De La Llana vs Alba

In 1981, BP 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and
for Other Purposes, was passed. De la Llana was assailing its validity because, first of all, he
would be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he
said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of
tenure of judges of the courts, He averred that only the SC can remove judges NOT Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by such
statute (BP 129).
HELD: The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to discipline
judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it
possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who
was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by
virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the
abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents
of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists
between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He
ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation,
therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that
as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view
be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord
respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of
law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the
action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of
deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who
shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the
hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the
tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal
interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded
power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested
in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any
unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it
with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that
in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate
a statute, the former is to be preferred.
The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-delegation is that it is the legislative body
which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and to alter and repeal them, the test
being the completeness of the statue in all its terms and provisions when enacted. As pointed
out in Edu v. Ericta:
88
"To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which
implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A
standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies
the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out.
Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above
guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express
or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does
not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act
considered as a whole."