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order remanding the case for a new trial. First, the supreme
court holds that the district court did not err in holding a
review them was not error. The supreme court remands the case
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent:
v.
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner:
JUDGMENT REVERSED
EN BANC
December 14, 2009
court for a new trial. We reverse and remand the case to the
2
established a sufficient need for the information at trial and,
renews his argument that the trial court should have conducted
was not reversible error for the trial court to conduct K.H.’s
her mental health records; therefore the trial court and the
3
interests. Here, however, K.H.’s education records did not
K.H. was nine years old at the time of the trial. Under
for a child of that age the events or facts respecting which the
Harris v. People, 174 Colo. 483, 490, 484 P.2d 1223, 1226
(1971).
front of the jury but elected to excuse the jury during the
4
judge’s ruling that K.H. was competent to testify. During the
and age, then questioned her about school, her teacher, and her
5
proceedings can never be held in front of a jury. 1 We disagree
with the court of appeals and hold that there is no per se rule
a child witness is not one of them. See CRE 104. Instead, the
1
The court of appeals never states that it is a per se rule as
such, but the relevant portion of its opinion reads:
We conclude that holding a competency hearing in the
jury’s presence is error when there is objection by
defense counsel since it avoids the potential for
prejudice and ensures fairness. . . . Because here the
competency hearing was held in the jury’s presence,
defendant’s convictions must be set aside, and he is
entitled to a new trial.
Wittrein, 198 P.3d at 1239.
2
Many other jurisdictions have declined to adopt a per se rule
against holding child competency proceedings in front of the
jury. See, e.g., Collier v. State, 140 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Wis.
1966) (holding it is not error to conduct the competency
6
minimizing the danger of unfair prejudice resulting from the
may never be held with the jury present. If the trial court
the jury, then it bears the risk that the defendant will be
for child competency hearings. 722 A.2d 643, 647 (Pa. 1998).
But even the Pennsylvania court noted that it was going “a step
7
rule, and we have found no other jurisdiction that has a
that there was no error when a child was examined for competency
409, 413 (Mo. 1966) (not adopting a per se rule, but holding
that was held outside the jury’s presence but without discussing
relate facts to the jury. The jury was not told the purpose of
the testimony and was excused before the trial judge ruled on
that competency is a legal question for the court but that the
jury makes the ultimate determination on credibility.
8
prejudice to be unwarranted based on the limited questioning
that occurred.
of his convictions.
response.
9
17 (Colo. 1999). Our prior cases have established the general
10
this to mean that Dr. Stern “could not imagine a child of K.H.’s
say that a child K.H.’s age could not make up sexual abuse
worker testifying that the child victim was telling the truth
to be error.
11
Even though Dr. Stern’s response was impermissible, we hold
Shackelford, 182 Colo. 48, 50, 511 P.2d 19, 20 (1973) (holding
questioning.
12
Even if the error was not strategic but instead the result
See Eppens, 979 P.2d at 18. “In order to rise to the level of
K.H. was telling the truth, and her response did not affect the
13
IV. In Camera Review of Education Records and
Medical Records
Dist. Ct., 719 P.2d 722, 726-27 (Colo. 1986)). The “privilege
14
protects testimonial disclosures as well as pretrial discovery
before the trial court may order the documents produced for an
15
its intention to introduce a diagnosis of PTSD from Children’s
conceded that K.H. had waived her privilege with regard to the
that K.H. waived her privilege with respect to the records from
Children’s Hospital but not to the records from AMH. 4 Thus the
quash the subpoena but based its decision on its own in camera
4
The trial court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent
K.H.’s interest in her mental health records. The guardian ad
litem determined that it was not in K.H.’s best interest to
waive her privilege as to the AMH records.
5
We note that in other cases the court of appeals has conducted
its own in camera review to resolve similar issues. See, e.g.,
People v. Kyle, 111 P.3d 491, 503 (Colo. App. 2004). In camera
review should be the province of the trial judge and not
appellate courts. Therefore, absent exceptional circumstances,
16
the defendant’s trial.” Id. Wittrein now argues that the court
records.
We agree with the trial court and hold that K.H. did not
Hospital and her records from AMH, holding that the two sets of
17
treatment, let alone be willing to reveal intimate details
did not assert his mental problems as the basis for a claim or
7
Wittrein argues that the trial court is required to review the
AMH records to determine if they contain information that is
material to his defense. The privilege, however, may not yield
to Wittrein’s bare request for the records, hoping that they may
contain exculpatory information. See Dill v. People, 927 P.2d
1315, 1324 (Colo. 1996) (“[W]e are not persuaded that
[Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987)] requires an in
camera inspection of a psychologist’s notes of post-report
therapeutic sessions with the child to ascertain whether
information material to the defense might have been disclosed by
the child.”); People v. Tauer, 847 P.2d 259, 261 (Colo. App.
1993) (“Indeed, even when the defendant raises a constitutional
right to confrontation, a balancing test between the patient’s
and the defendant’s rights is inappropriate. . . . In all cases,
a victim’s post-assault psychotherapy records are privileged
and, absent waiver, a defendant may not compel their
discovery.”); People v. Dist. Court, 719 P.2d at 726 (“The vague
assertion that the victim may have made statements to her
therapist that might possibly differ from the victim’s
anticipated trial testimony does not provide a sufficient basis
to justify ignoring the victim’s right to rely upon her
statutory privilege.”).
18
The trial court correctly determined that the
subject to review.
B. Education Records
of her alleged abuse. The trial court held that if the People
19
confidentiality interests of the child and parents against the
insufficient proffer.
20
the information contained in the records. See Bachofer, 192
P.2d at 461. The trial court must then balance the defendant’s
information and the issue in dispute, and (3) the harm that may
proper showing of need and that the trial court’s decision will
8
Wittrein argues that the proffer came from an earlier request
that the prosecution turn over any material or exculpatory
information concerning statements of prosecution witnesses and
“any and all records, or information, revealing prior misconduct
or bad acts attributed to any prosecution witness.” We
recognize that this proffer lacks the specificity that a trial
court should require before disclosing education records. But
we are also aware of the unique facts of this case, in that the
trial court imposed a flat prohibition on in camera review based
on an erroneous interpretation of federal law.
21
in the nondisclosure of K.H.’s education records. Under Brady
that it was not reversible error for the trial court to decline
V. Conclusion
original appeal.
22
JUSTICE MARTINEZ concurs, and JUSTICE BENDER joins the
concurrence.
23
JUSTICE MARTINEZ, concurring in judgment only:
as the majority.
I. Competency Proceeding
2
conducted outside the presence of the jury, it is well
See, e.g., Harris v. People, 174 Colo. 483, 490, 484 P.2d 1223,
1226 (1971); Wesner v. People, 126 Colo. 400, 403, 250 P.2d 124,
126 (1952).
of the jury); People v. Reynolds, 195 Colo. 386, 389, 578 P.2d
agree with the majority that Wittrein did not suffer prejudice
3
child victim in this case was telling the truth on a specific
occasion. Maj. op. at 10-11. However, they find that the error
4
to be seen as a victim volunteered more than was asked, and
in a way that would not have allowed for Dr. Stern’s expansive
5
error analysis to determine if reversal is required. In this
the victim did not even testify about her mental condition.
Further, although both the People and Wittrein agree that K.H.’s
6
Nonetheless, the majority discusses implied waiver and largely
address the due process issue, but conclude that Wittrein has
7
psychologist. Id. at 1317. The tape-recording of the initial
observed that the defendant did not show need for the records
access.
may be times when the due process clause requires that the trial
8
due process grounds, I reach the same ultimate result as the
majority.
concurrence.