (y a senior officerM /#sh co#ld %o#ch for
/endernick and $dom" (#t there was no one left to attest to his actions It was e%ent#ally
decided that statements from three chiefs e<#aled one officer
D0
In @99@" 6harlie /#sh got his &a%y 6ross" 6hief 8ohn /endernick recei%ed the 7il%er
7tar and 6hief 6harley $dom was awarded a special commendation
!ltho#gh those who ha%e ser%ed will find this (ook a o%erly simplified" others will find it
a (it technical" Keith has done yeoman.s work setting the stage and detailing 6harlie
/#sh.s story
6) )oster li%es in /i%erside
6N?/6NI''.7 GE/+!& !/+2
7tep (ack in time and meet the #nlikely soldiers who 3oined the British forces d#ring
44@
'I&K
+!2 1@ !: G509-+
:he (ra%ery of o#r home-grown heroes d#ring the 7econd 4orld 4ar is well
doc#mented" (#t less is known a(o#t those who fled &a;i-occ#pied E#rope to take #p the
!llied ca#se $%er the co#rse of the conflict" tho#sands of Germans and !#strians fled
&a;i persec#tion and 3oined British forces to fight against Nitler &ow" this extraordinary
(and of (rothers tell their stories in f#ll for the first time" and how together they (ecame
6h#rchill.s German !rmy
6h#rchill.s German !rmy 5 4ho were theyJ
+illions of soldiers fo#ght against Nitler.s Germany in 44@" (#t one gro#p of men and
women sacrificed e%erything in the (attle against the &a;is :hey knew they co#ld (e
tort#red and exec#ted as traitors if capt#red (#t were still willing to die for their adopted
co#ntry Near from the only known German fighter pilot in the /!)" a tank dri%er
originally from Bonn who s#r%i%ed the =acha# concentration camp yet was among the
first !llied troops to capt#re Nam(#rg" and the %eteran who shot the infamo#s 'ord Naw
Naw in the (#ttocks
:hey were descri(ed as Fs#icide soldiers. (eca#se of their German nationality and the fact
that many of them were 8ewish meant they wo#ld face tort#re and exec#tion if they were
e%er capt#red 2et all of them were %ol#nteers 1 not conscripts like the ma3ority of British
forces $%er the decades that followed" they (ecame so deeply assimilated into society
that they (ecame as British as the Brits
6h#rchill.s German !rmy 5 Now many Germans and !#strians fo#ght against the &a;isJ
!s many as 19"999 Germans and !#strians fled &a;i persec#tion and 3oined British
forces to fight against Nitler &eigh(o#rs" colleag#es and fellow soldiers all s#spected
they were traitors and do#(le agents" so life in their adopted comm#nities was hellish"
D4
and they had to fight do#(ly hard to pro%e their dedication to the war effort B#t facing
these challenges" these incredi(le %ol#nteers played a key part in some of the most
important e%ents of the war
)eat#ring mo%ing personal testimonies" 6h#rchill.s German !rmy tells the compelling
stories of these extraordinary heroes for the first time
-olish-7o%iet 4ar5 Battle of 4arsaw
!pril @9" @919
(y /o(ert 7;ymc;ak
$ne of the most easily o%erlooked" yet momento#s short wars of the @9th cent#ry was the
swift-mo%ing clash (etween the post-4orld 4ar I -olish /ep#(lic and /#ssia.s (rand-
new Bolshe%ik regime of Iladimir Ilyich 'enin /eaching a climax d#ring the s#mmer of
19@9" the /#sso--olish 4ar is often regarded as the final episode of the /#ssian 6i%il
4ar In fact" it was m#ch more E at once a reflection of the age-old enmity (etween two
7la%ic neigh(ors and a +arxist cr#sade (ent on %arying the torch of re%ol#tion into the
heart of E#rope :he campaign feat#red a remarka(le cast of characters on (oth sides and
mixed ferocio#s ca%alry charges with early (lit;krieg tactics in <#est of exceptional
o(3ecti%es
:he roots of the war ran deep )or a cent#ry and a <#arter" the once-formida(le -olish
nation was a political nonentity" ha%ing (een dismem(ered (y -r#ssia" !#stria and /#ssia
in the infamo#s partitions of 1GG@" 1G90 and 1G95 :hree national ins#rrections had failed
to dislodge the occ#pying powersC se%ere Germani;ation and /#ssification efforts" aimed
at the destr#ction of the -olish lang#age and c#lt#re" were imposed #pon the pop#lation
d#ring the 19th cent#ry !ltho#gh s#ch campaigns had little effect" (y the t#rn of the
cent#ry only the most optimistic -olish patriots co#ld still dream of independence
2et 4orld 4ar I pro%ided exactly the right set of circ#mstances for the -oles $n
&o%em(er D" 191D" !#stria-N#ngary and Germany" in a desperate (id to ens#re the
loyalty of their -olish pop#lations" 3ointly agreed to the formation of a semi-a#tonomo#s
FKingdom of -oland. In -aris" )rance" -olish spokesmen (eat the ears of !llied
statesmen on (ehalf of an independent -oland" (#t none of the 4estern powers cared to
antagoni;e their imperial /#ssian ally" which was opposed to s#ch a mo%e In 191G"
howe%er" /#ssia had dropped into a %iolent %ortex of chaos and re%ol#tion -artly in
conse<#ence to that de%elopment" the )o#rteen -oints for peace drafted (y ?nited 7tates
-resident 4oodrow 4ilson incl#ded the creation of an independent -oland and its
recognition as Fan allied (elligerent nation. as of 8#ne 0" 191B $n $cto(er G" 191B" with
D5
the 6entral -owers clearly on the (rink of defeat" the /egency 6o#ncil in 4arsaw
declared -olish independence !fter the g#ns of war fell silent on &o%em(er 11" the three
torn pieces of the -olish nation were tri#mphantly re#nited
:he representati%es of )rance" Great Britain" Italy and the #nited 7tates met in the
mirrored halls of Iersailles in 1919 to dismem(er the German and !#stro-N#ngarian
empires and set the world right /#ssia" the erstwhile ally that in &o%em(er 191G had
esta(lished the world.s first 6omm#nist go%ernment" was sh#nned (y the 4estern !lliesC
'enin.s decision to make a separate peace with Germany at Brest-'ito%sk in the spring of
191B wo#ld not (e forgi%en 3#st then +oscow.s a(sence form the Iersailles conference
later pro%ed to (e a costly (l#nder 4hile the !llies were a(le to prod#ce a tentati%e
settlement for -oland.s western frontiers" they had no means of esta(lishing any agree-
#pon (order (etween the new -olish state and the /#ssian coloss#s
:he res#rgent -oles" meanwhile" <#ickly esta(lished a 4estern-style parliamentary
go%ernment and chose a 51-year-old romantic" a conspiratorial and a%idly /#ssopho(ic
military hero named 8o;ef Klemens -ils#dski as chief of state -ils#dski" a longtime
mem(er of the -olish 7ocialist -arty.s right wing" had always placed the achie%ement of
-olish independence ahead of the social reforms ad%ocated (y some of his more
ideological colleag#es !s a yo#ng man he had felt the (r#tality of tsarist 3#stice"
spending fi%e years in 7i(erian exile for re%ol#tionary acti%ity =#ring 4orld 4ar I" he
organi;ed and commanded a -olish legion #nder !#strian a#spices on the Eastern )ront"
con%inced that /#ssia was the chief enemy of his co#ntry.s independence Ne soon
(ecame disill#sioned with %ag#e !#strian promises in fa%or of -olish independence"
howe%er" and ref#sed to take an oath of allegiance to the 6entral -owers !rrested and
imprisoned in +agde(#rg for two years" he was released on &o%em(er 19" 191B" and
ret#rned home to (e acclaimed as a national hero
-ils#dski possessed an iron will and a <#ick mind Ne clearly regarded the new -olish
army as his special pro%ince" and himself as the g#arantor of independence :he
rep#(lic.s forces" still motley and ill-e<#ipped" wo#ld soon (e p#t to the test as the
commander in chief t#rned his attention eastward
:he re-esta(lishment of -oland.s pre-partition 1GG@ frontiers" which incl#ded s#(stantial
parts of the ?kraine and Belor#ssia *F4hite /#ssia". now Belar#s," was a matter of top
priority for -ils#dski :o accomplish that goal" the %eteran re%ol#tionary res#rrected the
old -olish idea of federalism" first championed in the +iddle !ges (y the kings of the
8agiellonian dynasty -#t simply" the plan called for an East E#ropean federation
consisting of the independent rep#(lics of the ?kraine" Belor#ssia and 'ith#ania" (o#nd
together with -oland :he latter nation wo#ld" according to the -ils#dski scheme" play the
leading role
:his incredi(ly am(itio#s designed was destined to disintegrate almost immediately :he
'ith#anians" former partners in the old -olish kingdom" were intensely nationalistic" after
their own long s#(mergence in the /#ssian empire" and they ;ealo#sly so#ght to protect
their own newly proclaimed independence in the wake of the tsar.s fall :hey wanted no
DD
part of -ils#dski.s federalist notions :he ?krainians" while keenly desiring
independence" were nat#rally s#spicio#s of the -olish leader.s moti%es" reali;ing how
m#ch of the ?kraine was intended for incorporation within the -olish state :he
Belor#ssians" for cent#ries ca#ght in the crossroads of /oman 6atholic -oland and
$rthodox /#ssia" had no o#tstanding national conscio#sness yet and were frankly
interested in neither in independence nor in -ils#dski.s proposals of #nion :he -olish
arg#ment that none of those three nations co#ld stand next to /#ssia alone fell on deaf
ears :o all three of the potential federal mem(ers" it appeared that they might (e
exchanging the former /#ssian yoke for a -olish one
:he 4estern !llies" too" were decidedly against -ils#dski.s plans Both Britain and
)rance acc#sed the -olish chief of state of imperialism at /#ssia.s expense" and they
#rged -oland to limit its eastern frontiers to the farthest extent of clear-c#t -olish
ethnicity !s for /#ssian Bolshe%ism" 'ondon and -aris saw that not as a threat" (#t a
temporary disease" soon to (e destroyed (y the anti-6omm#nist 4hite forces" which the
!llies s#pported in the ten-raging /#ssian 6i%il 4ar
:he new Bolshe%ik go%ernment" (esieged (y a m#ltit#de of armies commanded (y a
politically di%erse collection of generals ranging from tsarist aristocrats to disill#sioned
socialists to pro%incial warlords" had its hands f#ll at the time :he 4hite forces of
Generals !nton =enikin" &ikolai 2#denich and -iotr 4rangel" and !dmiral !leksandr
Kolchak" s#pported (y 4estern and 8apanese armies and f#nds" had to (e stopped :he
/eds had little time in 191B to worry a(o#t -olish schemes to expand on /#ssia.s western
periphery
'enin.s dynamic associate 'eon :rotsky organi;ed the /ed !rmy to meet the 4hite
threat By #sing powerf#l idealism awakened in the re%ol#tion" and in%o%ling fears that
the landowning aristocrats might ret#rn to power" :rotsky (#ilt a formida(le force of
workers" peasants and ex-soldiers of the old imperial army" complete with a to#gh ca%alry
corps" to protect the Bolshe%ik regime :hro#gho#t 191Band 1919" the /eds t#rned the
ta(les on their foes" one (y one
!t that moment of chaos and ci%il war in /#ssia" the -oles str#ck In )e(r#ary 1919"
-ils#dski sent his troops northeast" occ#pying as m#ch territory as possi(le for the
p#rpose of presenting a fait accompli to the !llied 7#preme 6o#ncil :hat (ody wo#ld
then (e forced to recogni;e -oland.s expanded eastern (o#ndaries
:he -olish forces enco#ntered little resistance and ad%anced rapidly" soon capt#ring
4ilno *Iili#s," a historically -olish city" from the 'ith#anians" who had proclaimed it the
capital of their new rep#(lic By the a#t#mn of 1919" the -olish red-and-white (anner
was flying o%er large sections of Belor#ssia and the western Galician part of the ?kraine
was well
-ils#dski ordered a halt at that point" his intelligence ser%ice ha%ing informed him that
the 4hites #nder General =enikin were press#ring +oscow from the so#th and co#ld
possi(ly capt#re the seat of the Bolshe%ik regime :he -oles s#rmised that a 4hite
DG
go%ernment (ent on the reconstr#ction of the old empire wo#ld pro%e more recalcitrant
than the hard-pressed Bolshe%iks =enikin was willing to allow -oland to exist #p to the
(orders of -ri%islanski Ka3" a former /#ssian pro%ince car%ed from -oland" in exchange
for -olish participation in an anti-6omm#nist cr#sade" (#t since those terms wo#ld
depri%e -oland of half the territory -ils#dski wanted" the -olish commander in chief
re3ected that and other 4hite offers !ltho#gh -ils#dski secretly negotiated with the /eds
for an accepta(le eastern frontier" he was (y no means con%inced of 'enin.s sincerity
In =ecem(er" the British foreign minister" 'ord George &athaniel 6#r;on" proposed a
frontier that ro#ghly corresponded to the ethnic limits of -oland (#t failed to incl#de the
two predominantly -olish cities of 'wow and 4ilno Ironically" the F6#r;on 'ine". as it
was later d#((ed" was to (ecome the eastern (order of post-4orld 4ar II -oland :he
(order proposed (y the British" altho#gh ne%er meant to (e a final frontier" was re3ected
(y the -oles" for they had already p#shed (eyond it
4hen it (ecame e%ident to -ils#dski that the Bolshe%iks had t#rned the tide in the ci%il
war and the 4hites appeared doomed" -olish-7o%iet negotiations were (roken off and the
-oles prepared for another thr#st into Belor#ssia and the ?kraine 7#ch an action" the
-oles knew" wo#ld (e tantamo#nt to a f#ll-(lown anti-7o%iet war
Before pressing forward"d -ils#dski shopped aro#nd for an ally and fo#nd one in the anti-
Bolshe%ik ?krainian !taman 7emyon -ely#ra" whose (edraggled troops had fo#ght (oth
=enikin.s 4hites and :rotsky.s /eds for possession of Kie%" the ?krainian capital
&othing loess than complete ?krainian independence was -etly#ra.s goal" (#t he
concl#ded the -oles were decidedly the lesser e%il compared to either the 4hite or /ed
/#ssians $%ercoming se%ere o(3ections of se%eral of his nationalist associates" the
?krainian leader came to -oland to ask -ils#dski.s help and" on =ecem(er @" 1919"
signed a treaty granting eastern Galicia and western Iolhynia to -oland in ret#rn for
-olish s#pport of -etly#ra.s efforts to recapt#re Kie% and extend the ?kraine.s (orders to
the western (ank of the =nieper /i%er
Immediately after the collapse of the -olish-7o%iet negotiations" -ils#dski ordered
se%eral -olish di%isions to mo%e north and assist 'at%ian troops in dislodging the
Bolshe%iks from the (anks of the =%ina /i%er :he campaign res#lted in the capt#re of
the cr#cial fortress of =%inski on 8an#ary 0" 19@9" and frightened the 7o%iets into
res#ming negotiations with the -oles
-ils#dski re3ected 'enin.s offer of a frontier settlement that corresponded somewhat to
the existing front lineC he deli(erately dragged his feet" con%inced that the /ed offer was
insincere" a ploy masking +oscow.s real intentions E a transfer of troops from the
cr#m(ling 4hite fronts to the -olish line !s a gest#re of good faith" -ils#dski insisted
that the peace talks sho#ld (e cond#cted at Borisso%" a small Belor#ssian town near the
front :he 7o%iets. insistent re3ection of that demand apparently con%inced the -olish
leader that an attack on his position was imminent
DB
4hile playing the Bolshe%ik negotiating game thro#gho#t the winter months" -ils#dski
prepared for (attle =etermined to strike first" he managed to station 199"999 -olish
troops on the front" (#t they were spread o#t a line more than D99 miles long +eanwhile"
4arsaw.s intelligence ser%ice kept -ils#dski informed of e%ery detail of 7o%iet troops
mo%ements toward the front while the talks contin#ed
By that time" 'ondon and -aris were greatly alarmed at the reports they were getting of
the -olish war preparations )oreign 7ecretary 6#r;on fired a sharply worded telegram to
-ils#dski on )e(r#ary 9" warning him that -oland sho#ld expect Fneither help nor
s#pport. from Great Britain :he !llied 7#preme 6o#ncil followed s#it two weeks later
with a stern admonition -ils#dski ignored (oth messages
-olish spies reported to 4arsaw that more /ed troops" fresh from %ictory o%er the
4hites" were transferring west to the front e%ery day By spring" -ils#dski co#ld wait no
longer $n !pril @1" the -olish chief of state signed a military agreement with -elty#ra
and his ?krainian &ational 6o#ncil for a pre-empti%e expedition against the Bolshe%iks
7ho#ld the campaign pro%e s#ccessf#l" the ?krainians were pledged to enter a federal
#nion with -oland )o#r days after the pact was signed" -ils#dski la#nched a daring
offensi%e deep into the ?kraine
:he 4estern !llies were as d#m(fo#nded as the /eds (y the -olish commander.s
a#dacity Now co#ld a newly restored -oland" whose pop#lation had s#ffered terri(ly
d#ring 4orld 4ar I and whose economy was %irt#ally nonexistent" e%en contemplate E
let alone mo#nt E a f#ll-scale attack on /#ssiaJ ?ndeterred (y the protestations of the
4estern !llies" -ils#dski p#shed his forces all the way to the =nieper in less than a
fortnight $n the tips of their lances" the -olish ca%alrymen carried a proclamation
written (y their chief of state that promised Fall inha(itants of ?kraine" witho#t
distinction of class" race or religion. the (rotherly protection of -olandC it exhorted the
?kraine to dri%e o#t the Bolshe%ik intr#ders Fto win freedom for itself with the help of
the -olish /ep#(lic.
By +ay G" Kie% had fallen to the -oles witho#t resistance )or the fo#rth time since 191B"
the ?krainian 7o%iet go%ernment #nder 6hristian /ako%sky was forced to flee its capitalC
once again" the anti-Bolshe%ik regime of -etly#ra ensconced itself in the city and
anno#nced the end of /#ssian domination of the ?kraine :he capt#re of Kie% (oosted
-ils#dski.s pop#larity at home E%en his political enemies" the &ational =emocrats"
changed their minds a(o#t the F?krainian ad%ent#re. and ceased their %er(al attacks :he
-olish go%ernment passed a resol#tion of praise for -ils#dski on +ay 1B" and a :e =e#m
+ass was s#ng in his honor in e%ery -olish ch#rch -ortraits of the (#shy-(rowed"
hea%ily m#stachioed old re%ol#tionary were h#ng in all p#(lic (#ildings Nardly an honor
remained #n(estowed on him" for he had already (een promoted to the rank of marshal in
+arch
:he cele(rations wo#ld (e short-li%ed /ed !rmy 6ommissar :rotsky" no longer
concerned a(o#t the 4hite threat" was a(le to m#ster a si;ea(le and (attle-tested force for
action against the -oles -ils#dski.s swift dri%e to Kie% had se%erely o%erextended his
D9
s#pply lines" and his troops fo#nd little comfort in the ?kraine" whose pop#lation" tho#gh
anti-/#ssian" was also historically anti--olish
:he initial Bolshe%ik response came in late +ay" with the appearance of the most famo#s
#nit of the ci%il war" the )irst /ed 6a%alry !rmy" or Konarmiya 6onsisting of 1D"999
sa(er-swinging horse soldiers (acked #p (y fi%e armored trains" it was commanded (y
0G-year-old General 7emyon +ikhailo%ich B#dyonny" descri(ed (y a British military
historian as a Fhard-riding" spectac#lar sa%age of great personal co#rage. $n 8#ne 5" the
/ed 6a%alry crashed thro#gh the rear of the -olish lines so#th of Kie%" pa#sing to (#rn
down a -olish military hospital filled with h#ndreds of wo#nded men :he thinly
stretched -olish forces co#ld not contain the 7o%iet co#nterattack and immediately
retreated westward toward Iolhynia and -odolia
Kie% was a(andoned on 8#ne 11" and the hapless -etly#ra and his ?krainian &ational
6o#ncil fled the city for the last time :he fierce 7o%iet co#nterattack was part of a two-
pronged strategy 4hile B#dyonny.s horsemen of the 7o#thern )ront p#shed the -oles
o#t of the ?kraine" a northern attempt at e%icting the -oles from 'ith#anian and
Belor#ssian territory was #nderway )i%e /ed armies" estimated at 1D9"999 troops
opened a massi%e campaign at the (eginning of 8#ly
:he commander of this &orthern )ront" General +ikhail &ikolaye%ich :#khache%sky"
was a @G-year-old former tsarist lie#tenant who had 3oined 'enin.s ca#se shortly after the
Bolshe%ik tri#mph in 191G 6onsidered something of a military geni#s" :#khache%sky
had rendered in%al#a(le to the /eds thro#gho#t the ci%il warC it was he who (r#tally
s#ppressed the Kronstadt sailors. re(ellion in 7t -eters(#rg &ow the so-called F=emon
of the 6i%il 4ar. wo#ld t#rn his considera(le talents against the -oles $n 8#ly 5"
:#khache%sky opened his campaign in the north" his right flank led (y another
remarka(le character" the !rmenian ca%alry general 6haia =mitreye%ich Ghai" whose
hard-riding 6a#casian III 6a%alry 6orps consistently o#tflanked the -oles and dro%e
them toward 4arsaw
?nders#pplied" o#tg#nned" o#tn#m(ered and o#tmane#%ered" the -oles fo#ght hard (#t
co#ld not stop the ?rssians. northern dri%e $n 8#ly 1@" +insk" the Belor#ssian capital"
fell to the /ed"s followed (y 4ilno on the 14th and Grodno on the 19th In his order of
the day for 8#ly @9" :#khache%sky so#nded an omino#s note5 F:he fate of the world
re%ol#tion is (eing decided in the westC the way leads o%er the corpse of -oland to a
#ni%ersal conflagrationL:o 4arsawb.
4estern military o(ser%ers were as s#rprised (y the Bolshe%ik onsla#ght as they had (een
(y -ils#dski.s (efore it :he flames of 4orld 4ar I had (een exting#ished not two years"
and memories of the long months of preparation necessary to ad%ance a few yards at a
time from the trenches were still keen 2et here was a conflict of swift mo%ement
spearheaded (y ca%alry" a (ranch that had long (een prono#nced #seless :he <#estion
was" where and when wo#ld the Bolshe%iks stop their ad%anceJ
G9
:he 7o%iet go%ernment at first had met the serio#s -olish challenge (y appealing to the
/#ssian people" not for the sake of Bolshe%ism" (#t for nationalist reasons E%en the old
aristocratic old tsarist General !leksei Br#silo%" the last Imperial !rmy commander"
responded to this approach and 3oined in an anti--olish campaignC many other patriotic
ex-tsarist officers followed his example B#t now that the -oles had (een e%icted from
Belor#ssia and the ?kraine" ideology o%erwhelmed nationalism :he intoxicating s#ccess
of B#dyonny and :#khache%sky re%i%ed in 'enin.s mind an old Bolshe%ik dream5 the
/ed !rmy (reaking thro#gh -oland to Germany" where it wo#ld assist the strong and
well-organi;ed German 6omm#nist -arty in esta(lishing a socialist rep#(lic in the
homeland of Karl +arx
7e%eral key mem(ers of the Bolshe%ik 6entral 6ommittee" incl#ding :rotsky and 8osef
7talin" stren#o#sly o(3ected to 'enin.s plans to reach Germany Karol /adek" the 7o%iet
expert on foreign policy" opined that the -olish and German people were not prepared to
accept comm#nism 4hy not make peace with the -oles on the (asis of the British-
proposed 6#r;on line of 1919J In the heated arg#ments that followed" 'enin %ehemently
and repeatedly insisted that the time was right to spread the re%ol#tion westward
7#pported (y 'e% Kamene% and Grigori `ino%ie%" the Bolshe%ik leader.s point of %iew
held swayC 7talin and se%eral others changed their minds when the cr#cial %ote was
taken" gi%ing 'enin the %ictory
:he 7o%iet plans (ecame readily apparent when :#khache%sky.s troops reached
ethnically -olish territory In the city of Bialystok" the /#ssians installed a F-olish
/e%ol#tionary 6ommittee"5 headed (y )elix =;er;hinski" 8#lian +archle%ski and )elix
Kon" longtime 6omm#nists known for their opposition to -olish independence $n
!#g#st 0" the committee iss#ed a F+anifesto to the -olish 4orking -eople of :own and
6o#ntry". proclaiming a re%ol#tionary socialist go%ernment
:o 'enin.s great s#rprise" the prom#lgations of this +oscow-organi;ed regime fell on
deaf ears &one of the committee.s mem(ers had the remotest link to the -olish working
classC indeed" one of the Bialystok gro#p.s most important mem(ers" =;e;hinski" was
'enin.s close associate and the head of the 6heka" the 7o%iet secret police :he mere
mention of the F-olish /e%ol#tionary 6ommittee. was eno#gh to send tho#sands of
-olish workers flocking to the national colors to defend their capital 7till" the
#ncharacteristically impatient 'enin disregarded those omino#s signs and insisted on the
immediate capt#re of 4arsaw :he Bolshe%ik leader.s political ad%isers warned him not
to co#nt on a proletarian ins#rrection anywhere in -oland Bitter" cent#ries-long
memories of -olish oppression co#ld not (e raised (y raising the re%ol#tionary red flag in
4arsaw :rotsky" who seconded that gloomy appraisal" also warned 'enin that the speedy
capt#re of the -olish capital co#ld only (e achie%ed (y stretching the /ed !rmy.s s#pply
lines to precario#sly thin limits !gain" 'enin re3ected the opinions of the do#(ters in his
midst
+eanwhile" the rapid 7o%iet ad%ance on 4arsaw ca#sed a serio#s political crisis that
res#lted in the collapse of the -olish ca(inet !fter 15 days of haggling" -rime +inister
4ladislaw Gra(ski finally managed to form a crisis go%ernment Ne then appeared" hat in
G1
hand" (efore the !llied 7#preme 6o#ncil at 7pa" Belgi#m to appeal for help in defending
the -olish capital" only to (e s#(3ected to (itter criticism of -ils#dski.s eastern policy If
the -oles expected the 7#preme 6o#ncil to help arrange a tr#ce with the angered
Bolshe%iks" the price wo#ld (e high $n 8#ly 19" Gra(ski" ha%ing little choice" signed the
-rotocol of 7pa" in which -oland agreed to accept the co#ncil.s recommendations on the
disp#ted -olish-6;echoslo%akian and -olish-'ith#anian frontiersC to ret#rn 4ilno to
'ith#anian controlC to respect the !llies. sol#tion for the -olish #se of the port of =ani;gC
to a(ide (y any f#t#re decision on the stat#s of ?krainian-inha(ited eastern GaliciaC and
finally" to p#ll all -olish troops (ehind the 6#r;on 'ine #ntil an armistice co#ld (e
arranged
:he se%erity of those terms masked the act#al alarm felt (y the !llies as :#khache%sky.s
forces crossed the B#g /i%er and headed for 4arsaw )rantic appeals from the -olish
capital for arms and amm#nition #nderscored the #rgency of the sit#ation :orn (etween
saying F2o# made yo#r (ed" now sleep in it". and pro%iding the re<#ested assistance" the
4estern !llies decided they had no alternati%e (#t to render aid to the (eleag#ered -oles"
lest the /ed !rmy thr#st its way into the heart of E#rope
!ccordingly" the )rench and British sent high-powered ci%ilian and military missions to
4arsaw :he com(ined !llied mission reached the city on 8#ly @5 :he )rench contingent
feat#red the prominent General +axime 4eygand" +arshal )erdinand )och.s chief of
staff d#ring 4orld 4ar I :he cele(rated )renchman (ro#ght along his aide-de-camp" a
trim and proper 3#nior officer names 6harles de Ga#lle :he British were represented (y
Iisco#nt Edgar Iincent d.!(ernon and +a3 Gen -ercy de B /adcliffe" an old-time
ca%alryman with a rep#tation for logical thinking
:he 4estern military experts swiftly proceeded to show the (attered -oles how the /ed
!rmy co#ld (e stopped )ed information on the existing sit#ation (y )rench officers
attached as ad%isers to the -olish army" the !llied mission came to (elie%e that +arshal
-ils#dski had serio#sly #nderestimated the gra%ity of the 7o%iet threat :he British felt it
necessary #nder these circ#mstances to force the -oles to accept 4eygand as de facto
commander of the -olish forces :he -oles steadfastly ref#sed" altho#gh they feigned
deference to the great )rench general.s ad%ice rather than 3eopardi;e their so#rce of
s#pplies In reality" 4eygand was excl#ded form the decision making whene%er possi(le
By 8#ly @@" the day :#khache%sky.s troops crossed the B#g into indisp#ta(ly -olish
territory" the defenders. resistance had stiffened considera(ly -ils#dski was reported to
ha%e (een <#ite s#rprised that the 7o%iets had dared tra%erse the 6#r;on 'ine" the tr#ce
frontier s#ggested (y the British By !#g#st 1" the -olish leader reali;ed that the
Bolshe%iks intended destination was 4arsaw $n that day" the fortress town of Brest-
'ito%sk fell to the in%adersC the capital lay only 109 miles west
-ils#dski knew that a dramatic co#nteroffensi%e was the only possi(le way to sa%e
4arsaw" (#t where" he wondered" co#ld he m#ster the forces necessary for s#ch a mo%eJ
:he entire -olish army was committed to the defense of the co#ntry =espite the more
pressing threat posed (y :#khache%sky in the north" the -oles were rel#ctant to p#ll o#t
G@
their troops facing B#dyonny on the 7o#thern )ront E the Galician region that had ne%er
(een #nder /#ssian control" not e%en temporarily :hey preferred to (#ild their military
strength (y conscription and %ol#nteers
:ime was o(%io#sly of the essence -ils#dski finally decided that the war wo#ld (e
decided in the north B#t for effecti%e resistance" the -oles were in desperate need of
!llied war s#pplies" which (ecame increasingly diffic#lt to o(tain :he pro(lem came
from pro-Bolshe%ik German and 6;ech railroad workers" and e%en some British
dockworkers" who ref#sed to load the -olish-(o#nd e<#ipment in their co#ntries 7ome of
the materiel co#ld reach -oland only thro#gh the Baltic port of =an;ig" the )ree 6ity
#nder 'eag#e of &ations administration :here too" German dockworkers E con%inced
(y Bolshe%ik and German propaganda that a 7o%iet %ictory wo#ld #nite =an;ig with
Germany E o(str#cted deli%ery )rench marine infantry had to (e sent to =an;ig to
expedite the #nloading of m#nitions
$n !g##st B" :#khaceh%sky" confident the -oles were on the %erge of collapse" iss#ed his
orders for the capt#re of 4arsaw Ne intended to (ypass the city.s northern defenses"
mo%e on to the lower Iist#la /i%er and attack from the northwest :he /ed 7ixteenth
!rmy was to proceed from the east" while its flank was to (e protected only (y the B"999-
man +o;yr Gro#p !ltho#gh +oscow had detached B#dyonny.s ca%alry from General
!leksandr 2egoro%.s 7o#thern )ront and assigned the horsemen to :#khache%sky" the
latter appears not to ha%e planned to #se those additional forces for the protection of his
flank :he Bolshe%ik commander apparently (elie%ed that the -oles posed no danger to
his exposed periphery !dditionally" 'enin wanted 4arsaw deli%ered as soon as possi(le
!s :#khache%sky planned his strategy" the -olish forces had grown m#ch stronger than
his 159"999 men -ils#dski.s army had grown to 1B5"999 (y !#g#st 1@" and in two more
weeks the -oles co#ld co#nt 0G9"999 hastily trained" poorly e<#ipped soldiers on their
rolls" incl#ding almost 09"999 ca%alry Incl#ded in this force was General 8o;ef Naller.s
army of -olish-!mericans" which had seen 4estern )ront ser%ice in 4orld 4ar I" and the
Gth Eskadra FKosci#s;ko". a s<#adron of daring yo#ng !merican %ol#nteer pilots :he
capital.s defense was a#gmented (y a motley (#t enth#siastic force of B9"999 workers
and peasants :he crisis go%ernment of -rime +inister 4incenty 4itos" which had
replaced the Gra(ski ca(inet on 8#ly @4" had done its 3o( well
In spite of the progress of the -olish defense plans" the sit#ation remained gra%e +arshal
-ils#dski" ha%ing little time left" iss#ed his orders for a (old and imaginati%e
co#nterattack on !#g#st D" se%eral days (efore he learned of :#khache%sky.s plans to
encircle 4arsaw :he -olish commander had finally (ro#ght se%eral key #nits #p from
the so#th ! @9"999-man strike force" commanded (y General Edward 7migly-/yd;" was
to smash thro#gh :#khache%sky.s +o;yr Gro#p and (egin a sweeping" encircling
mo%ement to c#t off the 7o%iet northern forces :he -olish )ifth !rmy #nder the a(le
General 4ladislaw 7ikorski was to hold the cr#cial 4kra /i%er line north of the capital
:he city itself was defended (y a 4D"999-man garrison aided (y the worker-peasant
%ol#nteer (rigades" while the :hird and )o#rth armies were to s#pport the strike force
G0
By !#g#st 1@" it was apparent to the !llied military mission in 4arsaw that
:#khache%sky intended to attack the city from the northwest 4eygand expressed gra%e
reser%ations a(o#t the -oles. a(ility to defend the 4kra /i%er line" where they were
se%erely o#tn#m(ered :he !llied commission e%en recommended that a more effecti%e
-olish defense might (e mo#nted west of the Iist#la" tho#gh that wo#ld mean
a(andoning 4arsaw :he next morning" Bolshe%ik infantry #nits (roke thro#gh -olish
lines and capt#red /ad;ymin" only 15 miles form the capital Bloody hand-to-hand
com(at ens#ed #ntil the arri%al of reinforcements ena(led the -oles to recapt#re the town
on the 15th
+eanwhile" General 7ikorski.s )ifth !rmy attacked the /ed )o#rth !rmy northwest of
4arsaw and (roke thro#gh" serio#sly exposing the -olish flank in the process :he
/#ssian fail#re to capitali;e on s#ch an opport#nity was the res#lt of a lack of
comm#nications E disr#pted (y the -oles E and a lack of cooperation among the
Bolshe%ik commanders In addition to a poor coordination among :#khache%sky.s army
commanders aro#nd 4arsaw" the headstrong B#dyonny *possi(ly on 7talin.s ad%ice, had
ignored :#khache%sky.s call to 3oin him" instead remaining in the 'wow area to the
so#theast
7ikorski" <#ick to take ad%antage of the chaos among the /eds" contin#ed his ad%ance"
raiding the /ed )o#rth !rmy head<#arters at 6iechanow and capt#ring its plans and
ciphers ?sing tanks" tr#cks" armored cars and mo(ile col#mns" the -olish general has
(een credited with employing the first (lit;krieg tactics of the @9th cent#ry Instead of
attacking 7ikorski.s %#lnera(le left flank" the /ed ca%alry commander Ghai" who ref#sed
to s#pport the )o#rth !rmy" (#sied himself c#tting -olish railway lines some 49 miles
west
In those desperate days of mid-!#g#st" more !llied s#pplies finally arri%ed !t 4arsaw.s
+okotow !irfield" -olish mechanics la(ored day and night assem(ling former /oyal !ir
force figher planes in order to deny the 7o%iets any aerial reconnaissance $n the 1Dth"
when B#dyonny.s 6ossacks finally crossed the B#g /i%er and (egan their ad%ance on the
city of 'wow" aircraft of the III =yon *air di%ision," comprised of the 5th" Dth" Gth and
15th Eskasdri" (egan three days of (om(ing and strafing in an effort to stem the
onsla#ght )lying a total of 199 sorties" dropping nine tons of (om(s" -olish and
!merican airmen managed to slow B#dyonny.s ad%ance to only a few miles a day"
(#ying precio#s time for -olish land forces to mo%e to co#nter the 7o%iet threat
$n !#g#st 1D" too" +arshal -ilsidski ordered his strike force into action 6o%ering
to#ghly G9 miles in three days" the -olish northward mo%ement enco#ntered almost no
resistance Breaking thro#gh the gap in the Bolshe%ik ranks" the -olish )o#rth !rmy"
s#pported (y 1@ )rench-(#ilt /ena#lt +-1G): light tanks" reached Brest-'ito%sk and in
the process c#t off and trapped the /ed 7ixteenth !rmy 4hile 7ikorski.s troops kept the
Bolshe%iks in a state of conf#sion" -ilsidski" who tra%eled in the (ack of a tr#ck with his
forward #nits" p#shed his forces farther north
G4
:he !llies" meanwhile" had arranged for another ro#nd of -olish-7o%iet peace
negotiations" apparently (elie%ing that only a tr#ce co#ld sa%e 4arsaw now $n !#g#st
1G" delegates from (oth sides met in +ink" where +oscow presented its conditions for a
cease-fire5 the -olish army was to (e dismantled and the !llied military commission was
to (e sent packing :he 6#r;on 'ine was the only accepta(le frontier" declared the 7o%iet
delegates" with some small alterations in fa%or of the -oles
&ews from the front" where -ilsidski.s s#ccess astonished e%eryone" incl#ding the
marshal himself" made the Bolshe%ik peace terms so#nd l#dicro#s By !#g#st 1B"
:#khache%sky reali;ed that he had (een completely o#tflanked and ordered what
amo#nted to a general retreat E it was" in reality" a ro#t :hose /ed #nits in a position to
do so immediately (olted for the East -r#ssian (order (efore the -oles co#ld close the
ring 7ome gro#ps" s#ch as Ghai.s ca%alry and the /ed )o#rth !rmy" were locked in
(attle with 7ikorski.s troops and were trapped !ltho#gh (adly ma#led (y ferocio#s
enco#nters with p#rs#ing -olish #nits" Ghai.s (attered horsemen managed to reach East
-r#ssia" where they were immediately interned (y the German a#thorities :he )o#rth
!rmy co#ld not escape and was forced to s#rrender in -oland
By !#g#st @4" it was %irt#ally o%er :#khache%sky.s forces had left (ehind more than @99
artillery pieces" more than 1"999 machine g#ns" 19"999 %ehicles of e%ery kind and nearly
DD"999 prisoners of war :otal 7o%iet cas#alties were in the %icinity of 199"999C the -olish
%ictory had cost @0B officers and 4"1@4 enlisted men killed" as well as 5D@ officers and
@1"1B9 soldiers wo#nded
:here remained only the threat of B#dyonny" whose ca%alry had committed atrocities the
-oles wo#ld not soon forget -lacing General 7ikorski in command of the :hird !rmy on
!#g#st @G" -ils#dski then ordered hBim to o#st B#dyonny.s force from the 7o#thern
)ront $n !#g#st @9" 7ikorski.s %ang#ard $peration Gro#p" consisting of the 10th
Infantry =i%ision and 1st 6a%alry =i%ision #nder the o%erall command of General
7tanislaw Naller" confronted B#dyonny.s 6ossacks at `amarsc In an #n#s#al (attle (y
@9th cent#ry standards" -olish lancers rode at f#ll gallop into the /ed ca%alry and tore the
/#ssians to pieces !fter a second engagement with 7ikorsky.s forces that e%ening at
Komarow" B#dyonny <#ickly ordered a rearg#ard action and fled homeward" (arely
a%oiding the complete annihilation of his army
4hile 7ikorski ga%e chase to B#dyonny in the so#th" -ils#dski p#rs#ed :#khache%sky.s
(attered legions into Belor#ssia 6atching #p with the /eds on the &iemen /i%er on
7eptem(er @D" the -oles smashed the 7o%iet defensi%e lines and inflicted another
h#miliating defeat on them" destroying their :hird !rmy in the process -ils#dski.s troops
entered Grodno on the same day )ollowing #p on 7eptem(er @G" the -oles p#mmeled
:#khache%sky.s (eaten and de morali;ed troops yet again on the 7;c;ara /i%er" sending
them sc#rrying (ack to +insk In the Battle of the &iemen /i%er" the /#ssians lost
another 59"999 prisoners and 1D9 cannons
:he ro#t now complete" -oland re3oiced in her ho#r of %ictoryC +arshal -ils#dski.s
prestige soared and the !llies (reathed a sigh of relief :he /ed !rmy had s#ffered its
G5
most disastro#s defeat of the entire /#ssian 6i%il 4ar period !n armistice was officially
declared on $cto(er 1@" followed (y a protracted series of negotiations to formally end
hostilities and settle the -olish-7o%iet (order <#estion
:he res#lt was the treaty of /iga" signed on +arch 1B" 19@1" in the 'at%ian capital
-oland recei%ed a significant portion of her pre-partition frontiers" incl#ding the city of
'wow" and took possession of territories inha(ited (y a(o#t 1@ million 'ith#anians"
4hite /#ssians and ?krainians
'ittle remem(ered in the 4est" the Battle of 4arsaw was in fact one of the most
significant land engagements of the @9th cent#ry 7trategically" it re%ersed an ideological
onsla#ght that might otherwise ha%e carried 7o%iet 6omm#nism into 4estern E#rope in
19@9 E and e%ent#ality the conse<#ences of which can only (e imagined (y posterity
+ilitarily" the s#dden co#nterattack (y which -ils#dski and his lie#tenants split and
ro#ted the Bolshe%ik forces E themsel%es led (y one of the enemy.s most (rilliant
generals E deser%es a place among the tactical masterpieces of history
Book /e%iew5 :he Book of +ichael of /hodes5 ! )ifteenth-6ent#ry +aritime
+an#script
-amela $ 'ong" =a%id +cGee" !lan + 7tahl" eds :he Book of +ichael of /hodes5 !
)ifteenth-6ent#ry +aritime +an#script 6am(ridge5 +I: -ress" @999 Iol 1" G0@ ppC
Iol @" G0@ ppC Iol 0" 0B4 pp aD599 *cloth," I7B& 9GB-9-@D@-10590-9C aG599 *cloth,"
I7B& 9GB-9-@D@-19599-4C a4599 *cloth," I7B& 9GB-9-@D@-1@09B-@
/e%iewed (y Ieronica =ella =ora
-#(lished on N-NistGeog *+arch" @919,
6ommissioned (y /o(ert 8 +ayhew
! /edisco%ered Ienetian +ariner.s &ote(ook
+ichael of /hodes is certainly not the most pop#lar of fifteenth-cent#ry writers ! Greek
UmigrU who mo%ed to Ienice in 1491 as a h#m(le oarsman" fo#ght se%eral sea (attles"
and managed to ad%ance to the highest ranks in the Ienetian na%y" Konly with diffic#lty
co#ld ched (e considered an intellect#alM *%ol 0" p 191, 2et the man#script this
Kadopti%e heroM of the 7erenissima started to compose in 1404 *pro(a(ly as a way to
ad%ance in his career, represents a tr#e treas#re of information for early /enaissance
scholars and" more generally" for historians of early modern science and technology !
@41-folio <#arto man#script" the KBook of +ichael of /hodesM incl#des treatises and
practical exercises in commercial mathematics" a (ea#tif#lly ill#minated section on
astrology" extended notes on time reckoning" and a rare portolan" Greek prayers
transliterated in 'atin characters" officers. r#les" and nothing less than the world.s first
extant treatise on ship(#ilding :he man#script" which is (eing p#(lished for the first
time" marries medie%al encyclopaedism with early fifteenth-cent#ry technical knowledge"
late By;antine religio#s (eliefs with Ienetian c#lt#re" and science and art with e%eryday
practice Its %aried" if not eclectic" character is eno#gh to make +ichael.s man#script a
#ni<#e o(3ect of st#dy
GD
:he history of the man#script is itself interesting It is a saga no less compelling than the
ad%ent#ro#s life of its a#thor -arts of +ichael.s (ook were known in se%enteenth-
cent#ry Italy" (#t since then the man#script had (een deemed lost" #ntil it Kmirac#lo#slyM
s#rfaced in 19DD at a 7othe(ys a#ction -#rchased pri%ately" it once again %anished from
the scene" #ntil it s#ddenly reappeared on a#ction almost forty years later 6onscio#s of
its historical %al#e" this time the new owner not only ga%e scholars f#ll access to the
man#script (#t also allowed its integral reprod#ction1hence this +I: facsimile edition
:he Book of +ichael of /hodes is a lo%ely three-%ol#me hardco%er set :he first %ol#me
is a faithf#lly reprod#ced facsimile of the act#al man#script and other original doc#ments
related to the life of +ichael *incl#ding his and his wife.s wills, !ll the folia *comprising
a %ast n#m(er of (lank ones, are entirely reprod#ced in color on glossy paper in the same
si;e as the original" making %isi(le different types of ink" margin lines" water stains" and
the %ario#s marks of time :he <#ality of the reprint makes it possi(le to read the original
text and f#lly appreciate the wonderf#l ill#minations in their (rilliant colors :he second
%ol#me contains the transcription of the man#script faced (y the English translation on
the left page" in order to facilitate comparison and assist readers #nfamiliar with medie%al
Ienetian :he text is complemented (y comprehensi%e indexes of Ienetian general and
proper names and of their respecti%e translations" which makes the %ol#me easier to
na%igate :he third %ol#me comprises st#dies of the man#script (y nine international
experts in different aspects of the early /enaissance" incl#ding a paleographer" a
mathematician" an art historian speciali;ing in medie%al astrological imagery" a historian
of Ienetian cartography" historians of science and medicine" and an expert in medie%al
ship constr#ction
! companion to the facsimile edition" this last %ol#me is meant to in%estigate and
context#ali;e the fig#re of +ichael of /hodes and different aspects of his work and make
the man#script Kmore comprehensi(le and accessi(leM to scholars and the general p#(lic
*%ol 0" p ix, -amela $ 'ong.s detailed introd#ctory chapter certainly f#lfills (oth
goals Nere" the coeditor effecti%ely sets the man#script and its a#thor within the (roader
context of na#tical writing and the Ienetian maritime world 'ong l#cidly presents key
aspects of +ichael.s life and career and links them to main historical and c#lt#ral e%ents"
s#ch as famo#s (attles he fo#ght and" more nota(ly" the 6o#ncil of )errara-)lorence of
140B" to which +ichael.s ship escorted the By;antine imperial con%oy =etails from
acco#nts of other mariners and tra%ellers who 3o#rneyed on the con%oy are #sed to shed
light on +ichael.s experience and immerse the reader in a fifteenth-cent#ry mariner.s
world :he last part of the chapter links the contents of the man#script to the hy(rid
c#lt#ral context in which +ichael operated It sheds f#rther light on c#lt#ral and religio#s
aspects of the /hodian officer.s life and disc#sses %ario#s <#estions presented (y the
man#script and f#rther tackled (y other contri(#tors in the following chapters In this
sense" 'ong.s introd#ction nicely sets #p the scene for the following more speciali;ed
st#dies I personally fo#nd this chapter caref#lly researched and annotated" yet at the
same time accessi(le" compelling" easy to read" and f#ll of ill#minating insights" parallels"
and links with other /enaissance fig#res" ranging from o(sc#re late By;antine tra%ellers
to famed Italian h#manists" s#ch as &icholas of 6#sa
GG
?nlike 'ong.s introd#ction" most of the following chapters are #nlikely to s#stain the
contin#ed attention of the Kgeneral p#(licM :he cas#al reader will pro(a(ly feel
o%erwhelmed (y the degree of detail pro%ided in !lan + 7tahl.s metic#lo#s (iography of
+ichael of /hodes *c#rrently" the most complete so#rce of information a(o#t this
a#thor," (y parts of /affaella )ranci.s acc#rate st#dy of the mathematics in the
man#script" or (y the technicalities of ship(#ilding detailed in =a%id +cGee and +a#ro
Bondioli.s chapters" and so on By contrast" speciali;ed scholars will find all these
contri(#tions relia(le so#rces of precio#s information
Nistorical geographers and map historians will find -iero )alchetta.s chapter on the
man#script.s portolan of partic#lar interest :he portolan contains instr#ctions for the
coastal na%igation of !tlantic E#rope" the G#lf of 7alonika" and the !driatic1coasts
+ichael had more or less extensi%ely sailed Na%ing context#ali;ed +ichael.s portolan
within a m#ch (roader *yet rather #nderst#died, tradition of periploi *ancient Greek and
By;antine lists of ports" %illages" and cities as enco#ntered d#ring a coastal 3o#rney,"
)alchetta shows how +ichael.s portolan had (een copied from another so#rce *like most
of the rest of the man#script, Ne also shows how the portolan contains a n#m(er of
technical errors" which go (eyond mere transcription and wo#ld ha%e made the portolan
totally impractical" if not deceitf#l" for na%igational p#rposes )alchetta concl#des that the
#tility of the portolan was sym(olic" rather than practical It was the possession of certain
Kwork instr#mentsM *s#ch as the portolan and other sections of the man#script," rather
than their act#al content" that Kcertified the na#tical experience of their proprietors" as the
proof of the fact that they co#ld ha%e access thro#gh their li(ro *(ook, to specific
knowledgeM *%ol 0" p @95, In other words" +ichael.s man#script was less of a practical
aid than an o(3ect #sed to instr#ct and impress potential patrons and employers who were
not necessarily familiar with the art of na%igation and its technicalities
!s the other st#dies in the %ol#me show" this thesis seems to (e confirmed (y other parts
of the man#script )or example" the place of mathematics in +ichael.s man#script" )ranci
s#ggests" often appears to (e more KrecreationalM than practical *in the literal sense,
6opied from contemporary a((aci *or school text(ooks," pro(lems" exercises" and m#ch
of +ichael.s mathematical writing ha%e nothing to do with his own personal needs as a
sailor *%ol 0" p 145, 7imilarly" the man#script.s section on the ;odiac" =ieter Bl#me
shows" contains some (asic astrological mistakes" whereas the treatise on ship(#ilding"
we read in chapters G and B" was not all +ichael.s work Nere" +ichael once again
re%eals his importance as a collator and transmitter" rather than as an a#thority on the
matter *it is worth noting that did not himself (#ild ships,
$%erall" the companion %ol#me offers %al#a(le insights into maritime practices and
technologies and Ienetian commerce" as well as into a %ariety of aspects of pop#lar
knowledge and c#lt#re in the (roader world of the fifteenth-cent#ry +editerranean5 from
religio#s piety to pop#lar medicine and astronomy Besides pro%iding the reader with
detailed commentaries on different aspects of the man#script" the st#dies also shed light
on its o%erall p#rposes" (oth collecti%ely and indi%id#ally 4hile this gi%es the
companion %ol#me coherence and enco#rages nonspecialist academic readers to %ent#re
(eyond their area of expertise" it also *and perhaps ine%ita(ly, generates a n#m(er of
GB
repetitions and slight o%erlaps thro#gho#t the %ol#me :o a certain degree" each chapter
co#ld read as a self-contained essay directed to a specific category of specialists
:he price of the set does certainly 3#stice to its p#(lishing standard and the <#ality of the
writing *(oth in terms of translation and research, Beyond the sheer delight of a high-
<#ality facsimile" the (ook is a pleas#re to read simply for its rigoro#s acc#racy and
caref#l detail :he editors. work has (een tr#ly commenda(le 'ong" +cGee" and 7tahl
certainly s#cceeded in KfixingM the contents of this extraordinary #nedited man#script for
posterity" pre%enting them from getting lost a third time +ay :he Book of +ichael of
/hodes ser%e as an inspiration and example for p#(lishers" pri%ate collectors" and
scholars
Book /e%iew5 $ttomans" :#rks and the Balkans5
Empire 'ost" /elations !ltered
!pril @9" @919
critcalmass Nolding Book /e%iew" 6olonial 'ea%e a comment
E(r# Boyar $ttomans" :#rks and the Balkans5 Empire 'ost" /elations !ltered 'ondon5
IB :a#ris" @99G @5D pp aB499 *cloth," I7B& 9GB-1-B4511-051-0
/e%iewed (y Ipek K 2osmaogl# *?ni%ersity of 4isconsin-+adison,
-#(lished on N-:#rk *+arch" @919,
6ommissioned (y Iictor $stapch#k
$ttomans" :#rks and the Balkans
! serendipito#s location in medie%al Bithynia" nestled next to what remained of the
By;antine Empire" was one of the main reasons (ehind the early $ttomans. s#ccess in
state-(#ilding :he lands that transformed this fledgling state into an empire" howe%er"
lay across the straits in the fertile plains of /#meli :hey were the first to (e incorporated
into the $ttoman fold" and" following the )irst Balkan 4ar" the last in E#rope to (e
relin<#ished since the empire (egan losing territory in the se%enteenth cent#ry
KIn 1910 the $ttoman empire lost its so#l"M writes E(r# Boyar" (eca#se the KBalkans"
sym(oli;ing more than territory" was at the heart of what made the empireM *p 1, :he
reaction of the $ttoman and early /ep#(lican elites to this loss is the s#(3ect of her
monograph :he (ook" in the words of the a#thor" Kconsiders the de%elopment of the
$ttomanR:#rkish intellect#al relationships with the Balkans and tries to #nderstand in
what ways the loss of the Balkans colored $ttomanR:#rkish self-perception and shaped
the relations of the empire and later the /ep#(lic with the o#tside worldM *p @, :he
shock" h#miliation" and (itterness generated (y this loss were expressed in" and
pres#ma(ly filtered thro#gh" the literary and historical o#tp#t of these elites and (ecame
infl#ential factors in fixing the shape of :#rkish national identity in the early rep#(lican
G9
era Boyar.s (ook is a to#r of this disc#rsi%e landscape" and an important contri(#tion to
the historiography of the transition from $ttoman Empire to :#rkish /ep#(lic :he long-
lasting effects of the tra#ma of the empire.s attrition into what was essentially an !sian
co#ntry" and complete disappearance shortly thereafter" ha%e (een in%oked fre<#ently in
scholarly and pop#lari;ing works alike In fact" traces of what may (e called Knostalgia
for /#meliM ha%e lately appeared in pop#lar c#lt#re media s#ch as :I dramas Boyar.s
(ook" to the a#thor.s credit" does not follow the nostalgia %og#e :o the contrary" it is an
attempt to systematically analy;e how this territorial loss shaped the mindset of a
generation of elites and p#t an indeli(le mark on the first years of the :#rkish /ep#(lic
Boyar has performed an in%al#a(le ser%ice to the field (y #ndertaking s#ch a pro3ect
:he a#thor has cons#lted a wide range of primary so#rces for this pro3ect" which she has
organi;ed #nder fo#r main gro#ps :he first consists of Kthe history writing of the
period"M incl#ding official chronicles or histories" text(ooks" pop#lar history texts" and
scholarly p#(lications -op#lar literat#re and memoirs comprise the second and third
gro#ps :he fo#rth gro#p of so#rces she mentions is the official state doc#ments :hat
this final category occ#pies significantly less space in the (ook.s (i(liography is not
necessarily a dire methodological handicap" since the a#thor is mainly concerned with the
intellect#al reperc#ssions of what one might call Kthe 'oss"M and a
historiographicR(iographic analysis is more s#ited to that p#rpose
:he text is (ased on the a#thor.s = -hil thesis" and displays certain flaws inherent in
dissertations p#(lished as monographs :his is #nfort#nate (eca#se the topic and the
research agenda Boyar has ast#tely identified are an excellent cond#it for engaging
important historiographical pro(lems concerning the collapse of the $ttoman Empire and
the emergence of Balkan nationalisms :he first chapter of the (ook" entitled KNistory-
writing in the 'ate $ttomanREarly /ep#(lican Era"M is a twenty-page sampler of history
texts ranging in date from the :an;imat reforms to the early rep#(lican period Nere the
a#thor.s p#rpose seems to (e esta(lishing a contin#ity of historical approach from the
$ttoman into the rep#(lican period with respect to the centrality of the state5 KEither
$ttoman or :#rkish" either conser%ati%e or radical" all $ttomanR:#rkish historians in the
late $ttomanRearly /ep#(lican period percei%ed history as a #sef#l means to reach a
political or social aim of the state regardless of whether they #sed modern historical
techni<#es or notM :he reason" according to the a#thor" had to do with the pec#liar
relation of the historian to the state5 K:he $ttomanR:#rkish historian" as a mem(er of the
intelligentsia" existed in a direct relation with the state rather than with any class L the
intellect#als f#nctioned as the Fdep#ties. of a state" whose power was not merely
physically coerci%eM *p @1,
:he centrality of the state in :#rkish history-writing is indeed per%asi%e" and dates well
(efore the early rep#(lican period !s for the $ttoman intellect#als" one needs only to
take a look at the con%ergence of the otherwise widely different agendas of -rince
7a(ahaddin and !hmed /i;a" for instance" concerning the #rgency of Ksa%ing the state"M
to comprehend the centrality of this iss#e -resenting a historiographical contin##m (ased
on this o(%io#s common thread creates se%eral pro(lems" howe%er :he first concerns the
nat#re of the state in <#estion1this the a#thor partly acknowledges5 K)rom the late
B9
$ttoman era to the /ep#(lican era" the Flocation. of the historian within the state did not
change" altho#gh the state transformed itself from a m#lti-religio#s empire to a nation-
stateM *p @5, $n the other hand" the possi(le shifts in the state.s coerci%e powers"
physical or ideological" are ignored +ore importantly" the theme of contin#ity is so
(roadly defined that the reader is left with no appreciation of the different intellect#al
so#rces and methods of historians s#ch as +ehmed )#ad K\prAlA" `eki Ielidi :ogan and
!hmed /efik" e%en tho#gh the a#thor has e%idently considered these differences in her
research :he new regime.s #se of entirely new tools to impose the hegemony of official
history" s#ch as the p#(lications of the :#rkish Nistorical 7ociety" the form#lation of a
K:#rkish Nistory :hesis"M efforts to infiltrate pop#lar history texts thro#gh the K-eople.s
No#ses"M and the new pedagogical agenda to (e applied in schools1all of which
#nderscore the potent" no%el role of history in disseminating an officially defined national
identity1are cl#mped in the last few pages of this short chapter
:he next two chapters on K:he =efinition of the BalkansM and K:he /epresentation of the
Balkans"M examine the $ttoman and :#rkish definitions and perceptions of the Balkans
and the nationalist mo%ements originating therein :hese two important themes ha%e
largely (een left o#t of the recent de(ates that ha%e occ#pied Balkanists1de(ates
concerning the historical prod#ction of the category KBalkanM and KBalkanismM as a
special case of $rientalism :he information presented here wo#ld ha%e (een more
meaningf#l had it (een employed to re%isit" re%ise" or alternati%ely" to complement this
ongoing dialog#e" whereas the a#thor prefers to opt o#t" ignoring a (ody of scholarship
extremely pertinent to her research agenda 7he proceeds instead with a series of
spec#lations a(o#t a pres#med $ttoman resistance to the term KBalkansM prior to 199B"
spec#lations that she repeatedly rep#diates herself Ner analysis of Balkan nationalist
mo%ements as they were #nderstood (y $ttomanR:#rkish intellect#als s#ffers from a
similar lack of concept#al frame of reference" and a presentation style that is eclectic
rather than synthetic :he a#thor.s stated aim is to search for the collecti%e KmentalityM of
these intellect#als" which" she arg#es" can (e fo#nd in their choice of terms for descri(ing
nationalist mo%ements *p 40, 4hat follows" howe%er" is one dictionary definition after
the other *incl#ding a definition of the word Kmo%ementM," and disparate <#otes rather
than a well-foc#sed analysis of the $ttomanR:#rkish intelligentsia.s disc#rsi%e
preferences regarding the #prisings in the Balkans )or instance" $ttoman historians.
%arying explanations of the E#ropean s#pport for the Greek #prising in the -eloponnese"
ranging from the p#rely emotional to the more le%el-headed (alance-of-power
interpretations" might ha%e (een presented as a co#nterpoint to totali;ing %iews of
$ttomanR:#rkish nationalism as reacti%e or deri%ati%e ?nfort#nately" they are instead
red#ced to incomprehensi(le non se<#it#rs5 K!ltho#gh the first #nsophisticated
explanation was #sed mainly in the nineteenth-cent#ry texts" while the late-nineteenth-
and twentieth-cent#ry texts tended to #se more sophisticated and more systematic
interpretations" the more simplistic explanations still appear in these later writings d#e to
the simple and didactic character of the textsM *p D9,
:he main theme of K:he Balkan -eople and the Balkan 7tates"M the nine-page chapter
that follows" is $ttoman condescension towards the petty Balkan states :his
condescension1regardless of its so#rces1and what the a#thor identifies as the
B1
Kperipherali;ationM of the Balkans (y the $ttoman elite in the preceding chapter" (ring to
mind the notion of an $ttoman attempt to Kcoloni;eM their pro%inces in the nineteenth
cent#ry that has recently (een introd#ced as an alternati%e to the moderni;ation
paradigm" especially in the !ra( periphery of the empire 4hile one might take iss#e
with the appropriateness of K$ttoman colonialismM as a concept#al tool to analy;e the
final years of $ttoman r#le in the Balkans" and the rep#(lican intellect#als. recollections
of it" some of the examples Boyar pro%ides in this (rief chapter" s#ch as persistent
references to the 7er(ians as Kpig farmers"M (eg for a comparison that takes into acco#nt
not only the dominant E#ropean disco#rse of the late nineteenth cent#ry that %iewed the
Balkan peoples as no(le sa%ages at (est and corr#pt sla%es at worst" (#t also the ways in
which this disco#rse penetrated the Balkan peoples. *and" e%idently" the $ttomans., own
form#lations of a sliding scale of nations
:he following" final" and longest chapter of the (ook" K:he +#lti-Images of the
Balkans"M all#des to the possi(ility of s#ch a comparison :he a#thor asserts that Kwitho#t
#nderstanding the centrality of the E#ropean ci%ili;ation de(ate for the $ttomans and
:#rks" it is impossi(le to #nderstand the reasons (ehind the image of the Balkans as a
space of confrontations with E#rope in $ttoman and /ep#(lican historiography" or
$ttoman and :#rkish sensi(ilities o%er the regionM *pp B0-B4, :he a#thor.s disc#ssion
here follows three main threads5 /#ssian and E#ropean reactions to the plight of
6hristians in the $ttoman EmpireC the $ttoman reactions to what seemed to (e E#ropean
indifference to +#slim s#fferingC and finally the different images the theme of the
KBalkansM con3#res #p in literary and historical writings from the late $ttoman into the
rep#(lican period *for an #nexplained reason" possi(ly (eca#se of its connection to Greek
nationalism" 6rete is treated as part of the Balkans here" as it is thro#gho#t the (ook,
:his eclectic panorama of Balkan scenes completes the (ook" lea%ing largely #nexplored
the most o(%io#s <#estion one wo#ld ha%e liked to see addressed in s#ch a st#dy" namely
the link (etween the %iolent and protracted process of /#meli.s separation from the
$ttoman Empire and the genesis of an ethnically and religio#sly excl#si%e :#rkish
nationalism that claimed !natolia as its homeland as the res#lt of an e%en more %iolent
process :he a#thor.s concl#sion to this chapter is5 K:he existence of the m#ltiple images
of the Balkans demonstrates the centrality of the Balkans in the late $ttoman and early
/ep#(lican mentality :he region came to sym(oli;e the in3#stices" losses" yearnings" and
fail#res s#ffered (y the $ttoman and :#rks :hese images were constantly reprod#ced in
the history texts and the literat#re well into the /ep#(lican era and the %i%id impact and
emoti%e power of the Balkans still remain strong in the :#rkish psycheM *p 149,
$%erall" this is a well-concei%ed (ook that offers new and interesting information on a
theme that has (een #nderser%ed Nowe%er" it also s#ffers from a serio#s lack of
concept#al organi;ation" engagement with pertinent scholarship" and editorial g#idance"
the last of which is certainly not the a#thor.s fa#lt :hese shortcomings notwithstanding"
Boyar.s monograph is a timely contri(#tion that will (e appreciated (y those interested in
the historiography of this period
&otes
B@
c1d )or a re%iew see K E )leming" K$rientalism" the Balkans and Balkan
Nistoriography"M !merican Nistorical /e%iew 195 *@999,5 1@1B-1@00
c@d 7ee" for instance" ?sama +akdisi" K$ttoman $rientalism"M !merican Nistorical
/e%iew 19G *@99@,5 GDB-G9D
=esert +arders
!pril 19" @919
critcalmass !frika Korps !)Is !frika Korps !)Is 'ea%e a comment
)orce `.s =emise
!pril 19" @919
critcalmass Nolding &a%al Battle 'ea%e a comment
8apanese aerial photo of the initial attack on -rince of 4ales *top, and /ep#lse ! short"
thick pl#me of (lack smoke can (e seen emanating from /ep#lse" which has 3#st (een hit
(y a (om( and s#rro#nded (y at least six near misses -rince of 4ales can (e seen to (e
mane#%ering :he white smoke is from the f#nnels as the ships attempt to increase speed
$n 11 =ecem(er" these two other mem(ers of the :ripartite -act 3oined their 8apanese
ally (y grat#ito#sly declaring war on the ?nited 7tatesG In this wilf#lly extra%agant
gest#re (oth Nitler and +#ssolini had sol%ed /oose%elt.s pro(lem for him" m#ch to the
relief of the -resident and his friend" the F)ormer &a%al -erson." in 'ondon who slept
so#ndly for once" con%inced that the tide of the war had now irre%ersi(ly t#rned in the
!llies. fa%o#r Nis words reflect this perfectly5
7o we had won after allb 2es" after =#nkirkC after the fall of )ranceC after the horri(le
episode of $ran5 after the threat of in%asion L after se%enteen months of lonely fighting
B0
and nineteen months of my responsi(ility in dire stress 4e had won the war England
wo#ld li%eC Britain wo#ld li%eC the 6ommonwealth of &ations and the empire wo#ld li%e
=espite (elie%ing that Nitler and +#ssolini.s fate wo#ld (e sealed and confidently
predicting that the 8apanese wo#ld (e gro#nd to powder" the British -rime +inister was
soon to disco%er that the 7howa nation wo#ld not (e destroyed so lightly 7hortly after
the first wa%e of air strikes against Nawaii" 8apanese (om(s (egan to fall on the city of
7ingapore :hereafter" news <#ickly filtered thro#gh that 8apanese troops were landing
along the so#thern coast of :hailand and the northeastern shore of Kelantan in +alaya In
addition" reports spoke of a wa%e of aerial attacks taking place on the !merican air (ases
at 6lark )ield and I(a )ield on the island of '#;on and against the city of =a%ao on the
so#thern island of +indanao in the -hilippines :hese stories wo#ld soon (e added to (y
the landing of an assa#lt gro#p on the Bataan penins#la across the (ay from the
-hilippines capital of +anila It was clear that the 8apanese had em(arked #pon their
legendary nanshin or so#thern expedition
Bereft of any !dmiralty instr#ctions to the contrary" :om -hillips was left to ponder what
to do for the (est Nis fleet anchorage at 7ingapore was o(%io#sly not a safe ha%en any
longer" (#t a retreat to !#stralia" 6eylon or the =#tch East Indies was still feasi(le if he
wished to keep his fleet-in-(eing stat#s ali%e =esk(o#nd for many years and not
acc#stomed to operational command at sea" -hillips still chose not to take the safe option
Instead he decided that it was inc#m(ent #pon him and his Eastern )leet to try to do
something to disr#pt the 8apanese landings off Khota Bhar# Ne appears to ha%e reached
the not #nreasona(le ass#mption that if his capital ships co#ld get in amongst the troop
transports and their close escorts" they co#ld ca#se carnage If this happened it wo#ld
s#rely help to delay the 8apanese offensi%e and (#y the !llies time to get more ships"
aircraft and g#ns to their forces in +alaya O#ite how long -hillips expected the 8apanese
to take in landing their troops along the :hai and +alayan coasts is #nclear" (#t he m#st
ha%e (anked #pon the northeasterly monsoon inhi(iting their amphi(io#s operations with
its hea%y s<#alls and ro#gh seas ?nfort#nately" the %ital ad3#nct to any search and
destroy mission 1 airpower 1 was #nlikely to (e a%aila(le to him in significant strength
for the d#ration of his mission or (e there to protect him if things went (adly askew )or
this reason" it was essential that the presence of the renamed )orce ` *the capital ships
-rince of 4ales and /ep#lse and the fo#r destroyers" the modern and fast Electra and
Express and the old and slow :enedos and Iampire, sho#ld remain #ndetected (y either
enemy aircraft or s#(marines on its 3o#rney #p the east coast to the in%asion (eaches at
7ongkhla or f#rther so#th at Khota Bhar# E%en if -hillips.s l#ck held on this score and
)orce ` wasn.t o(ser%ed on its o#tward passage" he still needed to arri%e in :hai waters
(efore the 8apanese in%asion fleet had disgorged all of its troops and s#ppliesC otherwise
his (old gest#re of Fsailing to the so#nd of the g#ns. wo#ld ha%e (een all for na#ght
4hat l#ck there might ha%e (een only took a few ho#rs to desert him )orce ` was
initially spotted thro#gh the periscope of s#(marine I-D5 at 1045 ho#rs on 9 =ecem(er"
a(o#t 199 miles north of the !nam(a Islands -hillips remained o(li%io#s to this fact for
nearly fo#r ho#rs more" (#t that ignorance was r#dely dispelled at 1G49 ho#rs when three
8apanese seaplanes ho%e into %iew" remaining in sight (#t o#t of artillery range on the
hori;on" shadowing e%ery mo%e of his ships #ntil d#sk fell -hillips knew that his gam(le
B4
had failed and that any chance )orce ` might once ha%e had of (eing a(le to carry o#t a
decisi%e (low against the 8apanese transports at either of the in%asion spots had %anished
!ll there was left for him to do was to extricate his ships and men from the predicament
they fo#nd themsel%es in It wo#ldn.t (e easy It was o(%io#s that an enemy aerial
dragnet wo#ld (e cast o#t for him $nce #nder co%er of darkness" -hillips made two
alterations to his co#rse and then rel#ctantly t#rned for home at @915 ho#rs !pproaching
midnight he recei%ed a signal from 7ingapore in which his chief of staff reported that a
landing (y 8apanese troops was taking place at K#antan" a town to the so#th of )orce `
on the coast of -ahang and less than @99nm *0G9km, from his na%al (ase at 7em(awang
?nwilling to compromise on the need for radio silence" -hillips didn.t ask /ear-!dmiral
-alliser for confirmation that the report was acc#rate (#t" fig#ring that it made logical
sense for the 8apanese to try to esta(lish a (ridgehead there" he altered co#rse to
in%estigate the incident -hillips didn.t signal -alliser to re<#est any fighter co%er and the
latter didn.t send any 4hen )orce ` finally reached the waters off K#antan at 9B99 ho#rs
on 19 =ecem(er" it rapidly (ecame o(%io#s to one and all that the sleepy town was not
the site of a 8apanese in%asion )or some #nacco#nta(le reason" howe%er" -hillips did not
<#it the scene immediately (#t wasted more than two ho#rs sco#ring the seas of the
coastline checking for what was a nonexistent in%asion fleet It was to pro%e to (e a fatal
error of 3#dgement Nis ships were still engaged on this f#tile exercise when a 8apanese
reconnaissance plane finally spotted them at 1915 ho#rs
!t this point -hillips had nothing to lose (y (reaking radio silence and re<#esting -alliser
to send all a%aila(le aircraft to protect )orce ` as it sped home" since the 8apanese now
knew exactly where his ships were and they wo#ld (e (o#nd to spare nothing in trying to
eliminate them 7t#nningly" howe%er" no s#ch re<#est was e%er transmitted from the
-rince of 4ales =ecades later the seminal <#estion of why -hillips contin#ed to maintain
radio silence at this stage remains #nanswered 4hether the Brewster B#ffaloes that
co#ld ha%e (een sent from 7ingapore wo#ld ha%e made any material difference to the
e%ent#al o#tcome is" of co#rse" p#rely spec#lati%e" (#t the fact that they weren.t co%ering
)orce ` on its homeward passage is little short of ama;ing 'ess than an ho#r later" at
1110 ho#rs to (e precise" the sky a(o%e the two British capital ships was filled with a
swarm of 8apanese high-le%el +its#(ishi F&ell. torpedo (om(ers :hese softened #p the
(ig ships for the s#ccessi%e wa%e of FBetty. torpedo (om(ers to do the rest =espite <#ite
exceptional sea handling (y 6aptain :ennant" the /ep#lse finally s#cc#m(ed to this
(rilliantly orchestrated aerial assa#lt at 1@00 ho#rs" followed (y the -rince of 4ales at
10@9 ho#rs Ironically" the l#m(ering old Brewster B#ffaloes that :ennant had finally
called for (y emergency signal arri%ed too late to do anything (#t (ecome poignant
witnesses to the end of an era :hey watched helplessly as -hillips.s flagship sank
(eneath the wa%es of the 7o#th 6hina 7ea taking the acting-!dmiral and 6aptain 'each"
the captain of the -rince of 4ales" down with her In all B49 officers and men from these
two capital ships lost their li%es that =ecem(er l#nchtime
In sinking these %essels as decisi%ely as they did" the 8apanese pilots from the @@nd &a%al
!ir )lotilla had graphically re%ealed the fact that time had ca#ght #p with (oth the
(attleship and the (attlecr#iser :heir day had passed :his action had pro%ed it
demonstrati%ely It had taken half a cent#ry to o%ert#rn the persistent (elief fostered in
B5
na%al circles from the days of !lfred :hayer +ahan that the (attleship was the s#preme
fighting machine at sea" (#t in a little o%er two ho#rs on that (right tropical day in
=ecem(er 1941 the myth 1 for s#ch it now was 1 had (een emphatically de(#nked
BD