Burckhardt 1990 The Political Elite of The Roman Republic-Comments On Recent Discussion of The Concepts "Nobilitas" and "Homo Novus"

The Political Elite of the Roman Republic: Comments on Recent Discussion of the Concepts
"Nobilitas and Homo Novus"

Author(s): Leonhard A. Burckhardt
Source: Historia: Zeitschrift fr Alte Geschichte, Bd. 39, H. 1 (1990), pp. 77-99
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
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The political elite of the Roman Republic 77
THE POLITICAL ELITE OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC: COMMENTS
ON RECENT DISCUSSION OF THE CONCEPTS NOBILITAS AND
HOMO NOVUS
In his Habilitationsschriftof 1912, "Die Nobilitat der r6mischen Republik",'
Matthias Gelzer demonstrated that in Republican times a very small political
elite, whose members were designated nobiles, ruled Rome. He showed how
this nobility composed itself, from what class it recruited, and he described in
particular the social structures and mechanisms that permitted its long rule. In
time Gelzer's insights formed a widely accepted basis for the investigation of
the political system of the Roman Republic. Some later studies dealt with very
different aspects and did produce significant controversies. In more recent
times, however, Gelzer's own
findings
have been
disputed
-
mainly by English
scholars
-
and a completely new picture of Roman politics has emerged
aiming at a fundamental revision of established ideas about the nobility's rule.
In my view, however, the arguments that are adduced for this revision do not
sufficiently support their large claim. Yet such criticism demands a reconside-
ration of the current theory, which will briefly be undertaken below. First, I
will sketch the contribution of Gelzer and, where necessary, that of his succes-
sors. Then, the main tenets of the opposing theories will be discussed, their
arguments examined, and their accomplishments estimated.
I
Gelzer's slim work is clearly organized into two sections.2 In the first part he
derives a definition of the concept of nobility from the sources and draws
conclusions about its social composition in the second and first centuries B. C.
In the second part he describes the social bases of their rule.
Since no ancient definition of nobilitas exists
-
or of its opposing concept,
novitas -
Gelzer tries to trace the contemporary understanding of the concept
from the language use of Roman authors, especially Cicero, but also Sallust
I
Die Nobilitat der romischen Republik (Leipzig and Berlin, 1912)
=
Kleine Schriften, I
(Wiesbaden, 1962) 17-135. Below I refer to the reprint (Stuttgart, 1983), an enlarged edition with
a preface added by J. v. Ungern-Sternberg. The English translation is by R. Seager, The Roman
Nobility (2nd ed. Oxford, 1975).
2 For the genesis of this book and the influences that affected Gelzer up to the time of its
writing, see J. Bleicken, Chr. Meier, and H. Strasburger, Matthias Gelzer und die romische
Geschichte(KallmUnz, 1977); R. T. Ridley, 'The Genesis of a Turning-Point: Gelzer's
Nobilitat",
Historia 35 (1986) 474-502; Chr. Simon, "'Geizers Nobilitat der r6mischen Republik' als
'Wendepunkt"', Historia 37 (1988) 222-240. Also stimulating is Chr. Simon, "Gesellschaftsge-
schichte im Fruhwerk von M. Gelzer", an unpublished lecture given on the occasion of the 50th
anniversary of the Basler Seminar fur Alte Geschichte (1984 in Basel).
Historia, Band XXXIX/I (1990) K) Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart
78 LEONHARD BURCKHARDT
and Livy. On the basis of a list of every man ever called nobilis, Geizer is able
to show that in general someone would be called nobilis if among his direct
ancestors there was a consul, dictator, or consular tribune. There are only a
few exceptions to this rule.3 Gelzer further elaborates that the nobility was
merely the narrow peak of the class eligible for office, who alone could attain
office.4 For him this capability is identical with membership in the class of
equites. On the other hand, a man was an eques if he possessed a sufficient
income to reach the appropriate census. To the next higher level, the senato-
rial class, belonged anyone who was admitted into the senate by the censors.
This condition usually covered those men who had already held an office.
Certainly, a man became a senator if he had already held a curule magistracy.5
In this it is clear that through completion of the cursus honorum it was possible
to rise out of the class of equites into the senate, or even into the nobility. The
augmentation of the ruling class, then, was theoretically assured through
vertical mobility.6 Homines novi, Gelzer concludes, are thus equites who ob-
tained an office as the first of their families, in the most spectacular instance
the consulship.7 According to Gelzer, the latter was only a rare occurrence.
Political power, in the form of high office, was usually in the possession of
the nobiles and their descendants, and they conducted the business of state
with the help of the senate. This arrangement essentially lasted for 300 years.
Many noble gentes successfully and repeatedly brought at least a few of their
descendants to the consulship, or at least to a praetorship. The nobility's
bewildering constancy and tenacity in the control of power is the basis for the
second part of Gelzer's book. He inquires into the means by which the nobility
was able successfully to keep its position for so long, a phenomenon that is in
no way a matter of course given the condition of election to office by the
people. In answer to this question, Gelzer sees the decisive factor not in the
extraordinary nature of the Roman constitution, which preserved privileges
for no one, but rather in the social conditions that determined the functioning
of the political system.8 Holding closely to the sources, Gelzer clearly depicts
many informal connections, what he terms relationships based on fides and
personal connections, which pervaded the society and largely determined the
behavior of individuals. Among these he reckons,
for
example,
the
patronage
in courts and in wards, not to speak of the legally established patronage of
3
See the list of nobiles from Cicero given by Gelzer (above, note 1) 22-40, and the discussion
of the exceptions, 24f. For the terminology used by other authors see 28-32; here only contempo-
rary usage is considered.
4
Mommsen, Staatsrecht, III (3rd ed. Leipzig, 1887-88) 462f. For a correction see P. A. Brunt,
'Nobilitas and Novitas': JRS72 (1982) 1.
5
Gelzer (above, note 1) Iff.
6 Ibid., 41.
7
Ibid., 30; 40ff.
8
Ibid., 43.
freedmen. By the same token, a soldier could view his general, or a colonist his
founder, as a patron. Further examples of more or less closely structured
connections can be found. Ideally, it was characteristic of all these relation-
ships that the weak and the strong were obligated to one another not legally
but morally: the patron was obliged to protect in emergencies, while the client
was obliged to support wherever necessary and possible. The latter obligation
meant primarily political assistance,9 which became manifest naturally as
support in the elections.
Also important are the reciprocal obligations and connections of members
of the ruling class with one another. Accordingly, Gelzer calls a man most
powerful, "who through the strength of his clients and friends can mobilize
the greatest number of voters"'.' Thus it was the network of relationships
based on fides and personal connections that gave the nobiles, literally the
"known", the decisive advantage over outsiders in the popular elections. Since
the client relationships were anchored hereditarily and deeply in the thinking
of Roman society, the tendency to perpetuate the existing power relationships,
i. e. the rule of the nobility, was also inherent in that society. Gelzer offers
many examples of the functioning of these social connections in political life.
His evidence derives for the most part from the first century."1
With the discovery that social conditions were fundamental to the rule of
the nobility, Gelzer made an essential contribution to the understanding of
political life in the Roman Republic. Until quite recently, his picture received
no thoroughgoing criticism. That does not mean, however, that later genera-
tions of researchers have not augmented, enriched, corrected or deepened his
conception in many respects. Here I need merely cite R. Syme, E. Badian,
H. Strasburger, J. Bleicken, Cl. Nicolet, J. Martin and Chr. Meier,'2 who have
treated very different aspects of the problem in a more or less exhaustive way.
In their works Gelzer's basic insights remain the central focus.
9
The values that made these obligations vital cannot be discussed here in detail. Cf. below
and H. Oppermann (ed.), Romische Wertbegriffe (Wege der Forschung 34) (2nd ed. Darmstadt,
1974).
10 Gelzer (above, note 1) 116.
Ibid, 52ff., 68ff.
12 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution (Oxford, 1939); Syme, The Augustan Aristocracy (Oxford
1986); E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae (264-70 B. C.) (Oxford, 1958); H. Strasburger, RE XVIII
(1939) 773ff. s. v. optimates; Strasburger, REXVII (1937) 785ff. s. v. nobiles; J. Bleicken, Die
Verfassung der romischen Republik (Paderborn, 1975); Bleicken, Staatliche Ordnung und Frei-
heit in der romischen Republik (Kallmunz, 1972); Bleicken, "Die Nobilitat der romischen
Republik", Gymnasium 88 (1981), 236ff.; Cl. Nicolet, L'ordre equestre d 1'epoque
r4publicaine
(312-43 av. J. C.), vol. 1 (Paris, 1966), vol. 2 (Paris, 1976); Nicolet, Le metier de citoyen dans la
Rome republicaine (Paris, 1976); Nicolet, "Les classes dirigeantes romaines sous la republique.
Ordre senatorial et ordre equestre", Annales(ESC) 32 (1977) 726ff.; J. Martin, Die Popularen in
der Geschichte der spaten Republik (Diss. Freiburg, 1965); Chr. Meier, Res publica amissa. Eine
Studie zur Verfassung und Geschichte der spaten romischen Republik (2nd ed. Frankfurt, 1980);
recently, K.-J. Holkeskamp, Die Entstehung der Nobilitat (Stuttgart, 1987).
II
Fundamental criticism of Gelzer has appeared only very recently. The
criticism focuses on three lines of analysis. First, P. A. Brunt has doubted the
correctness of Gelzer's definitions of nobilitas and of homo novus and set
against these definitions an earlier thesis, which derives from Theodor
Mommsen.'3 Next, Keith Hopkins and Graham Burton claim to demonstrate
that the nobility and the whole political elite of Rome were much more open
than previously thought and that the fluctuation and mobility of persons were
much greater than has been maintained."4 Finally, Fergus Millar wants to
revise the picture of Rome as a republic of aristocrats: in his view the people,
specifically in the assembly, played a much more important role than is
generally conceded to them.'5
Here let us deal first with the concept of nobility and its antithesis, the homo
novus. P. A. Brunt considers Gelzer's definition of nobility inadequate and
believes that Mommsen was correct in his opinion that every holder of the ius
imaginum, thus every descendant of a curule magistrate, belonged to the
nobility.'6 Moreover, Brunt argues that all patricians
-
regardless whether their
ancestors had held office - also became nobiles. This last point Gelzer express-
ly rejects in attributing nobilitas only to the descendants of consuls.'7 Brunt's
justification for returning to Mommsen's definition, however, lacks rigor of
method and substance. Brunt does not deal with the problem directly. That is
to say, on the one hand, that he examines a few examples where it is difficult
to recognize any status for the men in question; for example, he treats cases
where there are similar names for two thoroughly different families of the
Roman ruling class, or where a less prominent family has usurped the name of
a noble one. Also, he deals with those persons whose ancestors are no longer
identifiable, but who were designated as nobiles. On the other
hand, Brunt
13
P. A. Brunt, 'Nobilitas and Novitas"' JRS 72 (1982) 1ff.; cf. also the earlier works of
A. Afzelius, "Zur Definition der r6mischen Nobilitat in der Zeit Ciceros", Class. et Med. 1 (1983)
40ff. and "Zur Definition der r6mischen Nobilitat vor der Zeit Ciceros", Class. et Med. 7 (1945)
150ff., Afzelius adopts the view that Gelzer's narrow conception of nobility only came to prevail
in the period of the Gracchi and that previously the wider conception, which joins nobility with
the ius imaginum, helds way. Against Gelzer also H. Drexler, "Nobilitas", Romanitas 3 (1961)
158ff. Drexler, Politische Grundbegriffe der Rbmer(Darmstadt, 1988) 73ff.
1" K. Hopkins/G. Burton, "Political succession in the late Republic (249-50 B. C.)" in:
K. Hopkins, Death and Renewal, Sociological Studies in Roman History 2 (Cambridge, 1983).
15 Fergus Millar, 'The political character of the classical Roman Republic, 200-150 B. C.,"
JRS 74 (1984) 1ff.; Millar, "Politics, Persuasion and the People before the Social War (150-90
B.C.)", JRS76 (1986) 1ff.
16 Brunt (above, note 13) passim; for Mommsen see Brunt's note 4 and cf. note 13. Recent
literature on the ius imaginum is given in J. P. Rollin, Untersuchungen zu Rechtsfragen romischer
Bildnisse (Bonn 1979) 5ff. and G. Lahusen "Zum romischen Bildnisrecht", Labeo 31 (1985)
308ff.; F. Lucrezi, "Ius imaginum, nova nobilitas", Labeo 32 (1986) 131ff.
17
Gelzer (above, note 1) 28f. According to Afzelius, Class. et Med. 7 (1945) 151, there is no
question of non-consular patricians.
wonders if the praetorship did not also confer nobility, since this office was
indeed on equal rank with the consulship for a period in the 4th century.'8 It
also seems doubtful to him that there could have been any non-nobiles
patricians at all.
By compiling this list of problem cases Brunt naturally has adduced no
proof for his conception.'9 Such a proof can only be advanced by an investiga-
tion of the ancient use of terminology, as Brunt himself sees. In his investiga-
tion the focus is, as for Gelzer, Cicero, in whose works appear by far the
greatest number of examples for the use of nobilitas and nobilis. Brunt is
obliged to admit that Gelzer's definition applies to 55 of the 59 individuals
designated as nobilis in the works of Cicero.20 Casting the net wider and
including the rest of the sources shows that, for Cicero's time at least, Gelzer's
definition demonstrably applies to 156 of Adam Afzelius's count of 294
references to nobiles, with an additional 126 very probable cases.2' According-
ly, only 12 cases would certainly fall outside the rule. Thus one is permitted to
assume with Gelzer that the remaining authors under consideration, e. g. Livy,
Sallust or Asconius, use the term in a way similar to Cicero.
These findings cast doubt on the nobilitas definition of Brunt and Momm-
sen. Admittedly, historical concepts or theories are not subject to the princi-
ples and demands of the exact sciences. In contrast to the laws and terminolo-
gy of natural science, historical constructs admit exceptions to the conformity
they describe, without thereby being falsified. How great must the number of
exceptions be before rendering the rule as such meaningless and robbing it of
its significance? In my opinion, Gelzer's definition of nobility - 4 of 59 cases
(or 12 of 294) all still partly open to interpretation, too - does positively not
exceed the critical threshold. His definition satisfies the minimum require-
ments of essential probability that must be applied to a historical concept. The
marginal cases that Brunt treats in detail, to which I refer above, do not change
this conclusion at all.
All this says nothing about the historical significance of the phenomenon
defined. What is supposed to be explained by this definition and what its use
is have not been established. We now know that according to the ancient
conception, a nobilis was almost certainly the descendant of a consul. That
does not in and of itself mean that the nobility, thus defined, was identical
with the political elite of the Roman Republic; but the regard that contempo-
18
On the praetorship see Brunt (above, note 13) 10f. and for usurpation of names 3ff.
19
Proof is also not supplied by the list of exceptions given by Brunt (above, note 13), 1, 13f., in
which individuals from non-consular families are designated as nobiles. This is discussed below.
20
Brunt (above, note 13), 14.
21
Afzelius, Class et Med.
1
(1938) 90; regarding his conception of nobility see above, note 13;
Cf. D. R. Shackleton-Bailey, "Nobiles and novi reconsidered", AJPh 107 (1986) 255f., who also
sees no reason to depart from Gelzer's definition.
raries already felt for nobilitas is evidence for this identification. Also, the
political history of the Roman Republic shows clearly that to this group was
ascribed a special significance as a standard bearer in the realm of political
activity. Prosopographical studies also add support.22 Surprisingly, Brunt con-
cedes this same influence to the consulars as well. In his study we read:
"Within the senate the consulars normally enjoyed most authority. Hence
access to the consulship mattered most" (p. 15). Since the special importance
of a consular is emphasized by the political reality of a given period, it is no
wonder that their descendants were perceived as outstanding by the rest of the
society. Accordingly, there is no need to doubt Gelzer's definition of nobility
and its explanatory value for the political system of the Roman Republic.
The method that Brunt applies to refute this definition is somewhat disap-
pointing. In a long segment of his article he first discusses relatively unimpor-
tant individual questions and attempts to cast doubt partly on Gelzer's, but
partly also on every other definition of nobility. Then, on the last pages of his
work, Brunt is obliged, on the basis of a study of the ancient use of terminolo-
gy
-
which above all is supposed to be relevant
-
and on the basis of the actual
facts to return to the traditional line of interpretation. The sense of such an
approach is at least questionable.
Yet it is true that in the second section of his essay, which is devoted to the
discussion of novitas in contrast to nobilitas, Brunt is able to uncover certain
gaps in the traditional discussion. He shows that the ancient authors employ
the concept homo novus, as opposed to nobilitas, relatively infrequently and
inconsistently. Gelzer and many of his successors have perhaps based them-
selves too narrowly on Cicero's understanding of the term. In fact, it becomes
clear that the concept of homo novus is to be understood less precisely than the
concept of nobilis. The concept of homo novus is inherently vague.23 This fact
is not particularly remarkable: the vagueness lies in the nature of the situation
and is a consequence of the internal diversity of the ruling class. There were
22
See, for example, Syme, Roman Revolution, Iff.; Hopkins (above, note 14) 37ff.; Chr.
Meier, "Die Ersten unter den Ersten des Senats: Betrachtungen zur Willensbildung im rbmi-
schen Senat", in: Gedachtnisschrift fuir W. Kunkel, ed. D. N6rr/D. Simon, Frankfurt a. M. 1984,
185-204.
23 Rightly emphasized by P. J. J. Vandenbroeck, ,Homo novus again", Chiron 16 (1986) 239ff.
Other recent works on homo novus: aside from Brunt (above, note 13), also T. P. Wiseman, New
Men in the Roman senate, 139 B. C-A. D. 14 (Oxford, 1971), who offers a comprehensive
prosopographical analysis largely on the basis of a very broad definition of homo novus(cf. with
it the prosopography for the years 78-49 B. C. in Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman
Republic [Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1974] 508ff.); like M. Pani, "Quale novitas?"
Quaderni de storia 16 (1982) 193ff., Vandenbroeck deals critically with M. Dondin-Payre, 'Homo
novus: Un slogan de Caton a Cesar?" Historia 30 (1981) 22-81, who develops a too narrow and
too strict definition of novitas; Strasburger, REXVIII (1937) 1223-1228, s. v. homo novus, has
indeed two concepts of novitas; but because of a paucity of sources he does not consider the time
before Cicero.
many types of newcomers. It is debatable whether all of these individuals were
designated as homines novi or just a few. To the newcomers belonged knights
who attained a magistracy and with it in general advanced into the senatorial
class; but along with these were also senators who had been elected to a higher
office than representatives of their family had previously been able to hold.
The most spectacular case was, of course, that of a consul born as a knight.
Examples of such "extreme" careers are rare, and precisely because of their
singularity they have had the most impact on the concept of homo novus.
Dondin-Payre even goes so far as to see knights, who achieved the consulship
or at least were candidate for it, as the only group to whom novitas could be
ascribed.24 Sallust, Asconius and Cicero employ the expression, however,
equally for knights who attained lower offices.25 Then again, the designation
scarcely appears for consulars from senatorial, but not noble, families.26 Men
from praetorian or at least aedile houses were apparently more acceptable or
natural as consuls than those from equestrian gentes. A conclusion of this line
of inquiry is evident: not all non-nobiles who passed through the cursus
honorum to the top were novi. Apparently, only equestrian newcomers were
given
this label.27 Novitas is thus not a complementary, but rather a contrasting
concept to nobilitas. This was perhaps not completely clear to Gelzer; in
particular, in his Habilitationsschrift he nowhere clearly differentiates between
novi who merely made their way into the senate, and those who even became
consuls.28 More recent work has made this clearer; using additional prosopo-
graphical means, Brunt emphasizes the existence of different types of novi.
Yet one should not overestimate the significance of the novitas concept for the
political discussion in the Roman Republic: in Republican literature (from the
auctor ad Herennium to the author of bellum Africanum) the concept appears,
according to the count of Dondin-Payre, merely 37 times,29 while in literature
of the Empire it appears an additional 23 times. In comparison to the frequen-
cy of the use of nobilitas, this count is not overwhelming, and for that reason
one can agree with Dondin-Payre when she denies to the expression homo
24
Dondin-Payne (above, note 23) 39-42; compare other studies mentioned in preceding note.
25
Ibid., 55f., where the evidence is assembled; cf. also Vandenbroeck (above, note 23) 239f.
26
Cf. Shackleton-Bailey (above, note 21) 258ff.
27
For the different gradations of "newness", see also Brunt (above, note 13) 13. Various
questions, for example, concerning the origin of the concept and concerning the semantic
coloring cannot be taken up here. J. Vogt, 'Homo novus. Ein Idealtyp der romischen Republik",
in Gesetz und Handlungsfreiheit in der Geschichte (1955) - written 1925 -
argued that homines
novi had a special political status, which in part took on an exemplary character. Despite a few
fine remarks about the self-images of a Cato or of a Cicero (and of Marius in Sallust's Jug. 85),
Dondin-Payre (above, note 23) 24f. rejects his thesis.
28 Later, to be sure, Gelzer too used a refined concept of novitas, see Cicero und Caesar,
Wiesbaden 1968, 11.
29
Dondin-Payre (above, note 23) 70.
novus the status of a political slogan. From this perspective, the concept
played no outstanding role in political life.
III
This certainly cannot be said about the reality which lies behind the term.
The question of how many new members there were in the nobility, how many
of these were homines novi and therefore how open or exclusive the political
elite was, is a central historical problem. The work of K. Hopkins and G. Bur-
ton mentioned above deals with this question. I come now to the second
aspect emphasizing criticism of the traditional concept of nobility.
It might be appropriate to begin with two basic points.
1. It was never disputed that the nobility was open in principle to indivi-
duals from below and that, therefore, the entry into the political elite was
possible in a systematic way, in so far as one belonged to the class capable of
rule
-
as Gelzer described it. The
nobility
was thus no closed
heredity group
to
be compared to a caste or feudal class. The means of entry was election to the
relevant offices.
2. The nobiles were not distinguished from the rest of the senators by social,
economic, cultural, and certainly not by legal privileges. The nobiles were
prominent merely through the tradition of exercise of political power, which
elevated this group above the rest of the ruling class of society.30 For that
reason, the nobility also can correctly be designated as a political elite.
From these two premises two interesting lines of inquiry are open to
investigation. How greatly did the composition of the nobility change and
who actually succeeded in entering into it? Moreover, it is important to know
which mechanisms were operative in this mobility.
Precisely these problems are the basis for the work of Burton/Hopkins.3'
Their study attempts to demonstrate on a quantitative basis that the change in
personnel of the Roman ruling class was much greater than has previously
been assumed. With the help of 12 tables and 3 graphs, which variously
30
At this juncture, we need not consider the separation of the senators from the class of
knights, which was formalized both by the lex Claudia de nave senatomum of 218 and by the leges
de equo reddendo or Acilia repetundarum.
31 Hopkins/Burton (above, note 14) 31-119. Of many reviews of this work, the most compre-
hensive is by B. D. Shaw, "Among the believers", in: Classical Views/Echos du monde classique
28, n. s. 3 (1984) 453-479 (in reply to that see Mehl, Gymnasium 94 (1987) 281). Further reviews:
Champlin, Phoenix 40 (1987) 231-233; Crawford, TLS83 (1984) 196; Dahlheim, HZ 242 (1986)
653f.; Duncan-Jones, CR 34 (1984) 270ff.; MacMullen, AHR 89 (1984) 741; Paterson, G & R 31
(1984) 90f.; Runciman, JRS76 (1986) 259-265; Wiseman, HT33.10 (1983) 59f. Aside from the
relevant second part of the work, i. e. by Hopkins, "Political succession in the Late Republic
(249-50 B. C.)", the book contains both a parallel study of the aristocracy under the Empire
(p. 120-200) and
-
as a kind of frame for the work
- a
chapter
each on the
gladiatorial games
(p. 1-30) and death at Rome (p. 201-256). As a consequence, the work has more the character of
a collection of essays than of a concise monograph.
illuminate the recruitment for high magistracies from different segments of the
upper classes, they hope to show that the influence of nobiles on the selection
was in no way absolute and further that the period of time when individual
families maintained a leading position was relatively short. Here I can discuss
only the most important findings. It makes little sense in this paper to subject
the authors' statistical method to a closer examination, although a few pro-
blems would be worthy of analysis. Among these problems, for example, is the
question of whether the sources for knowledge of the genealogies of the
consuls or consular gentes, so important to the Hopkins/Burton study, are
exact and sufflciently reliable. Moreover, one wonders whether the computa-
tional basis of the aggregated individuals cases is large enough to be able to
reckon throughout in percentiles, which are the only means of setting up a
comparison. At all events our knowledge of those holding off-ices lower than
the consulship is very imperfect for the period under investigation. All this
makes evaluation of the results of the two researchers very difficult and limits
its representative value, although scarcely to the extent that the results no
longer have any explanatory value. Their computations at least tend in the
right direction.
To summarize their main points, the object of their investigation is seven
generations of consulars in the period between 249 and 50 B. C. Their exami-
nation reveals that in this period 62 % of the consuls came from noble families,
while 40 % had a father who was already consul. Among the consular families,
to be sure, 47 % in the seven generations analyzed were able to produce only
one or two consuls in two succeeding generations. These gentes could therefo-
re be effective in the political elite only for a relatively short time.32 In addition,
the authors emphasize that in that case some representatives of noble families
must not have reached the consulship, and some perhaps completely aban-
doned a political career or were compelled to do so. The size of this group is
difficult to estimate. We have scarcely any concrete examples of nobiles who
never even became quaestor, yet the existence of such individuals cannot be
disproved. Just how this group even came into existence is not clear. It is an
open question how many nobles voluntarily turned away from politics
-
or
were satisfied with attaining the lower-level offices
-
and how many were
frustrated in their political ambitions.33 Hopkins/Burton incline to the conclu-
sion that among the gentes nobiles themselves the competition must have been
32
Hopkins/Burton (above, note 14) 56. There is no consideration of a possible long-term
resurgence of a gens, i. e. coming after the sixth generation; however, such cases were perhaps so
infrequent as to be insignificant.
33
An example of renouncing the cursus honorum for reasons of health: P. Cornelius Scipio,
son of the elder Africanus (RE IV, 1437f. (1901) s. v. Cornelius 331): Cic. Brut. 77; Cat. 37, de
off.
1.121; Vell. Pat. 1.10.3.
very severe.34 This is not an astonishing fact in itself since it can easily be
calculated that down through each of the years on average more than two
candidates from the nobility must have stood for the consulship. Those
aspirants who did not belong to the nobility naturally accentuated this compe-
tition for office. All the same, according to Hopkins/Burton these aspirants
took 38 % of the consulships.5 If these findings are accepted - and I have no
reason not to do so
-
the following conclusions can be drawn from them:
membership in the nobility was neither a necessary nor sufficient condition
for the exercise of political power. However, anyone who was nobilis had a
considerable advantage, vis-a-vis the rest of those eligible to rule, in the
competition for offices, especially the consulship. It also appears that the
ruling elite was subject to fluctuation. New gentes could establish themselves
in the nobility, while others could not maintain their status.
It was indeed possible for a gens to improve his position. Mostly the
improvement took place in stages over several generations: Gelzer already
stated in this connection that any senator's son was admitted to the consulship
without fundamental opposition.36 Thus, the limits to the exclusivity of the
nobiles were rather widely drawn. The case of a true homo novus was, to be
sure
-
as the studies mentioned above reveal
-
extremely
rare and thus
sensational.37 All in all, the change within the upper class was a rather slow-
moving but continual process; the nobility added to its numbers, so to speak,
osmotically.
Hopkins/Burton have plausibly deduced this state of affairs from their
quantitative analyses. Yet their implicit claim that they have thereby over-
turned the traditional formulation in this area is not justified. If it was known
long ago that the nobility was open from below and continually renewed itself,
it was equally clear that the entry into it was all the easier the higher ancestors
34
Hopkins/Burton (above note 14) 107ff.; see a similar view in T. P. Wiseman, "Competition
and Co-operation", in: Wiseman (ed.), Roman political life, 90 B. C.-A. D. 69 (Exeter, 1985)
3-19. R. Develin, Patterns in Office-Holding 366-49 B. C., Bruxelles 1979, 31ff., specially 36,
shows that in every 20-year period the 'maiores gentes' (i. e. the Aemilii, Fabii, Claudii, Cornelii,
Manlii and Valerii) and some other families certainly could provide a consul: according to this
view, the pressure of concurrence was not too high at least for those families; cf. idem, The
Practice of Politics at Rome 366-167 B. C., Bruxelles 1985, 89ff.; 307ff.
35
Certain imponderables are still contained in these figures: basically, it is not clear to what
extent individuals are represented whose possible nobilitasdepends on a great-great-grandfather
or even further back; Hopkins/Burton only reach back to the great-grandfather. Moreover, it
cannot be known how great the percentage of consuls of equestrian birth is and how many
ordinary homines novi there were in percentile terms.
36 Gelzer (above, note 1) 28.
37
Depending on the period under consideration, the list of true homines novi is of varying
length in different studies: Brunt (above, note 13) 6ff. identifies 11 so-called parvenus between
201 and 44 B. C.; for the whole Republican period and part of the Empire, Dondin-Payre (above,
note 23) 54ff. has 22 novi; Gelzer (above, note 1) 40, counts 15 novi from 366 B. C.
had risen in the past. For senators it was therefore easier than for knights, and
for those with praetorian ancestors easier than for the descendants of aediles.
In connection with this problem, a short digression on the political system
and the constitution in general may be in order. In any investigation of the
personnel changes within the nobility, it must, of course, be emphasized that
the institutional and structural framework remained by and large stable. The
constitution did not change essentially; the real power remained concentrated
in the hands of the small groups of office holders, especially the consuls, and
in the senate. The potential for integration into the nobility was remarkable:
new members in turn took over its values and its mentality and tried to
measure up to the tradition that they encountered. This process was greatly
facilitated by the fact that, viewed socially, the difference between the homines
novi and the well-established was significantly smaller than the difference
between the class eligible to rule and the simple plebeians. From the perspec-
tive of social circumstances, then, there were few obstacles to the process of
integration.38 Therefore, although attaining the consulship might have been a
difficult task for a given homo novus, the political system and the nobility
could easily deal with its new members. With this last point we can return to
our discussion. With their statistics established, Hopkins and Burton may thus
be able to grasp the degree of renewal in the nobility more precisely than
before and also to clarify our picture of the fluctuation within the political
elite. The authors find this rate relatively high and for that reason they search
for explanations for what appears to them to be a strong regrouping. They find
these explanations in factors, partly interrelated, of a demographic and social
kind, such as the fertility or mortality rates within the Roman upper class, or
the changed role of women in the late Vs. the early Republic. This discussion
cannot treat all of these in detail. It is worth noting in the approach of
Hopkins/Burton, however, that these authors ask the reasons for the high
social mobility and thus adopt a perspective which had little meaning for
earlier research. By contrast, previous studies sought the reasons for the
stability of the political elite. As emphasized, it was Gelzer who first investiga-
ted how it was possible for the nobility to bring their representatives again and
again to the pinnacle of the hierarchy.
This last question seems, to me at any rate, as fruitful to investigate as ever -
not only because the state of the preservation permits, as far as the sources are
38
Of course, within the class of those eligible to rule, there were important economic and
social differences, such as those between municipal nobility and senators, or between publicani
and owners of large estates. For the equestrian order see C. Nicolet, L'ordre
equestre
(above,
note 12); P. A. Brunt, 'The Equites in the Late Republic", in: Deuxieme Conference d'histoire
economique 1962, vol. 1 (The Hague, 1965) 117ff.
=
H. Schneider (ed.), Zur Sozial- und Wirt-
schaftsgeschichte der spdten romischen Republik (Wege der Forschung 413) (Darmstadt,
1976) 175ff.
concerned, a more reliable answer to that question than to that of Hopkins/
Burton.39 More than that, the numbers these researchers have compiled them-
selves support the conclusion that the composition of the nobility, under the
given constitutional and social conditions, was characterized by a remarkable
constancy. In particular, I find the figure of 62 % of the consuls from the
nobility rather high, considering that these consuls were elected by popular
vote and were competing with groups from which they were socially not very
different. Both factors would encourage a greater mixing. Also to be consid-
ered, incidentally, is the extinction of various noble families, a process that - in
a natural way, so to speak - freed up places for lower classes.'
The figure of 62 % can perhaps only be seen as low if the characteristic
closure of a hereditary aristocracy is used as a standard, that is, a situation in
which -
at least theoretically
-
there is no augmentation of personnel from
outside. The assumption of complete exclusion of new members is, however,
probably unrealistic for the majority of aristocratic societies,41 and especially
for the Roman Republic where the nobiles at first had only the advantage of
their nobility, i. e. their familiarity, over others as well as a tradition of exercise
of political power. Hopkins/Burton give false weight to their numbers: the
historically important problems consist precisely in the question of why the
majority of noble families could maintain themselves so long in the political
elite and not in the problem of why so many new men entered. The insights of
both researchers probably cause less to change in the traditional view about
political elite than they themselves realize. At any rate, they can show that in
the stable framework of constitution and political system, a nobilis was ex-
posed to difficult competition from within and from outside his group.
By employing a new approach to this subject, i. e. quantitative method
borrowed from sociology, these two researchers have been able to prove that
even for the nobiles political success was not guaranteed. In my view, this is
the chief value of their work.
39
Here we cannot deal with the hypotheses that Hopkins/Burton (above, note 14) 69ff. offer
in answer to questions raised by their inverted approach to the problem.
40
It would be interesting to examine how the severe losses that the nobility suffered in the
social and civil war of 91-82 affected the statistical rate of renewal; cf. on this point Gruen, The
Last Generation (above, note 23).
41
Of course, one cannot suppose complete social exclusivity even for a medieval, feudal
constitution. On possibilities for social mobility, at least under the conditions of the Late Middle
Ages, see the two very different examples offered by E. Perroy, "Social Mobility among the
French Noblesse in the Later Middle Ages", Past & Present 21 (1961) 25ff. and W. Paravicini,
"Soziale Schichtung und soziale Mobilitat am Hof der Herzoge von Burgund", Francia 5
(1977) 127ff.
IV
I come to a last critical approach that does not deal with the nature and
composition of the political elite, but rather considers the elite's relation to
certain institutions of the constitution, especially to the assembly.
While P. Brunt and K. Hopkins, along with G. Burton, assume that at
Rome an aristocracy was the politically dominant power, Fergus Millar takes
an opposing viewpoint. In two articles he defends the thesis that the power
and influence of the people and of the assembly have clearly been underesti-
mated in the past. Basing himself on the sixth book of the history of Polybius -
in which the Roman constitution is understood as a balanced mixture of
monarchic, oligarchic, and democratic elements - Millar sees many areas
where the people had decisive influence on politics.42 Of course, this thesis can
easily be made plausible on the basis of formal competences of the assembly.
The assembly elected officials, passed laws or plebicites, and made determina-
tions in matters of war and peace. Millar attempts to adduce many examples
to show in what areas and on what occasions the democratic element became
institutionally manifest. In Millar's view, the resulting list supports his thesis
effectively enough. It is only logical that Millar, in view of the influence he
accords to the assembly, gives a prominent place to political rhetoric in
decision making. For him rhetoric is the most important means for influencing
the decisions that the assembly made. For that reason he makes the relation-
ship of the orator to the masses fundamental for the politics of the Roman
Republic;43 beyond this, there is no social relationship which could have
nearly so great an influence on politics. Millar vehemently criticizes the
conception developed in the works of Gelzer and his successors, according to
which the social relationship
-
concretely, the fides and personal relation-
ships
-
decisively determined the decisions and electoral actions of the assem-
bly. Perhaps, he argues, the ancient authors allude to the existence of such
relationships, but their central importance in political life is nowhere atte-
sted.' This, in brief, is Millar's thesis. It is unlikely that he has thus correctly
grasped the distinctive feature of the "political character" of the Roman
Republic.45 Serious reservations about the content and methodology of his
study should be noted.
What the exercise of political power means in terms of opportunities in the
public realm, to determine the distribution of influence, respect, positions and
wealth, depends in all communities on many factors. These factors, indepen-
42
F. Millar, 'The political character of the Roman Republic, 200-150 B. C.", JRS 74 (1984)
1-19; Millar, "Politics, Persuasion and the People before the Social War, 150-90 B. C.", JRS 76
(1986) 1-11.
43
Millar (1984) 2f., 16f.; (1986) 9.
44
Millar (1984) lOff.; (1986) 2ff.
45
The title of the earlier article suggests this aim.
dent of influences in the short term, continually leave their mark on the
political system in the intermediate or long term. In the analysis of these
factors it is necessary at least to differentiate a purely institutional from a
social level as well as to investigate their mutual boundaries. In this way it
becomes clear which groups take part in decision making, to what extent they
participate in political power, how the mechanisms work, and how "autono-
mous" the political realm is from the rest of the social subsystem. Moreover,
such an approach reveals, for example, which objects become political mate-
rial and which remain prepolitical, how deeply political decisions reach, and
what obligations the geopolitical situation of the state creates, and much
more.
4
Only with a comprehensive evaluation of these factors, of the specific
importance of each in the realm of the total structure, and of their mutual
influence and the resulting interactions, can a realistic picture of the formation
of political power emerge and with it a picture of the uniqueness of the
political system. In his discussion Millar remains largely on the institutio-
nal level, and he supposes that for Rome he can to leave out of consideration,
for the most part, the social components that in every community leave their
mark on the constitutional reality. His justification for this lies in the nature of
the sources: Polybius's representation of the balanced mixed constitution is, in
Millar's view, to be taken seriously, since he is by far the most important
contemporary author for the history of the second century. From his work one
could not conclude that the senate was prominent, still less could one get the
impression of a rule of the nobility from his portrayal of Rome's constitution.47
The list of decrees of the assembly in different areas, which can also be culled
from other authors for the period from 200-90 B. C., confirms for Millar the
picture of equality among the three components of the Roman constitution.
Yet such a positivistic interpretation of the sources necessarily leads into
error wherever the answers to modem historical investigations are to be found
not simply in a direct reading of the ancient sources (for example, in the study
of the structure of the Roman state), but rather in conclusions from sources
achieved by the application of critical approaches of various kinds. The
question of the "political character" of the Roman state cannot, at any rate, be
adequately answered simply by adopting the picture sketched by Polybius, for
in his works he disregards many institutional forms and their operations as
they are influenced by the society and the value system.
46
Here I can offer no political theory of the Roman Republic or similar analysis. For such
theory dealing with the Late Republic, see the following works: Meier, Res publica amissa
(above, note 12); Bleicken, Staatliche Ordnung und Freiheit (above, note 12); Bleicken, Lex
publica (Berlin and New York, 1975) - less substantive. For my purposes here only those points
will be discussed that are relevant to a discussion of Millar's thesis.
47 Millar (1984) 19; (1986) 4.
In fact, two statements of Polybius himself show that he - leaving aside the
representation in the sixth book - was conscious of the real power relation-
ships in Rome. At one point he designates the essence of the Roman state as
aristocratic,48 and in another passage he ascribes the greatest influence to the
senate
(dICKuqv cX?V
i
CTO'yKX11tog,
6.51.6). With these two remarks Polybius
doubtless has in mind the actual distribution of power that prevailed at his
time. But in his eyes the given model of mixed constitution also allowed
certain internal shiftings of power.49 These remarks are to be taken very
seriously in the understanding of the political reality beyond the level of the
formal potentialities of individual institutions, as they are discussed at 6.11-18.
We can conclude from them that Polybius himself felt some doubt that his
constitutional scheme yielded a satisfactory explanation of the political life of
the Roman Republic.5"
Against Millar's conception, however, there are further and more serious
objections. First, it is clear that even on a formal, constitutional level the three
institutions of magistrates, senate and assembly - despite what Polybius and
Millar postulate - did not enjoy the same freedom of operation and indepen-
dence. Various well-known provisions assured that the elections and voting of
the magistrates
- and with it of the portion of the political elite that was in
power - could be, for the most part, well observed and controlled.
The following regulations can be noted. Every assembly was summoned
and conducted by a magistrate. The assemblymen had no right to offer
initiatives, proposals, or speeches. Until 139 B. C. numerous votes took place
openly. The citizen who took part in the assembly merely had the right to
listen to speeches made by the leaders or by those persons called upon by the
leaders and to give his vote.
The consequences of these mechanisms are clear: the result of an assembly
was very much affected by those who directed it. The unexpected seldom
happened because the participants scarcely had the opportunity to step out of
their passive roles. To my knowledge there is hardly an example of a law that
failed on the basis of a vote by citizens, and not through intervention by
48
Polybius 23.14.1. Millar (1984) 19 offers no satisfactory explanation for this characterization
of Rome by Polybius. Cf. Nicolet, "Polybe et la 'constitution' de Rome; aristocratie et democra-
tie", in: C. Nicolet (ed.), Democratia et aistokratia (Paris, 1983) 15ff. By examining several
passages of the sixth book, Nicolet makes it clear that for the foreigner Polybius the senate was
the most powerful force and for that reason he correctly characterized Rome as an aristocracy.
On Polybius' understanding of democracy see now A. Lintott, "Democracy in the Middle
Republic", ZRG 104 (1987) 36f.
49 Cf. here Polybius' discussion of the fate of Carthago (6.51.1-6): within the outline of a mixed
constitution, the people have the upperhand as the last stage in a trend toward downfall.
50 Nicolet (above, note 47) attempts to protect Polybius from the reproach of an overly
schematic view of the constitution.
tribunes, religious obstruction, or other forms of resistance.5' It therefore must
be assumed that in the the overwhelming number of cases the assembly fol-
lowed the will of its leaders in votes about substantive issues. An additional
consequence is that the leader of the assembly at every time was in the
position to break up the meeting if it did not run as expected. Here one should
not forget that open voting gave the leading elite a good check on the content
of the vote and also made any non-conformist actions difficult.
The institutionalized dependence of the assembly on the magistrates was
accordingly very high: questions of substance were seldom decided against
their will, and the opportunities of the citizenry to have substantial influence
on such questions were correspondingly limited. All this can only be seen as a
clear qualification of the theoretically great power of the assembly as well as
of the democratic element in the Roman constitution.52
Further characteristics of the Roman assembly also contributed to this
qualification of power: the assemblies traditionally took place at Rome; there
never developed a kind of representative voting. Specifically, this situation
benefitted the inhabitants of the city or of its immediate surroundings as well
as the well-to-do, who could afford the trip to Rome or lost income of a day's
work. Even if this situation did not diminish the fornal power of the assembly,
the representativeness of the will of the people as expressed by the assembly
did suffer. The increase in the citizen body and of the area it covered decrea-
sed the possibilities for participation by those living far away; in the first
century the comitia tributa were largely a concern of residents of the city and
of the followers of leading men who were organized for one reason or
another.53 This factor may have helped the political status of populares - and
with them the ability of minorities within the ruling nobility to get programs
51
So at any rate, W. Nippel, "Die Plebs urbana und die Rolle der Gewalt in der spaten
romischen Republik", in: H. Mommsen/W. Schulze (edd.), Vom Elend der Handarbeit (Stutt-
gart, 1981), 75f. with note 15. But see the example of the Lex Papiria of the year 131 or 130, which
wanted to permit the iteration of the tribunate and was refused by the people because of a speech
by Scipio Aemilianus cf. T. R. S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, I, New
York 1951, 502.
52 Cf. N. Rouland, Democratie impossible (Paris, 1981), and - with a different emphasis -
A. Guarino, La democrazia a Roma (Naples, 1979). For rules on elections and voting see, for
example, L. R. Taylor, Roman Voting Assemblies from the Hannibalic War to the Dictatorship of
Caesar (Ann Arbor, 1966); E. S. Staveley, Greek and Roman Voting and Elections (New York,
1972); E. Meyer, Romischer Staat und Staatsgedanke (4th ed. Zurich and Munich, 1975) 48ff.,
88ff., 126ff., 190ff., Bleicken, Verfassung (above, note 12) 96ff.
53
Parliamentary procedures and delegation of the citizens' votes to designated persons, and
thus to representatives, were alien to Roman circumstances as to the ancient world in general. In
Rome, the idea of representativity never got above rudimental traces. For a different view see
Larsen, Representative Government in Greek and Roman History (Berkeley and Los Angeles
1955). His conclusions are partly accepted by U. Hackl, "Das Ende der romischen Tribusgrun-
dungen 241 B. C.", Chiron 2 (1972) 135ff., who sees beginnings of representation in the tribal
organization. What is missing, however, is the element of delegation of votes on a single person:
each tribus voted only in his own name.
through - and resulted in explosive conflicts.54 On the other hand, the internal
arrangement of all voting bodies had a basically conservative effect. Thanks to
a strict law enforcing voting according to census, well-to-do classes were
especially dominant in the comitia centuriata.55
Taken together, these factors lead to a considerable qualification of the
power of the citizenry and, at the same time, to a certain determinism in the
results of elections and voting in the favor of a ruling elite. First of all, it is clear
enough that, measured on the basis of actual opportunities to exercise power,
there can be no question of equality of the assembly with the senate or with the
magistrates.56 On the contrary, in the period of the Roman Republic that is
illuminated by the sources, i. e. from the third to the first century, the ruling
elite could direct the assembly thanks to these formal, social, topographical
and institutional advantages.57 Millar indeed refers to most of the points just
mentioned, although only at the end of his essay; he does not attempt a
comprehensive evaluation and for that reason has overlooked58 there signifi-
cance or does not consider them important. These factors are, however,
apparently fundamental to an understanding of the operation of the assembly,
and they should accordingly be taken into consideration in an evaluation of
the assembly's role and its political influence.
Meanwhile, despite the plebeians' limited ability to act, there remains the
issue of the reasons for the stability of the nobility's rule and for the effective
54
For the case of Ti. Gracchus see, for example, Martin's interpretation (above, note 12) 130ff.
55
So Meyer's characterization (above, note 52) 50 of the older form, but the situation was
hardly different in this respect for the reformed comitia centuriata after 241 B. C. Cf. Taylor
(above, note 51) 84ff.; Staveley (above, note 51) 133ff.; Bleicken, Verfassung (above, note
12) 98ff.; Hackl (above, note 52) 135ff.
56
The relationship between senate and magistrates need not be discussed here in detail. The
following works shed some light on this issue: U. Hackl, Senat und Magistratur in Rom von der
Zerstorung Karthagos bis zur DiktaturSullas(Kallmunz, 1982); A. Lippold, "Consules. Untersu-
chungen zur Geschichte des r6mischen Konsulates von 264 bis 201 v. Chr.", Antiquitas8 (Bonn,
1963), esp. 73ff., A. M. Eckstein, Senate and General. Individual decision making and Roman
foreign relations, 264-194 B. C. (London and Berkeley, 1987). From time to time individuals
sought by way of the assembly to promote a program that they knew or feared would meet with
opposition in the senate. See, as an interesting example, the relationship of the younger Scipio
Africanus with the assembly, as discussed by J. Bleicken, Das Volkstribunat der klassischen
Republik (Munich, 1955) 68ff. The politics of the populares then turned the people's assembly
completely to its uses, for which see Martin (above, note 12) passim, Chr. Meier, RE Suppl. X
(1965) 549ffJ, sv. populares.
57This is to be distinguished from the time of the conflict of orders, where the people's
assembly was the unrestricted power base of the tribuni plebis or of the leading plebeian gentes,
and where consequently that assembly possessed an institutionally independent position vis-
a-vis others in power. The later functional change of the tribunate from leader of the plebs
against the patricians to a tool of the newly formed noble caste beautifully illustrates the change
in the meaning of the people's assembly. See Bleicken (above, note 55) passim, Holkeskamp,
Nobilitdt (above, note 12) 140ff.
58 Millar (1984) 17f. As far as I can tell, he does not mention that participants had no right to
initiate actions or to speak.
promotion of its interests in lawmaking and politics. Amazement at this
situation led Gelzer, as I have emphasized, to his observations on the political
relevance of the relationships based on fldes and personal connections. For his
part, Millar does not deny their existence, but apparently their importance in
the political system. For the latter he finds no evidence in the contemporary
sources, which are taken to cover the period until 150 B. C.59 Without a doubt
connections can indeed be demonstrated between patron and client even in
the time of the law of the Twelve Tables.60 Then, from Plautus Men. 571ff. it is
clear that is was desirable to have a large number of clients, perhaps because
these clients increased the social status and reputation of the patron.6' These
passages also substantiate the mutual obligations of client and patron; how-
ever, less clear from this is what kind of persons, aside from the liberti did in
fact or could possibly be numbered among the clients. For the first century
countless allusions to the importance of informal connections in society and
politics can be adduced, as Gelzer does very clearly and holding close to the
sources, e. g. from the Ciceronian corpus. Of these sources, particularly infor-
mative is the commentariolum petitionis of Quintus Cicero, which attributes
the advantage of the nobiles over the homo novus directly to their extensive
connections.62 But other authors of the Empire and the Republic are con-
scious of the existence and of the effects of relationships based on fides and
personal connections. It is unnecessary to cite them all.63
There is hardly any doubt that the nature of such connections, as represen-
ted in the Twelve Tables, differs considerably from that of connections in the
first century.'4 The older form was characterized by a comparatively close,
mutual obligation, which was even partly fixed in law and which in the narrow
urban society involved a clearly visible circle of persons. With the growth of
the citizen territory and of citizenship, the nature of this archaic clientele
59
Millar (1984) 17, 13ff.; (1986) 2ff.
60
Twelve Tables 5.8: The obligation of a libertus to his patron; 8.21: patronus, si clienti
fraudem fecerit, sacer esto (= Serv. ad Aen. 6.609), for which see Bleicken, Verfassung (above,
note 12) 23f.
61 On the same theme see Plaut. Trin. 471, Rud. 893, Asin. 870-72. On the passage mentioned
in the text see N. Rouland, Pouvoirpolitique et dependance personnelle dans l'antiquite romaine.
Genese et r6le des rapports de clientele (Brussels, 1979) 261ff., with bibliography. For the early
nature of the connections, see Holkeskamp (above, note 12) 253ff., with bibliography; Bleicken,
Verfassung (above, note 12) 20ff.
62
Comm.
pet. 3ff.; 21;
34ff.
63
See the numerous citations Gelzer assembles for his thesis, 49ff. Further literature:
A. v. Premerstein, RE IV (1901) 23ff. s. v. clientes and also v. Premerstein, Vom Werden und
Wesen des Prinzipats (Munich, 1937) 13ff. (examines the significance of connections for the
development of the principate); Rouland (above, note 51) 111-343. On the use of the word
patronus in legal and literary works: W. Neuhauser, Patronus und Orator (Comm. Aenipontanae
XIV) (lnnsbruck, 1958) 35ff. and 64ff. respectively.
64 Clearly emphasized by Meier, Res publica amissa (above, note 12); see also Rouland (above,
note 51) 345ff.
changed in many respects: to the traditional patronage in the courts and upon
manumission were added the connections of soldier to general, of colonist to
founder, and of the offspring of all these, along with those connections based
on economic dependence and other necessitudines. It was unavoidable that in
the course of this development, which is here only sketched,65 the clientele of
the individual patron increased and that the degree of intensity of the respec-
tive connections took on a very different scope. Certain dependencies came to
be relatively wide-ranging, others more closely bound. There is no doubt,
however, that in all cases the fact of mutual obligation between high and low
classes was a decisive factor in society and in politics. On the contrary, it
would be remarkable if the existence of such obligations, which is thoroughly
documented, should have had no influence on the political realm. It is diffi-
cult to imagine a society in which so important a part of the social make up
and the values lying behind it would not be reflected in some way in political
life.
Still, it is quite correct, as Millar reminds us,'1 that the relationships describ-
ed above hardly leave a trace in the sources for the period from 200-150 B. C.
In my view, there are two reasons for this situation: first, we have at our
disposal only very few Roman sources for this period; second, the chances
were slim anyway that phenomena such as these relationships, which were so
matter-of-fact for contemporaries, would become manifest. They were not
controversial, and the Roman system was at the same time at the highpoint of
its success where self-criticism lacked the usual impetus. All the same, from
the later time it can be extrapolated that the informal connections played a
similar role in the second century: such structures cannot arise with one
stroke, but rather develop over a longer period. So it is that from the evidence
derived from law of the Twelve Tables or from Plautus on the one hand, and
from the common practices of the first century on the other, we can assume
these relationships must have had a political function in the middle of the
Republican period. Yet their existence alone does not completely answer
Gelzer's question about the stability of the nobility's rule. Surely great success
in foreign policy, for example, which satisfied many demands, and the nobili-
ty's continued readiness to achieve, contributed substantially to their en-
trenchment.67
Let us return to the problem of election and voting behavior in the people's
assembly. Certainly, in this area one should beware of expecting a very orderly
65
For the importance of foreign connections see Badian, Foreign clientelae (above, note 12).
Pompey as example of a patron of mass clientele: Gelzer 77ff. (qualified by Meier, Res publica
amissa (above, note 12) 295). For the development of the nature of such connections in general
see Bleicken, Verfassung (above, note 12) 25ff.
66
Millar (1984) 17.
67
Bleicken,
Gymnasium 88 (1981) 236ff., esp. 249ff.
and autonomous functioning of the relationships. The connection to a patron
and the value system that lay at the basis of that connection were together only
one essential factor that influenced voting. Without good reason, a simple
Roman would be very unwilling to take upon himself a breach of the fides
obligation in regard to one of higher social standing.68 But that was probably
the only factor: aside from these influences, the popularity of the individual
standing for election or of the matter put for a vote, the interests of the citizen
himself and the given political situation - all these played a role. In connection
with the subject of this paper, one should indeed not overlook the fact that
information about the matter to be voted upon lay in the hands of the
members of those eligible of rule because of their advantages of knowledge
and education. The ability to upset the stability of order thus lay with those
empowered to speak, who since the end of the conflict of the orders had no
interest in this direction. Incidentally, here rhetoric has a role to play in
politics, and F. Millar accords it extraordinary importance as a decisive fac-
tor.69 The orator in the people's assembly had, it is clear, an opportunity for
personal image-building in the eyes of the people and of the other members of
the ruling class, and he took care to secure the support and devotion of his
audience. More important politically was the task of the speaker of the
moment to actualize the support of the participants for the question at hand
and to mobilize them for a candidate up for election.70 We are not thereby
justified in viewing the relationship of orator to the masses, of speaker to his
audience, as the most politically important social connection of the Roman
Republic; the impressions and dispositions with which both speaker and
listener entered the forum were of much more central importance for the
results of the political process.7'
A further influence certainly contributed to the weakness of the people's
assembly vis-a-vis the ruling class: since the end of the conflict of the orders
the most powerful plebeian gentes had been combined with the patricians
to
68
On Fides see: R. Heinze, 'Fides", Hermes 64 (1929) 140ff. (= Vom Geist des Romertums
(Leipzig, 1938) 25ff.); L. Lombardi, Dalla fides alla bona fides (Mailand, 1961) Iff.; Meyer,
Romischer Staat und Staatsgedanke (above, note 51); Bleicken, Verfassung (above,
note 12)
23.
69
See note 42.
70
Apparently, no specialized study exists of the political importance of rhetoric at Rome. See,
by way of contrast, W. Eisenhut, Einfiihrung in die antike Rhetorik und ihre Geschichte
(2nd
ed.
Darmstadt, 1974) 51ff.; M. Fuhrmann, Die antike Rheioik (Munich and Zurich, 1984)
42ff.
(both works contain further bibliography). Specifically for Cicero see C. J. Classen,
Recht -
Rhetonik - Politik (Darmstadt, 1985). On the content and form of a few controversies of the
Gracchan period: C. Nicolet, "La polemique politique au lIe siecle av. J. C.", in: C. Nicolet (ed.),
Demokratia et aristokratia (Paris, 1983) 37-50.
71 For the concept of "political process" see Chr. Meier, Res publica amissa, "Einfiihrung
zur
Neuausgabe 1980", xliiif.; Meier, "Fragen und Thesen zu einer Theorie historischer Prozesse",
in: Histonische Prozesse. Theorie der Geschichle, vol. 2 (Munich 1978) 1 1ff.
form the nobility;72 and those newly rising in politics had the opportunity,
though it might be difficult, to integrate themselves into the ruling class. As a
consequence, the plebs lacked that part of their number that was most able
and willing to speak out for them. This circumstance also reduced their
potency before the noble magistrates.
Without a doubt, the circumstances elaborated thus far restricted the politi-
cal, not the legal, autonomy of the people's assembly in respect to the other
institutions. In addition, the long history of exercise of power by the nobility,
which was particularly effective in the third and second centuries, gave the
system such legitimacy that opportunities for opposition were very slim. The
conflicts that are tangible for us took place essentially within the nobility or
between senate and magistrate, while the people's assembly at all events was
involved as an instrument of political warfare.73 In the period after the second
Punic War the office of tribunus plebis, the real opposition's magistracy,
actually became very much an office in the service of the senate or of a few
leading nobles.74
On the whole, therefore, it seems that Millar has greatly overestimated the
importance of the assembly when he, following Polybius, places it on an equal
footing with the senate and the magistrates. The assembly's potentially unli-
mited authority to make decisions was tied to a social and political context,
which in fact clearly qualified or reduced its power. This fact is not particular-
ly remarkable since the dominance of the nobility over ordinary citizens was
manifest in other areas of life. For example, the priesthoods, the higher
officers' posts, and (until 123) the judges' seats were reserved for this group.75
The gulf between the nobles and the people was greatly broadened and
emphasized by the hierarchical structure of cult, army and court that was
drawn along political lines. Here it will not be maintained that the assembly
and the rights of individual citizens could become superfluous for the functio-
ning of the political system.76 From a viewpoint of a theory of systems, the
72
Holkeskamp (above, note 12) 62ff.; R. Develin, 'The integration of the Plebeians in the
political order after 366 B. C.", in: K. Raaflaub (ed.), Social struggles in Archaic Rome. New
perspectives on the Conflict of the Orders (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 1986) 327ff.
73
Yet the conflict over the land bill of C. Flaminius, tr. pl. 232 (source: MRR 1, 225) again
raised fundamental questions about the relationship of tribunate/assembly to senate.
74 Bleicken, Volkstribunat (above, note 55) passim. For the late Republic see now L. Thom-
men, Das Volkstribunat derspdten Republik (Diss. Basel, 1987) Stuttgart 1989.
75
For the priesthoods see G. J. Szemler, "Priesthoods and priestly careers in Ancient Rome",
ANRW 2.16.3 (Berlin and New York, 1986) 2314-2331; Szemler, The priests of the Roman
Republic (Coll. Latomus 127) (Brussels, 1972). Cf. D. E. Halm, 'The Roman Nobility and the
three major Priesthoods, 218-167 B. C.", TAPhA 94 (1963) 73ff.
76 M. I. Finley, Das politische Leben der antiken Welt (Munich, 1986)
-
translation of Politics
in the Ancient World (Cambridge, 1983) - sees (117f.) the activities of the assembly as quite
circumscribed. In his view, the influence that the people exercised through demonstrations,
agitation and revolt was essentially more effective than their control over formal proceedings.
On the whole, his conception is diametrically opposed to Millar's.
functioning of the assembly cannot be discussed here in any comprehensive
way.77 A few short observations may suffice.
Through the competence of the assembly in legislation and plebicites it was
assured that many of the essential political questions were presented in the
forum and in that way made public. Such public notice compelled the political
elite at least to try to explain the given matter to the participants in the
assembly in a way both clear and effective. The nobility thus did not carry on
political activity completely divorced from the interests of the people.78 At the
very least, the nobility was required to demonstrate consideration in its spee-
ches in order to assure a more or less uninterrupted course for the political
process. We cannot generalize about how far and how deep this concern
actually went at a given time; only on the basis of the facts of any given case
can that be determined. On the other hand, it was guaranteed that the plebs or
their active representatives were tied into political life; even if for many this
applied only superficially,
it could
identify
a
large
and
-
given
the structure of
the
assembly
-
more
significant portion
of the
citizenry.
Because the people
were participants in political decision making since the conflict of the order, a
demand for influence on decision was absent as a point in the program of a
potential opposition to the dominant classes; other fundamental political
goals could be served anyway - at any rate in the third and second centuries -
in ways that conformed to the system.79
The participation of the people in the political process considerably exten-
ded the basis for the system's legitimacy. Not least of all, this circumstance
might have been an important support for the stability of the Republic.
V
Summarizing the arguments above it becomes clear that the traditional view
of the nobility and its domination should not be given up. Neither can we
develop a plausible alternative to Gelzer's definition of 'nobilitas' derived
from the antique sources, nor can it be doubted that this political elite largely
dominated decision-making. This view isn't changed either by the results won
by Hopkins/Burton according to which the fluctuation in nobility was rela-
tively high and the nobiles were under permanent pressure of concurrence
for
the magistracies. The different types of newcomers who all came from the
77
For comprehensive discussion see Meier, Res publica amissa (above, note 12) 95ff.; 190ff.;
Bleicken, Gymnasium 88 (1981) 236ff.; Bleicken, "Das romische Volkstribunat. Versuch einer
Analyse seiner politischen Funktion in republikanischer Zeit", Chiron 11 (1981) 87ff.
78 This is not intended to imply that the interests of the people and of the nobility could not
correspond in certain areas. In particular, the expansionist foreign policy seems never to have
been object of controversy. Cf. W. V. Harris, War and imperialism in republican
Rome (Oxford,
1979); Finley (above, note 75) 143ff.; 150ff.
79 See Bleicken, Chiron 11 (1981) 101ff.
class of equites eligible for office, integrated themselves quickly into the
leading group. On the whole the framework of institutions and the constitu-
tion remained stable.
If the considerations pointed out above are correct, the relationship bet-
ween aristocracy and the people was by no means one of equal partners, even
if this is suggested by the structure of institutions. The freedom of the assem-
bly to act was severely restrained by different technical niceties of the constitu-
tion, by the informal social ties of small people to aristocracy and by the glow
and social advantage of the nobility. Still the rights of the people ensured that
the political elite was not freed from every consideration for the needs of a
single citizen and of the plebs as a whole.
The attempts to revise this widely established picture of political power and
to paint a new one do not find enough conclusive arguments. The nobility was
the determinating force in the politics of the late Roman republic.80
Universitat Basel Leonhard A. Burckhardt
80
For the translation I would like to thank John Lawless, Providence R. I.

Burckhardt 1990 The Political Elite of The Roman Republic-Comments On Recent Discussion of The Concepts "Nobilitas" and "Homo Novus"

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Burckhardt 1990 The Political Elite of The Roman Republic-Comments On Recent Discussion of The Concepts "Nobilitas" and "Homo Novus"

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The Political Elite of the Roman Republic: Comments on Recent Discussion of the Concepts

"Nobilitas and Homo Novus"

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