PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant, G.R. No. 74433

September 14, 1987
153 SCRA 735
1. Legal Issue
Shall the accused suffer the penalty of arresto mayor subject by his
criminal liability?
2. Legal Facts
That on or about 15
th
day of July 1984 in the city of Tacloban
Leyte Philippines, the accused Francisco Abarca went to the bus
station and travel to Dolores Eastern Samar to fetch his daughter in
the morning. Unfortunately, the trip was delayed at 2 pm because
of his failure to catch the trip plus the engine trouble which causes
him to proceed at his fathers house, and then later went home.
When he reaches home the accused caught his wife in the act of
sexual intercourse with Khingsley Koh in the meantime his wife
and Koh notice him, that makes her wife push her paramour and
got his revolver. Abarca peeping above the built-in cabinet in their
room jumped and ran away to look for a firearm at the PC soldiers
house to where he got the M-16 rifle. The accused lost his wife and
Koh in vicinity at his house and immediately proceeded to a
mahjong house where he caught the victim aimed and shoot Koh
with several bullets on his different parts of his body causing Mr.
Khingsley Kohs instantaneous death. By that time, Arnold and
Lina Amparado had inflicted multiple wounds due to stray bullets
causing Mr. Amparados one and one-half month loss of working
capacity including his serious hospitalization and the latters wife
who had slighter physical injuries from the incident. The RTC
hereby sentenced Abarca to death for Murder with double
Frustrated Murder and must indemnify the Amparado Spouses and
Heirs of Kho.
3. Holding
The Supreme Court modified the appealed decision of destierro to
arresto mayor from the lower court sentencing four months and 21
days to six months of arresto mayor indemnifying Amparado
spouses for expenses and damages.
4. Reasoning

The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado
couple. Although as a rule, one committing an offense is liable for
all the consequences of his act, the rule presupposes that the act
done amounts to a felony. The accused-appellant is totally free
from any responsibility performing an illegal act when he fired
shots at the victim but he cannot be entirely without fault. It
appears that before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning
words which is not enough of a precaution to absolve him for the
injuries sustained by the Amparados. The acts of execution which
should have produced the crimes of murders as a consequence,
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
his will; nonetheless, the Court finds negligence on his part. He is
liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365 that is
less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or
negligence. For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado
spouses impose upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum period to being the graver penalty.















People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 (1983)

FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder
(qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia.
On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during
the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent
Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill. The defendant
was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and
found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked
them to stop destroying his house and asking if they could talk
things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go
ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with
his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running towards the
jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the
shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family)
was involved in a legal battle with the defendant and other land
settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time
of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment
(settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be
annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his
property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership
uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received
letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent.
He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land.
Shooting was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant claims he
killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that
Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant
despite the fact that he acted in defense of his person.

No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiselling of the
walls of the house of the defendant was indeed a form of
aggression on the part of the victim. However, this
aggression was not done on the person of the victim but rather
on his rights to property. On the first issue, the courts did not err.
However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the
courts referred to Art. 30 of the civil code recognizing the right of
owners to close and fence their land.

Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position to
subscribe to the article because his ownership of the land being
awarded by the government was still pending, therefore putting
ownership into question. It is accepted that the victim was the
original aggressor.

2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant
although he acted in defence of his rights.

Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of
self-defense is applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled.
Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates these requisites:
Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful
aggression towards appellant's property rights. Fleisher
had given Narvaez 6 months and he should have left him in
peace before time was up, instead of chiseling Narvaez's
house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also
provides that possession may not be acquired through
force or intimidation; while Art. 539 provides that every
possessor has the right to be respected in his possession
Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel
attack. In the case, killing was disproportionate to the
attack.
Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending
himself. Here, there was no provocation at all since he was
asleep
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the
special mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant
to Art. 13(6) RPC. These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary
surrender and passion and obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation)
Crime is homicide (2 counts) not murder because treachery is
not applicable on account of provocation by the deceased. Also,
assault was not deliberately chosen with view to kill since slayer
acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of
planning or preparation to kill. Art. 249 RPC: Penalty for
homicide is reclusion temporal. However, due to mitigating
circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be lowered three
degrees (Art. 64) to arrestomayor.

3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he
is unable to pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party.

No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment
of civil indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of Art. 39
applicable to fines only and not to reparation of damage caused,
indemnification of consequential damages and costs of
proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its conviction,
considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not
a habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant
to Art. 22 of the RPC.

Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating
circumstances and extenuating circumstance of incomplete self
defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto mayor and to indemnify
each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o
award for moral damages. Appellant has already been detained
14 years so his immediate release is ordered.

Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked
when coupled with form of attack on person defending property.
In the case at bar, this was not so. Appellant should then be
sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he has served more
than that, he should be released.








The wife had suffered maltreatment from her husband for over eight years.
She was 8 months pregnant when, one evening, her husband came home
drunk and started to batter her. Shouting that his wife "might as well be
killed so there will be nobody to nag" him, he dragged her towards a
drawer where he kept a gun, but was not able to open the drawer because
it was locked. So he got out a cutter from his wallet, but dropped it. She
was able to hit his arm with a pipe and escape into another room. The wife,
thinking of all the suffering that her husband had been inflicting on her, and
thinking that he might really kill her and her unborn child, distorted the
drawer and got the gun. She shot her husband, who was by then asleep
on the bed. She was tried and convicted for parricide, which is punishable
by reclusion perpetua (20 years and 1 day to 40 years) to death. On
appeal, she alleged "battered woman syndrome" as a form of self-defense.

May "battered woman syndrome" be regarded as a form of self-defense to
exempt the accused from criminal liability?

Yes. The Supreme Court said, however, that the records lack supporting
evidence that would establish all the essentials of the battered woman
syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of Genosa. More
specifically, the Court stated:

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense
arising from the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main
points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to
have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant
and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode
preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered
persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an
honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third,
at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not
necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on
the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken
altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-
defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of
these elements were duly established.
By the time the wife killed her husband, there was no longer any
aggression on his part to justify a claim of self-defense. However, the
Court also found that the cycle of abuse inflicted by the husband resulted
in post-traumatic stress disorder on the part of the wife, which lessened
her freedom of action, intelligence, and intent, resulting in a "psychological
paralysis". Also, the battering she received at his hands before she killed
him produced passion and obfuscation which overcame her reason. These
were appreciated by the Court as mitigating circumstances. Also, the Court
found that there was no treachery. The wife's conviction was affirmed, but
considering the mitigating circumstances, her sentence was reduced.
Since she had already served more than the minimum sentence, the Court
said that she might be considered for parole.