Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J .:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision
1
dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals
2
affirming the decision
3
dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch
72, declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between herein respondent Lolita M.
Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in
Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and
stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal
Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to
assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One
month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio
stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in
1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to
see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his given
address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect
service of summons by publication. The trial court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August
1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of
general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file a
responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion dated
November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the
motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion
existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to
intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial
court granted respondents motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how
Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her
testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-
Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to make
proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the
Court.
SO ORDERED.
4

In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios psychological incapacity, the trial
court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations
as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible
and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of
the Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child
which characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be traced to
respondents mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life.
5

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the
dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on
the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal.
The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
6

The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after the
celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take
steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two months, he never sent any support to nor
communicated with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines but he
did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to
no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court
rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and
creation of a family as a social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to suffer
in a marriage where the other spouse is not around and worse, left them without even
helping them cope up with family life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as
required under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?
7

The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Molina
8
and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.
9
In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos
while this case involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the psychological
incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite respondents failure
to comply with the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.
10

According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did
not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple
inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent
failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance
with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the
courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
11
Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
12

Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233
SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.
13
(emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos:
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability."
14
The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically
identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to.
15

We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshios psychological
incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He
abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but
he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness.
After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented
showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no
need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondents case had she
presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done
through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation.
16
There was no showing
that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We
cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family
immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove
that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he
must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological,not physical, illness.
17
There
was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
18

According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because
the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree.
In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino
spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to
determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in
general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,
19
this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the
State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to
her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997 of
the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
*
Acting Chief Justice
1
Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, and concurred in by Associate Justices Cancio
C. Garcia and Hilarion Aquino; Rollo, pp. 24-31.
2
Second Division.
3
Penned by Judge Rogelio Angeles; Rollo, pp. 32-33.
4
Rollo, p. 33.
5
Rollo, p. 52.
6
Rollo, p. 30.
7
Rollo, p. 29.
8
268 SCRA 198 [1997].
9
240 SCRA 20 [1995].
10
Rollo, p. 14.
11
Article II, Section 12; and, Article XV, Sections 1 & 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
12
Republic of the Philippines vs. Dagdag, 351 SCRA 425 [2001] citing Republic of the
Philippines vs. Hernandez, 320 SCRA 76 [1999].
13
Supra, Note 8, pp. 209-212.
14
Supra, Note 9, p. 33.
15
Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755, 764 [2000].
16
Article 55 (10) of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
x x x x x x x x x
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for
more than one year.
17
Supra Note 8, p. 210.
18
Ibid., pp. 211-212.
19
356 SCRA 588, 594 [2001].

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

VITUG, J .:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family
Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"),
brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the
decisions of the court a quo
1
and the Court of Appeal,
2
Leouel persists in beseeching its
application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army,
first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20
September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of
Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's
parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby
boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound
to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young
spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other
things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or
whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's
pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up
Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the
expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United
States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in
touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros
Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code"
(docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and
denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible
and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out
by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by
the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit
evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
3

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.
4

The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which
requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him,
for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated
to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A
wife who does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of
five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the
sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however,
provide an insight on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature
of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes
suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa
preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes
proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in
the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage
voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious
than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and
void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7)
be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the
mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack
of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental
incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or
nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance
of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while
subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital
obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be
deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain
the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence.
Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically
impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is
called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the
Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which
describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa
added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there
are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they
should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab
initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and
there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or
incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not
apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological
or mentally incapacitated" in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one
does not know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these
completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground
for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood
the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for
invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of
marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of
defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in
consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage
because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is
curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental
faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not
consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really
removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately,
consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not principally
a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping
together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to
marriage, which are completely different from each other, because they require a
different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is
different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of
vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is
incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no
prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is
always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it should
be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is
instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been
psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true
that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In
response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation
should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree.
Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this
matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a
defect in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and
therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity,
there are also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the
consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground
of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time
when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage.
5

xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the
grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the
impotence that in some instances the impotence is only temporary and only with
respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is
incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different
meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can
also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity"
is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show
that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically
incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with the essential marital
obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in
divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages,
it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the
idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which
incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the
marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured.
Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow
him to remarry.
6

xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the
beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other
hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes
manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the
manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in
other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which
are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that
mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity
is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their
February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase
"psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law
would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to
distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers
to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not
to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of
debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a special
case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of
marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with
Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in
Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that
marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of psychological
incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied
negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or
prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the
problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law.
On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the
avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee
approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio
were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within
which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The
Committee approved the suggestion.
7

It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the
provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some
resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee,
has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13
June 1994); thus:
8

The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that
the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,
9
which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila
matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or
secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment,
nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the
interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties,
10
giving an account on how the third paragraph of
Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator
intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage
because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975,
canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . .
. (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982,
canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term
anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the
conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological
disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since
psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier
Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of
personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal
terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is
due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a
binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability
to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal
act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be
overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon
contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving
what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the
marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only
that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in
fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by
these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy
11
cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of
the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable
or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases
of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in
the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does
not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with
the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being
of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may
have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every
case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that
innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the
Family Code, is that
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life.
It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation,
except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage
and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved,
even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always
provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.



Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J ., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But,
after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the
majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner
and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated
to comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her
husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not
deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision in
definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a
marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for
nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate
opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by
couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough
safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the intervention by the State, through the
public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her
husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she
never did and neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein
petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he
exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of
Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia
indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it
is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in
marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable
contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There
may also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live
separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for
each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with
the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no
intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts
eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has
she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of
psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations, although these indications
were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive
interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for
purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not,
in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one
forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of
illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship
and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but
I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one
like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by
reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel
Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the
Family Code.
ROMERO, J ., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared
a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter
1
dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the
Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro
traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a
chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil
Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact,
some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the
spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of
marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of
separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation,
and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute
divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but
called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to
discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law
Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New
Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of
marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social
institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also realizing the
strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the
Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of
our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea
of absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity
of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such
an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve
the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized
by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a
draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to
avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil
Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as
a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate
the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The
result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of
void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment
to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically
or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or
pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage
void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may
already dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on
declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute
divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of
the Ateneo University as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the
Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II,
the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of
"lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds
for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because
of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a
woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children.
Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work
that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic
personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee
referred to above intended to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as
grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of
the provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every petition for declaration of
nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and
an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that
the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle ofejusdem
generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be
manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to
abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed."
2
Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on a
case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon Law."
3

The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family
4
will remain the lodestar which our society will
hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of
the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of
the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to
find a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to
render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the
lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the Bench have implemented the
provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the other.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J ., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But,
after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the
majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner
and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated
to comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her
husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not
deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision in
definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a
marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for
nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate
opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by
couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough
safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the intervention by the State, through the
public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her
husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she
never did and neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein
petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he
exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of
Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia
indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it
is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in
marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable
contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There
may also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live
separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for
each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with
the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no
intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts
eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has
she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of
psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations, although these indications
were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive
interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for
purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not,
in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one
forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of
illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship
and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but
I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one
like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by
reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel
Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the
Family Code.
ROMERO, J ., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared
a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter
1
dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the
Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro
traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a
chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil
Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact,
some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the
spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of
marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of
separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation,
and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute
divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but
called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to
discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law
Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New
Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of
marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social
institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also realizing the
strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the
Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of
our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea
of absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity
of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such
an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve
the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized
by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a
draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to
avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil
Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as
a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate
the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The
result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of
void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment
to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically
or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or
pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage
void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may
already dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on
declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute
divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of
the Ateneo University as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the
Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II,
the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of
"lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds
for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because
of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a
woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children.
Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work
that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic
personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee
referred to above intended to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as
grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of
the provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every petition for declaration of
nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and
an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that
the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle ofejusdem
generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be
manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to
abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed."
2
Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on a
case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon Law."
3

The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family
4
will remain the lodestar which our society will
hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an abandonment of
the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some marriages, by reason of
the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus, the parties are constrained to
find a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to
render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the
lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the Bench have implemented the
provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the other.
Footnotes
1 Per Judge Enrique Garovillo.
2 Penned by Justice Jainal Rasul, concurred in by Justice Pedro Ramirez and
Ramon Mabutas, Jr.
3 Rollo, 37-42.
4 Rollo, 13-18.
5 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, July 26, 1986.
6 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, August 2, 1986.
7 Deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, August 9, 1986.
8 In her "Handbook on the Family Code."
9 Marriage in Canon Law, Delaware: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1986, 129-130.
C 1095 Sunt incapaces matrimonii contrahendi:
1. qui sufficiente rationis usu carent;
2. qui laborant gravi defectu discretionis iudicii circa iura et official matrimonialia
essentialia mutuo tradenda et acceptanda;
3. qui ob causas naturae psychicae obligationes matrimonii essentiales assumere
non valent.
10 Ibid., 131-132.
11 Handbook on the Family Code, First Edition, 1988.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
1 Written pursuant to the request of Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-Teodoro
during the March 23, 1985 joint meeting of the Family Law and Civil Code Revision
Committee at the UP Law Center for comments on P.B. 3149 (Pacificador Bill) on
Divorce, P.B. No. 1986 (Monfort and Collantes Bill) on Recognition of Church
Annulments of Marriages, P.B. No. 2347 (Sitoy Bill) on Additional Grounds for
Annulment of Marriage and Legal Separation and P.B. 1350 (Kalaw Bill) on Equal
Rights of Filipino Women which were pending before her Sub-Committee.
2 FAMILY CODE, Art. 48.
3 J.A. v. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, 37 (1988).
4 As quoted in the majority opinion.











Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996
EMILIO R. TUASON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA VICTORIA L. TUASON, respondents.

PUNO, J .:p
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated July 29, 1994 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 denying petitioner's appeal from an order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati in Civil Case No. 3769.
This case arose from the following facts:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
149, Makati a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio R.
Tuason. In her complaint, private respondent alleged that she and petitioner were married on June
3, 1972 and from this union, begot two children; that at the time of the marriage, petitioner was
already psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations which became
manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights between husband and wife; that in one of their
fights, petitioner inflicted physical injuries on private respondent which impelled her to file a criminal
case for physical injuries against him; that petitioner used prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the
authorities and sentenced to a one-year suspended penalty and has not been rehabilitated; that
petitioner was a womanizer, and in 1984, he left the conjugal home and cohabited with three women
in succession, one of whom he presented to the public as his wife; that after he left the conjugal
dwelling, petitioner gave minimal support to the family and even refused to pay for the tuition fees of
their children compelling private respondent to accept donations and dole-outs from her family and
friends; that petitioner likewise became a spendthrift and abused his administration of the conjugal
partnership by alienating some of their assets and incurring large obligations with banks, credit card
companies and other financial institutions, without private respondent's consent; that attempts at
reconciliation were made but they all failed because of petitioner's refusal to reform. In addition to
her prayer for annulment of marriage, private respondent prayed for powers of administration to save
the conjugal properties from further dissipation.
1

Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. As affirmative defense, he claimed that he
and private respondent were a normal married couple during the first ten years of their marriage and
actually begot two children during this period; that it was only in 1982 that they began to have
serious personal differences when his wife did not accord the respect and dignity due him as a
husband but treated him like a persona non grata; that due to the "extreme animosities " between
them, he temporarily left the conjugal home for a "cooling-off period" in 1984; that it is private
respondent who had been taking prohibited drugs and had a serious affair with another man; that
petitioner's work as owner and operator of a radio and television station exposed him to malicious
gossip linking him to various women in media and the entertainment world; and that since 1984, he
experienced financial reverses in his business and was compelled, with the knowledge of his wife, to
dispose of some of the conjugal shares in exclusive golf and country clubs. Petitioner petitioned the
court to allow him to return to the conjugal home and continue his administration of the conjugal
partnership.
After the issues were joined, trial commenced on March 30, 1990. Private respondent presented four
witnesses, namely, herself; Dr. Samuel Wiley, a Canon Law expert and marriage counselor of both
private respondent and petitioner; Ms. Adelita Prieto, a close friend of the spouses, and Atty. Jose F.
Racela IV, private respondent's counsel. Private respondent likewise submitted documentary
evidence consisting of newspaper articles of her husband's relationship with other women, his
apprehension by the authorities for illegal possession of drugs; and copies of a prior a church
annulment decree.
2
The parties' marriage was clerically annulled by the Tribunal Metropolitanum
Matrimonial which was affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal in 1986.
3

During presentation of private respondent's evidence, petitioner, on April 18, 1990, filed his
Opposition to private respondent's petition for appointment as administratrix of the conjugal
partnership of gains.
After private respondent rested her case, the trial court scheduled the reception of petitioner's
evidence on May 11, 1990.
On May 8, 1990, two days before the scheduled hearing , a counsel for petitioner moved for a
postponement on the ground that the principal counsel was out of the country and due to return on
the first week of June.
4
The court granted the motion and reset the hearing to June 8, 1990.
5

On June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion of private respondent, the court
declared petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case submitted for
decision on the basis of the evidence presented.
On June 29, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of private respondent's
marriage to petitioner and awarding custody of the children to private respondent. The court ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage contracted by Ma. Victoria L.
Tuason and Emilio R. Tuason on June 3, 1972 is declared null and void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the defendant under Sec. 36 of
the Family Code. Let herein judgment of annulment be recorded in the registry of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila where the marriage was contracted and in the registry of
Makati, Metro Manila where the marriage is annulled.
The custody of the two (2) legitimate children of the plaintiff and the defendant is
hereby awarded to the plaintiff.
The foregoing judgment is without prejudice to the application of the other effects of
annulment as provided for under Arts . 50 and 51 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
6

Counsel for petitioner received a copy of this decision on August 24, 1990. No appeal was taken
from the decision.
On September 24, 1990, private respondent filed a "Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of
Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties."
7
Petitioner opposed the motion on
October 17, 1990.
8

Also on the same day, October 17, 1990, petitioner, through new counsel, filed with the trial court a
petition for relief from judgment of the June 29, 1990 decision.
The trial court denied the petition on August 8, 1991.
9

Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals the order of the trial court denying his petition for
relief from judgment. On July 29, 1994, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
order of the trial court.
10

Hence this petition.
The threshold issue is whether a petition for relief from judgment is warranted under the
circumstances of the case.
We rule in the negative.
A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides:
Sec. 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other proceeding
thereof. When a judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken,
against a party in a Court of First Instance through fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the same cause
praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
Under the rules, a final and executory judgment or order of the Regional Trial Court may be set
aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In addition, the petitioner
must assert facts showing that he has a good, substantial and meritorious defense or cause of
action.
11
If the petition is granted, the court shall proceed to hear and determine the case as if a timely
motion for new trial had been granted therein.
12

In the case at bar, the decision annulling petitioner's marriage to private respondent had already
become final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal during the reglementary period.
Petitioner however claims that the decision of the trial court was null and void for violation of his right
to due process. He contends he was denied due process when, after failing to appear on two
scheduled hearings, the trial court deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and
rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence for private respondent. Petitioner justifies his
absence at the hearings on the ground that he was then "confined for medical and/or rehabilitation
reason."
13
In his affidavit of merit before the trial court, he attached a certification by Lt. Col. Plaridel F.
Vidal, Director of the Narcotics Command, Drug Rehabilitation Center which states that on March 27,
1990 petitioner was admitted for treatment of drug dependency at the Drug Rehabilitation Center at Camp
Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National
Police.
14
The records, however, show that the former counsel of petitioner did not inform the trial court of
this confinement. And when the court rendered its decision, the same counsel was out of the country for
which reason the decision became final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom.
15

The failure of petitioner's counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to
appeal therefrom is negligence which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding
upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in
the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its
face.
16

Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former counsel to inform the trial court of petitioner's
confinement and medical treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the scheduled hearings.
Petitioner has not given any reason why his former counsel, intentionally or unintentionally, did not
inform the court of this fact. This led the trial court to order the case deemed submitted for decision
on the basis of the evidence presented by the private respondent alone. To compound the
negligence of petitioner's counsel, the order of the trial court was never assailed via a motion for
reconsideration.
Clearly, petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived of due process. He may have lost his right
to present evidence but he was not denied his day in court. As the record show, petitioner, through
counsel, actively participated in the proceedings below. He filed his answer to the petition, cross-
examined private respondent's witnesses and even submitted his opposition to private respondent's
motion for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains.
1
7
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exception cases where
there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available or
adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion
for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the
trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing
such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition.
18
Indeed, relief will not be
granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at
law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to
appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.
19

Petitioner also insists that he has a valid and meritorious defense. He cites the Family Code which
provides that in actions for annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting officer should
intervene for the state because the law "looks with disfavor upon the haphazard declaration of
annulment of marriages by default." He contends that when he failed to appear at the scheduled
hearings, the trial court should have ordered the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and
inquire as to the reason for his non-appearance.
20

Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code read as follows:
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecution attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based
upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
21

A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of
collusion.
22
Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the state for the purpose of preventing any
collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the
defendant spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead,
should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties.
23
The
prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the
presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.
24
Our
Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution.
25
Our
family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the
state is vitally interested. The state can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families.
The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the
concern alone of the family members.
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the Family
Code. For one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner
filed his answer to the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by private respondent.
He actively participated in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings and cross-examining
the witnesses of private respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was
characterized by a no-holds barred contest and not by collusion.
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation
proceedings is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment
proceedings negates the conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no
allegation by the petitioner that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under
these circumstances, we are convinced that the non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure
lack of collusion between the contending parties is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the
trial court.
Petitioner also refutes the testimonies of private respondent's witnesses, particularly Dr. Samuel
Wiley and Ms. Adelita Prieto, as biased, incredible and hearsay. Petitioner alleges that if he were
able to present his evidence, he could have testified that he was not psychologically incapacitated at
the time of the marriage as indicated by the fact that during their first ten years, he and private
respondent lived together with their children as one normal and happy family, that he continued
supporting his family even after he left the conjugal dwelling and that his work as owner and operator
of a radio and television corporation places him in the public eye and makes him a good subject for
malicious gossip linking him with various women. These facts, according to petitioner, should
disprove the ground for annulment of his marriage to petitioner.
Suffice it to state that the finding of the trial court as to the existence or non-existence of petitioner's
psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding on us.
26
Petitioner has not
sufficiently shown that the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private
respondent's witnesses vis-a-vis petitioner's defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous.
2
7
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision dated July 29, 1994 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 is affirmed.
Regalado, Romero and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1 Amended Complaint, Records, pp. 22-30.
2 Records, pp. 96-118.
3 Exhibits "O," and "P;" Records, pp. 113-118.
4 Records, pp. 126-127.
5 Id., p. 128.
6 Id., pp. 132-133.
7 Id., pp. 136-139.
8 Id., pp. 143-145. Despite petitioner's opposition, the court, on September 9, 1991, granted
said motion and declared the establishment between husband and wife of the regime of
complete separation of property and adjudicated to private respondent the conjugal home
and lot on which the conjugal home stands.
9 Id., pp. 215-216.
10 CA-G.R. CV No. 37925, Rollo, pp. 33-40.
11 Mateo v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 280 [1991]; Torno v. Court of Appeals, 166 SCRA
742 [1988].
12 Revised Rules of Court, Rule 39, Section 7.
13 Petitioner's Reply to Comment, p. 3; Rollo, p.110.
14 Records, pp. 151-152.
15 Petitioner's Reply to Comment, p. 3; Rollo, p. 110.
16 Palanca v. American Food Mfg. Co., 24 SCRA 819 [1968]; Duran v. Pagarigan, 106 Phil.
907 [1960].
17 Court of Appeals Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 38.
18 Somoso v. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 654, 660 [1989]; Ibabao v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 76 [1987]; Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation v. Lood, 110
SCRA 205 [1981].
19 Ibabao v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra., at 86; Manila Electric Co. v. Court of
Appeals, 187 SCRA 201 [1990].
20 Petition, p. 4; Rollo, p. 15.
21 Taken from Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which were also taken
from Article 85 of the Old Civil Code.
22 Dean Francisco Capistrano, member of the Civil Code Commission, cited in I Francisco,
Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines 1026 [1973].
23 Rule 18, Section 6 provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. If the
defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between
the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it
that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
24 San Gabriel v. San Gabriel, (CA) 56 O.G. 3555, Nov. 27, 1959.
25 Sec. 12, Article II.
26 cf. Periquet, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 238 SCRA 697, 710 [1994].
27 Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Aruego, 102 SCRA 530 [1981]; Bank of the Philippine
Islands v. de Coster, 47 Phil. 594 [1925].













Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J .:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled
waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of
the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to
respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision
November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated
February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of
Appeals
1
its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . .
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they
went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their
married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were
supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant
just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There
was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on
the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during
their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with
her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to
join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no
sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk
during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept
together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989.
But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he
claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio
Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin,
while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which
was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked
by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show
his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant
married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country
and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by
reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several
reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is
physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and
if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that,
according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this
will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the
intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on
March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his
wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only
once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case
against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of
jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their
marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young
and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr.
Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof,
Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no
evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has
an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5)
centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr.
Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is
capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties
and that the evidence is not fabricated."
2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into
by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the
Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera.
Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between
the parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is
a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have
sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court
without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the
burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to
prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's
conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial
court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the
trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to
prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and
was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party,
she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be
came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May
22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil
Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such
annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled.
This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and
his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been
only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice
Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation
of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to
discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary
and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations
with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering
from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this
Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).
4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding
about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal
which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have been other
reasons, i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, why private
respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a
short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who
between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated,
the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is
suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with
private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but
physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or
asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to
find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his
doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of
erection.
5
Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder
on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.
6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not
want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically
impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988
to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for
her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she
balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330).
Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant
did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was
instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her
husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to
believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony
against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital
status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the
unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological
incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months
of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual
act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation,
and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge
the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.
7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an
island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift
and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation
and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is a
shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a
long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped
in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Thirteenth Division: Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, J., ponente, Eduardo G. Montenegro
and Antonio P. Solano, JJ., concurring.
2 Rollo, pp. 20-24.
3 Ibid.
4 Rollo, p. 34.
5 Exhs. "2", "2-B" and "2-C".
6 Psychological Incapacity, G.T. Veloso, p. 20, cited in The Family Code of the
Philippines Annotated, Pineda, 1989 ed., p. 51.
7 Decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 30-31.




















epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J .:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various
petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted
the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals,
still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific
cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless
expressive of his frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the
world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down
specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993
Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals
2
in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991
decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,
3
Benguet, which declared the marriage of
respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O.
Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at
the San Agustin Church
4
in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father
since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his
money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his
wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in
February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the
sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a
result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job
in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that
he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly
immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served;
and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in
order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no
longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and
frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her
group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital
duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their
finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church
of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was
born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker,
and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical
Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of
petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision.
Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of
the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding
that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in
the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied
5
heavily on the trial
court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and
conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee
(hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on
personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a
broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse
indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long
haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason
to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply
the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in
their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital
responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals
6
this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled
that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . .
and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr.
Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila,
7
Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
"irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get
along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its
juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no
incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr.
Sison testified:
8

COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based
on your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the
marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are
psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically
fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were
constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While
some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of
"thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and
intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent
psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults
and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this
case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family
Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the
Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,
9
Vicar
J udicial (Presiding J udge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno,
10
a member of the Family Code Revision
Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative
and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed
up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family,
11
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code
12
echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
thepermanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
13
nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may
be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature.
14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other
shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition.
Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J ., Davide, J r., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, J r., and Torres, J r.,
J J ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, J J ., concurs in the result.



Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J ., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of
the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a
given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of
the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and J ulia Rosario-
Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still
maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the
duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do
not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the
field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that
no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
actual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J ., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional
Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and
conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not
simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but
a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such
marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not
constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapableof doing so, due to some psychological (not physical)
illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were
due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect
of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was
to excludemental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly
on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent
revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack
of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following
revised provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to
"wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or
marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to
"defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it
should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it
is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are
sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."
1

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in
a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence,"
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase" and
is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the
question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be
more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological
incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and
Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the
afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as
contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and
special situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally
enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some
marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the
drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and
practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting
marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of
the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages
with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate
state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a
marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first
place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed
and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the
formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a
formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the
marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds
for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the
former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo
freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to
contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some
persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil
Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Code and classified the same as a ground for declaring
marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide
directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable according to
law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not
ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear
category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be
valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment,
called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means
that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the weddingand
therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable
of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader
approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota
had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the
time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems
shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once
the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way
was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious
psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an
inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert
became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before
and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give
professional opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were
rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to
provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital
causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to
valid matrimonial consent.
2

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not
only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse
or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For
marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the
right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development
of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each
other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented'
since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must
have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a
physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the
obligations of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held
to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference
to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
3

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment:
(1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness
to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial
responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of
marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that
might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion
even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors
possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the
following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has
no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts
whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation
that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily
into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift
in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to
exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be concentratingon the parties' to assume or carry out
their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An
advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that the at the
time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family
almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as promised at the
time the marriage was entered into.
4

In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not
considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of
Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from
the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof of her
psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity.
5
Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable
and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,
6
this Court upheld both the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological
incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping
with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the
physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and
stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation
is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the
marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological
incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or
her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal.Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no
less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting
absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or
both of the spouses.

VITUG, J ., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in
his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and
the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code
of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified
by the Family Code. Thus
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center,
which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision was taken from Canon Law.
1

Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage;
(those)
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the
interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment.
2

The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a
Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct
from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would
likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that
could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;
3
viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code
has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as,
likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family
Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of
the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.
4

In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to
understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing
love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although
its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a
few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would
also put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of
the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned
out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the
constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse
language its unequivocal command on how the State should regard marriage and the family,
thus
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development. (The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the
specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a
different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more
harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on
marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere
expediency or convenience, but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J ., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of
the peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a
given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of
the law, on the facts of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and J ulia Rosario-
Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still
maintain, that there was psychological incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the
duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of the present case, after an indepth study, do
not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the
field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that
no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
actual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J ., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional
Trial Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and
conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not
simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but
a defect in their Psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such
marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not
constitute so much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the
parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that
they must be shown to be incapableof doing so, due to some psychological (not physical)
illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were
due to insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect
of vice of consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was
to excludemental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly
on psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent
revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to
understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack
of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following
revised provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations,
even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to
"wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or
marriage" and to "mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to
"defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of
appreciation of one's marital obligation." There being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it
should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it
is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are
sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has
nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."
1

My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in
a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence,"
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an
invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase." He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as
"psychological or mental incapacity to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that
sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and
application of Art. 36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase" and
is incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the
question of how they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be
more problematic. Yet the possibility that one may be cured after the psychological
incapacity becomes manifest after the marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and
Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the
afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as
contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and
special situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally
enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such
marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some
marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the
drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and
practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting
marriage: "3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of
the Family Code: "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages
with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate
state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a
marriage, it actually declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first
place, for a valid sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed
and consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the
formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a
formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the
marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds
for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the
former being more strict, quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo
freed from the marriage bonds in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to
contract a valid civil marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some
persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil
Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological
incapacity into the Family Code and classified the same as a ground for declaring
marriages void ab initio or totally in existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide
directly for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a
combination of three old canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable according to
law' in order to give valid consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not
ignorant' of the major elements required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear
category) required that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be
valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for annulment,
called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack of due discretion means
that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of the weddingand
therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was incapable
of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader
approach to the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota
had reasoned for the first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the
time of marriage was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems
shortly after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once
the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way
was paved for what came after 1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious
psychological problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an
inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert
became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before
and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give
professional opinions about a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were
rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to
provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital
causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to
valid matrimonial consent.
2

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not
only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse
or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For
marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for
heterosexual acts, but is, in its totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the
right to a developing. lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development
of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each
other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented'
since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must
have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a
physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the
obligations of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of this
interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held
to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference
to the fundamental relationship to the other spouse.
3

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment:
(1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness
to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial
responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of
marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that
might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion
even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors
possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the
following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has
no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts
whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation
that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily
into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift
in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to
exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be concentratingon the parties' to assume or carry out
their responsibilities an obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An
advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that the at the
time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family
almost is of someone's failure out marital responsibilities as promised at the
time the marriage was entered into.
4

In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not
considered equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of
Appeals cited in the ponencia, the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from
the U.S. or to communicate with her husband for more then five years is not proof of her
psychological incapacity as to render the marriage a nullity.
5
Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable
and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,
6
this Court upheld both the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological
incapacity on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping
with his wife never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the
physical disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and
stubborn refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation
is the basic end of marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the
marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological
incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or
her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity
than to stubborn refusal.Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.
We declared:
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no
less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting
absent psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or
both of the spouses.

VITUG, J ., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in
his ponencia, and I find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and
the bar in the proper appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code
of the Philippines"). The term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified
by the Family Code. Thus
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center,
which drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-
case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision was taken from Canon Law.
1

Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage;
(those)
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning
essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the
interpretation and construction of the statutory enactment.
2

The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a
Code must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct
from, the other grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would
likewise, but for distinct reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that
could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various
circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;
3
viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code
has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as,
likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family
Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in
conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the
Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of
the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily
preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves,
depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological
incapacity.
4

In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to
understand, assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing
love, respect and fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although
its overt manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a
few observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would
also put it, to be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of
the law has failed to carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned
out for the better, if it were otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the
constitutionality of the measure. The fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse
language its unequivocal command on how the State should regard marriage and the family,
thus
Section 2, Article XV:
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .
Section 1, Article XV:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development. (The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the
specific issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that
constitutional provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a
different intention is manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more
harm than by disregarding them. It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on
marriage and the family has not been meant to be simply directory in character, nor for mere
expediency or convenience, but one that demands a meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Footnotes
1 Rollo pp. 25-33.
2 Sixteenth Division composed of J ., Segundino G. Chua, ponente and
chairman J J ., Serafin V.C. Guingona and Ricardo P. Galvez, concurring.
3 Presided by Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps.
4 Solemnized by Fr. Jesus C. Encinas.
5 The Court of Appeals reproduced in its Decision a substantial portion of the
RTC Decision is follows:
"To sustain her claim that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with his marital obligations, petitioner testified that he is immature,
irresponsible, dependent, disrespectful, arrogant, a chronic liar, and an infidel.
These characteristics of respondent are based on petitioner's testimony that
the former failed to be gainfully employed after he was relieved from the office
of the Government Corporate Counsel sometime in February, 1986. leaving
petitioner as the sole breadwinner of the family. Also when they were
separated in fact, respondent practically abandoned both petitioner-mother
and son except during the first few months of separation when respondent
regularly visited his son and gave him a monthly allowance of P1,000.00 for
about two to four months. Respondent is likewise dependent on his parents for
financial aid and support as he has no savings, preferring to spend his money
with his friends and peers. A year after their marriage, respondent informed
petitioner that he bought a house and lot at BF Homes, Paraaque for about a
million pesos. They then transferred there only for the petitioner to discover a
few months later that they were actually renting the house with the
respondent's parents responsible for the payment of the rentals. Aside from
this. respondent would also lie about his salary and ability. And that at present,
respondent is living with his mistress and their child. which fact he does not
deny.
It is unfortunate that the marriage between petitioner and respondent turned
sour if we look at the background of their relationship. During their college
days, when they were still going steady, respondent observed petitioner to be
conservative, homely, and intelligent causing him to believe then that she
would make an ideal wife and mother. Likewise, petitioner fell in love with
respondent because of his thoughtfulness and gentleness. After a year,
however, they decided to break their relationship because of some differences
in their personalities. Almost five (5) years later, while they were working in
Manila, petitioner and respondent rekindled their love affair. They became very
close and petitioner was glad to observe a more mature respondent. Believing
that they know each other much better after two years of going steady, they
decided to settle down and get married. It would seem. therefore, that
petitioner and respondent knew each other well and were then prepared for
married life.
During their marriage, however, the true personalities of the parties cropped-
up and dominated their life together. Unexpectedly on both their parts,
petitioner and respondent failed to respond properly to the situation. This
failure resulted in their frequent arguments and fighting's. In fact, even with the
intervention and help of their parents who arranged for their possible
reconciliation, the parties could not come to terms.
It seems clear at this stage that the marriage between the parties broke-up
because of their opposing and conflicting personalities (sic). Neither of them
can accept and understand the weakness of the other. No one gives in and
instead, blame each other for whatever problem or misunderstanding/s they
encounter. In fine, respondent cannot be solely responsible for the failure of
other (sic) marriage. Rather, this resulted because both parties cannot relate to
each other as husband and wife which is unique and requisite in marriage.
Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
with the basic objective of establishing a conjugal and family life. (Article 1,
Family Code). The unique element of permanency of union signifies a
continuing, developing, and lifelong relationship between the parties. Towards
this end, the parties must fully understand and accept the (implications and
consequences of being permanently) united in marriage. And the maintenance
of this relationship demands from the parties, among others, determination to
succeed in their marriage as well as heartfelt understanding, acceptance,
cooperation, and support for each other. Thus, the Family Code requires them
to live together, to observe mutual (love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support. Failure to observe) and perform these fundamental
roles of a husband and a wife will most likely lead to the break-up of the
marriage. Such is the unfortunate situation in this case. (Decision, pp. 5-8;
Original Records, pp. 70-73).
6 240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995.
7 Quoted from Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code, First
Edition, 1988.
8 TSN, April 6, 1991, p. 5.
9 The National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal reviews all decisions of the
marriage tribunals of each archdiocese in the country. Aside from heading the
Appellate Tribunal, Most. Rev. Cruz is also incumbent president of the Catholic
Bishops' Conference of the Philippines, Archbishop of Dagupan-Lingayen, and
holds the degrees of Doctor of Canon Law and Doctor of Divinity. Archbishop
Cruz was also Secretary-General of the Second Plenary Council of the
Philippines PCP II held from January 20, 1991 to February 17, 1991, which
is the rough equivalent of a parliament or a constitutional convention in the
Philippine Church, and where the ponente, who was a Council member, had
the privilege of being overwhelmed by his keen mind and prayerful
discernments.
10 Justice Puno was a former member of the Court of Appeals, retired Minister
of Justice, author, noted civil law professor and the law practitioner.
Article XV
THE FAMILY
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino Family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the state.
Sec. 3. The State shall defend:
(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
connections and the demands of responsible parenthood;
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty. exploitation, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development;
(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income;
(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning
and implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
Sec. 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the state
may also do so through just programs of social security.
Art. 1 Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
13 Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994.
14 This text is taken from the Memorandum of Archbishop Cruz. On the other
hand, the text used in Santos v. CA reads:
"Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
The difference in wording between this and that in Arch. Cruz's Memorandum
is due to the fact that the original Canon is written in Latin and both versions
are differently-worded English translations.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
1 Justice Caguioa's explanation in the Minutes of July 26, 1986 of the Civil
Code Revision Committee of the U.P. Law Center.
2 Zwack , Joseph P. Annulment, A Step-by-Step Guide.
3 The Code of Canon Law, A Text and Commentary, The Canon Law Society of
America, Paulist Press, New York, 1985.
4 Zwack, ibid., p. 47.
5 G.R. No. 112019, 240 SCRA 20 (1995).
6 G.R. No. 119190 (1997).
VITUG, J., concurring:
1 Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, quoting Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, In
Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100.
2 In Santos vs. Court Appeals, 240 SCRA 20.
3 Supra.
4 At pages 34-35.















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 126010 December 8, 1999
LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ, respondents.

MENDOZA, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals, dated January 30,
1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10, 1993,
which dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner.
Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married at
the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A).
2
Three children
were born to them, namely, Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982 (Exh. B),
3
Lyra, born on May 22, 1985
(Exh. C),
4
and Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D).
5

On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a
petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological
incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of
the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the
management of the household, devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his
friends. She further claimed that private respondent, after they were married, cohabited with another
woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and that,
because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a
sexually transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private respondent was irresponsible,
immature and unprepared for the duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that for having
abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three children in the
total amount of P9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the custody of their children; and that
she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo.
Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite, purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep which private
respondent took with him when he left the conjugal home on June 12, 1992.
6

On October 8, 1992, because of private respondent's failure to file his answer, the trial court issued
an order directing the assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there
was collusion between the
parties.
7
Only petitioner appeared at the investigation on November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the
prosecutor found no evidence of collusion and recommended that the case be set for trial.
8

Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows:
9

Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in Dasmarias,
Cavite. Petitioner, who is five years older than private respondent, was then in her first year of
teaching zoology and botany. Private respondent, a college freshman, was her student for two
consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979 when she was no longer
private respondent's teacher. On January 1, 1981, they were married.
Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid for his tuition fees,
while petitioner provided his allowances and other financial needs. The family income came from
petitioner's salary as a faculty member of the Philippine Christian University. Petitioner augmented
her earnings by selling "Tupperware" products, as well as engaging in the buy-and-sell of coffee, rice
and polvoron.
From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it was agreed that he would
help petitioner in her businesses by delivering orders to customers. However, because her husband
was a spendthrift and had other women, petitioner's business suffered. Private respondent often had
smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and betted on fighting cocks. In 1982, after the birth of
their first child, petitioner discovered two love letters written by a certain Realita Villena to private
respondent. She knew Villena as a married student whose husband was working in Saudi Arabia.
When petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted having an extra-marital affair with
Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end her relationship with private respondent. For his
part, private respondent said he would end the affairs, but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he
left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their child. When private respondent came
back, however, petitioner accepted him, despite private respondent's infidelity in the hope of saving
their marriage.
Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to get a job at Reynolds
Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmarias, Cavite in 1986. However, private respondent was
employed only until March 31, 1991, because he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered
by the company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but instead of spending the amount for
the needs of the family, private respondent spent the money on himself and consumed the entire
amount within four months of his retirement.
While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking, gambling and
womanizing became worse. Petitioner discovered that private respondent carried on relationships
with different women. He had relations with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie, who was
an operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a "Japayuki"; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at the Road Master
Driver's School in Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, with whom he cohabited for quite a while; and, Ruth
Oliva, by whom he had a daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989 (Exh.
E).
10
When petitioner confronted private respondent about his relationship with Tess, he beat her up, as
a result of which she was confined at the De la Salle University Medical Center in Dasmarias, Cavite on
July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral concussion (Exh. F).
11

According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the
latter part of 1986. As a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner.
They both received treatment at the Zapote Medical Specialists Center in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite
from October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H).
12

Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest
child who was then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he
was never affectionate and hardly spent time with them.
On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh. J)
13
with F & C Realty Corporation
whereby she agreed to buy from the latter a parcel of land at the Don Gregorio Heights Subdivision I in
Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite and placed a partial payment of P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987, after full
payment of the amount of P51,067.10, inclusive of interests from monthly installments, a deed of absolute
sale(Exh. K)
14
was executed in her favor and TCT No. T-221529 (Exh. M)
15
was duly issued.
According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten
letter
16
to private respondent expressing her frustration over the fact that her efforts to save their
marriage proved futile. In her letter, petitioner also stated that she was allowing him to sell their owner-
type jeepney
17
and to divide the proceeds of the sale between the two of them. Petitioner also told private
respondent of her intention to fill a petition for the annulment of their marriage.
It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioner's letter. By this time, he had
already abandoned petitioner and their children. In October 1992, petitioner learned that private
respondent left for the Middle East. Since then, private respondent's whereabouts had been
unknown.
Ester Alfaro, petitioner's childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine Christian University,
testified during the hearing on the petition for annulment. She said that sometime in June 1979,
petitioner introduced private respondent to her (Alfaro) as the former's sweetheart. Alfaro said she
was not impressed with private respondent who was her student in accounting. She observed
private respondent to be fun-loving, spending most of his time with campus friends. In November
1980, when petitioner asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at her forthcoming wedding,
Alfaro wanted to dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding because she thought
private respondent was not ready for married life as he was then unemployed. True enough,
although the couple appeared happy during the early part of their marriage, it was not long thereafter
that private respondent started drinking with his friends and going home late at night. Alfaro
corroborated petitioner's claim that private respondent was a habitual drunkard who carried on
relationships with different women and continued hanging out with his friends. She also confirmed
that petitioner was once hospitalized because she was beaten up by private respondent. After the
first year of petitioner's marriage, Alfaro tried to talk to private respondent, but the latter accused her
of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro said that private respondent was not close to his children
and that he had abandoned petitioner.
18

On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision
19
dismissing the petition for annulment of
marriage filed by petitioner. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
20

The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by the
petitioner in support of her claim that respondent was "psychologically incapacitated"
to marry her are among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for the grant of
legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code) not as grounds for a declaration of
nullity of marriages or annulment thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads as
follows:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the
following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed
against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
xxx xxx xxx
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable
cause for more than one year.
xxx xxx xxx
If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions
psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage,
has intended to include the above-stated circumstances as constitutive of such
incapacity, then the same would not have been enumerated as grounds for legal
separation.
In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of the petitioner
under Article 46, paragraph (3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, as there is no
dispute that the "gonorrhea" transmitted to the petitioner by respondent occurred
sometime in 1986, or five (5) years after petitioner's marriage with respondent was
celebrated in 1981. The provisions of Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same law
should be taken in conjunction with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the same code, and a
careful reading of the two (2) provisions of the law would require the existence of this
ground (fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the annulment of
petitioner's marriage with the respondent on this ground, as alleged and proved in
the instant case, cannot be legally accepted by the Court.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its decision
affirming the decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals,
21
the Court of
Appeals held:
22

It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a
spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullify of marriage, must exist at the time of
the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment,
gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological
incapacity of a spouse.
We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to prove that her
respondent-husband was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. Certainly, petitioner-appellant's declaration that at the time of their
marriage her respondent-husband's character was on the "borderline between a
responsible person and the happy-go-lucky," could not constitute the psychological
incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, petitioner-
appellant herself ascribed said attitude to her respondent-husband's youth and very
good looks, who was admittedly several years younger than petitioner-appellant who,
herself, happened to be the college professor of her respondent-husband. Petitioner-
appellant even described her respondent-husband not as a problem student but a
normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992).
The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after the
marriage and there is no proof that the same have already existed at the time of the
celebration of the marriage to constitute the psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred
I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL
MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME OF
THE CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE.
II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH HIS
ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
DENYING THE AWARD OF PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE
CHILDREN TO PETITIONER.
IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
DENYING THE PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER
REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE
THREE CHILDREN IN THE AMOUNT OF P3,000,00 PER CHILD.
V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY
PETITIONER AS HER EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY.
The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be
annulled on the ground of private respondent's psychological incapacity.
Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to show that private
respondent's psychological incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She
argues that the fact that the acts of incapacity of private respondent became manifest only after the
celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to the annulment of their marriage.
Art. 36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.
23

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,
24
we held:
"Psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality,
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand,
an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior
to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of
a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant
to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed.
The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that
at the time they were married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in
fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant
responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to show that
private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved
that private respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological nature, and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the outset of their marriage,
private respondent showed lack of drive to work for his family. Private respondent's parents and
petitioner supported him through college. After his schooling, although he eventually found a job, he
availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by his employer and spent the entire amount he
received on himself. For a greater part of their marital life, private respondent was out of job and did
not have the initiative to look for another. He indulged in vices and engaged in philandering, and
later abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondent's condition is incurable,
causing the disintegration of their union and defeating the very objectives of marriage.
However, private respondent's alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these
acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private
respondent's youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held. As
pointed out in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:
25

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (citing Salaita v.
Magtolis, supra) nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon rests petitioner. The
Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.
26
Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
27

We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose
conclusions, affirming the trial court's finding with regard to the non-existence of private respondent's
psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to great weight and even
finality.
28
Only where it is shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can these be
overturned.
The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioner's contentions
on the issue of permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective support, and the
declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters may more
appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property
regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Per Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros and concurred in by Justices Jorge S. Imperial
(Chairman) and B.A. Adelfuin-De la Cruz.
2 RTC Records, p. 7.
3 Id., p. 8.
4 Id., p. 9.
5 Id., p. 10.
6 Petition, RTC Records, pp. 1-4.
7 RTC Records, p. 24.
8 Id., p. 25.
9 TSN, pp. 6-56, Nov. 13, 1992; pp. 3-31, Dec. 8, 1992.
10 RTC Records, p. 37.
11 Id., p. 38.
12 Id., pp. 39-40a.
13 Id., pp. 41-43.
14 Id., pp. 44-45.
15 Id., p. 47.
16 Id., pp. 49-51.
17 Id., p. 48.
18 TSN, pp. 32-68, Dec. 8, 1992.
19 Per Acting Presiding Judge Eleuterio F. Guerrero.
20 RTC Records, pp. 58-59.
21 310 Phil. 22 (1995).
22 Rollo, pp. 44-46.
23 As amended by E.O. No. 227 dated July 17, 1987.
24 Supra, at 40-41.
25 335 Phil. 664, 676-680 (1997).
26 See Art. II, 12; Art. XV, 1-2.
27 Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra.
28 Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169 (1996).




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 136490 October 19, 2000
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by
the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be
examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
July 24, 1998 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby
declared valid."
2

Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for
Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G.
Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant
to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with
Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of
the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their
custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City
where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the
Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982
which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2)
on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the
Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their
marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was
transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos Regime.
Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the
Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the
military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she
as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos.
Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss,
Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she
was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in
different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for
work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good
provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her
weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so
severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would
leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she
was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to
Malacaang. When she was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her business.
Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a
trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter
quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore.
On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then
turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The
following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her
sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical
Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit
in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing
the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her
driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella,
Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as
cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological
evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude
towards appellee and their children, x x x."
3

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the
totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological
incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and
clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must
also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations
of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such
non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence
and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric
evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were
based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was
mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or
as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to
show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was
not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or
sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the
appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the
extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was]
grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."
4

Hence, this Petition.
5

Issues
In her Memorandum,
6
petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the
Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological
evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses
should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."
7

The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not
a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence
she presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to
determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not
have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those
tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she
had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological
capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,
8
the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation
of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code
9
were laid down by this Court
as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees
marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state.
x x x x x x x x x
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.
x x x x x x x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095."
10

The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v.
Court of Appeals:
11
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case --
including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker
-- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment,
the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that
they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not
gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the
marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially
now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.1wphi1
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220,
221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction,
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.
12
At best, the
evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a
marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the
procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed
them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that
the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion
requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological
incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.


Footnotes
1
Penned by Justice Bernardo LL Salas with the concurrence of Justices Fermin A. Martin Jr.
(Division chairman) and Candido V. Rivera (member).
2
CA Decision, pp. 12-13; rollo, pp. 38-39.
3
CA Decision, pp. 5-7; rollo, pp. 31-33.
4
CA Decision, pp. 10-11; rollo, pp. 36-37.
5
This case was deemed submitted for resolution on February 24, 2000, upon receipt by this
Court of respondent's Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Virgilio V. Macaraig.
Petitioner's Memorandum, signed by Atty. Rita Linda V. Jimeno, had been filed earlier on
November 5, 1999.
6
Rollo, p. 70; original in upper case.
7
Memorandum for petitioner, p. 6; rollo, p. 70.
8
268 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
9
"Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
"The action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under this Article shall prescribe
in ten years after its celebration."
10
Supra, pp. 209-213.
11
240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995, per Vitug, J.
12
"Article 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious
or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a
child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or
inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six
years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in
the Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than
one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term 'child' shall include a child by nature or by
adoption."
























Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 137590 March 26, 2001
FLORENCE MALCAMPO-SIN, petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPP T. SIN, respondent.
PARDO, J .:
The Family Code emphasizes the permanent nature of marriage, hailing it as the foundation of the
family.
1
It is this inviolability which is central to our traditional and religious concepts of morality and
provides the very bedrock on which our society finds stability.
2
Marriage is immutable and when both
spouses give their consent to enter it, their consent becomes irrevocable, unchanged even by their
independent wills.
However, this inviolability depends on whether the marriage exists and is valid. If it is void ab initio,
the "permanence" of the union becomes irrelevant, and the Court can step in to declare it so. Article
36 of the Family Code is the justification.
3
Where it applies and is duly proven, a judicial declaration
can free the parties from the rights, obligations, burdens and consequences stemming from their
marriage.
A declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code requires the application of
procedural and substantive guidelines. While compliance with these requirements mostly devolves
upon petitioner, the State is likewise mandated to actively intervene in the procedure. Should there
be non-compliance by the State with its statutory duty, there is a need to remand the case to the
lower court for proper trial.
The Case
What is before the Court
4
is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals
5
which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City
6
dismissing petitioner Florence
Malcampo-Sin's (hereafter "Florence") petition for declaration of nullity of marriage due to
psychological incapacity for insufficiency of evidence.
The Facts
On January 4, 1987, after a two-year courtship and engagement, Florence and respondent Philipp T.
Sin (hereafter "Philipp"), a Portugese citizen, were married at St. Jude Catholic Parish in San Miguel,
Manila.
7

On September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City, a
complaint for "declaration of nullity of marriage" against Philipp.
8
Trial ensued and the parties
presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence.
On June 16, 1995, the trial court dismissed Florence's petition.
9

On December 19, 1995, Florence filed with the trial court a notice of appeal to the Court of
Appeals.
10

After due proceedings, on April 30, 1998, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED. Cost against the Appellant."
11

On June 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the
aforequoted decision.
12

On January 19, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
13

Hence, this appeal.
14

The Court's Ruling
We note that throughout the trial in the lower court, the State did not participate in the proceedings.
While Fiscal Jose Danilo C. Jabson
15
filed with the trial court a manifestation dated November 16,
1994, stating that he found no collusion between the parties,
16
he did not actively participate therein.
Other than entering his appearance at certain hearings of the case, nothing more was heard from
him. Neither did the presiding Judge take any step to encourage the fiscal to contribute to the
proceedings.
The Family Code mandates:
"ARTICLE 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the
Court shall orderthe prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the
State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is
not fabricated or suppressed (italics ours).
"In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment."
It can be argued that since the lower court dismissed the petition, the evil sought to be prevented
(i.e., dissolution of the marriage) did not come about, hence, the lack of participation of the State
was cured. Not so. The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant
and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a
sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an
invalid one as well. This is made clear by the following pronouncement:
"(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
17
briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095 (italics ours)."
18

The records are bereft of any evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case not
just at the trial level but on appeal with the Court of Appeals as well. Other than the "manifestation"
filed with the trial court on November 16, 1994, the State did not file any pleading, motion or position
paper, at any stage of the proceedings.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Erlinda Matias Dagdag,
19
while we upheld the validity of the
marriage, we nevertheless characterized the decision of the trial court as "prematurely rendered"
since the investigating prosecutor was not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence
before the judgment was rendered. This stresses the importance of the participation of the State.
Having so ruled, we decline to rule on the factual disputes of the case, this being within the province
of the trial court upon proper re-trial.
Obiter Dictum
For purposes of re-trial, we guide the parties thus: In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
20
the guidelines
in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code are as follows (omitting
guideline [8] in the enumeration as it was already earlier quoted):
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code
echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
"(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically
identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically (sic) ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
"(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
"(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
"(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
"(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
"(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts."
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the appealed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51304, promulgated on April 30, 1998 and the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City in Civil Case No. 3190, dated June 16, 1995.
Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for proper trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ ., concur.


Footnotes
1
Article 1, Family Code of the Philippines.
2
Article XV, Section 1, "The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development." Section 2, "Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State."
3
Article 36, Family Code of the Philippines, "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
4
Via an appeal under Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
5
In CA-G.R. CV No. 51304, promulgated on April 30, 1998, Callejo, Sr., ponente, Umali and
Guttierez, JJ., (now an Associate Justice of this Court), concurring.
6
In Civil Case No. 3190, dated June 16, 1995, Judge Jose S. Hernandez, presiding.
7
Regional Trial Court Record, p. 37.
8
Petition, Rollo, p. 16.
9
Regional Trial Court Record, pp. 81-83.
10
Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 51304, CA Rollo, p. 3.
11
Petition, Annex "A", Rollo, p. 45.
12
Petition, Rollo, p. 15.
13
Petition, Rollo, p. 16; CA Rollo, p. 142.
14
On August 30, 1999, we resolved to give due course to the petition, Rollo, p. 144.
15
4th Asst. Provincial Prosecutor.
16
Regional Trial Court Record, p. 17.
17
No such certification appears in the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
18
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 664, 679-680 (1997).
19
G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001.
20
Supra, Note 18, pp. 676-678.









Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J .:
For review on certiorari is the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY
No. 34378, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case
No. 380-0-90 declaring the marriage of Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years
old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.
2
The marriage certificate was
issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on
October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M. Dagdag, born on January 16, 1978; and
Eden M. Dagdag, born on April 21, 1982.
3
Their birth certificates were issued by the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, also on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, located at the back of the
house of their in-laws.
4
A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without
explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear
again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and
would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused,
he would inflict physical injuries on her.
5

On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. Erlinda was
constrained to look for a job in Olongapo City as a manicurist to support herself and her children.
Finally, Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime,
6
and that he escaped from jail
on October 22, 1985.
7
A certification therefor dated February 14, 1990, was issued by Jail Warden
Orlando S. Limon. Avelino remains at-large to date.
On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
8
Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the
Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation, on September 3, 10, and 17,
1990.
9
Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to establish jurisdictional facts. Thereafter, on
December 17, 1990, the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel
appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness.
Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She and her husband live in Olongapo
City but they spend their vacations at the house of Avelino's parents in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She
testified that Erlinda and Avelino always quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the
couple's house. She knew that Avelino had been gone for a long time now, and that she pitied
Erlinda and the children.
10

Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating
prosecutor until January 2, 1991, to manifest in writing whether or not he would present
controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be
deemed submitted for decision.
In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that
there was no collusion between the parties. However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid
fabrication of evidence.
11

On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating prosecutor's manifestation dated
December 5, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision
12
declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino
void under Article 36 of the Family Code, disposing thus:
"WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares
the marriage celebrated at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija between Erlinda Matias and Avelino
Dagdag on 7 September 1975 to be null and void.
The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to enter into his Book of
Marriage this declaration after this decision shall have become final and executory .
SO ORDERED."
On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the
ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to
manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the
ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. After requiring Erlinda to
comment, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated August 21, 1991
as follows:
13

"This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court dated
December 27, 1990 filed by the Solicitor-General. The observation of the movant is to the
effect that 'Mere alcoholism and abusiveness are not enough to show psychological
incapacity. Nor is abandonment. These are common in marriage. There must be showing
that these traits, stemmed from psychological incapacity existing at the time of celebration of
the marriage.
In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as the husband left his wife and children
since 1983. The defendant, while in jail escaped and whose present whereabouts are
unknown. He failed to support his family for the same period of time, actuations clearly
indicative of the failure of the husband to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage defined and enumerated under Article 68 of the Family Code. These findings of
facts are uncontroverted. 1wphi1.nt
Defendant's character traits, by their nature, existed at the time of marriage and became
manifest only after the marriage. In rerum natura, these traits are manifestations of lack of
marital responsibility and appear now to be incurable. Nothing can be graver since the family
members are now left to fend for themselves. Contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor-
General, these are not common in marriage.
Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the New Family Code, to assuage the
sensibilities of the more numerous church, is a substitute for divorce (See: Sempio Diy, New
Family Code, p. 36) in order to dissolve marriages that exist only in name.
WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the motion for Reconsideration aforecited is
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED"
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the sole assignment of error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEE'S MARRIAGE TO A VELINO
DAGDAG NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF
THE LATTER, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW NOT
HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.
14

On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
15
affirming the decision of the trial court,
disposing thus:
"Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the
duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal. Necessarily, the plaintiff is now endowed with the
right to seek the judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Defendant's constant non-fulfillment of any of such obligations is continously (sic)
destroying the integrity or wholeness of his marriage with the plaintiff. (Pineda, The Family
Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1992 Ed., p. 46)."
16

Hence, the present petition for review ,
17
filed by the Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino Dagdag is not of
the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. According to him, the Court of Appeals
made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase "psychological incapacity" and an
incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case. Respondent, in her Comment, insists that the
facts constituting psychological incapacity were proven by preponderance of evidence during trial.
At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly declared the marriage as
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from
psychological incapacity as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a
fugitive from justice.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides -
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage,
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be
judged, not on the basis ofa priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to
say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court.
18

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,
19
the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code:
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle ofejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June
13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists
and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and
raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less in
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code
20
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code
21
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095."
22

Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-
mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that
the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently
proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not
sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The
investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence
since the trial court's decision was prematurely rendered.
In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,
23
we affirmed the dismissal of the trial court and Court
of Appeals of the petition for annulment on the ground of dearth of the evidence presented. We
further explained therein that -
"Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of
private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon
petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. (Art. II, Sec. 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. (citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, supra. )"
24

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.


Footnote
1
Rollo, pp. 28-38.
2
Id. at 29.
3
Id. at 30-31.
4
TSN, December 17, 1990, p. 6; Records, p. 47.
5
Rollo, p. 29.
6
The records did not specify what crime.
7
Records, p. 32.
8
Originally, Article 39 of the Family Code provided: "Art. 39, The action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. However, in the case of
marriage celebrated before the effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36, such
action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this Code shall have taken effect."
However, Republic Act No, 8533 was eventually enacted and approved on February 23,
1998, which amended Article 39 to read as follows: "Art. 39, The action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe."
9
RTC Records, p. 16.
10
TSN, December 17,1990, pp. 22-23.
11
RTC Records, p. 33.
12
Id. at 38-40.
13
Id. at 96.
14
Rollo, p. 10.
15
Id. at 28-38.
16
Id. at 37-38 only.
17
Id. at 6-26.
18
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198, 214 (1997), Padilla, J., Separate Statement.
19
268 SCRA 198 (1997).
20
Article 68, Family Code. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Art. 69, Family Code. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of
disagreement, the court shall decide. x x x
Art. 70, Family Code. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The
expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community
property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In
case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied
from their separate properties.
Art. 71, Family Code. The management of the household shall be the right and duty of both
spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the
provisions of Article 70.
21
Article 220, Family Code. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have
with respect to their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right
precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their
means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and
understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty,
integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in
civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all
times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their
activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company,
and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and
morals;
(6) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
(7) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(8) To impose discipline on them as maybe required under the circumstances; and
(9) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians.
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the
injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living
in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses
provided by law.
Art. 225. The father and the mother shall, jointly exercise legal guardianship over the
property of their unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment.
In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to
the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds
P50,000.00, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the
court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or
annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general
guardians.
A verified petition, for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place
where the child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the
place where the property or any part thereof is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and
issues regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of
this Article shall be heard and resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under
substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in
which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply. 1wphi 1. nt
22
Id. at 209-213.
23
320 SCRA 76 (1999).
24
Id. at 88.











Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 136921 April 17, 2001
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner
vs.
ZOSIMO A PESCA, respondent.
VITUG, J .:
Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A.
G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Caloocan City,
Branch 130, which has declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent.
Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on
board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on
03 March 1975. Initially, the young couple did not live together as petitioner was still a student in
college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely
a month after the marriage. Six months later, the young couple established their residence in
Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where they finally
resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they could stay
together - when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-
year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie.
It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of
"psychological incapacity" to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally
immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual
drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning.
When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick
her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the
presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence.
Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house
of her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later,
petitioner decided to forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change.
But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. Indeed, matters became worse.
On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight o'clock, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half
an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to
medical examination at the Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as
contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was
filed against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment.
This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister.
Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial
Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner
likewise sought the custody of her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite .
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on 25 April 1994 by
personal service by the sheriff. As respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance
within the reglementary period, the trial court ordered the city prosecutor to look into a possible
collusion between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on 03 August 1994, submitted her report
to the effect that she found no evidence to establish that there was collusion between the parties. 1wphi 1. nt
On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer, and the same,
although filed late, was admitted by the court. In his answer, respondent admitted the fact of his
marriage with petitioner and the birth of their children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of
the complaint which listed the conjugal property. Respondent vehemently denied, however, the
allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated.
On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its decision
declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court
erred, particularly, in holding that there was legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in
denying his motion to reopen the case.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between
petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting. The appellate court said:
"Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant showed signs of
mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as
so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded
the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because
of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has been
identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is
permanent and incurable in nature.
"The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity."
1

Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the
thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals,
2
promulgated on 14 January
1995, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina,
3
promulgated on
13 February 1997, should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina
ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely
advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the application of
the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings and not its dismissal.
Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there
is absolutely no evidence that has been shown to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the
term has been so defined inSantos.
Indeed, there is no merit in the petition.
The term "psychological incapacity," as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, has been explained by the Court, in Santos and reiterated in Molina.
The Court, in Santos, concluded:
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most
importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of
the phrase 'psychological incapacity' under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's 'Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their
Parallels in Canon Law,' quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorder by
the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's 'Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases'). Article 36 of the Family. Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
'psychological incapacity' should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated."
The- "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The
rule follows the settled legal maxim - "legis interpretado legis vim obtinet" - that the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
3
The interpretation or
construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The
latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the
statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of
parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance
therewith
5
under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
The phrase "psychological incapacity ," borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in
our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has
escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to
the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts
and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological
incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.
At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her
evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the
time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage.
Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological
incapacity.
The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of
the family
6
that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her
unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not
necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither
should we.
WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, J.C.; Melo, J.A.R; Panganiban, A.V.; Gonzaga-Reyes, M.P.; Sandoval-Gutierez, A., Concur.
Footnotes:
1
Rollo. pp. 42-43
2
240 SCRA 20.
3
268 SCRA 198.
4
People vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607
5
Unciano Paramedical College, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 285; Tanada vs.
Guingona, 235 SCRA 507; Columbia Pictures, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 144.
6
See Section 2, Article XV, 1987 Constitution.













Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004
DAVID B. DEDEL, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, Respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was working in the
advertising business of his father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations,
culminating in the exchange of marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on September 28,
1966.
1
The civil marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967.
2

The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September 18, 1968;
3
Stephanie
Janice born on September 9, 1969;
4
Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971;
5
and Ingrid born on
October 20, 1976.
6
The conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature
wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical
psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship
with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two
children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing
along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two
illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to
join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on
special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition
seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as
defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149.
Summons was effected by publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general
circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the
Philippines.
7

Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psychological
evaluation of petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who
wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he
does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality
Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and
had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with
petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of
infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder
amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
8

After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages between DAVID B.
DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby
declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to
perform the essential obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties is dissolved and in lieu
thereof a regime of complete separation of property between the said spouses is established in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to rights previously
acquired by creditors.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance
with Article 52 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.
9

Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed alleging that
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF
A VALID GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND VOID.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION
HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA
CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal of
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
10

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 8, 2002.
11
Hence,
the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion and manifestly erred in its
conclusion that the: (1) respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to perform her
marital obligations; (2) psychological incapacity of respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted by the petitioner
falls short to prove psychological incapacity suffered by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. More specifically, does the
aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term "psychological
incapacity?"
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,
12
it was ruled:
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law
does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations
with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being
of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may
have some bearing on the degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case,
be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
13

The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a very complex
and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, respondents sexual
infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not
have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid
assumption thereof.
14
It appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the
inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its
celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.
15
It must be shown that
these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth,
immaturity
16
or sexual promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Article
55
17
of the Family Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos
18
that Article 36 is not to be
equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity
but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the
church marriage of petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the
Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church.
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate court.1wphi 1 We cannot deny the
grief, frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are
circumstances, like in this case, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to
every individual problem.
19
While we sympathize with petitioners marital predicament, our first and
foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh it may be.
20

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467 before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on official leave.


Footnotes
1
Exhibits F and F-3.
2
Exhibit F.
3
Exhibit H.
4
Exhibit I.
5
Exhibit J.
6
Exhibit K.
7
Exhibits D to D-3.
8
Exhibit L; Records pp. 57-78.
9
Rollo, p. 49; penned by Presiding Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga (now an Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals).
10
Rollo, pp. 33-44; per Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices
Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Eliezer R. Delos Santos, concurring.
11
Rollo, p. 45.
12
310 Phil. 21 (1995).
13
Id., at 40-41.
14
Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, 9 February 2001, 351 SCRA 425.
15
Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001, 356 SCRA 588, 594.
16
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 87-88.
17
ART. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the
petitioner, a common child or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious
or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a
child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or
inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years
even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage in the
Philippines, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion.
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than
one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term child shall include a child by nature or by
adoption.
18
G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 755, 765.
19
Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 36.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003]
DIANA M. BARCELONA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
TADEO R. BENGZON, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J .:
The Case
The Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision
[1]
as well as the
7 August 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the Order
[2]
dated 21 January 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-24471. The Regional Trial Court
refused to dismiss private respondents Petition for Annulment of Marriage for failure to
state a cause of action and for violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No.
04-94. The assailed Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent Tadeo)
filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona
(petitioner Diana). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23445 (first
petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87.
[3]
On 9 May 1995,
respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition which the trial court granted in its
Order dated 7 June 1995.
On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage
against petitioner Diana. This time, the case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-
24471 (second petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106
(trial court).
Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. First,
the second petition fails to state a cause of action. Second, it violates Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 (Circular No. 04-94) on forum
shopping. Respondent Tadeo opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed
Additional Arguments in Support of the Motion.
The trial court, through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued on 18 September 1996 an
Order (first order) deferring resolution of the Motion until the parties ventilate their
arguments in a hearing. Petitioner Diana filed a motion for reconsideration. However,
the trial court, through Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison, issued on 21 January
1997 an Order (second order) denying the motion. In denying the motion for
reconsideration, Judge Pison explained that when the ground for dismissal is the
complaints failure to state a cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely
from the petition itself. Judge Pison held that contrary to petitioner Dianas claim, a
perusal of the allegations in the petition shows that petitioner Diana has violated
respondent Tadeos right, thus giving rise to a cause of action. Judge Pison also
rejected petitioner Dianas claim that respondent Tadeo is guilty of forum shopping in
filing the second petition. Judge Pison explained that when respondent Tadeo filed the
second petition, the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445) was no longer pending as
it had been earlier dismissed without prejudice.
Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the
Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts first order deferring action on the Motion and
the second order denying the motion for reconsideration on 14 February 1997. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner Diana that the trial court in its first order
erred in deferring action on the Motion until after a hearing on whether the complaint
states a cause of action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the trial
courts second order corrected the situation since in denying the motion for
reconsideration, the trial court in effect denied the Motion. The appellate court agreed
with the trial court that the allegations in the second petition state a cause of action
sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven to be true.
The Court of Appeals also held that there was no violation of Circular No. 04-94. To
determine the existence of forum shopping, the elements of litis pendentia must exist or
a final judgment in one case must amount to res judicata in the other. In this case,
there is no litis pendentia because respondent Tadeo had caused the dismissal without
prejudice of the first petition before filing the second petition. Neither is there res
judicata because there is no final decision on the merits.
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner Diana raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SECOND PETITION
FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE SUFFICIENTLY STATE A
CAUSE OF ACTION;
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT TADEO VIOLATED SUPREME
COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 IN FAILING TO
STATE THE FILING OF A PREVIOUS PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE, ITS TERMINATION AND
STATUS.
[4]

The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Sufficiency of Cause of Action
Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition fails to state a cause of action
is untenable. A cause of action is an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the
legal right of the plaintiff.
[5]
A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three
essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3)
the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff.
[6]

We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The petition
sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code.
[7]
The petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally
married at the Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage
contract attached to the petition. The couple established their residence in Quezon
City. The union begot five children, Ana Maria, born on 8 November 1964; Isabel, born
on 28 October 1968; Ernesto Tadeo, born on 31 March 1970; Regina Rachelle born on
7 March 1974; and Cristina Maria born in February 1978. The petition further alleged
that petitioner Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of
their marriage to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity
subsists up to the present time. The petition alleged the non-complied marital
obligations in this manner:
xxx
5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied
upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper
and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters house or would play
tennis the whole day.
6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and
the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak
to her husband.
7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina
Maria and on the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the
latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. She further insisted that she wanted
to feel a little freedom from petitioners marital authority and influences. The
petitioner argued that he could occupy another room in their conjugal dwelling to
accommodate respondents desire, but no amount of plea and explanation could
dissuade her from demanding that the petitioner leave their conjugal dwelling.
8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents
pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling and reside in
a condominium located in Greenhills.
9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the petitioner and the
respondent. The petitioner waived his right to the conjugal dwelling in respondents
favor through an extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains. The
separation in fact between the petitioner and the respondent still subsists to the present
time.
10. The parties likewise agreed on the custody and support of the children. The
extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is hereto attached as Annex
C and taken as an integral part hereof.
11. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligation of marriage and
such incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity was
conclusively found in the psychological examination conducted on the relationship
between the petitioner and the respondent.
12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent is void ab initio and needs to be annulled. This petition is in accordance
with Article 39 thereof.
xxx.
[8]

The second petition states the ultimate facts on which respondent bases his claim in
accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court.
[9]
Ultimate facts refer to the
principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of which the cause of
action rests. The term does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of
evidence which establish the material elements.
[10]

Petitioner Diana relies mainly
[11]
on the rulings in Santos v. Court of Appeals
[12]
as
well as in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.
[13]
Santos gave life to the phrase
psychological incapacity, a novel provision in the Family Code, by defining the term in
this wise:
xxx psychological incapacity should refer to no less than mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. xxx.
Molina additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in
cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity.
[14]

Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines set forth
in Santos and Molina. Specifically, she contends that the second petition is defective
because it fails to allege the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. The
second petition also fails to state that the alleged psychological incapacity existed from
the celebration of the marriage and that it is permanent or incurable. Further, the
second petition is devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring
about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Lastly, the second petition did not even state the marital obligations which
petitioner Diana allegedly failed to comply due to psychological incapacity.
Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(new Rules).
[15]
Specifically, Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
x x x.
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically
allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the
time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. (Emphasis supplied)
Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage.
[16]
The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion need
not be alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of
the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral
sciences are competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since
the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological
incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of
the psychological incapacity.
Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work, respond to
and control the human body. Scientists still do not understand everything there is to
know about the root causes of psychological disorders. The root causes of many
psychological disorders are still unknown to science even as their outward, physical
manifestations are evident. Hence, what the new Rules require the petition to allege
are the physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. Respondent
Tadeos second petition complies with this requirement.
The second petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of
respondent Tadeo, the correlative obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission
of petitioner Diana in violation of the legal right. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,
[17]
the
Court held:
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause
of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or
allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have
to be done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA,
supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the
defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Devt Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA
152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197
SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a
claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v.
Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action
hypothetically admits all the factual averments in the complaint.
[18]
Given the
hypothetically admitted facts in the second petition, the trial court could render judgment
over the case.
Forum Shopping
Similarly untenable is petitioner Dianas contention that the second petitions
certificate of non-forum shopping which does not mention the filing of the first petition
and its dismissal without prejudice violates Circular No. 04-94.
[19]
Petitioner Diana refers
to this portion of Circular No. 04-94-
1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint,
petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such
original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not
theretofore commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues
in the Supreme court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b)
to the best of his knowledge, no action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such
action or proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he
must state the status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar
action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within
five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn
certification contemplated herein have been filed.
[20]

Petitioner Diana points out that respondent Tadeo did not disclose in his certificate
of non-forum shopping that he had previously commenced a similar action based on the
same grounds with the same prayer for relief. The certificate of non-forum shopping
should have stated the fact of termination of the first petition or its status.
The Court has consistently held that a certificate of non-forum shopping not
attached to the petition or one belatedly filed or one signed by counsel and not the party
himself constitutes a violation of the requirement. Such violation can result in the
dismissal of the complaint or petition. However, the Court has also previously held that
the rule of substantial compliance applies to the contents of the certification.
[21]

In Roxas v. Court of Appeals,
[22]
the Court squarely addressed the issue of whether
the omission of a statement on the prior filing and dismissal of a case involving the
same parties and issues merits dismissal of the petition. In Roxas, the Court ruled:
xxx an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would
not constitute res judicata and litis pendentia as in the case at bar, is not fatal as to
merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings considering that the
evils sought to be prevented by the said certificate are not present. It is in this light
that we ruled in Maricalum Mining Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Commission that a liberal interpretation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on non-
forum shopping would be more in keeping with the objectives of procedural rules
which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.
The dismissal of the first petition precluded the eventuality of litis pendentia. The
first petitions dismissal did not also amount to res judicata. Thus, there is no need to
state in the certificate of non-forum shopping in the second petition (Civil Case No. Q-
95-24471) about the prior filing and dismissal of the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-
23445).
The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the instance of respondent
Tadeo to keep the peace between him and his grown up children. The dismissal
happened before service of answer or any responsive pleading. Clearly, there is no litis
pendentia since respondent Tadeo had already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of
the first petition when he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res
judicata because the dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal
without prejudice.
Circular No. 04-94,
[23]
now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
must be interpreted and applied to achieve its purpose. The Supreme Court
promulgated the Circular to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of
justice. The Circular should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure
which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.
[24]

A final word. We are ever mindful of the principle that marriage is an inviolable
social institution and the foundation of the family that the state cherishes and
protects.
[25]
In rendering this Decision, this Court is not prejudging the main issue of
whether the marriage is void based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court
must resolve this issue after trial on the merits where each party can present evidence
to prove their respective allegations and defenses. We are merely holding that, based
on the allegations in the second petition, the petition sufficiently alleges a cause of
action and does not violate the rule on forum shopping. Thus, the second petition is not
subject to attack by a motion to dismiss on these grounds.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision dated 30 May 1997
as well as the Resolution dated 7 August 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 43393 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on leave.



[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia, and
Artemio G. Tuquero concurring.
[2]
Penned by Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison.
[3]
Presided by Judge Elsie Ligot-Telan.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 243-244.
[5]
Far East Bank and Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135548, 29 September 2000, 341 SCRA
486.
[6]
Relucio v. Lopez, G.R. No. 138497, 16 January 2002, 373 SCRA 578.
[7]
Article 36 of the Family Code provides: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 54-55.
[9]
Section 1. In general. Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise
and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or
defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts.
[10]
OSCAR M. HERRERA, Remedial Law I, 1999 Ed.
[11]
Petitioner Diana relied on Santos for her motion to dismiss in the trial court and her certiorari petition in
the appellate court. In her motion to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals, she
cited Molina.
[12]
310 Phil. 21 (1995).
[13]
G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997, 268 SCRA 198.
[14]
Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001, 356 SCRA 588.
[15]
Effective 15 March 2003.
[16]
Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, G.R. No. 138137, 8 March 2001, 354 SCRA 100; Presidential Commission on
Good Government v. Desierto, G.R. No. 140358, 8 December 2000, 347 SCRA 561.
[17]
313 Phil. 8 (1995).
[18]
Sta. Clara Homeowners Association v. Gaston, G.R. No. 141961, 23 January 2002, 374 SCRA 396.
[19]
Now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[20]
Emphasis supplied by petitioner.
[21]
MC Engineering, Inc. v. NLRC, 412 Phil. 614 (2001).
[22]
415 Phil. 430 (2001).
[23]
Preceded by Circular No. 28-91.
[24]
See note 22.
[25]
See Section 2, Article XV, 1987 Constitution.




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J .:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision
1
dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of
Appeals
2
affirming the decision
3
dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch
72, declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between herein respondent Lolita M.
Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in
Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and
stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal
Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to
assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One
month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio
stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in
1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to
see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his given
address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect
service of summons by publication. The trial court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August
1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of
general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file a
responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion dated
November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the
motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion
existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to
intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial
court granted respondents motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how
Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her
testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-
Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to make
proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the
Court.
SO ORDERED.
4

In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios psychological incapacity, the trial
court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations
as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible
and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of
the Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child
which characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be traced to
respondents mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life.
5

The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the
dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on
the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal.
The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
6

The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after the
celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take
steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two months, he never sent any support to nor
communicated with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines but he
did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to
no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court
rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and
creation of a family as a social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to suffer
in a marriage where the other spouse is not around and worse, left them without even
helping them cope up with family life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as
required under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?
7

The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Molina
8
and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.
9
In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos
while this case involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the psychological
incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite respondents failure
to comply with the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.
10

According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did
not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple
inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent
failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance
with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the
courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
11
Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
12

Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233
SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be
given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.
13
(emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos:
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability."
14
The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically
identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to.
15

We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshios psychological
incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He
abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but
he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly
irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness.
After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented
showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no
need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondents case had she
presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done
through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation.
16
There was no showing
that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We
cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family
immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove
that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he
must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological,not physical, illness.
17
There
was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with
the obligations essential to marriage.
18

According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because
the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree.
In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino
spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to
determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in
general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,
19
this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the
State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to
her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997 of
the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
*
Acting Chief Justice
1
Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, and concurred in by Associate Justices Cancio
C. Garcia and Hilarion Aquino; Rollo, pp. 24-31.
2
Second Division.
3
Penned by Judge Rogelio Angeles; Rollo, pp. 32-33.
4
Rollo, p. 33.
5
Rollo, p. 52.
6
Rollo, p. 30.
7
Rollo, p. 29.
8
268 SCRA 198 [1997].
9
240 SCRA 20 [1995].
10
Rollo, p. 14.
11
Article II, Section 12; and, Article XV, Sections 1 & 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
12
Republic of the Philippines vs. Dagdag, 351 SCRA 425 [2001] citing Republic of the
Philippines vs. Hernandez, 320 SCRA 76 [1999].
13
Supra, Note 8, pp. 209-212.
14
Supra, Note 9, p. 33.
15
Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755, 764 [2000].
16
Article 55 (10) of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
x x x x x x x x x
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for
more than one year.
17
Supra Note 8, p. 210.
18
Ibid., pp. 211-212.
19
356 SCRA 588, 594 [2001].
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 150785 September 15, 2006
EMMA P. NUGUID, petitioner,
vs.
CLARITA S. NICDAO,
1
respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J .:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Emma P. Nuguid assails
the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. No. 23054:
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED and the Assailed Decision
dated May 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court [RTC], Branch 5, Bataan, affirming the
Decision dated January 11, 1999 of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dinalupihan-
Hermosa, Bataan is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The petitioner CLARITA S. NICDAO is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged. NO
COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
2

Petitioner seeks a review of the decision with respect to the alleged lack of civil liability of respondent
Clarita S. Nicdao. Stemming from two cases of violation of BP 22,
3
this petition involves the following
facts:
xxx xxx xxx
Accused Clarita S. Nicdao is charged with having committed the crime of Violation of BP 22
in fourteen (14) counts. The criminal complaints allege that sometime in 1996, from April to
August thereof, [respondent] and her husband [,] of Vignette Superstore [,] approached
[petitioner] and asked her if they [could] borrow money to settle some obligations. Having
been convinced by them and because of the close relationship of [respondent] to [petitioner],
the latter lent the former her money. Thus, every month, she was persuaded to release
P100,000.00 to the accused until the total amount reached P1,150,000.00.
As security for the P1,150,000.00, [respondent] gave [petitioner] the following open dated
Hermosa Savings Bank (HSLB) (sic) with the assurance that if the entire amount is not paid
within one (1) year, [petitioner] can deposit the check:
Check No. Amount
7277 P100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
7348 150,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
12118 100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
8812 50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
12102 100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
7255 100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
2286 50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
8128 100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
7254 50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
7278 100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
4540 50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
4523 50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
12103 50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
7294 100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
P1,150,000.00
In June 1997, [petitioner] together with Samson Ching demanded payment of the sums
[above-mentioned], but [respondent] refused to acknowledge the indebtedness. Thus, on
October 6, 1977, [petitioner] deposited all aforementioned checks in the bank of Samson
Ching totaling P1,150,000.00 since all the money given by her to [respondent] came from
Samson Ching. The checks were all returned for having been drawn against insufficient
funds (DAIF).
A verbal and written demand was made upon [respondent] to pay the amount represented by
the bounced checks, but [to] no avail. Hence, a complaint for violation of BP 22 was filed
against the [respondent].
4
(Citation omitted)
After petitioner instituted 14 criminal cases
5
(docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9458-9471) for
violation of BP 22 involving the sum of P1,150,000, corresponding warrants of arrest were issued
against respondent. On November 12, 1997, respondent was arraigned. She pleaded not guilty and
trial ensued.
In a decision dated January 11, 1999, Judge Manuel M. Tan of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Dinalupihan, Bataan found respondent guilty of the charges against her. Respondent was sentenced
to pay P1,150,000, plus interest, and to suffer imprisonment equivalent to one year for each violation
of BP 22, or a total of 14 years of imprisonment.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed in toto by the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan, Bataan.
Respondent elevated the case to the CA. On October 30, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the
lower courts and acquitted respondent. According to the CA, certain substantial facts were
overlooked by the trial court. These circumstances, if properly considered, justified a different
conclusion on the case.
6

Petitioner now comes to us, raising this main issue: whether respondent remains civilly liable to her
for the sum ofP1,150,000. In this connection, she asserts that respondent obtained loans from her in
the aggregate amount ofP1,150,000 and that these loans have not been paid.
From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: (1) as an offense against the State
because of the disturbance of the social order and (2) as an offense against the private person
injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and
others (wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because there are no
damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime
7
). What gives rise to
the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to
another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or
not punishable by law.
8

Extinction of penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil liability, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist.
9

On one hand, as regards the criminal aspect of a violation of BP 22, suffice it to say that:
[t]he gravamen of BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment [and] the accused failed to satisfy the amount
of the check or make arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from notice of
dishonor. The act is
malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Laws are created to achieve a
goal intended to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the check
was issued is irrelevant in determining culpability. The terms and conditions surrounding the
issuance of the checks are also irrelevant.
10

On the other hand, the basic principle in civil liability ex delicto is that every person criminally liable is
also civilly liable, crime being one of the five sources of obligations under the Civil Code.
11
A person
acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof
required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for
civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence
12
). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a
person's acquittal must be based on the fact that he did not commit the offense.
13
If the acquittal is
based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not
mean he did not commit the act complained of.
14
It may only be that the facts proved did not
constitute the offense charged.
15

Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; (2) where the court
declared the accused's liability is not criminal but only civil in nature and (3) where the civil liability
does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.
16

In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to respondent. As found by the CA, her
supposed civil liability had already been fully satisfied and extinguished by payment. The statements
of the appellate court leave no doubt that respondent, who was acquitted from the charges against
her, had already been completely relieved of civil liability:
[Petitioner] does not dispute the fact that payments have already been made by petitioner in
[the stated] amounts but argues that the Demand Draft represented payment of a previous
obligation. However, no evidence of whatever nature was presented by the prosecution
to substantiate their claim that there was indeed a previous obligation involving the
same amount for which the demand draft was given. Except for this bare allegation,
which is self-serving, no documentary evidence was ever adduced that there were
previous transactions involving the subject amount.
Likewise, [petitioner] admitted having received the cash payments from petitioner on a daily
basis but argues that the same were applied to interest payments only. It however appears
that [petitioner] was charging [respondent] with an exorbitant rate of intereston a daily
basis. xxx In any event, the cash payments [made] were recorded at the back of the
cigarette cartons by [petitioner] in her own handwriting as testified to by [respondent]
and her employees, Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. Indeed, the daily cash
payments marked in evidence as Exhibits 7 to 15 reveal that [respondent] had already
paid her obligation to [petitioner] in the amount of P5,780,000.00 as of July 21, 1997
and that she stopped making further payments when she realized that she had already
paid such amount.
From the foregoing, it would appear that [respondent] made a total payment of
P6,980,000.00, inclusive of the P1,200,000.00 Demand Draft, which is definitely much
more than P1,150,000.00, the amount she actually borrowed from [petitioner]. These
facts were never rebutted by [petitioner].
Moreover, we find no evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that there was a
stipulation in writing that interest will be paid by [respondent] on her loan obligations [as
required under Article 1956 of the Civil Code].
xxx xxx xxx
By and large, the obligation of [respondent] has already been extinguished long before the
encashment of the subject checks. A check is said to apply for account only when there is
still a pre-existing obligation. In the case at bench, the pre-existing obligation was
extinguished after full payment was made by [respondent]. We therefore find the clear and
convincing documentary evidence of payment presented by [respondent] worthy of
credence.
17
(emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The October 30, 2001 decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 23054 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, J.J., concur.


Footnotes
1
The Court of Appeals was impleaded as a respondent but we have excluded it pursuant to
Section 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and concurred in by Associate
Justices Godardo A. Jacinto (retired) and Eloy R. Bello, Jr., of the Sixth Division of the Court
of Appeals; rollo, p. 53.
3
Anti-Bouncing Checks Law.
4
CA Decision, rollo, pp. 39-40; MCTC Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 9458-9471, id., pp.
68-69. See alsoPetition, id., pp. 21-22.
5
Samson Ching, petitioner's partner, had earlier instituted a criminal case for eleven counts
of violation of BP 22 against Nicdao, this time involving the sum of P20,950,000. It was
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9433-9443.
In Criminal Case Nos. 9433-9443, Hon. Manuel M. Tan of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court found Nicdao guilty of the charges.
Nicdao filed two separate petitions for review with the CA. The petition for review of
the RTC decision on Criminal Case Nos. DH-848-99 to DH-858-99 was docketed as
CA-G.R. No. 23055. Meanwhile, the petition involving Criminal Case Nos. DH-859-99
to DH-872-99, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 23054, is the subject matter of this petition.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for consolidation of the two petitions
on October 13, 1999 pursuant to Section 7 (b) (1) of the 1988 Revised Rules of the
CA.
Without resolving and acting on the motion for consolidation, the CA, through
Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero, decided CA-G.R. No. 23055 on November
22, 1999. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and acquitted Nicdao.
Samson Ching questioned the civil aspect of the CA decision by way of petition for
review on certiorari before this Court. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 141181.
At the time of the filing of the present petition, G.R. No. 141181 was allegedly still
pending with the Court's First Division.
6
Rollo, p. 52.
7
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code: Criminal Law 1 (2001), p. 876. Citation omitted.
8
See also Occena v. Icamina, G.R. No. 82146, 22 January 1990, 181 SCRA 328, 333.
9
Reyes supra note 7, at 878, citing Sec. 2, par. 4, Rule III, Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
10
Boado, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code and Special Penal Laws (2002), p.
692. Citations omitted. See also Ngo v. People, G.R. No. 155815, 14 July 2004, 434 SCRA
522, 530-533; King v. People,377 Phil. 692 (1999); Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
112389-90, 1 August 1994, 234 SCRA 639.
11
Id., p. 298. Civil Code, Art. 1156.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id., p. 302. See also Reyes, supra note 7, at 879.
Civil liability may exist, although the accused is not held criminally liable, in the
following cases:
1. Acquittal on reasonable doubt (Civil Code, Art. 29)
2. Acquittal from a cause of nonimputability (Revised Penal Code, Art. 101)
3. Acquittal in the criminal action for negligence (Civil Code, Art. 2177)
4. When there is only civil responsibility (De Guzman v. Alva, 51 O.G. 1311)
5. In cases of independent civil actions (Civil Code, Arts. 31-34).
17
CA Decision, rollo, pp. 48-52. Citations omitted.


















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 127358 March 31, 2005
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, respondents.
x-------------------x
G.R. No. 127449 March 31, 2005
NOEL BUENAVENTURA, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J .:
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner
Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his
wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner,
with leave of court, amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an
amended answer denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated.
1

On July 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Declaring and decreeing the marriage entered into between plaintiff Noel A. Buenaventura
and defendant Isabel Lucia Singh Buenaventura on July 4, 1979, null and void ab initio;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos
and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision
plus attorneys fees ofP100,000.00;
3) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant expenses of litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs;
4) Ordering the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property[,] particularly the
plaintiffs separation/retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank [and] Trust
Company[,] by ceding, giving and paying to her fifty percent (50%) of the net amount
of P3,675,335.79 or P1,837,667.89 together with 12% interest per annum from the date of
this decision and one-half (1/2) of his outstanding shares of stock with Manila Memorial Park
and Provident Group of Companies;
5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh Buenaventura in the
amount ofP15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises;
6) Awarding the care and custody of the minor Javy Singh Buenaventura to his mother, the
herein defendant; and
7) Hereby authorizing the defendant to revert back to the use of her maiden family name
Singh.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the appropriate civil registry and registries of
properties.
SO ORDERED.
2

Petitioner appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending in the
appellate court, respondent filed a motion to increase the P15,000 monthly support pendente lite of
their son Javy Singh Buenaventura. Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, praying that it be denied or
that such incident be set for oral argument.
3

On September 2, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution increasing the support pendente
lite toP20,000.
4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration questioning the said Resolution.
5

On October 8, 1996, the appellate court promulgated a Decision dismissing petitioners appeal for
lack of merit and affirming in toto the trial courts decision.
6
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied. From the abovementioned Decision, petitioner filed the instant
Petition for Review on Certiorari.
On November 13, 1996, through another Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration of the September 2, 1996 Resolution, which increased the monthly support for
the son.
7
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari to question these two Resolutions.
On July 9, 1997, the Petition for Review on Certiorari
8
and the Petition for Certiorari
9
were ordered
consolidated by this Court.
10

In the Petition for Review on Certiorari petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals decided the case
not in accord with law and jurisprudence, thus:
1. WHEN IT AWARDED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT
OF P2.5 MILLION AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P1 MILLION, WITH 6% INTEREST
FROM THE DATE OF ITS DECISION, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL AND MORAL BASIS;
2. WHEN IT AWARDED P100,000.00 ATTORNEYS FEES AND P50,000.00 EXPENSES
OF LITIGATION, PLUS COSTS, TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, WITHOUT FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASIS;
3. WHEN IT ORDERED PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT NOEL TO PAY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
ONE-HALF ORP1,837,667.89 OUT OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS RECEIVED FROM
THE FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO., WITH 12% INTEREST THEREON FROM THE
DATE OF ITS DECISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT SAID RETIREMENT BENEFITS
ARE GRATUITOUS AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF NOEL, AND ALSO TO DELIVER TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE ONE-HALF OF HIS SHARES OF STOCK WITH THE MANILA
MEMORIAL PARK AND THE PROVIDENT GROUP OF COMPANIES, ALTHOUGH SAID
SHARES OF STOCK WERE ACQUIRED BY NOEL BEFORE HIS MARRIAGE TO
RESPONDENT ISABEL AND ARE, THEREFORE, AGAIN HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTIES;
AND
4. WHEN IT AWARDED EXCLUSIVE CARE AND CUSTODY OVER THE PARTIES MINOR
CHILD TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE WITHOUT ASKING THE CHILD (WHO WAS
ALREADY 13 YEARS OLD AT THAT TIME) HIS CHOICE AS TO WHOM, BETWEEN HIS
TWO PARENTS, HE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CUSTODY OVER HIS PERSON.
11

In the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner advances the following contentions:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED
TO SET RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR INCREASED SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES
SON FOR HEARING.
12

THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO INCREASE JAVYS
MONTHLY SUPPORT OF P15,000.00 BEING GIVEN BY PETITIONER EVEN AT
PRESENT PRICES.
13

IN RESOLVING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR THE INCREASE OF JAVYS SUPPORT,
THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXAMINED THE LIST OF EXPENSES
SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN THE LIGHT OF PETITIONERS OBJECTIONS
THERETO, INSTEAD OF MERELY ASSUMING THAT JAVY IS ENTITLED TO A P5,000
INCREASE IN SUPPORT AS SAID AMOUNT IS "TOO MINIMAL."
14

LIKEWISE, THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE GIVEN PETITIONER AN
OPPORTUNITY TO PROVE HIS PRESENT INCOME TO SHOW THAT HE CANNOT
AFFORD TO INCREASE JAVYS SUPPORT.
15

With regard to the first issue in the main case, the Court of Appeals articulated:
On Assignment of Error C, the trial court, after findings of fact ascertained from the
testimonies not only of the parties particularly the defendant-appellee but likewise, those of
the two psychologists, awarded damages on the basis of Articles 21, 2217 and 2229 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
Thus, the lower court found that plaintiff-appellant deceived the defendant-appellee into
marrying him by professing true love instead of revealing to her that he was under heavy
parental pressure to marry and that because of pride he married defendant-appellee; that he
was not ready to enter into marriage as in fact his career was and always would be his first
priority; that he was unable to relate not only to defendant-appellee as a husband but also to
his son, Javy, as a father; that he had no inclination to make the marriage work such that in
times of trouble, he chose the easiest way out, that of leaving defendantappellee and their
son; that he had no desire to keep defendant-appellee and their son as proved by his
reluctance and later, refusal to reconcile after their separation; that the aforementioned
caused defendant-appellee to suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation,
sleepless nights not only in those years the parties were together but also after and
throughout their separation.
Plaintiff-appellant assails the trial courts decision on the ground that unlike those arising
from a breach in ordinary contracts, damages arising as a consequence of marriage may not
be awarded. While it is correct that there is, as yet, no decided case by the Supreme Court
where damages by reason of the performance or non-performance of marital obligations
were awarded, it does not follow that no such award for damages may be made.
Defendant-appellee, in her amended answer, specifically prayed for moral and exemplary
damages in the total amount of 7 million pesos. The lower court, in the exercise of its
discretion, found full justification of awarding at least half of what was originally prayed for.
We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.
16

The award by the trial court of moral damages is based on Articles 2217 and 21 of the Civil Code,
which read as follows:
ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The trial court referred to Article 21 because Article 2219
17
of the Civil Code enumerates the cases in
which moral damages may be recovered and it mentions Article 21 as one of the instances. It must
be noted that Article 21 states that the individual must willfully cause loss or injury to another. There
is a need that the act is willful and hence done in complete freedom. In granting moral damages,
therefore, the trial court and the Court of Appeals could not but have assumed that the acts on which
the moral damages were based were done willfully and freely, otherwise the grant of moral damages
would have no leg to stand on.
On the other hand, the trial court declared the marriage of the parties null and void based on Article
36 of the Family Code, due to psychological incapacity of the petitioner, Noel Buenaventura. Article
36 of the Family Code states:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:
. . . no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. . . .
18

The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as
proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful
and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a
product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate
inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the
petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same
set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of
entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by
a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such
evidence appears to have been adduced in this case.
For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes
the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the
private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner.
Therefore, the award of moral damages was without basis in law and in fact.
Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary damages
cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
19

With respect to the grant of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation the trial court explained, thus:
Regarding Attorneys fees, Art. 2208 of the Civil Code authorizes an award of attorneys fees
and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, when as in this case the plaintiffs act or
omission has compelled the defendant to litigate and to incur expenses of litigation to protect
her interest (par. 2), and where the Court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation should be recovered. (par. 11)
20

The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:
On Assignment of Error D, as the award of moral and exemplary damages is fully justified,
the award of attorneys fees and costs of litigation by the trial court is likewise fully justified.
21

The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological incapacity,
and his act in filing the complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly
compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both are grounded on petitioners psychological
incapacity, which as explained above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with
the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for attorneys fees and litigation
expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the
award of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis.
Anent the retirement benefits received from the Far East Bank and Trust Co. and the shares of stock
in the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of Companies, the trial court said:
The third issue that must be resolved by the Court is what to do with the assets of the
conjugal partnership in the event of declaration of annulment of the marriage. The Honorable
Supreme Court has held that the declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a
judgment for the liquidation of property (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No.
104818, Sept. 17, 1993, 226 SCRA, pp. 572 573, 586). Thus, speaking through Justice
Flerida Ruth P. Romero, it was ruled in this case:
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment
therein shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of
the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in the
previous proceedings.
The parties here were legally married on July 4, 1979, and therefore, all property acquired
during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved (Art. 116, New Family Code; Art. 160, Civil Code). Art. 117 of the Family
Code enumerates what are conjugal partnership properties. Among others they are the
following:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses;
2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the
spouses;
3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the
common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each
spouse. . . .
Applying the foregoing legal provisions, and without prejudice to requiring an inventory of
what are the parties conjugal properties and what are the exclusive properties of each
spouse, it was disclosed during the proceedings in this case that the plaintiff who worked first
as Branch Manager and later as Vice-President of Far East Bank & Trust Co. received
separation/retirement package from the said bank in the amount of P3,701,500.00 which
after certain deductions amounting to P26,164.21 gave him a net amount ofP3,675,335.79
and actually paid to him on January 9, 1995 (Exhs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11). Not having shown
debts or obligations other than those deducted from the said retirement/separation pay,
under Art. 129 of the Family Code "The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties
shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless
a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlement or unless there
has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code." In this
particular case, however, there had been no marriage settlement between the parties, nor
had there been any voluntary waiver or valid forfeiture of the defendant wifes share in the
conjugal partnership properties. The previous cession and transfer by the plaintiff of his one-
half (1/2) share in their residential house and lot covered by T.C.T. No. S-35680 of the
Registry of Deeds of Paraaque, Metro Manila, in favor of the defendant as stipulated in their
Compromise Agreement dated July 12, 1993, and approved by the Court in its Partial
Decision dated August 6, 1993, was actually intended to be in full settlement of any and all
demands for past support. In reality, the defendant wife had allowed some concession in
favor of the plaintiff husband, for were the law strictly to be followed, in the process of
liquidation of the conjugal assets, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated
shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom
their only child has chosen to remain (Art. 129, par. 9). Here, what was done was one-half
(1/2) portion of the house was ceded to defendant so that she will not claim anymore for past
unpaid support, while the other half was transferred to their only child as his presumptive
legitime.
Consequently, nothing yet has been given to the defendant wife by way of her share in the
conjugal properties, and it is but just, lawful and fair, that she be given one-half (1/2) share of
the separation/retirement benefits received by the plaintiff the same being part of their
conjugal partnership properties having been obtained or derived from the labor, industry,
work or profession of said defendant husband in accordance with Art. 117, par. 2 of the
Family Code. For the same reason, she is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the outstanding shares
of stock of the plaintiff husband with the Manila Memorial Park and the Provident Group of
Companies.
22

The Court of Appeals articulated on this matter as follows:
On Assignment of Error E, plaintiff-appellant assails the order of the trial court for him to give
one-half of his separation/retirement benefits from Far East Bank & Trust Company and half
of his outstanding shares in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of Companies to the
defendant-appellee as the latters share in the conjugal partnership.
On August 6, 1993, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the Compromise
Agreement entered into by the parties. In the same Compromise Agreement, the parties had
agreed that henceforth, their conjugal partnership is dissolved. Thereafter, no steps were
taken for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Finding that defendant-appellee is entitled to at least half of the separation/retirement
benefits which plaintiff-appellant received from Far East Bank & Trust Company upon his
retirement as Vice-President of said company for the reason that the benefits accrued from
plaintiffappellants service for the bank for a number of years, most of which while he was
married to defendant-appellee, the trial court adjudicated the same. The same is true with
the outstanding shares of plaintiff-appellant in Manila Memorial Park and Provident Group of
Companies. As these were acquired by the plaintiff-appellant at the time he was married to
defendant-appellee, the latter is entitled to one-half thereof as her share in the conjugal
partnership. We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the trial court.
23

Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of
Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the
general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime
applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
In Valdes v. Regional Trial Court, Branch 102, Quezon City,
24
this Court expounded on the
consequences of a void marriage on the property relations of the spouses and specified the
applicable provisions of law:
The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the
provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article
147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous
cases; it provides:
ART. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall
be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did
not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed
to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in
the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of
the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common
children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the
cohabitation.
This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a
void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in
the first paragraph of the law) refers to thelegal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e.,
any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care
and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits
of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Article 147 of the Family Code, in substance and to the above extent, has clarified Article
144 of the Civil Code; in addition, the law now expressly provides that
(a) Neither party can dispose or encumber by act[s] inter vivos [of] his or her share in co-
ownership property, without the consent of the other, during the period of cohabitation; and
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith shall forfeit his or her share in the
co-ownership in favor of their common children; in default thereof or waiver by any or all of
the common children, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants, or still in default thereof, to the innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place
upon the termination of the cohabitation or declaration of nullity of the marriage.

In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the settlement of the parties' common
property, the trial court acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which had
jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be deemed likewise clothed with authority
to resolve incidental and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling
that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property
in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property
owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles
50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail.
The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership of gains, the property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in
the latter case until the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-
ownership that exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the
Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its
explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of
the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of
a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule
that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are
inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to establish their
nullity. In now requiring for purposes of remarriage, the declaration of nullity by final
judgment of the previously contracted void marriage, the present law aims to do away with
any continuing uncertainty on the status of the second marriage. It is not then illogical for the
provisions of Article 43, in relation to Articles 41 and 42, of the Family Code, on the effects of
the termination of a subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of a previous
marriage to be made applicable pro hac vice. In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that
the law has also meant to have coincident property relations, on the one hand, between
spouses in valid and voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the other, between
common-law spouses or spouses of void marriages, leaving to ordain, in the latter case, the
ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provision of Article 147 and Article 148 of the
Family Code. It must be stressed, nevertheless, even as it may merely state the obvious,
that the provisions of the Family Code on the "family home," i.e., the provisions found in Title
V, Chapter 2, of the Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of the property
regime of the spouses.
25

Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be
covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have
been included or involved in said distribution. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties owned in common by the parties herein as ordered by the court a quo should, therefore,
be sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains.
As to the issue on custody of the parties over their only child, Javy Singh Buenaventura, it is now
moot since he is about to turn twenty-five years of age on May 27, 2005
26
and has, therefore,
attained the age of majority.
With regard to the issues on support raised in the Petition for Certiorari, these would also now be
moot, owing to the fact that the son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, as previously stated, has attained
the age of majority.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 8, 1996 and its Resolution dated
December 10, 1996 which are contested in the Petition for Review (G.R. No. 127449), are hereby
MODIFIED, in that the award of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, expenses of
litigation and costs are deleted. The order giving respondent one-half of the retirement benefits of
petitioner from Far East Bank and Trust Co. and one-half of petitioners shares of stock in Manila
Memorial Park and in the Provident Group of Companies is sustained but on the basis of the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the co-ownership and not of the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains. The rest of said Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari (G.R. No. 127358) contesting the Court of Appeals Resolutions
of September 2, 1996 and November 13, 1996 which increased the support pendente lite in favor of
the parties son, Javy Singh Buenaventura, is now MOOT and ACADEMIC and is, accordingly,
DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., concur.


Footnotes
1
Rollo (G.R. No.127449), p. 54.
2
Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), p. 76.
3
Rollo (G.R. No. 127358), pp. 7-8.
4
Id. at 136.
5
Id. at 138.
6
Id. at 144.
7
Id. at 153.
8
G.R. No. 127449.
9
G.R. No. 127358.
10
Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), p. 100.
11
Id. at 32.
12
Rollo (G. R. No.127358) p. 11.
13
Id. at 15.
14
Id. at 17.
15
Id. at 20.
16
Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), pp. 81-82.
17
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
. . .
18
Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 34.
Emphasis supplied.
19
Article 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
20
Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), p. 67.
21
Id. at 82.
22
Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), pp. 69 -71.
23
Id. at 82-83.
24
G.R. No. 122749, 31 July 1996, 260 SCRA 221.
25
Id. at 226-234. (Emphasis in the original.)
26
Javy Singh Buenaventura was born on May 27, 1980; Rollo (G.R. No. 127449), p. 56.




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. NO. 158896 October 27, 2004
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 01
July 2003, reversing the decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City,
dated 31 January 2001, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by
respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco ("respondent Manuel").
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and respondent Manuel were married at
civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that
they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they
named Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together, respondent Manuel
filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita.
He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish
attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she
incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly
parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables,
chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard
at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she
would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the house within the hearing of their
neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional advancement as she did not even give
him moral support and encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose before marriage,
rooted in her deep-seated resentment and vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and
appreciation from her own parents since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and
incurable and, even if treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the
emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and that he endured and suffered through his
turbulent and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their
conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her so that he could
be free to marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was respondent Manuel
who was remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all his
endeavors despite his philandering; that she was raised in a real happy family and had a happy
childhood contrary to what was stated in the complaint.
In the pre-trial order,
3
the parties only stipulated on the following:
1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;
2. That they have one son who is already 20 years old.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took the witness stand and
elaborated on the allegations in his petition. He testified that his parents never approved of his
marriage as they still harbored hope that he would return to the seminary.
4
The early years of their
marriage were difficult years as they had a hard time being accepted as husband and wife by his
parents and it was at this period that his wife started exhibiting signs of being irritable and
temperamental
5
to him and his parents.
6
She was also obsessive about cleanliness which became
the common source of their quarrels.
7
He, however, characterized their union as happy during that
period of time in 1979 when they moved to Malolos as they were engrossed in furnishing their new
house.
8
In 1981, when he became busy with law school and with various community organizations, it
was then that he felt that he and his wife started to drift apart.
9
He then narrated incidents during
their marriage that were greatly embarrassing and/or distressing to him, e.g., when his wife
quarreled with an elderly neighbor;
10
when she would visit him in his office and remark that the
curtains were already dirty or when she kicked a trash can across the room or when she threw a
ballpen from his table;
11
when she caused his office drawer to be forcibly opened while he was
away;
12
when she confronted a female tenant of theirs and accused the tenant of having an affair
with him;
13
and other incidents reported to him which would show her jealous nature. Money matters
continued to be a source of bitter quarrels.
14
Respondent Manuel could not forget that he was not
able to celebrate his appointment as judge in 1995 as his wife did not approve it, ostensibly for lack
of money, but she was very generous when it came to celebrations of their parish
priest.
15
Respondent Manuel then denied that he was a womanizer
16
or that he had a
mistress.
17
Lastly, respondent Manuel testified as to their conjugal properties and obligations.
18

Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuels Clerk of Court, testified that petitioner Juanita seldom
went to respondent Manuels office.
19
But when she was there, she would call witness to complain
about the curtains and the cleanliness of the office.
20
One time, witness remembered petitioner
Juanita rummaging through respondent Manuels drawer looking for his address book while the latter
was in Subic attending a conference.
21
When petitioner Juanita could not open a locked drawer she
called witness, telling the latter that she was looking for the telephone number of respondents hotel
room in Subic. A process server was requested by petitioner Juanita to call for a locksmith in the
town proper. When the locksmith arrived, petitioner Juanita ordered him to open the locked drawer.
On another occasion, particularly in August of 1998, witness testified that she heard petitioner
Juanita remark to respondent Manuel "sino bang batang bibinyagan na yan? Baka anak mo yan sa
labas?"
22

As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA whose professional
qualifications as a psychiatrist were admitted by petitioner Juanita.
23
From her psychiatric
evaluation,
24
Dr. Garcia concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco contributed to
the marital collapse. There is a partner relational problem which affected their capacity to
sustain the marital bond with love, support and understanding.
The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth Edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM IV) is secondary to the psychopathology of
both spouses. Manuel and Juanita had engaged themselves in a defective communication
pattern which is characteristically negative and deformed. This affected their competence to
maintain the love and respect that they should give to each other.
Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both partners who are expected to
use healthy strategies to solve their disputes and differences. Whereas Juanita would be
derogatory, critical, argumentative, depressive and obsessive-compulsive, Manuel makes
use of avoidance and suppression. In his effort to satisfy the self and to boost his masculine
ego to cover up for his felt or imagined inadequacies, he became callused to the detrimental
effects of his unfaithfulness and his failure to prioritize the marriage. Both spouses, who
display narcissistic psychological repertoire (along with their other maladaptive traits), failed
to adequately empathize (or to be responsive and sensitive) to each others needs and
feelings. The matrimonial plot is not conducive to a healthy and a progressive marriage.
Manuel and Juanita have shown their psychologically [sic] incapacity to satisfactorily comply
with the fundamental duties of marriage. The clashing of their patterns of maladaptive traits,
which warrant the diagnosis of personality disorder not otherwise specified (PDNOS, with
code 301.9 as per DSM IV criteria) will bring about more emotional mishaps and
psychopathology. These rigid sets of traits which were in existence before the marriage will
tend to be pervasive and impervious to recovery.
25

In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuels allegations. She insisted that they
were a normal couple who had their own share of fights; that they were happily married until
respondent Manuel started having extra-marital affairs
26
which he had admitted to her.
27
Petitioner
Juanita professed that she would wish to preserve her marriage and that she truly loved her
husband.
28
She stated further that she has continuously supported respondent Manuel, waiting up
for him while he was in law school to serve him food and drinks. Even when he already filed the
present case, she would still attend to his needs.
29
She remembered that after the pre-trial, while
they were in the hallway, respondent Manuel implored her to give him a chance to have a new
family.
30

DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent
Manuel,
31
testified that he conducted a psychiatric evaluation on petitioner Juanita, the results of
which were embodied in his report. Said report stated in part:
Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the psychological tests, respondent
Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco, was found to be a mature, conservative, religious and
highly intelligent woman who possess [sic] more than enough psychological potentials for a
mutually satisfying long term heterosexual relationship. Superego is strong and she is
respectful of traditional institutions of society like the institution of marriage. She was also
found to be a loving, nurturing and self-sacrificing woman who is capable of enduring severe
environmental stress in her social milieu. Finally, she is reality-oriented and therefore
capable of rendering fair and sound decision.
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to be psychologically
capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.
32

CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since 1992 described the Siayngcos as the
ideal couple, sweet to each other.
33
The couple would religiously attend prayer meetings in the
community.
34
Both were likewise leaders in their community.
35
Witness then stated that she would
often go to the house of the couple and, as late as March 2000, she still saw respondent Manuel
there.
36

On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuels petition for declaration of nullity of
his marriage to petitioner Juanita holding in part that:
The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not preponderantly supported in
evidence. The couple [was] happily married and after four years of marital bliss [was] blest
with a son. Their life together continued years thereafter in peace and prosperity.
The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical, depressed and obsessive doubtless
arose later in the parties relationship sometime in the early 90s when the defendant-wife
started receiving letters that the plaintiff is playing footsy.
x x x x x x x x x
The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-jerk responses to slight stabs
of the Pavlovian hammer on marital relations. A wife, as in the instant case, may have
succumbed, due to her jealousy, to the constant delivery of irritating curtain lectures to her
husband. But, as our laws now stand, the dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in
such cases. In contrast to some countries, our laws do not look at a marital partner as a
mere refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he or she sometimes may sound like a firetruck.
37

A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order dated 04 May 2001.
38

On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric
evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the
case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals.
39
Thus:
The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of plaintiff
Manuel and defendant Juanita. It appears that there is empathy between plaintiff and
defendant. That is a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced
not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each others feelings at a time it
is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is
definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love
"amore gignit amorem", sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise conscious of
its value as a sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 324).
This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no
less, but reverse and set aside the decision of the lower court. Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to
have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity, not only of
defendant but also of himself.
40

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred
I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED
II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT SEPARATED ON
MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING TOGETHER AS HUSBAND
AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION UP TO THE PRESENT
III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V. MOLINA
IV. IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT NULL
AND VOID ON GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF
THE FAMILY CODE
The Courts Ruling
Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag
41
is apropos. There, we held that whether or not
psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage
depends crucially on the facts of the case. Each case must be closely scrutinized and judged
according to its own facts as there can be no case that is on "all fours" with another. This, the Court
of Appeals did not heed.
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear divergence in
its factual milieu with the case at bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple involved therein, despite sharing
the same bed from the time of their wedding night on 22 May 1988 until their separation on 15 March
1989, never had coitus. The perplexed wife filed the petition for the declaration of the nullity of her
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of her husband. We sustained the wife for the
reason that an essential marital obligation under the Family Code is procreation such that "the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity."
On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue herein. Rather, we have here a
case of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by his wifes outbursts and overbearing ways,
who finds his wifes obsession with cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is
wounded by her lack of support and respect for his person and his position as a Judge. In our book,
however, these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel to file a case
against her do not amount to psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals
42
where we declared that "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should
refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
43
In Republic v. Court of Appeals
44
we expounded:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code
echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically
identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts.
45

With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the issue of whether or not the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against
petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.
A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL
We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition
of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution.
46
With this cardinal state policy in mind, we held in Republic v. Court of
Appeals
47
that the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff (respondent
Manuel herein). Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that respondent Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated. The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuels
own evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position to
gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations of marriage:
She talked about her spouse, "My husband is kind, a good provider, cool, intelligent but a
liar, masamang magalit at gastador. In spite of what he has done to me, I take care of him
whenever he is sick. He is having extra marital affairs because he wants to have a child. I
believe that our biggest problem is not having a child. It is his obsession to have a child with
his girl now. He started his relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them together in the
car. I think that it was the girl who encouraged him to file the petition." She feels that the
problems in the relationship is [sic] "paulit-ulit," but, that she still is willing to pursue it.
x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is not really psychologically
incapacitated. He apparently told her, "You and Jeremy should give me a chance to have a
new family." She answered and said, "Ikaw tinuruan mo akong to fight for my right.
Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage natin."
48

What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the
parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was
not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.
49
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not
constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.
50
It must be shown
that respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes
him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state
51
and not merely
due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel
has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child at that particular
point."
52

B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA
As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wifes lack
of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling
nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are
grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception of
the marriage or that they are incurable.
53
In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was
admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply
with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.
54

The psychological report of respondent Manuels witness, Dr. Garcia, on the other hand, does not
help his case any. Nothing in there supports the doctors conclusion that petitioner Juanita is
psychologically incapacitated. On the contrary, the report clearly shows that the root cause of
petitioner Juanitas behavior is traceable not from the inception of their marriage as required by law
but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws disapproval of her as they wanted
their son to enter the priesthood,
55
her husbands philandering, admitted no less by him,
56
and her
inability to conceive.
57
Dr. Garcias report paints a story of a husband and wife who grew
professionally during the marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to the hilt, becoming busier
and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by
respondent Manuel himself during his direct examination.
58

Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a window into
the Siayngcoss life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart,
becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a
way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
59
As we
stated in Marcos v. Marcos:
60

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts
the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent Manuel might be
experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working.
Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the
specific answers to every individual problem.
61

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 01 July 2003 of the
Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 31 January 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is reinstated and given full force and effect. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Per Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria (Chairman) and concurred in by Justices Andres B. Reyes,
Jr. and Regalado E. Maambong.
2
Penned by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.
3
RTC Record, p. 36.
4
TSN, 07 October 1998, p. 10.
5
Id. at 13.
6
Id. at 13-14.
7
Id. at 16-17.
8
Id. at 19.
9
Id. at 20-22.
10
Id. at 23.
11
Id. at 28-29.
12
Id. at 34.
13
Id. at 30.
14
Id. at 27-28.
15
Id. at 33.
16
Id. at 30.
17
Id. at 37.
18
Id. at 43-44.
19
TSN, 27 January 1999, p. 3.
20
TSN, 25 November 1998, p. 15.
21
Id. at 9-13.
22
Id. at 14.
23
TSN, 10 May 1999, p. 5.
24
Exh. "M" for petitioner Manuel, respondent herein.
25
Records, pp. 114-115.
26
TSN, 29 March 2000, pp. 5-6.
27
Id. at 7.
28
Id. at 11.
29
Id. at 12.
30
Id. at 22.
31
TSN, 21 June 2000, p. 5.
32
Records, p. 169.
33
TSN, 14 July 2000, p. 4.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
36
Id. at 6.
37
RTC Records, pp. 205-206.
38
Id. at 209.
39
G.R. No. 119190, 16 January 1997, 266 SCRA 324.
40
Rollo, p. 43.
41
G.R. No. 109975, 09 February 2001, 351 SCRA 425.
42
G.R. No. 112019, 04 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20.
43
Id.; Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 755.
44
G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997, 268 SCRA 198.
45
At pp. 209-212. The above pronouncements have been modified by the provisions of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages which took effect on 15 March 2003, particularly Section 2(d) thereof
which provides:
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically
allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the
time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.
Previously, the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitted the
"Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders and its
Rationale" enunciated among other things, that:
3. Attachment of expert opinion to petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage under Article 36 is dispensed with. Instead, the court shall determine the
advisability of expert testimony during the pre-trial conference.
x x x x x x x x x
12. The certification of the Solicitor General required in the Molina case is dispensed
with to avoid delay.
46
Sec. 12, Art. II, Constitution.
47
Supra, note 43.
48
Dr. Garcias psychological report, Exh. "M" (RTC Record at 110).
49
See Art. 68, Family Code.
50
Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 42; Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
126010, 08 December 1999, 320 SCRA 76; Dedel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151867, 29
January 2004.
51
Ibid.
52
Supra, note 46 at 111.
53
Marcos v. Marcos, supra, note 43 at 764.
54
RTC Record at 169.
55
Supra, note 46 at 102-103.
56
Id. at 111.
57
Id. at 110.
58
Q: Did your wife agree to your going to law school?
A: I did not encounter any objection from her.
Q: And what was the marriage like during this time when you were attending law
school?
A: I started feeling that we somehow begun (sic) drifting apart because I was
developing a new field of interest in the legal profession. I was occupied with leading
various community organization (sic) including homeowners association. Maybe that
was when we started drifting apart. (TSN, 07 October 1998, at 22)
59
Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 44 at 207.
60
Supra, note 43 at 765.
61
Dedel v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 50, citing Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra, note
42, at 36.




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J .:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love
transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always
disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in
the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouses capability to fulfill the marital
obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision
1
and Resolution
2
of the Court of Appeals
dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment
3
of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner)
and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and
affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was
36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the
Gospel
4
at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding
5
at the Sta. Rosa de Lima
Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.
6
Out of their union, a child was born
on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,
7
petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and
void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted
that respondents incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to
the present.
8

As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that
respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things,
9
to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,
10
and instead
introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth
about the boys parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.
11

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when
in fact, no such incident occurred.
12

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told
some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.
13

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording
Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing
activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the
Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect
14
but petitioner
discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken
place.
15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent
lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one
moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million.
16
Petitioner later found out that
respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in
one of their quarrels.
17
He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments
of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.
18

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it
appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told
petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer.
19
She spent lavishly on unnecessary
items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.
20

(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to
monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from
her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he
finally left her for good in November 1991.
21

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist,
and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that
petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other
hand, they observed that respondents persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based
on love, trust and respect.
22
They further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also
pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that
petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.
23

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending
to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she
fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities.
24
She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her
husband.
25

(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent
from Davids act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.
26

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the
Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.
27

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and
she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola,
Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording
artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office
after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine
Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.
28

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were
not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while
Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.
29

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked
the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to
monitor her husbands whereabouts.
30

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her
monthly budget of P7,000.00.
31

In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the
other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that
the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her
part.
32

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the
allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted
by his assistant,
33
together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-
Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was
not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that
regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which
are signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.
34

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as
(i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondents psychological evaluation, and
(ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can
fake the results of such test.
35

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that respondents
propensity to lying about almost anythingher occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her
income, among othershad been duly established. According to the trial court, respondents fantastic
ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe.
This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.
36
The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the
part of the parties.
37
During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan
Tribunals ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,
which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.
38
Subsequently,
the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.
39

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the
appellate court reversed the RTCs judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been
completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the
evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondents psychological incapacity. It declared
that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals
40
governing the application and
interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court.
He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondents psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by
the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.
41
It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the
conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from
the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.
42
The Court is
likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence
presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient
to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.
43

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the
crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets
the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
These standards were definitively laid down in the Courts 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of
Appeals
44
(also known as the Molina case
45
), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited
the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar.
46
Since Molinawas decided in 1997,
the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
47
In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming
Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,
48
wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was
psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by
Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.
49
Yet
what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly
onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity
under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article
36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."
50
The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel
in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the
dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full
enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage."
51
Marriages with such persons were
ordained as void,
52
in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already
married, among others. A partys mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce
Law of 1917,
53
but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration
was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.
54
Divorce on the ground of a
spouses incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese
occupation.
55
Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of
"unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.
56
The
mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a
marriage void ab initio.
57
Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of
the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.
58

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity
impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.
59
The initial
common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did
not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the
Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is
not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a
marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.
60
Dr. Tolentino
likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the
marriage."
61

There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family
Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the
marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a
cause for annulment of the marriage only."
62
At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different
if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this
would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."
63
These concerns though were answered,
beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,
64
wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged
that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."
65

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of
marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in
the Molina
66
case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban
observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereto."
67
Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume."
68

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal
wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."
69
At the same time, it has been consistently
recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the
revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision ona case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."
70

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:
71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage,
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to
say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court.
72

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the
revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological
incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case,
current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices
of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have
been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary
framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the
same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-
to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of
Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case
shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the
considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but
unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the
concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law,
73
and as one member admitted,
enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still
existent under civil law.
74
It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church
doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly
acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local
Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
75
Still, it must
be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of
Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into
the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression.
Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts,
judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.
76

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication
of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in
denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution,
which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and
that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a
social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define
all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on
whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that
such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the
case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect
marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the
Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects,
imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a
petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such
action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained
decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need
not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically
incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection
of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family,
which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to
defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36
do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock
among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of
petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation
in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law
on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
77

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification
stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition.
78
This requirement however was
dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
79
Still, Article 48 of the
Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case,
considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity.
In any event, the fiscals participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records
of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the
great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of
Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had
consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question
remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity,
consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his
spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on
his wifes behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel
Pavillon which disputed respondents claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also
presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant
behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below
considered petitioners evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that
respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.
80

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be
able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action
cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State
interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting
attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish
the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion
among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial
courts decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited
unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and
inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of
lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among
others.
81

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical
causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such
witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of
at least two (2) major hospitals,
82
testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a
couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems
(sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and
repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an
individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then
incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the
lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You
see, relationship is based on communication between individuals and what we generally
communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings,
[you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to
happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that
should be based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying
and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the
petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioners officemates and ask him
(sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is
specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about
this, Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no
actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to
the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as
we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or
pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another
woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different women,
then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated
to perform the basic obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Maam.
83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of
respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a]
pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."
84

These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record,
particularly the trial transcripts of respondents testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of
petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held
in Marcos v. Marcos
85
that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for
the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
86
We deem the methodology utilized by
petitioners witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and
Lopezs common conclusion of respondents psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own
acceptance of petitioners version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself
accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of
psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of
psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her
actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her
occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to
invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making
her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In
persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist
presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to
psychological incapacity.
87

Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of
and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from
fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about
her natural childs real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after
their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had
shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife.
Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the
belief that respondents psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that
any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order
to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent
to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court
were emphatic on respondents inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her
mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondents inability to understand and
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between
fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond,
much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including
parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or
emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a
reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not
convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage
hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
Respondents ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at
best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondents ability to adhere to the truth,
her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage
may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which
enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such
fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw
linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under
Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to,
and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of
respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to
psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced
by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial
court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic
tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the
marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed
this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision
despite petitioners efforts to bring the matter to its attention.
88
Such deliberate ignorance is in
contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the
marriage in question in a Conclusion
89
dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the
part of respondent.
90
Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal,
91
and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.
92
In fact, respondents psychological incapacity was
considered so grave that a restrictive clause
93
was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting
respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunals consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically
defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and
employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the
practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation
of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the
depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert
Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality
constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the
Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent
in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty
impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and
reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial
consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack
of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.
94

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but
also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the
marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial
court, of the veracity of petitioners allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondents
version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic
Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of
the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant
recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity
be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of
Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear
certain that respondents condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.
95

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her,
desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondents aberrant behavior remained
unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From
this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondents condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondents condition is
incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondents psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a
remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioners expert witnesses characterized
respondents condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological
incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts taciturnity on this point.
The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision
on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made
explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other
provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by
first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee,
96
then the opinion of canonical
scholars,
97
before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological
incapacity.
98
Santos did refer to Justice Caguioas opinion expressed during the deliberations that
"psychological incapacity is incurable,"
99
and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized
"by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
100
However, in formulating the doctrinal
rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a
characteristic of psychological incapacity.
101

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its
own ruling that remained silent on whether respondents psychological incapacity was incurable.
Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be
established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the
time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial courts decision that
required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time
when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,
102
the Court countered an argument
that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a
part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted.
103
Yet we approach this present case from
utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without
expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses
that respondents psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no
legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly
propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to
those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where
presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to
adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological
incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily
on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert
medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to
present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years
ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of
respondents psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts
are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider
incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that
respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as
having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological
state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for
nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondents avowed commitment to
remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid
sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of
people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring
the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family
Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Asscociate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Attestation by the Divisions
Chairman, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice


Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, concurred in by Associate Justices Renato
C. Dacudao and Mariano C. Del Castillo; See rollo, pp. 67-84.
2
Rollo, p. 86.
3
Penned by Judge (now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Josefina Guevara-
Salonga.
4
Solemnized by Rev. Victor M. Navarro, Minister of the PCCC, Las Pias, Metro Manila.
5
Solemnized by the Parish Priest, Rev. Fr. Rodolfo Aguirre Gallardo.
6
Rollo, pp. 69, 91.
7
Records, pp. 1-5.
8
Id. at 1-2.
9
Id. at 2-3. See also rollo, pp. 69, 91.
10
Named Tito F. Reyes II, born on 21 January 1982.
11
Supra note 8.
12
Rollo, pp. 69, 92.
13
Id. at 70, 92.
14
Id. at 95.
15
Supra note 13.
16
Id. at 70, 92.
17
TSN, 8 September 1993, p. 12.
18
Id. at 12-13. See also records, p. 91.
19
Rollo, pp. 71, 92.
20
Id.; records, p. 3.
21
Rollo, pp. 71, 92.
22
Id. at 71-72, 92-93.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 93.
25
Id. at 74, 94.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 73, 93.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 74, 94.
31
Id. at 73, 94.
32
Id. at 77-78.
33
Miss Francianina Sanches.
34
Rollo, p. 94.
35
Id. at 72, 93; TSN, 23 March 1995, pp. 15-17.
36
Rollo, pp. 95-96.
37
Id. at 97-98.
38
Id. at pp. 99-100.
39
Id. at 101-103.
40
335 Phil. 664 (1997).
41
Rollo, p. 95.
42
Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 105, 126 (1995), citing Serrano
v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 107 (1991).
43
Rollo, p. 82.
44
Supra note 40.
45
The petitioning spouse and co-respondent in the case being Roridel O. Molina. Id.
46
Rollo, p. 78.
47
There were two cases since 1997 wherein the Court did let stand a lower court order
declaring as a nullity a marriage on the basis of Article 36. These cases are Sy v. Court of
Appeals, 386 Phil. 760 (2000), and Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 127358 &
127449, 31 March 2005, 454 SCRA 261. However, in Sy, the Court found that the marriage
was void ab initio due to the lack of a marriage license at the time the marriage was
solemnized, and thus declined to pass upon the question of psychological incapacity.
In Buenaventura, since the parties chose not to challenge the trial courts conclusion of
psychological incapacity and instead raised questions on the award of damages and support,
the Court did not review the finding of psychological incapacity.
48
334 Phil. 294 (1997).
49
It does not escape this Courts attention that many lower courts do grant petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36, and that these decisions are not elevated for review to
the Supreme Court.
50
See Family Code, Art. 36.
51
Translated from the original Spanish by Justice F.C. Fisher. See F.C. Fisher, The Civil
Code of Spain with Philippine Notes and References 45 (Fifth Ed., 1947). The original text of
Article 83 (2) of the Spanish Civil Code reads: "No pueden contraer matrimonio: x x x (2) Los
que no estuvieren en el pleno ejercicio du su razon al tiempo de contraer matrimonio."
52
See Spanish Civil Code. (1889) Art. 101.
53
Act No. 2710 (1917).
54
See Act No. 3613 (1929), Sec. 30 (c)
55
See Executive Order No. 141 (1943), Sec. 2 (5).
56
Unless the party of unsound mind, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other
as husband or wife. See Civil Code, Art. 85 (3).
57
See Civil Code, Art. 80.
58
Subject to the same qualifications under Article 85 (3) of the Civil Code. See note 56.
59
See Civil Code, Art. 1327 (2) in relation to Art. 1318 (1).
60
See Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 32-33 (1995). See also A. Sempio Diy,
Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines 37 (1988). A contrary view though was
expressed by Justice Ricardo Puno, also a member of the Family Code commission. See
Santos v. Court of Appeals, ibid.
61
I A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries and Jurisprudence 274-275
(1990 ed.).
62
Id.
63
Id. at 274.
64
Supra note 60.
65
Id. at 40, emphasis supplied. The Court further added, "[t]here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to marriage." Id.
66
Supra note 40.
67
Id. at 677.
68
Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 851 (2000).
69
It may be noted that a previous incarnation of Article 36, subsequently rejected by the
Family Code Commission, stated that among those void ab initio marriages are those
"contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use
of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically
or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of
incapacity is made manifest after the celebration." See Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra
note 60, at 30.
70
Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 107-108; citing A.
Sempio-Diy, supra note 60, at 37, emphasis supplied. See also Santos v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 60, at 36; Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at 677.
71
G.R. No. 109975, 9 February 2001, 351 SCRA 425.
72
Id. at 431; citing Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198, 214 (1997), Padilla, J.,
Separate Statement.
73
See Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 32-39.
74
See Sempio-Diy, supra note 60, at 36.
75
Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at 678.
76
Thus, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, supra note 48, wherein the psychological
incapacity of the petitioner was recognized by the Court from the fact that he did not engage
in sexual relations with his wife during their ten (10) month marital cohabitation, remains a
binding precedent, even though it was decided shortly before the Molina case.
77
Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 40, at 676-680.
78
Id. at 680.
79
See Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422,
435.
80
Rollo, p. 82.
81
Records, pp. 2-3.
82
University of Santo Tomas Hospital and UERM Memorial Medical Center. Dr. Abcede
likewise was the past president of the Philippine Psychiatrist Association. TSN, February 23,
1994, p. 6.
83
TSN, 23 February 1994, pp. 7-9, 11-12.
84
TSN, 23 March 1995, p. 12.
85
397 Phil. 840 (2000).
86
Id. at 850.
87
Rollo, pp. 95-96.
88
As shown by the Motion(s) for Early Resolution of the Case filed by petitioner with the
canonical declarations attached as annexes.
89
Id. at 97-98.
90
The Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila based the decree of invalidity on
the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of both parties. On appeal, however, the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal modified the judgment by holding that lack of due
discretion applied to respondent but there was no sufficient evidence to prove lack of due
discretion on the part of petitioner. See also note 38.
91
Rollo, pp. 99-100.
92
Id. at 101-103.
93
"A restrictive clause is herewith attached to this sentence of nullity to the effect that the
respondent may not enter into another marriage without the express consent of this Tribunal,
in deference to the sanctity and dignity of the sacrament of matrimony, as well as for the
protection of the intended spouse."; rollo, p. 97.
94
Rollo, p. 99. Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.
95
Rollo, p. 82.
96
Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 60, at 30-36.
97
Id. at 37-39.
98
Id. at 39-40.
99
Id. at 33.
100
Id. at 39.
101
"It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most
importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of
the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances
(cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their
Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder
by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an
inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit
under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
"The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state
of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract
voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become
mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these
various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of
the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
"Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed.
The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable." Santos v.
Court of Appeals, id. at 39-41.
102
G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001, 356 SCRA 588.
103
Id. at 593.

















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006
MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner,
vs.
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the
Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for
failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a
Decision
1
denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The
trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order
2
dated April 20, 2001 where the trial
court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
3
in toto the judgment of the trial court. It
held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already present at the inception of
the marriage.
4
The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish the
substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at the
conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to clearly
demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in
respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the
essential marital obligations.
5

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied
6
for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for
review on certiorari with this Court. As already stated, the petition for review was denied for failure of
petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal committed any reversible error.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.
7
The Court required respondent Brix Ferraris to
file comment
8
but failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file
comment. Further, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on
petitioner's motion for reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of
marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.
9
Such factual
issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to
analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination.
10
It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court,
11
save for the most compelling and cogent
reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary
to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts,
12
which are
unavailing in the instant case.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
13
As all people may have
certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality
disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
14
It is for this
reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human
personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained,
15
which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment cases is
the presence of evidence that can adequately establish respondent's psychological
condition. Here, appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed,
the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed that respondent's
alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of
some deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the
couple's relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a
year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy
and contented with her life in the company of respondent. In fact, by petitioner's own
reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began
when petitioner started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only when they started fighting
about the calls from women that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and
failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Respondent could not understand
petitioner's lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions
irrational. Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. x x x.
x x x x
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has
a mixed personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant
type." In fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that one suffering from such mixed personality disorder
is dependent on others for decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of
theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's information that respondent had extramarital affairs
was supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and
inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" x x x. She
stated that there was a history of respondent's parents having difficulties in their relationship.
But this input on the supposed problematic history of respondent's parents also came from
petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or
supervening disabling factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in
respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby
complying with, the essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove
that respondent's supposed psychological or mental malady existed even before the
marriage. All these omissions must be held up against petitioner, for the reason that upon
her devolved the onus of establishing nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital
vinculum.
16

We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever
they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment
and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are
not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,
17
where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his
friends than his family on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his finances, the Court held that the
psychological defects spoken of were more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that
the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals
18
that habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void
based on psychological incapacity.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage.
19
No
less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
20

Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in
conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35,
21
37,
22
38,
23
and 41
24
that would
likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45
25
that would make
the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must
be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law
were indifferent on the matter.
26
Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves.
27
Neither it is to be equated with
legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.
28

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June
9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show
that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.


Footnotes
1
Rollo, pp. 96-99. Penned by Judge Franchito N. Diamante.
2
Id. at 101.
3
Id. at 9-19. Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao and concurred in by
Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Danilo B. Pine.
4
Id. at 17.
5
Id. at 18.
6
Id. at 7.
7
Id. at 208-227.
8
Id. at 228.
9
Concurring Opinion of Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil.
664, 680 (1997).
10
Abacus Real Estate Development Center, Inc. v. Manila Banking Corporation, G.R. No.
162270, April 6, 2005, 455 SCRA 97, 106.
11
Domingo v. Robles, G.R. No. 153743, March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 812, 817.
12
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Macalinao, G.R. No. 141856, February 11, 2005, 451
SCRA 63, 69.
13
Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 851 (2000).
14
Santos v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 21, 40 (1995).
15
Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 9 at 677.
16
Rollo, pp. 111-113.
17
Supra note 9 at 669 & 674.
18
377 Phil. 919, 931 (1999).
19
Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 439.
20
Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 508, 522.
21
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent
of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages
unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good
faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding
Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the
other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
22
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning,
whether the relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
23
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public
policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the
fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between the adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other
person's spouse or his or her own spouse.
24
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article
391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
25
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of
the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was
eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was
solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute
parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of
twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as
husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited
with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue
influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the
other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was inflicted with a sexually-transmitted disease found to be
serious and appears to be incurable.
26
Concurring Opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug in Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 9
at 690.
27
Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, supra note 19 at 439.
28
Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 13.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 165424 June 9, 2009
LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, Petitioner,
vs.
CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
CORONA, J .:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying
petitioners petition for review on certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The petition sought
to set aside the January 26, 2004 decision
1
and September 24, 2004 resolution
2
of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona M.
Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.
He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a "joke." After the ceremonies,
they never lived together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship. However, they
started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent
and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to stop
dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he
found out that the marriage was not "fake."
Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder, particularly
dependent and self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad
Dayan. The court a quo held that petitioners personality disorder was serious and incurable and
directly affected his capacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to respondent. It thus
declared the marriage null and void.
3

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the ground that the
totality of the evidence presented failed to establish petitioners psychological incapacity. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration. It was denied.
The case was elevated to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. We affirmed the CAs
decision and resolution upholding the validity of the marriage.
Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage to
respondent ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He
stressed that the evidence he presented, especially the testimony of his expert witness, was more
than enough to sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial court that he was and still is
psychologically incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
We grant the motion for reconsideration.
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines,
4
this Court reiterated that
courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of
nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.
Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary
task and burden of decision-making, must consider as essential the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental disposition of the parties.
5

In this case, the testimony
6
of petitioners expert witness revealed that petitioner was suffering from
dependent personality disorder. Thus:
Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinations and interviews which you conducted, can you
briefly tell this court your findings [and] conclusions?
A. Well, the petitioner is suffering from a personality disorder. It is a mixed personality
disorder from self-defeating personality disorder to [dependent] personality disorder and this
is brought about by [a] dysfunctional family that petitioner had. He also suffered from partner
relational problem during his marriage with Chona. There were lots of fights and it was not
truly a marriage, sir.
Q. Now, what made you conclude that Lester is suffering from psychological incapacity to
handle the essential obligations of marriage?
A. Sir, for the reason that his motivation for marriage was very questionable. It was a very
impulsive decision. I dont think he understood what it meant to really be married and after
the marriage, there was no consummation, there was no sexual intercourse, he never lived
with the respondent. And after three months he refused to see or talk with the respondent
and afterwards, I guess the relationship died a natural death, and he never thought it was a
really serious matter at all.
xx xx xx
Q. Likewise, you stated here in your evaluation that Lester Halili and respondent suffered
from a grave lack of discretionary judgment. Can you expound on this?
A. xx xx I dont think they truly appreciate the civil [rites which] they had undergone. [It was]
just a spur of the moment decision that they should get married xx xx I dont think they truly
considered themselves married.
xx xx xx
Q. Now [from] what particular portion of their marriage were you able to conclude xx xx that
petitioner and respondent are suffering from psychological incapacity?
A. xx xx they never lived together[.] [T]hey never had a residence, they never consummated
the marriage. During the very short relationship they had, there were frequent quarrels and
so there might be a problem also of lack of respect [for] each other and afterwards there was
abandonment.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder
7
as
[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such
individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and
are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through
a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder
may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow
others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people
even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own,
volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.1avvphil
In her psychological report,
8
Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners dependent personality disorder was
evident in the fact that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on them for
decisions.
9
Petitioners mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt
confused on what action to take upon learning that his marriage to respondent was for real.
10

Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons suffering from a dependent personality
disorder, petitioner typically acted in a self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating
attitude. This submissive attitude encouraged other people to take advantage of him.
11
This could be
seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be dominated, first, by his father who treated his family
like robots
12
and, later, by respondent who was as domineering as his father.
13
When petitioner could
no longer take respondents domineering ways, he preferred to hide from her rather than confront
her and tell her outright that he wanted to end their marriage.
14

Dr. Dayan traced petitioners personality disorder to his dysfunctional family life, to wit:
15

Q. And what might be the root cause of such psychological incapacity?
A. Sir, I mentioned awhile ago that Lesters family is dysfunctional. The father was very
abusive, very domineering. The mother has been very unhappy and the children never had
affirmation. They might [have been] x x x given financial support because the father was [a]
very affluent person but it was never an intact family. x x x The wife and the children were
practically robots. And so, I would say Lester grew up, not having self-confidence, very
immature and somehow not truly understand[ing] what [it] meant to be a husband, what [it]
meant to have a real family life.
Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners personality disorder was grave and incurable and
already existent at the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent.
16

It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was grave and
incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case, recognized that
individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus
therapy may be long-term.
17
Particularly, personality disorders are "long-standing, inflexible ways of
behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of living. These
disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or adolescence, create problems
for those who display them and for others."
18

From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological
incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The April 16, 2008 resolution of
this Court and the January 26, 2004 decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are SET ASIDE.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17, 1998 is hereby
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
*

Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
**

Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice


Footnotes
*
Additional member per raffle dated May 27, 2009.
**
Additional member in lieu of Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario per Special Order No. 653
dated June 1, 2009.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Godardo A. Jacinto (deceased) and concurred in by
Associate Justices Elvi John S. Asuncion (dismissed from the service) and Lucas P.
Bersamin of the Former Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 10-20.
2
Id., pp. 22-24.
3
Decision penned by Judge Jose R. Hernandez. Id., pp. 106-109.
4
G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009, p. 25. See Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, 13
June 1994, 233 SCRA 100, citing Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines, 1988, p. 37. Although the case pertained mainly to a petition to declare the
parties marriage as null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity of one of them,
this Court, however, did not rule on the issue as the assigned error in the petition for review
filed in this Court dealt with rules of procedure.
See also Santos v. CA, et al., 310 Phil. 21, 36, (1995), which reiterated the above
cited principle.
5
Id., pp. 28-29, citing Archbishop Oscar V. Cruz, D.D. of the Archdiocese of Lingayen-
Dagupan, who explained in the Marriage Tribunal Ministry, 1992 ed., that "[s]tandard practice
shows the marked advisability of [e]xpert intervention in [m]arriage [c]ases accused of nullity
on the ground of defective matrimonial consent on account of natural incapacity by reason of
any factor causative of lack of sufficient use of reason, grave lack of due discretion and
inability to assume essential obligations although the law categorically mandates said
intervention only in the case of impotence and downright mental disorder."
6
TSN, 11 December 1997, pp. 3-10.
7
Te v. Yu-Te, supra note 4, p. 35, citing Kahn and Fawcett, The Encyclopedia of Mental
Health, 1993 ed., p. 131.
8
Exhibit C. RTC records, pp. 42-57.
9
Id., p. 44.
10
See RTC Decision, rollo, p. 107.
11
Exhibit C, supra at 51.
12
TSN, supra note 6, p. 7.
13
Id., p. 8. Respondent was described as domineering, demanding and short-tempered.
14
Exhibit C, supra at 44.
15
TSN, supra note 6, p. 7.
16
Id., see pp. 9-10:
Q. Now, would you say that this psychological incapacity which you identified and
described earlier, is it beyond treatment?
A. Yes, sir.
xx xx xx
Q. Now, based on your findings and what you said, would you say then that the
psychological incapacity of the petitioner was already apparent even before he got
married?
A. Yes, sir.
17
Te v. Yu-Te, supra note 4, p. 34, citing Kahn and Fawcett, The Encyclopedia of Mental
Health, 1993 ed., p. 292.
18
Id., p. 35, citing Bernstein, Penner, Clarke-Stewart and Roy, Psychology, 7th ed., 2006,
pp. 613-614.


















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, Petitioner,
vs.
ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE, Respondent,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J .:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity, since its incorporation
in our laws, has become a clichd subject of discussion in our jurisprudence. The Court treats this
case, however, with much ado, it having realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has
unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally
inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in form and devoid of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867.
The petition further assails the January 19, 2004 Resolution
2
denying the motion for the
reconsideration of the challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in
a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Edward was then initially
attracted to Rowenas close friend; but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided
to court Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student and
respondent, a freshman.
3

Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another and developed a
certain degree of closeness towards each other. In March 1996, or around three months after their
first meeting, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was
young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to
Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing the boat ticket.
4

However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house accommodation and
daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a job. In April 1996, they decided to go
back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his
family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit
suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles place.
5

On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He was then 25 years
old, and she, 20.
6
The two then continued to stay at her uncles place where Edward was treated like
a prisonerhe was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns
and warned the latter not to leave Rowena.
7
At one point, Edward was able to call home and talk to
his brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents home and live with them. Edward
relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they
could live on their own. Edward talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward
that he would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home.
8

After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed with his parents. His
family then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever they telephoned to ask for him.
9

In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live
with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.
10

After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis
of the latters psychological incapacity. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.
11

As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there was collusion between the
parties.
12
In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance and deputized the OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings.
13

On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if
there was collusion between the parties; thus, it recommended trial on the merits.
14

The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties psychologically incapacitated,
and made the following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and baptized Born Again
Christian at Manila. He finished two years in college at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is
currently unemployed. He is married to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He
presented himself at my office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for Nullification
of Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity. He is now residing at 181
P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased sister. Both his
parents are also in the business world by whom he [considers] as generous, hospitable, and patient.
This said virtues are said to be handed to each of the family member. He generally considers himself
to be quiet and simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After 1994, he
tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International Incorporated. And because of job
incompetence, as well as being quiet and loner, he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His interest
lie[s] on becoming a full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself
from his friends even during his childhood days as he only loves to read the Bible and hear its
message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a disobedient wife.
She is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and shared intimate sexual moments with her
boyfriend prior to that with petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this became the foundation of
their intimate relationship. After a month of dating, petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is
having problems with his family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and
that she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent had insisted to
petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner hesitated because he is not prepared
as they are both young and inexperienced, but she insisted that they would somehow manage
because petitioner is rich. In the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of
eloping and she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly agreed to
the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay at the house of a friend of
respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment.
The parties tried to look for a job but could not find any so it was suggested by respondent that they
should go back and seek help from petitioners parents. When the parties arrived at the house of
petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the country so respondent decided to go back to her
home for the meantime while petitioner stayed behind at their home. After a few days of separation,
respondent called petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded
immediately and when he arrived at their house, respondent confronted petitioner as to why he
appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner
got scared so he went home again. Respondent would call by phone every now and then and
became angry as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent went to the extent of threatening
to file a case against petitioner and scandalize his family in the newspaper. Petitioner asked her how
he would be able to make amends and at this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of
marriage. Petitioner[,] out of frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996,
respondents uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same day[,] petitioner was
made to sign the Marriage Contract before the Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any
Marriage License.
Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival of the parents of
petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived, respondent refused to allow petitioner to go
home. Petitioner was threatened in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns.
Respondent even threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will commission their
military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a declaration that if he
should perish, the authorities should look for him at his parents[] and relatives[] houses. Sometime
in June of 1996, petitioner was able to escape and he went home. He told his parents about his
predicament and they forgave him and supported him by giving him military escort. Petitioner,
however, did not inform them that he signed a marriage contract with respondent. When they knew
about it[,] petitioner was referred for counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact
respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home of petitioners parents while they
are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed that she would only live with him if they
will have a separate home of their own and be away from his parents. She also intimated to
petitioner that he should already get his share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so they
can start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the petitioner already settled his
differences with his own family. When respondent refused to live with petitioner where he chose for
them to stay, petitioner decided to tell her to stop harassing the home of his parents. He told her
already that he was disinherited and since he also does not have a job, he would not be able to
support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any money anymore, respondent stopped
tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that they should live separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and
weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties[] unreadiness to commitment and their
young age. He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still
egocentrically involved with herself.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Revised Beta Examination
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Draw A Person Test
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
Sachs Sentence Completion Test
M M P I
TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and recklessly impulsive
upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was motivated by different notions on marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure and unready so as to
commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on the search of what he wants in life. He is
absconded as an introvert as he is not really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social
interactions and mingling with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he
finds it boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that of respondent,
as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is more of the reserved and timid type
of person, as he prefer to be religiously attached and spend a solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-rebellious type of
woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her [plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She
is seen to take move on marriage as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good
fortune because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams realized, she used force and
threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-willed. Upon the realization that there is really
no chance for wealth, she gladly finds her way out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry himself before submitting
to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution
solemnized by religious and law. In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is
evidently clear that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still
unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of weakening their relationship by
his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive
so as to be unlawful, insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is
apparent that she is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of Narcissistic and
Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since childhood and only manifested during marriage.
Both parties display psychological incapacities that made marriage a big mistake for them to take.
15

The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision
16
declaring the marriage of the parties null
and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
17
The Republic, represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of
appeal.
18

On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision
19
in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867,
reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling.
20
It ruled that petitioner failed to prove the
psychological incapacity of respondent. The clinical psychologist did not personally examine
respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological
incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In sum,
the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina
21
needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
22
The CA faulted the lower court for rendering the decision without the required certification of
the OSG briefly stating therein the OSGs reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as the
case may be, the petition.
23
The CA later denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in the
likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.
24

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review on certiorari. On June 15,
2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.
25

In his memorandum,
26
petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the marriage void, not only because of respondents
psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner also
points out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent.
Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP because the latter represented it
during the trial; and it had been furnished copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders and
notices.
27

For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,
28
that the annulment petition filed before the RTC
contains no statement of the essential marital obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The
root cause of the psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it
medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was not shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical psychologist did not personally
examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG concludes that the requirements in Molina
29
were not
satisfied.
30

The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the
marriage between the parties is null and void.
31

I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the development of
jurisprudence interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code
32
provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that drafted the Family
Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P.
Romero elucidated in her separate opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:
33

However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of
the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-
Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
"During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a chapter on absolute
divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil Code) that it had been tasked by the
IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a
no-fault divorce between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de facto.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of
marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of separation
between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a
married person would have obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such
a proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code
Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law Committee
started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New Family Code, they agreed
and formulated the definition of marriage as
a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within
the limits provided by law.
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of marriage of the Filipino
people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social institution upon which the family and society
are founded, and also realizing the strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would
encounter from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great
majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea of
absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage
based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be
an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church annulments
of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was, thus,
requested to again prepare a draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of
marriage. Still later, to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present
Civil Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage on
grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as a Joint Committee in the
preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages
with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void
marriage in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34.
Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage shall not
prescribe.
x x x x x x x x x
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may already be dissolved
or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on declaration of nullity as well as
annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a
conference with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting with
Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that
since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of
"lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like
teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some personality disorder or
disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise
perfectly normal person; marriage to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who
refuses to have children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in
tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic
personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly.
34

In her separate opinion in Molina,
35
she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the
sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was
psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such
lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:
"(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity becomes
manifest after the celebration."
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" and to
"mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There
being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there
is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are
lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does
not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage."
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a
sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence,"
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention
of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase."
He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity
to discharge . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically
impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art.
36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase "and is
incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how
they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the
possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa
suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special situations,"
hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage
which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are
void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters,
now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the
time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage:
"3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with
respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the
voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually
declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid
sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated
marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process
which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties
as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil
marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict,
quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbofreed from the marriage bonds
in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws.
Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law
Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the
Family Codeand classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally
inexistent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly
for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old
canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to be capable according to law in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons be at least not ignorant of the major elements required
in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external
freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct
but related grounds for annulment called lack of due discretion and lack of due competence. Lack
of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of
the wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person was
incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding
ceremony."
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to
the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the
first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was
probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The
nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a
cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after 1970.
Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested
themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the
ceremony.
36

Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so
doing, it might limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The
Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since
the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.
37
The law is then so designed as to allow some
resiliency in its application.
38

Yet, as held in Santos,
39
the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes
a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68
40
of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity; and render
help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most serious of cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
41
This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction must be made
between the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely between the grave lack of discretionary
judgment and the incapacity to assume the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge,
explains the difference by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to
Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable according to positive law to enter such
contract, there remains the object of the contract, viz, the house. The house is located in a different
locality, and prior to the conclusion of the contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to
both of them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the canon. The third
paragraph does not deal with the psychological process of giving consent because it has been
established a priori that both have such a capacity to give consent, and they both know well the
object of their consent [the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the
consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid because it lacks its formal object. The
consent as a psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The psychological act, however, is
directed towards an object which is not available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the
third paragraph deals not with the positing of consent but with positing the object of consent. The
person may be capable of positing a free act of consent, but he is not capable of fulfilling the
responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941 regarding psychic incapacity
with respect to marriage arising from pathological conditions, there has been an increasing trend to
understand as ground of nullity different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from sexual anomalies. Nymphomania
is a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has studied under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always and in every case
imply a grave psychopathological condition which affects the higher faculties of intellect,
discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual anomalies that are purely so that is to say, they
arise from certain physiological dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual
condition, leaving intact the higher faculties however, so that these persons are still capable of free
human acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is abundant that there are certain anomalies
of a sexual nature which may impel a person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either
with respect to its frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself [sadism,
masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that
the higher faculties remain intact such that a person so afflicted continues to have an adequate
understanding of what marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose
marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person can assume those responsibilities
which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the
incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the
object of consent, rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this regard. The initial
steps taken by church courts were not too clear whether this incapacity is incapacity to posit consent
or incapacity to posit the object of consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion
that the intellect, under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly deliberating and its
judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at the moment of
consent, is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion, with the inevitable conclusion that such
a decision, made as it was under these circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be
incontrovertible that a decision made under duress, such as this irresistible impulse, would not be a
free act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the intellect is always
and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It would seem entirely possible, and
certainly more reasonable, to think that there are certain cases in which one who is sexually
hyperaesthetic can understand perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it
implies; his consent would be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit the object
of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal way and with usually regularity. It
would seem more correct to say that the consent may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective
because the party is consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was
gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his way more clearly
through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear conceptual distinction between the inability to
give consent on the one hand, and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his
opinion that nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and they are usually able
to evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty with positing a free and intelligent consent.
However, such persons, capable as they are of eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience
difficulty in another sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had
likewise treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of positing the object of
consent from the point of view of a person afflicted with nymphomania. According to him, such an
affliction usually leaves the process of knowing and understanding and evaluating intact. What it
affects is the object of consent: the delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the selected rotal
jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress towards a consensus doctrine that
the incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of
consent) can coexist in the same person with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent
judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram Sabattani
concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have difficulty not only with regard to
the moment of consent but also, and especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The
decision concludes that a person in such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal
obligation of fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in understanding what the obligations of
marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual to refer to this
ground as moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar expressions to express a specific
incapacity rooted in some anomalies and disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact
the faculties of the will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish it
from the impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by C.1084. Nonetheless, the
anomalies render the subject incapable of binding himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent
that the anomaly renders that person incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the
principle affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
x x x x
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the contractants are not
capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One immediately thinks of those cases where
one of the parties is so self-centered [e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know
how to begin a union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a relationship. A
second incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses are incapable of beginning or
maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to the very substance of matrimony. Another
incapacity could arise when a spouse is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other
party. The canon speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is
capable only of realizing or contributing to the good of the other party qua persona rather than qua
conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting marriage. Such would be the case of a person
who may be quite capable of procuring the economic good and the financial security of the other, but
not capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of the other. These are general strokes and this is not
the place for detained and individual description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of the case concerns
a person diagnosed to be suffering from serious sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent
may have understood, on the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not
capable of assuming them because of his "constitutional immorality."
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the fulfillment of
responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of decision but also and especially during the
moment of execution of decision. And when this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it
means that the actual fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration
that must be factored into the question of whether a person was in a position to assume the
obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the inability of the party to assume and
fulfill the obligations, one is not looking at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially at
matrimonium in facto esse. In [the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity
of the respondent to assume the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic constitution of the
person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as regards money and his apathy as regards the
rights of others that he had violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the
presence of this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to recognize and experience how
others feel) is common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable expectation, especially favorable
treatment, is usually present. Likewise common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are
taken advantage of in order to achieve ones ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial obligations. One of
them is the right to the communio vitae. This and their corresponding obligations are basically
centered around the good of the spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do
not have to be necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several, or
even all of these rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal relationship is impossible.
Some characteristic features of inability for interpersonal relationships in marriage include affective
immaturity, narcissism, and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric homosexuality was
understood to be invalidating of marriage that is to say, is homosexuality invalidating because of
the inability to evaluate the responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its
obligations. Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it as incapacity to
assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella was able to consider, with charity,
homosexuality as an autonomous ground of nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said to
be unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of
matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also the consortium totius
vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage]
certainly seems to be the more adequate juridical structure to account for the complex phenomenon
that homosexuality is. The homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few
exceptional cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations with the spouse. Neither
is it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due
discretion because this sexual anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual
faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to assume the responsibilities of marriage
because he is unable to fulfill this object of the matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity
lies, not so much in the defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the source of incapacity
specified by the canon: causes of a psychological nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the
clause is a reference to the personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference
to the psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in the psyche or in the psychic
constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that one can then affirm that the person is
incapable according to the hypothesis contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in
this juridical sense only to the extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic
constitution which impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit deeply engrained in
ones consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a source of this invalidating incapacity. The
difference being that there seems to be some freedom, however remote, in the development of the
habit, while one accepts as given ones psychic constitution. It would seem then that the law insists
that the source of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of some degree of freedom.
42

Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should determine
whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower
courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,
43
ruled that the findings of the trial
court are final and binding on the appellate courts.
44

Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment on the
pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,
45
explained that when private respondent testified
under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby
presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of
Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina,
46
thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Churchwhile remaining independent, separate and apart from each
othershall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.
47

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership concurred in the ponencia
of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in
the result" and another threeincluding, as aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains to compose their
individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predelictions or generalizations, but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."
48

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,
49
the Court has applied the aforesaid
standards, without too much regard for the laws clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as "courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in
Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then
alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the
OSGs exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world."
50
The
unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume
little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was
intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by
it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed
sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and
pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of
the personality disorders of the said individuals.
51

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there
are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State,
through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of
evidence.
52
The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital
abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is not
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because
it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or
assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that
the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction,
and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly.
53
Let it be noted
that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning.
54
To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a
decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too much of a concern
for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its business. And second, because the
judicial declaration of psychological incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one
hand, the normal spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a
personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the psychologically incapacitated runs
the risk of the latters disorder recurring in their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply
declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,
55
there is need to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration
of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that
each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations
but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996,
eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who
provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral
pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondents, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.
56

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
57

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about
a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and
tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition
of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances
made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-
important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to
that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that
a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid
consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to
sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses
from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong
relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the
capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be other oriented since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a
self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because
marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of
this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and
faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4)
emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure
of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall short of
reasonable expectations.
x x x x
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a
case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas
originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the
marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to
assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An
advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was
entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to
carry out marital responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into."
58
1avvphi 1
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals
59
emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to
establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos
60
asserts, there is no requirement that the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
61
Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert
proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.
62
Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest the inclusion in the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
63
an
option for the trial judge to refer the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an
independent assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the
courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent and judicious
determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense with the parties prerogative to
present their own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we consider as adequate,
produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disordersto repeat, dependent
personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent.
We note that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders as follows
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a persons recent and
long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking are not usually limited to isolated episodes
but are deeply ingrained, inflexible, maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental
stress or anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal functioning. Personality
disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or earlier, continue through adulthood and become
less obvious in middle or old age. An individual may have more than one personality disorder at a
time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a variety of character
traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive problems in social and occupational
adjustment. Some individuals with personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic,
paranoid, obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors. Such qualities may
lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as difficulties in other areas of life and often a
tendency to blame others for their problems. Other individuals with personality disorders are not
unpleasant or difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits can lead
to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a variety of causes of
personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic factors, neurobiologic theories and brain
wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development led to certain
personality types. Thus, some disorders as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types.
Demanding and dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive
from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and emotional aloofness
were thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage; fixation at the phallic stage was thought to
lead to shallowness and an inability to engage in intimate relationships.lawphil. net However, later researchers
have found little evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of development
lead to specific personality patterns.
Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor involved in the etiology
of antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there is less evidence of inheritance of other
personality disorders. Some family, adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality
may be related to genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality, researchers have found that
low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of
aggression and a past history of suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with
low platelet monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been reported in antisocial
personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely reported abnormality. A study of borderline
patients reported that 38 percent had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19
percent in a control group.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev., 1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized
into three major clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals who have these
disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits and traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality disorders. Individuals who
have these disorders often appear overly emotional, erratic and dramatic.
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear anxious or fearful.
The DSM-III-R also lists another category, "personality disorder not otherwise specified," that can be
used for other specific personality disorders or for mixed conditions that do not qualify as any of the
specific personality disorders.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus
therapy may be long-term.
64

Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner
A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such
individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and
are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through
a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder
may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow
others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people
even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own,
volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feel
uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned.
65
and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain a job over a period of years,
disregard for the rights of others (either through exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent
physical fights and, quite commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to
blame others. There is often a faade of charm and even sophistication that masks disregard, lack of
remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control others.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit some individuals who
are prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-centeredness and disregard for the rights
of others may be hidden prior to a public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as moral insanity. The term
described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not accompanied by impairments in reasoning.lawphil. net
According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality disorder is one of the four "dramatic" personality
disorders, the others being borderline, histrionic and narcissistic.
66

The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case,
finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the
marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties psychological incapacity. We
further consider that the trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses deportment, arrived
at the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential
marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and
support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to
make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when
he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone
and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
67
As clearly shown in this case, petitioner
followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible,
has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and
clear direction in life.
Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her being afflicted with
antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations. This
finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control
of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by society.
68
Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is
impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of
blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The August
5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
71867 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30, 2001, REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice


Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando, with Associate Justices Delilah
Vidallon-Magtolis and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring; rollo, pp. 23-36.
2
Id. at 38-39.
3
TSN, September 12, 2000, p. 2.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 2-3.
6
Records, p. 8.
7
TSN, September 12, 2000, pp. 3-4.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 4.
11
Records, p. 1.
12
Id. at 24.
13
Id. at 36-37.
14
Id. at 39.
15
Id. at 48-55.
16
Id. at 61-66.
17
The dispositive portion of the RTCs July 30, 2001 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between plaintiff
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE and defendant ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ UY-TE,
officiated by Honorable Judge Evelyn Corpus-Cabochan, of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 82, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, on April 23, 1996, NULL AND VOID, ab
initio, on the ground of the couples psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code; and dissolving their property regime in accordance with law, if there is
any.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the City Civil Registry of Valenzuela City
where the marriage took place and City Civil Registry of Quezon City where this
decision originated for proper recording.
SO ORDERED. (Id. at 66.)
18
Records, pp. 67-68.
19
Supra note 1.
20
The dispositive portion of the CAs August 5, 2003 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed decision dated July 30,
2001 of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 106,
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-00-39720, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and a new one is entered declaring the marriage between petitioner-appellee Edward
Kenneth Ngo Te and respondent Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te VALID and
SUBSISTING. The petition is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 35.)
21
335 Phil. 664 (1997).
22
Executive Order No. 209, entitled "The Family Code of the Philippines," enacted on July 6,
1987.
23
Rollo, pp. 28-35.
24
Supra note 2.
25
Rollo, p. 79.
26
Id. at 95-104.
27
Id. at 100-102.
28
Id. at 82-93.
29
Supra note 21.
30
Rollo, pp. 86-92.
31
Supra note 22.
32
Id.
33
G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20.
34
Id. at 38-41. (Italics supplied.)
35
Supra note 21.
36
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at 681-685.
37
Salita v. Magtolis, G.R. No. 106429, June 13, 1994, 233 SCRA 100, 107-108, quoting
Sempio-Dy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1998, p. 37.
38
Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 33, at 31.
39
Id.
40
Article 68 of the Family Code provides in full:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
41
Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 33, at 34.
42
Dacanay, Canon Law on Marriage: Introductory Notes and Comments, 2000 ed., pp. 110-
119.
43
326 Phil. 169 (1996).
44
Id. at 182.
45
334 Phil. 294, 300-304 (1997).
46
Supra note 21.
47
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at 676-680.
48
Id. at 680.
49
See Republic of the Philippines v. Lynnette Cabantug-Baguio, G.R. No. 171042, June 30,
2008; Nilda V. Navales v. Reynaldo Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008; Lester
Benjamin S. Halili v. Chona M. Santos-Halili, et al., G.R. No. 165424, April 16, 2008; Bier v.
Bier, G.R. No. 173294, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 123; Paras v. Paras, G.R. No.
147824, August 2, 2007, 529 SCRA 81; Navarro, Jr. v. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049,
April 13, 2007, 521 SCRA 121; Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, G.R. No. 168328, February
28, 2007, 517 SCRA 123; Zamora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141917, February 7, 2007,
515 SCRA 19; Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006, 495 SCRA 396;
Republic v. Cuison-Melgar, G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 177; Antonio v.
Reyes, G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353; Villalon v. Villalon, G.R. No.
167206, November 18, 2005, 475 SCRA 572; Republic v. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, September
21, 2005, 470 SCRA 508; Carating-Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004, 441
SCRA 422; Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 735;
Ancheta v. Ancheta, 468 Phil. 900 (2004); Barcelona v. Court of Appeals, 458 Phil. 626
(2003); Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175 (2002); Pesca v. Pesca, 408 Phil. 713 (2001); Republic
v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, February 9, 2001, 351 SCRA 425; Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil.
840 (2000); Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999, 320
SCRA 76.
50
See Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at 668.
51
Ng, Apruebo & Lepiten, Legal and Clinical Bases of Psychological Incapacity, 2006 ed.,
pp. 14-16, cites the following:
"Canon 1095, 3 concerning psychological incapacity pointed out cases of various
psychological disorders from the Roman Rota as enumerated below (Fr. Bacareza,
1999).
"6.1. From the 1917 Code of the Second Vatican Council
1. Coram Teodori in Italy on January 19, 1940 on Nymphomania.
2. Coram Heard on June 5, 1941 on Nymphomania.
3. Coram Heard in Quebec on January 30, 1954 on Lethargic Encephalitis.
4. Coram Mattioli in Quebec, Canada on November 6, 1956 on General Paralysis.
5. Coram Sabbatani in Naples, Italy on June 21, 1957 on Nymphomania.
6. Coram Mattioli in Rome on November 28, 1957 on Schizophrenia.
7. Coram Lefebvre on December 19, 1959 on Nymphomania.
8. Coram De Jorio on December 19, 1961 on Schizophrenia.
"6.2 From the Second Vatican Council to the Promulgation of the 1983 Code
9. Coram Monsigneur Charles Lefebre on the following:
a. Homosexuality,
b. Hypersexuality-Nymphomania,
c. Hypersexuality-Satyriasis, and
d. Affective Immaturity and Passive Dependent Personality.
10. Coram Monsigneur Lucien Anne on February 25, 1969 on Lesbianism.
11. Coram De Jorio on April 30, 1969 on Maturity of Judgment.
12. Coram Jose Maria Pinto Gomez on the following:
a. Serious Paranoid Schizophrenia (November 26, 1969),
b. Anti-Social Personality Disorder (March 18, 1971),
c. Vaginismus or Psychic impotence; Frigidity (July 15, 1977)
d. Neurasthenic Psychopath (April 20, 1979)
e. Sexual Disorder (December 3, 1982)
13. Coram Bruno on the following:
a. Hypersexuality-Nymphomania (December 15, 1972)
b. Sexual Neurosis (March 27, 1981)
c. Psychoneurosis (December 17, 1982)
14. Coram Jose Maria Serrano Ruiz on the following:
a. Hypersexuality-Satyriasis (April 5, 1973)
b. Lack of Interpersonal Integration (April 15, 1973)
c. Immature Personality (July 9, 1976)
d. Psychic Immaturity (November 18, 1977)
e. Depressive Neurosis (July 12, 1978)
f. Obsessive-Compulsive Personality (May 23, 1980)
g. Frigidity (July 28, 1981)
h. Affective Immaturity (January 15, 1977)
15. Coram Ewers on the following:
a. Affective Immaturity (January 15, 1977)
b. Sexual Neurosis (April 4, 1981)
16. Coram Pariscella on the following:
a. Obsessive-Compulsive Neurosis (February 23, 1978)
b. Homosexuality (June 11, 1978)
17. Coram Fiore (May 27, 1981)
18. Coram Agustoni (March 23, 1982)
"6.3. After the Promulgation of the 1983 Code of Canon Law
19. Rotal Case No. 41:c. Colagiovanni on March 3, 1983 on Homosexuality
20. Rotal Case No. 42 c. Huot on July 18, 1983 on Alcoholism and Immature
Personality.
21. Rotal Case No. 43: c. Giannechini on July 19, 1983 on Homosexuality.
22. Rotal Case No. 45: c. Colagiovanni on November 22, 1983 about an ex-priest
who was a "liar, cheat and swindler" (Anti-Social Personality)
23. Rotal Case No. 46: c. Stankiewiez on November 24, 1983 on Homosexuality.
24. Rotal Case No. 47: c. Egan on March 29, 1984 on Hysterical Personality.
25. Rotal Case No. 48: c. Di Felice on June 9, 1984 on Psychic Immaturity.
26. Rotal Case No. 49: c. Pinto on May 30, 1986 on Alcoholism and Gambling.
27. Rotal Case No. 50: c. Giannecchini on December 20, 1988 on Hypersexuality-
Nymphomania.
52
Justice Padillas Dissenting Opinion, Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra note 33, at 36-37;
Ancheta v. Ancheta, supra note 49, at 917.
53
Supra note 34.
54
See Article 36 of the Family Code; see also Justice Carpios Dissenting Opinion, Tenebro
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004, 423 SCRA 272, 299.
55
Supra note 49, at 370.
56
Records, pp. 54-55; TSN, November 7, 2000, pp. 5-6.
57
Archbishop Oscar V. Cruz, D.D., of the Archdiocese of Lingayen-Dagupan, explains in
Marriage Tribunal Ministry, 1992 ed., that "[s]tandard practice shows the marked advisability
of Expert intervention in Marriage Cases accused of nullity on the ground of defective
matrimonial consent on account of natural incapacity by reason of any factor causative of
lack of sufficient use of reason, grave lack of due discretion and inability to assume essential
obligationsalthough the law categorically mandates said intervention only in the case of
impotence and downright mental disorder x x x." (p. 106).
58
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, supra note 21, at 685-688.
59
Supra note 49, at 88; see also Republic v. Quintero-Hemano, supra note 49, at 743.
60
Supra note 49, at 850; see also Republic v. Quintero-Hemano, supra note 49, at 742;
Republic v. Iyoy, supra note 49, at 526; Zamora v. Court of Appeals, supra note 49, at 27;
Paras v. Paras, supra note 49, at 96-97.
61
The Court, however, by saying
[T]he assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions
communicated to him by respondent. The doctor never conducted any psychological
examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done so. In fact, his
Professional Opinion began with the statement "[I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his
wife Leni is true, x x x"
x x x x
Obviously, Dr. Guanzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as
these had merely been relayed to him by respondent. The former was working on
pure suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one side.
Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.
Dr. Guanzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to assess
petitioners character, not only through the descriptions given by respondent, but also
through the formers at least fifteen hours of study of the voluminous transcript of
records of this case. Even if it took the good doctor a whole day or a whole week to
examine the records of this case, we still find his assessment of petitioners
psychological state sorely insufficient and methodologically flawed.
in Choa v. Choa (Supra note 49, at 190-191), in effect, required the personal
examination of the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
62
Psychologists of the Psychological Extension Evaluation Research Services (PEERS)
enumerate the segments of the psychological evaluation report for psychological incapacity
as follows:
Identifying Data: Personal Information
Referral Question: Data coming from informants and significant others
(psychologists, psychiatrists, physicians, parents, brothers, sisters, relatives,
friends, etc.).
Test Administered (Dates): List by name
Background Information:
Current Life Situation: Presenting complaint (personal and marital conflict), history of
problem, and consequences in clients life.
Life History Information: Childhood development, educational history, vocational
history, medical history, sexual and marital history, personal goals.
Behavior Observations: Description of client, relationship with examiner, and test
related behaviors.
Interpretation of Test Results:
Intellectual Functioning: Wechsler tests, Stanford-Binet, etc. Obtained IQ scores and
specific strengths and deficits.
Cognitive Functioning: Rorschach, TAT, MMPI, etc. Perception of reality or
perceptual efficiency, conceptual organization, psychological needs, conflicts,
preoccupations, suspiciousness, hallucinations, or delusions.
Emotional Functioning (MMPI, Rorschach, etc.): Liability of emotions, impulse
control, predominant concerns like aggression, anxiety, depression, guilt,
dependency, and hostility.
Relationship Patterns (MMPI, Rorschach, TAT, etc.): Problem areas in work or
school, friendships, intimate relationships, difficulties such as immaturity,
irresponsibility, cooperativeness, sociability, introversion, impulsivity, aggression,
dangerousness to self or others.
Defenses and compensations: Evidence of any strength, any coping mechanisms, or
any useful compensation that might be helping the client maintain himself/herself.
Integration of Test Results with Life History: Presenting a clinical picture of
the client as a total person against the background of his marital discords and
life circumstances. Hypotheses posed through the referral question and
generated and integrated via test results and other reliable information.
Summary, Conclusion, Diagnosis, Prognosis:
Summary: Emphasis should be on conciseness and accuracy so that the reader can
quickly find the essential information and overall impression.
Conclusion: Integrating the material (data) into a more smoothly stated
conceptualization of the clients personality and problem areas as regards root
causes and characteristics as ground for nullity of marriage.
Diagnosis: Diagnostic impression is evolved form the data obtained, formed
impression of personality disorders, and classified mental disorders based on the
criteria and multi axial system of the DSM IV.
Prognosis: Predicting the behavior based on the data obtained that are relevant to
the current functioning of the client, albeit under ideal conditions.
Recommendation: Providing a careful specific recommendation is based on
the referral sources and obtained data in dealing with a particular client that
may be ameliorative, remedial, or unique treatment/intervention approaches.
As to psychological incapacity, specific recommendation on the nullity of
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code and expertise and clinical
judgment of the Clinical Psychologist should be given emphasis. (Ng,
Apruebo & Lepiten, Legal and Clinical Bases of Psychological Incapacity,
supra note 51, at 179-181.)
63
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 15, 2003.
64
Kahn and Fawcett, The Encyclopedia of Mental Health, 1993 ed., pp. 291-292. See
Bernstein, Penner, Clarke-Stewart, Roy, Psychology, 7th ed., 2006, pp. 613-614, defining
personality disorders as "long-standing, inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much
severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of living. These disorders affect all areas of
functioning and, beginning in childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who
display them and for others. Some psychologists view personality disorders as interpersonal
strategies or as extreme, rigid, and maladaptive expressions of personality traits." (Citations
omitted.)
65
Id. at 131.
66
Id. at 50-51.
67
Supra note 65.
68
Supra note 66.





Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009
BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner,
vs.
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J .:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the November 17, 2003 Amended
Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution
2
in CA-G.R. CV No.
59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998
Decision
3
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
4

The facts follow.
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972
while they were classmates in medical school.
5
They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975
in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child.
At first, they resided at Benjamins family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City.
6
When their second
child was born, the couple decided to move to Carmens family home in Cebu City.
7
In September
1975, Benjamin passed the medical board examinations
8
and thereafter proceeded to take a
residency program to become a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology after two years. By 1979,
Benjamin completed the preceptorship program for the said field
9
and, in 1980, he began working for
Velez Hospital, owned by Carmens family, as member of its active staff,
10
while Carmen worked as
the hospitals Treasurer.
11

The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975; James Louis, born on
August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21, 1986;
Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on June 16, 1991.
12

On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their
youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City
praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She
claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of
their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.
13

In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware that Benjamin
used to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends.
14
But after they were married, petitioner
continued to drink regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of
the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and insult respondent, physically assault her and
force her to have sex with him. There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the
gate of their house.
15
Because of his drinking habit, Benjamins job as anesthesiologist was affected
to the point that he often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to
other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his services because they
perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the latters
drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.
16

Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial support to their family
and would even get angry at her whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of
providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and gambling and would even buy
expensive equipment for his hobby.
17
He rarely stayed home
18
and even neglected his obligation to
his children.
19

Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling.
20
He would gamble two or three
times a week and would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks whenever he had no
money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wifes own jewelry to finance his gambling.
21
There
was also an instance when the spouses had to sell their family car and even a portion of the lot
Benjamin inherited from his father just to be able to pay off his gambling debts.
22
Benjamin only
stopped going to the casinos in 1986 after he was banned therefrom for having caused trouble, an
act which he said he purposely committed so that he would be banned from the gambling
establishments.
23

In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following
manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the
family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts,
because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give
regular financial support to his family.
24

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a
respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of social and
athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also denied
being a violent person, except when provoked by circumstances.
25
As for his alleged failure to
support his family financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his
professional fees from Velez Hospital when he was still serving there as practicing
anesthesiologist.
26
In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial support
within his means whenever he could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending
his hard-earned money on unnecessary things.
27
He also pointed out that it was he who often
comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a
week.
28

During the trial, Carmens testimony regarding Benjamins drinking and gambling habits and violent
behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses children from
1987 to 1992.
29
Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed instances when Benjamin maltreated
Carmen even in front of their children.
30

Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a psychiatrist.
31
Instead of the usual
personal interview, however, Dr. Oates evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during Benjamins deposition because the latter had already gone to work
as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of stenographic
notes, Dr. Oate concluded that Benjamins compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical
abuse of respondent are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.
32

To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and a
consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his
expert witness.
33
Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamins psychological behavior based on the transcript of
stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a
psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obras) interview with
Benjamins brothers.
34
Contrary to Dr. Oates findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing
wrong with petitioners personality, considering the latters good relationship with his fellow doctors
and his good track record as anesthesiologist.
35

On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision
36
declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oates findings and the
admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Specifically, the trial court found
Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular
activities to his family, and a person with violent tendencies, which character traits find root in a
personality defect existing even before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage
between plaintiff and defendant null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x
x x x x
SO ORDERED.
37

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a
Decision
38
reversing the trial courts ruling. It faulted the trial courts finding, stating that no proof was
adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he
married Carmen since Dr. Oates conclusion was based only on theories and not on established
fact,
39
contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals
40
and in Rep. of the Phils. v.
Court of Appeals and Molina.
41

Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should
not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or
more than five years after she had filed her petition with the RTC.
42
She claimed that the Molina
ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of stare
decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the
prescribed period. Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining compliance with the
prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit. Undaunted, respondent filed a
petition for certiorari
43
with this Court. In a Resolution
44
dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the
petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmens motion for reconsideration.
45
On review, the CA
decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended
Decision
46
reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial courts decision.
47

A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied by the CA in
its December 13, 2004 Resolution.
48

Hence, this petition.
For our resolution are the following issues:
I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines
set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;
II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity
for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has
been liberalized; and
III. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null
and void [is] in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
We find merit in the petition.
I. On the issue of stare decisis.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this
Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
49
Basically, it is
a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,
50
necessary for two simple reasons: economy and
stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.
51

This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and was
later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Punos
discussion on the historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v.
Commission on Elections
52
is enlightening:
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not disturb the
calm." The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the
18th century, "it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come
again in litigation." As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not
be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting
decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the "actual principle or principles necessary
for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision."
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S.
Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are necessary to prevent "arbitrary
discretion in the courts." Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the precedent ventures into
the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected." Prof. Consovoy well noted that
Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the countervailing policy considerations that would allow a
judge to abandon a precedent." He added that their ideas "reveal a deep internal conflict between
the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this
internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries."
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation although stare
decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by
legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply
the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as
horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy
correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare
decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is
not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis constitutional stare
decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the
Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is
important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations.
Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway
today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable
command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is
a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a
question once decided." In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate
touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it." In
contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As
Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent
course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as
clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." This stance reflects both
respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes
judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise,
courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate
and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political
understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of
Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect
stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and
reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of
Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as
constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown,
the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal." Thus, by
freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans
from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be
straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal
Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law
are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and
held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on
the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability,
reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the
balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional
litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1)
determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2)
consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether
related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an
abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently,
as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.
53

To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and
Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no
longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,
54
and
again in Antonio v. Reyes.
55
In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a
law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior
ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to
be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in
good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36.
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.
We have not.
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,
56
we declared that, in hindsight, it may
have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving
all cases of psychological incapacity. We said that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina
unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into
and be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well
because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all fours" with
another.
57

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to
give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological
temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not
conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.
58
At best, courts
must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a
given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to.
59
The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always
base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving
the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements set
forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on
the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological
incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or
psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice
o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus,
the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina
Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and
the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial
conference.
60

But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert
opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a partys alleged
psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be
weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
III. On petitioners psychological incapacity.
Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to
prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband,
and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the
marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial courts and the appellate courts
rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
61
The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the
inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to
assume.
62
1avvphi 1.zw+
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners "defects" were present at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that
petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is
insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the
evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in determining
whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not
convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened respondents allegation of
psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically contradicting psychological
evaluations: Dr. Oate testified that petitioners behavior is a positive indication of a personality
disorder,
63
while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality.
Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obras opinion because, aside from analyzing
the transcript of Benjamins deposition similar to what Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also took into
consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa
who personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obras) personal interview with Benjamins
brothers.
64
Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obras findings.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioners drinking and gambling problems, or his
violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must
remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same
to him. Unfortunately, this court finds respondents testimony, as well as the totality of evidence
presented by the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to
Article 36.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio.
65
In this case, the presumption has not been amply rebutted and must,
perforce, prevail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
*

Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice


Footnotes
*
Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez per Special Order
No. 602 dated March 20, 2009.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, with Associate Justices Rodrigo V.
Cosico and Sergio L. Pestao, concurring; rollo, pp. 78-89.
2
Rollo, pp. 110-111.
3
Id. at 35-45.
4
Art. 36 of the Family Code provides in full:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization. [as amended by Executive Order No. 227 dated July 17, 1987]
5
TSN, December 7, 1994, morning, p. 4.
6
Id. at 12.
7
Id. at 17.
8
Id. at 14; Exhibit "3."
9
Id. at 13, 15.
10
Id. at 21-23.
11
Id. at 10.
12
Rollo, p. 48.
13
Id. at 35.
14
TSN, January 6, 1995, pp. 3, 8-9.
15
Rollo, p. 36.
16
Id. at 37.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 40.
19
Id. at 44.
20
Id. at 40.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 36.
23
Id. at 40.
24
Id. at 48-49.
25
Id. at 42, 49.
26
Id. at 49.
27
TSN, December 7, 1994, morning, pp. 23-25.
28
Id. at 26.
29
TSN, August 31, 1995, pp. 5-26.
30
Id. at 7-9.
31
Rollo, p. 38.
32
Id. at 39.
33
Id. at 41.
34
Id. at 54-55.
35
Id. at 42.
36
Id. at 35-45.
37
Id. at 45.
38
Id. at 47-65.
39
Id. at 64.
40
G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20.
41
335 Phil. 664 (1997).
42
Rollo, pp. 80-81.
43
Docketed as G.R. No. 150479.
44
CA rollo, pp. 199-202.
45
Rollo, pp. 78-79.
46
Supra note 1.
47
Pertinent portion of the CAs Amended Decision dated November 17, 2003 reads:
The foregoing considered and taking a cue on the adoption x x x of the Honorable
Justices of the Supreme Court of the new "Rule On Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages" (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
which took effect on March 15, 2003, this Court hereby RECONSIDERS itself and
GRANTS the motion for reconsideration filed by the herein petitioner-appellee on
November 29, 2000. Consequently, respondent-appellants appeal is hereby
DISMISSED and the DECISION of the court below declaring the marriage between
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING and BENJAMIN G. TING null and void ab initio under
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines is hereby AFFIRMED.
WHEREFORE, in view thereof, we can not do any less but sustain the decision
dated 29 August 2002 of the court below in Civil Case No. CEB-14826 declaring the
marriage between petitioner-appellee Carmen Velez-Ting and respondent-appellant
Benjamin G. Ting void from the beginning under Article 36, Family Code (as
amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987).
Consequently, the Decision of this Court promulgated on October 19, 2000 is hereby
SET ASIDE and a new one rendered AFFIRMING the appealed Decision of the
Court a quo.
SO ORDERED. (Id. at 88-89.)
48
Rollo, pp. 110-111.
49
De Mesa v. Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc., G.R. Nos. 153063-70, August 19, 2005, 467
SCRA 433, 440.
50
Id. at 438.
51
Art. 8 of the Civil Code provides in full:
Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
52
G.R. Nos. 174153 and 174299, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160.
53
Id. at 308-312. (Citations and emphasis omitted.)
54
408 Phil. 713 (2001).
55
G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353.
56
G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009.
57
Supra note 41, at 680.
58
Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000).
59
Id. at 850.
60
Rationale for the New Rules as submitted by the Committee on the Revision of Rules to
the Supreme Court, November 11, 2002, p. 3, as cited in Sta. Maria, Jr., Court Procedures in
Family Law Cases, 2007 ed., pp. 10-11.
61
Supra note 40, at 34.
62
Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 58, at 850-851.
63
Rollo, p. 39.
64
Id. at 54-55.


















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 150677 June 5, 2009
RENATO REYES SO, Petitioner,
vs.
LORNA VALERA, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J .:
For our review is the Petition for Review on Certiorari
1
filed by petitioner Renato Reyes So
(petitioner) against the Decision dated July 4, 2001
2
and the Resolution dated October 18, 2001
3
of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 65273. The challenged decision reversed the
decision
4
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 143, Makati City declaring the marriage of the
petitioner and respondent Lorna Valera (respondent) null and void on the ground of the latters
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The assailed resolution denied the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The petitioner and the respondent first met at a party in 1973 after being introduced to each other by
a common friend. The petitioner at that time was a 17-year old high school student; the respondent
was a 21-year old college student. Their meeting led to courtship and to a 19-year common-law
relationship,
5
culminating in the exchange of marital vows at the Caloocan City Hall on December 10,
1991.
6
They had three (3) children (Jeffrey, Renelee, and Loni)
7
in their relationship and subsequent
marriage.
On May 14, 1996, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of the nullity of his
marriage with the respondent.
8
The case was docketed as JDRC Case No. 96-674. He alleged that
their marriage was null and void for want of the essential and formal requisites. He also claimed that
the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage,
as shown by the following circumstances: the respondent failed and refused to cohabit and make
love with him; did not love and respect him; did not remain faithful to him; did not give him emotional,
spiritual, physical, and psychological help and support; failed and refused to have a family domicile;
and failed and refused to enter into a permanent union and establish conjugal and family life with
him.
9

The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his charges.
The petitioner testified that he and the respondent eloped two (2) months after meeting at a
party.
10
Thereafter, they lived at the house of his mothers friend in Bulacan, and then transferred to
his parents house in Caloocan City. They stayed there for two (2) months before transferring to
Muntinlupa City.
11

The petitioner likewise related that respondent asked him to sign a blank marriage application form
and marriage contract sometime in 1986. He signed these documents on the condition that these
documents would only be used if they decide to get married. He admitted not knowing what
happened to these documents, and maintained that no marriage ceremony took place in 1991.
12
As
noted below, the petitioner, however, submitted a certified true copy of their marriage contract as
part of his documentary evidence.
The petitioner further alleged that the respondent did not want to practice her profession after
passing the dental board exam; and that she sold the dental equipment he bought for her.
13
He also
claimed that when he started his own communication company, the respondent disagreed with many
of his business decisions; her interference eventually led to many failed transactions with
prospective clients.
14

The petitioner narrated that he often slept in the car because the respondent locked him out of the
house when he came home late. He felt embarrassed when his employees would wake him up
inside the car. When he confronted the respondent the next morning, she simply ignored him. He
also claimed that respondent did not care for their children, and was very strict with clients.
Moreover, the respondent went out with his employees to gamble whenever there were no clients.
Lastly, he testified that sometime in 1990, he found all his things outside their house when he came
home late after closing a deal with a client. He left their house and stayed at a friends house for two
(2) months. He tried to go back to their house, but the respondent prevented him from entering. The
respondent also told him she did not love him anymore. He attempted to reconcile with her for the
sake of their children, but she refused to accept him back.
15

Summons was served on the respondent on July 17, 1996, but she failed to file an answer. The RTC
ordered the public prosecutor to investigate if there had been collusion between the parties and to
intervene for the State to see to it that evidence was not fabricated. Prosecutor Andres N. Marcos
manifested that he was unable to make a ruling on the issue of collusion since the respondent failed
to appear before him.
16

Aside from his testimony, the petitioner also presented certified true copies of the birth certificate of
their three children;
17
certified true copy of their marriage contract;
18
and the testimony, original
curriculum vitae,
19
and psychological report
20
of clinical psychologist Dr. Cristina Rosello-Gates (Dr.
Gates).
In her Psychological Report, Dr. Gates noted as follows:
x x x
P A R T I C U L A R S
- Parties met in a party when Petitioner was 17 years and Respondent was 21 years old;
both were studying but Petitioner was also working in his fathers business;
- During the first time they met, Respondent hugged Petitioner and stayed close to him; she
also taught him how to smoke marijuana; after their first meeting, Respondent would fetch
petitioner from school, and they would go out together;
- Within the next two months, Respondent dropped out of school without informing her
parents; she applied for a job and was purportedly raped by her employer;
- When Respondents parents found out that she quit school, she sought petitioners help to
look for a place to stay; Renato brought her to his friends house in Bulacan but her hosts did
not like her frequent outings and parties; Respondent then asked Petitioner to live with her in
a rented apartment; she told him to execute an Affidavit of Loss so he can withdraw his
savings with a new bankbook without the knowledge of his father;
- Parties were fetched by Petitioners parents to live with them in Caloocan; petitioner sent
Respondent to school to wean her away from her friends; when she passed the Dentistry
Board Examinations, he put up a dental clinic for her; after 2 months, she quit her dental
practice and joined Petitioner in his communications business;
- Respondent had problems dealing with Petitioners clients; she interfered with his
decisions, and resented his dealings with clients which would, at times, last till late at night;
one incident in 1990, Respondent locked Petitioner out of house prompting the latter to sleep
in the car; other similar incidents followed where employees would wake up Petitioner when
they report for work; one night, Petitioner found all his things thrown out of the house by
Respondent;
- Respondent was not the one who took care of their children; the second child, for instance,
cries whenever said child sees Respondent as the latter is not familiar with the former;
- While parties lived together since 1973, they applied for a marriage license only in 1986;
Respondent asked Petitioner to sign both license and marriage contract without any public
appearance at City Hall; their marriage was registered in 1991 after the couple separated.
21

and concluded that:
An examination of the parties respective family background and upbringing, as well as the events
prior to their marriage point to psychological impairment on the part of Respondent Lorna Valera.
From a simple existence in the province, Lorna Valera was thrust in the big city for her college
education. It was in Sampaloc, Manila where she lived and groped, and eventually found herself in
bad company. Thus, her so-called "culture shock" was abated by pot sessions lasting several days
at a time making her temporarily forget the harsh reality in the metropolis. Her escapist and
regressive tendencies stunted her psychological growth and prevented her from fully functioning as
a responsible adult.
Based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), the international standards of
psychological disorders, Respondent Lorna Valera is plagued with an Adjustment Disorder as
manifested in her impulsiveness, lack of restraint, lack of civility and a sense of decency in the
conduct of her life. Compulsive Behavior Patterns are also evident in her marijuana habit, gambling
and habitual squandering of Petitioners money. Lorna Valeras Adjustment Disorder and
Compulsive Behavior Patterns were already existing prior to her marriage to Petitioner Renato So.
Continuing up to the present, the same appears to be irreversible.
22

The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the marriage of petitioner and respondent in its decision of November 8, 1999. The
decision, a relatively short one at four (4) pages, single-spaced, including the heading and the
signature pages, made a short summary of the "testimonies of the witness" with the statements that

Petitioner and respondent became common law husband and wife from 1973 to 1991. Out of this
relationship were born three children, namely Jeffrey, Renelee and Lino all surnamed Varela.
Sometime in 1987 petitioner was induced by respondent to sign a blank Marriage Contract and a
blank application for marriage license. The petitioner freely signed the documents with the belief that
the documents will be signed only when they get married.
23

Thereafter, the RTC decision wholly dwelt on the question of the respondents psychological
incapacity based on the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Gates, his expert witness. The decisions
concluding
paragraphs stated:
Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that respondent Lorna Valera is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligation of marriage, which incapacity existed at
the time of the celebration thereof (Art. 36 F.C.).
It should be borne in mind that marriage is a special contract of permanent union and the foundation
of the Family. The husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual help and
support (Art. 68 F.C.). It includes the giving of love and affection, advice and counsel,
companionship and understanding (Art. 230 F.C.). Respondent failed to observe all these things.
24

The dispositive portion of the decision that immediately followed reads:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner and against respondent:
1. Declaring respondent psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations under Art. 36 of the Family Code;
2. Declaring the marriage contracted by Renato Reyes So and Lorna Valero on December
10, 1991, null and void ab initio;
3. Dissolving the conjugal partnership between the spouses in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of the Family Code;
4. Awarding the custody of the minor children to petitioner.
x x x
SO ORDERED.
25

The CA Decision
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the
RTC decision to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 65273. The CA, in its Decision dated July 4,
2001, reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
26

The CA ruled that the petitioner failed to prove the respondents psychological incapacity. According
to the CA, the respondents character, faults, and defects did not constitute psychological incapacity
warranting the nullity of the parties marriage. The CA reasoned out that "while respondent appears
to be a less than ideal mother to her children, and loving wife to her husband," these flaws were not
physical manifestations of psychological illness. The CA further added that although the
respondents condition was clinically identified by an expert witness to be an "Adjustment Disorder,"
it was not established that such disorder was the root cause of her incapacity to fulfill the essential
marital obligations. The prosecution also failed to establish that respondents disorder was incurable
and permanent in such a way as to disable and/or incapacitate respondent from complying with
obligations essential to marriage.
The CA likewise held that the respondents hostile attitude towards the petitioner when the latter
came home late was "a normal reaction of an ordinary housewife under a similar situation"; and her
subsequent refusal to cohabit with him was not due to any psychological condition, but due to the
fact that she no longer loved him.
Finally, the CA concluded that the declaration of nullity of a marriage was not proper when the
psychological disorder does not meet the guidelines set forth in the case of Molina.
The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied his motion in its
resolution
27
dated October 18, 2001.
The Petition and Issues
The petitioner argues in the present petition that the CA seriously erred
28

1. in reversing the RTC decision without ruling on the trial courts factual and conclusive
finding that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was null and void ab initio;
2. in departing from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings that factual
findings of the trial courts are entitled to great weight and respect and are not disturbed on
appeal; and
3. in totally disregarding the undisputed fact that respondent is psychologically incapacitated
to perform the essential marital obligations.
29

The Republic, as intervenor-appellee, alleged in its comment that: (a) the trial court never made a
definitive ruling on the issue of the absence of the formal and essential requisites of the parties
marriage; and (b) petitioner was not able to discharge the burden of evidence required in Molina.
30

The petitioner filed a reply;
31
thereafter, both parties filed their respective memoranda reiterating their
arguments. Other than the issue of the absence of the essential and formal requisites of marriage,
the basic issue before us is whether there exists sufficient ground to declare the marriage of
petitioner and respondent null and void.
THE COURTS RULING
We deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. No case of lack of essential and formal requisites of
marriage has been proven or validly ruled upon by the trial court.
1. The CA did not err in not ruling on the alleged lack
of the essential and formal requisites of marriage
The petitioner cites as ground for this appeal the position that the CA reversed and set aside the
RTC decision without touching on the trial courts ruling that there was absence of the essential and
formal requisites of marriage.
We find this argument baseless and misplaced for three basic reasons.
First. The argument stems from the mistaken premise that the RTC definitively ruled that petitioners
marriage to respondent was null and void due to the absence of the essential and formal requisites
of marriage.
A careful examination of the RTC decision shows that the trial court did not discuss, much less rule
on, the absence of the formal and essential requisites of marriage; it simply recited the claim that
"[S]ometime in 1987 petitioner was induced by respondent to sign a blank Marriage Contract and a
blank application for marriage license. The petitioner freely signed the documents with the belief that
the documents will be signed only when they get married." The trial court did not even mention the
certified true copy of the Marriage Contract signed by the officiating minister and registered in the
Civil Registry of Kalookan City. The petitioner introduced and marked this copy as his Exhibit "D" to
prove that there is a marriage contract registered in the Civil Registry of Kalookan City between
petitioner and respondent.
32

Out of this void came the dispositive portion "[D]eclaring the marriage contracted by Renato Reyes
So and Lorna Valera on December 10, 1991 null and void."
33
Faced with an RTC decision of this
tenor, the CA could not have ruled on the validity of the marriage for essential and formal
deficiencies, since there was no evidence and no RTC ruling on this point to evaluate and rule upon
on appeal. Even if it had been a valid issue before the CA, the RTCs declaration of nullity should be
void for violation of the constitutional rule that "[No] decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based."
34

Second. The same examination of the RTC decision shows that it concerned itself wholly with the
declaration of the nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. After its recital of
the "testimonies of witnesses," part of which are the facts relied upon to support the claimed
psychological incapacity, the decision dwelt on the evidence of Dr. Gates, the expert witness, and,
from there, proceeded to its conclusion that psychological incapacity existed. In this light, the
dispositive portion declaring "the marriage...on December 10, 1991, [is] null and void," must be
based on psychological incapacity as found by the trial court, not on the absence of the essential
and formal requisites of marriage.
Third. We note that the petitioner himself offered the Marriage Contract as evidence that it is
registered with the Civil Registry of Kalookan City.
35
As a duly registered document, it is a public
document, and is prima facie evidence of the facts it contains, namely, the marriage of the petitioner
with the respondent. To contradict these facts and the presumption of regularity in the documents
favor, the petitioners contrary evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely
preponderant.
36
To be sure, a married couple cannot simply nullify their marriage through the non-
appearance of one spouse and the uncorroborated declaration by the other spouse that the
marriage did not really take place. If the biased and interested testimony of a witness is deemed
sufficient to overcome a public instrument, drawn up with all the formalities prescribed by the law,
then there will have been established a very dangerous doctrine that would throw the door wide
open to fraud.
37
At the very least, the declaration that the marriage did not take place must be
supported by independent evidence showing a physical impossibility, a forgery, or the disavowal by
the supposed participants, to name a few possible reasons.
2. Petitioner failed to establish respondents psychological incapacity
As the CA did, we hold that the totality of evidence presented by petitioner failed to establish the
respondents psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations.
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides that "a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." In Santos v.
Court of Appeals,
38
the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined
to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage."
39

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the
Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals
40
(the Molina case) as
follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,
41
further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a
condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity.
Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the
Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.
42

The factual background of this case covers at least 18 years. The petitioner and the respondent first
met in 1973 and lived together as husband and wife, without the benefit of marriage, before they got
married in 1991. In the course of their relationship, they had three (3) children; established a
business, and even incurred indebtedness amounting to P4 million; had differences due to what the
CA described as "character faults and defects"; and had a well-described quarrel which the CA
observed to be the "common reaction of an ordinary housewife in a similar situation." Thus, unlike
the usual Article 36 cases this Court encountered in the past, where marriage, cohabitation, and
perception of psychological incapacity took place in that order, the present case poses a situation
where there had been a lengthy period of cohabitation before the marriage took place. To be sure,
this factual unique situation does not change the requirement that psychological incapacity must be
present at the time of the celebration of the marriage. It does, however, raise novel and unavoidable
questions because of the lapse of time the couple has been together and their intimate knowledge of
each other at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Specifically, how do these factors affect the
claim of psychological incapacity that should exist at the time of the marriage, considering that
marriage came near or at the end of the parties relationship?
Ideally, the best results in the determination of psychological incapacity are achieved if the
respondent herself is actually examined. This opportunity, however, did not arise in the present case
because the respondent simply failed to respond to the court summons and to cooperate in the
proceedings. Thus, only an indirect psychological examination took place through the transcript of
stenographic notes of the hearings and clinical interviews of the petitioner which lasted for about
three (3) hours.
43
In light of the differences in the appreciation of the psychologists testimony and
conclusions between the trial court and the appellate court, we deem it necessary to examine the
records ourselves, as the factual allegations and the expert opinion vitally affect the issues submitted
for resolution.
Our own examination of the psychologists testimony and conclusions leads us to conclude that they
are not sufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological
incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage. In the first place, the facts on which the psychologist based her conclusions
were all derived from statements by the petitioner whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be
doubted. It does not appear to us that the psychologist read and interpreted the facts related to her
with the awareness that these facts could be slanted. In this sense, we say her reading may not at
all be completely fair in its assessment. We say this while fully aware that the psychologist appeared
at the petitioners bidding and the arrangement between them was not pro bono.
44
While this
circumstance does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her reading of the facts, her
testimony, and her conclusions must be read carefully with this circumstance and the source of the
facts in mind.
In examining the psychologists Report, we find the "Particulars" and the "Psychological
Conclusions" disproportionate with one another; the conclusions appear to be exaggerated
extrapolations, derived as they are from isolated incidents, rather than from continuing patterns. The
"particulars" are, as it were, snapshots, rather than a running account of the respondents life from
which her whole life is totally judged. Thus, we do not see her psychological assessment to be
comprehensive enough to be reliable.
For example, the psychologists statements about the parties sexual relationship appear to us to be
rash, given that no parallel examination of the petitioners own pattern of sexual behavior has been
made. Sex with a partner is a two-way affair and while one partner can be more aggressive than the
other, aggressiveness is not per se an aberrant behavior and may depend on the dynamics of the
partners relationship. To infer prior sexual experience because the respondent allegedly initiated
intimate behavior, and to cite an unverified incident of a previous rape to characterize the
respondents sexual behavior, are totally uncalled for. That the respondent did pass her Dental
Board Exam was glossed over and unverified unsavory incidents related to her exam were
highlighted. Her alleged failure to practice was stressed, without emphasizing, however, that "she
quit her dental practice and joined petitioner in his communications business."
The respondents business behavior is a matter that needed full inquiry, as there could be reasons
for her interference. With respect to employees, while the petitioner charged the respondent with
being strict, he, at the same time, alleged that she gambled with the employees when there were no
clients. The psychologist did not pursue these lines and, significantly, the petitioners testimonies on
this point are uncorroborated. The respondents reaction to her husbands nights out was singled out
and slanted to indicate negative traits. It took the CA to observe that her hostile attitude when the
petitioner stayed out late at night "is merely a usual common reaction of an ordinary housewife in a
similar situation." To further quote the CA citing the transcripts, "[I]n fact, petitioner-appellee admitted
that the reason respondent got angry and threw his things outside is because he came home late
and drunk, which petitioner-appellee had done several times already on the pretext of closing
business deals, which sometimes included going out night-clubbing with clients."
45
Why and how the
couple incurred indebtedness of about P4 million may be usual in the communications business, but
is certainly a matter that the psychologist should have further inquired into in relation with her alleged
strictness in business affairs.1avvphi 1
As against the negatives in viewing the respondent, we note that she lived with the petitioner for 18
years and begot children with him born in 1975, 1978 and 1984 developments that show a fair
level of stability in the relationship and a healthy degree of intimacy between the parties for some
eleven (11) years. She finished her Dentistry and joined her husband in the communications
business traits that do not at all indicate an irresponsible attitude, especially when read with the
comment that she had been strict with employees and in business affairs. The petitioners
Memorandum
46
itself is very revealing when, in arguing that the Marriage Contract was a sham, the
petitioner interestingly alleged that (referring to 1987) "[S]ince at that time, the relationship between
the petitioner and respondent was going well, and future marriage between the two was not an
impossibility, the petitioner signed these documents."
More than all these, the psychologists testimony itself glaringly failed to show that the respondents
behavioral disorder was medically or clinically permanent or incurable as established jurisprudence
requires. Neither did the psychologist testify that the disorder was grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. To directly quote from the
records:
ATTY. RODOLFO BRITANICO
Q: All right, what was basically your conclusion in your qualitative research with regards to
the psychological incapacity of the respondent to comply with the marital obligation?
DR. CRISTINA R. GATES
A: There is a strong indication that the respondent was not able to carry out her marital
obligation her marital duties and responsibilities. And going through the TSN, it is evident
that in their conjugal relation, it was petitioner who was responsible, but he in fact gave her
opportunity to develop and to become responsible herself. [sic]
For instance, he sent her back to school to take Dentistry, he supported her during that time and
during the exam and after that he built her a clinic. In all these, the respondent proved to be
irresponsible. [sic]
When she was taking pre-dental, most of the time she was out of the house, and in one instance
petitioner discovered that respondent was having an extra-marital affair with her classmate. And in
her board exam she failed the first time. And even if it is questionable, petitioner approached one of
the commissioners and through his efforts the respondent was able to pass the second time around.
[sic]
And in the matter of dental clinic, after merely two months respondent refused to practice, she not
only refused and without the knowledge of the petitioner sold all the dental equipments at a loss.
[sic]
Q: How about their relationship?
A: From the start respondent is older, she had, like, prior sexual experience, and she was the
one who introduced to him the use of marijuana. x x x x
Q: How about respondent. How would the respondent compliment the responsibility?
A: There is no mutuality, because if she run away and asked for petitioner to rent an
apartment for them to live together, petitioner continued to work and study and went home to
her in the evening, but respondent on the other hand she quit schooling and she did push
through with working, and worst she allowed her friend to live with them, allegedly in that
apartment, and respondent and friend would engage in pot sessions. [sic]
Q: What did you find out with regards to the duty of respondent to live together with the
petitioner? [sic]
A: She was frequently out, in [sic] her friends. .
Q: How about love and respect?
A: Love is rather complicated. Because she made love to him in her own will. [sic]
Q: But did they show respect?
A: No, because she had extra-marital affair, and demanding lot of money.
Q: How about to render emotional, spiritual and physical help? How would respondent
comply?
A: She was not able to comply, except maybe for the sexual obligation, but in terms of
physical and emotional support she was not there for him. When she quit, she hang out with
him on their business, but instead of helping him, she would quarrel him, interfere in his
decisions, she would embarrass petitioner in front of his clients and employees, and if
petitioner would have a deal with his clients and sometimes would come home late, she
would refuse to listen to his explanation and would lock him out and shout at him. [sic]
Q: And in your Psychological findings, when did this [incapacity] of the respondent start, her
incapacity to comply with the marriage obligation?
A: In the testimony of the petitioner, I think he did mention that she came to Manila for her
studies, and during the interview I found out that upon arrival in Manila she was alone, by
herself, she had difficulty adjusting to city life, because all her life were spent in the province
with her parents and siblings, and she lived in Sampaloc where she got herself in the
company of bad friends like going into marijuana and frequent parties and pot sessions,
[which] would last for 3 to 4 days, and in effect disallowed her from going to school regularly.
Q: In clinical psychologist [sic], what is the effect?
A: It is traumatic for her, because there is a separation of her parents, and not only that she
was thrown to a situation of her being alone, at that time she had no guidance, it would
assume that she would just study[sic]
Q: In your conclusion of your Psychological Report, you stated here and I quote: "Based on
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM IV), the international standards of psychological
disorders, Respondent Lorna is plagued with an Adjustment Disorder as manifested in her
impulsiveness, lack of restraint, lack of civility and a sense of decency in the conduct of her
life." Can you please explain to us.
A: Lorna Valera is like a person who is not in control of herself, impulsive. x x x
Q: How about lack of restraint?
A: Impulses. Like for example, when the husband comes home late, instead of looking
means and ways to rationalize, she would just shout and lock him out.
Q: And what about lack of civility, what is your basis?
A: She did not consider the welfare of her children, her frequent outings, like she would
conduct her extra marital affairs through phone calls. When they separated, I understand that
she was always out of the house, gambling at night. In fact, petitioner in one of his visits to
respondent and children intercepted the letter of a younger child asking for an appointment
to see the mother because the childs report is that he hardly sees the mother.
x x x x
Q: You mentioned also in your psychological conclusion that Adjustment Disorder and
Compulsive Behavior of Lorna Valera existed prior and continuous up to the present, can
you please explain?
A: If Lorna Valera somewhere in her life changes all of a sudden, then the psychological
incapacity is not obtaining but in mal-adopting behavior, like you remove the stimulus of the
petitioner in her life. Then the same behavior pattern as I learned from the children, then the
incapacity is irreversible because it is there.
47
[sic]
These statements, lopsided as they are as we observed above, merely testify to the respondents
impulsiveness, lack of restraint, and lack of civility and decency in the conduct of her life. The
psychologist, however, failed to sufficiently prove that all these emanated from a behavioral disorder
so grave and serious that the respondent would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage; that it was rooted in the respondents medical or psychological history before
her marriage; and that a cure was beyond the respondents capacity to achieve.
Speaking of the root of the alleged disorder, the psychologist could only trace this to the time the
respondent came to Manila; the psychologist concluded that the disorder was due to her separation
from her parents and lack of guidance. Will common human experience, available through the
thousands of students who over the years trooped from the provinces to Manila, accept the
conclusion that this experience alone can lead to a disorder that can affect their capacity to marry?
In terms of incurability, the psychologist could only cryptically say -
A. If Lorna Valera somewhere in her life changes all of a sudden, then the psychological incapacity
is not obtaining but in mal-adopting behavior, like you remove the stimulus of the petitioner in her
life. Then the same behavior pattern as I learned from the children, then the incapacity is irreversible
because it is there.
48

Does this convoluted statement mean that Lorna Valera can still change, and that change can
happen if the "stimulus of the petitioner" is removed from her life? In other words, is the incapacity
relative and reversible?
In Molina, we ruled that "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional
emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as indicative of psychological incapacity. The illness must
be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, the root cause should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage." In the present
case, the psychologist simply narrated adverse "snapshots" of the respondents life showing her
alleged failure to meet her marital duties, but did not convincingly prove her permanent incapacity to
meet her marital duties and responsibilities; the root or psychological illness that gave rise to this
incapacity; and that this psychological illness and consequent incapacity existed at the time the
marriage was celebrated.
In light of the wide gaps in the facts the psychologist considered and of the patent deficiencies of her
testimony tested under the standards of established jurisprudence, we cannot accord full credence
and accept the psychologists Report as basis for the declaration of annulment of the parties
marriage under Article 36. In the absence of any contradictory statements from the respondent, the
fairer approach is to read between the lines of this Report and discern what indeed happened
between the parties based on common human experience between married couples who have lived
together in the way the parties did. From this perspective, we have no problem in accepting the CA
decision as a fairer assessment of the respondents alleged psychological incapacity, and for being a
more realistic appreciation of the evidence adduced in light of the requirements of Article 36:
Such character faults and defects, We believe, do not constitute psychological incapacity as a
ground for the declaration of marriage between petitioner-appellee and respondent. While she
appears to be less than ideal mother to her children and loving wife to her husband, herein
petitioner-appellee, the same are not physical manifestations of a psychological illness as described
in Molina. Although the expert witness had clinically identified respondents condition as "Adjustment
Disorder," allegedly resulting from respondents separation from her parents when she studied in
Manila before she met petitioner-appellee, it was not established that such disorder or illness
allegedly manifested in her carefree and outgoing behavior as a means of coping with her emotional
and psychological stresses, was the root cause of her incapacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. Moreover, such alleged disorder was not shown to be of a serious nature, "a
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effective incapacitates" the respondent from "really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage." The clinical findings on respondents alleged Adjustment Disorder
have not established such illness to be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. And, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, although
the Psychological Report stated that respondents condition "appears to be irreversible," the expert
witness did not substantiate her conclusion that respondents condition was indeed incurable or
permanent. Nowhere in the testimony of petitioner-appellee was it shown that respondents allegedly
carefree ways (and smoking of marijuana) while she was younger and had no children yet,
continued throughout their marriage until their separation in 1990. On the contrary, her strict attitude
towards the clients and employees is a clear indication that she takes their business concerns
seriously, such attitude being a reflection of a mature and responsible personality.
49

Shorn of any reference to psychology, we conclude that we have a case here of parties who have
very human faults and frailties; who have been together for some time; and who are now tired of
each other. If in fact the respondent does not want to provide the support expected of a wife, the
cause is not necessarily a grave and incurable psychological malady whose effects go as far as to
affect her capacity to provide marital support promised and expected when the marital knot was tied.
To be tired and to give up on ones situation and on ones husband are not necessarily signs of
psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy
for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy,
however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is still a limited remedy that addresses only a
very specific situation a relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded
because the parties, or one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness
existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and,
thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage. Outside of this situation, this Court is powerless
to provide any permanent remedy. To use the words of Navales v. Navales:
50
1avvphi 1
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic
marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or
"ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological
illness that is contemplated by said rule.
51
[Emphasis ours]
WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July 4, 2001 and October 18, 2001, respectively, in CA-
G.R. CV No. 65273. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
*

Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
**

Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it
is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice


Footnotes
*
Designated additional Member of the Second Division per Special Order No. 645 dated May
15, 2009.
**
Designated additional Member of the Second Division effective May 11, 2009 per Special
Order No. 635 dated May 7, 2009.
1
Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justice
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestao; rollo, pp. 30-37.
3
Id., p. 39.
4
Penned by Judge Salvador Abad Santos.
5
TSN, August 14, 1997, pp. 4-6.
6
Annex "B," rollo, p. 62.
7
Annexes "A," "A-1," and "A-2," id., pp. 56-61.
8
Id., pp. 40-44.
9
Id., p. 42.
10
TSN, August 14, 1997, p. 8.
11
TSN, April 2, 1998, pp. 2-4.
12
Id., pp. 5-7.
13
Id., pp. 7-8.
14
Id., pp. 9-10.
15
Id., pp. 10-13.
16
Records, p. 33.
17
Id., pp. 6-8.
18
Rollo, p. 62.
19
Exhibit "F," id., pp. 63-64.
20
Exhibit "E," id., pp. 65-69.
21
Id., pp. 65-66.
22
Id., pp. 68-69 (Emphasis in the original).
23
RTC Decision, id., p. 74.
24
Id., p. 75.
25
Id., pp. 75-76.
26
CA Decision, id., p. 36.
27
Id., p. 39.
28
Id., pp. 3-28.
29
Id., pp. 8-9.
30
Id., pp. 130-150.
31
Id., pp. 177-184.
32
See Annexes "B" and "G," id., pp. 53 and 62.
33
RTC decision, id., p. 75.
34
CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 14; See People v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 148821, July 18,
2003, 406 SCRA 658, and Yao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132428, October 24, 2000, 344
SCRA 202.
35
Supra note 30.
36
See Yturralde v. Azurin, G.R. No. L-22158, May 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 407; Calahat v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. 75257-58, February 15, 1995, 241 SCRA 356.
37
Yturralde v. Azurin, supra.
38
G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20.
39
See Dimayuga-Laurena v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159220, September 22, 2008.
40
G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198.
41
G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755.
42
See Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 123 (Emphasis ours).
43
TSN, September 15, 1998, pp. 6-14.
44
See Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose, G.R. No. 168328, February 28, 2007, 517 SCRA 123;
Choa v. Choa, G.R. No. 143376, November 26, 2002, 392 SCRA 641.
45
CA Decision, rollo, p. 36.
46
Id., pp. 200-227.
47
TSN, September 15, 1998, pp. 6-14.
48
Id., p. 14.
49
CA Decision, rollo, pp. 35-36.
50
G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008.
51
Id. (citations omitted).