Stuck in the closet: a reply to Ahmed

IAN B. PHILLIPS
Morgenbesser cases matter, as Ahmed (ref.) puts it, because they appear to reute the
attracti!e"y simp"e suppositiona" theory o counteractua"s.
#
In my $%%&, I deended the
suppositiona" theory by endorsing S"ote's suggestion that our intuitions in Morgenbesser
cases are (!estiges o a deterministic mindset' (S"ote #)&*+ the phrase is rom Schaer $%%,-
.%/). I then argued that, i 0e di!est ourse"!es o that mindset, and re1ect Morgenbesser
counteractua"s (e.g., (.) and (,) be"o0+ I o""o0 Ahmed's numbering throughout), the crucia"
ro"e o counteractua"s in empirica" reasoning is not impugned. In his stimu"ating rep"y,
Ahmed disputes both c"aims.
#. Independent intuitions?
2oy"e is p"aying 3e4as Ho"d'em. He o"ds the three and i!e o c"ubs. 3he ne4t three cards
((the "op') are then dea"t by a random card5generator on a tru"y indeterministic basis, and
entire"y independent"y o 2oy"e's decision to o"d. Seeing the ace, t0o and our o c"ubs
dea"t, 2oy"e 6ic6s himse", thin6ing (.) and, as Ahmed sees it, imp"icit"y, (,).
(.) I he had not o"ded, he 0ou"d ha!e 0on.
(,) I he had not o"ded, the "op 0ou"d ha!e been 0hat it actua""y 0as.
In the deterministic case this is appropriate, gi!en the causa" independence o decision and
"op. 3he orthodo4 !ie0, 0hich Ahmed endorses, ta6es it that these thoughts are a"so correct
in the indeterministic case. I demur. 3o thin6 (.) or (,) is, imp"icit"y, to thin6 o the outcome
o the "op as re!ea"ing some hidden act about an ear"ier situation, a act that 0ou"d ha!e
been the same e!en i 2oy"e had bet. Ho0e!er, i the process is tru"y indeterministic, the
outcome re!ea"s no such thing. In a dierent (e.g., betting) situation, the outcome might 0e""
ha!e been dierent. 3o thin6 other0ise is to be "oc6ed in a deterministic mindset.
1
See, in particu"ar, Adams #)&/ and 7dgington #))/. 7dgington ($%%,, $%%*) orsa6es simp"icity precise"y
because o Morgenbesser cases. 8or discussion see my $%%&.
Ahmed disagrees. 3he intuition behind (.) and (,) is, he c"aims, 9uite independent o
determinism. 3o see this 0e are as6ed to consider the o""o0ing argument or (,) 0hose
premises, 0e are to"d, are (both intuiti!e and independent o determinism' (ref.).
(*) I : ;2oy"e's o"ding< ma6es no dierence to an actua" e!ent 7 ;the actua"
"op< then 7 0ou"d sti"" ha!e occurred e!en i : had not (premise).
()) : ma6es no dierence to any actua" e!ents to 0hich it is causa""y irre"e!ant
(premise).
(#%) 2oy"e's o"ding is causa""y irre"e!ant to the "op (premise).
(##) 3hereore (,) is true.
=n the basis o this argument, Ahmed conc"udes that (contra Phi""ips, there is an intuiti!e
route to (.) and (,) that doesn't presuppose determinism' (ref.).
(#%) is stipu"ati!e. 3he action is 0ith (*) and ()). >e can treat these together by considering-
(#$) I : is causa""y irre"e!ant to an actua" e!ent 7 then 7 0ou"d ha!e occurred
e!en i : had not.
3he prob"em 0ith Ahmed's argument is that (#$) might be both intuiti!e, and independent o
determinism, 0ithout being intuiti!e, independent"y o determinism. 3he point o my $%%&
0as that the ob!ious justification or a c"aim "i6e (#$) 0as c"oset determinism, since
determinism guarantees that e!ery 0or"d that agrees 0ith actua"ity o!er the "a0s and the
causa" actors pertaining to 7 0i"" agree 0ith actua"ity o!er 7 (see Ahmed's (#.) be"o0). In
contrast, in an indeterministic setting, there is no ob!ious 1ustiication or (#$). Insisting that
it is intuiti!e 0on't do+ that intuition (in my !ie0) is precise"y the intuition underpinned by
c"oset determinism. I 0e re"in9uish our deterministic mindset, 0e "ose our reason or
accepting (#$), and 0ith it (.) and (,). Ahmed's argument does not cha""enge this.
Perhaps Ahmed's ob1ection is that there is space or (#$) in an indeterministic 0or"d, since
maintaining (#$) does not entai" determinism. 3o estab"ish this, Ahmed argues that (#$)
entai"s on"y (#,), but not the stronger (#.), 0hich captures the re"e!ant aspect o determinism.
(#.) 8or any post5: e!ent 7, every 0or"d that agrees 0ith actua"ity o!er (i) the "a0s
(ii) the causa" actors or 7, 0i"" agree 0ith actua"ity o!er 7.
(#,) 8or any post5: e!ent 7, the closest ?:50or"ds that agree 0ith actua"ity o!er (i)
the "a0s (ii) the causa" actors or 7, 0i"" agree 0ith actua"ity o!er 7.
I (#,) is true but (#.) a"se, it must be the case that a 0or"d can agree 0ith actua"ity o!er (i)
the "a0s and (ii) the causa" actors or 7, but nonethe"ess not be amongst the c"osest 0or"ds. I
e!ery such 0or"d counted as c"ose, then either (#.) 0ou"d ho"d, or (#,) 0ou"d be a"se, and
0ith it (#$). 3hus, to sho0 that there rea""y is space or (#$) in indeterministic 0or"ds, Ahmed
must 1ustiy a c"oseness metric 0hich de"i!ers this resu"t.
Ahmed cannot 1ustiy such a metric on the ground that it captures our intuiti!e !erdicts in
re"ation to Morgenbesser cases. It is those !erdicts 0hich are at issue. 8urthermore, the metric
cannot simp"y be our (ordinary common5or5garden' notion o c"oseness as 7dgington ($%%,-
#$) reminds us. 8or i a 0or"d that agrees 0ith actua"ity o!er (i) the "a0s and (ii) the causa"
actors or 7 is nonethe"ess not to count as amongst the c"osest, this must be because 0eight
is gi!en to uture simi"arity in determining c"oseness. @et, as 0e ha!e 6no0n since the
ob1ections o 8ine (#)&/) and Bennett (#)&,) to Le0is (#)&.), gi!ing 0eight to uture
simi"arity in the ordinary sense generates high"y counter5intuiti!e conse9uences in re"ation to
the assessment o other counteractua"s, at "east 0ithout urther manoeu!ring.
$. Counterfactual modus tollens
Ahmed's second counter5argument is that, i 0e embrace the suppositiona" account and re1ect
Morgenbesser counteractua"s, our abi"ity to reason empirica""y 0ith counteractua"s 0i"" be
irreparab"y damaged. I addressed this ob1ection as posed by 7dgington ($%%,) in my $%%&.
But I dea"t there on"y 0ith the case o counteractua" abduction, imp"icit"y ta6ing 7dgington's
!ie0 that (the t0o orms o inerence are not rea""y distinct' ($%%,- $,). Ahmed ob1ects that a
simi"ar treatment cannot succeed or counteractua" modus to""ens, i.e. reasoning 0hich
instantiates the schema :M3 (i.e. Ahmed's (#A)+ (P B C' is to be read (I P had occurred, then
C 0ou"d ha!e occurred').
:M3 C, P B ?C, thereore ?P
Ahmed insists that :M3 is !a"id, indispensab"e, and incompatib"e 0ith the suppositiona"
theory (at "east gi!en the heterodo4 approach to Morgenbesser counteractua"s that I deend).
=nce again, I demur.
Ahmed's cha""enge begins 0ith the o""o0ing c"aim- (Any instance o ;:M3< is !a"id- i its
premises are true then its conc"usion is true+ moreo!er the conc"usion is at "east as "i6e"y as
the con1unction o the premises' (ref.). Ha!ing asserted this, Ahmed then considers an
app"ication o :M3 in a chancy conte4t. >e are to imagine an eruption o""o0ed by an
e4treme"y un"i6e"y and causa""y independent earth9ua6e. A geo"ogist, on "earning o the
earth9ua6es occurrence, reasons as o""o0s. An earth9ua6e occurred. But, i the eruption had
occurred, the earth9ua6e 0ou"d not ha!e occurred. 3hereore, the eruption did not occur.
I 0e are certain that i the eruption had occurred, the earth9ua6e 0ou"d not ha!e occurred,
then on "earning o an earth9ua6e, the geo"ogist can indeed conc"ude that the eruption did not
occur. But in conte4ts o uncertainty, :M3 spe""s disaster or the suppositiona" theorist. 3he
earth9ua6e had on"y a #D chance o occurring post5eruption, so the suppositiona" theorist
0i"" 0ant to assign a #D probabi"ity to the counteractua", (I the eruption had occurred, the
earth9ua6e 0ou"d ha!e occurred', and so a ))D probabi"ity to the counteractua", (I the
eruption had occurred, the earth9ua6e 0ou"d not ha!e occurred'. @et, i 0e 6no0 that an
earth9ua6e occurred, then the 1oint probabi"ity o the premises remains at ))D. So, assuming
that :M3 is probabi"istica""y !a"id, it o""o0s that 0e shou"d be ))D conident that there 0as
no eruption. And, as Ahmed dec"ares- (3his is ob!ious"y 0rong- the 0ho"e point o the
e4amp"e 0as to describe air"y good e!idence for an eruptionE' (ref.).
3he resu"t is ob!ious"y 0rong (though I do not see ho0 this orm o reasoning cou"d pro!ide
good e!idence for an eruption gi!en the assumed independence o 9ua6e and eruption). It is
ob!ious"y 0rong because, as Ahmed points out, (0e cou"d use ;:M3< to argue against the
actua" occurrence o any possib"e e!ent that (0ou"d ha!e) preceded any un"i6e"y and causa""y
unre"ated actua" one' (ref.). 3hat inc"udes both occurrence and non5occurrence o an eruptionE
Nonethe"ess, the resu"t is not a disaster or the suppositiona" theorist. 8or the suppositiona"
theorist 0i"" simp"y deny Ahmed's c"aim that :M3 is !a"id.
:M3 undoubted"y has the o""o0ing property- i I am certain that C, and a"so that P B ?C,
then I can be certain that ?P (7dgington $%%,- $,+ c. #))/- $*A on the (:ertainty criterion').
I 0e 0ere dea"ing 0ith propositions, this 0ou"d be enough to ensure the probabi"istic
!a"idity that Ahmed's argument re9uires. Ho0e!er, according to the suppositiona" theorist,
0hen it comes to counteractua"s, 0e are not dea"ing 0ith propositions. >e are dea"ing 0ith
conditiona" probabi"ities. As a resu"t 0e cannot assume that certainty preser!ation entai"s that
Fthe conc"usion is at "east as "i6e"y as the con1unction o the premisesG (ref.).
Not on"y can 0e not assume it, there are countere4amp"es to the probabi"istic !a"idity o
:M3. Here is 7dgington's a!ourite. I dri!e past a riend's house at night considering
0hether to drop in. I see that the "ights are o. Hno0ing that it's !ery "i6e"y that, i they 0ere
in, the "ights 0ou"d be on, I conc"ude that they aren't in and dri!e on. 3ypica""y, this is a
perect"y acceptab"e orm o reasoning. @et, as 7dgington comments-
It can be deeated thus- (I agree that it 0as indeed !ery "i6e"y that 0e 0ou"d ind the
"ights on, i they 0ere at home+ but it 0as a"so !ery "i6e"y that 0e 0ou"d ind the
"ights on, i they 0ere not at home+ or they ha!e the deep"y ingrained practice o
"ea!ing the "ights on 0hen they go out at night. So there must be some other
e4p"anation or the "ights being out. Perhaps there's a po0er cutI' ($%%,- $,)
As 7dgington notes ($%%,- $.5,), in cases such as this, 0here both P B ?C and ?P B ?C are
suicient"y probab"e, :M3 instances can ha!e premises 1oint"y, signiicant"y more "i6e"y than
their conc"usions. Ahmed's earth9ua6e case is simp"y another case in point- the probabi"ity o
(I the eruption had occurred, the earth9ua6e 0ou"d not ha!e occurred' and (I the eruption
had not occurred, the earth9ua6e 0ou"d not ha!e occurred' are both ))D. 3hus, 0e shou"d
e4pect :M3 to yie"d absurd resu"ts.
Ahmed is a0are o 7dgington's resistance to :M3. Ho0e!er, he regards her position as
untenab"e, arguing that :M3 must be probabi"istica""y !a"id- F7!en assuming (on any
interpretation o probabi"ity) that the probabi"ity o C is i4ed and high, i the probabi"ity o
?P B ?C increases the probabi"ity o P B ?C 0i"" fall+ at no point 0i"" the probabi"ity o (P B
?C) J C e4ceed that o ?P, on pain o incoherent"y assigning a non5Kero probabi"ity to the
inconsistent con1unction o P, C and P B ?CG (ref., n.). 3he reasoning here 0ou"d be "a0"ess
i 0e 0ere dea"ing 0ith the probabi"ities o propositions. But, or the suppositiona" theorist,
0e are dea"ing 0ith conditiona" probabi"ities 0hich are notorious"y not the probabi"ities o
propositions.
$
3his matters because, un"ess counteractua"s are treated propositiona""y, 0e
"ac6 any standard understanding o the probabi"ities o con1unctions 0ith conditiona"
con1uncts. >ithout some such understanding, Ahmed's argument does not get o the ground.
.
>here does this "ea!e usL Must the suppositiona" theorist abandon counteractua" modus
tollens reasoning in indeterministic settingsL Not at a"". 3he suppositiona" theorist must
simp"y ac6no0"edge that such reasoning is deeasib"e (c. 7dgington $%%,- $..).
Suppositiona" theorists ha!e e!ery right to parta6e in such orms o reasoning, they 0i"" 1ust
en1oin us to remember their "imitations.
,
All Souls College
Oxford OX1 4A! "#
ian.p$illips%all&souls.ox.ac.u'
(eferences
Adams, 7.>. #)&/. )$e ogic of Conditionals. 2ordrecht- Meide".
Ahmed, A. =ut o the c"oset. Analysis NN- 44O44.
Bennett, P. #)&,. :ounteractua"s and possib"e 0or"ds. Canadian *ournal of +$ilosop$y ,-
.*#O,%$.
7dgington, 2. #))/. =n conditiona"s. ,ind #%,- $./O.$).
7dgington, 2. $%%#. :onditiona"s. In )$e Stanford -ncyclopedia of +$ilosop$y (8a""
$%%# 7dition), ed. 7. Qa"ta.
7dgington, 2. $%%,. :ounteractua"s and the beneit o hindsight. In Cause and C$ance, ed.
P. 2o0e and P. Noordho, #$O$&. London- Mout"edge.
7dgington, 2. $%%*. :ounteractua"s. +roceedings of t$e Aristotelian Society #%*- #O$#.
8ine. H. #)&/. :ritica" notice o 2a!id Le0is's Counterfactuals. ,ind *,- ,/#O,/*.
Le0is, 2. #)&.. Counterfactuals. Basi" B"ac60e""- =4ord.
2
3he shit o perspecti!e this brings in re"ation to indicati!es is e"egant"y discussed in 7dgington $%%#- R..#.
3
Idea""y, the suppositiona" theorist 0ou"d ha!e to hand a comprehensi!e treatment o counteractua"
conditiona"s in terms o conditiona" probabi"ities. 3o my 6no0"edge, no such treatment yet e4ists (or the
oundation stones, see Adams #)&/- :h.,). 3he "ac6 o a comprehensi!e positi!e account does not diminish the
orce o the negati!e point in the te4t.
4
3han6s to 2orothy 7dgington, 2anie" Mothschi"d and Lee >a"ters or e4treme"y he"pu" e4changes 0hich
great"y impro!ed this paper.
Phi""ips, I.B. $%%&. Morgenbesser cases and c"oset determinism. Analysis A&- ,$O).
Schaer, P. $%%,. :ounteractua"s, causa" independence and conceptua" circu"arity.
Analysis A,- $))O.%).
S"ote, M. #)&*. 3ime in counteractua"s. +$ilosop$ical (evie. *&- .O$&.