SEMCO (A): A MOST UNUSUAL WORKPLACE

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GRADUATE SCHOOL OF
MANAGEMENT
UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN
AUSTRALIA
300-153-1
o
U
Semco 'A':
A Most Unusual Workplace
This case was writtenby Fernando Chaddad, Managerat AndersenConsulting in
Sao Paulo, Brazil, under the supervision ofProfessor GaryJ Stockport, Graduate
School ofManagement, University of Western Australia. It is intendedto be usedas
the basisfor class discussion rather thanto illustrate either effective or ineffective
handlingofa management situation.
The case was compiledfrom publishedsources.
2001 GJ Stockport and F Chaddad, University of Westem Australia, Perth, Australia.

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, c'
300-153-1
Introduction
Semco is a small business located in an old industrial district in Sao Paulo, Brazil, with 2000revenues
approaching US$ lOOm and a direct staff of less than 300. It manufactures pumps, dishwashers, digital
scanners, mixers for anything from bubble gum to rocket fuel, and cooling units. Since the early 1990's,
Semco has been crawled over by the media and hundreds of curious corporations, including 150 of the
Fortune top 500 American companies.
Why does such a small company generate such a great amount of publicity? Ricardo Semler, the
Harvard-educated Semco CEO who was only in his early 20' s when he took over the company in 1980,
explains: "At Semco, the basic question we work on is: how do you get people to want to come to work
on a grey Monday morning? This is the only parameter we care about, which is 100%a motivation
issue. Everything else - quality, profits, growth - will fall into place if enough people are interested in
coming to work on Monday morning." (1)
Semco's reputation as a most unusual workplace has been projected internationally. Semco prides itself
on being a democratic, transparent place with little controls as each individual is responsible for his or
her own actions. In Brazil, thousands of applicants swamp Semco every time a job opening is made
public. Semler himself has been twice awarded the prize of Brazil's "Most Admired Business Leader".
Abroad, Semler has gained a guru-like reputation in the business speakers' circle, sharing the
microphone in the 1997World Masters of Business Seminar with Lee Iacocca, Norman Schwarzkopf
and Stephen Covey.
The democracy that permeates Semco seems to work. According to Semler, who himself owns 90% of
Semco: "Look at the results. Productivity is up seven-fold, and profits are up five-fold. We took a
moribund company and made it thrive, chiefly by refusing to squander our g r ~ s t asset: people." (2)
Company Background
Antonio Curt Semler was born in Vienna in 1912. Upon graduation from Vienna's Polytechnic as an
engineer, he accepted a position with DuPont company in a chemicals and textiles plant in Argentina.
By the early 1950's, he had moved to Brazil and had secured a patent for a centrifuge which could
separate lubricating oil from vegetables. Hence Semco, a contraction of Semler & Company, was
started inSao Paulo in 1953.
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Fortunately for this one-product company, the centrifuge became a market leader. Three Brazilian
partners then joined Semco with badly needed capital and a knowledge of the country. The 1960's were
a time of fast growth for the Brazilian economy, and Semco was well positioned to take advantage of
the favourable scenario. As the Brazilian government made public through a National Shipbuilding
Plan its intention to spur shipbuilding in the country, Semco signed partnership agreements with two
British pump manufacturers and became a major marine pump supplier.
By1980, almost 90% of Semco's revenues were related to marine products such as pumps, components
for propellers, and water-oil separators for ship engines. Sales had been stable at US$4m for several
years. As the early-1980's recession loomed in Brazil, the shipbuilding industry was especially battered,
much like any other capital-goods industry. At Semco, the business slowdown was severe enough to
jeopardise Semco's very existence. Semco management spent much of 1980 in search of bank loans to
keep afloat, and even considered selling assets.
Ricardo Semler Steps In
It was in this difficult period for Semco that Ricardo Semler, then aged 20, joined Semco as his father
and Semco founder, Antonio Curt Semler, had expected.
Ricardo Semler, who in his own words "spent much of [his] adolescence playing rock & roll in a band,
was shocked by the oppression [... ] when [he] first started working at Semco (3)" in the purchasing
department at age 16. "The amount of rules and procedures numbed me. I couldn't help thinking that
Semco could be run differently, [... ] without keeping track of whether people were late, without all
these numbers and rules." (3) After graduating from Sao Paulo's prestigious State Law School, he
rejoined Semco in 1980. Soon thereafter, his father would transfer to him the majority of Semco shares
as well as the responsibility to run the business. Upon taking charge, young Semler's first action was to
remove more than half of those who had belonged to his father's trusted management team. Several
years after being in charge of Semco, Semler applied to undertake an MBA at Harvard Business School
but he was turned down on two occasions. He would later undergo executive training at Harvard,
spending three stints of one month per year there over a three-year period.
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In the early 1980's, Semco needed orders badly amidst a deep recession. However, business was
unlikely to come from the shipping industry, then in complete standstilL Thus, Ricardo Semler and an
experienced new hire in the sales department named Harro Heyde set out to broaden Semco's product
line. They would convince manufacturers around the world to let Semco manufacture their pumps and
mixers in Brazil. By 1982, Semco was cash flow positive again and able to payoff its debt.
After this lesson, Semler decided to avoid dependency on one industry, thus diversifying away from
marine equipment through acquisitions. For US$ 0.5m, Semco acquired two businesses from Asea
Brown Boveri and Merck, respectively. The first acquisition was Flakt, which manufactured
refrigeration equipment for ships and ventilation systems for marine engine rooms. The second
acquisition was BAC (Baltimore Aircoil), a company that manufactured air-conditioning equipment.
Along with the two acquisitions came two new plants and 120 people. By 1984, another acquisition
followed: the Hobart plant, a Dart & Kraft Brazilian business unit with a headcount of 150 that
manufactured dishwashers, fryers, scales and slicers. The period that followed the Semco acquisition
spree was characterised by incremental improvements to the new Semco, such as the streamlining of
budgeting by paring 400 cost centres down to 50.
Making Unusual Decisions
Semler was in his mid-20s and busy in the effort to integrate recent acquisitions into the old Semco as
he confessed in a medical appointment that he had physically collapsed more than once in his usually
long workdays. Convinced of the threat that he would be retuming frequently to the doctor's should he
not mend his ways, Semler embarked on a delegation initiativ'e so that he could manage his time more
reasonably.
At the same time, Semler felt that something about Semco had to be done as welL The old Semco had
been a traditional, hierarchical company that was almost brought down to its knees by a recession. The
new Semco seemed organised and well disciplined, still in Semler's words "we could not get our
people to perform as we wanted, or to be happy with their jobs" (4). Feeling the company needed
enthusiasm, Semler started to experiment with unusual decisions, such as eliminating the company
dress code and the end-of-day security searches. Next came the revoking of parking privileges for
management, and the elimination of executive dining rooms. Members of management that were used
to the old, traditional Semco found it increasingly difficult to stay.
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In Semler's own words, "These ideas didn't just come to me. I was testing some of the things I'd learnt
in the rock group, where if the drummer doesn't fee11ike coming to rehearsals you know something's
wrong. You can hassle him as much as you want but the problem remains." (5)
The cultural shift that Semler kicked off gained momentum from 1985 onwards. What started as a
seemingly innocuous string of decisions such as the elimination of parking privileges took a much
larger shape as workers in the Hobart plant became increasingly more responsible for their own work.
Soon they were setting their own production quotas and redesigning the dough mixers they made.
The empowerment that progressively permeated the organisation shocked some supervisors, who felt
their power had been taken away. They would complain to Semler in hallways: "I can't even tell if my
people are arriving on time." (6) Aformer Commercial Director who spoke against the changes noted
that "we lost control of some of the decisions which are [now made] by the employees..... I feel I have
to take the decisions. As an Executive Director you should be responsible for some of the decisions.
But when everyday the workers from the factory come with another proposition - we need this or we
need that- you do not have time to think about the strategy of the company." (7)
By the late 1980's, the unstoppable cultural changes had reached Semco's structure. The old Semco,
which had been a traditionally functional organisation, became the hew Semco with an "amoeba-like"
structure of groups of no more than 10 members. In Semler's words, "I have never met anyone who
works effectively with more than 10 or 12 people at the same time. If you PJIt together a group of 200,
the transparency is lost and you need to put control systems inplace to make sure people are coming in
on time. Then it all becomes a boarding school problem." (8)
At some point in the mid-1980's, three Semco engineers proposed a new kind of work unit. They
wanted to take a small group of people raised in Scmco'sculture and set them free of day-to-day
activities such as production problems, orders and inventory. Instead, they would focus on innovation
of any type, which could include: the creationof new product lines, improvement of manufacturing
processes, or the development of new market strategies.
The so-called Nucleus of Technology Innovation (NTI) was thus started. NTI members would be part
of a totally flat hierarchy with neither bosses nor subordinates. Their performance would be assessed
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every 6 months by Partners, which would decide whether the NTI members would be allowed 6
additional months of work or not. By the end of their first six months, NTI had 18 projects under way,
and over the next few years they uncorked an array of inventions, changes and refinements. One
particularly curious invention was a scale that weighs fright trains moving at full speed. Further, NTI
compensation and performance would be closely related, as NTI members would be entitled to
royalties emanating from new creations and a share of any savings identified. Semco management
calculated that a Semco engineer that made US$ 25k a year (in 1987 dollars) on average would be paid
anywhere between US$15k and US$85k per year depending on performance.
Next, a company-wide job rotation programme touched every position at Semco - including the CEO-
ship, which would be shared by 6 rotating "Counsellors". This informal board would frequently meet
on day-to-day decisions, while the CEO-ship would be rotated among the Counsellors every 6 months.
Semler gave up the CEO title and became a Counsellor. The Semco hierarchy, which once housed 12
levels, was pared down to only 4. And as the results followed, the Counsellors felt it would be unfair
not to implement a profit-sharing programme that would reach every corner of Semco - including the
factory floors. After a company-wide debate, the Semco Profit-Sharing Programme (SemcoPar) was
designed. Every quarter, it would deliver 23%of each autonomous business unit's profits to the
employees of each individual business unit.
Hand-in-hand with empowerment and transparency came the elimination of unnecessary controls. For
instance, nobody at Semco knows exactly how many people the company employs. Semler explains:
"When we walk through our plants, we rarely even know who works for us: Some of the people in the
. .
factory are full-time employees; some work for us part-time; some work for themselves and supply
Semco with components or services; some work for themselves under contract to outside companies
(even competitors); and some of them work for each other. We could decide to find out which is which
and who is who, but [... ] we think it is all useless information." (9)
Semler is keen to point out that the apparent lack of control systems does not harm efficiency. Quite on
the contrary, "we delivered our last cookie factory with all its 16,000components right on time. One of
our competitors, a company with tight controls and hierarchies, delivered a similar factory to the same
client a year and two months late." (10)
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Company-wide transparency means that every single Semco employee, white collar and blue collar
alike, are given a monthly sheet with the their business unit results. When asked whether he could
actually read a P&L, one blue collar employee replied: "Yes, I do understand Semco's P&L. I was given
a crash course some time ago. It was eo-funded by the union." (11)
Regarding any potential collateral effects of transparency, Semler explains that "people warned me
that all sorts of information about our company would get into the wrong hands, that we had to protect
ourselves. It's a waste of time to worry about leaks. First of all, we do not know whose the wrong
hands are. The competition used to be [... ] a mile away, but now it comes from companies [... ] in
Taiwan or in Finland. Second, I've never seen a company overtake another because it had seen its
[quarterly reports] or even the specifications for a valve. Third, we want to be a moving target." (12)
As of whether Semco practices may be a target of employee abuse, Semler points out that "we've had a
few employees take wholesale advantage of our open stockrooms and trusting atmosphere, but we
were lucky enough to find and prosecute them without putting in place a lot of insulting watchdog
procedures for the nine out of ten who are honest. We've seen a few cases of greed when people set
their own salaries too high." (13)
Semco's results in the 1980's were solid. By 1988, Semco's sales had soared to U$35m, almost nine times
of what it had been when Semler took charge in 1980. Productivityalso improved dramatically, as per-
employee sales increased from US$10.8kper head in 1980to US$92kin 1992. When asked about how
has Semco survived in the 1980's, Semler replied "hard work, of course. And good luck - fundamental
to all business success. But most important, I think, were the drastic changes we made in our concept
of management. Without those changes, riot even hard work and good luck could have pulled us
through." (14)
Semco Practices as at 2000
Semco is a company entirely different from the one Ricardo Semler inherited from his father and
Semco-founder two decades ago. A brief overview of Semco as at 2000can be summarised as follows:
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Strategy:
No "Grand Strategy": Semco does not have a "grand plan". Semler mentions that "I don't know what we
shall be making in 15 years' time, or how we shall be making it - it won't be my decision. But as a
shareholder, I'm more confident in this investment than I would be in a conventional company whose
grand strategy seemed failsafe by today's lights." (15) Further, Semler points out that "I think that
strategic planning and vision are often barriers to success." (16)
NTI's
Associates
Co-ordinators
Partners
Gunsellors
Semco
structure
operations, such as the next year's investment plan;

Structure:
Circular Organisation: Layers of hierarchy of the organisation have been reduced from twelve to four
fluid, concentric circles (see figure 1). Semler is one of six CEO's who are called Counsellors. The
next circle are those in-charge of business units and are called Partners. The third circle are the first-
line supervisors who are called Co-ordinators. The rest are called Associates. Semco is run by
various committees (where the union is represented) which makes all the decisions on strategy and
Figure 1: Semco's structure. Source: "Maoerick!" by Ricardo Semler, ArrowBusiness, London, pages 183-192
Nucleus of Technology Innauation (NTI): Groups, usually engineers, are periodically freed of day-to-
day responsibilities, in order to invent new products, discover how to reduce costs or improve
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processes and products. They-oftenpopose new strategies or new lines of business. Their
compensation is related to the results of their entrepreneurship;
Satellite Programme: Counsellors, Partners, Co-ordinators and Associates are encouraged to set up
their own businesses to sell to Semco items that used to be done in-house. They can also sell to
competition. To ease the transition, Semco leases out the equipment they need at reasonable rates.
One former Semco employee who now owns and runs a satellite business explains that "we
received technical support and help to physically set up the job shop, but no direct cash infusions"
(17). Interestingly, these satellite businesses borrow not only Semco hardware but also Semco
values. According to [oao Scares, a former Semco employee and union representative who now
runs a successful satellite: "Transparency is most important to our 15 employees, who have access
to the company's books. It is a way of encouraging dedication and loyalty to my company." (18)
When asked whether he was trying to get rid of surplus personnel and old machinery, Semler said
"Some of these machines are actually brand new. As far as the employees go, some of them have an
entrepreneurial flair and will succeed [in their satellites], whereas the ones that do not succeed and
go bankrupt can return the equipment and get back to work with us." (19)
Staffing:
Sticking to Basics: There is no support staff doing dead-end jobs. Everyone sends his or her own fax
and meets their guest. There is no executive dining room or reserved parking space;
"Lostin Space": New recruits are let Idose in Semco for about a year. They have no bosses, no job
descriptions. They are simply asked to spend time in all departments. After about a year, they
negotiate a longer-term involvement with a department;
Reverse Evaluation: Promotions in rank and salary are voted on by those who have worked with the
person concerned. Every six months, a Co-ordinator or Partner is rated by those who have worked
with him. Those who are rated consistently Iow eventually leave the company. (See appendix 1 for
selected questions of the supervisor evaluation tool);
Self-set Pay: The members of Semco themselves decide what their pay will be. They are involved in
salary surveys. Hence, surveys have high credibility. The principle is that employees will think not
only of their welfare but also that of the company and that common sense will prevail. SemIer says
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that "paying people whatever they want seems a sure route to bankruptcy, but we've done this for
eight years, and we've never performed better (20). When asked about how much he made himself,
Sem1er explained that "my pay varies between US$150k and US$400k per year depending on
circumstances. The decision that the other Counsellors have to make every 6 months is not whether
I make too much or too little, but whether they want to keep me or not for this amount" (21);
Risk Salary: On a voluntary basis, employees (Associates) have joined the risk-salary system where
they take an automatic cut of 25%in pay when business is bad but also get 125%of pay when the
business has had a good year;

Family Silverware: When a newjob opportunity is available, the applicant's characteristics are
graded from 0 to 100. The evaluation criteria are put together by the individuals with whom the
new opening will have the most day-to-day contact. The applicant's score is obtained through
multiple interviews, and then compared against the ideal candidate (score of 100 points) as defined.
If a person in the organisation scores 70, he or she will get the job over an outsider even if the
outsider scored 95, as Semco personnel are familiar with Semco's culture;
Job security: Job security is not offered nor is it asked;
Strikes: Unfortunately, strikes have not beeneliminated yet. Associates cancall a strike anytime.
There is no punishment for going on strike. During a strike in the Hobart plant in the mid 1980's,
the employees found out that they were free to enter the Semco premises during the strike and even
use the cafeteria for meetings. On the other hand, they also found out thatSemco never negotiates
during strikes. Only after the employees are back to work is Semco ready to negotiate.
Systems:
Few rules: There are few rules. There are no rules on travel. There is no internal audit group. The
assumption is that common sense will prevail;
Few Controls: Semco does not control expenses such as travel. Semler explains that "we used to
spend a lot of time discussing about [travel expenses]. Some people stay in 4-star hotels and some
live like spartans. No one checks expenses, so there is no way of knowing. The point is, we don't
care. If we can't trust people with our money and their judgement, we sure as hell shouldn't be
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sending them overseas to do business in our name." (22) When asked about Semco before Semler's
arrival, one job shop worker said that "1felt very uncertain in those times, with guards checking my
bag at the end of the workday. When I went to the toilet, the supervisor would watch me from the
raised platform and harass me if it took me too long. These days are over now." (23)
Shared Values:
Semler explains that Semco has 3 fundamental values - democracy, profit sharing and information -
thatall work in a complicated circle where each is dependent on the other two (24).
Information
Profit
Sharing
Democracy
~ : : --+-
Figure 2: Semco's shared values
Democracy: This is the cornerstone of the Semco culture. Everyone participates in major decisions.
For example, the purchase of a new plant site or a major acquisition is done via a direct vote of all
members of the organisation. Semler believes that "the main problem afflicting [most] companies is
autocracy. America, Britain and Brazil are all very proud of their democratic values in civic life, but
I have yet to see a democratic workplace. That is the difficult transition that.is going on. We are still
constricted by a system that doesn't allow democracy into business or into the workplace." (25) One
Counsellor explains that Semco's core values are"freedom, trust and commitment" mentioning
that "we were thus able to take the fear out of the organisation" (26);
Information: Information is available to everybody. Nothing is kept secret. Everyone is trained how
to read financial statements. An employee can talk with media without fear of repercussion. Semler
adds that"participation gives people control of their work, profit-sharing gives them a reason to do
it better and information tells them what's working and what isn't." (27)
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Profit-Sharing (SemcoPar): Periodically, the employees of Semco determine what their profit share
should be (usually 23%in the last several years) and they also decide how to split the profit share;
Style:
The Workplace: Offices have no walls. Only plants separate the workers who are encouraged to
mingle with each other freely. Work is clustered in a way that a complete product, not just a
component, is made;
Workat home: Everyone is encouraged to do at home the work that can be done there; Semler
himself works about three mornings a week at home;
Flexitime: The workers decide on their working hours. Experience has been such that individual
preferences have been subordinated to group schedules;
Memos: Memos must be kept to one page. There are no exceptions.
Skills:
Sabbatical training: By approval of eo-workers, everyone is encouraged to recharge or learn new
skills. One is encouraged to envision what he or she would like to become say five years hence and
then take the initiative to get the necessary training;
Job rotation: On a regular basis, everyone is encouraged to ~ h n g e jobs inSemco, This way, they
learn new skills and there is more than one person ready to take on a job that has been vacated.
Finally, Semler seems to believe Semco is on the right track. In a 1992 survey for instance, 93% of
Associates and Co-ordinators said they are happy to go to work on Monday mornings. Semler believes
that "people go to work because they are looking to do something with their life. I have never met
anyone who goes to work for the money. In the same way I have never met any businessman who is in
business to make money." (28) Semco counsellor [oao Vendramim believes the unique culture is one of
the company's greatest assets, mentioning that "what I like most [about Semco] is the environment of
freedom, absence of fear, encouragement to take risks [and] the opportunity to have a nice feeling of
belonging to something very interesting." (29)
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In the meantime, Semco has become one of Latin America's fast-growing companies. Semco continues
to grow through partnerships. One of Semco's latest ventures is ERM Brasil, one of Brazil's largest
environmental consulting companies, a joint venture with Environmental Resources Management.
Another example is the partnership with the New-York based consultancy firm Cushman Wakefie1d. In
Brazil, Cushman Wakefield Semco is in the business of real estate asset management.
The latest Semco partnership to date was announced in February 2000. Semco then joint-ventured with
Bidcom, creating Semco Bidcom. The start-up would invest over the next few years in equipment and
software aiming to turn the world-wide-web into a tool for the construction industry. Initially, Semco
Bidcom would rent a virtual platform that allows the design of construction works as well as the on-
line trading of materials and services.
In the early 2000' s, Semco's initiative to pursue growth in industries unrelated to its core businesses is
taking the company once more to new territories. According to Semco counsellor [oao Vendramim,
"my view is that [our] challenge now is to accommodate the culture of our foreign partners with ours-
we have several Joint Ventures - ,and still maintaining the core of our culture and our basic values, in a
globally changing business environment, and the ever increasing need to understand and face
diversity." (30)
After a best-seller book on Semco and the extensive press coveragethat followed, Sem1er joined the
international speakers' circle in the late 1990's and gained a guru-like reputation, sharing the
microphone in the 1997 World Masters of Business Seminar with Lee Iacocca, Norman Schwarzkopf
and Stephen Covey. Regarding the new technology-based economy that emerged in the late 1990's,
SemIer said in the June 2000 Forbes CEO Annual Conference that he was happy to see "the end of the
week-ends" (31), mentioning that the internet and the world-wide-web lead to longer working hours
for most people, now able to work at home over week-ends as welL
Ricardo Sem1er pondered about the future strategy of Semco and how the organisation could become
even more of an unusual workp1ace.
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Bibliography
(1) "It's Still Rock & Roll Time To Me - Semco's Chief', Financial Times, 15/5/97 page 18
(2) "City Diary: Semier's Secret", Sunday Telegraph, 12/9/93 page 37
(3) Ricardo Semler: "Maverick!", Arrow Business Books, London 1993, page 65
(4) Ibid., page 65
(5) "It's Still Rock & Roll Time To Me - Semco's Chief', Financial Times, 15/5/97 page 18
(6) Ricardo Semler: "Maverick!", Arrow Business Books, London 1993, page 89
(7) "The Maverick Solution", BBCFor Business video production, 1995
(8) Ibid.
(9) Ricardo Semler: "Why My Former Employees Still Work ForMe", Harvard Business Review, Jan/Feb
1994, page 64
(10) Ricardo Semler: "Why MyFormer Employees Still Work For Me", Harvard Business Review,
Jan/Feb 1994, page 74
(11) "The Maverick Solution", BBCFor Business video production, 1995
(12) Ricardo Semler: "Why MyFormer Employees Still Work ForMe", Harvard Business Review,
Jan/Feb 1994, page 72
(13) Ricardo Semler: "Why My Former Employees Still Work ForMe", Harvard Business Review,
Jan/Feb 1994, page 65
(14) Ricardo Semler: "Managing Without Managers", Harvard Business Review, Sep/Oct 1989, page
77
(15) "The Boyfrom Brazil: Ricardo Semler" by Simon Caulkin.Observer, 17/10/93 page 8
(16) Ricardo Semler: "Why MyFormer Employees Still Work ForMe", HarvardBusiness Review,
[an/Fob 1994, page 64
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
78
(23)
"The Maverick Solution", BBCFor Business video production, 1995
Ibid.
Ibid.
"How the Maverick Boss Keeps Himself on His Toes" by Robert Heeler, Mail on Sunday, 8/1/95
"The Maverick Solution", BBCFor Business video production,1995
Ricardo Semler: "Managing Without Managers", Harvard Business Review, Sep/Oct 1989, page
"The Maverick Solution", BBCFor Business video production, 1995
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(24) Ricardo Sem1er: "Managing Without-Managers", Harvard Business Review, Sep/Oct 1989, page
77
(25) "Has Work Reached The End of Line?" by Victor Keegan, The Guardian, 28/9/93 page 2
(26) "The Maverick Solution", BBCFor Business video production, 1995
(27) " A Welcome Breath ofLaisser Faire", Financial Times, 30/10/96 page 11
(28) Ibid.
(29) [oao Vendramim in an e-mail interviewwith Gary Stockport and Femando Chaddad, 21/9/00
(30) Ibid.
(31) "Sem Week-End", by Cesar Ciobbi, Agencia Estado de 5ao Paulo, 17/06/00
15
Appendix 1:Selected Questions of the Supervisor Evaluation Tool
When an employee makes a small mistake, the subject is:
a. Irritated and unwilling to discuss the mistake
b. Irritated but willing to discuss it
c. Realises the mistake and discusses it in a constructive manner
d. Ignores the mistake and only pays attention to more important matters
The subject reacts to criticism:
a. Poorly, ignoring it
b. Poorly, rejecting it
c. Reasonably well
d. Well, accepting it
The subject is:
a. Constantly tense
b. Usually tense, but relaxed on occasion
c. Usually relaxed, but tense on occasion
d. Constantly relaxed
When the subject's department achieves a high level of productivity, the subject usually:
a. Takes credits for others' success
b. Gives the credit to those who did the work
c. Gives credit to the team as a whole
The subject is:
a. A weak leader, unable to motivate the team
b. A weak leader, but able to motivate the team
c. A strong leader, but unable to motivate the team
d. A strong leader, but able to motivate the team
During a crisis, the subject
a. Disrupts the team's unity
b. Does not affect the team's unity
c. Helps the group stick together
The subject is
a. Not very creative and resists new ideas
b. Too creative and change-oriented, disturbing the atmosphere
c. Adequately creative and change-oriented
16
300-153-1