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Santiago v comelec

Political Law Separation of Powers
On 6 December 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to
Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples
Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for
signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of
the said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election
registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On
18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition
against the Delfin Petition. Also, Raul Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion
to dismiss the Delfin petition, the petition having been untenable due to the
foregoing. Santiago argues among others that the Peoples Initiative is limited
to amendments to the Constitution NOT a revision thereof. The extension or the
lifting of the term limits of those in power (particularly the President)
constitutes revision and is therefore beyond the power of peoples initiative.
The respondents argued that the petition filed by Roco is pending under the
COMELEC hence the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of it.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the case.
HELD: COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
in entertaining the Delfin petition.Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory
petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be
entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent
Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the
actions or proceedings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under
Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a docket
number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning,
undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which
should not have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996,
the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the
oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and
merely wasted its time, energy, and resources. Being so, the Supreme Court can
then take cognizance of the petition for prohibition filed by Santiago
notwithstanding Rocos petition. COMELEC did not even act on Rocos
petition. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is
threatened by the political ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court can
save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the
Constitution. It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the
COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. The
COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the
arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearingon 12 December 1996, it
required them to submit within five days their memoranda or
oppositions/memoranda. Earlier, or specifically on 6 Dec 1996, it practically
gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the
publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the
signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing.

Amendment to the Constitution
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to
Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples
Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for
signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of
the said petition in papers ofgeneral circulation, and c.) instructed local election
registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On
18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition
against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the constitutional provision
on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law
to be passed by Congress and no such law has yet been passed by
Congress,2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative
namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. The
two latter forms of initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and
III thereof but no provisions were specifically made for initiatives on the
Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to
amend the Constitution was left to some future law as pointed out by former
Senator Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative
on amendments to the constitution and if so whether the act, as worded,
adequately covers such initiative.
HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments
to the constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of
Article 17 of the Constitution provides: Amendments to this constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of
at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least there per centum of the
registered voters therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the implementation
of the exercise of this right This provision is obviously not self-executory as it
needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of
the 1986 Con-Con stated without implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17
cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the constitution is a
mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional action in the last analysis is
still dependent on Congressional action. Bluntly stated, the right of the people
to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until
Congress provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such
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right, though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does
not provide for its implementation.

***Note that this ruling has been reversed on November 20, 2006 when ten
justices of the SC ruled that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such
initiative. HOWEVER, this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their
various opinions already given when the Decision herein was promulgated, that
Republic Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru
a peoples initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis.

Political Law Revision vs Amendment to the Constitution
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to
Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples
Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for
signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of
the said petition in papers ofgeneral circulation, and c.) instructed local election
registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On
18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a special civil action for prohibition
against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues among others that the Peoples
Initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution NOT a revision thereof.
The extension or the lifting of the term limits of those in power (particularly the
President) constitutes revision and is therefore beyond the power of peoples
initiative.
ISSUE: Whether the proposed Delfin petition constitutes amendment to the
constitution or does it constitute arevision.
HELD: The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but
a revision of, the Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ.,
it would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited
tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might
appear to be an isolated one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on
synchronization of elections and on the State policy of guaranteeing equal
access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political dynasties.
A revisioncannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2
of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments. The prohibition
against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national
and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, to open
up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the
demands of leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic
powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for
participation in policy and decision-making for the common good; hence, to
remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987
Constitution.

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY
vs.
COMELEC

G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996FACTS:
March 13, 1992, Congress enacted
RA. 7227(The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which created
the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the
declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into
alternative productive uses.
November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military
reservation to the Philippines government. Immediately, petitioner commenced
the implementation of its task, particularly the preservation of the sea-ports,
airport, buildings, houses and other installations left by the American navy.
On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed
Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10 , Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute
concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special
Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President.
May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993.
The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify Pambayang Kapasyang
Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic Special Economic Zone, b) to allow
Morong to join provided conditions are met.
Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by promulgating
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the
Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227.
satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under theLGC of
1991.
July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on the
ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not an ordinance.
February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532
defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including therein the portion of the
former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of
Morong.

June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and2848,
adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum
And providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the
referendum
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July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari
Contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondent
is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a
national law

ISSUE:
1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
Resolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct of the referendum proposing
to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10
2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of
the people of Morong to enact; i .e., whether such initiative "seeks the
amendment of a national law."

HELD:
1.YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. FIRST. The process
started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec
made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the
Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the word "referendum" is
repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec
labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a
"Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the
canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore
the description "referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used
in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an
INITIATIVE.As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose
bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of
the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to
the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a
legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of
electors become a law. In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises
administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its powers over the
conduct of elections.
These law-making powers belong to the people, hence the respondent
Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content
of legislation.
2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution is
still in the proposal stage and not yet an approved law.
The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved
law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to
adjudicate. It is only when the people have voted for it and it has become an
approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be enforced or
implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ or
prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally
speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical
questions or cases. In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court
has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the
commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the
same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not
been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch
or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on
Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues
brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal
in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no decision or
action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take
cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review
powers.
GARCIA ET AL. VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 111511 October 5, 1993 [Initiative and Referendum; Recall
proceeding]

FACTS:
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some
mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve
(12) municipalities of the province constituted themselves into a Preparatory
Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. They issued
Resolution No. 1 as formal initiation of the recall proceedings. COMELEC
scheduled the recall election for the gubernatorial position of Bataan.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of
preliminary injunction to annul the Resolution of the COMELEC because the
PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and procedural requirement" laid
down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code 1991). They pointed
out the most fatal defect of the proceeding followed by the PRAC in passing the
Resolution: the deliberate failure to send notices of the meeting to 65 members
of the assembly.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall
proceedings.
2) Whether or not the procedure for recall violated the right of elected local
public officials belonging to the political minority to equal protection of the
law.

RULING:
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1) No. The history of Section 70 reveals a conscious effort on the part of our
lawmakers to institute an alternative mode of initiating recall apart from the old
means of commencement of the process solely by the people. The lawmakers
had observed that the mode was almost impossible to implement and had been
poorly used, thus precipitating the enactment of Section 3 Article X, which
sought to provide for a more responsible and accountable system of
decentralization with effective means of recall
There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people
have the "sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall
proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single
mode, of initiating recall elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress
to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive
and accountable local government structure through a system of
decentralization witheffective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum .
. ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to
choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates.
What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether
one or many, to be chosen by Congress should be effective. Using its
constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an
alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of
initiation by direct action of the people. The legislative records reveal there
were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the recall
process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of
initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its
expenses.

2) No. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang
members of the municipalities and component cities are made members of the
preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. Its membership is not
apportioned to political parties. No significance is given to the political
affiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the
provincial level includes all the elected officials in the province concerned.
Considering their number, the greater probability is that no one political party
can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides that the only
ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the
people. The members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of
their political parties but as representatives of the people. By necessary
implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere differences in
political party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party
system for the existence of opposition parties is indispensable to the growth and
nurture of democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be faulted
for discriminating against local officials belonging to the minority.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall
process by a preparatory recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous
influences. We held that notice to all the members of the recall assembly is a
condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a
qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene in
session and in a public place. Needless to state, compliance with these
requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid resolution of recall
which can be given due course by the COMELEC.

Evardone v. Comelec, 204 SCRA 464, 472, December 2, 1991
Petitioner: Felipe Evardone
Respondents: Comelec, Alexander Apelado, Victorino Aclana and Noel NivalPonente: Padilla

Facts:
Felipe Evardone the mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having been elected to the position during the
1988 local elections. He assumed office immediately after proclamation. In 1990, Alexander R.
Apelado, Victozino E. Aclan and Noel A. Nival filed a petition for the recall of Evardone with the
Office of the Local Election Registrar, Municipality of Sulat. The Comelec issued a Resolution
approving the recommendation of Election Registrar Vedasto Sumbilla to hold the signing of
petition for recall against Evardone.Evardone filed a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer of
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Later, in an en banc resolution, the
Comelec nullified the signing process for being violative of the TRO of the court. Hence, this
present petition.
Issue 1: WON Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by the COMELEC by virtue of its powers
under the Constitution and BP 337 (Local Government Code) was valid.
Held: Yes
Ratio: Evardone maintains that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution repealed Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by Congress. Since there was, during the period
material to this case, no local government code enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject of recall of elected government
officials, Evardone contends that there is no basis for COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and that
the recall proceedings in the case at bar is premature. The COMELEC avers that the constitutional
provision does not refer only to a local government code which is in futurum butalso in esse .
It merely sets forth the guidelines which Congress will consider in amending the provisions of the
present LGC. Pending the enactment of the amendatory law, the existing Local Government
Code remains operative. Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express provides that
all existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987Constitution shall remain operative, until amended,
repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local Government Code of 1991,
approved by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in
Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act .But the Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on
1 January 1992 and therefore the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg.337) is still the law
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applicable to the present case. Prior to the enactment of the new Local Government Code, the
effectiveness of B.P. Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission. We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272promulgated by the
COMELEC is valid and constitutional. Consequently, the COMELEC had the authority to
approve the petition for recall and set the date for the signing of said petition.
Issue 2: WON the TRO issued by this Court rendered nugatory the signing process of the
petition for recall held pursuant to Resolution No. 2272.
Held: No
Ratio: In the present case, the records show that Evardone knew of the Notice of Recall filed by
Apelado, on or about 21 February 1990 as evidenced by the Registry Return Receipt; yet, he was
not vigilant in following up and determining the outcome of such notice. Evardone alleges that it
was only on or about 3 July 1990 that he came to know about the Resolution of the COMELEC
setting the signing of the petition for recall on 14 July 1990. But despite his urgent prayer for the
issuance of a TRO, Evardone filed the petition for prohibition onlyon 10 July 1990. Indeed, this
Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the petition for recall took place just the
same on the scheduled date through no fault of the COMELEC and Apelado. The signing
process was undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality of Sulat and its Election Registrar
in good faith and without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this Court. As attested by
Election Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern Samar or
about 34% signed the petition for recall. As held in Parades vs. Executive Secretary there is no
turning back the clock. The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or appoint. It is
included in the right of suffrage. It is based on the theory that the electorate must maintain a direct
and elastic control over public functionaries. It is also predicated upon the idea that a public office
is "burdened" with public interests and that the representatives of the people holding public offices
are simply agents or servants of the people with definite powers and specific duties to perform and
to follow if they wish to remain in their respective offices. Whether or not the electorate of Sulat
has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs to the realm
of politics where only the people are the judge. "Loss of confidence is the formal withdrawal by an
electorate of their trust in a person's ability to discharge his office previously bestowed on him by
the same electorate. The constituents have made a judgment and their will to recall Evardone has
already been ascertained and must be afforded the highest respect. Thus, the signing process held
last 14 July1990 for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said municipality is valid and has
legal effect. However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided in
Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337. The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local
election prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 on the
second Monday of May, 1992. Thus, to hold an election on recall approximately seven (7)
months before the regular local election will be violative of the above provisions of the applicable
Local Government Code
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS. COMELEC, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011
342 SCRA 247, October 6, 2000 (Constitutional Law Party List
Representatives, 20% Allocation)
FACTS: Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering
the proclamation of 38 additional party-list representatives to complete the 52
seats in the House of Representatives as provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987
Constitution and RA 7941.
On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties,
avers that the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list
representatives in the House of Representatives, as provided under the
Constitution, was mandatory, wherein the twenty (20%) percent congressional
seats for party-list representatives is filled up at all times.
ISSUE: Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is
mandatory.
HELD: No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same
declared therein a policy to promote proportional representation in the
election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that
would benefit them.
It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions
participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast
for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those
garnering more than this percentage could have additional seats in proportion
to their total number of votes.
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than
three seats in the House of Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941).

Note:
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the
determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list
lawmakers, who shall comprise twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. We thus translate this
legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
- x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives
This formulation means that any increase in the number of district
representatives, as may be provided by law, will necessarily result in a
corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate,
considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the
1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed
as follows:
208
x .20 = 52
.80
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The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend.
The problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all
such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances?
Our short answer is No.
G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001
ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec


Facts
Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785
,
which
approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those
herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system
was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the
mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their
petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.


Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper.
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.
3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785.


Ruling:
1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of
other remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public
interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case
rendered it justiciable.

2. Political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list
elections subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA
7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified
from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations . It is however,
incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented, the criteria for participation, in
relation to the cause of the party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of the
noble purpose of the party-list system.

3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of
respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual
allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court
not being a trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of
the law and the Constitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled
from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court
ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance
by the party lists.
Summary of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962).
Facts
Charles Baker (P) was a resident of Shelby County, Tennessee. Baker filed suit
against Joe Carr, the Secretary of State of Tennessee. Bakers complaint alleged
that the Tennessee legislature had not redrawn its legislative districts since
1901, in violation of the Tennessee State Constitution which required
redistricting according to the federal census every 10 years. Baker, who lived in
an urban part of the state, asserted that the demographics of the state had
changed shifting a greater proportion of the population to the cities, thereby
diluting his vote in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Baker sought an injunction prohibiting further elections, and sought the remedy
of reapportionment or at-large elections. The district court denied relief on the
grounds that the issue of redistricting posed a political question and would
therefore not be heard by the court.
Issues
1. Do federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a
legislative apportionment?
2. What is the test for resolving whether a case presents a political question?
Holding and Rule
1. Yes. Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear a constitutional challenge to a
legislative apportionment.
2. The factors to be considered by the court in determining whether a case
presents a political question are:
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1. Is there a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department (i.e. foreign affairs or
executive war powers)?
2. Is there a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving the issue?
3. The impossibility of deciding the issue without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.
4. The impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government.
5. Is there an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made?
6. Would attempting to resolve the matter create the possibility of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question?
The political question doctrine is based in the separation of powers and whether
a case is justiciable is determined on a case by cases basis. In regards to foreign
relations, if there has been no conclusive governmental action regarding an
issue then a court can construe a treaty and decide a case. Regarding the dates
of the duration of hostilities, when there needs to be definable clarification for a
decision, the court may be able to decide the case.
The court held that this case was justiciable and did not present a political
question. The case did not present an issue to be decided by another branch of
the government. The court noted that judicial standards under the Equal
Protection Clause were well developed and familiar, and it had been open to
courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine if an act
is arbitrary and capricious and reflects no policy. When a question is enmeshed
with any of the other two branches of the government, it presents a political
question and the Court will not answer it without further clarification from the
other branches.
MARIANO, JR. VS. COMELEC, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 10, 2011
G.R. No. 118627; 242 SCRA 213, March 7, 1995 (Constitutional Law
Requirements in challenging the constitutionality of the law)
FACTS: Petitioners suing as tax payers, assail a provision (Sec 51) of RA No.
7859 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized
City to be known as the City of Makati) on the ground that the same attempts to
alter or restart the 3-consecutive term limit for local elective officials
disregarding the terms previously served by them, which collides with the
Constitution (Sec 8, Art X & Sec 7, Art VI).
ISSUE: Whether or not challenge to the constitutionality of questioned law is
with merit.
HELD: No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law are well-delineated. They are: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised
by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.
The court cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51.
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law
are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2)
the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the
constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.


Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is
premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay
will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in
said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the
1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual
case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano)
are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this
futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no
jurisdiction.
Montejo vs. COMELEC
242 SCRA 415
March 16, 1995

Facts:

Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte,
pleads for the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting
certain municipalities in Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of
equality of representation.

The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5
districts. The 3rd district is composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan,
Caibiran, Calubian, Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro,
Tabango and Villaba.

Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue
of Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out
the municipalities comprising the subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan,
8

Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories
comprised therein.

On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of
Biliran became a regular province. (The conversion of Biliran into a regular
province was approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite.) As a
consequence of the conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district
composed the new province of Biliran. A further consequence was to reduce the
3rd district to five municipalities (underlined above) with a total population of
146,067 as per the 1990 census.

To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and
municipalities in the province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held
consultation meetings with the incumbent representatives of the province and
other interested parties and on December 29, 1994, it promulgated the assailed
resolution where, among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of
the 2nd district and the municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd
district of Leyte.

Issue:

Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power
of redistricting and reapportionment is valid or not.

Held:

Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set aside.

The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows that
COMELEC was denied the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself
exercised the power. Regarding the first elections after the enactment of the
1987 constitution, it is the Commission who did the reapportionment of the
legislative districts and for the subsequent elections, the power was given to the
Congress.

Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987
constitution as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally
regarded as part of the power to make laws. Said ordinance states that:

Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor
adjustments to the reapportionment herein made.

Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be createdThe number of
Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was
created or where the city, whose population has so increases, is geographically
located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but
such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before
the election.

Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district.
Examples include error in the correct name of a particular municipality or when
a municipality in between which is still in the territory of one assigned district is
forgotten. And consistent with the limits of its power to make minor
adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did not also give the respondent
COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from one legislative district
to another district. The power granted by section 3 to the respondent is to adjust
the number of members (not municipalities.)
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CI TATI ON: 248 SCRA 300

FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant
Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education,
in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in
Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late
speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In
1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a
Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres.
Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal
where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they
lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel
Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of
Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for
the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"

with
the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest
misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to
9

rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected
Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven
months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality
of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be
eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The
court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence
or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7
months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas
domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of
domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term
residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When
Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin
and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.

4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired
right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon
returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile
of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her
residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers
house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She
even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdays and other important milestones.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary
residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the
First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24,
May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent
COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to
proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.
issue: whether or not petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law
as a result of her marriage to the late president Marcos.
held: For election purposes, residence i s used synonymously with
domicile. the court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own
declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for
only 4 months, because of the followiing (a) a minor follows the domicile of her
parents: tacloban became petitioner1s domicile of origin by operation of law
when her father brought the family toLeyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only
'hen there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with the purpose; i n the absence of clear and positive
proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origi n should
be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the
husbands domicile because the term residence in civil Law does not mean
the same thing in political Law; when petitioner married president Marcos in
1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not
adomicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new
domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one
only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly
indicate that she chose tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of
choice.

Aquino v. comelec
62 SCRA 275 Political Law De Jure vs De Facto Government Marcos as
a De Jure President Under the 1973 Constitution
In January 1975, a petition for prohibition was filed to seek the nullification of
some Presidential Decrees issued by then President Ferdinand Marcos. It was
alleged that Marcos does not hold any legal office nor possess any lawful
authority under either the 1935 Constitution or the 1973 Constitution and
therefore has no authority to issue the questioned proclamations, decrees and
orders.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Marcos government is a lawful government.
HELD: Yes. First of, this is actually a quo warranto proceedings and Benigno
Aquino, Jr. et al, have no legal personality to sue because they have no claim to
the office of the president. Only the Solicitor General or the person who asserts
title to the same office can legally file such a quo warranto petition.
On the issue at bar, the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of Martial Law
Proclamation No. 1081 issued on September 22, 1972 by President Marcos
because there was no arbitrariness in the issuance of said proclamation pursuant
10

to the 1935 Constitution; that the factual bases (the circumstances of
lawlessness then present) had not disappeared but had even been exacerbated;
that the question as to the validity of the Martial Law proclamation has been
foreclosed by Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution.
Under the (1973) Constitution, the President, if he so desires; can continue in
office beyond 1973. While his term of office under the 1935 Constitution
should have terminated on December 30, 1973, by the general referendum of
July 27-28, 1973, the sovereign people expressly authorized him to continue in
office even beyond 1973 under the 1973 Constitution (which was validly
ratified on January 17, 1973 by the sovereign people) in order to finish the
reforms he initiated under Martial Law; and as aforestated, as this was the
decision of the people, in whom sovereignty resides . . . and all government
authority emanates . . ., it is therefore beyond the scope of judicial inquiry. The
logical consequence therefore is that President Marcos is ade jure President of
the Republic of the Philippines.
BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ
G.R. No. 142840
May 7, 2001
FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of
the constitutional requirement that no person shall be a Member of the House
of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in
1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine
Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath
of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for
under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philippine
Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen
may lose his citizenship by, among other, rendering service to or accepting
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was
erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his
service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by
Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting
Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for and
was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1998
elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of
the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen,
can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the
same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by
which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status
as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored
to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service
to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after
separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil
Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The
said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as
the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows
him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.