GSIS VS. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.

124208, JANUARY 1, 2008

Facts: Abraham Cate complained of a mass on his left cheek which gradually increased in size. The
histopath report revealed that he was suffering from Osteoblastic Osteosarcoma. He underwent an
operation to remove the mass. After several months, another biopsy revealed the recurrence of
the ailment. He underwent debulking of the recurrent tumor.

Abraham filed a claim for income benefits with Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). But
GSIS denied the claim on the ground that Osteosarcoma is not considered an occupational disease
under PD No. 626 and there is no showing that his duties as SPO4 in the Philippine National Police
(PNP) had increased the risk of contracting said ailment.

When Abraham died, his heirs appealed the decision of GSIS to the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC). The ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the decision of the ECC.

Issue: Whether or not the ailment of Abraham is compensable under the present law on
employees compensation.

Held: Article 167 of Chapter 1, Title II, Book 4 of the Labor Code defines sickness as any illness
definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the ECC, or any illness caused by
employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions.

In this case, Osteosarcoma is not listed as an occupational disease in the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation. Hence, it is supposed to be upon the claimant or private respondent to
prove by substantial evidence that the risk of contracting it was increased by the working condition
of the late Abraham. The records show that Abraham failed to present evidence to establish that
the development of his ailment was traceable to his working condition in the Philippine Navy, the
Philippine Constabulary, and the PNP. Further, private respondents allegation in their petition for
review with the Court of Appeals that Abraham, as a rifleman in the Philippine Navy, may have
been exposed to elements like a virus which could have contributed to his ailment does not satisfy
the requirement of substantial evidence. The rule is that awards of compensation cannot rest on
speculations and presumptions as the claimant must prove a positive thing.

However, in this particular case, the requirement is impossible to comply with, given the present
state of scientific knowledge. The obligation to present such as an impossible evidence, must,
therefore be deemed void. Respondent, therefore, is entitled to compensation, consistent with
social legislations intended beneficial purpose.

SALMONE V. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, G.R.
NO. 142392, SEPTEMBER 26, 2000

Salmone was employed as sewer by a corporation engaged in the business of sewing costumes,
gowns and casual and formal dresses. Eventually, she started to feel chest pains. She then filed a
leave of absence from work as the chest pains became unbearable. After subjecting herself to
medical examination, she was found to be suffering from Atherosclerotic heart disease, Atrial
Fibrillation, Cardiac Arrhythmia. Upon recommendation of her doctor, she resigned from her work
hoping that with a much-needed complete rest, she will be cured. She later filed a disability claim
with the SSS from the Employees Compensation Fund, under Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended. Was the sickness compensable?

Held: Yes, the illness is compensable. Under the Labor Code, as amended, the law applicable to the
case at bar, in order for the employee to be entitled to sickness or death benefits, the sickness or
death resulting therefrom must be or must have resulted from either (a) any illness definitely
accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or (b) any illness caused by
employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions. In other words, for a sickness and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the said sickness must be an occupational disease listed under Annex A the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation; otherwise, the claimant or employee concerned
must prove that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working condition.
Indisputably, cardiovascular diseases, which, as herein above-stated include atherosclerotic heart
disease, atrial fibrillation, cardiac arrhythmia, are listed as compensable occupational diseases in
the Rules of the Employees Compensation Commission, hence, no further proof of casual relation
between the disease and claimants work is necessary.

LEGAL HEIRS OF THE LATE EDWIN B. DEAUNA, represented by his wife, MRS. ARLINA DEAUNA,
Petitioners,
vs.
FIL-STAR MARITIME CORPORATION, GREGORIO ORTEGA, CAPT. VICTOR S. MILLALOS and
GRANDSLAM ENTERPRISES CORPORATION, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

REYES, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by the
legal heirs (collectively referred to as the petitioners) of the late Edwin Deauna (Edwin),
represented by his wife, Arlina Deauna, to assail the Decision2 dated July 15, 2009 and the
Resolution3 dated March 8, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106199. The
dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 28 October 2008 of Voluntary
Arbitrator Rene Ofreneo in AC 94-NCMB-NCR, is hereby, REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one
entered absolving the petitioner[s] [herein respondents] from liability for the death benefits under
the terms and conditions of the POEA Contract and Article 29 pf (sic) the AMOSUP/JSU-CBA.

SO ORDERED. 4

The assailed resolution denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Antecedent Facts

Respondent Fil-Star Maritime Corporation (Fil-Star) is a local manning agency, with respondent
Captain Victor S. Millalos (Capt. Millalos) as its general manager. Respondent Grandslam Enterprise
Corporation (Grandslam) is among Fil-Star's foreign principals. Grandslam owns and manages the
vessel M/V Sanko Stream (Sanko) which Edwin boarded on August 1, 2004 for a nine-month
engagement as Chief Engineer. As such, he was responsible for the operations and maintenance of
the entire vessel's engineering equipment. He also determined the requirements for fuel, lube oil
and other consumables necessary for a voyage, conducted inventory of spare parts, prepared the
engine room for inspection by marine and safety authorities, and took charge of the engine room
during maneuvering and emergency situations.

Prior to Edwin's deployment, he underwent the customary Pre-employment Medical Examination
(PEME) and was found as "fit to work" as was repeatedly the case in the past 30 years since his first
deployment by Fil-Star in 1975.

Sometime in October 2004, Edwin experienced abdominal pains while on-board Sanko. He was
promptly referred to a doctor in Paranagua, Brazil. An ultrasound examination revealed that he had
kidney stones for which he was administered oral medications. Thereafter, he resumed his work
on-board Sanko.

On April 3, 2005 or more or less 8 months from deployment, Edwin was repatriated. There were,
however, conflicting claims regarding the cause of his repatriation. The respondents claimed that
Edwin requested for an early termination of his contract in order to attend his daughter's
graduation ceremony. On the other hand, the petitioners averred that Edwin was repatriated due
to the latter's "body weakness and head heaviness".5 The petitioners likewise claimed that on April
4, 2005, they called Capt. Millalos to inform the latter that upon arrival at the airport, Edwin was
very sick, weak, disoriented, and merely wanted to immediately go home to Daet, Camarines
Norte.6 Edwin can neither physically report in Fil-Star's office nor board his next vessel of
assignment.

On April 27, 2005, Dr. Eduardo R. Mercado (Dr. Mercado), a neurosurgeon at the Cardinal Santos
Medical Center certified that:

Mr. Edwin Deauna, 52 years of age, is presently under my care at the Cardinal Santos Medical
Center. He presented with (sic) behavioral changes associated with a left-sided facial and upper
extremity weakness. An MRI of the brain done [on] April 26, 2005 showed a large right-sided brain
tumor with involvement of his right temporal lobe, basal ganglia, corona radiate and insular cortex.
There is associated severe swelling and shift (mass effect) to the opposite side. He is undergoing
medical decompression to relieve pressure intracranially.

He will need stereotactic biopsy of his brain tumor for "grading purposes". Thereafter, treatment
options will be discussed with family but I can predict that he will need radiation treatment as well
as chemotherapy. This is necessary for palliation purposes and prolongation of life with good
quality.7 (Citation omitted)

The petitioners sent the respondents two letters requesting for the conduct of a medical
examination and treatment of Edwin's brain tumor. The respondents averred that they provided
Edwin with medical assistance for him to be able to promptly undergo a biopsy.

On May 4, 2005, Dr. Mercado found out from the pathology report that Edwin was suffering from
"Glioblastoma WHO Grade 4" (GBM), a malignant and aggressive form of brain cancer. According to
Dr. Mercado, "it is logical/safe to surmise that the tumor has been existent and progressively
growing for a number of months".8

On May 13, 2005, the company-designated physician, Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz (Dr. Cruz), opined that
the "etiology of GBM is unknown". Further, Edwin's "illness is work-related if he has history of
exposure to radiation, vinyl products and the likes and working in near proximity of power line,
otherwise, it is not," and that "the tumor is already present even prior to embarkation but not
detectable but (sic) ordinary PEME".9

On August 22, 2005, or about four months after Edwin's repatriation, Dr. Cruz sent Capt. Millalos a
medical report stating that:

The patient was repatriated because of body weakness and head heaviness since October 2004. He
had his consultation in Brazil, where he was evaluated to have "kidney stones" after undergoing
ultrasound. Patient then finished his contract. At the airport, upon his arrival last April 03, 2005, he
was noted to be drowsy and disoriented. On April 05, 2005, he was seen by a physician in Daet. CT
Scan was done and he was diagnosed to have hypertension and neurologic disease. He was seen at
the Cardinal Santos Hospital and on April 30, 2005, he underwent biopsy of the brain mass and the
pathology report revealed Glioblastoma Multiforme. He has completed his 1st period of
radiotherapy.

The MRI of the brain showed slight reduction in the size of the tumor. He has weakness of the left
foot resulting to episodic foot drop. He also has facial edema secondary to steroid intake. He also
complains of occasional doubling of vision but he has no headache.

Submitting to you the monthly expenses for his chemotherapy.

DIAGNOSIS:

Glioblastoma Multiforme

Advised to come back on September 23, 2005. 10

The respondents claimed that out of compassion and intent to avoid legal battles, they extended to
Edwin an allowance of US$6,033.36. They also offered the payment of US$60,000.00 disability
benefits despite having no obligation to do so on their part as GBM can only be considered as work-
related if a person who suffers therefrom had exposures to radiation or vinyl products, or had
worked in the vicinity of power lines.11 The respondents claimed that Edwin did not have such
exposure while under their employ.

Two demand letters seeking disability benefits were thereafter sent by the petitioners to the
respondents. The first, which was received by the respondents on November 21, 2005, sought the
payment of US$125,000.00 as allegedly provided under the International Bargaining
Forum/Associated Marine Officers and Seamens Union of the Philippines/International Mariners
Management Association of Japan Collective Bargaining Agreement (IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA).
The second letter, dated December 8, 2005, reiterated the petitioners' claims for disability benefits.
The respondents replied that they had already aptly dealt with the illness under the respective
employment agreement. Not long after, the petitioners again wrote the respondents informing the
latter that Edwin's condition was already critical. Hence, the possibility that the claims for disability
benefits would be converted to death benefits arose. The respondents denied the petitioners'
demand.

In December 2005, a complaint for disability benefits, medical and transportation reimbursements,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees were filed before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). Edwin died on April 13, 2006 during the pendency of the proceedings. He was
substituted therein by the petitioners who sought the payment of death benefits.

After finding that there was an arbitration clause in the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA, the Labor
Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision referring the complaint to voluntary arbitration. The case was
thereafter docketed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) as AC 94-NCMB-
NCR-39-01-13-07.

On October 28, 2008, Voluntary Arbitrator Rene Ofreneo (VA Ofreneo), invoking the provisions of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA SEC)
and the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA, awarded death benefits to the petitioners. VA Ofreneo
ratiocinated that:

This Office has also taken cognizance of the following facts that were not questioned or contested
by the parties: One, that EDWIN DEAUNA was under the employ of the same company for roughly
25 years due to repeated re-hiring from 1975 to 2005, and Two, that the RESPONDENTS made an
earlier settlement offer of US$60,000 as payment for disability benefits.

On the repatriation of EDWIN DEAUNA and the relationship of his ailment to his work as Chief
Engineer of the vessel Sanko Stream, the medical report dated 22 August 2005 by the company
physician, DR. NICOMEDES G. CRUZ, to CAPTAIN VICTORIO S. MILLALOS, General Manager of Fil-
Star Maritime Corporation, does not need any other interpretation other than observation that
EDWIN DEAUNA's health status had been deteriorating on board. x x x

x x x x

From the foregoing facts and circumstances, it is abundantly clear that the ailment of EDWIN
DEAUNA was work-related and manifested while he was on board in his last sailing. This ailment
developed and progressed in the course of his employment, that is, during the long and continuous
service EDWIN DEAUNA rendered to the same manning company, which spanned a period of over
25 years. His repatriation, recorded as made upon his request, was clearly unavoidable given his
rapidly deteriorating health situation as proven no less by the series of medical tests and treatment
EDWIN DEAUNA was subjected to with the help of private and Company physicians and
eventually by his death.12

The respondents filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court to
challenge VA Ofreneo's award. Before the CA could resolve the case, the petitioners filed a motion
for execution13 which was granted by VA Ofreneo over the respondents' vehement opposition.14
Consequently, the respondents paid to the petitioners the sum of P5,603,026.00,15 but the former
manifested that their act was without prejudice to the outcome of the proceedings then pending
with the CA.16

On July 15, 2009, the CA rendered the now assailed decision reversing VA Ofreneo's award based
on the following grounds:

Under the Definition of Terms found in the Standard Contract, a work-related illness is defined as
"any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under
Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied". An illness not otherwise
listed in Section 32-A is disputably presumed work-related.

Glioblastoma multiforme is the most aggressive of the gliomas, a collection of tumors arising from
glia or their precursors within the central nervous system. Most glioblastoma tumors appear to be
sporadic, without any genetic predisposition. No links have been found between glioblastoma and
smoking, diet, cellular phones or electromagnetic fields. Recently, evidence for a viral cause has
been discovered, possibly SV40 or cytomegalovirus. There also appears to be a small link between
ionizing radiation and glioblastoma. Having one of the following genetic disorders is associated with
an increased incidence of glomas: neurofibromatosis, tuberous sclerosis, Von Hippel-Lindau
disease, Li-Fraumeni syndrome, turcot syndrome. These tumors manifest de novo, presenting after
a short clinical history, usually less than 3 months.

The presumption was disproved by petitioner[s] [herein respondents] in its (sic)
arguments.1wphi1 Petitioner[s] presented the expert medical opinion of its (sic) company-
designated doctor, opining that the deceased seaman's Glioblastoma Multiforme was not work-
related considering that he was never exposed to factors that would cause the same during his
employment with the petitioners. While opinions of petitioner's (sic) doctor should not be given
evidentiary weight as they are palpably self-serving and biased in favor of the former, and certainly
could not be considered independent, respondent[s] has (sic) used the medical report of the very
same physician to support their arguments, and is (sic) thus considered in estoppel.

Respondent's (sic) bare assertion, without any scientific or logical proof, that such employment of
the deceased seaman in the vessel of the petitioner[s], is the cause of his illness and eventual
death, cannot be upheld by this court. Under P.D. No. 626, if an ailment or sickness is not listed as
an "occupational disease", the claimant must prove that the risk of contracting the illness suffered
was increased by his or her working conditions. The degree of proof required is "substantial
evidence". Jurisprudence defines "substantial evidence" as that amount of relevant evidence which
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify the conclusion. It provides that to establish
compensability of a non-occupational disease, reasonable proof and not direct proof of a causal
connection between the work and the ailment is required. To require proof of actual causes or
factors which lead to the ailment would not be consistent with the liberal interpretation of the
social justice guarantee in favor of workers.


Thus, death compensation benefits cannot be awarded unless there is substantial evidence
showing that (a) the cause of Deauna's death was reasonably connected with his work; or (b) the
sickness for which he died is an accepted occupational disease; or (c) his working conditions
increased the risk of contracting the disease for which he died.

The deceased seaman's cause of death was not connected with his employment on board the
vessel as a Chief Engineer. A Chief Engineer is someone qualified to oversee the entire engine
department. He is also responsible for all operations and maintenance that has to do with any and
all engineering equipment throughout the entire ship. He also determines the fuel, lube oil, and
other consumables required for a voyage; [r]equired inventory for spare parts, oversees fuel, lube
and slop oil transfers, prepares the engine room for inspection by local marine/safety authorities,
oversees all major maintenance; is required to be in the engine room during maneuvering
operations, and is in charge of the engine room during emergency situations.

Glioblastoma Multiforme is not an accepted occupational disease of a Chief Engineer under the
POEA-SEC, Art. 32-A. It does not arise from known occupational hazards, such as being a Chief
Engineer as in this case, and its origin has not yet been pinpointed by any medical experts or
organizations up to the present. Furthermore, to say that his earlier illness of kidney stones, even if
such was proven to have been caused by the deceased seaman's occupation, lead to the
development of the Glioblastoma Multiforme, which eventually caused his death, is stretching the
facts too far. We are not medical experts to be able to connect such illness as the cause of GBM,
which even the former has not yet discovered, and thus, warrant a new discovery in the field of
medicine and grant the death benefits prayed for by the respondents.

Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. The evidence must be real and substantial, and
not merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by law is
real and not merely apparent. This Court finds that under the circumstances[,] respondents' bare
allegations do not suffice to discharge the required quantum of proof of compensability. Awards of
compensation cannot rest on speculations or presumptions, like the one made by herein
respondents. The beneficiaries must present evidence to prove a positive proposition.

For the second argument, petitioner[s] argues (sic) that when the deceased seaman was
repatriated on April 3, 2005, whether it is due to finished contract or for medical reasons, this will
have the effect of terminating the employment of the said seaman. When the seaman died on April
16, 2006, he was no longer under the employment of the petitioners.

Petitioner[s] cited the case of Gau Sheng v. Joaquin, [through which] the Highest Tribunal ruled that
in order to give effect to the benefits granted under the (sic) Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series
of 1989, it must be shown that the employee died during the effectivity of the contract of
employment.

We rule in the affirmative.

Art. 29 of the said IBF AMOSUP-JSU IMMAJ CBA provides, in part, that:

"If a seafarer dies of any cause whilst in the employment of the company including death from
natural causes and death occurring whilst traveling to and from the vessel, or as a result of marine
or other similar peril, but excluding death due to willful act, the Company shall pay the sums
specified xxx to a nominated beneficiary and to each dependent child up to a maximum of four (4)
under 21 years of age. The above compensation shall include those Seafarers who have been
missing as a result of peril of the sea xxx and presumed to be dead three (3) months after the
adversity xxx."

It is clear from the above provision that in order to come under the operation of the said CBA
agreement, it must be shown by the respondent[s] that the ailment must have been incurred while
on the employment with the petitioner[s]. Respondent's (sic) contention that since the origin or
cause of the illness was unknown, it is presumed to have been contracted during employment, is
untenable. There is no such correlation between the two to give rise to such presumption. The
issuance of a clean bill of health to the deceased seaman, made by the physicians
selected/accredited by the petitioner[s] does not necessarily follow that the illness for which the
former died of was acquired during his employment.

Stated differently, for death of a seafarer to be compensable, the death must occur during the term
of his contract of employment. It is the only condition for compensability of a seafarer's death.
Once it is established that the seaman died during the effectivity of his employment contract, the
employer is liable. By provision of Section 20 (A) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract,
based on POEA Memorandum Circular No. 055, series of 1996, payment of death benefit pension is
mandated in case of death of a seafarer during the term of his employment.

Section 20 (A) (1) and (4) (A, B and C) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract provides:

"Section 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR DEATH

1. In case of death of the seafarer during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his
beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars
(US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to each child
under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at the exchange rate
prevailing during the time of payment.

x x x x x x x x x

4. The other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of injury or illness during
the term of employment are as follows:

a. The employer shall pay the deceased's beneficiary all outstanding obligations due the seafarer
under this Contract.

b. The employer shall transport the remains and personal effects of the seafarer to the Philippines
at employer's expense except if the death occurred in a port where local government laws or
regulations do not permit the transport of such remains. In case death occurs at sea, the
disposition of the remains shall be handled or dealt with in accordance with the master's best
judgment. In all cases, the employer/master shall communicate with the manning agency to advice
(sic) for disposition of seafarer's remains.

The employer shall pay the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippine currency equivalent to the
amount of One Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at the exchange rate prevailing
during the time of payment."

This is a similar, if not exact, provision of the CBA aforementioned. The law demands the same
requirements as it was in the latter. The death of a seaman during the term of employment makes
the employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. Once it is established that the
seaman died during the effectivity of his employment contract, the employer is liable. However, if
the seaman dies after the termination of his contract of employment, his beneficiaries are not
entitled to the death benefits enumerated above.

Finally, the Voluntary Arbitrator has erred in relying only on the medical report presented by the
company physician Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz in making his conclusion that the ailment of the
deceased seaman was work-related and it manifested while he was on board of (sic) the vessel in
his last sailing. He did not consider the other equally important points such as whether the death of
the seaman was suffered during the term of his employment or that assuming arguendo, that he
was indeed repatriated due to medical reasons, his death occurred after the term of his
employment has already ceased.

That administrative quasi-judicial bodies like the Voluntary Arbitrator are not bound by technical
rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases, does not mean that the basic rules on proving
allegations should be entirely dispensed with. A party alleging a critical fact must still support his
allegation with substantial evidence. Any decision based on unsubstantiated allegation cannot
stand as it will offend due process. The liberality of procedure in administrative actions is subject to
limitations imposed by basic requirements of due process. As this Court said in Ang Tibay v. CIR, the
provision for flexibility in administrative procedure "does not go so far as to justify orders without a
basis in evidence having rational probative value."

Furthermore, as held in Uichico v. NLRC, this procedural rule should not be construed as a license
to disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules.17 (Citations omitted)

The CA thereafter issued the assailed resolution denying the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration to the foregoing. Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues

The petitioners submit the following for resolution:

THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DO NOT CONFORM TO THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD. MOREOVER, THERE WAS A MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS AND THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO NOTICE CERTAIN RELEVANT POINTS WHICH IF
CONSIDERED WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION. HENCE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO THE APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE.

A. THE SURVIVING SPOUSE AND LEGAL HEIRS OF THE DECEASED SEAFARER ARE ENTITLED TO
DEATH COMPENSATION IN THE SUM OF US$121,000.00 UNDER THE AMOSUP/JSU-CBA;

B. PETITIONER[S] [ARE] ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES FOR (sic) Php1,000,000.00, EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES [OF] Php200,000.00 AND TEN PERCENT (10%) OF THE AWARDS AS AND BY WAY OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES.18

The Petitioners' Arguments

The petitioners emphasize that under the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA, a seafarer's death is
compensable regardless of its cause and its non work-relatedness as long as it occurs during the
term of the latter's employment. The only exception to compensability is when death is due to
willful acts. In Edwin's case, he had been under the respondents' employment for the past 30 years.
Prior to boarding Sanko, he passed the PEME but was thereafter medically-repatriated as stated in
Dr. Cruz's report. He died of GBM, the origin of which is unknown. Hence, it can be presumed that
GBM had been contracted during his employment with the respondents.

The petitioners also point out that the dictum that death must occur during the term of a seafarer's
employment is not even a hard and fast rule. In Carmelita C. Arambulo v. West Fleet
Phil./Pandiman Phil., Inc./Pacific Maritime, Inc.,19 the NLRC declared that for an illness to be
compensable, it is not necessary for death to occur during the term of employment. What is merely
required is for the connection between the cause of repatriation and the cause of death to be duly
established. In Seagull Shipmanagement & Transport, Inc. v. NLRC,20 the Court similarly declared
that "if the disease is the proximate cause of the employee's death for which compensation is
sought, the previous physical condition of the employee is unimportant, and recovery may be had
for said death, independently of any pre-existing disease."

The petitioners also refute in detail the applicability of the doctrines invoked by the respondents as
the circumstances surrounding them do not obtain in the case at bar. In Gau Sheng Phils., Inc. v.
Joaquin,21 employment was terminated upon the parties' mutual consent and the seafarer's claim
was anchored on the POEA SEC and not on the provisions of a CBA. In Hermogenes v. Osco Shipping
Services, Inc.,22 no evidence was offered to prove the cause of the early termination of the
seafarer's contract. In Spouses Aya-ay, Sr. v. Arpaphil Shipping Corporation,23 the seafarer was
repatriated due to an eye injury but he died of cardiovascular arrest after his contract was already
terminated. In Prudential Shipping and Management Corporation v. Sta. Rita,24 the seafarer was
repatriated due to umbilical hernia and he died ten days after with cardiopulmonary arrest as the
immediate cause, acute renal failure as the antecedent cause and hepatocellular carcinoma as the
underlying cause. In Klaveness Maritime Agency, Inc. v. Beneficiaries of the Late Second Officer
Anthony S. Allas,25 the seafarer was not medically repatriated. In the Estate of Posedio Ortega v.
Court of Appeals,26 the seafarer died of lung cancer and his heirs anchored their claim for death
benefits on the POEA SEC, which unfortunately does not list the said illness as an occupational
disease. The petitioners thus conclude that the contexts of the aforecited cases are different,
hence, the doctrines enunciated therein find no application.

The petitioners also allege that the respondents' prior actions indicated nothing less but an
admission of the latter's legal and moral obligation to pay Edwin the amounts he was entitled to.
For one, the expenses for the initial treatment administered to Edwin were shouldered by the
respondents. Further, the respondents paid Edwin a full sickness allowance as provided for under
POEA SEC. Moreover, the respondents repeatedly offered Edwin the amount of US$60,000.00
corresponding to the original claim for disability benefits under the POEA SEC. This clearly meant
that the respondents recognized that Edwin's illness entitled him to benefits under the POEA SEC.

The petitioners likewise aver their entitlement to moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees on account of the respondents' unjustified refusal to comply with their contractual obligations.

The Respondents' Contentions

In their Comment with Manifestation,27 the respondents counter that Edwin's illness was not
work-related and his death occurred not during the term of his employment. Thus, the petitioners
are not entitled to the payment of any benefits. The mere circumstance that the manifestations of
an illness appeared while the seafarer is on-board does not necessarily render it as work-related. In
the POEA SEC, the words "during the term of contract" refer to the time when death occurs while
"work-related" refers to the cause of death. The two requisites must both be proven especially in
view of the Court's declaration in Rivera v. Wallem Maritime Services, Inc.,28 that "in the absence
of substantial evidence, working conditions cannot be presumed to have increased the risk of
contracting the disease".

In the case at bar, the petitioners' bare allegation, that GBM was work-related as can be inevitably
concluded from Edwin's lengthy and repeated employment with the respondents, deserves no
probative value unless corroborated by substantial evidence. Dr. Cruz, who had attended to
Edwin's medical needs for more than three months, opined that GBM was not work-related as the
latter, in the course of his employment with the respondents, was never exposed to factors which
would have increased the risk of contracting the illness.

Further, Articles 25 and 26 of the CBA provide for the entitlement of a seafarer to medical
treatment and sick wages for a maximum period of 130 days from repatriation. In Edwin's case, he
died on April 13, 2006 or more than a year after his repatriation. Hence, when he died, he was no
longer under the respondents' employ. Moreover, his repatriation, regardless of its cause, already
terminated his employment. This is in consonance with Section 18 of the POEA SEC, which in part
expressly provides that a seafarer's employment ceases when he signs off from the vessel and
arrives at the point of hire due to medical reasons. Besides, even Article 29 of the CBA states that
death is only compensable if it occurs to the seafarer "whilst in the employment of the company".

The respondents likewise deny that in effect, they admitted their liability when they made
repeated offers to pay the petitioners US$60,000.00. The respondents state that the offers were
made sans prejudice to the defenses they were raising. Further, they withdrew the offers during
the pendency of the proceedings before the LA and VA Ofreneo.

In Escarcha v. Leonis Navigation Co., Inc.,29 the heirs of a deceased seafarer were ordered to
return the amount paid to them pursuant to the execution of an award favorable to them but
which was subsequently reversed by the Court. In Edwin's case, equity dictates that the proper
reimbursement be effected as well by the petitioners.

Our Ruling

While generally, only questions of law can be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, the instant petition falls among the exceptions in the light of the
conflicting factual findings of the VA and the CA.

The instant petition ascribes misappreciation of facts on the part of the CA, which if allegedly
reconsidered, would yield a conclusion favorable to the petitioners. As a rule, only questions of law,
not questions of fact, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.30 The
Court is thus generally bound by the CA's factual findings. There are, however, exceptions to the
foregoing, among which is when the CA's factual findings are contrary to those of the trial court or
administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions from which the action originated.31 The
instant petition falls under the aforementioned exception in the light of the divergent factual
findings of the VA and the CA.

Anent the substantive arguments, we find the instant petition partially impressed with merit.

The petitioners insist their entitlement to the payment of death compensation benefits not
pursuant to the provisions of the POEA SEC but under Article 29 of the CBA. According to them, the
CBA merely focuses on the fact of death occurring during the term of a seafarer's employment,
regardless of its cause. They further claim that even if death occurs beyond the term of a seafarer's
employment, compensation should still be awarded as long as a connection can be established
between the causes of repatriation and death.

On the other hand, the respondents' denial of the petitioners' claims rests on the (1) circumstance
that Edwin died after the termination of his employment contract or more than a year after he was
already repatriated; and (2) argument that GBM was supposedly not work-related in the absence of
proofs of exposure of a seafarer to vinyl, radiation or power lines while in the work place.

The IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA provisions govern the relations of the parties especially since the
issue of the VA's jurisdiction was never challenged in the proceedings below.

It bears noting that the petitioners' complaint was initially filed with the NLRC which referred the
same to the NCMB for voluntary arbitration. VA Ofreneo took cognizance and ruled on the
complaint. Thereafter, the respondents assailed before the CA, through a petition for review under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the notice of award issued by VA Ofreneo. In the said petition, the
parties never raised the issue of the VA's jurisdiction. In effect, it was an admission on the part of
both the petitioners and the respondents that the controversy involves the interpretation of CBA
provisions relative to the claims for death compensation benefits. Stated otherwise, in the
proceedings below, the contending parties both impliedly acquiesced to the applicability of the CBA
provisions and not of the POEA SEC over the claims of the petitioners.

More importantly, the special clauses on collective bargaining agreements must prevail over the
standard terms and benefits formulated by the POEA in its Standard Employment Contract. A
contract of labor is so impressed with public interest that the more beneficial conditions must be
endeavored in favor of the laborer. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to
give maximum aid and full protection to labor as enshrined in Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution.32

We thus proceed to the inquiry on whether or not within the purview of the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ
CBA, Edwin's death on April 13, 2006, or more than a year from his repatriation, can be considered
as one occurring while he was still in the employment of the respondents.

Under the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA provisions, Edwin's death a little more than a year from his
repatriation can still be considered as one occurring while he was still under the respondents'
employ.

Articles 22 (Termination of Employment), 25 (Medical), 26 (Sick Pay) and 29 (Loss of Life Death in
Service) and Appendix 3 of the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA state in part:

22.1 The employment shall be terminated:

x x x x

(b) when signing off owing to sickness or injury, after medical examination in accordance with
Article 25, but subject to the provision of Article 29.

x x x x

25.3 A seafarer repatriated to their port of engagement, unfit as a result of sickness or injury, shall
be entitled to medical attention (including hospitalisation) at the Company's expense:

(a) in the case of sickness, for up to a minimum of sixty (60) days and a maximum of one hundred
and thirty (130) days after repatriation, subject to the submission of satisfactory medical reports.

x x x x

26.1 When a seafarer is landed at any port because of sickness or injury, payment of their basic
wages shall continue until they have been repatriated at the Company's expense.

26.2 Thereafter[,] the seafarers shall be entitled to sick pay at the rate equivalent to their basic
wage while they remain sick up to a minimum of sixty (60) days and a maximum of one hundred
and thirty (130) days.

x x x x

26.4 Proof of continued entitlement to sick pay shall be by submission of satisfactory medical
reports, endorsed where necessary, by a Company[-] appointed doctor. If a doctor appointed by or
in behalf of the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be nominated jointly
between the Company and the Union and the decision of this doctor shall be final and binding on
both parties.

x x x x

29.1 If a Seafarer dies through any cause whilst in the employment of the Company including death
from natural causes and death occurring whilst travelling to and from the vessel, or as a result of
marine or other similar peril, but excluding death due to willful acts, the Company shall pay the
sums specified in the attached APPENDIX 3 to a nominated beneficiary and to each dependent child
up to a maximum of four (4) under 21 years of age. x x x

x x x x

29.4 For the purpose of this clause[,] a seafarer shall be regarded as "in the employment of the
company" for so long as the provisions of Articles 25 and 26 apply and provided the death is
directly attributable to sickness or injury that caused the seafarer's employment to be terminated
in accordance with Article 22.1(b).

Appendix 3

x x x x

Loss of Life Death in Service

Death in service benefits as provided in Article 29 of this Agreement shall, unless more favourable
benefits are negotiated, be:

To the nominated beneficiary .............. US$75,000.00

To each dependent child (maximum four (4) under 21 years of age)
...............................................................US$15,000.00

(Emphasis and underlining supplied)

Article 22.1(b) considers an employment as terminated if a seafarer signs off from the vessel due to
sickness, but subject to the provisions of Article 29.

Article 29.1 of the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA provides that the death of a seafarer, for any cause, is
compensable when it occurs while he is in the employment of the company. Article 29.4, on the
other hand, clarifies that the seafarer shall be considered as in the employment of the company
"for so long as the provisions of Articles 25 and 26 apply and provided the death is directly
attributable to sickness or injury that caused the seafarer's employment to be terminated in
accordance with Article 22.1(b)".

Under Article 25.3, a seafarer repatriated to the port of his engagement, unfit as a result of
sickness, shall be entitled to medical attention at the company's expense for up to a maximum
period of 130 days after repatriation, subject to the submission of satisfactory medical reports.
Article 26.2 further states that a seafarer shall likewise be entitled to sick pay at the rate equivalent
to his basic wage while he remains sick up to a maximum of 130 days. Article 26.4 allows continued
entitlement to sick pay beyond the 130 day period, reckoned from repatriation, provided
satisfactory medical reports shall be submitted and endorsed where necessary, by a company-
appointed doctor.

We now apply the provisions of the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA to the circumstances surrounding
Edwin's death.1wphi1

On August 22, 2005, or more or less 130 days from Edwin's arrival in the Philippines, the company-
designated physician, Dr. Cruz, indicated in a medical report33 addressed to Capt. Millalos that
Edwin's repatriation was due to "body weakness and head heaviness since October 2004". Dr. Cruz
also stated that upon Edwin's arrival at the airport on April 3, 2005, the latter was noted to be
"drowsy and disoriented". Dr. Cruz diagnosed Edwin to be suffering from GBM and submitted the
monthly expenses for the latter's chemotherapy to Capt. Millalos. Edwin was advised to come back
on September 23, 2005. Edwin eventually died of GBM on April 13, 2006.

We note that body weakness, head heaviness, drowsiness and disorientedness are among the
symptoms associated with GBM. Dr. Cruz indicated that these symptoms were exhibited by Edwin
since October 2004 while he was still on board Sanko and were notable even when the latter was
repatriated on April 3, 2005. Prior to repatriation, Edwin had only been diagnosed in Brazil to be
suffering from kidney stones, but no exhaustive examination was conducted on him and no finding
was rendered declaring that he had GBM. Nonetheless, the symptoms previously referred to were
the cause of Edwin's repatriation more or less than a month before his contract was about to
expire. On May 4, 2005 or about a month after repatriation, Dr. Mercado found that Edwin was
afflicted with GBM and that the tumor had been progressively growing for months.34 Further, the
medical report, dated August 22, 2005, addressed to Capt. Millalos, submitting to him the monthly
expenses for Edwin's chemotherapy and advising the latter to come back on September 23, 2005,
was an implied admission on the part of Dr. Cruz that medical assistance and sick pay should
indeed be extended to Edwin even beyond the 130-day period prescribed by Articles 25 and 26 of
the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA.

From the foregoing, we can thus conclude that at the time of Edwin's death on April 13, 2006 due
to GBM, he was still in the employment of the respondents. While it is true that Article 22.1 of the
IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA considers a seafarer as terminated when he signs off from the vessel due
to sickness, the foregoing is subject to the provisions of Article 29. Under Article 29, a seafarer
remains under the respondents' employ as long as the former is still entitled to medical assistance
and sick pay, and provided that the death which eventually occurs is directly attributable to the
sickness which caused the seafarer's employment to be terminated. As discussed above, the
company-designated physician, Dr. Cruz, in effect admitted that Edwin was repatriated due to
symptoms which a person suffering from GBM normally exhibits. Further, he recommended to
Capt. Millalos Edwin's entitlement to medical assistance and sick pay for a period beyond 130 days
from repatriation. Edwin subsequently died of GBM, the symptoms of which were the cause of his
earlier repatriation. Hence, since Edwin's death is reasonably connected to the cause of his
repatriation, within the purview of the IBF/AMOSUP/IMMAJ CBA, he indubitably died while under
the respondents' employ, thus, entitling the petitioners to death benefits as provided for in
Appendix 3 of the said CBA.

The petitioners are, however, not entitled to moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

We find that the acts of the respondents hardly indicate an intent on their part to evade the
payment of their obligations so as to justify the award of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees to the petitioners. The respondents extended medical assistance and allowances to
Edwin while he went through his treatment. Further, the respondents offered an amount of
US$60,000.00 as disability benefits even when the petitioners' claims had not been conclusively
established yet.

http://textbook.ncmm.no/maritime-occupational-medicine/339-112-chemical-
hazardsWHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated July 15, 2009 and Resolution dated March 8, 2010 of the Court of Appeals, absolving
the respondents from liability for death benefits pertaining to the petitioners by reason of Edwin
Deaunas death, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 28, 2008 of the
Voluntary Arbitrator, awarding the amount of US$121,000.00 to the petitioners in accordance with
Appendix 3 of the International Bargaining Forum/Associated Marine Officers and Seamens Union
of the Philippines/International Mariners Management Association of Japan Collective Bargaining
Agreement, is REINSTATED. However, interests on the award shall no longer be imposed in view of
the execution of the said decision already made on May 28, 2009.

SO ORDERED.





ROBERTO D. DEBAUDIN, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS) and EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION (ECC),
Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

AZCUNA, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules on Civil Procedure seeks to review the August
17, 1999 Decision1 and May 18, 2001 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
44670 which affirmed respondents Social Security System (SSS) and Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC) in denying petitioners claim for compensation benefits under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 626, as amended.

Petitioner is a seaman by profession. He joined the United Philippine Lines (UPL) on April 13, 1975
and was separated from his employment on May 21, 1993 at the age of 62.3

During his eighteen (18) years of service with UPL, he boarded various foreign ocean-going vessels4
while performing his duties and responsibilities that included cleaning chemical-spill-oil on deck,
slat dislodging, and spraying naphtha chemical and washing dirt and rusts inside the tank.

Petitioners medical record shows that his illness started in May 1993 when he experienced
episodes of bilateral blurring of vision. While in Singapore then, he consulted Dr. Richard F.T. Fan,
an ophthalmic surgeon, and he was diagnosed to be suffering from advanced glaucoma.5 His
condition recurred even after his separation from service, prompting him to seek further eye
consultations and treatments in the Philippines.6 His eye disease was finally diagnosed as chronic
open angle glaucoma.7

On account of his ailment, petitioner filed before the SSS a claim for compensation benefits under
P.D. No. 626, as amended. The application, however, was denied on the ground that there is no
causal relationship between the illness and his job as a seaman.8 When his motion for
reconsideration was also denied, petitioner elevated the case to the ECC which later on affirmed
the assailed decision. The ECC ratiocinated, thus:

Following a careful review of the documents on record, the Commission is inclined to rule against
the compensability of *petitioners] ailment. The present employees compensation program, which
is embodied in P.D. 626, as amended, requires[,] and we quote, that:

"For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the
result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions set
therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions" (Rule III, Section 1[b] of the Implementing Rules of P.D. 626,
as amended)

Definitely, *petitioners+ Chronic Open Angle Glaucoma is not an occupational disease under the
law. Thus, he is required to show by substantial evidence that the nature of his job as a Seaman
had increased the risk of contracting the disease. However, appellant failed to discharge the
burden of proof required by the law.

Based on medical findings, Open Angle Glaucoma arises as a complication of chronic obstruction of
aqueous humor reabsorption in the trabecular meshwork. It is usually asymptomatic and only
rarely causes ocular pain or corneal edema. The treatment is primarily medical. Surgery to prevent
permanent visual loss is necessary in only a minority of patients (Ref.: Harrisons Principles of
Internal Medicine, 11th edition, p. 71).

As suggested by the foregoing medical findings, the cleaning of chemical-spill-oil on deck and the
spraying of [naphtha] chemical inside the tank were not predisposing factors in the contraction of
Open Angle Glaucoma. Thus, we believe that the respondent System correctly ruled against the
compensability of *petitioners+ ailment.9

An appeal from the adverse decision was filed before the CA.10 On August 17, 1999, however, the
petition was denied due course and the CA accordingly dismissed the case on the ground that
petitioner failed to adduce substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that the working
conditions as a seaman increased the risk of contracting his chronic open angle glaucoma.11

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied;12 hence, this recourse.

The lone issue presented for consideration is whether the work of petitioner as a seaman
contributed even in a small degree in or had increased the risk of contracting his chronic open
angle glaucoma.13

While petitioner admits that chronic open angle glaucoma is not one of those listed as occupational
diseases under the law he nonetheless maintains that the cause of glaucoma is still unknown and
predisposition thereto is due to both physical and emotional factors. In his case, petitioner asserts
that he had been exposed to these elements for 18 years during his employment. He claims that as
a utility staff he performed odd jobs without fail such as cleaning chemical-spill-oil on deck, slat
dislodging, and spraying naphtha chemical and washing dirt and rusts inside the tank. According to
him, these strenuous tasks required climbing, bending over and running for so many times acts
which a medical book considered as contributory factors that would increase intraocular pressure
which causes glaucoma. Aside from the physical demands of the job, petitioner contends that he
was also subjected to emotional strains of going through the perils of the sea and homesickness for
being away from his family during the entire duration of the contracts. He, thus, alleges that his
employment as a seaman contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of his
ailment.1wphi1

In fine, petitioner stresses that, as a social legislation, P.D. No. 626, as amended, should be
interpreted to give meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the 1987
Constitution and the Labor Code.

The petition lacks merit.

Under the Labor Code, as amended, an employee is entitled to compensation benefits if the
sickness is a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees'
Compensation; or in case of any other illness, if it is caused by employment, subject to proof that
the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions.14 This is as it should be
because for an illness to be compensable, it must be (1) directly caused by such employment; (2)
aggravated by the employment; or (3) the result of the nature of such employment.15
Jurisprudence provides that to establish compensability of a non-occupational disease, reasonable
proof of work-connection and not direct causal relation is required.16 It is enough that the
hypothesis on which the workmen's claim is based is probable.17 Probability, not the ultimate
degree of certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings18 since in carrying out and
interpreting the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations the
primordial and paramount consideration is the employees' welfare.

In the present case, petitioners chronic open angle glaucoma is not listed as an occupational
disease; hence, he has the burden of proving by substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion, that the nature of his
employment or working conditions increased the risk of contracting the ailment or that its
progression or aggravation was brought about thereby.

Perusal of the records, however, regrettably reveals petitioners failure to adduce any proof of a
reasonable connection between his work as a seaman and the chronic open angle glaucoma he had
contracted. At the most, he merely claims that he performed odd jobs without fail cleaning
chemical-spill-oil on deck, slat dislodging, and spraying naphtha chemical and washing dirt and
rusts inside the tank strenuous tasks which according to him required climbing, bending over and
running for so many times. Adding thereto were the perils of the sea and the homesi ckness he said
he experienced which allegedly caused emotional strains on his part.

Other than positing the foregoing, petitioner presented no competent medical history, records or
physicians report to objectively substantiate the claim that there is a reasonable nexus between
his work and his ailment. Without saying more, his bare allegations do not ipso facto make his
illness compensable. Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations or presumptions. The
claimant must present concrete evidence to prove a positive proposition.19

The necessity of establishing the supposed work connection is all the more crucial in the face of the
fact that the readily-available medical literature would appear to consistently indicate that open
angle glaucoma is brought about by several factors other than the purported "physical and
emotional strains," such as aging, race, family history, nearsightedness or farsightedness,
prolonged corticosteroid use, nutritional deficiencies, brain chemical abnormalities, injuries,
infection or abnormalities in the eye, and medical conditions such as diabetes, high blood pressure
or heart disease.20 Therefore, to easily attribute to the "physical and emotional strains" allegedly
attendant in petitioners job as a seaman the chronic open angle glaucoma he is currently suffering
is evidently to oversimplify an otherwise complex fact-finding process that should have taken place
to determine the true cause of the ailment.

In Sante v. Employees Compensation Commission,21 this Court ruled that " a claimant must
submit such proof as would constitute a reasonable basis for concluding either that the conditions
of employment of the claimant caused the ailment or that such working conditions had aggravated
the risk of contracting that ailment. What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute an
adequate basis for a reasonable man (not necessarily a medical scientist) to reach one or the other
conclusion, can obviously be determined only on a case-to-case basis. That evidence must,
however, be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for the duty to prove work-causation or
work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real not merely apparent."

Moreover, petitioner cannot conveniently rely on the invocation that the Employees Compensation
Act, as a social legislation, must be liberally construed in favor of the ordinary working person.
While the sympathy of the law on social security is toward the employees or their beneficiaries, it is
imperative to remember that such compassion must be balanced by the equally vital interest of
denying undeserving claims for compensation benefits. Thus, GSIS v. CA22 held:

x x x [T]here is a competing, yet equally vital interest to heed in passing upon undeserving claims
for compensation. It is well to remember that if diseases not intended by the law to be
compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is
endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to
show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families
look to for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur. This stems from
the development in the law that no longer is the poor employee still arrayed against the might and
power of his rich corporate employer, hence the necessity of affording all kinds of favorable
presumptions to the employee. This reasoning is no longer good policy. It is now the trust fund and
not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law.
The employer joins the employee in trying to have their claims approved. The employer is spared
the problem of proving a negative proposition that the disease was not caused by employment.
Moreover, the new system instituted by the new law has discarded, among others, the concept of
"presumption of compensability and aggravation" and substituted one based on social security
principles. The new system is administered by social insurance agencies the GSIS and the SSS
under the ECC. The purpose of this innovation was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the
employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive
reparation for work-connected death or disability.23

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 17, 1999 Decision and May 18, 2001 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PABLO A. AUSTRIA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION (SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM),
(CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE TARLAC), respondents.

PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 29, 20001 and
its Resolution dated September 8, 20002 in CA-G.R. No. 52688 entitled "Pablo Austria vs.
Employees Compensation Commission (Social Security System), Central Azucarera de Tarlac." The
Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Social Security System (SSS) and the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) denying petitioners request for conversion of his permanent
partial disability benefit under PD 626 as amended3 to permanent total disability benefit.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Pablo A. Austria was employed as bag piler at Central Azucarera de Tarlac from June 1,
1977 to July 20, 1997. As bag piler, his duties were to:

(1) carry and pile sacks of refined sugar;

(2) relocate and move stock piles for shifting or return to the refinery;

(3) assist the production checker in random weighing of production;

(4) clean the warehouse, piling conveyor and its surroundings;

(5) assist in the repair and maintenance work during off-season; and

(6) do other related work assigned to him from time to time by his superior.4

In 1994, petitioner began to feel severe back pain. On November 18, 1994, petitioner underwent
an MRI which revealed a small disc protrusion at L4 and L5 level. Petitioner underwent
Laminectomy on March 17, 1995 at the Ramos General Hospital in Tarlac, Tarlac. The x-ray
photographs taken on May 23, 1997, September 3, 1998, and September 28, 1998 revealed
osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine.

On account of his osteoarthritis, petitioner filed with the SSS a claim for compensation benefits
under PD 626 as amended. The claim was granted and petitioner was awarded permanent partial
disability benefits for eight (8) months starting September 1, 1995, a second release for seven (7)
months starting May 10, 1996, and a third release for fifteen (15) months starting April 1, 1997.

Petitioner thereafter requested the SSS for conversion of his permanent partial disability benefit to
permanent total disability benefit. The SSS denied the request. It reasoned:

"Based on clinical records submitted, there is no progression of your illness which was already
granted under previous EC disability. Granting of extension on your claim cannot be based solely on
the findings on your lumbo-sacral X-ray hence they are not related to each other or of different
disease entity."5

On appeal, the ECC affirmed the decision of the SSS. The ECC held that considering the degree of
his disability at the time he was separated from the service, petitioner has already availed of the
maximum benefits to which he is entitled on account of his osteoarthritis.6

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari. The appellate court
dismissed the petition, ruling that the law does not allow the conversion of permanent partial
disability to permanent total disability.7

Petitioner filed a petition before this Court to review the decision of the CA. Petitioner raises the
sole issue:

"Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in denying the claim for additional benefits
in favor of the petitioner and not allowing the conversion of his (petitioner) permanent partial
disability to permanent total disability."8

We find merit in the petition.

PD 626 as amended provides three types of disability benefits to qualified employees: (1)
temporary total disability, (2) permanent total disability, and (3) permanent partial disability. In the
case at bar, petitioner was granted by the SSS, as affirmed by the ECC, permanent partial disability
benefit, but he seeks to avail of permanent total disability benefit. Under Section 2 Rule VII of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, a disability is total and permanent if as a result of the
injury or sickness, the employee is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous
period exceeding 120 days; and a disability is partial and permanent if as a result of the injury or
sickness, the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his body. We held
in Vicente vs. Employees Compensation Commission9 that:

"x x x the test of whether or not an employee suffers from permanent total disability is a showing
of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he
incurred. Thus, if by reason of the injury or sickness he sustained, the employee is unable to
perform his customary job for more than 120 days and he does not come within the coverage of
Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability (which, in more detailed manner,
describes what constitutes temporary total disability), then the said employee undoubtedly suffers
from permanent total disability regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his
body."

Disability is intimately related to ones earning capacity. It should be understood less on its medical
significance but more on the loss of earning capacity.10 In Gonzaga vs. Employees Compensation
Commission,11 the Court characterized permanent total disability as:

"x x x disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of a similar
nature that she was trained for, or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a person of
her mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean an absolute helplessness but rather an
incapacity to perform gainful work which is expected to be permanent. Total disability does not
require that the employee be absolutely disabled, or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the
injury must be such that she cannot pursue her usual work and earn therefrom."

Applying the foregoing standards, we find petitioner entitled to permanent total disability benefit
under the law. Petitioner has been employed as bag piler for twenty (20) years at the Central
Azucarera de Tarlac. His duties require him to carry heavy loads of refined sugar and to perform
other manual work. Since his work obviously taxes so much on his back, his illness which affects his
lumbar spine renders him incapable of doing his usual work as bag piler. Hence, his disability to
perform his regular duties may be considered total and permanent.

Contrary to the assertion of the Court of Appeals, there is nothing in the law12 that prohibits the
conversion of permanent partial disability benefit to permanent total disability benefit if it is shown
that the employees ailment qualifies as such. Furthermore, the grant of permanent total disability
benefit to an employee who was initially compensated for permanent partial disability but is found
to be suffering from permanent total disability would not be prejudicial to the government to give
it reason to deny the claim. The Court has in fact allowed in the past the conversion of permanent
partial disability benefit to permanent total disability benefit.13 These rulings are consistent with
the primary purpose of PD 626, that is, to provide meaningful protection to the working class
against the hazards of disability, illness and other contingencies resulting in the loss of income,14
as well as the Constitutional mandate to afford full protection to labor.15

ALEXANDER B. GATUS (PETITIONER) VS. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (RESPONDENT)
Date of Decision: January 26, 2011
GR No.: 174725
Topic: Grounds and Requisites for a Disease of Sickness to be Compensable under the SSS
Law and Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Sub-Topic/s: (1) Coronary Artery Disease a Compensable Disease under the SSS Law.
(2) Quantum of Evidence to prove that the Disease/Sickness is Compensable.
(3) Necessary Party to Prove the Compensability of the Disease/Sickness

FACTS:
Gatus worked at the Central Azucarera de Tarlac for a period of 30 years. During his
employment, he contracted disease and was diagnosed to be suffering from Coronary Artery
Disease (CAD): Triple Vessel and Unstable Angina. His medical records showed him to be
hypertensive for 10 years and a smoker. He was given by the SSS the following EC/SSS Permanent
Partial Disability (PPD) benefits: (a) 8 monthly pensions effective September 1, 1994 and (b) 4
monthly pensions effective January 3, 1997. He became an SSS retirement pensioner on February
1, 2002. However, an SSS audit revealed the need to recover the EC benefits already paid to him on
the ground that his CAD, being attributed to his chronic smoking, was not work-related. He was
notified thereof through a letter dated July 31, 2003. Petitioner, believing he was entitled to such
benefits, assailed the decision of the SSS. SSS denied the petition. He then elevated to the ECC
ruled against the Petitioner. Further, CA ruled that the Petitioner is not entitled to the benefits
under Presidential Decree No. 626. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or Not the Petitioner is entitled to the Benefits under Presidential Decree No.
626.
DECISION:
The Supreme Court held that the Petitioner is not entitled to the benefits under
Presidential Decree No. 626 and upheld the ruling of the CA. In its decision, the Court mentioned
of Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation states that the sickness
must be the result of an occupational disease listed thereon otherwise proof must be shown that
the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. The Petitioner in this
case failed to prove the compensability of his disease, thus, he was not able to prove with
substantial evidence that indeed he is entitled to the benefits under PD 626.
The burden of proof is thus on petitioner to show that any of the above conditions
have been met in his case. The required proof is further discussed in Ortega v. Social Security
Commission:

The requisite quantum of proof in cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies is
neither proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence. In this type of cases, a fact
may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. In this case,
substantial evidence abounds.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION,
petitioner,
vs.
PEDRO MARIANO, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Subject of this petition for review on certiorari is the decision,1 dated July 26, 1999, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR SP No. UDK-2898. It reversed the decision of the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC), dated October 23, 1998, in ECC Case No. MS-9677-498, which had affirmed the
ruling of the Social Security System (SSS) denying herein respondent Pedro Marianos claim for
compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626.2

The pertinent facts, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), are as follows:

For an eleven-year period starting January 1983, respondent Pedro Mariano was an employee of
LGP Printing Press. During his employment, Mariano worked in various capacities, including that of
a machine operator, paper cutter, monotype composer, film developer, and supervisor of the
printing press.3

Sometime in February 1994, Marianos service abruptly ended when he could no longer perform
any work due to a heart ailment. An electrocardiograph test revealed that he was suffering from
"Incomplete Right Bundle Branch Block."4

Mariano filed a claim for employees compensation benefit with the SSS. In its medical evaluation
dated April 15, 1997, SSS denied his claim on the ground that there was no causal connection
between his ailment and his job as film developer.5

On July 1, 1997, the SSS forwarded the record of respondents case to the ECC. In a letter dated
September 12, 1997, the ECC remanded respondents case to the SSS for reception of additional
documentary evidence.

On February 9, 1998, the SSS directed respondent to submit the following: (1) complete clinical
abstract if he was confined; and (2) records of consultation due to hypertension.6

Meanwhile, respondent had consulted Dr. Rogelio Mariano, whose diagnosis showed he was
suffering from Parkinsons disease and hypertension, as per the medical certificate dated April 20,
1998.7

The SSS once again submitted respondents case records to the ECC for review.

On October 23, 1998, the ECC, through Executive Director Teofilo E. Hebron, dismissed
respondents claim. Hebron ruled that the respondent had failed to establish a causal connection
between Parkinsons Disease and the working conditions at the printing press.8 On respondents
claim for compensation for Essential Hypertension, the ECC found that respondent had failed to
adduce sufficient evidence to establish that his ailment had caused impairment of any of his body
organs, which in turn could permanently prevent him from engaging in a gainful occupation.

Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. UDK-2898.

On July 26, 1999, the appellate court rendered a judgment reversing the decision of the ECC,
decreeing as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
respondents Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) and Social Security System (SSS) are
ordered to pay petitioners claim for compensation benefits under P.D. 626."9

In holding for the respondent, the Court of Appeals found that the nature of petitioners work at
LGP resulted in his exposure to various toxic chemicals, which is a possible cause of Parkinsons
Disease. As to his hypertension, the appellate court ruled that the respondents duties as machine
operator and paper cutter involved physical pressure and restlessness, since he was required to
meet urgent deadlines for rush print orders. This in turn caused respondent to suffer from stress
and anxiety. In sum, the appellate court held that respondent had substantially established the
connection between the cause of his ailments and the nature of his work.

Hence, the instant petition, anchored on the following assignment of errors:

I.
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH LAW, PARTICULARLY SECTION 1 (B), RULE III OF THE RULES IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS
OF TITLE II, BOOK IV OF THE LABOR CODE.

II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE EXISTS A CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN
RESPONDENTS PARKINSONS DISEASE AND THE WORKING CONDITIONS AT THE PRINTING
PRESS.10

The sole issue for our resolution is: Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the ECC decision and in
ordering petitioner to pay respondent his claim for compensation benefits?

For the petitioner, the OSG contends that the rule implementing P.D. No. 626 does not list
Parkinsons Disease as an occupational ailment, hence, it is not compensable. The OSG takes the
view that the evidence on record does not establish that the risk of contracting said ailment was
increased by the nature of respondents work. Thus, said the OSG, it was error for the Court of
Appeals to declare the ailment compensable. Additionally, the OSG avers that private respondent
failed to submit the documents that the ECC required to support his claim for disability benefits.

Respondent counters that the nature of his functions at LGP clearly brought about the onset of
Parkinsons Disease. Moreover, assuming arguendo, that Parkinsons Disease is non-compensable,
his other ailment - Essential Hypertension is covered by P.D. No. 626. He contends that the risk of
contracting Essential Hypertension was increased by his job at LGP.11

Workmens Compensation cases are governed by the law in force at the time the claimant
contracted his illness.12 In the instant case, the applicable rule is Section 1 (b),13 Rule III, of the
Rules Implementing P.D. No. 626. Under said Rule, for the sickness to be compensable, the same
must be an "occupational disease" included in the list provided, with the conditions set therein
satisfied; otherwise, the claimant must show proof that the risk of contracting it is increased by the
working conditions.14 What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute an adequate basis for
a reasonable man (not necessarily a medical scientist) to reach one or the other conclusion, can
obviously be determined only on a case-to-case basis.15 For reasons herein elaborated, we agree
with the appellate court that respondent Pedro Mariano has substantially proved his claim to
compensability.

First, as to Parkinsons disease, while it is true that this disease is not included in the list of
compensable diseases under the law then prevailing, it was found by the Court of Appeals that the
conditions prevailing at LGP largely led to the progression of the ailment. The respondents
functions entailed constant exposure to hazardous or toxic chemicals such as carbon disulfate,
carbon monoxide, or manganese. As the ECC itself admitted in its judgment, the exposure to these
toxic substances is among the possible causes of this disease.16 Where it was established that the
claimants ailment occurred during and in the course of his employment, it must be presumed that
the nature of the claimants employment is the cause of the disease.17

Second, even if we were to assume that Parkinsons Disease is not compensable, there can be no
question that Essential Hypertension is a compensable illness, following our ruling in Government
Service Insurance System v. Gabriel,18 that hypertension and heart ailments are compensable
illnesses. The respondent herein was diagnosed to have developed Incomplete Right Bundle Branch
Block,19 a disease caused by a delay in the depolarization of the right ventricle.20 Right Bundle
Branch Block is an intraventricular conduction defect common in individuals with otherwise normal
hearts as well as in many diseased processes, including ischemic heart disease, inflammatory
disease, infiltrative disease, cardiomyopathy, and postcardiotomy.21 We note that respondent was
also diagnosed as having hypertension and a medical certification was issued to that effect.

In Ijares v. Court of Appeals,22 which involved a claim for disability benefits due to hypertension,
this Court gave probative value to the medical findings of the examining physician. A doctors
certification as to the nature of the claimants disability normally deserves full credence. No
medical practitioner will, in the normal course of things, issue certifications indiscriminately,
considering the doctors awareness of the serious and far-reaching effects that a false certification
would have on a claim filed with a government agency and of its implications upon his own
interests as a professional.23

In upholding respondent Marianos claim, the Court of Appeals found that among the various jobs
the respondent performed were those of a machine operator, paper cutter, monotype
composer,24 and later as supervisor, most of which are physical and stressful in character. In
established cases of Essential Hypertension, the blood pressure fluctuates widely in response to
emotional stress and physical activity.25 Given the nature of his assigned job and the printing
business, with its tight deadlines entailing large amounts of rush work, indeed the emotional and
physical stress of respondents work at the printing press caused, and then exacerbated, his
hypertension. On this score, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in liberally construing the
rules implementing P.D. No. 626. In matters of labor and social legislation, it is well established that
doubts in the interpretation and application of the law are resolved liberally in favor of the worker
and strictly against the employer.

While the SSS and ECC may be commended for their vigilance against sustaining unjustified claims
that would only drain funds meant for deserving disabled employees, respondent Marianos case
does not fall in that class. Said agencies ought to realize, in our view, that strict interpretation of
the rules should not result in the denial of assistance to those in need and qualified therefor.
Workers whose capabilities have been diminished, if not completely impaired, as a consequence of
their service, ought to be given benefits they deserve under the law. Compassion for them is not a
dole-out, but a right.26

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
July 26, 1999, in CA-G.R. SP No. UDK-2898 is AFFIRMED.

MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION and/or WASTFEL-LARSEN MANAGEMENT A/S, V.
LOBUSTA

Petitioners appeal the Decision1 dated August 18, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 74035 and its Resolution2 dated April 19, 2007, denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof. The CA declared that respondent is suffering from permanent total disability and ordered
petitioners to pay him US$2,060 as medical allowance, US$60,000 as disability benefits and 5% of
the total monetary award as attorneys fees.

The facts follow:
Petitioner Magsaysay Maritime Corporation is a domestic corporation and the local manning agent
of the vessel MV Fossanger and of petitioner Wastfel-Larsen Management A/S.3

Respondent Oberto S. Lobusta is a seaman who has worked for Magsaysay Maritime Corporation
since 1994.4 In March 1998, he was hired again as Able Seaman by Magsaysay Maritime
Corporation in behalf of its principal Wastfel-Larsen Management A/S. The employment contract5
provides for Lobusta's basic salary of US$515 and overtime pay of US$206 per month. It also
provides that the standard terms and conditions governing the employment of Filipino seafarers on
board ocean-going vessels, approved per Department Order No. 33 of the Department of Labor and
Employment and Memorandum Circular No. 55 of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA Standard Employment Contract), both series of 1996, shall be strictly and
faithfully observed.

Lobusta boarded MV Fossanger on March 16, 1998.6 After two months, he complained of
breathing difficulty and back pain. On May 12, 1998, while the vessel was in Singapore, Lobusta
was admitted at Gleneagles Maritime Medical Center and was diagnosed to be suffering from
severe acute bronchial asthma with secondary infection and lumbosacral muscle strain. Dr. C K Lee
certified that Lobusta was fit for discharge on May 21, 1998, for repatriation for further
treatment.7

Upon repatriation, Lobusta was referred to Metropolitan Hospital. The medical coordinator, Dr.
Robert Lim, issued numerous medical reports regarding Lobustas condition. Lobusta was first seen
by a Pulmonologist and an Orthopedic Surgeon on May 22, 1998.8 Upon reexamination by the
Orthopedic Surgeon on August 11, 1998, he opined that Lobusta needs surgery, called
decompression laminectomy,9 which was done on August 30, 1998.10 On October 12, 1998, Dr.
Lim issued another medical report stating the opinion of the Orthopedic Surgeon that the
prognosis for Lobustas recovery after the spine surgery is good. However, the Pulmonologist
opined that Lobustas obstructive airway disease needs to be monitored regularly and that Lobusta
needs to be on bronchodilator indefinitely. Hence, Lobusta should be declared disabled with a
suggested disability grading of 10-20%.11 The suggestion was not heeded and Lobusta's treatment
continued.

On February 16, 1999, Lobusta was reexamined. Dr. Lim reported that Lobusta still complains of
pain at the lumbosacral area although the EMG/NCV12 test revealed normal findings. Lobusta was
prescribed medications and was advised to return on March 16, 1999 for re-evaluation.13

On February 19, 1999, Dr. Lim reported that Lobusta has been diagnosed to have a moderate
obstructive pulmonary disease which tends to be a chronic problem, such that Lobusta needs to be
on medications indefinitely. Dr. Lim also stated that Lobusta has probably reached his maximum
medical care.14

Petitioners then faced the need for confirmation and grading by a second opinion and it took
the parties time to agree on a common doctor, until they agreed on Dr. Camilo Roa.15Dr. Roas
clinical summary states that Lobusta's latest follow-up check-up was on December 16, 1999; that
Lobusta is not physically fit to resume his normal work as a seaman due to the persistence of his
symptoms; that his asthma will remain chronically active and will be marked by intermittent
exacerbations; and that he needs multiple controller medications for his asthma.16

As the parties failed to reach a settlement as to the amount to which Lobusta is entitled, Lobusta
filed on October 2, 2000, a complaint17 for disability/medical benefits against petitioners before
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Sometime in October 2000, Magsaysay Maritime Corporation suggested that Lobusta be examined
by another company-designated doctor for an independent medical examination. The parties
agreed on an independent medical examination by Dr. Annette M. David, whose findings it was
agreed upon, would be considered final.

On November 17, 2000, Dr. David interviewed and examined Lobusta.18 Pertinent portions of Dr.
Davids report read:
xxx Based on the Classes of Respiratory Impairment as described in the American Medical
Association's Guidelines for the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, this is equivalent to Class 2
or Mild Impairment of the Whole Person (level of impairment: 10-25% of the whole person). Given
the persistence of the symptoms despite an adequate medical regimen, the impairment may be
considered permanent.

The determination of disability and fitness for duty/return-to-work is more complex. During
asymptomatic periods, Mr. Lobusta could conceivably be capable of performing the duties and
responsibilities of an Able Seaman as listed in the memos provided by Pandiman (Duties of an Able
Seaman on board an average vessel, January 26, 2000; and Deck Crew general Responsibilities,
95.11.01). However, consideration needs to be given to the following:

o During the personal interview, Mr. Lobusta reported the need to use a self-contained
breathing apparatus (SCBA) for double bottom work. While the use of these devices may not
appreciably increase the work of breathing, an individual who develops an acute asthmatic attack
under conditions requiring the use of an SCBA (oxygen-poor atmospheres) may be at increased risk
for a poor outcome.
o When out at sea, the medical facilities on board an average vessel may not be
adequate to provide appropriate care for an acute asthmatic exacerbation. Severe asthmatic
attacks require life-sustaining procedures such as endotracheal intubation and on occasion,
mechanical ventilation. Asthma can be fatal if not treated immediately. The distance from and the
time required to transport an individual having an acute asthmatic attack on a vessel at sea to the
appropriate medical facilities on land are important factors in the decision regarding fitness for
duty.
o Several of the duties listed for an Able Seaman require the use of a variety of chemical
substances (e.g. grease, solvents, cleaning agents, de-greasers, paint, etc.), many of which are
known or suspected asthma triggers in sensitized individuals. The potential for an Able Seaman's
exposure to these asthma triggers is considerable.

Taken altogether, it is my opinion that Mr. Lobusta ought not to be considered fit to return to work
as an Able Seaman. While the degree of impairment is mild, for the reasons stated above, it would
be in the interest of all parties involved if he were to no longer be considered as capable of gainful
employment as a seafarer. It is possible that he may perform adequately in another capacity, given
a land-based assignment.19 (Stress in the original by Dr. David.)

As no settlement was reached despite the above findings, the Labor Arbiter ordered the parties to
file their respective position papers.

On April 20, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision20 ordering petitioners to pay Lobusta (a)
US$2,060 as medical allowance, (b) US$20,154 as disability benefits, and (c) 5% of the awards as
attorneys fees.

The Labor Arbiter ruled that Lobusta suffered illness during the term of his contract. Hence,
petitioners are liable to pay Lobusta his medical allowance for 120 days or a total of US$2,060. The
Labor Arbiter held that provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, on permanent total disability do
not apply to overseas seafarers. Hence, he awarded Lobusta US$20,154 instead of US$60,000, the
maximum rate for permanent and total disability under Section 30 and 30-A of the 1996 POEA
Standard Employment Contract. The Labor Arbiter also awarded attorneys fees equivalent to 5% of
the total award since Lobusta was assisted by counsel.21

Lobusta appealed. The NLRC dismissed his appeal and affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision. The
NLRC ruled that Lobustas condition may only be considered permanent partial disability. While Dr.
David suggested that Lobustas prospects as seafarer may have been restricted by his bronchial
asthma, Dr. David also stated that the degree of impairment is mild. Said qualification puts
Lobusta's medical condition outside the definition of total permanent disability, said the NLRC.22
Later, the NLRC also denied Lobustas motion for reconsideration.

Unsatisfied, Lobusta brought the case to the CA under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended. As aforesaid, the CA declared that Lobusta is suffering from permanent total disability
and increased the award of disability benefits in his favor to US$60,000, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The challenged resolution of the NLRC
dated 20 June 2002 is MODIFIED, declaring [Lobusta] to be suffering from permanent total
disability.
[Petitioners] are ORDERED to pay [Lobusta] the following:

a) US$2,060.00 as medical allowance,
b) US$60,000.00 as disability benefits, and
c) 5% of the total monetary award as attorneys fees
x x x x23
The CA faulted the NLRC for plucking only particular phrases from Dr. Davids report and said that
the NLRC cannot wantonly disregard the full import of said report. The CA ruled that Lobusta's
disability brought about by his bronchial asthma is permanent and total as he had been unable to
work since May 14, 1998 up to the present or for more than 120 days, and because Dr. David found
him not fit to return to work as an able seaman.

Hence, this petition which raises two legal issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE POEA CONTRACT CONSIDERS THE MERE LAPSE OF MORE THAN ONE
HUNDRED TWENTY (120) DAYS AS TOTAL AND PERMANENT DISABILITY.

II.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO AWARD RESPONDENT LOBUSTA ATTORNEYS FEES.24

Petitioners argue that the CA erred in applying the provisions of the Labor Code instead of the
provisions of the POEA contract in determining Lobustas disability, and in ruling that the mere
lapse of 120 days entitles Lobusta to total and permanent disability benefits. The CA allegedly erred
also in holding them liable for attorneys fees, despite the absence of legal and factual bases.
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners are mistaken that it is only the POEA Standard Employment Contract that must be
considered in determining Lobusta's disability. In Palisoc v. Easways Marine, Inc.,25 we said that
whether the Labor Codes provision on permanent total disability applies to seafarers is already a
settled matter. In Palisoc, we cited the earlier case of Remigio v. National Labor Relations
Commission26 where we said (1) that the standard employment contract for seafarers was
formulated by the POEA pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 24727 to secure the
best terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance
therewith, and to promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas; (2) that
Section 29 of the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract itself provides that all rights and
obligations of the parties to the contract, including the annexes thereof, shall be governed by the
laws of the Republic of the Philippines, international conventions, treaties and covenants where
the Philippines is a signatory; and (3) that even without this provision, a contract of labor is so
impressed with public interest that the Civil Code expressly subjects it to the special laws on labor
unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of
labor and similar subjects.28

In affirming the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability, Remigio further stated:
Thus, the Court has applied the Labor Code concept of permanent total disability to the case of
seafarers. In Philippine Transmarine Carriers v. NLRC, seaman Carlos Nietes was found to be
suffering from congestive heart failure and cardiomyopathy and was declared as unfit to work by
the company-accredited physician. The Court affirmed the award of disability benefits to the
seaman, citing ECC v. Sanico, GSIS v. CA, and Bejerano v. ECC that disability should not be
understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of earning capacity. Permanent total
disability means disablement of an employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of
similar nature that [he] was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which a
person of [his] mentality and attainment could do. It does not mean absolute helplessness. It
likewise cited Bejerano v. ECC, that in a disability compensation, it is not the injury which is
compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of ones earning
capacity.

The same principles were cited in the more recent case of Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad. In
addition, the Court cited GSIS v. Cadiz and Ijares v. CA that permanent disability is the inability of a
worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of
any part of his body.
x x x x

These facts clearly prove that petitioner was unfit to work as drummer for at least 11-13 months
from the onset of his ailment on March 16, 1998 to 8-10 months after June 25, 1998. This, by itself,
already constitutes permanent total disability. x x x29

In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.,30 we also said that the standard terms of the
POEA Standard Employment Contract agreed upon are intended to be read and understood in
accordance with Philippine laws, particularly, Articles 191 to 193 of the Labor Code, as amended,
and the applicable implementing rules and regulations in case of any dispute, claim or grievance.

Thus, the CA was correct in applying the Labor Code provisions in Lobustas claim for disability
benefits. The Labor Arbiter erred in failing to apply them.

Article 192(c)(1) under Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended, reads:

ART. 192. Permanent total disability. x x x
x x x x
(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:
(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except
as otherwise provided in the Rules;
x x x x

Section 2(b), Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended,
or the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation Commission (ECC Rules), reads:

Sec. 2. Disability. x x x
(b) A disability is total and permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is unable
to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding 120 days, except as otherwise
provided for in Rule X of these Rules.
x x x x

Section 2, Rule X of the ECC Rules reads:

SEC. 2. Period of entitlement. (a) The income benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of
such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive
days except where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but
not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability
shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at any time after
120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss
or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System.
x x x x

According to Vergara,31 these provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, and implementing rules
are to be read hand in hand with the first paragraph of Section 20(B)(3) of the 2000 POEA Standard
Employment Contract which reads:

Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance
equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability
has been assessed by the company-designated physician[,] but in no case shall this period exceed
one hundred twenty (120) days.

Vergara continues:

As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the
company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For
the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary total
disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is
declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent,
either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment
Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such
declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary
total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the
employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists.
The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by
his medical condition.
x x x x

As we outlined above, a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by
the company physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the
maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the
existence of a permanent disability.32

To be sure, there is one Labor Code concept of permanent total disability, as stated in Article
192(c)(1) of the Labor Code, as amended, and the ECC Rules. We also note that the first paragraph
of Section 20(B)(3) of the 2000 POEA Standard Employment Contract was lifted verbatim from the
first paragraph of Section 20(B)(3) of the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract, to wit:

Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance
equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability
has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall this period exceed
one hundred twenty (120) days.

Applying the foregoing considerations, we agree with the CA that Lobusta suffered permanent total
disability. On this point, the NLRC ruling was not in accord with law and jurisprudence.
Upon repatriation, Lobusta was first examined by the Pulmonologist and Orthopedic Surgeon on
May 22, 1998. The maximum 240-day (8-month) medical-treatment period expired, but no
declaration was made that Lobusta is fit to work. Nor was there a declaration of the existence of
Lobustas permanent disability. On February 16, 1999, Lobusta was still prescribed medications for
his lumbosacral pain and was advised to return for reevaluation. May 22, 1998 to February 16,
1999 is 264 days or 6 days short of 9 months.

On Lobustas other ailment, Dr. Roas clinical summary also shows that as of December 16, 1999,
Lobusta was still unfit to resume his normal work as a seaman due to the persistence of his
symptoms. But neither did Dr. Roa declare the existence of Lobustas permanent disability. Again,
the maximum 240-day medical treatment period had already expired. May 22, 1998 to December
16, 1999 is 19 months or 570 days. In Remigio, unfitness to work for 11-13 months was considered
permanent total disability. So it must be in this case. And Dr. Davids much later report that Lobusta
ought not to be considered fit to return to work as an Able Seaman validates that his disability is
permanent and total as provided under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and the Labor
Code, as amended.

In fact, the CA has found that Lobusta was not able to work again as a seaman and that his
disability is permanent as he has been unable to work since 14 May 1998 to the present or for
more than 120 days. This period is more than eight years, counted until the CA decided the case in
August 2006. On the CA ruling that Lobustas disability is permanent since he was unable to work
for more than 120 days, we have clarified in Vergara that this temporary total disability period
may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days.

Thus, we affirm the award to Lobusta of US$60,000 as permanent total disability benefits, the
maximum award under Section 30 and 30-A of the 1996 POEA Standard Employment Contract. We
also affirm the award of US$2,060 as sickness allowance which is not contested and appears to
have been accepted by the parties.

On the matter of attorneys fees, under Article 220833 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees can be
recovered in actions for recovery of wages of laborers and actions for indemnity under employers
liability laws. Attorneys fees are also recoverable when the defendants act or omission has
compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest.34 Such conditions being present
here, we affirm the award of attorneys fees, which we compute as US$3,103 or 5% of US$62,060.

Before we end, we note petitioners repeated failure to comply with our resolutions, as well as the
orders issued by the tribunals below. We remind petitioners and their counsels that our resolutions
requiring them to file pleadings are not to be construed as mere requests, nor should they be
complied with partially, inadequately or selectively. Counsels are also reminded that lawyers are
called upon to obey court orders and willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not only for
contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well.35 We may also dismiss petitioners appeal for their
failure to comply with any circular, directive or order of the Supreme Court without justifiable
cause.36 In fact, we actually denied the instant petition on July 9, 2008 since petitioners failed to
file the required reply to the comment filed by Lobusta.37 On reconsideration, however, we
reinstated the petition.38 But when we required the parties to submit memoranda, petitioners
again did not comply.39 As regards the proceedings below, they did not file their position paper on
time, despite the extensions granted by the Labor Arbiter.40 Nor did they file the comment and
memorandum required by the CA.41

Finally, we note that the Labor Arbiter improperly included Miguel Magsaysay as respondent in his
decision.42 It should be noted that Lobusta sued Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and/or Wastfel-
Larsen Management A/S in his complaint.43 He also named them as the respondents in his position
paper.44 Petitioners are the proper parties.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the present petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRM the Decision dated
August 18, 2006 of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution dated April 19, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No.
74035. We ORDER petitioners Magsaysay Maritime Corporation and/or Wastfel-Larsen
Management A/S to pay respondent Oberto S. Lobusta US$65,163 as total award, to be paid in
Philippine pesos at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.

RIZALDY QUITORIANO VS. JEBSENS MARITIME, INC.
Facts:
Petitioner Quitoriano was hired as 2nd Officer aboard the vessel M/V Trimnes by respondent
Jebsens Maritime, Inc. While Quitoriano was assigned as navigating officer he complained of
dizziness with severe headache, and general body weaknesses. He was brought to a hospital in
Spain where he was diagnosed to be suffering "hypertension arterial" or "mild stroke." When his
health condition did not improve, he was repatriated to the Philippines on May 30, 2001 to
undergo further medical examination and treatment.
On June 6, 2001, Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz, the company-designated physician diagnosed petitioner of
Hypertension and Transient ischemic attack. On November 16, 2001 or 169 days after petitioners
repatriation, Dr. Cruz issued a medical report declaring him "fit to work. Petitioner then sought
the opinion of an independent internist-cardiologist, Dr. Sharon A. Lacson who diagnosed him as
suffering from "hypertension cardiovascular disease and hyperlipidemia." Dr. Aquino also found
him to have "cerebral infarction, R, basal ganglia area." Thereupon, petitioner asked from Jebsens
for full permanent disability compensation but was unsuccessful. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint
for recovery of permanent disability compensation before the NLRC Arbitration Office. The Labor
Arbiter however dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the latters decision with
modification that the petitioner be allowed to resume sea duty. The CA likewise affirmed the
decision of the NLRC. Hence this petition.


Issue:
Is Quitorianos disability considered permanent and total thereby entitling him to disability
compensation?

Ruling:
YES.In Vicente v. ECC, the Supreme Court ruled that the test of whether or not an employee suffers
from permanent total disability is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue
performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred. Atotaldisabilitydoes not require
that the employee be absolutely disabled or totally paralyzed. What is necessary is that the injury
must be such that theemployee cannot pursue his usual work and earn therefrom. On the other
hand, a total disabilityis considered permanent if it lasts continuously for more than 120 days.
Permanent disability is inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless
of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.
In disability compensation, it is not the injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity
to work resulting in the impairment of ones earning capacity. In this case it was only on November
16, 2001 that the "fit to work" certification was issued by Dr. Cruz or more than five months from
the time petitioner was medically repatriated on May 30, 2001. Thus, petitioners disability is
considered permanent and total. Petitioners disability being then permanent and total, he is
"entitled to 100% compensation, i.e., US$80,000 for officers," as stipulated in par. 20.1.7 of the
parties CBA.