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DNV GL 2013 SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER DNV GL 2013

Other techniques
DNV GL 2013
Other techniques
Checklists
Hazid
What-if / Structured what-if
Failure Mode and Criticality Assessment (FMECA
02 June 2014 Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved
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DNV GL 2013
Available Techniques
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Conceptual Design
Detailed Engineering
Construction/Start-Up
Operation
Expansion or Modification
Incident Investigation
Decommissioning
Rarely used or
inappropriate
Commonly
used
DNV GL 2013 SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER DNV GL 2013
HAZID
DNV GL 2013
HAZID
!y"ically done at an earlier sta#e in system/"rocedure de$elo"ment
Carried out at sli#htly hi#her le$el % system rather than com"onent
&o #uidewords
Assumes that a hazard occur and in$esti#ates what e$ents may cause this
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Hazard Identification is the first and most critical step
of risk management Why?
DNV GL 2013
Types of Hazard Event
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1 Events which have happened before
2 Obvious hazards due to type of activity
3 Accidents which can be inferred from 1 and 2
4 Simple combinations of events
5 Complex combinations never before observed
6 Recognised hazards, but defeated by installation,
maintenance or operations
7 Completely unknown or unanticipated hazard
Must be
Identified
in a
Hazard Id
Should be
Identified
in a
Hazard Id
DNV GL 2013
HAZID - Must be ealistic
't is tem"tin# to disre#ard (&on-Credi)le* Scenarios )ut+
(&on-credi)le* scenarios ha$e ha""ened to others
Worst Cases are im"ortant to emer#ency "lannin#
We should consider com)inations of failures/ e$ents
e,ui"ment can )e off-line (e#- Salt-water fire "um"s
safety de$ices can )e disa)led or fail to o"erate
se$eral tasks may )e concurrent
"rocedures are not always followed
"eo"le are not always a$aila)le
how we act is not always how we "lan to
thin#s almost always takes lon#er than "lanned
a)normal conditions can cross section limits
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DNV GL 2013
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Conceptual Design
Detailed Engineering
Construction/Start-Up
Operation
Expansion or Modification
Incident Investigation
Decommissioning
Rarely used or
inappropriate
Commonly
used
DNV GL 2013
!hec"list Application
.sed traditionally to ensure com"liance with standard "ractices
Checklists are a "owerful hazard identification techni,ue
'ncor"orate "ast e/"erience in con$enient lists of do0s and don1ts
2alua)le for re$ealin# an otherwise o$erlooked hazard
!hey can )e e/"ected to re$eal most common hazards
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DNV GL 2013
!HE!#$I%T%
Ad$anta#es
All of the issues on the list are addressed
Easy to do and can )e a""lied at any sta#e of a "ro3ect life-cycle
Minimal man"ower com"ared with HA4567 etc-
Standard checklist can )e de$elo"ed to ensure consistency
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Disadvantages
Limited by the experience and knowledge of the author
Rely on past experience (not predictive)
Comprehensive checklists can be very lengthy documents
Checklists need to be audited and kept up to date
DNV GL 2013
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Conceptual Design
Detailed Engineering
Construction/Start-Up
Operation
Expansion or Modification
Incident Investigation
Decommissioning
Rarely used or
inappropriate
Commonly
used
DNV GL 2013
&hat-If Analysis
Creati$e )rainstormin# usin# (What-'f8* ,uestions to de$elo" scenarios for
undesira)le e$ents
9ased on "lant systems or su)-systems
'dentify the hazards and conse,uences of the scenario
'dentify e/istin# safe#uards
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DNV GL 2013
'&hat-If( )uestions
What if ---8
How could ---8
's it "ossi)le --- 8
Has any)ody e$er ---8
Etc-7 Etc-7 Etc-8
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DNV GL 2013
%&I*T+s ,- )uestion !ate.ories
Material "ro)lems (M6
E/ternal effects or influence (EE/'
5"eratin# error and other human factors (5E:HF
Analytical or sam"lin# errors (A/SE
E,ui"ment/instrumentation malfunction (E/'M
6rocess u"sets of uns"ecified ori#in (6..5
.tility failures (.F
'nte#rity failure or loss of containment ('F/;5C
Emer#ency o"erations (E5
En$ironmental release (E<
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DNV GL 2013
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Conceptual Design
Detailed Engineering
Construction/Start-Up
Operation
Expansion or Modification
Incident Investigation
Decommissioning
Rarely used or
inappropriate
Commonly
used
DNV GL 2013
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Failure Mode Effect and (Criticality) Analysis
FMEA= Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
FMEA is a qualitative analysis technique
FMEA is used to identify (single) component failures that
can lead to system failure.
Work process:
Identify failure modes for each component
Assess consequences/effects of failure modes on
system
Identify potential mitigating actions to compensate
or eliminate unacceptable effects.
DNV GL 2013
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Form
FMECA Form:
DNV GL 2013
E/a0pl of application of *ME!A1
Maintenance plannin.
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PM system - download
Equipment hierarchy
Current maint. plan
Risk screening
Risk analysis
(FMEA)
Safety/health/Env.
Direct costs
Down time cost model
costs
Internal and external
requirements
Failure
modes
Definition of maint.:
Strategy, Activities,
Attributes
An optimal
Maintenance
plan
Today's maintenance plan
Best practise
Frame conditions
Preparation of data
for analysis
Define order in
which to analyze
system and which
equipment to detail
analyze based on
the function they
are upholding
Define
failure
modes
for each
system
Define maintenance
strategy, discipline,
spare parts,
document needs
Best practice
Transfer
data to PM
system
DNV GL 2013
02 June 2014
Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved
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Few accidents occur because the
design team lack knowledge; most
errors occur because the design team
failed to apply their knowledge
Trevor Kletz
DNV GL 2013
SAFER, SMARTER, GREENER
www.dnvgl.com
02 June 2014 Det Norske Veritas AS. All rights reserved
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