Anzio/Cassino Campaign Jan - June 1944

by
MSG James H. Kirtland
MSG David A. Faiello
Msa Mahdi Mahmud-Bey
MSG Bobby L. Brown
SOM Josef H. Hawrat
Group 14
3 May 1991
ii
outline
Thesis: The recent air campaign in the Persian Gulf shares many
aspects with the bo.oing of the Abbey of Monte Cassino.
I. General background infor.ation
A. Just War Theory application
B. Comparison of leaders
II. Archaeological/religious significance of areas
A. Abbey of Monte Cassino
B. Persian Gulf region
III. Support for campaigns
A. Anzio/Cassino campaign
B. Persian Gulf campaign
IV. Air Force bo.oing campaigns
A. Anzio/Caasino campaign
B. Persian Gulf caapaign
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The Anzio/Cassino Campaign, Jan - Jun 1944
It is but a rare moment when this planet is without some
form of conflict. Whenever there are two distinct expressions of
thought, there is a chance of disagreement. Too often, the
disagreement leads to war. The values and beliefs of the leaders
of the fighting factions deter.ine the manner by which the war is
fought. On one side are those who will initiate any means, no
matter how heinous, to accomplish their intended end. On the
other side are those who take into account moral right and who
adhere to a Just War Tradition. The recent air campaign in the
Persian Gulf shares aany aspects with the bombing of the Abbey of
Monte Cassino, and it reflects the same general moral rights and
wrongs.
The methods employed by the Germans in World War II and by
the Iraqi's in the Persian Gulf, were extreme. These methods are
direct reflections of the leaders who employed them. Adolf
Hitler and Saddam Hussein share many similarities. Both were
born of peasant parents. Both knew deprivation from infancy.
Both grew up with distinct prejudices against those who
surrounded them. Both used weapons of terror, as opposed to
weapons of tactical iaportance. Hitler believed in a .aster
race, and tried vehemently to destroy those he considered weaker.
Saddam Hussein demonstrated his lack of remorse during the
war between Iran and Iraq by using chemical weapons against his
countrymen.
One may argue that both were men set on self-aggrandizement.
Or, one may argue that both deeply believed that their respective
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countries and lifestyles were meant to be the example for the
world. Whatever the argument, both leaders attempted to
overpower weaker nations through force. Both leaders invited
war.
European and Mideast history abound in conflict. Even today,
almost 50 years later, many still believe that, "Nazism was an
ultimate threat to everything decent in our lives, an ideology so
murderous, so degrading, that its victory would have been
increasingly awful. An evil so bad, that the only recourse was
to fight it" (Walzer 86). Blitzkrieg, expansionism, and the
syste.atic exter.ination of millions of people were hallmarks of
this great evil.
Hussein's regime has proven no less evil. Throughout his
reign, there have been countless reports of tortures, executions,
and other such atrocities. For many years, Amnesty International
has been receiving widespread reports of torture, many of which
concerned minors (Hiller & Hylroie 250). And now, as did Hitler,
Hussein too, made an attempt at expansionism by launching a
blitzkrieg invasion into Kuwait. He too, demonstrated an evil
that had to be fought and defeated.
In 1920, an international co..ission, .eeting in The Hague,
concluded that, "Aerial bombardment, destined to terrorize the
civilian population, or to destroy or daaage private property
which has no military character, or to wound non-combatants, is
prohibited" (Walzer 94). Hitler and Hussein were gUilty of
violating this measure. Hitler used the V weapons - V-l's and
V-2's. These were essentially flying bombs. Plagued by an
unreliable guidance syste., the.e boabs .eldom hit their targets.
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They did cause larqe a.ounts of random destruction and a larqe
nu-oer of casualties. These boabs turned out to be a
demoralizinq agent in Germany's war with Great Britain (Siaon &
Schuster 663). "Hitler's indiscriminate 'venqeance weapons' took
8,938 civilian lives and left nearly 25,000 seriously injured in
their blind wake" (Jablonski 100).
Hussein also had his weapon of terror. Comaonly referred to
as "Scud," this missile is highly inaccurate, but, like the
V-bomb brought fear a.anq the innocent. These errant missiles
also caused a lot of da..ge, but fortunately took only a few
lives. Of course, fortune and luck were not the only powers
which rendered the Scud virtually worthless. For the first time
in the history of warfare, the United States launched the
"anti-missile missile", the Patriot (Brown 22). "Almost 70 Scud
missiles were fired dur1nq the brief war, many of thea shot down
by Patr10t .1ss1les" (11 Pa.o Tl..., 6 Apr 91).
As one can see, both leaders exercised blatant disregard for
l1fe 1n their respective caapa1gns. Hitler and Hussein had to be
stopped. The Un1ted states answered the call in both instances.
Ho war is without its atrocities. No war is ever o ~ l e t e l y
cleanly fouqht. The United States is not without guilt. We
have, throuqhout our short history, resorted to means against
which the Just War Theory applies. However, the United states
never co..itted crimes in such .aqnitude as did Hitler and
Hussein. Blatantly disreqardinq the Widely accepted Laws of War
is not the nature of the United States or the Araed Forces.
Much thought is put into u.s. tarqet selection. Is this
bombinq a military necessity? What are the chances of
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non-combatant casualties? What is the probability of success?
What will be the pUblic opinion? What methods will we use?
"Host wars are described in ultimate terms while they are being
fought" (walzer 85).
The bo.oing of the Abbey at Honte Cassino was, and still is,
widely considered a military aistake. Granted, the Abbey
probably posed .ore of a psychological threat than a tactical
one. The decision to bo.o did not co.. easy. Of vital
importance in the planning was the consideration of religious
impact, public opinion, and the aethod of bombing (Hapgood 259).
The same type of thought process seemed to prevail in the
planning of the air caapaign in the Persian Gulf.
Religion and cultural heritage are important facets of life.
Even Hitler showed signs of religious belief when he ended his
orders to open hostilities against the Soviet Union with the
phrase, "May the Lord God help us all in the battle" (Boldt 41).
The custo.ary law of war and Hague Convention Mo. IV,
entitled, "Respecting the Laws and Custo.. of War on Land,"
outline rules governing types of targets and weaponry that can be
used in battle. These rules state that military forces must try
to spare such targets as schools, churches, and hospitals. These
rules also state that we can never destroy enemy property unless
military necessity dictates. Unfortunately, these rules only
becaae international law after World War II. Whether they would
have been followed by either side in the war, had they been
passed before the outbreak of hostilities, ..y never be known.
What is known i8 that during World War II, both sides destroyed
many historic, religious and cultural artifacts (Wallace 120).
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In 1944, German Field Marshal Albert Kesselring stated that
he never realized "what it was like to wage war in a museum"
until he caae to Italy (Wallace 120). He was referring to Italy
being a storehouse of religious and historical treasures.
Here, in entire cities like Ro.., Florence, and Venice,
and in a thousand cathedrals and churches and
8Onasteries, was embodied the progress of huaanity from
ancient Rome through the rise of Christianity to the
Renaissance. This was the civilization the Mazis
sought to wipe out; and the Allies did not propose
deliberately to destroy its artifacts. (Hapgood 30)
One such treasure was the Abbey of Monte Cassino, a Benedictine
Monastery founded in 529 A.D. This towering work of art held
.any treasures. Within its walls were tbousands of parcbaents,
.anuscripts and printed books. The .anastery also housed
numerous pieces of sculpture and paintings (Wallace 139). The
abbey was not the only piece of history destroyed during the war.
Also lost wer& the Church of Monteoliveto in Naples and the
bridge of Santo Trinita in Florence (Wallace 121).
Italian authorities, as well as forces from the opposing
armies, took great strides in trying to protect Italy's artistic
riches. The German aray helped transport many works of art to
safety. However, IIWlny artifacts were confiscated by Oer..n
authorities to be used as gifts and in other manners.
Many . walked off with prized objects, large and
s-.ll, but the champion looter was the No. 1 Nazi
hi.aelf. Adolf Hitler was deter.ined to a..ss the .ost
magnificent art collection in the world for display in
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his hometown of Linz, Austria. After the Germans took
over in 1943, Italy becaae his happy hunting ground.
(Wallace 127)
The allies established the Subco..ission for Monu.ents, Fine Arts
and Archives (KrAA), which "briefed crews and infantry
commanders on monu.ents tbat should be spared if possible."
However, both sides contributed to the destruction of many of
these artifacts. For the allies destroyed ..ny in their
bo-oing raids over Italian cities. The Ger.-ns blew up aany
historic bridges to prevent the allies fro. crossing them
(Wallace 120).
Iraq is no less a storehouse of religious and historical
treasures than was Italy. Prom the Ineyclopedla A.. we
learn that "The soil of Iraq holds traces, and often the visible
remains of the buildings and artifacts of every age, which give
it an outstanding status in arebeology and ancient art" (388).
From the Hew Ineyelop.di. Britannica, we read, "Iraq's history
reaches back to the very origins of civilization, for it was here
in the fertile valley of the Tigris and luphrates rivers that the
world's first urban, literate civilization was born" (377).
The ..jority of the population of Iraq is Musli. (about
95'). Every .ajor population area bouses several aosques.
Conaidered "moat holy," these religious centera house .any
artifacts of religious and cultural Allied military
strategists understood the iaportance of this cultural heritage.
Tbey understood that the war was not against the people of Iraq
so auch as it was against the forces of ailitary aggression.
They based targets for destruction on strategic those
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that possibly had a long-tera impact on the country's ability to
conduct war (Dugan 28).
Hussein probably understood our boabing strategy. It is
known that he many items of equipment, to include aircraft,
to populated areas and around significantly historical
and religious buildings and shrines. His .atives may have been
two fold. First, to protect his personnel and equipment,
realizing that it was our policy to not bomb civilians or other
non-ailitary entities. Second, Hussein ..y have been trying to
lure our to these areas in order to sway world opinion to
his side and subsequently disbanding the allied coalition. In
either case, the allied military strategists basically refused to
violate the just principles of war during the Persian Gulf
crisis. This, however, was not necessarily the case during all
phases of World War II.
Despite the religious and historical significance, the
Allied forces fighting in the Cassino arena believed that the
ulti.ate fate of the Abbey of Monte Cassino would be destruction.
The abbey lay between the two warring factions. Although both
sides declared it safe fro. attack, it received destructive
artillery fire al.ast daily. The battlelines were at a
stalemate. In late January, 1944, newspapers in the United
states and Hngland began reporting that Honte Cassino was
blocking the advance of the allies in Italy and was costing the
lives of .any allied soldiers (Hapgood 175). Public opinion
started to sway in favor of the abbey. On 29 January
1944, tbe Hew York Tl... published a dispatch with the headline
reading, in part, that the ene.y was using religious sites for
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observation posts. The author C. L. Sulzberger named Monte
Cassino as one of those sites (Hapgood 175). New Times'
writer Anne O'Hare declared in her of 9 February, 1944,
that "the Germans are established on the hill." The Times of
London headlined, "Monastery Used as Observation Post" (Hapgood
176). Almost all the Allied soldiers in the area were convinced
that the Oer..ns were watching the. fro. the abbey. The co..on
soldier despised the abbey and felt it was costing them lives.
Newspapers expres.ed these opinion. in nuaerous articles and
based thea on interviews and quotes fro. the soldiers fighting on
the slopes of Monte cassino (Hapgood 177). Though hesitant at
first, the Allied leadership decided to bo-o the
bowing to public opinion and concern for their soldiers.
The fighting men who witneed the bombing had aixed
eaotions. They wanted the abbey de.troyed, yet expreed sadness
over its destruction. The Allied leadership justified its
destruction ba.ed on the belief that the Oer..ns occupied it for
tactical purposes, thus endangering the lives of Allied soldiers.
The How York T180' reported on February 16, 1944, that,
shortly after the bombing, "President Roosevelt considered the
occasion enough to .ake public a state.ent of policy
that said religious and historic structures could not be spared
when the lives of Aaerican soldiers were the alternative." The
saae edition of the New York T1.., quoted three Catholic
priests about their feelings over the bo-oing. The Most Reverend
Michael J. Curley, Archbisbop of Baltiaore, stated, "Every
Catholic throughout the world, I sure, will understand."
Archbishop Joseph Francis Runnel of New Orleans bla.ed the
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bombing on the "disregard of the German forces for the sacredness
of this monument of religion." And finally, the Most Reverend
Gerald P. O'Hara from Atlanta was quoted as saying, "Ho words are
strong enough to deplore the fact that the Germans are using the
Abbey of Monte Cassino as an observation post." On 11 February
1944, an article fro. the Del "oine. Register said, "catholic
boys are dying because we are leaving it alone"
(Hapgood 178).
British General Sir Harold Alexander knew the psychological
fear the monastery gave the allied soldiers. He was in favor of
the bo.oing. He writes:
Was the destruction of the monastery a ailitary
necessity? Was it .orally wrong to destroy it? The
answer to the first question is 'ye ' It wa.
necessary aore for the effect it would have on the
of the attackers than for purely ..terial
reasons. The answer to the second question is this:
when soldiers are fighting for a just cause and are
prepared to suffer death and autilation in the process,
bricks and aortar, no .atter how venerable, cannot be
allowed to weigh against hu.an lives. (Wallace 142)
The "bottoa line up front" tells us that no ..tter how aorally
wrong the of the abbey was, the opinion that it was a
necessity to do so prevailed.
The air caapaign of the Persian Gulf war was no less
traumatic than the air of World wax II. By and large,
the public supported President Bush in his decision to confront
Iraq. In its January 21 edition, H'wswe.k reported that "62
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percent of the u.s. pUblic now supports the use of force if Iraq
refuses to withdraw from Kuwait." The article went on to state
that, by 67 votes in the House and 5 votes in the Senate,
Congress granted Bush the authority to use force in the Persian
Gulf (Lacayo 32).
Much like the Vietnam era, protests erupted tbroughout the
United Stat But .any of the angrily exprd.pa.sions turned
to compassion once the war began.
A Newsweek poll taken after the fir.t wave of attacks
showed nearly a 5 to 1 ..rgin of support for ailitary
action. Throughout the country, the news of war
fostered a rare sen.e of co..unity and a mood of somber
reflection. (Adl.r 36)
Even after news broke out that the allied air led
to the bombing of a bunker harboring hundred. of civilians,
public support grew.
Aaericans regretted the civilian deaths, but they did
not waiver in their support for the war and especially
the bombing which appears to be saving the
lives of u.s. troop. on the g%ound. In the late.t
'ewsweek poll, 84 percent wanted the war to continue
until Saddam's govern..nt is fro. power.
(Watson 18).
Popular .upport backed the fighting forces in World War
II, and now it was backing th in the Per.ian Oulf.
Why the 1944 air against the Monte Csino
Abbey with the recent air ca.pai9n against Iraq? The
similarities and contrasts combine to ..ke a profound statement
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about the evolution of modern military air power. First, a
comparison provides perspective. World War II lasted 320 weeks.
The total Cassino campaign (inclusive of four major battles)
lasted 23 weeks. The actual bo.oing of the Abbey lasted two
days. The Persian Gulf air lasted only 46 days. The
ground offensive took part during the last 100 hours of the
To give you an idea of the comparative len9ths of the
campaigns, refer to figures 1 and 2 at appendix A. Figure 1
coapares, usin9nullber of days, the lengths of World War II, the
Cassino Cagpaign, and the Persian Gulf War. The days depicted
for World war II represent the total war, and not just the days
of u.s. involve.ent. The days representing the Persian Gulf war
represent the tiae fro. the first air boabardaent to the end of
the fighting. Figure 2 the use of air versus
ground war during the Ca.sino caapaign and the Persian Gulf war.
Again, the decision to bo.o the abbey was based on its
alleged Ger..n. use as an observation post, gun post, and
fortress. LTG Mark W. Clark, Co.-ander, Fifth Army, had the
authority to order the bo.oing. But Clark was opposed to the
bombing for three reasons: First, he respected the historical
and religious value of the Second, he was not
convinced that Ger..n forces occupied the abbey. And third, he
believed the Ger..n.s could and would use the rubble as defensive
positions (Bllis 169). This third reason beca.. fact for, "As
soon as the bombing stopped, the Ger..ns, who had pro.ised to
stay out of the Abbey unless the Allies bombed it, moved into the
ruins to set up gun eaplace..nts" (Jablonski 29). NG H.I.S.
Tuker, English co...nder of the 4th Indian Division, strongly
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believed a frontal attack on the aonastery should not be
And, once the tactical necessity of attacking the
aonastery was decided, he favored bo.oing fro. the air (Hapgood
167). LTG Bernard Freyberg, co.-ander of the Hew Zealand Corps,
insisted upon the destruction of the abbey (Hap900d 168).
General .Sir Harold Alexander, co.mander of the Allied forces,
supported Freyberg. All these viewpoints swayed Clark to .ake
the final decision to bomb the abbey. Since Alexander was
Clark' uperior, the ultiaate bla.e for the destruction of the
abbey would fallon Alexander (Hapgood 185).
Part of the decision to bo.o the abbey rested with the fact
that the cassino caapaign was not ..king pr09ress. The total
entailed four aajor battles. The 9round attack on Honte
Cassino started on 12 January 1944. The first battle lasted
until 9 February. The second battle ran fro. 15 - 18 February.
The air strikes on the abbey took place on 16 and 17 February.
After the abbey's total d.struction, a third 9round attack began.
This third attack also failed to produce ..asurable results. It
was about this tlae that the Allied co...nders began having
second thoughts about the bo.oing. It was initially hoped that
the bombing would end the stale..te. But in actuality, it did
not add to the war effort. The fourth battle was begun by the
Allies on 11 Hay and finally succeeded with a break through the
lines on 5 June 1944 (Ellis 169).
To actually bo.o the .anastery WAS a difficult decision.
The air strike occurred 35 days after the first battle began.
One reason for this delay was the concern over the consequences
of destroying this ancient shrine. What would the world think?
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Another reason for the delay was that the 8-17 Flying Portress
and daylight "precision" bombing were not fully proven as the
best available air-power technology. Throughout the war, LTG
Ira C. Eaker, co-.ander of the Mediterranean Allied Air Force,
had been an advocate of daylight precision bolabing. He initiated
this concept while stationed in 8ngland. HoweveE, due to his
transfer to the Italian front, he could never pEove the value of
this in raids oveE GeE..ny pEioE to the of the
abbey (HapC)ood 200).
On 14 FebEuaEy, Baker flew oveE the abbey on an obseEvation
flight and was later quoted as saying, "We clearly identified
German soldieEs and theiE radio mast" (Hapgood 201). This
stateaent froa a .an of Baker's stature probably contributed to
the eventual decision to destEoy the abbey.
The initial bombing was carried out by 144 8-17s in an early
.orning raid (Hapgood 216). Even though the destruction was near
coaplete, a second scheduled wave of 86 aediua boabers struck the
abbey that afternoon (Hapgood 220). The following day, the
allies carried out another boabing raid using 59 fiC)hter bombers
(Hapgood 238). One should note that the so-called precision
bombing of World War II was far below that of the bo.oing
caapaign of Iraq in respect to accuracy. This "precision"
boabinC) nearly killed Clark, who was 17 ailes away fro. the abbey
during the boabing (Hapgood 220). weEe also 24 Allied
soldiers wounded fro. 12 boab. which landed on the Indian
division, located 300 yards fro. the abbey. Indian division
had slowly worked its way toward the abbey, unaware that the
aonastery was about to be boabed. The officer in charge of the
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Indian Division, Brigadier o. de T. Lovett, wrote, "Al.ost
before the ground ceased to shake, the telephones were ringing.
At that .a.ent I was called and told that the bo.oers would be
over in 15 .inutea" (Hapgood 221).
The 2nd Bomber Group had the ais8ion to attack the abbey.
MAJ Bradford B. Bvans served as the alsslon group co-.ander.
Before the bollblnC) run, he recelved an IntelliCJence briefing. He
was told that the _ust be destroyed. The only
occupants were Geraan forces (Hapgood 215).
During the first day, 453-1/2 tons of boabs (66-1/2 tons of
which were incendiary) were dropped. On the second day of
bombing, warplanes dropped 23 tons. The destruction was total.
But, it turned out that the only casualties were civilians who
had taken refuge at the aonastery. One estl..te put the total
deaths at 115. Another estimate told of several hundred civilian
deaths (Hapgood 228-238).
The bo.oing ..de world headlines. Allegations that the
_onastery had been used as a fortress continued to fill the
newspapers (Hapgood 229). On 16 February, 1944, the
Hew York Ti... ran an article entitled "Monastery Is Wrecked".
The author, C. L. Sulzberger, wrote, "The German soldiers who
had violated all civilized codes by the sanctuary for
ailitary purposes .et their day of wrath." On 20 February, 1944,
the s .e newspaper ran an article accusing the Ger-.ns of forcing
2,000 civillans to stay in the abbey whlle it was bollbed. "The
cowardly Ger..ns who did this were said to have fled when the
first bombs fell" (Roper 1). While the article did not state the
purpose of this incident, the reader is left to conclude that it
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was to .ake the Allies look bad. On 29 March, 1944, Newsweek ran
an article entitled "Death of an Abbey." This article describes
German desecration and looting. Since auch of this has the ring
of propaganda, it is difficult to know what to discount or what
to believe.
At this point, there are two conclusions to draw. First, it
is apparent that air power was not yet ready to be the .ajor
means of war. The of sorties used and the large tonnage
of bollbs dropped did little to aid in the advance of the Allies.
Next, there is the possibility that the was carried out
illegally: that Is, the decision to was .ade by the wrong
person. Clark .ade the decision to bo.o but did not give the
order. The authority to boab rested with Gen Henry M. Wilson,
commander of the Allied Forces in the "edit.rranean. But the
actual go-ahead was signaled by .aker. Kaker clai..d he had
received the order fro. Wilson. But there is no evidence to
support this. It see..d that Baker had a hidden agenda. He
strongly desired to prove the worth of the 8-17 and his
notion of precision daylight
If the Ger.ans were actually using the .anastery as a
fortification and observation post, then why is not one German
soldier known to have been killed? AlSO, why did it take almost
four aore .anths to end the Cassino The obvious answer
Is that the Ger..ns were not using the abbey for military
activiti.s before the boabinCJ. So why bollb it? On. possibility
was the way in which the ..dia cover.d the Th .edia
played to the tune of the soldlers. soldl.r. perceived the
abbey to be a fortress, so the dia called it a fortress. The
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media of the tim. strongly supported the American effort in the
war, and quite possibly, the media thus was able to influence the
decision of the military leaders.
The .edia of today have brought wars fought on foreign land
closer to home than ever before. A result of this i.-ediate
press is the necessity for our leaders to be wary of statements
..de without deliberation. Shortly before he was relieved from
duty, Air Force Chief of Staff, GBM Michael J. Dugan, stated that
air power was the solution to defeating Iraq. Dugan advised a
quick air attack in that land war would cost too .any lives. The
type of power struggle that surfaced between the air proponents,
such as Baker, and the ground o ~ o n n t s of the Cassino campaign,
seemed to surface during the early stages of the Persian Gulf
campaign. Bach service had its solution to the confrontation
awaiting the.. M'wsWl.k on 21 January 1991 quoted an unnaaed Air
Force officer as saying, "The Ar.y won't let the Air Porce win
this one, .specially with an Aray aan in overall co...nd" (Lane
35). Gen Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
proposed that the only sure course to victory was on the ground.
This particular thought came from the N'wswe.k of 7 January 1991
(Barry 18). This sa.. article pointed out that Powell was trying
to protect the Army from the co.ing 20' bUdget cuts, and that the
coming war was a great chance to show off the Aray's new M1A1
battle tank. This edition of Newswe.k also noted that Bush's
greatest fear was that, by starting with a ground war, he would
face enorgous pressure for a proapt caasefire. On the other
hand, starting with an air war would cost fewer A8erican lives
and increase the likelihood of being able to fight to complete
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victory.
The ulti.ate decision to prosecute an air war rested with
the commander-in-chief. On 17 January 1991, the headlines of the
11 Palo Ti... echoed in large print, "U.S. UNLEASHES AIR WAR ON
IRAQ." Dugan, who .ay have been fired for going public with his
case for a ..ssive air campaign, appeared to be vindicated. Bush
s ....d to have followed Dugan's plan. D.sert Shield was now
Desert Stor., and the wisdom of relying heavily on air power
would now be tested.
Was this decision to wage an air war the ~ r l choice? This
decision was far from risk-free. Modern air power had not lived
up to its claims on recent occasions. In 1986, nine F-111
fighter boabers attacked Mua...r Qadhafi's Libyan headquarters
with laser-guided b o ~ s These so-called technologically
advanced aircraft scored no direct hits, with only two bo.os
landing in the target area. In 1989, during the invasion of
Pana.., the r-117 Stealth fighters missed targets and Incurred
the ire of Defense Secretary Cheney (Budiansky, 10 Sep 90, 36).
The attack on Iraq started on 17 January 1991 with ship-
launched To..hawk 8issiles sent toward Baghdad. F-117's,
F-1SB'I, and F-111's soon followed with reports of tr...ndous
success (11 Paso Ti..s, 17 Jan 91). The F-117's were able to
evade Iraqi radar while Navy BA6B's and Air rorce SP-Ill's
tricked it. The To..hawks als.iles and Stealth fighters hlt
co.-and-and-control facilities, and Navy rIA 18'. struck Iraqi
aissile sites. Escorted by F-15 fighters, F-4G Wild Weasels took
out Iraqi surface-to-air (SAH) sites (Duffy 25).
Ever since precision bo.oing was first used, its opponents
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have called it a contradiction in terms. There were literally
thousands of innocent civilians killed in World War II as a
result of this type bombing. In 1942, the allies dropped 3,000
tons of bo.os on Dresden, Ger.any, killing as many as 135,000
civilians. This doe. not appear very .oral. In the Persian Gulf
war, the allies dropped more than 3,000 tons of bo.os in the
first 36 hour., killing, by Iraqi claims, only 23 civilians.
Technology see.a to have prevailed here (Budiansky 31). In World
War II, a 8-17 needed 4,500 sorties and 9,000 bombs to insure a
target's destruction. During Desert stor., a Stealth fighter,
.are often than not, needed one sortie and one bo.o to destroy a
target (Dugan 27).
For 44 days, the allies pounded Iraq in the largest air
attack the world has ever witnessed. The precision was
remarkable. Bven though done in a way as to not praise the
military, but in a manner in which to co.plain about how the
ailitary handled the press, Newsweek, in an 11 February 1991
article, described one of Gen Hor..n Schwarzkopf's press
briefings. The article said that the general dazzled the press
for 23 .inutes with cockpit tapes of incredibly accurate air
strikes. This is truly a testiaony to the advance technology the
United stat held over Iraq. However, one .hould note that the
advance technology -- our rt bo-os -- only represented a small
percentage of the overall ar nt used. "Precision-guided
bombs, the icon of Pentagon briefings and the ailitary's
preferred i ..ge of the Persian Gulf war, made up barely
7 percent of the u.s. tonnage dropped on Iraqi targets" (Gellman
12). It is not surprising that the .edia was unable to exploit
Kirtland 19
this fact during the campaign.
The media during World War II, being extremely pro-military,
probably influenced the decision to bomb the Abbey of Honte
Cassino. The media during the Gulf Crisis appeared to be
concerned with stl.ulating pUblic opinion against the military
than reporting the news. This friendly press of World War II was
able to influence events then than was the press during the
Gulf crisis. This fact was probably advantageous to the allied
.1litary force. facing Iraq.
By the two one should be able to see
that allied leaders in both wars atteapted to avoid an unjust
war. There also .ee.e to be co.-on ground in the zealous support
of air power by Baker and Dugan. They saw air power as a means
to shorten what otherwise could be a long ground war.
Unfortunately, the technology of today did not exist during World
War II. If it had, possibly thousands of lives could have been
spared. A second look at figure 2 ..ke. a self-explanatory
statement about air power. Against a technologically inferior
force, air power can be decisive (Lane 35). The graph also shows
that air power Is not yet the total solution to winning war.
Even in Iraq, the United states felt the final blow would have to
come from ground forces.
Target selection during World War II was often led by
disinfor.ation. We did not possess the hi-tech intelligence
apparatus then that we do now. But even then, target selection
was agonized over. Harry S. Tru..n did not order the bombing of
Nagasaki and Hiroshima without auch .editation. He aeticulously
weighed the result against the ..ans of attack.
Kirtland 20
How .any lives would the bomb save by ..king an
invasion (of Japan) unnecessary? How much chance was
there for peace without an invasion or a bomb? With
reluctance, he (Tru.an) had to agree that he could
think of no alternative and found hiuelf in accord.
(Kur:Zllan 312)
Neither was the attack on the Abbey of Monte Cassino an overnight
decision. And, however wrong, the decision to bo.-b was thought
to be a necessary evil. We have proven by our actions in the
Gulf war that the United states truly believes in the Just War
Theory. Our targets were .ilitary in nature, according to the
most advanced intelligence gathering methods known to .an. Our
strategy was .aral. Overall, it was a "clean" war on our part.
Very few allied lives were lost. America can hold her head high.
America and her allies once again recognized an eVil, faced it,
and defeated it.
~ h e r e are lessons learned in ever:y crisis. With each battle
the tactics of future warfare changes. With each success, public
support grows. In his u.s. lews and o ~ l Report editorial of
Mar:ch 11, 1991, Morti..r 8. Zucker..n writes:
As for America, Desert storm has been a healing and
unifying experience. After World War II, we could do
anything. After Vietnaa, we could do nothing. Today,
the renewed patriotism and pride in the moral basis of
our authority augur well for our capacity to deal with
probl... abroad, and hopefully at ho... (76)
The advance technology of our weapon syste.., coupled with the
demonstrated precise ..thods of ar....nt delivery, have changed
Kirtland 21
the face of warfare. Potential adversaries will have to rethink
their stand before enticing the United states to enter
into conflict against them.
The media also had a lesson to learn. The .edia was a
winner during World war II, "accentuating the positive." The
.edia was a loser dUElng DeseEt stoEa. Yes, the pictures and
fila footaC)- brouCJht ho.e the reality of war in all its glory.
But, the reportinC) was neCjative. "Many TV and media grandees
must be hopinCj the public will soon forget their
hand wringinCj, skepticism, .oral torpor and downriCjht
misjudgment" (Zuckerman 76).
The media 8isjudged the ability of our high-tech equipment.
They said the Persian Gulf caapaign would be another Vietnam
"with thousands of dead and Aaerica at war with itself"
(Zucker..n 76). Unless the attitude of the aedia chanCjes, they
will find the-aelves widening the gap between the.eelves and the
military, even takinCj the chance of alienating the..elves from
their public. ACjainst the military, they will lose.
America witnessed that air superiority, although not an end
in itself, is what enabled the coalition ground forces to conduct
their operations without undue interference by the enemy (Dugan
29). The objective of war is to win: SWiftly, decisively, and
with .lni.u. 108s of life and equipaaent. Advance technoloCjy
brought this objective into the realm of reality during the
Persian Gulf "The only constants of war are death,
tragedy, devastation, and waste" (Jablonski viii). These cannot
be avoided. However, thanks to Advance technolo9Y, our leaders
can better orchestrate future battles. This technology will
Kirtland 22
further enhance the pinpoint accuracy of targeting. It will
lessen the need for face-to-face combat. It will continue to
reduce the number of allied casualties as the world witnessed in
the gulf. It will further xeduce the nu-oer of non-co.oatant
deaths. It will help avoid needle destruction of cultural and
religious shrines and artifacts. And .ast advance
technology will enable the United states to adhere to a Just War
Theory.
Kirtland 23
APPENDIX A
(Figure 1)
Relative length of the World War II, the Monte Cassino Campaign,
and the Persian Gulf War. (each square equals one day)
161
140
Kirtland 24
APPENDIX A
(days)
120
100
80
60
46
40
20
2
(Figure 2)
Monte Cassino Persian Gulf War
This graph shows the relative length of the ground and air
campaigns at Monte Cassino and the Persian Gulf War.
(ground war is shown in green; air war is shown in red)
Kirtland 25
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