Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J .:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested,
tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was
high time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00.
1

Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at
about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and
later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him.
2
Later, the information
was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening
and likewise investigated.
3
Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
4
Subsequently, the fiscal filed a
motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers
absolving her after a 'thorough investigation."
5
The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against
the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted .
6

According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers
that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying
marijuana.
7
He was Identified by name.
8
Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25,
1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to
him.
9
They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of
what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner,
10
who testified that she
conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his
clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants.
11
He alleged that he was arbitrarily
arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC
headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator
hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still
handcuffed.
12
He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was
selling watches and sometimes cigarettes.
13
He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have
been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock
room of the PC headquarters.
14

The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to
have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo
for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses.
15
Aminnudin
testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not
discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of
his manhandling.
16
He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other,
although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin,
17
to a friend whose full name he said did not
even know.
18
The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not
sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him.
19

There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who
had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their
credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face
and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal
record. But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-
appellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a
medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that
opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been
set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his
release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he
was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession
inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this
point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest
of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on
warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that
they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only
justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to
them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the
time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest,
20
another two weeks
21
and a
third "weeks before June 25."
22
On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting
team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:
Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the
coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable
sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible
trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this
information from that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we
have already reports of the particular operation which was being
participated by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June
25, 1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the
coming of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days
before June 25, 1984, did you also receive daily report regarding the
activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of
Idel Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of
information, maybe for security reason and we cannot Identify the
person.
Q But you received it from your regular informer?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel
Aminnudin is coming with drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo
with marijuana was received by you many days before you received
the intelligence report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days
before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that
minnudin was coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was
coming but on June 23, 1984 that was the time when I received the
information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his
activities, we have reports that he was already consummated the act
of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was
mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23,
1984, you had already gathered information to the effect that Idel
Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search
of the subject mentioned in your intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield
positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you
do not need a search warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary.
23

That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the
PC. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws
and not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the
government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant
as in the case of Roldan v. Arca,
24
for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to
warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses,
it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest
and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of
Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team,
had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of
what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents.
25
Rule 113 was clearly
applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime
nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for
his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking
from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his
arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and
not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the
despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and
punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to
return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights
guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words
suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional
presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as
the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution
must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial
court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree,
to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because
there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed
by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained
thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends
the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our
people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be
more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual
in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high- handedness from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes,
again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-
appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be
discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.


Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J ., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I hold that the accused was caught in flagrante, for he was carrying marijuana
leaves in his bag at the moment of his arrest. He was not "innocently disembarking from the vessel."
The unauthorized transportation of marijuana (Indian hemp), which is a prohibited drug, is a crime.
(Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425). Since he was committing a crime, his arrest could be lawfully effected
without a warrant (Sec. 6a, Rule 113, Rules of Court), and the search of his bag (which yielded the
marijuana leaves) without a search warrant was also lawful (Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court). I
vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court finding him guilty of illegally transporting marijuana.


Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J ., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I hold that the accused was caught in flagrante, for he was carrying marijuana
leaves in his bag at the moment of his arrest. He was not "innocently disembarking from the vessel."
The unauthorized transportation of marijuana (Indian hemp), which is a prohibited drug, is a crime.
(Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425). Since he was committing a crime, his arrest could be lawfully effected
without a warrant (Sec. 6a, Rule 113, Rules of Court), and the search of his bag (which yielded the
marijuana leaves) without a search warrant was also lawful (Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court). I
vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court finding him guilty of illegally transporting marijuana.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 29.
2 Ibid., p. 2.
3 Original Records, p. 6.
4 Ibid., p. 20.
5 "Exh. 1," Original Records, p. 204.
6 Original Records, p. 26.
7 TSN, Sept. 19, 1984, p. 5; Oct. 25, 1984, p. 31.
8 TSN, Oct. 25, 1984, p. 29.
9 TSN, Sept. 19, 1984, pp. 6-7.
10 TSN, Sept. 5, 1984, pp. 8-10.
11 TSN, Aug. 15, 1985, p. 3.
12 Ibid., pp. 8-9; 19-20.
13 Id., pp. 10 & 13.
14 Brief for the Appellant, p. 22.
15 Rollo, p. 28.
16 TSN, Aug. 15, 1985, pp. 17-18; 22-24.
17 Ibid., p. 29.
18 Id., p. 4.
19 Rollo, p. 28.
20 TSN, Oct. 25, 1984, p. 31.
21 TSN, Sept. 19, 1984, p. 19.
22 TSN, Oct. 25, 1984, p. 12.
23 TSN, Oct. 25, 1984, pp. 31-33.
24 65 SCRA 336.
25 People v. Rubio, 142 SCRA 329; People v. Madarang, 147 SCRA 123; People v.
Sarmiento, 147 SCRA 252; People v. Cerelegia; 147 SCRA 538; People v.
Fernando, G.R. No. L-68409, December 1, 1987.

















Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 133917 February 19, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMA @ "BOBONG" and GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @
"BOBOY", accused-appellants.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of protecting the society from
lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless and to subvert those values upon which our
ultimate freedom and liberty depend.
1

For automatic review is the Decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in
Criminal Case No. 37,264-96, finding accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias "Bobong"
and Gregorio Mula y Malaguraalias "Boboy," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section
8,
3
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by Republic Act No.
7659,
4
and sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
The information against accused-appellants reads:
That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with each other, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously was found in their possession 946.9 grants of
dried marijuana which are prohibited.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
5

Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the accusation
against them.
6
Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca,
SPO1 Leonardo Y. Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as witnesses.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine National Police
detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the presence of an
alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City.
7
The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in
person was during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a
motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the
pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the
arrest. Moreover, the names and addresses of the accused- appellants came to the knowledge of
SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested.
8

At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the
alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma- a, Davao City any time that morning.
9
Consequently, at
around 8:00 A.M. of the same day, he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina,
Davao City, which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2
Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house
of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by.
10

At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team were positioned in the house of
SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1
Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their,
vehicle and overtook the "trisikad."
11
SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty meters from
where the accused-appellants were accosted.
12

The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, accused-appellant Mula who was
holding a black bag handed the same to accused-appellant Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona
introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open the bag.
13
Molina
replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this."
14
SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which
revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter; accused-appellants Mula and Molina were
handcuffed by the police officers.
15

On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence,
contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having
been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
16
The demurrer was denied by the trial court.
17
A motion for reconsideration was filed by
accused-appellants, but this was likewise denied. Accused-appellants waived presentation of
evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum.
On April 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision,
18
the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution alone without any evidence from both
accused who waived presentation of their own evidence through their counsels, more than
sufficient to prove the guilt of both accused of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt,
pursuant to Sec. 20, sub. par. 5 of Republic Act 7659, accused NASARIO MOLINA and
GREGORIO MULA, are sentenced to suffer a SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH through
lethal injection under Republic Act 8176, to be effected and implemented as therein provided
for by law, in relation to Sec. 24 of Rep. Act 7659.
The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to immediately elevate the entire records
of this case with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, Manila, for the automatic review of
their case by the Supreme Court and its appropriate action as the case may be.
SO ORDERED.
19

Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the
case was elevated to this Court on automatic review. Accused-appellants contend:
I.
THAT THE MARIJUANA IS IN ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING BEEN SEIZED IN
VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE,
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
II.
THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT
OTHERWISE PROVED THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; AND
III.
THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT, THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 8 OF RA No.
7659 (sic), IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IS LIFE
IMPRISONMENT, NOT DEATH.
20

The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and MO1ion (In Lieu of Brief), wherein he prayed for the
acquittal of both accused-appellants.
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a
reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the
existence of a probable cause. The pertinent provision of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
21

Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III,
Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
22
Thus:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words, valueless and undeserving of
mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so too, without this rule, the freedom
from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high
regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
23

The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and seizure
may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3)
search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures;
24
and (6) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search).
25

The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and
seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this
instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made --- the
process cannot be reversed.
26
As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with .a valid
warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a
peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested
is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another ( arrest of escaped prisoners ).
27

In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its judgment of conviction on a finding that the
warrantless arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent search conducted by the peace
officers, are valid because accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of
prohibited drugs.
28
This brings us to the issue of whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and
seizure in the present case fall within the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
In People v. Chua Ho San,
29
the Court held that in cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The
arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law
adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of
probable cause. As discussed in People v. Doria,
30
probable cause means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the
peace officers making the arrest.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any
overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting
officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
Thus, in People v. Aminnudin,
31
it was held that "the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of
his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done
so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the MNWilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier
of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension."
Likewise, in People v. Mengote,
32
the Court did not consider "eyes... darting from side to side :..
[while] holding ... [one's] abdomen", in a crowded street at 11:30 in the morning, as overt acts and
circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative of probable cause. According to the
Court, "[b]y no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense
had just been committed, or was actually being committed or was at least being attempted in [the
arresting officers'] presence." So also, in People v. Encinada,
33
the Court ruled that no probable
cause is gleanable from the act of riding a motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs.1wphi1. nt
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals,
34
the trial court concluded that petitioner was attempting to
commit a crime as he was "`standing at the comer of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard' with his
eyes 'moving very fast' and 'looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them.'"
35
In
declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal, the Court said:
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest preceding the search in
light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of V u, the arresting officer, or an overt
physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was
being committed or was going to be committed.
36

It went on to state that
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably
elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" - an
observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near
petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions
were merely standing at the comer and were not creating any commotion or trouble...
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed
with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
"discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the
distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed
hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.
37

Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer.
38

In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their
arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing,
attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that accused-appellant Molina
responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag.
Such response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that accused-
appellants were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not
constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1
Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to
the arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or
otherwise.
While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a surveillance of accused-
appellant Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon, however, admitted that he only learned Mula's name and
address after the arrest. What is more, it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized
accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in
person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer while they were on the side of the road. These
circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant Mula,
considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when, SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse
of him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he had never
seen him before the arrest.
This belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew the name of accused-appellants even before
the arrest, to wit
"Q- When you said that certain Mula handed a black bag to another person and how did
you know that it was Mula who handed the black bag to another person?
A- Because I have already information from Paguidopon, regarding Mula and Molina,
when they pass by through the street near the residence of Paguidopon. He told that the one
who is big one that is Gregorio Mula and the thin one is Nazario Molina"
39

The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona, therefore, is entirely baseless SPO1 Pamplona could
not have learned the name of accused-appellants from SPO1 Paguipodon because Paguipodon
himself, who allegedly conducted the surveillance, was not even aware of accused-appellants' name
and address prior to the arrest.
Evidently, SPO1 Paguidopon, who acted as informer of the arresting officers, more so the arresting
officers themselves, could not have been certain of accused-appellants' identity, and were, from all
indications, merely fishing for evidence at the time of the arrest.
Compared to People v. Encinada, the arresting officer in the said case knew appellant Encinada
even before the arrest because of the latter's illegal gambling activities, thus, lending at least a
semblance of validity on the arrest effected by the peace officers. Nevertheless, the Court declared
in said case that the warrantless arrest and the consequent search were illegal, holding that "[t]he
prosecution's evidence did not show any suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked from
the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be
ascribed to appellant under such bare circumstances."
40

Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their right against unreasonable
searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been
more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus
considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
41

Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions
allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal.
Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against
accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of accused-
appellants.
While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers towards this drive, all efforts for the
achievement of a drug-free society must not encroach on the fundamental rights and liberties of
individuals as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which protection extends even to the basest of
criminals.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case
No. 37, 264-96, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias "Bobong" and Gregorio Mula
y Malagura alias "Boboy", areACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they
are validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.


Footnotes:
1 Dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 1105 [1976].
2 Dated April 25, 1997, Rollo, pp. 11-24.
3 Sec. 8. - Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use any prohibited
drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. - The penalties for
offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if
the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
5) 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana;
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the forgoing quantities the penalty shall range fromprision
correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
4 An Act Imposing the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes.
5 Filed on August 10, 1996; Rollo, p. 7.
6 Records, p. 14.
7 TSN, November 14, 1996, pp. 2-4.
8 TSN, November 14, 1996, pp. 7-9.
9 Id., pp. 10 and 18.
10 TSN, November 26, 1996, pp. 4-5 (Direct examination of spa 1 Pamplona).
11 TSN, November 26, 1996, pp. 5-6.
12 TSN, November 14, 1996, pp. 14-15.
13 TSN, November 26, 1996, pp. 6-8.
14 Id., p. 14.
15 Id., p. 9.
16 Records, pp. 32-37.
17 Records, pp. 39-43.
19 Decision, Rollo, p. 24.
20 Rollo, p. 40.
21 Constitution, Article III, Section 2.
22 People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432, 443 [1999].
23 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. ed. 2d 1081, 1090 [1961].
24 People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 705 [1999]; citing Hizon v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 517, 527 [1996]; People v. Fernandez, 239
SCRA 174, 182-183 [1994]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687, 697 [1986]; Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, p.
169 [1996]; Cruz, Constitutional Law, pp. 147-153 [1986]; Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 126, Section 12, and Rule 113,
Section 5; People v. Bagista, 214 SCRA 63, 69 [1992]; People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122, 126-128 [1991]; Roldan, Jr. v. Arca, 65
SCRA 336, 348 [1975]; Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857, 871-874 [1968]; People v. Tabar, 222 SCRA 144, 153 [1993]; Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil.
33, 48 [1937]; and People v. Kagui Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 226 [1936].
25 People v. Chua Ho San, supra.; citing Terry v. Ohio, 20 L Ed 2d, 896 adopted in Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 288 [1990];
and People v. Ramos, 222 SCRA 557 [1993].
26 Id., at 449; citing Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159, 175 [1997].
27 Id., at 444; and the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (as amended), Rule 113, Section 5.
28 Decision, Rollo, p. 22.
29 People v. Chua Ho San. supra.; citing People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; People v. Encinada, 280 SCRA 72 [1997]; People v.
Montilla, 285 SCRA 703 [1998]; People v. Claudio. 160 SCRA 646 [1988]; People v. Maspil, Jr., 188 SCRA 751 [1988]; People v. Lo Ho
Wing, 193 SCRA 122 [1991]; People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 [1990]; Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 288 [1990]; People v.
Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 [1991].
30 People v. Doria, supra.; citing Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA 251, 263 [1991]; United States v. Santos, 36 Phil. 851 [1917]; People v. Bati,
189 SCRA 97 [1990]; People v. Sucro, 195 SCRA 388 [1990] and People v. Ramos, 186 SCRA 184 [1990].
31 163 SCRA 402, 409-410 [1988].
32 210 SCRA 174, 179-180 [1992].
33 280 SCRA 72, 86-87 [1997].
34 283 SCRA 159 [1997].
35 Id., at 169.
36 Id., at 175.
37 Id., at 178.
38 Concurring Opinion of Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in People v, Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 720 [1999].
39 TSN, November 26, 1996, p. 7.
40 People v. Encinada, supra.
41 Id., at 91; citing Aniag v. Commission on Elections. 237 SCRA 424, 436-437 [1994].







































Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 120915 April 3, 1998
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSA ARUTA y MENGUIN, accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J .:
With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its pernicious effects on our society, our law enforcers tend at times to overreach
themselves in apprehending drug offenders to the extent of failing to observe well-entrenched constitutional guarantees against illegal
searches and arrests. Consequently, drug offenders manage to evade the clutches of the law on mere technicalities.
Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and charged with violating Section 4, Article
II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The information reads:
That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of December, 1988, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without being lawfully authorized, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
engage in transporting approximately eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of dried
marijuana packed in plastic bag marked "Cash Katutak" placed in a traveling bag, which are
prohibited drugs.
Upon arraignment, she pleaded "not guilty." After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos.
1

The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of P/Lt. Ernesto Abello, Officer-in-Charge of the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt. Jose Domingo. Based on their testimonies,
the court a quo found the following:
On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as Benjie, that a
certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, December 14, 1988, with a
large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose
Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.
Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the afternoon of
December 14, 1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) building
along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one group,
made up of P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt. Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the PNB building
while the other group waited near the Caltex gasoline station.
While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO printed on its
front and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening of the
same day from where two females and a male got off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed
out to the team "Aling Rosa" who was then carrying a traveling bag.
Having ascertained that accused-appellant was "Aling Rosa," the team approached her and
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked "Aling Rosa" about the
contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former.
Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag
marked "Cash Katutak." The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to
which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office
for investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana
leaves.
Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas,
Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating that
said specimen yielded positive results for marijuana, a prohibited drug.
After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the above technical report,
the prosecution rested its case.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a "Demurrer to Evidence" alleging the illegality
of the search and seizure of the items thereby violating accused-appellant's constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in evidence.
The said "Demurrer to Evidence" was, however, denied without the trial court ruling on the alleged
illegality of the search and seizure and the inadmissibility in evidence of the items seized to avoid
pre-judgment. Instead, the trial court continued to hear the case.
In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her behalf. As expected, her version of the
incident differed from that of the prosecution. She claimed that immediately prior to her arrest, she
had just come from Choice Theater where she watched the movie "Balweg." While about to cross
the road, an old woman asked her help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt.
Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them to the NARCOM Office.
During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity of the woman
and averred that the old woman was nowhere to be found after she was arrested. Moreover, she
added that no search warrant was shown to her by the arresting officers.
After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a "Comment and/or
Objection to Prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence" contesting the admissibility of the items seized
as they were allegedly a product of an unreasonable search and seizure.
Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted
accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of marijuana from
Baguio City to Olongapo City in violation of Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
2

In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:
1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents could not apply for a warrant for
the search of a bus or a passenger who boarded a bus because one of the requirements for
applying a search warrant is that the place to be searched must be specifically designated
and described.
2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a search warrant was applied for by the
NARCOM agents, still no court would issue a search warrant for the reason that the same
would be considered a general search warrant which may be quashed.
3. The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of
accused-appellant violated the latter's constitutional rights.
4. The trial court erred in not holding that although the defense of denial is weak yet the
evidence of the prosecution is even weaker.
These submissions are impressed with merit.
In People v. Ramos,
3
this Court held that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the
strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution which provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it
operates only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. The plain import of the language of the
Constitution, which in one sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the same
time prescribes the requisites for a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally
unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the
fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between person and
police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to
issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.
4

Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as
evidence pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v. Diokno.
5
This exclusionary rule was later
enshrined in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into the
houses, papers, effects, and most importantly, on the person of an individual. The constitutional
provision guaranteed an impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches and seizures. As such,
it protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of
restraint.
6

Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which allows
exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed
and their application limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do otherwise is an
infringement upon personal liberty and would set back a right so basic and deserving of full protection and
vindication yet often violated.
7

The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court
8
and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right
to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
9

6. Stop and Frisk;
10
and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
11

The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers to
trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons against
unreasonable search and seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before
a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It
likewise refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s),
article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by
law is in the place to be searched.
12

It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his knowledge is
technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in
abundance. The same quantum of evidence is required in determining probable cause relative to search.
Before a search warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought
are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in
the place to be searched.
13

In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable cause to be present.
Absent any probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as evidence against the
person arrested. Probable cause, in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion
or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has become a sufficient probable cause
to effect a warrantless search and seizure.
In People v. Tangliben,
14
acting on information supplied by informers, police officers conducted a
surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who
may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At
9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red traveling bag who was acting
suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He acceded later
on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic
wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest.
In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from their informant
regarding Aruta's alleged activities. In Tangliben policemen were confronted with an on-the-spot tip.
Moreover, the policemen knew that the Victory Liner compound is being used by drug traffickers as
their "business address". More significantly, Tangliben was acting suspiciously. His actuations and
surrounding circumstances led the policemen to reasonably suspect that Tangliben is committing a
crime. In instant case, there is no single indication that Aruta was acting suspiciously.
In People v. Malmstedt,
15
the Narcom agents received reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana. They likewise received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
prohibited drugs on his person. There was no reasonable time to obtain a search warrant, especially
since the identity of the suspect could not be readily ascertained. His actuations also aroused the
suspicion of the officers conducting the operation. The Court held that in light of such circumstances, to
deprive the agents of the ability and facility to act promptly, including a search without a warrant, would be
to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant case. In present case, the police
officers had reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant. Second, Aruta's identity was
priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta was not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was searched
aboard a moving vehicle, a legally accepted exception to the warrant requirement. Aruta, on the
other hand, was searched while about to cross a street.
In People v. Bagista,
16
the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming
from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received from their
regular informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be
bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise had probable cause to search accused-appellant's
belongings since she fitted the description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid
warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained in the course of said search is
admissible against accused-appellant. Again, this case differs from Aruta as this involves a search of a
moving vehicle plus the fact that the police officers erected a checkpoint. Both are exceptions to the
requirements of a search warrant.
In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,
17
the policemen conducted a surveillance in an area of the
Kalookan Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were roaming therein. Upon reaching the
place, they chanced upon a man in front of the cemetery who appeared to be "high" on drugs. He was
observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to be
trying to avoid the policemen. When approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried to
resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained marijuana. The Court held that the policemen had
sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant to determine if he was actually "high" on drugs due to his
suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information, this area was a haven for drug
addicts.
In all the abovecited cases, there was information received which became the bases for conducting
the warrantless search. Furthermore, additional factors and circumstances were present which,
when taken together with the information, constituted probable causes which justified the
warrantless searches and seizures in each of the cases.
In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence of probable cause necessitates a
reexamination of the facts. The following have been established: (1) In the morning of December 13,
1988, the law enforcement officers received information from an informant named "Benjie" that a
certain "Aling Rosa" would be leaving for Baguio City on December 14, 1988 and would be back in
the afternoon of the same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the
evening of December 14, 1988, accused-appellant alighted from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a
traveling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement officers; (3) The law
enforcement officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents; (4) When
asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her traveling bag, she gave the same to him; (5) When
they opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; (6) Accused-appellant was then brought
to the NARCOM office for investigation.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received information two days before
the arrival of Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on board the M/V Wilcon 9. His
name was known, the vehicle was identified and the date of arrival was certain. From the information
they had received, the police could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed,
to justify the issuance of a warrant. Instead of securing a warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend
Aminnudin. When the case was brought before this Court, the arrest was held to be illegal; hence
any item seized from Aminnudin could not be used against him.
Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police likewise received confidential
information the day before at 4:00 in the afternoon from their informant that Encinada would be
bringing in marijuana from Cebu City on board M/V Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in the morning of the
following day. This intelligence information regarding the culprit's identity, the particular crime he
allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts could have been a basis of probable cause for the
lawmen to secure a warrant. This Court held that in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 13
and Circular No. 19, series of 1987, the lawmen could have applied for a warrant even after court
hours. The failure or neglect to secure one cannot serve as an excuse for violating Encinada's
constitutional right.
In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. To
legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag, accused-appellant must
have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides inter alia:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
xxx xxx xxx
Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit
one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was
not acting in any manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to
suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to
accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was
singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant
were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on
record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing
a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor
tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable
cause and warrantless arrests.
Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of
accused-appellant's bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been
lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the
subsequent search was similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-
appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellant for
these are "fruits of a poisoned tree" and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III, Sec. 3(2)
of the Constitution.
Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful
arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil
that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Where a search is first
undertaken, and an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search
and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.
18

As previously discussed, the case in point is People v. Aminnudin
19
where, this Court observed that:
. . . accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it
shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that
called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of
the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the
furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable
cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the search and
seizure of accused-appellant's bag would also not be justified as seizure of evidence in "plain view"
under the second exception. The marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as shown by
the fact that the NARCOM agents still had to request accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain
its contents.
Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag be justified as a search of a
moving vehicle. There was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant case as accused-appellant
was apprehended several minutes after alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact, she was
accosted in the middle of the street and not while inside the vehicle.
People v. Solayao,
20
applied the stop and frisk principle which has been adopted in Posadas v. Court of
Appeals.
21
In said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he and his companions were accosted by
government agents. In the instant case, there was no observable manifestation that could have aroused
the suspicion of the NARCOM agents as to cause them to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant. To
reiterate, accused-appellant was merely crossing the street when apprehended. Unlike in the
abovementioned cases, accused-appellant never attempted to flee from the NARCOM agents when the
latter identified themselves as such. Clearly, this is another indication of the paucity of probable cause
that would sufficiently provoke a suspicion that accused-appellant was committing a crime.
The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be categorized under exigent and emergency
circumstances, as applied in People v. De
Gracia.
22
In said case, there were intelligence reports that the building was being used as headquarters
by the RAM during a coup d' etat. A surveillance team was fired at by a group of armed men coming out
of the building and the occupants of said building refused to open the door despite repeated requests.
There were large quantities of explosives and ammunitions inside the building. Nearby courts were closed
and general chaos and disorder prevailed. The existing circumstances sufficiently showed that a crime
was being committed. In short, there was probable cause to effect a warrantless search of the building.
The same could not be said in the instant case.
The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the warrantless search and seizure would be
consent given by the accused-appellant to the warrantless search as to amount to a waiver of her
constitutional right. The Solicitor General argues that accused-appellant voluntarily submitted herself
to search and inspection citingPeople v. Malasugui
23
where this Court ruled:
When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or
premises, he is precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations,
8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.) The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every
right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.
In support of said argument, the Solicitor General cited the testimony of Lt. Abello, thus:
Q When this informant by the name of alias Benjie pointed to Aling Rosa,
what happened after that?
A We followed her and introduced ourselves as NARCOM agents and
confronted her with our informant and asked her what she was carrying and if
we can see the bag she was carrying.
Q What was her reaction?
A She gave her bag to me.
Q So what happened after she gave the bag to you?
A I opened it and found out plastic bags of marijuana inside.
24

This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General's contention for the Malasugui case is inapplicable to
the instant case. In said case, there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest thereby making the
warrantless search effected immediately thereafter equally lawful.
25
On the contrary, the most essential
element of probable cause, as expounded above in detail, is wanting in the instant case making the
warrantless arrest unjustified and illegal. Accordingly, the search which accompanied the warrantless
arrest was likewise unjustified and illegal. Thus, all the articles seized from the accused-appellant could
not be used as evidence against her.
Aside from the inapplicability of the abovecited case, the act of herein accused-appellant in handing
over her bag to the NARCOM agents could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied
acquiescence to the unreasonable search. The instant case is similar to People v. Encinada,
26
where
this Court held:
[T]he Republic's counsel avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs containing the
package of marijuana to the arresting officer and thus effectively waived his right against the
warrantless search. This he gleaned from Bolonia's testimony.
Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened
next?
A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.
Q: Are you referring to the two plastic chairs?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two
chairs that he carried, what did you do next?
A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the
two chairs.
We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise illegal
search, we believe that appellant based on the transcript quoted above did not voluntarily
consent to Bolonia's search of his belongings. Appellant's silence should not be lightly taken as
consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is
thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Furthermore,
considering that the search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we cannot appreciate
consent based merely on the presumption of regularity of the performance of duty." (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, accused-appellant's lack of objection to the search is not tantamount to a waiver of her
constitutional rights or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search. As this Court held in People
v. Barros:
27

. . . [T]he accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on
the occasion of his warrantless arrest "simply because he failed to object"
. . . To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly,
that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 698). The fact
that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount
to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770).
As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia
v. Locsin (supra):
xxx xxx xxx
. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act
of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either
contesting an officer's authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights;
but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not
a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for
the supremacy of the law. (Citation omitted).
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights."
28
(Emphasis supplied)
To repeat, to constitute a waiver, there should be an actual intention to relinquish the right. As clearly
illustrated inPeople v. Omaweng,
29
where prosecution witness Joseph Layong testified thus:
PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:
Q When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what did you do?
A When we saw that traveling bag, we asked the driver if we could see the
contents.
Q And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there was any?
A He said "you can see the contents but those are only clothings" (sic).
Q When he said that, what did you do?
A We asked him if we could open and see it.
Q When you said that, what did he tell you?
A He said "you can see it".
Q And when he said "you can see and open it," what did you do?
A When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was not clothings
(sic) that was contained in the bag.
Q And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what did you do?
A When I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took some of the
contents and showed it to my companion Fomocod and when Fomocod
smelled it, he said it was marijuana. (Emphasis supplied)
In the above-mentioned case, accused was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized
as a violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. If one had
been made, this Court would be the first to condemn it "as the protection of the citizen and the
maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the highest duties and privileges of the Court." He
willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle
and traveling bag, which is not the case with Aruta.
In an attempt to further justify the warrantless search, the Solicitor General next argues that the
police officers would have encountered difficulty in securing a search warrant as it could be secured
only if accused-appellant's name was known, the vehicle identified and the date of its arrival certain,
as in the Aminnudin case where the arresting officers had forty-eight hours within which to act.
This argument is untenable.
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
. . . [N]o search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
(Emphasis supplied)
Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be seized to those and only
those, particularly described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they shall seize to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not
be made.
30

Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have secured one without too
much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General. The person intended to be searched
has been particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also sufficiently ascertained to
be in the afternoon of December 14, 1988. "Aling Rosa" turned out to be accused-appellant and the thing
to be seized was marijuana. The vehicle was identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact, the NARCOM
agents purposely positioned themselves near the spot where Victory Liner buses normally unload their
passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agents failed to particularize the vehicle, this would not in any
way hinder them from securing a search warrant. The above particulars would have already sufficed. In
any case, this Court has held that the police should particularly describe the place to be searched and the
person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible.
31
(Emphasis supplied)
While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment and by actively participating in the
trial, accused-appellant may be deemed to have waived objections to the illegality of the warrantless
search and to the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the same may not apply in the
instant case for the following reasons:
1. The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest as her plea of
"not guilty" and participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary submission to the court's
jurisdiction.
32
The plea and active participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of the search and
transform the inadmissible evidence into objects of proof. The waiver simply does not extend this far.
2. Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissible upon failure to
object thereto during the trial of the case, records show that accused-appellant filed a Demurrer to
Evidence and objected and opposed the prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence.
It is apropos to quote the case of People v. Barros,
33
which stated:
It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid
warrantless arrest or a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an accused
person. The a priori argument is that the invalidity of an unjustified warrantless arrest, or an
arrest effected with a defective warrant of arrest may be waived by applying for and posting
of bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop an accused from questioning the legality or
constitutionality of his detention or the failure to accord him a preliminary investigation. We
do not believe, however, that waiver of the latter necessarily constitutes, or carries with it,
waiver of the former an argument that the Solicitor General appears to be making
impliedly. Waiver of the non-admissibility of the "fruits" of an invalid warrantless arrest and of
a warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right
against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its vitality for the protection of our people.
In the case at bar, defense counsel had expressly objected on constitutional grounds to the
admission of the carton box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when these were formally
offered in evidence by the prosecution. We consider that appellant's objection to the
admission of such evidence was made clearly and seasonably and that, under the
circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under the premises can be reasonably inferred
from his conduct before or during the trial. (Emphasis supplied).
In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search warrant
considering that they had more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this is again an instance
of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence illegal and inadmissible subsequently in
evidence.
The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and
spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
34

While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be held criminally and civilly
liable, theStonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary rule is "the
only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction" against abuse. This approach is based on
the justification made by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution which itself controls the
seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed."
35

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford
full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it
may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for
the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government.
36

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: "I
think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is
simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the
Constitution itself.
37

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Olongapo
City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered
RELEASED from confinement unless she is being held for some other legal grounds. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Decision penned by Judge Alicia L. Santos.
2 Decision, Rollo, p. 49.
3 222 SCRA 557 [1993].
4 Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1987,
First ed., pp. 85-86.
5 20 SCRA 383 [1967].
6 Bernas, Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A
Commentary 1996 ed., pp. 147-148.
7 People v. Argawanon, 215 SCRA 652 [1992].
8 "Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
an offense, without a search warrant."
9 Padilla v. CA and People, G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997.
10 People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 [1996].
11 People v. De Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 [1994].
12 People v. Encinada, G.R. No. 116720, October 2, 1997.
13 Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652 [1995].
14 84 SCRA 220 [1990].
15 198 SCRA 401 [1991].
16 214 SCRA 63 [1992].
17 G.R. No. 113447, October 9, 1997.
18 People v. Cuizon, 256 SCRA 325 [1996].
19 163 SCRA 402 [1988].
20 262 SCRA 255 [1996].
21 188 SCRA 288 [1990].
22 233 SCRA 716 [1994].
23 63 Phil. 221 [1936].
24 TSN, June 14, 1989, p. 6.
25 Supra.
26 G.R. No. 116720, October 2, 1997.
27 231 SCRA 557 [1994].
28 Supra, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458.
29 213 SCRA 462 [1992].
30 Herrera, Oscar, A Handbook on Arrest, Search and Seizure and Custodial
Investigation, 1994 ed., p. 60.
31 People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169 [1925).
32 People v. De Guzman, 224 SCRA 93 [1993], People v. De Guia, 227 SCRA 614
[1993], People v. De Guzman, 231 SCRA 737 [1994], People v. Correa, G.R. No.
119246, January 30, 1998.
33 Supra.
34 Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 [1967].
35 Cruz I. A., Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., p. 148.
36 Pamaran, The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Annotated, 1995 ed., p.
526 citing Rodriguez v. Villamiel, 65 Phil. 230 and Alvarez v. CFI of Tayabas, 64 Phil.
33.
37 People v. Aminnudin, supra.