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The case involves a dispute over unpaid energy fees between Fiesta World Mall Corp. and Linberg Philippines Inc. under their build-own-operate agreement. The agreement contains an arbitration clause requiring arbitration for any disputed amounts in invoices. However, Linberg filed a complaint in court to collect over P15 million in fees, which Fiesta World disputed. The Supreme Court ruled that Linberg's filing in court was premature as the arbitration clause was mandatory and the parties were bound to arbitrate the disputed amount first before proceeding to court.
Description originale:
Rule 19 - son vs son
ADR - fiesta world vs linberg
Rule 23 - dasmarinas garments vs reyes
The case involves a dispute over unpaid energy fees between Fiesta World Mall Corp. and Linberg Philippines Inc. under their build-own-operate agreement. The agreement contains an arbitration clause requiring arbitration for any disputed amounts in invoices. However, Linberg filed a complaint in court to collect over P15 million in fees, which Fiesta World disputed. The Supreme Court ruled that Linberg's filing in court was premature as the arbitration clause was mandatory and the parties were bound to arbitrate the disputed amount first before proceeding to court.
The case involves a dispute over unpaid energy fees between Fiesta World Mall Corp. and Linberg Philippines Inc. under their build-own-operate agreement. The agreement contains an arbitration clause requiring arbitration for any disputed amounts in invoices. However, Linberg filed a complaint in court to collect over P15 million in fees, which Fiesta World disputed. The Supreme Court ruled that Linberg's filing in court was premature as the arbitration clause was mandatory and the parties were bound to arbitrate the disputed amount first before proceeding to court.
G.R. No. 73077 December 29, 1995 ESCOLASTICA MONTESCLAROS SON, and HEIRS OF ANASTACIO SON, petitioners, vs. CARMELINO SON, TEOFISTA SON, PRIMITIVO SON, CIPRIANA SON, ANATALIA SON, LAREANO SON, GERARDA SON and THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
Facts: Private respondents are the heirs of Pedro Son, who during his lifetime, inherited a parcel of land from his parents.
Upon discovery that a portion of it was being occupied by the petitioners, heirs of Anastacio Son, his brother, private respondents demanded the return of said land to their possession, but the petitioners refused and claimed that a deed of absolute sale was allegedly executed by Pedro Son in November 1957 in their favor. Consequently, the private respondents filed a complaint with CFI for annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale dated 5 November 1957 on grounds of forgery and for recovery of real property.
During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to limit the issue to the validity or invalidity of the aforementioned deed of absolute sale.
The trial court rendered a decision declaring the 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale as null and void.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration insisting that by virtue of an earlier Deed of Sale with Right of Repurchase, dated 17 December 1951, wherein Pedro Son allegedly sold to petitioners of the land he inherited but with a right to repurchase within 1 year, petitioners acquired ownership thereof for failure of Pedro Son to redeem the same within the period stipulated.
The trial court reversed its earlier decision and dismissed the complaint.
After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the private respondents appealed to the CA. The CA reversed the trial courts order holding that the delimitation of issues at a pre-trial conference bars the consideration of other questions on appeal, considering that the validity of the 1951 Deed of Sale discussed in their MR had already been waived by them. It further held that defendants (petitioners) failure to disclose this defense is contrary to the purpose and spirit of the pre-trial procedure. Defendants are bound by the delimitation of the issues contained in the trial courts' order issued on the very day the pre-trial conference was held. Such order controls the subsequent course of action, unless modified before trial to prevent manifest injustice. In this case, modification of the pre-trial order was never sought at the instance of any party.
The CA however upheld the trial courts ruling that the 1957 Deed of Sale was simulated, forged and therefore null and void. Hence, the present petition
Issue: Whether or not the parties are bound by the delimitation of issues in the Pre-Trial Order
Ruling: NO, the rules are not applied with rigidity. To prevent manifest injustice, some exceptions are admitted.
The case at bar falls under this particular exception. Private respondents' failure to raise any objection: (a) when petitioners presented in evidence the 1951 Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase;
(b) when petitioners' counsel vigorously cross-examined respondent Teofista Son Arcipe on the aforementioned deed;
and (c) when Anastacio Son testified on said document,
constitutes an implied assent on the part of respondents to depart from the issue contained in the pre-trial order.
Private respondents' implied consent to try the issue was further demonstrated by their own counsel's extensive cross-examination of petitioners' witness Anastacio Son regarding both the 1951 Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase and the 1957 Deed of Absolute Sale.
Private respondents cannot claim that they were not adequately prepared to meet petitioners' defense. They were simply not "caught in surprise." On the other hand, they had every opportunity to present rebuttal or counter-evidence on the issue.
Petition granted. CA reversed and set aside. RTC judgment reinstated. 2 Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) R.A. No. 9285; A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC - Special Rules of Court on ADR (A.M. 07-11-08-SC)
G.R. NO. 152471 August 18, 2006 FIESTA WORLD MALL CORP., Petitioner, vs. LINBERG PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
Facts: The petitioner is the owner and operator of the Fiesta World Mall in Lipa City; while respondent is a corporation that builds and operates power plants.
Petitioner and respondent executed a build-own- operate agreement, entitled Contract Agreement for Power Supply Services, 3.8 MW Base Local Load Power Plant (the contract). Under this contract, the respondent will construct, at its own cost, and operate as owner a power plant, and to supply petitioner power/electricity at its shopping mall in Lipa City. Petitioner on the other hand, will pay respondent energy fees, which is based on the actual KWH generated by the plant. As the power plant became operational, the respondent started billing the petitioner. However, the petitioner questioned the amount which totaled to more than P15M, and refused to pay despite respondents repeated demands.
Respondent filed with RTC-Pasig a Complaint for Sum of Money against petitioner. In its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, petitioner specifically denied the allegations in the complaint, claiming that respondent failed to fulfill its obligations under the Contract by failing to supply all its power/fuel needs. It further alleged that respondents filing of the complaint is premature and should be dismissed on the ground of non-compliance with the provisions of the Contract on Disputes, to wit:
7.4 Disputes
If FIESTA WORLD disputes the amount specified by any invoice, it shall pay the undisputed amount on or before such date(s), and the disputed amount shall be resolved by arbitration of three (3) persons, one (1) by mutual choice, while the other two (2) to be each chosen by the parties themselves, within fourteen (14) days after the due date for such invoice and all or any part of the disputed amount paid to LINBERG shall be paid together with interest pursuant to Article XXV from the due date of the invoice. It is agreed, however, that both parties must resolve the disputes within thirty (30) days, otherwise any delay in payment resulting to loss to LINBERG when converted to $US as a result of depreciation of the Pesos shall be for the account of FIESTA WORLD. Corollarily, in case of erroneous billings, however, LINBERG shall be liable to pay FIESTA WORLD for the cost of such deterioration, plus interest computed pursuant to Art. XXV from the date FIESTA WORLD paid for the erroneous billing. (Underscoring supplied)
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Hearing on the ground that the respondent violated the arbitration clause provided in the Contract.
The respondent opposed the motion contending that:
17.2 Amicable Settlement:
The parties hereto agree that in the event there is any dispute or difference between them arising out of this Agreement or in the interpretation of any of the provisions hereto, they shall endeavor to meet together in an effort to resolve such dispute by discussion between them but failing such resolution the Chief Executives of LINBERG and FIESTA WORLD shall meet to resolve such dispute or difference and the joint decision of such shall be binding upon the parties hereto, and in the event that a settlement of any such dispute or difference is not reached, then the provisions of Article XXI shall apply. (Art. XXI refers to jurisdiction of RTC-Pasig)
The trial court denied the motion for lack of merit as well as its MR.
The petitioner elevated the matter to CA but to no avail. (petition dismissed; MR denied).
3 Hence, the instant petition for review
Issue: Whether or not the filing with the trial court of respondents complaint is premature
Ruling: YES. Paragraph 7.4 of the Contract mandates that should the petitioner dispute any amount of energy fees in the invoice and billings made by respondent, the same "shall be resolved by arbitration of three (3) persons, one (1) by mutual choice, while the other two (2) to be each chosen by the parties themselves." The parties, in incorporating such agreement in their Contract, expressly intended that the said matter in dispute must first be resolved by an arbitration panel before it reaches the court. They made such arbitration mandatory.
It is clear from the records that petitioner disputed the amount of energy fees demanded by respondent. However, respondent, without prior recourse to arbitration as required in the Contract, filed directly with the trial court its complaint, thus violating the arbitration clause in the Contract.
It bears stressing that such arbitration agreement is the law between the parties. Since that agreement is binding between them, they are expected to abide by it in good faith. And because it covers the dispute between them in the present case, either of them may compel the other to arbitrate. Thus, it is well within petitioners right to demand recourse to arbitration.
In this connection, since respondent has already filed a complaint with the trial court without prior recourse to arbitration, the proper procedure to enable an arbitration panel to resolve the parties dispute pursuant to their Contract is for the trial court to stay the proceedings. After the arbitration proceeding has been pursued and completed, then the trial court may confirm the award made by the arbitration panel.
In sum, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the arbitration clause in the parties Contract.
Petition granted. Parties are ordered to submit their controversy to arbitration panel. MODES OF DISCOVERY
Rule 23 DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTION Sec. 4 Use of deposition
G.R. No. 108229 August 24, 1993 DASMARIAS GARMENTS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. RUBEN T. REYES, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 50, and AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES, LTD., respondents.
Facts: Respondent APL sued petitioner Dasmarinas before the RTC-Manila to recover the sum of US$53,228.45 plus 25% as for attorneys fee and litigation expenses.
In its Answer, Dasmarinas specifically denied any liability to APL and set up compulsory counterclaims against it.
A trial was then scheduled wherein APL presented its first witness whose testimony was completed. The case was reset for reception of the testimony of the two (2) more witnesses in APLs behalf.
During the scheduled hearing, instead of presenting its witnesses, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to take the depositions of H. Lee and Yeong Fang Yeh in Taipei, Taiwan and prayed that for this purpose, a "commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to the consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines in Taipei . . . " Five (5) days later APL filed an amended motion stating that since the Philippine Government has no consulate office in Taiwan in view of its "one China policy," there being in lieu thereof an office set up by the President "presently occupied by Director Joaquin Roces which is the Asia Exchange Center, Inc.," it was necessary and it therefore prayed "that commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to Director Joaquin Roces, Executive Director, Asian Executive Exchange Center, Inc., Room 901, 112 Chunghsiao, E. Road, Section 1, Taipe, Republic of China, to hear and take the oral deposition of the aforenamed persons . . . ."
4 The motion was opposed by Dasmarias. It contended that (a) the motion was "fatally defective in that it does not seek . . . that a foreign court examine a person within its jurisdiction;" (b) issuance of letters rogatory was unnecessary because the witnesses "can be examined before the Philippine Court;" and (c) the Rules of Court "expressly require that the testimony of a witness must be taken orally in open court and not by deposition."
Extensive argument on the matter thereafter followed, through various pleadings filed by the parties, in the course of which APL submitted to the Trial Court (a) the letter received by its counsel from Director Joaquin R. Roces of the Asian Exchange Center, Inc., dated November 20, 1989, advising that "this Office can only take deposition upon previous authority from the Department of Foreign Affairs," this being "in consonance with the Supreme Court Administrative Order requiring courts or judicial bodies to course their requests through the Department of Foreign Affairs;" and (b) a letter sent by "fax" to the same counsel by a law firm in Taipei, Lin & Associates Maritime Law Office, transmitting information inter alia of the mode by which, under the "ROC Civil Procedure Code," "a copy or an abridged copy" of documents on file with a Taiwan Court may be obtained.
The trial court issued an order granting the motion to take testimonies of APLs Taiwanese witnesses by deposition (upon written interrogatories) and that the AEC thru Dir. Roces is hereby commissioned to take down the deposition. Said order was coursed thru DFA pursuant to SC Circular.
Dasmarinas sought reconsideration on the following grounds: : (1) authority of the Asian Exchange Center, Inc. (AECI) to take depositions has not been established, it not being one of those so authorized by the Rules of Court to take depositions in a foreign state; (2) AECI's articles of incorporation show that it is not vested with any such authority; (3) to permit deposition-taking by commission without the authority of the foreign state in which deposition is taken constitutes infringement of judicial sovereignty; and (4) depositions by written interrogatories have inherent limitations and are not suitable to matters dependent on the credibility of witnesses; oral testimony in open court remains the "most satisfactory method of investigation of facts'" and "'affords the greatest protection to the rights and liberties of citizens."
Said motion was denied by the trial court due to late filing (filed out of time) and being a mere rehash of arguments already passed upon. In the same order, APL was directed to take the necessary steps to implement the order authorizing the deposition- taking.
Dasmarinas instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the CA to nullify the orders. The CA restrained enforcement of the orders and maintained the status quo (current situation) to prevent the infliction of irreparable damage and injury upon the petitioner.
After due proceedings, the CA rendered judgment denying the petition and upholding the orders of TC. MR having been denied, hence, the present recourse.
Issue: Whether or not depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand by the proponent
Ruling: YES. These exceptional situations are governed by Sec. 4, Rule 24 of the Rules of Court, which provides, to wit:
Sec. 4. Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion of an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions:
(a) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness; (b) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partnership, or 5 association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose; (c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness if out of the province and at a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend to testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used; (d) If only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, the adverse party may require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part introduced, and any party may introduce any other parts.
It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may be, in the Philippines or abroad. If the party or witness is in the Philippines, his deposition "shall be taken before any judge, municipal or notary public" (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of Court). If in a foreign state or country, the deposition "shall be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory" (Sec. 11, Rule 24).
Leave of court is not necessary where the deposition is to be taken before "a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines," and the defendant's answer has already been served (Sec. 1 Rule 24). After answer, whether the deposition-taking is to be accomplished within the Philippines or outside, the law does not authorize or contemplate any intervention by the court in the process, all that is required being that "reasonable notice" be given "in writing to every other party to the action . . . (stating) the time and place for taking the deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the name is not known, a general description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he belongs. . . . " (Sec. 15, Rule 24). The court intervenes in the process only if a party moves (1) to "enlarge or shorten the time" stated in the notice (id.), or (2) "upon notice and for good cause shown," to prevent the deposition-taking, or impose conditions therefor, e.g., that "certain matters shall not be inquired into" or that the taking be "held with no one present except the parties to the action and their officers or counsel," etc. (Sec. 16, Rule 24), or (3) to terminate the process on motion and upon a showing that "it is being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party" (Sec 18, Rule 24).
Where the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines has no "secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice- consul, or consular agent," then obviously it may be taken only "before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory.