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Rudolf Bultmann and the Individualised Moment of Redemption

John C. McDowell
Girton College
University of Cambridge
August 1999
[This paper is a brief outline survey of some important aspects of Rudolf Bultma
nns eschatology. It was composed in August 1995, at the end of the first year of
my PhD, and the introduction was modified in 1999.]
Introduction
In the 1999 movie The Matrix Keanu Reeves has to face up to realising that reali
ty is not what it seems. The way things appear, the matrix, is precisely the dream
-world creation of a malicious set of machines feeding off the life-forces of hu
mans originally harnessed and then harvested to provide the energy for the funct
ioning of the automatons.
In one sense, one may be forgiven for envisaging the script writer as a good Car
tesian since precisely Ren Descartes philosophy is founded, in his infamous method
of doubt, on the potential and actual deceptiveness of sensory experience. Perhap
s, he finds irresistible, we may be dreaming, the sleeping lacking insight into
their own dormant condition. Who can tell? In other words, things are not as the
y appear to view. In another sense, however, the apocalyptic backdrop of the mov
ie, that the situation and the subsequent action is introduced as the consequenc
es of nuclear holocaust, the burnt offering (holocaust) by humans of its own rac
e in the name of the gods of mammon and technological progress, is a mood missed
by Descartes overconfident enlightenment humanity (note the reference to light ove
rcoming the darkness implied in the term enlightenment, and in whose presence the
enlightened is enabled to see).
Much of Christian eschatology, particularly that associated with the so-called th
eologians of hope (Jrgen Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg, et al) also operates on th
e assumption that things will not be as they currently appear to be. Gods future
will recreate all things anew, and the light of that eschaton irradiates the dar
knesses of the present for those with eyes to see. Indeed, apocalyptic has made so
mething of a come back (with Pannenberg, for example). What the horizon of Gods abs
olute future for the world teaches is that of itself, and through its own device
s, the world is more likely to drive itself to apocalyptic nightmares, in which
the only visions are those better not seen, than to an evolved telos.
Within the twentieth centurys rediscovery of eschatological themes as central to th
eology the figure of Rudolf Bultmann hovers. Hovers rather than engages with the f
ray since his reflections constitute something of a defiance of the direction th
at eschatology was taking in, firstly, the christomorphic eschatology of Karl Ba
rths and, secondly, the ontological futurism of the theologians of hope. Indeed, Bu
ltmanns own thematics inadvertently nod back towards Descartes not merely in the t
hings are not as they seem scenario common both to Cartesian epistemology and Chr
istian eschatology, but to his infamous shaping of the individualised modern ato
mised self. It is this individualised ego who becomes the eschatological centre
for Bultmannian existentialism, not the thinking self of the Cartesian cogitio b
ut rather the feeling and choosing self of Heideggerian philosophy. This self is
not only the judge of the meaning, but itself is the meaning of eschatological
statements once they have been demythologised (translated into their meaning for mod
ern human eyes).
What is concerning is precisely that this focus not only does an injustice to th
e christological focus of eschatological assertions, something well expressed by
Karl Barth and Karl Rahner among others, but that it undermines the sense of ho
pes ethical praxis and therefore verges on quietism a price that atomisation of t
he self has to pay. Ironically twentieth century theologians have rethought them
es of eschatology and hope since the making famous of Marxs critique that thought
s of heaven (although Bultmanns heaven is a very different, and much more earthly r
ooted, type than the one Marx had his sights set on) distract from the business
of critiquing, challenging and transforming present actual injustices.
Rediscovering Eschatology
To use such generalised language as everyone knows would be rather too easily sett
ing oneself up for a fall. However, in relation to the history of academic escha
tology it would be tempting to adopt some general discourse, for talk of a redisc
overy of eschatology has become almost a clich, as the discussions of the textbook
s makes plain. As Phan, for example, argues
Von Balthasars famous dictum that the eschatological office, which almost shut do
wn in the nineteenth century according to Ernst Troeltsch, has now been working
overtime since the turn of the century, has become the virtually classical descr
iption of the recent developments of eschatology as a theological tract in our t
imes.
Indeed, Schwarz even goes as far as suggest that "Biblical eschatology has domin
ated twentieth century theology more than any other topic".
Credit for this is most appropriately attributed to the work of Johannes Weiss a
nd Albert Schweitzer. Bultmann stands firmly within the main lines of the Weiss-
Schweitzer portrait of biblical eschatology, particularly in accepting in princi
ple their view that Jesus proclaimed the imminent in-breaking of an apocalyptic
kingdom. Indeed, for Bultmann, this is a central category through which to compr
ehend Jesus message. This message is characterised as an eschatological message o
f the two aeons, standing in the historical context of "pessimistic-dualistic" J
ewish expectations about the end of the old aeon and the world and Gods new futur
e, and that an imminent end. Jesus points to the signs of the time and proclaims
that Gods reign is dawning, rather than already here. At the same time, he (his
presence, his deeds, his message) is the sign of the time.
Like Schweitzers infamous treatment of the apparent failure of Jesus eschatologica
l hope, Bultmann thought that Jesus expected the kingdom of God to begin at his
death and went up to Jerusalem to purify the Temple in preparation for it. As th
e bearer of the word, he demands from his audience a decision for or against him
which is simultaneously a decision for or against God and therefore implies a c
hristology.
The problem with this, Bultmann claimed, is that contemporaneity cannot make sen
se of these images and expectations. The kingdom did not interrupt the course of
history, as Jesus had imagined. "Of course, Jesus was mistaken in thinking that
the world was destined to come to an end."
[T]he parousia of Christ never took place as the New Testament expected. History
did not come to an end, and, as every schoolboy knows, it will continue to run
its course.
This delay of the parousia and consequent temporal extension of the interim is k
eenly felt in the New Testament. That impatience exists, that despairing questio
ns are heard, is shown even by the synoptic tradition with its admonitions to wa
tchfulness and its emphasis that the day will come like a thief in the night. Th
e warning that the day will come unexpectedly, like a thief, is also echoed else
where.
It is clear that in many congregations disappointment has arisen. Indeed, II Pet
. 3:1-10 has to defend the expectation of the parousia against serious doubts.
But Bultmann interpreted the significance of Jesus message in a quite different w
ay from Weiss and Schweitzer. They had rediscovered the essential eschatological
import of Jesus message, and had raised an important barrier to the simplistic L
iberal assumption of an ethical teacher by indicating that Jesus was rather an p
reacher of the apocalyptic. Subsequently, they were only able to reject Jesus tea
chings as mere products of their time from which, according to Schweitzer, moder
n humanity could legitimately glean inspiration for ability to renounce the valu
es of the world and for the acceptance of the importance of love. According to W
eiss,
that which is universally valid in Jesus preaching, which should form the kernel
of our systematic theology is not his idea of the kingdom of God, but that of th
e religious and ethical fellowship of the children of God.
In other words, while rejecting the ease with which certain Liberal theologians
created the historical Jesus in their own image, the theological conclusions of
Weiss and Schweitzer were not too dissimilar. These two thinkers, then, did not
belong to their own school of thought, Bowman claims. Similarly, Hebblethwaite d
eclares that
Weiss did not himself know hat to do with his discovery. At the end of his book
he somewhat disarmingly says: The real difference between our modern Protestant w
orld-view and that of primitive Christianity is that we do not hare the eschatol
ogical attitude. We do not await a Kingdom of God which is to come down from hea
ven to earth and abolish this world, but we do hope to be gathered with the chur
ch of Jesus Christ into the heavenly Kingdom.
In one very real sense, then, as has been suggested, Bultmanns approach followed
the basic pattern of this reading of the historical Jesus. Yet, in another sense,
he reinstated the possibility of the contemporary theological usefulness of esch
atological discourse. Bultmann is famous for his comment that modern man (a term h
e intended inclusively) cannot legitimately recconcile possession of the wireless
and the light-bulb with belief in the miracles of New Testament. A similar attitud
e features heavily in his treatment of the New Testaments eschatology.
The Kingdom Come
The eschatology of the bible, especially that of the apocalyptic writings, accor
ding to Bultmann, was thoroughly mythological in form. Parousia, resurrection, t
he end of the world, heaven and hell were all mythological ideas in the sense of
ways representing the eternal and the beyond in vivid this-worldly picture-lang
uage. Consequently, Bultmann draws a sharp contrast between the biblical thought
-world and that of contemporaneity and consequently attempted a hermeneutic of de
mythologisation of the concepts into contemporary thought-forms (for Bultmann, th
is was existentialism). As Travis summarises,
This mythological language should therefore be demythologised, or translated into
language which better expresses the underlying personal meaning of the myth. And B
ultmann insists that demythologizing does not mean simply stripping away the myt
h as though it were irrelevant, but interpreting it.
Now if the biblical myths are to be interpreted, how are they to be interpreted?
What is the underlying truth of the myths which can provide the key to correct
interpretation? Whereas Rahner perceives the hermeneutical criterion to be chris
tological, Bultmanns claim is that they have to be interpreted existentially, i.e
., that the true meaning of the myths lies in their understanding of human exist
ence. "Myth should be interpreted not cosmologically, but anthropologically, or
better still, existentially."
Bultmann therefore asserts that eschatology in the sense of a universal change i
n nature and history must be discarded, because it is part of a past mythical wo
rld-view. The surprising fact, according to Bultmann, is that the mythical world
-view of the New Testament does not lend itself to a strictly cosmological inter
pretation. To obtain its real meaning, it must be interpreted in anthropological
or existential terms. Instead of taking the apocalyptic imagery literally, we s
hould ask for its existential meaning.
Their existential meaning was not some future series of events but rather the ev
er-present possibility of an end to my worldly, inauthentic existence, and a beg
inning to the authentic life of faith. For Bultmann the crucial thing about Jesu
s ministry and proclamation was that it created a crisis demanding a decision.
The future element in the proclamation is not so much temporal as existential; i
t is future in the sense that it is coming towards men and demanding a decision
of them.
In his demythologising programme, then, the kingdom is ever coming and thus ceas
es to be a future event that is and can be hoped for. Since the decision is a co
ntinual decision, the kingdom of God is not an event in time. Thus the kingdom,
emptied of its temporal content, transcends time without ever entering it. In sh
ort, Bultmann sees the kingdom of God primarily in existentialist fashion as the
hour for the individuals decision. Bultmann thus claimed to reach the heart of J
esus message by demythologising it in the categories of Heideggers existentialism.

The Reign of God is a power which wholly determines the present although in itse
lf it is entirely future. It determines the present in that it forces man to dec
ision: he becomes one thing or the other, chosen or rejected, his entire present
experience determined by it. ... The coming of the Kingdom of God is not theref
ore actually an event in the course of time, which will come within time and to
which a man will be able to take up a position, or even hold himself neutral. Ra
ther, before he takes up a position he is already revealed for what he is, and h
e must therefore realize that the necessity for decision is the essential qualit
y of his being. Because Jesus so sees man as standing in this crisis of decision
before the activity of God, it is understandable that in him the Jewish expecta
tion becomes the absolute certainty that now the hour of the breaking-in of the
Reign of God has come. If man stands in the crisis of decision, and if this is t
he essential characteristic of his being as a man, then indeed every hour is the
last hour, and it is understandable that for Jesus the whole contemporary mytho
logy should be pressed into the service of this conception of human existence an
d that in the light of this he should understand and proclaim his hour as the la
st hour.
Accordingly, the de-eschatologised message of John and the later epistles of Paul,
which abandoned emphasis on a temporally future parousia but retained the exist
ential dimension, was the authentic development from Jesus message. Bultmanns view
, therefore, involves a significant element of realised eschatology.
Bultmann, hence does believe the New Testament to lend some kind of weight to th
e type of eschatology he deems significant for contemporaneity. The reason for t
his particularly derives from the notion of the delay of the parousia, a concept
which has given some New Testament critics the basis for assessing the differen
ce in the presentation of eschatology by the Fourth Gospel from that of the Syno
ptics.
Faced with the difficult prospect of perceiving this expectation as meaningless
and erroneous, the early church reinterpreted her founders eschatological message
. The singular character of Jesus was then explicated by the early church when i
t understood "Jesus as the one whom God by the resurrection has made Messiah", a
nd so "awaited him as the coming Son of Man".
Since God raised Jesus from the dead and made him Messiah, exalting him to be
the Son of Man who is to come on the clouds of heaven to hold judgment and to br
ing in salvation of Gods reign ..., the indefinite mythological figure, Messiah,
has become concrete and visible.
Jesus coming, cross and resurrection had the meaning of an eschatological occurre
nce, and therefore the earliest church regarded itself as a community of the end
of days. It is this element of eschatological realisation that Bultmann presses a
s significant for contemporaneity. And yet, in terms of the message and mission
of Jesus, as decipherable from the evidence attributable to the kerygma of the e
arliest believers, the kingdom of God is conceived as a future, eschatological,
supra-historical and supernatural entity, which places the person at the moment
of decision. It is clear, Bultmann maintains, that Jesus and the New Testament w
riters believed in a future eschaton. They thought that the end of history and o
f the world was about to commence. Accordingly, man between the times is, first of
all, man waiting - waiting for the breaking in of the new aeon, for the parousi
a of Christ.
Since the hoped-for parousia did not occur, Christians eventually doubted the im
mediate coming of the end of the world in a more and more distant and unknown fu
ture. In Man Between the Times, Bultmann points to the conviction present in the N
ew Testament writers, and others soon after, that the end of the times has actua
lly come. This move, he says,
has been made in many circles without any discontuinuity or difficulty ..., ther
e is no sign of impatience or disappointment.
Bultmann characterises the early church as an eschatological community. When the
earliest church proclaimed Jesus as the coming Messiah or the Son of Man, it st
ayed within the frame of Jewish eschatological expectations. The earliest commun
ity understood itself to be standing between the times, an interim people, namely ,
at the end of the old aeon and at the beginning of the new one (see 1 Cor. 15:23
-7). The difference between these Christians and the Jewish apocalypticists was
that the former believed that the new aeon is already breaking in and that its p
owers are already at work and could be discerned. So
the Christian community waits for the imminent breaking in of the new aeon with
full certainty, while the Jewish apocalypticist asks complainingly, How long, O L
ord? (IV Ezra 4:33).
Moreover, the Christian community has been, in a certain sense, already freed fr
om the old aeon and belongs to the new one. It understands itself as the communi
ty of the last days, as the true Israel, the elect and saints.
In the New Testament a distinction is already perceivable between the expected e
nd and the goal of history. While in Jewish apocalyptic, history is still interp
reted in the context of eschatology, for Paul history is dissolved into eschatol
ogy. The latter has lost its meaning as the goal of history and is now understoo
d as the goal of the individual human being. What really matters is not world hi
story but the history of the individual and the encounter with Christ, because i
n confrontation with this eschatological event the individual is enabled to exis
t truly historically. Again Bultmann finds support in New Testament writers. Pau
l emphasises that the turn of the aeons has occurred, from the aeon of sin to th
e aeon of freedom from sin in faith, and that in Christ the realisation of the f
uture has become a present possibility. Judgment and resurrection are happening
now, when we die and rise with Christ in our baptism, and the believer who is in
Christ becomes a new creation. Our existence is no longer tied to the past. The
future is open to us in the dialectic of indicative and imperative, an existenc
e according to flesh or according to spirit. Though Paul still describes the esc
hatological judgment in apocalyptic terms as a future event, decisive is what no
w happens to our own existence, hence Bultmann speaks of faith as an eschatologi
cal occurrence for Paul. Neither is it necessary, therefore, for us today to und
erstand the goal of history as some apocalyptic cataclysm. Even Pauls hope that t
he great drama of eschatological events might occur during his lifetime is label
led by Bultmann an unimportant sideline in Pauls actual eschatological outlook.
In his endeavour to demonstrate that New Testament eschatology should be interpr
eted in existential categories, Bultmann refers extensively to the Johannine wri
tings. While Paul is indebted to Jewish apocalyptic terminology, John uses Gnost
ic terms to convey an eschatological gospel. John employs gnostic dualisms betwe
en light and darkness, truth and lie, above and below, and freedom and bondage -
a dualism usually understood cosmologically as denoting certain localities - to c
ommunicate the gospel. Again Bultmann contends that John transposes this cosmolo
gical dualism into "a dualism of decision". Confronted with Jesus, humanity must
decide for light or darkness, for God or against God. Thus Jesus coming is the j
udgment, and our reaction to revelation becomes decisive. Salvation becomes a pr
esent occurrence: whoever accepts Jesus as Gods revelation has eternal life and h
as passed through judgment.
The Gospel of John, in its emphasis on the present as the time of salvation, is
seen by Bultmann as a protest against the traditional, dramatic, and primitive e
schatology. Yet he cannot avoid noting that some passages in John do nevertheles
s point to a future eschaton (Jn 6:44, 54). But Bultmann assumes that a later ed
itor interpolated these references. While the actual existence of such a later c
hurchly editor is not uncontested by other scholars, Bultmann's own hypothesis w
ould attest to the fact that, contrary to his claim, Christian theology cannot e
xist in the long run without a future goal of history. If the original writer of
the Gospel of John indeed omitted the hope for a future fulfilment and completi
on of nature and history, a later generation found it necessary to reintroduce t
he future dimension of history.
Consequently, Bultmann argues that Gods purposes for the future can be spoken of
only with great reserve. Although Jesus himself shared his contemporaries expecta
tion of a great eschatological drama, he refrained from depicting the details of
heaven and hell; he refused to calculate the time of the end. His message "is f
ree from all the learned and fanciful speculation of the apocalyptic writers."
Jesus did not look back as they did upon past periods, casting up calculations w
hen the end is coming; he does not bid men to peer after signs in nature and the
affairs of nations by which they might recognize the nearness of the end. And h
e completely refrains from painting in the details of the judgment, the resurrec
tion, and the glory to come. Everything is swallowed up in the single thought th
at then God will rule; and only a few details of the apocalyptic picture of the
future recur in his words.
Thus Jesus does take over the apocalyptic picture of the future, but he does so
with significant reduction of detail.
Similarly, "the Christian hope knows that it hopes, but it does not know what it
hopes for". In face of death the Christian can hope because he is assured of re
surrection in a specific and desirable form "for all pictures of a glory after d
eath can only be the wishful images of imagination" - but simply because "for hi
m who is open to all that is future as the future of the coming God, death has l
ost its terror". As Travis argues, one of the merits of Bultmanns position is in
reminding one that language about the parousia is not intended merely to satisfy
curiosity about the future, but rather to influence actions and attitudes in th
e present time.
For Bultmann the Christ-event and the preaching of the Christ-event constitute t
he eschatological moment in which, as I hear the Word, my existence is put in qu
estion. Bultmann asserts that "we are confronted with the eschaton in the Now of
encounter". Two quotations serve to illustrate this interpretation:
Where this Word resounds, the end of the world becomes present to the hearer, in
that it confronts him with the decision whether he will belong to the old or to
the new world.
Every instant has the possibility of being an eschatological instant and in Chri
stian faith this possibility is realised.
Not an Eschatology of the Community
It has frequently been complained that Bultmanns analysis of faith and the existe
ntial decision leads him into the murky waters of an individualism whose ethic p
ermits little or no room for social behaviour, critique or transformation and ro
om for ecclesiology.
Bultmann interpreted Jesus as not advocating a theory of social or individual et
hics. Rather, he taught that one should obey God and love ones neighbour. But Bul
tmann went further and maintained that Jesus saw humanity as insecure before tha
t which confronted him in each new moment. It is true that Jesus had no set of r
ules, but Bultmann contends that belief in God is stifled by living together wit
h other persons, and such living together presents a danger
of losing its real character as a community of free and isolated persons, and of
deteriorating into a clamour of voices weakening us and deceiving us about our
solitariness.
Bultmann continued to show how individual humanity could lose its individualisti
c existence in the community. This excessive stress on the individual's existenc
e does less than justice to the New Testament idea of loving the neighbour. An i
solated self is not necessarily spared the arrogance and false security which be
fall those who get lost in the community. It is quite difficult to see how one c
an make responsible decisions in loving the neighbour and at the same time remai
n an isolated self.
The exaggerated individualism of Bultmann neglects the doctrine of the church. M
acquarrie noted with amazement that Bultmann's Theology of the New Testament dis
cusses nearly 150 Greek terms but omits the word koinonia. Of course, Bultmann d
oes not completely ignore the church. He is a churchman and has contributed sign
ificantly to the church of his day. He interpreted Pauls view of the church as a
community of the faithful called of God and constituted by the Word. Paul saw th
e church as a continuation of the Christ event, the body of Christ. It is a comm
unity, but in essence is invisible, an eschatological community whose members ha
ve already been taken out of the world.
This minimal emphasis on the doctrine of the church is rather astonishing. The p
roclamation of the kerygma is very important to Bultmann; only the church makes
this proclamation. In the New Testament, faith comes about by hearing the procla
imed Word and results in an involvement with other believers. The New Testament
believers shared their lives, dangers, hopes, and even their property. This witn
essing community is always a part of the proclaiming event. Does not this witnes
s contribute materially to the credibility of the assertions and challenge of th
e gospel? Does not such witness have a bearing on the individuals pre-understandi
ng and self-understanding? Today, when a person hears this gospel proclaimed cal
ling him to faith, does he hear it as an isolated individual or one in the conte
xt of a community of faith which helps him understand the choice before him?
Faith, for Bultmann, is that moment of self-understanding and of understanding t
he world, and of eschatological occurrence which makes the authentic life one of
hope and joy. The new self-understanding of faith is a radically personal trans
formation. The individual is changed from a self-centred, isolated slave to the
world into a new person with a new understanding of God, world and self. Therefo
re, there is the potential in Bultmanns understanding of faith and transformed un
derstanding and obedience to open his theology outwards towards the other. Authentic
ity is that of personal commitment and obedience of the individual to God. And s
urely part of this commitment is to love others as expressed in the life of Jesu
s, and also that commitment is born and developed in correspondence with the fai
th of the community? Bultmann, in citing Paul, argues that humanity seeks the go
od of the neighbour in her faith active in love (Gal. 5:6), deciding in the inte
rests of other people and even becoming a slave in order to help them (1 Cor. 9:
19). So Bultmann argues that
True human community grows out of a deeper ground than the ordinances of justice
- namely, out of man's willing obedience to the demand of God.
Moreover, Bultmann argues that faith brings freedom from the world in the sense
that instead of living in the false security of the world, humanity in its radic
al surrender to God is open for what God demands. Hence there is a critical note
in Bultmanns theology as to theologys relation to the world.
However, Bultmann fails to emphasise and develop these themes, as well as that o
f the developing history of the individual. Certainly he does recognise that fai
th is not a static possession, received once and enjoyed forever more, but due t
o its personal and relational nature it is an act, and a miraculous one at that,
and an ongoing participation as a gift from God. It is a recurring event rather
than an intrinsic quality of being.
Nevertheless, "[s]ubjectivity is clearly the nature of faith to Bultmann." He "t
ends to regard the human self independently of social, economic and political fo
rces." Firstly, Bultmanns stress is in the individual, and his/her encounter with
God. So when discussing sin Bultmann stress sin as unbelief, the selfs surrender t
o the world, slavery and death, and does little to explicate the either the inst
itutionalising of sin in the structures of society or its societal consequences
in its effects. He moves some ways towards this when he discusses sin as self-su
rrender to the world. Therefore, Fergusson argues that Bultmann's "conception of
what it is to be human is too restrictive; a more relational understanding of h
uman existence is called for."
Consequently, Bultmann's theology is also characterised by generalisations in hi
s discussion of the individual. Despite his best intentions, the initial setting
of Bultmanns theology has abstracted from the reality of the human situation. Th
e contextual and relational nature of all human existence is lost sight of in th
e encounter with the Word of God. As a result, the physical and social dimension
of life is always likely to appear as something of second-order importance from
a theological perspective. Even worse, it may result in a concealed quietism wh
ich tacitly accepts the status quo. The insistence on the centrality of a divine
-human encounter which prescinds from every political context may reinforce the
legitimacy of those circumstances in which that encounter takes place. Recent li
beration theologies have effectively analysed the concealed political assumption
s that govern the form and content of all theology, and it is difficult to avoid
the conclusion that Bultmann was insufficiently critical of the assumptions tha
t underlay his own hermeneutic.
So also Bultmanns concept of faith as leap which has no objectively informational
content is perilously close to fideism and obscurantism. Certainly Bultmann is
conscious of not wanting to drive God into the nether regions of the individuals ps
ychology, for he does not deny the objectifying of God. What he wants to do is to
re-emphasise the personal and transformatory personal encounter with God in fait
h. God is not an empirical datum which may be discussed from some external vanta
ge point, but an extremely personal reality known only in encounter and the cris
is of decision for him. But, as Fergusson argues, it could be pressed that Bultm
anns disjoining of faith and objectivity results in a false antithesis.
Could it not be the case that whole the validity of the Christian world-view can
only be perceived in faith, nonetheless, the believer is committed to formulati
ng such a world-view in order to understand and express faith?
Bultmann, Fergusson further argues, is in danger of reducing faith to human self
-description. So some of Bultmanns closest followers remain uneasy with his asser
tion that the account of the historical life of Jesus is largely irrelevant to t
he Christian proclamation.
Secondly, it is here that Moltmanns critique of the immediacy of revelation in Bu
ltmanns scheme is well justified. For Bultmann, revelation is Gods self-disclosure
. In true dialectical fashion, Bultmann never tires of pointing out that revelat
ion does not consist of propositional truth about God, but is God's disclosure o
f himself. Revelation is personal address. Revelation is that event in which I a
m called into question and changed in my innermost being. However, Bultmanns actu
alism has been called into question by Bonhoeffer.
Thirdly, although Bultmann speaks in Pauline fashion of being-in-the-world but not
being-of-the-world, he understands this as detachment from the world.
Hebblethwaite declares that
We may be pardoned for thinking that for Bultmann, the word eschatological has com
e to mean nothing more than existential, at least where my existence is thought of
as determined here and now by the Word of God.
And it seems as if too has transferred the reference point of eschatological lan
guage entirely from the future to the present. "I do not see why it is necessary
to think of a temporal end of time". He even takes the notion of living between
the times to refer not to chronological time but to the believers constant opennes
s to the future. This means of course that the future does not disappear entirel
y from Bultmanns theology; for the authentic life of faith, made possible by this
Word, is a matter of facing the future with confidence and faith. The man of fa
ith is unafraid of the future, including death. He cannot picture a future beyon
d death, but his trust in Gods word has the character of unshakeable hope even in
face of death.
Many criticisms have been made of Bultmanns existentialist interpretation. It has
been accused of excessive individualism, of having nothing to say about Gods pur
pose in creation and providence, of failing to do justice to Christian hope for
the future realisation of the kingdom of God, whether on earth or in heaven. A C
hristianity pared down to the moment of the Word of God and the faith of the ind
ividual, however religiously powerful its existential force, is an impoverished
Christianity. Moreover, as Moltmann argues, if in the moment of revelation one a
lready comes to himself in that authenticity which is at once both original and fi
nal, then
faith itself would be the practical end of history and the believer himself woul
d himself already be perfected. There would be nothing more that still awaits hi
m, and nothing more towards which he is on his way in the world in the body and
in history. Gods futurity would be constant and mans openness in his wayfaring would l
ewise be constant and never-ending.
Hence Moltmann characterises Bultmann's eschatology as "a new form of the epiphan
y of the eternal present".
Bultmanns eschatology of the moment of existential faith not only neglects the te
mporality and historicity of successiveness of existence, but it also packages e
xistence too neatly. Bultmann stresses the move from inauthenticity to authentic
ity in the moment of decision, but in so doing negates any possible tragic persp
ective. As Ashcroft points out,
Countless millions in every age, including the New Testament age, are exploited,
enslaved, robbed, and killed in wars and by diseases. Many of them were denied
the choice for authentic existence, or scarcely got the chance to exist at all.
The problem and significance of this is conspicous by its absence in Bultmann. W
hat hope is there for them? Ashcroft continues,
Bultmann's silence on this subject is consistent with his method [the subjectivi
ty of faith]. But, the silence raises a question about his method.
Yet Bultmann does pose a very serious question: how can we still accept a future
eschaton entailing God's provision of a new world and a total transformation of
the present, without asserting at the same time that this is to be accomplished
by us? Schwarz consequently argues that "We seem to know the laws of this world
too well to be open to such a surprise."
Bibliography
Ashcroft, Morris, Rudolf Bultmann (Waco, Texas: Word, 1972).
Bultmann, Rudolf, Existence and Faith. Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann, tran
s. Schubert
Ogden (London, 1961).
History and Eschatology. The Gifford Lectures 1955 (Edinburgh: The University Pr
ess,
1957).
Jesus and the Word, trans. Louise Pettibone Smith and Erminie Huntress Lantero
(London: Collins, 1958).
New Testament and Mythology, in Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate, ed. Hans
W. Bartsch, trans. R.H. Fuller, 2 vols. (London: SPCK, 1953-62).
Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting, trans. R.H. Fuller (London:
Collins,
1956).
Theology of the New Testament Volume 1, trans. Kendrick Grobel (London: SCM Pres
s,
1952).
Fergusson, David, Bultmann, Outstanding Christian Thinkers Series (London: Geoff
rey Chapman,
1992).
Hebblethwaite, Brian, The Christian Hope (Basingstoke: Marshall, Morgan and Scot
t, 1984).
Macquarrie, John, An Existentialist Theology (New York and Evanston: Harper and
Row, 1955).
Rahner, Karl, Foundations of Christian Faith. An Introduction to the Idea of Chr
istianity, trans.
William V. Dych (London: Darton Longman & Todd, 1978).
Theological Investigations, 23 volumes (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1961-1
992).
Travis, Stephen H., Christian Hope and the Future of Man (Leicester: IVP, 1980).

John C. McDowell
Girton College
University of Cambridge

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