G.R. No.

102380 January 18, 1993

HERODOTUS P. ACEBEDO and DEMOSTHENES P. ACEBEDO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, MIGUEL ACEBEDO, ALEXANDER ACEBEDO, NAPOLEON ACEBEDO,
RIZALINO ACEBEDO, REPUBLICA ACEBEDO, FILIPINAS ACEBEDO and YU HWA PING, respondents.
.
CAMPOS, JR., J .:
The lower court's jurisdiction in approving a Deed of Conditional Sale executed by respondents-heirs and ordering
herein administrator-petitioner Herodotus Acebedo to sell the remaining portions of said properties, despite the
absence of its prior approval as a probate court, is being challenged in the case at bar.
The late Felix Acebedo left an estate consisting of several real estate properties located in Quezon City and
Caloocan City, with a conservative estimated value of about P30 million. Said estate allegedly has only the
following unsettled claims:
a. P87,937.00 representing unpaid real estate taxes due Quezon City;
b. P20,244.00 as unpaid real estate taxes due Caloocan City;
c. The unpaid salaries/allowances of former Administrator Miguel Acebedo, and the incumbent
Administrator Herodotus Acebedo; and
d. Inheritance taxes that may be due on the net estate.
The decedent was succeeded by eight heirs, two of whom are the petitioners herein, and the others are the private
respondents.
Due to the prolonged pendency of the case before the respondent Court for sixteen years, respondents-heirs filed a
"Motion for Approval of Sale", on October 4, 1989. The said sale involved the properties covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. 155569, 120145, 9145, and 18709, all of which are registered in Quezon City, and form part
of the estate. The consideration for said lots was twelve (12) million pesos and by that time, they already had a
buyer. It was further stated in said Motion that respondents-heirs have already received their proportionate share of
the six (6) million pesos paid by the buyer, Yu Hwa Ping, as earnest money; that the balance of P6,000,000.00 is
more than enough to pay the unsettled claims against the estate. Thus, they prayed for the Court to direct the
administrator, Herodotus Acebedo (referred to as petitioner-administrator hereafter):
1. to sell the properties mentioned in the motion;
2. with the balance of P6 million, to pay all the claims against the Estate; and
3. to distribute the residue among the Heirs in final settlement of the Estate.
To the aforesaid Motion, herein petitioner-administrator interposed an "Opposition to Approval of Sale", to wit:
1. That he has learned that some of the heirs herein have sold some real estate property of the
Estate located at Balintawak, Quezon City, without the knowledge of the herein administrator,
without the approval of this Honorable Court and of some heirs, and at a shockingly low price;
2. That he is accordingly hereby registering his vehement objection to the approval of the sale,
perpetrated in a manner which can even render the proponents of the sale liable for punishment for
contempt of this Honorable Court;
3. The herein Administrator instead herein prays this Honorable Court to authorize the sale of the
above mentioned property of the Estate to generate funds to pay certain liabilities of the Estate and
with the approval of this Honorable Court if warranted, to give the heirs some advances chargeable
against theirs (sic) respective shares, and, for the purpose to authorize the herein Administrator,
and the other heirs to help the Administrator personally or through a broker, to look for a buyer for
the highest obtainable price, subject always to the approval of this Honorable Court.
1

On October 30, 1989, herein petitioners moved to be given a period of forty-five (45) days within which to look for a
buyer who will be willing to buy the properties at a price higher than P12,000,000.00.
The case was set for hearing on December 15, 1989. However, by said date, petitioners have not found any buyer
offering better terms. Thus, they asked the Court, on February 8, 1990, for an in extendible period of thirty days to
look for a buyer.
Petitioner-administrator then filed a criminal complaint for falsification of a public document against Yu Hwa Ping
and notary public Eugenio Obon on February 26, 1990. He initiated this complaint upon learning that it was Yu Hwa
Ping who caused the notarization of the Deed of Conditional Sale wherein allegedly petitioner-administrator's
signature was made to appear. He also learned that after he confronted the notary public of the questioned
document, the latter revoked his notarial act on the same.
On April 2, 1990, petitioner-administrator filed the civil action to secure the declaration by the Court of the nullity of
the Deed of Conditional Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale.
The period granted herein petitioners having lapsed without having found a buyer, petitioner Demosthenes
Acebedo sought to nullify the Orders granting them several periods within which to look for a better buyer.
Respondents filed a comment thereon.
Having miserably failed to find a better buyer, after seven long months, petitioner-administrator filed another
"Opposition to Approval of Sale", dated May 10, 1990, maintaining that the sale should wait for the country to
recover from the effects of the coup d'etat attempts, otherwise, the properties should be divided among the heirs.
On June 21, 1990, petitioners filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Mortgage and Lease some of the Properties of
the Estate". To this Motion, respondents filed an Opposition on the following grounds : that the motion is not proper
because of the pending motion to approve the sale of the same properties; that said conditional sale was initiated
by petitioner-administrator who had earlier signed a receipt for P500,000.00 as earnest money; that the approval of
the sale would mean Yu Hwa Ping's assumption of payment of the realty taxes; that the estate has no further debts
and thus, the intestate administrator may be terminated.
On August 17, 1990, respondent Court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which, stated, among others, to
wit:
2

b. the motion filed by the heirs-movants, dated October 4, 1989, praying that the new administrator
be directed to sell the properties covered by TCT Nos. 155569, 120145, 9145 and 18709, in favor
of Yu Hwa Ping is hereby denied; and
c. the new administrator is hereby granted leave to mortgage some properties of the estate at a just
and reasonable amount, subject to the approval of the Court.
On December 4, 1990, the respondent Judge issued an order resolving to call the parties to a conference on
December 17, 1990. The conference was held, but still the parties were unable to arrive at an agreement. So, on
January 4, 1991, it was continued, wherein the parties actually agreed that the heirs be allowed to sell their shares
of the properties to Yu Hwa Ping for the price already agreed upon, while herein petitioners negotiate for a higher
price with Yu Hwa Ping.
Petitioners, then, instead filed a "Supplemental Opposition" to the approval of the Deed of Conditional Sale.
On March 29, 1991, the respondent Court issued the challenged Order, the dispositive portion of which states, to
wit:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated August 7, 1990, is hereby lifted, reconsidered and set aside, and
another one is hereby issued as follows:
1. Approving the conditional sale, dated September 10, 1989, executed by the heirs-movants, in
favor of Yu Hwa Ping, pertaining to their respective shares in the properties covered by TCT Nos.
155569, 120145, 1945 and 18709 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City;
2. Ordering the administrator Herodotus Acebedo to sell the remaining portions of the said
properties also in favor of Yu Hwa Ping at the same price as the sale executed by the herein heirs-
movants;
3. Ordering Yu Hwa Ping to deposit with the Court the total remaining balance of the purchase
price for the said lots within TWENTY (20) DAYS from notice hereof;
4. The motion to cite former administrator Miguel Acebedo in contempt of court, resulting from his
failure to submit the owner's copy of TCT Nos. 155569, and 120145 is hereby denied.
3

Yu Hwa Ping, on April 4, 1991, deposited the remaining balance of the purchase price for the properties subject of
the Deed of Conditional Sale in the amount of P6,500,000.00.
Petitioners herein received the questioned Order on April 11, 1991. Twenty one (21) days thereafter, they filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Court reinstate its Order of August 17, 1990. To this, private
respondents filed their Opposition.
4

Instead of making a reply, petitioners herein filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. The motions for
reconsideration of herein petitioners were denied by the respondent Court on August 23, 1991.
On September 23, 1991, herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, hoping for the last time that
they would be able to convince the Court that its Order dated March 29, 1991 in effect approving the conditional
sale is erroneous and beyond its jurisdiction.
On October 17, 1991, the respondent Court denied the Motion for Partial Reconsideration for "lack of merit".
On November 7, 1991, private respondents filed a Motion for Execution of the Order dated March 29, 1991. This
was pending resolution when the petitioners filed this Petition for Certiorari.
The controversy in the case at bar revolves around one question: Is it within the jurisdiction of the lower court,
acting as a probate court, to issue an Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale executed by respondents-heirs
without prior court approval and to order herein Administrator to sell the remaining portion of said properties?
We answer in the positive?
In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals,
5
this Court made a pronouncement that it is within the jurisdiction of the
probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final
adjudication. Hence, it is error to say that this matter should be threshed out in a separate action.
The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable
property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the
court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the probate
court in the case at bar, acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale.
We cannot countenance the position maintained by herein petitioners that said conditional sale is null and void for
lack of prior court approval. The sale precisely was made conditional, the condition being that the same should first
be approved by the probate court.
Petitioners herein anchor their claim on Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court.
6
It is settled that court approval is
necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedent's estate. However, reference to judicial approval cannot
adversely affect the substantive rights of the heirs to dispose of their ideal share in the co-heirship and/or co-
ownership among the heirs.
7

This Court had the occasion to rule that there is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right, interest, or
participation he may have in the property under administration. This is a matter which comes under the jurisdiction
of the probate court.
8

The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent's property, even if the same is under administration, is based on the
Civil Code provision
9
stating that the possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without
interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted. Where there
are however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such
heirs.
10

The Civil Code, under the provisions on co-ownership, further qualifies this right.
11
Although it is mandated that
each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and thus
may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of the alienation
or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
12
In other words, the law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal
share in the property held in common.
13

As early as 1942, this Court has recognized said right of an heir to dispose of property under administration. In the
case of Teves de Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et al.,
14
it was said that the sale made by an heir of his share in an
inheritance, subject to the result of the pending administration, in no wise, stands in the way of such administration.
The Court then relied on the provision of the Old Civil Code, Article 440 and Article 339 which are still in force as
Article 533 and Article 493, respectively, in the new Civil Code. The Court also cited the words of a noted civilist,
Manresa: "Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs 'becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with
respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed
among the co-owners of the estate which remains undivided'."
Private respondents having secured the approval of the probate court, a matter which is unquestionably within its
jurisdiction, and having established private respondents' right to alienate the decedent's property subject of
administration, this Petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.
PREMISES considered, Petition is hereby DISMISSED. With Costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 61584 November 25, 1992
DONATO S. PAULMITAN, JULIANA P. FANESA and RODOLFO FANESA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALICIO PAULMITAN, ELENA PAULMITAN, ABELINO PAULMITAN, ANITA
PAULMITAN, BAKING PAULMITAN, ADELINA PAULMITAN and ANITO PAULMITAN, respondents.

ROMERO, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals, dated July
14, 1982 in CA-G.R. No. 62255-R entitled "Alicio Paulmitan, et al. v. Donato Sagario Paulmitan, et al." which
affirmed the decision
2
of the then Court of First Instance (now RTC) of Negros Occidental, 12th Judicial District,
Branch IV, Bacolod City, in Civil Case No. 11770.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, who died sometime in 1953,
3
left the two following parcels of land located in the
Province of Negros Occidental: (1) Lot No. 757 with an area of 1,946 square meters covered by Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. RO-8376; and (2) Lot No. 1091 with an area of 69,080 square meters and covered by OCT No.
RO-11653. From her marriage with Ciriaco Paulmitan, who is also now deceased, Agatona begot two legitimate
children, namely: Pascual Paulmitan, who also died in 1953,
4
apparently shortly after his mother passed away, and
Donato Paulmitan, who is one of the petitioners. Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa is Donato's daughter while the third
petitioner, Rodolfo Fanes, is Juliana's husband. Pascual Paulmitan, the other son of Agatona Sagario, is survived
by the respondents, who are his children, name: Alicio, Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking and Anito, all
surnamed Paulmitan.
Until 1963, the estate of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan remained unsettled and the titles to the two lots mentioned
above remained in the name of Agatona. However, on August 11, 1963, petitioner Donato Paulmitan executed an
Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship, extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757 based on the claim that he
is the only surviving heir of Agatona Sagario. The affidavit was filed with the Register of Deeds of Negros
Occidental on August 20, 1963, cancelled OCT No. RO-8376 in the name of Agatona Sagario and issued Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 35979 in Donato's name.
As regards Lot No. 1091, Donato executed on May 28, 1974 a Deed of Sale over the same in favor of petitioner
Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter.
5

In the meantime, sometime in 1952, for non-payment of taxes, Lot No. 1091 was forfeited and sold at a public
auction, with the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental being the buyer. A Certificate of Sale over the land
was executed by the Provincial Treasurer in favor of the Provincial Board of Negros Occidental.
6

On May 29, 1974, Juliana P. Fanesa redeemed the property from the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental
for the amount of P2,959.09.
7

On learning of these transactions, respondents children of the late Pascual Paulmitan filed on January 18, 1975
with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a Complaint against petitioners to partition the properties plus
damages.
Petitioners set up the defense of prescription with respect to Lot No. 757 as an affirmative defense, contending that
the Complaint was filed more than eleven years after the issuance of a transfer certificate of title to Donato
Paulmitan over the land as consequence of the registration with the Register of Deeds, of Donato's affidavit
extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757. As regards Lot No. 1091, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claimed
in her Answer to the Complaint that she acquired exclusive ownership thereof not only by means of a deed of sale
executed in her favor by her father, petitioner Donato Paulmitan, but also by way of redemption from the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental.
Acting on the petitioners' affirmative defense of prescription with respect to Lot No. 757, the trial court issued an
order dated April 22, 1976 dismissing the complaint as to the said property upon finding merit in petitioners'
affirmative defense. This order, which is not the object of the present petition, has become final after respondents'
failure to appeal therefrom.
Trial proceeded with respect to Lot No. 1091. In a decision dated May 20, 1977, the trial court decided in favor of
respondents as to Lot No. 1091. According to the trial court, the respondents, as descendants of Agatona Sagario
Paulmitan were entitled to one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 1091, pro indiviso. The sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan to
his daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not prejudice their rights. And the repurchase by Juliana P. Fanesa
of the land from the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental did not vest in Juliana exclusive ownership over
the entire land but only gave her the right to be reimbursed for the amount paid to redeem the property. The trial
court ordered the partition of the land and directed petitioners Donato Paulmitan and Juliana P. Fanesa to pay
private respondents certain amounts representing the latter's share in the fruits of the land. On the other hand,
respondents were directed to pay P1,479.55 to Juliana P. Fanesa as their share in the redemption price paid by
Fanesa to the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the second cause of action pleaded in the
complain as follows:
1. The deed of sale (Exh. "F") dated May 28, 1974 is valid insofar as the one-half undivided portion
of Lot 1091 is concerned as to vest ownership over said half portion in favor of defendant Juliana
Fanesa and her husband Rodolfo Fanesa, while the remaining half shall belong to plaintiffs, pro-
indiviso;
2. Lot 1091, Cadastral Survey of Pontevedra, Province of Negros Occidental, now covered by TCT
No. RO-11653 (N.A.), is ordered partitioned. The parties must proceed to an actual partition by
property instrument of partition, submitting the corresponding subdivision within sixty (60) days
from finality of this decision, and should they fail to agree, commissioners of partition may be
appointed by the Court;
3. Pending the physical partition, the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is ordered to cancel
Original Certificate of Title No. RO-11653 (N.A.) covering Lot 1091, Pontevedra Cadastre, and to
issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in the name of plaintiffs and defendants, one-half
portion each,pro-indiviso, as indicated in paragraph 1 above;
4. Plaintiffs are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, defendant Juliana Fanesa the amount of
P1,479.55 with interest at the legal rate from May 28, 1974 until paid;
5 Defendants Donato Sagario Paulmitan and Juliana Paulmitan Fanesa are ordered to account to
plaintiffs and to pay them, jointly and severally, the value of the produce from Lot 1091
representing plaintiffs' share in the amount of P5,000.00 per year from 1966 up to the time of actual
partition of the property, and to pay them the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees as well as the
costs of the suit.
xxx xxx xxx
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence this petition.
To determine the rights and obligations of the parties to the land in question, it is well to review, initially, the
relatives who survived the decedent Agatona Sagario Paulmitan. When Agatona died in 1953, she was survived by
two (2) sons, Donato and Pascual. A few months later in the same year, Pascual died, leaving seven children, the
private respondents. On the other had, Donato's sole offspring was petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa.
At the time of the relevant transactions over the properties of decedent Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, her son
Pascual had died, survived by respondents, his children. It is, thus, tempting to apply the principles pertaining to the
right of representation as regards respondents. It must, however, be borne in mind that Pascual did no predecease
his mother, 8 thus precluding the operation of the provisions in the Civil Code on the right of representation
9
with
respect to his children, the respondents. When Agatona Sagario Paulmitan died intestate in 1952, her two (2) sons
Donato and Pascual were still alive. Since it is well-settled by virtue of Article 777 of the Civil Code that "[t]he rights
to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent,"
10
the right of ownership, not only
of Donato but also of Pascual, over their respective shares in the inheritance was automatically and by operation of
law vested in them in 1953 when their mother died intestate. At that stage, the children of Donato and Pascual did
not yet have any right over the inheritance since "[i]n every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the
more distant
ones."
11
Donato and Pascual excluded their children as to the right to inherit from Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, their
mother.
From the time of the death of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan to the subsequent passing away of her son Pascual in
1953, the estate remained unpartitioned. Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides: "Where there are two or more
heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the
payment of debts of the deceased."
12
Donato and Pascual Paulmitan were, therefore, co-owners of the estate left
by their mother as no partition was ever made.
When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his children, the respondents, succeeded him in the co-ownership
of the disputed property. Pascual Paulmitan's right of ownership over an undivided portion of the property passed
on to his children, who, from the time of Pascual's death, became co-owners with their uncle Donato over the
disputed decedent estate.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claims ownership over Lot No. 1091 by virtue of two transactions, namely: (a) the sale
made in her favor by her father Donato Paulmitan; and (b) her redemption of the land from the Provincial of Negros
Occidental after it was forfeited for non-payment of taxes.
When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091 to his daughter Juliana P. Fanesa, he was only a co-
owner with respondents and as such, he could only sell that portion which may be allotted to him upon termination
of the co-ownership.
13
The sale did not prejudice the rights of respondents to one half (1/2) undivided share of the
land which they inherited from their father. It did not vest ownership in the entire land with the buyer but transferred
only the seller's pro-indiviso share in the property
14
and consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the land until it
is partitioned. InBailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals,
15
the Court, through Justice Irene R. Cortes, outlined the
effects of a sale by one co-owner without the consent of all the co-owners, thus:
The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the Civil Code,
Thus:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute
another person its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. [Emphasis supplied.]
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the
sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the
sale [Punsalan v. Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320 (1923)]. This is because under the aforementioned codal
provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only
what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common [Ramirez v.
Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909)]. Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and
Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect to their proportionate shares, and the subsequent
transfers which culminated in the sale to private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable
thereby became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land as correctly held by the lower court since
the sales produced the effect of substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof [Mainit v. Bandoy,
14 Phil. 730 (1910)].
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share,
a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null
and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer
a co-owner of the property.
Applying this principle to the case at bar, the sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan of the land to his daughter,
petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not give to the latter ownership over the entire land but merely transferred to her
the one half (1/2) undivided share of her father, thus making her the co-owner of the land in question with the
respondents, her first cousins.
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa also claims ownership of the entire property by virtue of the fact that when the
Provincial Government of Negros Occidental bought the land after it was forfeited for non-payment of taxes, she
redeemed it.
The contention is without merit.
The redemption of the land made by Fanesa did not terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the entire land
subject of the co-ownership. Speaking on the same issue raised by petitioners, the Court, in Adille v. Court of
Appeals,
16
resolved the same with the following pronouncements:
The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the
property held in common?
Essentially, it is the petitioners' contention that the property subject of dispute devolved upon him
upon the failure of his co-heirs to join him in its redemption within the period required by law. He
relies on the provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil Code, Article 1613 of the present Code,
giving the vendee a retro the right to demand redemption of the entire property.
There is no merit in this petition.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by co-owner with respect to his share alone (CIVIL
CODE, art. 1612, CIVIL CODE (1889), art. (1514.). While the records show that petitioner
redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make him the
owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership (Supra, Art.
489). There is no doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil
Code:
Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the
expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the
latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as
may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is
prejudicial to the co-ownership.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a vendee a retro,
under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the
redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership
over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the
property and consolidate title thereto in his name (Supra, art. 1607). But the provision does not give
to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of
terminating a co-ownership.
Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the entire lot by virtue of the redemption she made,
nevertheless, she did acquire the right to reimbursed for half of the redemption price she paid to the Provincial
Government of Negros Occidental on behalf of her co-owners. Until reimbursed, Fanesa hold a lien upon the
subject property for the amount due her.
17

Finally, petitioners dispute the order of the trial court, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, for them to pay private
respondents P5,000.00 per year from 1966 until the partition of the estate which represents the share of private
respondents in the fruits of the land. According to petitioners, the land is being leased for P2,000.00 per year only.
This assigned error, however raises a factual question. The settled rule is that only questions of law may be raised
in a petition for review. As a general rule, findings of fact made by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final
and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal.
18

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 108228. February 1, 2001]
SPOUSES MANUEL and SALVACION DEL CAMPO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF
JOSE REGALADO, SR., respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 15 in Civil Case No. V-5369, ordering the dismissal of the action for repartition,
resurvey and reconveyance filed by petitioners.
Pure questions of law are raised in this appeal as the following factual antecedents are undisputed:
Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and Julita, all surnamed Bornales, were the original co-owners
of Lot 162 of the Cadastral Survey of Pontevedra, Capiz under Original Certificate of Title No. 18047. As appearing therein,
the lot, which consisted of a total area of 27,179 square meters was divided in aliquot shares among the eight (8) co-owners as
follows:
Salome Bornales 4/16
Consorcia Bornales 4/16
Alfredo Bornales 2/16
Maria Bornales 2/16
Jose Bornales 1/16
Quirico Bornales 1/16
Rosalia Bornales 1/16
Julita Bornales 1/16
On July 14, 1940, Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 for P200.00 to Soledad Daynolo. In the Deed of Absolute
Sale signed by Salome and two other co-owners, Consorcia and Alfredo, the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad was described
as having more or less the following measurements:
63-1/2 meters from point 9 to 10, 35 meters from point 10 to point 11, 30 meters from point 11 to a certain point
parallel to a line drawn from points 9 to "10; and then from this Certain Point to point 9 and as shown in the
accompanying sketch, and made an integral part of this deed, to SOLEDAD DAYNOLO, her heirs and assigns.
[1]

Thereafter, Soledad Daynolo immediately took possession of the land described above and built a house thereon. A few
years later, Soledad and her husband, Simplicio Distajo, mortgaged the subject portion of Lot 162 as security for a P400.00
debt to Jose Regalado, Sr. This transaction was evidenced by a Deed of Mortgage
[2]
dated May 1, 1947.
On April 14, 1948, three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162, specifically, Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo, sold 24,993
square meters of said lot to Jose Regalado, Sr.
On May 4, 1951, Simplicio Distajo, heir of Soledad Daynolo who had since died, paid the mortgage debt and redeemed
the mortgaged portion of Lot 162 from Jose Regalado, Sr. The latter, in turn, executed a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage
[3]
in
favor of Soledads heirs, namely: Simplicio Distajo, Rafael Distajo and Teresita Distajo-Regalado. On same date, the said heirs
sold the redeemed portion of Lot 162 for P1,500.00 to herein petitioners, the spouses Manuel Del Campo and Salvacion
Quiachon.
Meanwhile, Jose Regalado, Sr. caused the reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. 18047. The reconstituted
OCT No. RO-4541 initially reflected the shares of the original co-owners in Lot 162. However, title was transferred later to
Jose Regalado, Sr. who subdivided the entire property into smaller lots, each covered by a respective title in his name. One of
these small lots is Lot No. 162-C-6 with an area of 11,732 square meters which was registered on February 24, 1977 under
TCT No. 14566.
In 1987, petitioners Manuel and Salvacion del Campo brought this complaint for repartition, resurvey and
reconveyance against the heirs of the now deceased Jose Regalado, Sr. Petitioners claimed that they owned an area of 1,544
square meters located within Lot 162-C-6 which was erroneously included in TCT No. 14566 in the name of Regalado.
Petitioners alleged that they occupied the disputed area as residential dwelling ever since they purchased the property from the
Distajos way back in 1951. They also declared the land for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding taxes.
On April 1, 1987, summons were served on Regalados widow, Josefina Buenvenida, and two of her children, Rosemarie
and Antonio. Josefina and Rosemarie were declared in default on May 10, 1989 because only Antonio filed an answer to the
complaint.
During trial, petitioners presented the Deed of Absolute Sale
[4]
executed between Soledad Daynolo and Salome Bornales
as well as the Deed of Mortgage
[5]
and Deed of Discharge
[6]
signed by Jose Regalado, Sr. The Deed of Absolute
Sale
[7]
showing the purchase by the Del Campos of the property from the Distajos was likewise given in evidence.
Despite the filing of an answer, Antonio failed to present any evidence to refute the claim of petitioners. Thus, after
considering Antonio to have waived his opportunity to present evidence, the trial court deemed the case submitted for decision.
On November 20, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. It held that while Salome could
alienate her pro-indiviso share in Lot 162, she could not validly sell an undivided part thereof by metes and bounds to Soledad,
from whom petitioners derived their title. The trial court also reasoned that petitioners could not have a better right to the
property even if they were in physical possession of the same and declared the property for taxation purposes, because mere
possession cannot defeat the right of the Regalados who had a Torrens title over the land.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment, with no pronouncement as to costs.
[8]

Petitioners now seek relief from this Court and maintain that:
I.
THE FACT THAT THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PORTION CONSTITUTES A SALE OF A CONCRETE OR
DEFINITE PORTION OF LAND OWNED IN COMMON DOES NOT ABSOLUTELY DEPRIVE HEREIN
PETITIONERS OF ANY RIGHT OR TITLE THERETO;
II.
IN ANY EVENT, HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ALL ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THE RIGHT AND
TITLE OF HEREIN PETITIONERS.
[9]

In resolving petitioners appeal, we must answer the following questions: Would the sale by a co-owner of a physical
portion of an undivided property held in common be valid? Is respondent estopped from denying petitioners right and title
over the disputed area? Under the facts and circumstances duly established by the evidence, are petitioners entitled to
repartition, resurvey and reconveyance of the property in question?
On the first issue, it seems plain to us that the trial court concluded that petitioners could not have acquired ownership of
the subject land which originally formed part of Lot 162, on the ground that their alleged right springs from a void sale
transaction between Salome and Soledad. The mere fact that Salome purportedly transferred a definite portion of the co-owned
lot by metes and bounds to Soledad, however, does not per serender the sale a nullity. This much is evident under Article
493
[10]
of the Civil Code and pertinent jurisprudence on the matter. More particularly in Lopez vs. Vda. De Cuaycong,
et.al.
[11]
which we find relevant, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bocobo, held that:
The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell a concrete portion of the hacienda does not render the sale void, for
it is a well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so.
Quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest. (When a thing is of no force as I do it, it shall have as much force
as it can have.)
[12]

Applying this principle to the instant case, there can be no doubt that the transaction entered into by Salome and Soledad
could be legally recognized in its entirety since the object of the sale did not even exceed the ideal shares held by the former in
the co-ownership. As a matter of fact, the deed of sale executed between the parties expressly stipulated that the portion of Lot
162 sold to Soledad would be taken from Salomes 4/16 undivided interest in said lot, which the latter could validly transfer in
whole or in part even without the consent of the other co-owners. Salomes right to sell part of her undivided interest in the co-
owned property is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-
indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its enjoyment
[13]
Since
Salomes clear intention was to sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid objection can be made
against it and the sale can be given effect to the full extent.
We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned
property prior to partition among all the co-owners. However, this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything
at all in case a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-owner/vendors undivided
interest could properly be the object of the contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale
are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their
transaction. In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract
share in the property held in common.
Resultantly, Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of the year 1940 when the sale was made in her favor. It follows
that Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not have sold the entire Lot 162 to Jose Regalado, Sr. on April 14, 1948 because at
that time, the ideal shares held by the three co-owners/vendors were equivalent to only 10/16 of the undivided property less the
aliquot share previously sold by Salome to Soledad. Based on the principle that no one can give what he does not
have,
[14]
Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not legally sell the shares pertaining to Soledad since a co-owner cannot
alienate more than his share in the co-ownership. We have ruled many times that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as
his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-
owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the rights of said
co-owner to the buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
[15]

In this case, Regalado merely became a new co-owner of Lot 162 to the extent of the shares which Salome, Consorcia and
Alfredo could validly convey. Soledad retained her rights as co-owner and could validly transfer her share to petitioners in
1951. The logical effect of the second disposition is to substitute petitioners in the rights of Soledad as co-owner of the land.
Needless to say, these rights are preserved notwithstanding the issuance of TCT No. 14566 in Regalados name in 1977.
Be that as it may, we find that the area subject matter of this petition had already been effectively segregated from the
mother lot even before title was issued in favor of Regalado. It must be noted that 26 years had lapsed from the time
petitioners bought and took possession of the property in 1951 until Regalado procured the issuance of TCT No. 14566.
Additionally, the intervening years between the date of petitioners purchase of the property and 1987 when petitioners filed
the instant complaint, comprise all of 36 years. However, at no instance during this time did respondents or Regalado, for that
matter, question petitioners right over the land in dispute. In the case of Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals,
[16]
we had
occasion to hold that where the transferees of an undivided portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a
definite portion thereof and had not disturbed the same for a period too long to be ignored, the possessor is in a better condition
or right than said transferees. (Potior est condition possidentis). Such undisturbed possession had the effect of a partial partition
of the co-owned property which entitles the possessor to the definite portion which he occupies. Conformably, petitioners are
entitled to the disputed land, having enjoyed uninterrupted possession thereof for a total of 49 years up to the present.
The lower courts reliance on the doctrine that mere possession cannot defeat the right of a holder of a
registered Torrens title over property is misplaced, considering that petitioners were deprived of their dominical rights over the
said lot through fraud and with evident bad faith on the part of Regalado. Failure and intentional omission to disclose the fact
of actual physical possession by another person during registration proceedings constitutes actual fraud. Likewise, it is fraud to
knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person.
[17]
In this case, we are
convinced that Regalado knew of the fact that he did not have a title to the entire lot and could not, therefore, have validl y
registered the same in his name alone because he was aware of petitioners possession of the subject portion as well as the sale
between Salome and Soledad.
That Regalado had notice of the fact that the disputed portion of Lot 162 was under claim of ownership by petitioners and
the latters predecessor is beyond question. Records show that the particular area subject of this case was mortgaged by
Soledad and her husband to Jose Regalado, Sr. as early as May 1, 1947 or one year prior to the alienation of the whole lot in
favor of the latter. Regalado never questioned the ownership of the lot given by Soledad as security for the P400.00 debt and he
must have at least known that Soledad bought the subject portion from Salome since he could not have reasonably accepted the
lot as security for the mortgage debt if such were not the case. By accepting the said portion of Lot 162 as security for the
mortgage obligation, Regalado had in fact recognized Soledads ownership of this definite portion of Lot 162. Regalado could
not have been ignorant of the fact that the disputed portion is being claimed by Soledad and subsequently, by petitioners, since
Regalado even executed a Release of Mortgage on May 4, 1951, three years after the entire property was supposedly sold to
him. It would certainly be illogical for any mortgagee to accept property as security, purchase the mortgaged property and,
thereafter, claim the very same property as his own while the mortgage was still subsisting.
Consequently, respondents are estopped from asserting that they own the subject land in view of the Deed of Mortgage
and Discharge of Mortgage executed between Regalado and petitioners predecessor-in-interest. As petitioners correctly
contend, respondents are barred from making this assertion under the equitable principle of estoppel by deed, whereby a party
to a deed and his privies are precluded from asserting as against the other and his privies any right or title in derogation of the
deed, or from denying the truth of any material fact asserted in it.
[18]
A perusal of the documents evidencing the mortgage
would readily reveal that Soledad, as mortgagor, had declared herself absolute owner of the piece of land now being
litigated. This declaration of fact was accepted by Regalado as mortgagee and accordingly, his heirs cannot now be permitted
to deny it.
Although Regalados certificate of title became indefeasible after the lapse of one year from the date of the decree of
registration, the attendance of fraud in its issuance created an implied trust in favor of petitioners and gave them the right to
seek reconveyance of the parcel wrongfully obtained by the former. An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust
ordinarily prescribes in ten years. But when the right of the true and real owner is recognized, expressly or implicitly such as
when he remains undisturbed in his possession, the said action is imprescriptible, it being in the nature of a suit for quieting of
title.
[19]
Having established by clear and convincing evidence that they are the legal owners of the litigated portion included in
TCT No. 14566, it is only proper that reconveyance of the property be ordered in favor of petitioners. The alleged
incontrovertibility of Regalados title cannot be successfully invoked by respondents because certificates of title merely
confirm or record title already existing and cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner or be used as a shield for
the commission of fraud.
[20]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30438 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The parties are directed to cause a SURVEY for exact determination of their respective portions
in Lot 162-C-6. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14566 is declared CANCELLED and the Register of Deeds of Capiz is
ordered to ISSUE a new title in accordance with said survey, upon finality of this decision.
Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairm
G.R. No. L-44546 January 29, 1988
RUSTICO ADILLE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EMETERIA ASEJO, TEODORICA ASEJO, DOMINGO ASEJO,
JOSEFA ASEJO and SANTIAGO ASEJO, respondents.

SARMIENTO, J .:
In issue herein are property and property rights, a familiar subject of controversy and a wellspring of enormous
conflict that has led not only to protracted legal entanglements but to even more bitter consequences, like strained
relationships and even the forfeiture of lives. It is a question that likewise reflects a tragic commentary on prevailing
social and cultural values and institutions, where, as one observer notes, wealth and its accumulation are the basis
of self-fulfillment and where property is held as sacred as life itself. "It is in the defense of his property," says this
modern thinker, that one "will mobilize his deepest protective devices, and anybody that threatens his possessions
will arouse his most passionate enmity."
1

The task of this Court, however, is not to judge the wisdom of values; the burden of reconstructing the social order
is shouldered by the political leadership-and the people themselves.
The parties have come to this Court for relief and accordingly, our responsibility is to give them that relief pursuant
to the decree of law.
The antecedent facts are quoted from the decision
2
appealed from:
xxx xxx xxx
... [T]he land in question Lot 14694 of Cadastral Survey of Albay located in Legaspi City with an
area of some 11,325 sq. m. originally belonged to one Felisa Alzul as her own private property; she
married twice in her lifetime; the first, with one Bernabe Adille, with whom she had as an only child,
herein defendant Rustico Adille; in her second marriage with one Procopio Asejo, her children were
herein plaintiffs, now, sometime in 1939, said Felisa sold the property in pacto de retro to certain
3rd persons, period of repurchase being 3 years, but she died in 1942 without being able to
redeem and after her death, but during the period of redemption, herein defendant repurchased, by
himself alone, and after that, he executed a deed of extra-judicial partition representing himself to
be the only heir and child of his mother Felisa with the consequence that he was able to secure title
in his name alone also, so that OCT. No. 21137 in the name of his mother was transferred to his
name, that was in 1955; that was why after some efforts of compromise had failed, his half-brothers
and sisters, herein plaintiffs, filed present case for partition with accounting on the position that he
was only a trustee on an implied trust when he redeemed,-and this is the evidence, but as it also
turned out that one of plaintiffs, Emeteria Asejo was occupying a portion, defendant counterclaimed
for her to vacate that,
Well then, after hearing the evidence, trial Judge sustained defendant in his position that he was
and became absolute owner, he was not a trustee, and therefore, dismissed case and also
condemned plaintiff occupant, Emeteria to vacate; it is because of this that plaintiffs have come
here and contend that trial court erred in:
I. ... declaring the defendant absolute owner of the property;
II. ... not ordering the partition of the property; and
III. ... ordering one of the plaintiffs who is in possession of the portion of the property to vacate the
land, p. 1 Appellant's brief.
which can be reduced to simple question of whether or not on the basis of evidence and law, judgment appealed
from should be maintained.
3

xxx xxx xxx
The respondent Court of appeals reversed the trial Court,
4
and ruled for the plaintiffs-appellants, the private
respondents herein. The petitioner now appeals, by way of certiorari, from the Court's decision.
We required the private respondents to file a comment and thereafter, having given due course to the petition,
directed the parties to file their briefs. Only the petitioner, however, filed a brief, and the private respondents having
failed to file one, we declared the case submitted for decision.
The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in
common?
Essentially, it is the petitioner's contention that the property subject of dispute devolved upon him upon the failure of
his co-heirs to join him in its redemption within the period required by law. He relies on the provisions of Article
1515 of the old Civil Article 1613 of the present Code, giving the vendee a retro the right to demand redemption of
the entire property.
There is no merit in this petition.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with aspect to his share alone.
5
While the records show
that the petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make him
the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership.
Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to collect reimbursement from the
remaining co-owners.
6
There is no doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil
Code:
ART. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the
expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the
latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as
may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is
prejudicial to the co-ownership.
The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article
1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by one co-heir or co-
owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to
redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto in his name.
7
But the
provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of
terminating a co-ownership.
Neither does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in securing title over the parcel in his name terminate the
existing co-ownership. While his half-brothers and sisters are, as we said, liable to him for reimbursement as and
for their shares in redemption expenses, he cannot claim exclusive right to the property owned in common.
Registration of property is not a means of acquiring ownership. It operates as a mere notice of existing title, that is,
if there is one.
The petitioner must then be said to be a trustee of the property on behalf of the private respondents. The Civil Code
states:
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of
law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.
We agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that fraud attended the registration of the property. The petitioner's
pretension that he was the sole heir to the land in the affidavit of extrajudicial settlement he executed preliminary to
the registration thereof betrays a clear effort on his part to defraud his brothers and sisters and to exercise sole
dominion over the property. The aforequoted provision therefore applies.
It is the view of the respondent Court that the petitioner, in taking over the property, did so either on behalf of his
co-heirs, in which event, he had constituted himself a negotiorum gestor under Article 2144 of the Civil Code, or for
his exclusive benefit, in which case, he is guilty of fraud, and must act as trustee, the private respondents being the
beneficiaries, under the Article 1456. The evidence, of course, points to the second alternative the petitioner having
asserted claims of exclusive ownership over the property and having acted in fraud of his co-heirs. He cannot
therefore be said to have assume the mere management of the property abandoned by his co-heirs, the situation
Article 2144 of the Code contemplates. In any case, as the respondent Court itself affirms, the result would be the
same whether it is one or the other. The petitioner would remain liable to the Private respondents, his co-heirs.
This Court is not unaware of the well-established principle that prescription bars any demand on property (owned in
common) held by another (co-owner) following the required number of years. In that event, the party in possession
acquires title to the property and the state of co-ownership is ended .
8
In the case at bar, the property was
registered in 1955 by the petitioner, solely in his name, while the claim of the private respondents was presented in
1974. Has prescription then, set in?
We hold in the negative. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been
preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn is subject to certain conditions: (1) a
co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners;
(3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive, and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law.
9

The instant case shows that the petitioner had not complied with these requisites. We are not convinced that he
had repudiated the co-ownership; on the contrary, he had deliberately kept the private respondents in the dark by
feigning sole heirship over the estate under dispute. He cannot therefore be said to have "made known" his efforts
to deny the co-ownership. Moreover, one of the private respondents, Emeteria Asejo, is occupying a portion of the
land up to the present, yet, the petitioner has not taken pains to eject her therefrom. As a matter of fact, he sought
to recover possession of that portion Emeteria is occupying only as a counterclaim, and only after the private
respondents had first sought judicial relief.
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title,
10
but it has likewise been our
holding that the Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud.
11
It is therefore no argument to say that the act of
registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule
that registration operates as a universal notice of title.
For the same reason, we cannot dismiss the private respondents' claims commenced in 1974 over the estate
registered in 1955. While actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes in ten years,
12
reckoned from the date
of the registration of the property,
13
we, as we said, are not prepared to count the period from such a date in this
case. We note the petitioner's sub rosa efforts to get hold of the property exclusively for himself beginning with his
fraudulent misrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit of extrajudicial settlement that he is "the only heir and child of
his mother Feliza with the consequence that he was able to secure title in his name also."
14
Accordingly, we hold
that the right of the private respondents commenced from the time they actually discovered the petitioner's act of
defraudation.
15
According to the respondent Court of Appeals, they "came to know [of it] apparently only during the
progress of the litigation."
16
Hence, prescription is not a bar.
Moreover, and as a rule, prescription is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or
in the answer otherwise it is deemed waived,
17
and here, the petitioner never raised that defense.
18
There are
recognized exceptions to this rule, but the petitioner has not shown why they apply.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the respondent Court of Appeals, the petition is
DENIED. The Decision sought to be reviewed is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED,
NELSON CABALES and G.R. No. 162421
RITO CABALES,
Petitioners,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA,JJ.




COURT OF APPEALS, Promulgated:
JESUS FELIANO and
ANUNCIACION FELIANO,
Respondents. August 31, 2007

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

PUNO, C.J .:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals dated October 27,
2003, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68319 entitled Nelson Cabales and Rito Cabales v. Jesus Feliano and Anunciacion
Feliano, which affirmed with modification the decision
[2]
of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25,
dated August 11, 2000, in Civil Case No. R-2878. The resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February 23, 2004, which
denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration, is likewise herein assailed.

The facts as found by the trial court and the appellate court are well established.

Rufino Cabales died on July 4, 1966 and left a 5,714-square meter parcel of land located in Brgy. Rizal,
Sogod, Southern Leyte, covered by Tax Declaration No. 17270 to his surviving wife Saturnina and children Bonifacio, Albino,
Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito.

On July 26, 1971, brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold the subject property to Dr. Cayetano
Corrompido for P2,000.00, with right to repurchase within eight (8) years. The three (3) siblings divided the proceeds of the
sale among themselves, each getting a share of P666.66.

The following month or on August 18, 1971, Alberto secured a note (vale) from Dr. Corrompido in the amount
of P300.00.

In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner Nelson.

On December 18, 1975, within the eight-year redemption period, Bonifacio and Albino tendered their payment
of P666.66 each to Dr. Corrompido. But Dr. Corrompido only released the document of sale with pacto de retro after
Saturnina paid for the share of her deceased son, Alberto, including his vale of P300.00.

On even date, Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold the subject parcel of
land to respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano forP8,000.00. The Deed of Sale provided in its last paragraph,
thus:

It is hereby declared and understood that the amount of TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
EIGHTY SIX PESOS (P2,286.00) corresponding and belonging to the Heirs of Alberto Cabales and to Rito
Cabales who are still minors upon the execution of this instrument are held
in trust by the VENDEE and to be paid and delivered only to them upon reaching the age of 21.

On December 17, 1985, the Register of Deeds of Southern Leyte issued Original Certificate of Title No. 17035 over the
purchased land in the names of respondents-spouses.

On December 30, 1985, Saturnina and her four (4) children executed an affidavit to the effect that petitioner Nelson
would only receive the amount of P176.34 from respondents-spouses when he reaches the age of 21 considering that Saturnina
paid Dr. Corrompido P966.66 for the obligation of petitioner Nelsons late father Alberto, i.e., P666.66 for his share in the
redemption of the sale with pacto de retro as well as his vale of P300.00.

On July 24, 1986, 24-year old petitioner Rito Cabales acknowledged receipt of the sum of P1,143.00 from respondent
Jesus Feliano, representing the formers share in the proceeds of the sale of subject property.

In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson, then residing in Manila, went back to his fathers hometown in Southern
Leyte. That same year, he learned from his uncle, petitioner Rito, of the sale of subject property. In 1993, he signified his
intention to redeem the subject land during a barangay conciliation process that he initiated.

On January 12, 1995, contending that they could not have sold their respective shares in subject property when they
were minors, petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte, a complaint for redemption of the
subject land plus damages.

In their answer, respondents-spouses maintained that petitioners were estopped from claiming any right over subject
property considering that (1) petitioner Rito had already received the amount corresponding to his share of the proceeds of the
sale of subject property, and (2) that petitioner Nelson failed to consign to the court the total amount of the redemption price
necessary for legal redemption. They prayed for the dismissal of the case on the grounds of laches and prescription.

No amicable settlement was reached at pre-trial. Trial ensued and on August 11, 2000, the trial court ruled against
petitioners. It held that (1) Alberto or, by his death, any of his heirs including petitioner Nelson lost their right to subject land
when not one of them repurchased it from Dr. Corrompido; (2) Saturnina was effectively subrogated to the rights and interests
of Alberto when she paid for Albertos share as well as his obligation to Dr. Corrompido; and (3) petitioner Rito had no more
right to redeem his share to subject property as the sale by Saturnina, his legal guardian pursuant to Section 7, Rule 93 of the
Rules of Court, was perfectly valid; and it was shown that he received his share of the proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986,
when he was 24 years old.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court. It held that the sale by Saturnina of petitioner
Ritos undivided share to the property was unenforceable for lack of authority or legal representation but that the contract was
effectively ratified by petitioner Ritos receipt of the proceeds on July 24, 1986. The appellate court also ruled that petitioner
Nelson is co-owner to the extent of one-seventh (1/7) of subject property as Saturnina was not subrogated to Albertos rights
when she repurchased his share to the property. It further directed petitioner Nelson to pay the estate of the late Saturnina
Cabales the amount of P966.66, representing the amount which the latter paid for the obligation of petitioner Nelsons late
father Alberto. Finally, however, it denied petitioner Nelsons claim for redemption for his failure to tender or consign in court
the redemption money within the period prescribed by law.

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) recognizing
petitioner Nelson Cabales as co-owner of subject land but denied him the right of legal redemption, and (2) not recognizing
petitioner Rito Cabales as co-owner of subject land with similar right of legal redemption.

First, we shall delineate the rights of petitioners to subject land.

When Rufino Cabales died intestate, his wife Saturnina and his six (6) children, Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco,
Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito, survived and succeeded him. Article 996 of the New Civil Code provides that [i]f a
widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as
that of each of the children. Verily, the seven (7) heirs inherited equally on subject property. Petitioner Rito and Alberto,
petitioner Nelsons father, inherited in their own rights and with equal shares as the others.

But before partition of subject land was effected, Alberto died. By operation of law, his rights and obligations to one-
seventh of subject land were transferred to his legal heirs his wife and his son petitioner Nelson.

We shall now discuss the effects of the two (2) sales of subject land to the rights of the parties.
The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido by the brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto was
valid but only as to their pro-indiviso shares to the land. When Alberto died prior to repurchasing his share, his rights and
obligations were transferred to and assumed by his heirs, namely his wife and his son, petitioner Nelson. But the records show
that it was Saturnina, Albertos mother, and not his heirs, who repurchased for him. As correctly ruled by the Court of
Appeals, Saturnina was not subrogated to Albertos or his heirs rights to the property when she repurchased the share.

In Paulmitan v. Court of Appeals,
[3]
we held that a co-owner who redeemed the property in its entirety did not make
her the owner of all of it. The property remained in a condition of co-ownership as the redemption did not provide for a mode
of terminating a co-ownership.
[4]
But the one who redeemed had the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and until
reimbursed, holds a lien upon the subject property for the amount due.
[5]
Necessarily, when Saturnina redeemed for Albertos
heirs who had then acquired his pro-indivisoshare in subject property, it did not vest in her ownership over the pro-
indiviso share she redeemed. But she had the right to be reimbursed for the redemption price and held a lien upon the property
for the amount due until reimbursement. The result is that the heirs of Alberto, i.e., his wife and his son petitioner Nelson,
retained ownership over their pro-indiviso share.

Upon redemption from Dr. Corrompido, the subject property was resold to respondents-spouses by the co-
owners. Petitioners Rito and Nelson were then minors and as indicated in the Deed of Sale, their shares in the proceeds were
held in trust by respondents-spouses to be paid and delivered to them upon reaching the age of majority.

As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable as correctly held by the Court of Appeals. Articles 320
and 326 of the New Civil Code
[6]
state that:
Art. 320. The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property
pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the
father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance.

Art. 326. When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or
mother shall be considered a guardian of the childs property, subject to the duties and obligations of
guardians under the Rules of Court.
In other words, the father, or, in his absence, the mother, is considered legal administrator of the property pertaining to
the child under his or her parental authority without need of giving a bond in case the amount of the property of the child does
not exceed two thousand pesos.
[7]
Corollary to this, Rule 93, Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, applicable to
this case, automatically designates the parent as legal guardian of the child without need of any judicial appointment in case the
latters property does not exceed two thousand pesos,
[8]
thus:
Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. When the property of the child under parental authority is worth two
thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal
guardian x x x x
[9]


Saturnina was clearly petitioner Ritos legal guardian without necessity of court appointment considering that the amount
of his property or one-seventh of subject property wasP1,143.00, which is less than two thousand pesos. However, Rule 96,
Sec. 1
[10]
provides that:
Section 1. To what guardianship shall extend. A guardian appointed shall have the care and custody
of the person of his ward, and the management of his estate, or the management of the estate only, as the case
may be. The guardian of the estate of a nonresident shall have the management of all the estate of the ward
within the Philippines, and no court other than that in which such guardian was appointed shall have
jurisdiction over the guardianship.

Indeed, the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the minors property. It does not include the
power of alienation which needs judicial authority.
[11]
Thus, when Saturnina, as legal guardian of petitioner Rito, sold the
latters pro-indiviso share in subject land, she did not have the legal authority to do so.

Article 1403 of the New Civil Code provides, thus:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or
legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;

x x x x

Accordingly, the contract of sale as to the pro-indiviso share of petitioner Rito was unenforceable. However, when he
acknowledged receipt of the proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito effectively ratified it. This act of ratification
rendered the sale valid and binding as to him.

With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of sale was void. He was a minor at the time of the
sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians with judicial authority to alienate or encumber
his property. It was his mother who was his legal guardian and, if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his
undivided share to the property. She did not. Necessarily, when Saturnina and the others sold the subject property in its
entirety to respondents-spouses, they only sold and transferred title to their pro-indiviso shares and not that part which
pertained to petitioner Nelson and his mother. Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership over their
undivided share of subject property.
[12]


But may petitioners redeem the subject land from respondents-spouses? Articles 1088 and 1623 of the New Civil
Code are pertinent:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or
all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the
sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the
sale by the vendor.

Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty
days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of
sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that
he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.

Clearly, legal redemption may only be exercised by the co-owner or co-owners who did not part with his or their pro-
indiviso share in the property held in common. As demonstrated, the sale as to the undivided share of petitioner Rito became
valid and binding upon his ratification on July 24, 1986. As a result, he lost his right to redeem subject property.

However, as likewise established, the sale as to the undivided share of petitioner Nelson and his mother was not valid
such that they were not divested of their ownership thereto. Necessarily, they may redeem the subject property from
respondents-spouses. But they must do so within thirty days from notice in writing of the sale by their co-owners vendors. In
reckoning this period, we held in Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
[13]
thus:
x x x we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule
that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions
the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause
injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. x x x x
x x x x While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the
right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to the letter that killeth but to
the spirit that vivifieth, to give effect to the lawmakers will.

In requiring written notice, Article 1088 (and Article 1623 for that matter)
[14]
seeks to ensure that the
redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the
30-day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a general rule,
to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to obviate the problem of alleged delays, sometimes
consisting of only a day or two.

In the instant case, the right of redemption was invoked not days but years after the sale was made in 1978. We are
not unmindful of the fact that petitioner Nelson was a minor when the sale was perfected. Nevertheless, the records show that
in 1988, petitioner Nelson, then of majority age, was informed of the sale of subject property. Moreover, it was noted by the
appellate court that petitioner Nelson was likewise informed thereof in 1993 and he signified his intention to redeem subject
property during a barangay conciliation process. But he only filed the complaint for legal redemption and damages on January
12, 1995, certainly more than thirty days from learning about the sale.

In the face of the established facts, petitioner Nelson cannot feign ignorance of the sale of subject property in
1978. To require strict proof of written notice of the sale would be to countenance an obvious false claim of lack of knowledge
thereof, thus commending the letter of the law over its purpose, i.e., the notification of redemptioners.

The Court is satisfied that there was sufficient notice of the sale to petitioner Nelson. The thirty-day redemption
period commenced in 1993, after petitioner Nelson sought thebarangay conciliation process to redeem his
property. By January 12, 1995, when petitioner Nelson filed a complaint for legal redemption and damages, it is clear that the
thirty-day period had already expired.

As in Alonzo, the Court, after due consideration of the facts of the instant case, hereby interprets the law in a way that
will render justice.
[15]


Petitioner Nelson, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, can no longer redeem subject property. But he and his
mother remain co-owners thereof with respondents-spouses. Accordingly, title to subject property must include them.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
of October 27, 2003 and February 23, 2004 are AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Register of Deeds of Southern
Leyte is ORDERED to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 17035 and to issue in lieu thereof a new certificate of title in the
name of respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for the 6/7 portion, and petitioner Nelson Cabales and his mother
for the remaining 1/7 portion, pro indiviso.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46296 September 24, 1991
EPITACIO DELIMA, PACLANO DELIMA, FIDEL DELIMA, VIRGILIO DELIMA, GALILEO DELIMA, JR., BIBIANO
BACUS, OLIMPIO BACUS and PURIFICACION BACUS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GALILEO DELIMA (deceased), substituted by his legal heirs, namely:
FLAVIANA VDA. DE DELIMA, LILY D. ARIAS, HELEN NIADAS, ANTONIO DELIMA, DIONISIO DELIMA,
IRENEA DELIMA, ESTER DELIMA AND FELY DELIMA, respondents.
Gabriel J. Canete for petitioners.
Emilio Lumontad, Jr. for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J .:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court's judgment
which declared as null and void the certificate of title in the name of respondents' predecessor and which ordered
the partition of the disputed lot among the parties as co-owners.
The antecedent facts of the case as found both by the respondent appellate court and by the trial court are as
follows:
During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu by sale
on installments from the government. Lino Delima later died in 1921 leaving as his only heirs three brothers and a
sister namely: Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima. After his death, TCT No. 2744 of
the property in question was issued on August 3, 1953 in the name of the Legal Heirs of Lino Delima, deceased,
represented by Galileo Delima.
On September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now substituted by respondents, executed an affidavit of "Extra-judicial
Declaration of Heirs." Based on this affidavit, TCT No. 2744 was cancelled and TCT No. 3009 was issued on
February 4,1954 in the name of Galileo Delima alone to the exclusion of the other heirs.
Galileo Delima declared the lot in his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes thereon from 1954 to 1965.
On February 29, 1968, petitioners, who are the surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita Delima, filed with the Court of
First Instance of Cebu (now Regional Trial Court) an action for reconveyance and/or partition of property and for the
annulment of TCT No. 3009 with damages against their uncles Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima,. Vicente Delima
was joined as party defendant by the petitioners for his refusal to join the latter in their action.
On January 16, 1970, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners, the dispositive portion of which
states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the following are the declared owners of Lot
No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate presently covered by transfer Certificate of
Title No. 3009, each sharing a pro-indiviso share of one-fourth;
1) Vicente Delima (one-fourth)
2) Heirs of Juanita Delima, namely: Bibiano Bacus, Olimpio Bacus and Purificacion Bacus (on-
fourth);
3) Heirs of Eulalio Delima, namely Epitacio, Pagano, Fidel, Virgilio and Galileo Jr., all surnamed
Delima (one-fourth); and
4) The Heirs of Galileo Delima, namely Flaviana Vda. de Delima, Lily D. Arias, Helen Niadas and
Dionisio, Antonio, Eotu Irenea, and Fely, all surnamed Delima (one-fourth).
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3009 is declared null and void and the Register of Deeds of Cebu is
ordered to cancel the same and issue in lieu thereof another title with the above heirs as pro-
indiviso owners.
After the payment of taxes paid by Galileo Delima since 1958, the heirs of Galileo Delima are
ordered to turn a over to the other heirs their respective shares of the fruits of the lot in question
computed at P170.00 per year up to the present time with legal (interest).
Within sixty (60) days from receipt of this decision the parties are ordered to petition the lot in
question and the defendants are directed to immediately turn over possession of the shares here
awarded to the respective heirs.
Defendants are condemned to pay the costs of the suit.
The counterclaim is dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 54-55, Rollo)
Not satisfied with the decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May 19, 1977, respondent
appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and upheld the claim of Galileo Delima that all the other brothers
and sister of Lino Delima, namely Eulalio, Juanita and Vicente, had already relinquished and waived their rights to
the property in his favor, considering that he (Galileo Delima) alone paid the remaining balance of the purchase
price of the lot and the realty taxes thereon (p. 26, Rollo).
Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioners alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:
1) In not holding that the right of a co-heir to demand partition of inheritance is imprescriptible. If it
does, the defenses of prescription and laches have already been waived.
2) In disregarding the evidence of the petitioners.(p.13, Rollo)
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not petitioners' action for partition is already barred by the
statutory period provided by law which shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive
prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their shares in the disputed property. Article 494 of the Civil Code
expressly provides:
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand
at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding
ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long
as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the others, but will be held to benefit all.
It is understood that the co-owner or co-heir who is in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in
representation of his co-owners or co-heirs, if, as such owner, he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with
the obligation of delivering it to his co-owners or co-heirs, is under the same situation as a depository, a lessee or a
trustee (Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil, 857; Segura v. Segura, No. L-29320, September 19, 1988, 165 SCRA 368).
Thus, an action to compel partition may be filed at any time by any of the co-owners against the actual possessor.
In other words, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership (Del Blanco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. 72694,
December 1, 1987, 156 SCRA 55).
However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the
properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of
ownership (De Castro v. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23; Bargayo v. Camumot, supra; De los Santos v. Santa Teresa, 44 Phil.
811). In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or applied when one of
the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by
prescription.
It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a trustee. In order that such possession is considered
adverse to the cestui que trust amounting to a repudiation of the co-ownership, the following elements must concur:
1) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; 2) that such
positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust; and 3) that the evidence thereon should
be clear and conclusive (Valdez v. Olorga, No. L-22571, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 71; Pangan v. Court of Appeals,
No. L-39299, October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA 375).
We have held that when a co-owner of the property in question executed a deed of partition and on the strength
thereof obtained the cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and the issuance of a new one
wherein he appears as the new owner of the property, thereby in effect denying or repudiating the ownership of the
other co-owners over their shares, the statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted by
the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and of their rights thereunder (Castillo v. Court
of Appeals, No. L-18046, March 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 549). Since an action for reconveyance of land based on
implied or constructive trust prescribes after ten (10) years, it is from the date of the issuance of such title that the
effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is counted (Jaramil v. Court of Appeals,
No. L-31858, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 420).
Evidence shows that TCT No. 2744 in the name of the legal heirs of Lino Delima, represented by Galileo Delima,
was cancelled by virtue of an affidavit executed by Galileo Delima and that on February 4, 1954, Galileo Delima
obtained the issuance of a new title in Ms name numbered TCT No. 3009 to the exclusion of his co-heirs. The
issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership, and the lapse of
ten (10) years of adverse possession by Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in him by
prescription. As the certificate of title was notice to the whole world of his exclusive title to the land, such rejection
was binding on the other heirs and started as against them the period of prescription. Hence, when petitioners filed
their action for reconveyance and/or to compel partition on February 29, 1968, such action was already barred by
prescription. Whatever claims the other co-heirs could have validly asserted before can no longer be invoked by
them at this time.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 19,
1977 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992
MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and PAULINA
MARIATEGUI,respondents.
Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.
Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of the late Maria del Rosario Mariategui.
Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.

BIDIN, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated December 24, 1980 in CA-
G.R. No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. v. Maria del Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the judgment
of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII ** at Pasig, Metro Manila.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 8). During his lifetime,
Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8,
1904, he begot four (4) children, namely: Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and
was survived by her children named Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed
Espina. Ireneo also died and left a son named Ruperto. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a
daughter named Cresenciana who was born on May 8, 1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They had three children,
namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February 16, 1931 and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938.
Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid).
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried
(Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These properties are described in the complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66,
1346 and 156 of the Muntinglupa Estate (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39).
On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely, Maria del Rosario, Urbana,
Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico,
all surnamed Espina, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No.
163 of the Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary registration proceedings filed
by the adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land registration court issued a decree ordering the registration of
the lot. Thus, on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name of the above-mentioned heirs. Subsequently,
the registered owners caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which separate
transfer certificates of title were issued to the respective parties (Rollo, ibid).
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and Paulina) filed with
the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were
owned by their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs,
they (children of the third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for partition of
the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967
(Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded
in the complaint as unwilling defendants as they would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs although they
acknowledged the status and rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to the partition of the parcels of land as well as the
accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8; Record on Appeal, p. 4).
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended Record on Appeal, p. 13).
Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and prescription. They
specifically contended that the complaint was one for recognition of natural children. On August 14, 1974, the
motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court, in an order the dispositive portion of which reads:
It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of the Civil Code cited by counsel
for the defendants are of erroneous application to this case. The motion to dismiss is therefore
denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).
However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners' counterclaim were dismissed by the trial court,
in its decision stating thus:
The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or recognition of their continuous
enjoyment and possession of status of children of their supposed father. The evidence fails to
sustain either premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be sustained. (Ibid, Rollo, pp. 67-68)
The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court committed an error ". . . in
not finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in
holding (that) they (appellants) are not legitimate children of their said parents, thereby divesting them of their
inheritance . . . " (Rollo, pp. 14-15).
On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the children and descendants of
Lupo Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (children of the third marriage) as entitled to equal
shares in the estate of Lupo Mariategui; directing the adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real properties
who eventually acquired transfer certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of reconveyance in favor, and for the
shares, of Jacinto, Julian and Paulina provided rights of innocent third persons are not prejudiced otherwise the
said adjudicatees shall reimburse the said heirs the fair market value of their shares; and directing all the parties to
submit to the lower court a project of partition in the net estate of Lupo Mariategui after payment of taxes, other
government charges and outstanding legal obligations.
The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition which was given due course by the court on December 7, 1981.
The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not prescription barred private respondents'
right to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, and (b) whether or not the private respondents, who
belatedly filed the action for recognition, were able to prove their successional rights over said estate. The
resolution of these issues hinges, however, on the resolution of the preliminary matter, i.e., the nature of the
complaint filed by the private respondents.
The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of the deceased spouses Lupo
Mariategui . . . and Felipa Velasco"; that "during his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui had repeatedly acknowledged and
confirmed plaintiffs as his children and the latter, in turn, have continuously enjoyed such status since their birth";
and "on the basis of their relationship to the deceased Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with the law on intestate
succession, plaintiffs are entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing estate (Record on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed,
among others, that plaintiffs be declared as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication in favor of
plaintiffs their lawful shares in the estate of the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).
A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the action is principally one of partition.
The allegation with respect to the status of the private respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights
in the estate of the deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule that the nature of an
action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint constituting the cause of action (Republic vs.
Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]).
It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted under the law, it does not
characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs' action, and the relief to which plaintiff is entitled based on the facts
alleged by him in his complaint, although it is not the relief demanded, is what determines the nature of the action
(1 Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, the
Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based
on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father was still living,
he was able to mention to (him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of
Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be
such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert
these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage,
provided all requisites for its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 [1984]).
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws
presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is
legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life
(Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v.
Workmen's Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978]; Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes
v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]).
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the following rationale:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in Alavado vs. City
Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]).
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such relationship is not denied nor
contradicted, the presumption of their being married must be admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of
Tacloban,supra).
The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven. However, considering the
effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the case at bar must be decided under a new if not entirely
dissimilar set of rules because the parties have been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, there are only
two classes of children legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among various types of illegitimate
children have been eliminated (Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child.
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of
birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced
before the lower court. In the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have
presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of
children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in substance as to certain dates
and names of relatives with whom their family resided, these are but minor details. The nagging fact is that for a
considerable length of time and despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the private respondents and Lupo lived
together until Lupo's death in 1953. It should be noted that even the trial court mentioned in its decision the
admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto,
Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay pawang mga kapatid ko sa
ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents are legitimate children and
heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition
is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the
filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or
impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie except
when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156
SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear
repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342
[1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco
vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for
declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved
(Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed the extrajudicial partition
excluding the private respondents and registered the properties in their own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20).
However, no valid repudiation was made by petitioners to the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming
petitioners' registration of the subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not
yet set in when private respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552
[1990]).
In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands, petitioners, except the unwilling
defendants in the lower court, failed and refused to acknowledge and convey their lawful shares in the estate of
their father (Record on Appeal, p. 6). This allegation, though denied by the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14),
was never successfully refuted by them. Put differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed knowledge of their
relationship to private respondents who are therefore their co-heirs, petitioners fraudulently withheld private
respondent's share in the estate of Lupo Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he had been
inquiring from petitioner Maria del Rosario about their (respondents) share in the property left by their deceased
father and had been assured by the latter (Maria del Rosario) not to worry because they will get some shares. As a
matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto constructed a house where he now resides on Lot No. 163 without any
complaint from petitioners.
Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid repudiation of the co-
ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]), the Court held:
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by
repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1)
a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to
the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in
possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the
period required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has likewise
been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument
to say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one,
notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as a universal notice of title.
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs prescription can only be
deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation
(Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because
private respondents commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that petitioners had registered
in their names the lots involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 24, 1980
is Affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
JAMES ESTRELLER, EDUARDO G.R. No. 170264
CULIANAN, GREG CARROS,
RAQUEL YEE, JOSELITO
PENILLA, LORNA DOTE,
CRESENCIANA CLEOPAS, Present:
TRINIDAD TEVES, SONIA
PENILLA, ANITA GOMINTONG, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
CHING DIONESIO, MARIBEL Chairperson,
MANALO, DESIRES HUERTO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
and RAYMUNDO CORTES, CHICO-NAZARIO,
Petitioners, NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
- versus -

LUIS MIGUEL YSMAEL and
CRISTETA L. SANTOS-ALVAREZ, Promulgated:
Respondents.

March 13, 2009

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x


D E C I S I O N


AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:

In the present petition, the Court finds occasion to reassert the legal precepts that a co-owner may file an action for recovery of
possession without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs since the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all;
and that Section 2 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 2016, reinforced by P.D. No. 1517, which prohibits the eviction of qualified
tenants/occupants, extends only to landless urban families who are rightful occupants of the land and its structures, and does not include those
whose presence on the land is merely tolerated and without the benefit of contract, those who enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose
possession is under litigation.

Respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 216, Quezon City, a case for Recovery of Possession against
petitioners, claiming ownership of the property subject of dispute located in E. Rodriguez Avenue and La Filonila Streets in Quezon City, by
virtue of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 41698 issued by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on June 10, 1958. Respondents alleged
that on various dates in 1973, petitioners entered the property through stealth and strategy and had since occupied the same; and despite demands
made in March 1993, petitioners refused to vacate the premises, prompting respondents to file the action.
[1]


Petitioners denied respondents' allegations. According to them, respondent Luis Miguel Ysmael (Ysmael) had no personality to file the
suit since he only owned a small portion of the property, while respondent Cristeta Santos-Alvarez (Alvarez) did not appear to be a registered
owner thereof. Petitioners also contended that their occupation of the property was lawful, having leased the same from the Magdalena Estate,
and later on from Alvarez. Lastly, petitioners asserted that the property has already been proclaimed by the Quezon City Government as an Area
for Priority Development under P. D. Nos. 1517 and 2016, which prohibits the eviction of lawful tenants and demolition of their homes.
[2]


After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated September 15, 2000 in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs Luis Miguel Ysmael and
Cristeta L. Santos-Alvarez and against defendants ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights under them to
immediately vacate the subject property and peacefully surrender the same to the plaintiffs.

Defendants are likewise ordered to pay plaintiffs the following:

1. The amount of P400.00 each per month from the date of extra-judicial demand until the subject
property is surrendered to plaintiffs as reasonable compensation for the use and possession thereof;
2. The amount of P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
3. The amount of P20,000.00 by way of attorney's fees and litigation expenses;
4. Cost of suit.

Corollarily, the counter-claims of defendants are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
[3]


Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which, in a Decision
[4]
dated March 14, 2005, dismissed their appeal and
affirmed in toto the RTC Decision.

Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on the following grounds:

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT RESPONDENTS YSMAEL
AND ALVAREZ ARE BOTH REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST WHO WOULD BE BENEFITED OR INJURED
BY THE JUDGMENT OR THE PARTY ENTITLED TO THE AVAILS OF THE SUIT.

II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER AND DECIDE THE RELEVANT
QUESTIONS AND ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONERS IN ROMAN NUMERALS II, III AND IV OF
THEIR DISCUSSIONS AND ARGUMENTS IN THE APPELLANTS BRIEF WHICH ARE HEREUNTO COPIED
OR REPRODUCED.
[5]


The present petition merely reiterates the issues raised and settled by the RTC and the CA. On this score, it is well to emphasize the
rule that the Courts role in a petition under Rule 45 is limited to reviewing or reversing errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate
court. Factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are conclusive on the parties. Since such findings are generally not
reviewable, this Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below, unless
the factual findings complained of are devoid of support from the evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts.
[6]


The Court then finds that the petition is without merit.

Respondents are real parties-in-interest in the suit below and may, therefore, commence the complaint for accion publiciana. On the
part of Ysmael, he is a named co-owner of the subject property under TCT No. 41698, together with Julian Felipe Ysmael, Teresa Ysmael, and
Ramon Ysmael.
[7]
For her part, Alvarez was a buyer of a portion of the property, as confirmed in several documents, namely: (1) Decision dated
August 30, 1974 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 9 (IX), in Civil Case No. Q-8426, which was based on a
Compromise Agreement between Alvarez and the Magdalena Estate;
[8]
(2) an unnotarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 1985 executed
between the Ysmael Heirs and Alvarez;
[9]
and (3) a notarized Memorandum of Agreement between the Ysmael Heirs and Alvarez executed
on May 2, 1991.
[10]


Recently, in Wee v. De Castro,
[11]
the Court, citing Article 487 of the Civil Code, reasserted the rule that any one of the co-owners may
bring any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-
owners. The Court also stressed that Article 487 covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession, i.e., forcible entry and unlawful
detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion), thus:

In the more recent case of Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman,this Court declared that a co-owner is not even a
necessary party to an action for ejectment, for complete relief can be afforded even in his absence, thus:

In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However,
pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an
action, any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-
owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an
indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even
necessary parties, for a complete relief can be afforded in the suit even without their participation, since
the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners persistently question the validity of the transfer of ownership to Alvarez. They insist that Alvarez failed to establish any
right over the property since the Deed of Absolute Sale was not inscribed on TCT No. 41698. Interestingly, petitioners debunked their own
argument when they themselves claimed in their Answer with Counter-claim that they derived their right to occupy the property from a lease
agreement with, first, the Magdalena Estate, and thereafter, Alvarez herself.
[12]
More importantly, the fact that the sale was not annotated or
inscribed on TCT No. 41698 does not make it any less valid. A contract of sale has the force of law between the contracting parties and they are
expected to abide, in good faith, by their respective contractual commitments. Article 1358 of the Civil Code which requires the embodiment of
certain contracts in a public instrument, is only for convenience; and registration of the instrument only adversely affects third parties, and non-
compliance therewith does not adversely affect the validity of the contract or the contractual rights and obligations of the parties thereunder.
[13]


Petitioners further contend that the property subject of the Deed of Absolute Sale Lot 6, Block 4 of Subd. Plan Psd No. 33309 is
different from that being claimed in this case, which are Lots 2 and 3. They claim that there exists another title covering the subject property, i.e.,
TCT No. 41698 in the names of Victoria M. Panganiban and Teodoro M. Panganiban.

Notably, TCT No. 41698 in the name of the Ysmael Heirs covers several parcels of land under Subd. Plan Psd No. 33309. These
include: Lot 2, Block 4; Lot 3, Block 4; and Lot 6, Block 4, each of which contains 1,000 square meters. In the Decision dated August 30,
1974 rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 9, in Civil Case No. Q-8426, the ownership of 200 square meters of Lot 2, Block 4; 250
square meters of Lot 3, Block 4; and the full 1,000 square meters of Lot 6, Block 4, was conferred on Alvarez. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated
May 1985 was later executed by the Ysmael Heirs in favor of Alvarez, but it covered only Lot 6, Block 4. Nevertheless, a Memorandum of
Agreement dated May 2, 1991 was subsequently entered into by the Ysmael Heirs and Alvarez, whereby all three apportioned parcels of land
allocated to Alvarez under the RTC Decision dated August 30, 1974, were finally sold, transferred and conveyed to her. Evidently, while the title
was yet to be registered in the name of Alvarez, for all intents and purposes, however, the subject property was already owned by her. The
Ysmael Heirs are merely naked owners of the property, while Alvarez is already the beneficial or equitable owner thereof; and the right to the
gains, rewards and advantages generated by the property pertains to her.

The existence of a title in the same TCT No. 41698, this time in the names of Victoria M. Panganiban and Teodoro M. Panganiban,
was adequately explained by the Certification of the Register of Deeds dated March 1, 1994, and which reads:

At the instance of RUY ALBERTO S. RONDAIN, I, SAMUEL C. CLEOFE, Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, do hereby certify that TCT No. 41698, covering Lot 19, Blk. 8 of the cons.-subd. plan Pos-817, with an area of Three
Hundred Seventy Five (375) Square Meters, registered in the name of VICTORIA M. PANGANIBAN; and TEODORO
M. PANGANIBAN, married to Elizabeth G. Panganiban, issued on February 8, 1991, is existing and on file in this Registry.

This is to certify further that TCT No. 41698 presented by Ruy Alberto S. Rondain covering Lot 3, Blk. 2 of the
subd. Plan PSD-3309, with an area of Nine Hundred Ninety Six (996) Square Meters, issued on June 10, 1958 and
registered in the name of JUAN FELIPE YSMAEL, TERESA YSMAEL, RAMON YSMAEL, LUIS MIGUEL
YSMAEL, which is also an existing title is different and distinct from each other inasmuch as they cover different
Lots and Plans.

That it is further certified that the similarity in the title numbers is due to the fact that after the fire of June 11,
1988, the Quezon City Registry issued new title numbers beginning with TCT No. 1.
[14]
(Emphasis supplied)

Finally, petitioners' claim that they are entitled to the protection against eviction and demolition afforded by P.D. Nos.
2016,
[15]
1517,
[16]
and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7279,
[17]
is not plausible.

Section 6 of P.D. No. 1517 grants preferential rights to landless tenants/occupants to acquire land within urban land reform areas, while
Section 2 of P.D. No. 2016 prohibits the eviction of qualified tenants/ occupants.

In Dimaculangan v. Casalla,
[18]
the Court was emphatic in ruling that the protective mantle of P.D. No. 1517 and P.D. No. 2016
extends only to landless urban families who meet these qualifications: a) they are tenants as defined under Section 3(f) of P.D. No. 1517; b) they
built a home on the land they are leasing or occupying; c) the land they are leasing or occupying is within an Area for Priority Development and
Urban Land Reform Zone; and d) they have resided on the land continuously for the last 10 years or more.

Section 3(f) of P.D. No. No. 1517 defines the term "tenant" covered by the said decree as the rightful occupant of land and its
structures, but does not include those whose presence on the land is merely tolerated and without the benefit of contract, those who enter the land
by force or deceit, or those whose possession is under litigation. It has already been ruled that occupants of the land whose presence therein is
devoid of any legal authority, or those whose contracts of lease were already terminated or had already expired, or whose possession is under
litigation, are not considered "tenants" under the Section 3(f).
[19]


Petitioners claim that they are lawful lessees of the property. However, they failed to prove any lease relationship or, at the very least,
show with whom they entered the lease contract. Respondents, on the other hand, were able to prove their right to enjoy possession of the
property. Thus, petitioners, whose occupation of the subject property by mere tolerance has been terminated by respondents, clearly do not
qualify as tenants covered by these social legislations.

Finally, petitioners failed to demonstrate that they qualify for coverage under R. A. No. 7279 or the Urban Development and Housing
Act of 1992.

R. A. No. 7279 provides for the procedure to be undertaken by the concerned local governments in the urban land development
process, to wit: conduct an inventory of all lands and improvements within their respective localities, and in coordination with the National
Housing Authority, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, the National Mapping Resource Information Authority, and the Land
Management Bureau; identify lands for socialized housing and resettlement areas for the immediate and future needs of the underprivileged and
homeless in the urban areas; acquire the lands; and dispose of said lands to the beneficiaries of the program.
[20]
While there is a Certification that
the area bounded by E. Rodriguez, Victoria Avenue, San Juan River and 10
th
Street of Barangay. Damayang Lagi, Quezon City is included in
the list of Areas for Priority Development under Presidential Proclamation No. 1967,
[21]
there is no showing that the property has already been
acquired by the local government for this purpose; or that petitioners have duly qualified as beneficiaries.

All told, the Court finds no reason to grant the present petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated March 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 134329 January 19, 2000
VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SILVERIO PADA, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J .:
The victory
1
of petitioner spouses Ricardo and Verona Kilario in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
2
in an ejectment
suit
3
filed against them by private respondent Silverio Pada, was foiled by its reversal
4
by the Regional Trial
Court
5
on appeal. They elevated their cause
6
to respondent Court of Appeals
7
which, however, promulgated a
Decision
8
on May 20, 1998, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court.
The following facts are undisputed:
One Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador, Higino, Valentina and Ruperta. He
died intestate. His estate included a parcel of land of residential and coconut land located at Poblacion, Matalom,
Leyte, denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 5581 with an area of 1,301.92 square meters. It is the northern portion of
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is the subject of the instant controversy.
During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained permission from him to build a house
on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581. When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the
house together with his eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's children, has been living in
that house since 1960.
Sometime in May, 1951, the heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial partition of his estate. For this
purpose, they executed a private document which they, however, never registered in the Office of the Registrar of
Deeds of Leyte.
At the execution of the extra-judicial partition, Ananias was himself present while his other brothers were
represented by their children. Their sisters, Valentina and Ruperta, both died without any issue. Marciano was
represented by his daughter, Maria; Amador was represented by his daughter, Concordia; and Higina was
represented by his son, Silverio who is the private respondent in this case. It was to both Ananias and Marciano,
represented by his daughter, Maria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581 was allocated during the said partition. When
Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita, succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property.
On June 14, 1978, Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his father, Ananias, as co-owner of
Cadastral Lot No. 5881.
On November 17, 1993, it was the turn of Maria Pada to sell the co-ownership right of his father, Marciano. Private
respondent, who is the first cousin of Maria, was the buyer.
Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No.
5581 so his family can utilize the said area. They went through a series of meetings with the barangay officials
concerned for the purpose of amicable settlement, but all earnest efforts toward that end, failed.
On June 26, 1995, private respondent filed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom, Leyte, a complaint for
ejectment with prayer for damages against petitioner spouses.
On July 24, 1995, the heirs of Amador Pada, namely, Esperanza Pada-Pavo, Concordia Pada-Bartolome, and
Angelito Pada, executed a Deed of Donation
9
transferring to petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, their respective shares
as co-owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.
On February 12, 1996, petitioner spouses filed their Answer averring that the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No.
5581 had already been donated to them by the heirs of Amador Pada. They contended that the extra-judicial
partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was invalid and ineffectual since no special power of
attorney was executed by either Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor of their respective children who represented
them in the extra-judicial partition. Moreover, it was effectuated only through a private document that was never
registered in the office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner spouses. It made the following findings:
After a careful study of the evidence submitted by both parties, the court finds that the evidence adduced
by plaintiff failed to establish his ownership over . . . Cadastral Lot No. 5581 . . . while defendants has [sic]
successfully proved by preponderance of evidence that said property is still under a community of
ownership among the heirs of the late Jacinto Pada who died intestate. If there was some truth that
Marciano Pada and Ananias Pada has [sic] been adjudicated jointly of [sic] the above-described residential
property . . . as their share of the inheritance on the basis of the alleged extra judicial settlement, how come
that since 1951, the date of partition, the share of the late Marciano Pada was not transferred in the name
of his heirs, one of them Maria Pada-Pavo and still remain [sic] in the name of Jacinto Pada up to the
present while the part pertaining to the share of Ananias Pada was easily transferred in the name of his
heirs . . ..
The alleged extra judicial settlement was made in private writing and the genuineness and due execution of
said document was assailed as doubtful and it appears that most of the heirs were not participants and
signatories of said settlement, and there was lack of special power of attorney to [sic] those who claimed to
have represented their co-heirs in the participation [sic] and signing of the said extra judicial statement.
Defendants were already occupying the northern portion of the above-described property long before the
sale of said property on November 17, 1993 was executed between Maria Pada-Pavo, as vendor and the
plaintiff, as vendee. They are in possession of said portion of the above-described property since the year
1960 with the consent of some of the heirs of Jacinto Pada and up to the [sic] present some of the heirs of
Jacinto Pada has [sic] donated . . . their share of [sic] the above-described property to them, virtually
converting defendants' standing as co-owners of the land under controversy. Thus, defendants as co-
owners became the undivided owners of the whole estate . . . . As co-owners of . . . Cadastral Lot No. 5581
. . . their possession in the northern portion is being [sic] lawful.
10

From the foregoing decision, private respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court. On November 6, 1997, it
rendered a judgment of reversal. It held:
. . . [T]he said conveyances executed by Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo were never questioned or
assailed by their co-heirs for more than 40 years, thereby lending credence on [sic] the fact that the two
vendors were indeed legal and lawful owners of properties ceded or sold. . . . At any rate, granting that the
co-heirs of Juanita Pada and Maria Pada Pavo have some interests on the very lot assigned to Marciano
and Ananias, nevertheless, said interests had long been sadly lost by prescription, if not laches or estoppel.
It is true that an action for partition does not prescribe, as a general rule, but this doctrine of
imprescriptibility cannot be invoked when one of the heirs possessed the property as an owner and for a
period sufficient to acquire it by prescription because from the moment one of the co-heirs claim [sic] that
he is the absolute owner and denies the rest their share of the community property, the question then
involved is no longer one for partition but of ownership. . . . Since [sic] 1951 up to 1993 covers a period of
42 long years. Clearly, whatever right some of the co-heirs may have, was long extinguished by laches,
estoppel or prescription.
x x x x x x x x x
. . . [T]he deed of donation executed by the Heirs of Amador Pada, a brother of Marciano Pada, took place
only during the inception of the case or after the lapse of more than 40 years reckoned from the time the
extrajudicial partition was made in 1951. Therefore, said donation is illegal and invalid [sic] the donors,
among others, were absolutely bereft of any right in donating the very property in question.
11

The dispositive portion of the decision of the Regional Trial Court reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, a judgment is hereby rendered, reversing the judgment earlier promulgated by the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Matalom, Leyte, [sic] consequently, defendants-appellees are hereby
ordered:
1. To vacate the premises in issue and return peaceful possession to the appellant, being the lawful
possessor in concept of owner;
2. To remove their house at their expense unless appellant exercises the option of acquiring the same, in
which case the pertinent provisions of the New Civil Code has to be applied;
3. Ordering the defendants-appellees to pay monthly rental for their occupancy and use of the portion of
the land in question in the sum of P100.00 commencing on June 26, 1995 when the case was filed and
until the termination of the present case;
4. Ordering the defendants to pay to the appellant the sum of P5,000.00 as moral damages and the further
sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees;
5. Taxing defendants to pay the costs of suit.
12

Petitioners filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the foregoing decision of the Regional Trial Court.
On May 20, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing said petition. It explained:
Well-settled is the rule that in an ejectment suit, the only issue is possession de facto or physical or
material possession and not de jure. Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings,
the court may pass upon such issue but only to determine the question of possession, specially if the
former is inseparably linked with the latter. It cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownership, such issue
being inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of possession . . . .
Private respondent Silverio Pada anchors his claim to the portion of the land possessed by petitioners on
the Deed of Sale executed in his favor by vendor Maria Pada-Pavo, a daughter of Marciano, son of Jacinto
Pada who was the registered owner of the subject lot. The right of vendee Maria Pada to sell the property
was derived from the extra-judicial partition executed in May 1951 among the heirs of Jacinto Pada, which
was written in a Bisayan dialect signed by the heirs, wherein the subject land was adjudicated to Marciano,
Maria Pavo's father, and Ananias Pada. Although the authenticity and genuineness of the extra-judicial
partition is now being questioned by the heirs of Amador Pada, no action was ever previously filed in court
to question the validity of such partition.1wphi1.nt
Notably, petitioners in their petition admitted among the antecedent facts that Maria Pavo is one of the co-
owners of the property originally owned by Jacinto Pada . . . and that the disputed lot was adjudicated to
Marciano (father of Maria Pavo) and Ananias, and upon the death of Marciano and Ananias, their heirs
took possession of said lot, i.e. Maria Pavo the vendor for Marciano's share and Juanita for Ananias' share
. . . . Moreover, petitioners do not dispute the findings of the respondent court that during the cadastral
survey of Matalom, Leyte, the share of Maria Pada Pavo was denominated as Lot No. 5581, while the
share of Juanita Pada was denominated as Lot No. 6047, and that both Maria Pada Pavo and Juanita were
in possession of their respective hereditary shares. Further, petitioners in their Answer admitted that they
have been occupying a portion of Lot No. 5581, now in dispute without paying any rental owing to the
liberality of the plaintiff . . . . Petitioners cannot now impugn the aforestated extrajudicial partition executed
by the heirs in 1951. As owner and possessor of the disputed property, Maria Pada, and her vendee,
private respondent, is entitled to possession. A voluntary division of the estate of the deceased by the heirs
among themselves is conclusive and confers upon said heirs exclusive ownership of the respective
portions assigned to them . . ..
The equally belated donation of a portion of the property in dispute made by the heirs of Amador Pada,
namely, Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, in favor of petitioner Verona Pada is a futile attempt to confer
upon the latter the status of co-owner, since the donors had no interest nor right to transfer. . . . This
gesture appears to be a mere afterthought to help petitioners to prolong their stay in the premises.
Furthermore, the respondent court correctly pointed out that the equitable principle of laches and estoppel
come into play due to the donors' failure to assert their claims and alleged ownership for more than forty
(40) years . . . . Accordingly, private respondent was subrogated to the rights of the vendor over Lot No.
5581 which include [sic] the portion occupied by petitioners.
13

Petitioner spouses filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing decision.
On June 16, 1998, respondent Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying said motion.
Hence this petition raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONERS, AS CO-
OWNERS, CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM THE PREMISES CONSIDERING THAT THE HEIRS OF
JACINTO PADA DONATED TO THEM THEIR UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
II.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT WHAT MARIA PADA SOLD WAS
HER UNDIVIDED SHARE IN THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE BUILDERS IN GOOD FAITH.
14

There is no merit to the instant petition.
First. We hold that the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made in 1951 is valid,
albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be
registered in order to be valid.
15
The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a partition be
put in a public document and registered, has for its purpose the protection of creditors and the heirs themselves
against tardy claims.
16
The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the
intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not undermined when no creditors are
involved.
17
Without creditors to take into consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an
agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by the rules from
which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred that a writing or other formality is essential for the partition to be
valid.
18
The partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document so as to be effective as
regards the heirs that participated therein.
19
The requirement of Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have
for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property,
must appear in a public instrument, is only for convenience, non-compliance with which does not affect the validity
or enforceability of the acts of the parties as among themselves.
20
And neither does the Statute of Frauds under
Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real
property, considering that it involves not a transfer of property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or
ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives
the inheritance.
21
The 1951 extrajudicial partition of Jacinto Pada's estate being legal and effective as among his
heirs, Juanita and Maria Pada validly transferred their ownership rights over Cadastral Lot No. 5581 to Engr.
Paderes and private respondent, respectively.
22

Second. The extrajudicial partition which the heirs of Jacinto Pada executed voluntarily and spontaneously in 1951
has produced a legal status.
23
When they discussed and agreed on the division of the estate Jacinto Pada, it is
presumed that they did so in furtherance of their mutual interests. As such, their division is conclusive, unless and
until it is shown that there were debts existing against the estate which had not been paid.
24
No showing, however,
has been made of any unpaid charges against the estate of Jacinto Pada. Thus, there is no reason why the heirs
should not be bound by their voluntary acts.
The belated act of Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito, who are the heirs of Amador Pada, of donating the subject
property to petitioners after forty four (44) years of never having disputed the validity of the 1951 extrajudicial
partition that allocated the subject property to Marciano and Ananias, produced no legal effect. In the said partition,
what was allocated to Amador Pada was not the subject property which was a parcel of residential land in Sto.
Nino, Matalom, Leyte, but rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut land in the interior of Sto. Nino St., Sabang,
Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom, Leyte. The donation made by his
heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus, is void for they were not the owners thereof. At any rate it is too
late in the day for the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate the legal effects of the 1951 extrajudicial partition as
prescription and laches have equally set in.
Third. Petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of Jacinto Pada
after explicitly admitting in their Answer that they had been occupying the subject property since 1960 without ever
paying any rental as they only relied on the liberality and tolerance of the Pada family.
25
Their admissions are
evidence of a high order and bind them insofar as the character of their possession of the subject property is
concerned.
Considering that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer tolerance of its owners, they knew
that their occupation of the premises may be terminated any time. Persons who occupy the land of another at the
latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise
that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy
against them.
26
Thus, they cannot be considered possessors nor builders in good faith. It is well-settled that both
Article 448
27
and Article 546
28
of the New Civil Code which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and
retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds
on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof.
29
Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer
tolerance of its owners are not possessors in good faith. Neither did the promise of Concordia, Esperanza and
Angelito Pada that they were going to donate the premises to petitioners convert them into builders in good faith for
at the time the improvements were built on the premises, such promise was not yet fulfilled, i.e., it was a mere
expectancy of ownership that may or may not be realized.
30
More importantly, even as that promise was fulfilled,
the donation is void for Concordia, Esperanza and Angelito Pada were not the owners of Cadastral Lot No. 5581.
As such, petitioners cannot be said to be entitled to the value of the improvements that they built on the said lot.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is HEREBY DENIED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 133345. March 9, 2000]
JOSEFA CH. MAESTRADO, as substituted by her daughter LOURDES MAESTRADO-LAVIA and CARMEN
CH. ABAYA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Ninth Division and JESUS C. ROA,
JR., RAMON P. CHAVES and NATIVIDAD S. SANTOS, respondents. xl-aw
[G.R. No. 133324. March 9, 2000]
JOSEFA CHAVEZ MAESTRADO and CARMEN CHAVES ABAYA, petitioners, vs. JESUS C. ROA, JR.,
RAMON P. CHAVES and NATIVIDAD S. SANTOS, respondents. x-sc
D E C I S I O N
DE LEON, JR., J .:
Before us are two (2) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari of the Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals
[2]
dated
November 28, 1997 declaring Lot No. 5872, located in Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City, as common property of
the heirs of the deceased spouses, Ramon and Rosario Chaves, and ordering its equal division among all the co-
owners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23 of Cagayan de Oro City,
which dismissed petitioners action against the private respondents for Quieting of Title over the said lot.
The pertinent facts are the following: Sc
These consolidated cases involve the status of Lot No. 5872 and the rights of the contending parties thereto. The
said lot which has an area of 57.601 square meters, however, is still registered in the name of the deceased
spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. The spouses Ramon and Rosario died intestate in 1943 and 1944,
respectively. They were survived by the following heirs, namely: Carmen Chaves-Abaya, Josefa Chaves-
Maestrado, Angel Chaves, Amparo Chaves-Roa, Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores and Salvador Chaves.
To settle the estate of the said deceased spouses, Angel Chaves initiated intestate proceedings
[3]
in the Court of
First Instance of Manila and was appointed administrator of said estates in the process. An inventory of the estates
was made and thereafter, the heirs agreed on a project of partition. Thus, they filed an action for partition
[4]
before
the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental. The court appointed Hernando Roa, husband of Amparo Chaves-
Roa, as receiver. On June 6, 1956, the court rendered a decision approving the project of partition. However, the
records of said case are missing and although respondents claimed otherwise, they failed to present a copy of said
decision.
This notwithstanding, the estate was actually divided in this wise: (1) Lot No. 3046 situated in Bulalong, Cagayan
de Oro City, consisting of 44 hectares of coconut land was distributed equally among four (4) heirs, namely: (a)
Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores; (b) Angel Chaves; (c) Amparo Chaves-Roa; and (d) Ramon Chaves, while (2) Lot
Nos. 5925, 5934, 1327 and 5872, all located in Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City and consisting of an aggregate
area of 14 hectares was distributed equally between petitioners (a) Josefa Chaves-Maestrado; and (b) Carmen
Chaves-Abaya. Scmis
At the time of the actual partition, Salvador Chaves had already died. His share was given to his only son, Ramon,
who is the namesake of Salvadors father. In 1956, the year the partition case was decided and effected, receiver
Hernando Roa delivered the respective shares of said heirs in accordance with the above scheme. Subsequently,
Concepcion sold her share to Angel, while Ramon sold his share to Amparo. Hence, one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 3046
went to Angel and the other half to Amparo.
Significantly, Lot No. 5872 was not included in any of the following documents: (1) the inventory of properties of the
estate submitted to the court in the proceedings for the settlement of said estate; (2) the project of partition
submitted to the court for approval; (3) the properties receiver Hernando Roa had taken possession of, which he
listed in the "Constancia" submitted to the court; and (4) the court order approving the partition. Decedent Ramon
Chaves acquired Lot No. 5872 from Felomino Bautista, Sr. but he subsequently delivered it to the spouses
Hernando Roa and Amparo Chaves-Roa
[5]
. It was thereafter delivered to petitioners during the actual partition in
1956, and petitioners have been in possession of the same since then. Missc
As to the omission of Lot No. 5872 in the inventory and project of partition, the parties offer different explanations.
Respondents claim that due to the series of transactions involving the said lot, the heirs were unsure if it belonged
to the decedents estate at all. As a result, they deferred its inclusion in the inventory of the properties of the estate
and its distribution pending the investigation of its status. In fact, administrator Angel Chaves filed a motion in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate to include the said lot in the inventory but the court did not act on it.
Petitioners, on the other hand, insist that the omission was inadvertent and the inaction of the court on the motion
was due to the compromise agreement entered into by the heirs
[6]
.
Petitioners thesis consists of the existence of an oral partition agreement entered into by all heirs soon after the
death of their parents. The proposed project of partition was allegedly based on it but the courts order of partition
failed to embody such oral agreement due to the omission of Lot No. 5872. For some reason, however, the actual
partition of the estate conformed to the alleged oral agreement.
Petitioners claim that they failed to notice the non-inclusion of Lot No. 5872 in the courts order. They only realized
such fact after the death in 1976 of Silvino Maestrado, the husband of petitioner Josefa. They discovered among
Silvinos belongings, the partition order and found out that Lot No. 5872 was not included therein.
[7]

In an effort to set things right, petitioners prepared a quitclaim to confirm the alleged oral agreement. On August 16,
1977, Angel, Concepcion and Ramon signed a notarized quitclaim in favor of petitioners. Amparo was unable to
sign because she had an accident and had passed away on the following day. It was her heirs who signed a
similarly worded and notarized quitclaim on September 8, 1977.
[8]
Misspped
Respondents dispute the voluntariness of their consent or the consent of their predecessors-in-interest to the
quitclaims. Ramon claims to have been betrayed by his lawyer, Francisco Velez, who is the son-in-law of petitioner
Josefa Maestrado. He allegedly signed the quitclaim without reading it because his lawyer had already read it. He
believed that since his lawyer was protecting his interests, it was all right to sign it after hearing no objections from
said lawyer. On the other hand, Angel signed the quitclaim "out of respect" for petitioners. On the other hand,
Concepcion signed because she was misled by alleged misrepresentations in the "Whereas Clauses" of the
quitclaim to the effect that the lot was inadvertently omitted and not deliberately omitted due to doubts on its
status.
[9]
Spped
Six (6) years after the execution of the quitclaims, respondents discovered that Lot No. 5872 is still in the name of
the deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. Thus, on October 14, 1983, respondent Ramon Chaves, the
sole heir of Salvador Chaves, and respondent Jesus Roa, the son of Amparo Chaves-Roa, wrote a letter to their
uncle Angel Chaves to inform him that said property, which they claim to belong to the estate of their deceased
grandparents, has not yet been distributed to the concerned heirs. Hence, they requested Angel Chaves to
distribute and deliver it to the heirs.
[10]
On October 24, 1983, respondent Natividad Santos, daughter and attorney-
in-fact of Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores, also wrote a similar letter to Angel Chaves. On December 1, 1983,
Angel Chaves transmitted the said letters to petitioner Carmen Abaya and requested her to respond.
In response, petitioners filed, on December 22, 1983, an action for Quieting of Title
[11]
against respondents in the
Regional trial Court of Cagayan de Oro. On April 10, 1995, the trial court rendered its Decision in favor of
respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"In view of these facts, the court therefore considers the property, Lot 5872 still common property.
Consequently, the property must be divided in six (6) parts, there being six heirs. But since the
group of Jesus Roa already quitclaimed in favor of plaintiffs and the same is true with Angel
Chaves, the defendants Natividad Santos and Ramon Chaves shall receive one-sixth (1/6) each
out of Lot 5872 and the balance will be divided equally by the plaintiffs Josefa Chaves-Maestrado
represented by her daughters and the other half to Carmen Chaves-Abaya.
With no other pronouncements. Josp-ped
SO ORDERED."
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which in a Decision, promulgated on November 28,1997,
sustained the said Decision of the trial court, in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Decision dated April 10, 1995 subject of the
appeal, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the plaintiffs-appellants. Spp-edjo
SO ORDERED."
On May 29, 1998, petitioner Lourdes Maestrado-Lavina, in substitution of her deceased mother, Josefa Chaves-
Maestrado, filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court.
[12]
Petitioner Carmen Chaves-Abaya also filed her
own petition for review on certiorari on June 1, 1998.
[13]
Since the two petitions involve the same facts and issues,
we decided in a Resolution
[14]
to consolidate the said cases.
Petitioner Maestrado-Lavina assigns the following errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION
DECLARING LOT 5872 AS STILL COMMON PROPERTY, THEREBY EFFECTIVELY
NULLIFYING THE VERBAL PARTITION AGREEMENT REACHED AND IMPLEMENTED BY THE
CHILDREN/HEIRS OF DECEDENTS RAMON AND ROSARIO CHAVES WAY BACK IN 1956;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION
DECLARING LOT 5872 AS STILL COMMON PROPERTY UPON ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE
SIGNATURES OF RESPONDENTS ON THE DULY NOTARIZED QUITCLAIMS WERE
OBTAINED THROUGH FRAUD; Mi-so
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT, ON THE BASIS
ALONE OF THE CLAIMS THAT (A) RAMON CHAVES SIGNED THE QUITCLAIM WITHOUT
READING IT; AND THAT (B) ANGEL CHAVES SIGNED THE QUITCLAIM OUT OF RESPECT,
THERE WAS FRAUD AS WOULD VITIATE RESPONDENTS CONSENT TO THE QUITCLAIMS;
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS CONCLUSION
THAT PETITIONERS HAVE NO CAPACITY TO SUE FOR QUIETING OF TITLE OR REMOVAL
OF CLOUD THEREON ON THE BASIS ALONE THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT THE
REGISTERED OWNERS OF LOT 5872;
V. IT BEING UNDISPUTED THAT THE FACTS GIVING RISE TO CLOUD ON JOSEFAS AND
CARMENS OWNERSHIP OVER LOT 5872 SURFACED ONLY IN 1983 AND PETITIONERS
FILED THE CORRESPONDING ACTION TO QUIET TITLE OR REMOVE CLOUD THEREON
ALSO IN 1983, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS
CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONERS ARE GUILTY OF LACHES."
[15]
Ne-xold
Petitioner Carmen Chaves-Abaya, on the other hand, assigns the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A CLEAR ERROR IN THE
INTERPRETATION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS FRAUD IN OBTAINING THE
CONSENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT RAMON P. CHAVES AND CONCEPCION CHAVES
SANVICTORES, THE MOTHER OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT NATIVIDAD SANTOS, TO THE
DEEDS OF QUITCLAIM;
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ACTION FOR
QUIETING OF TITLE WAS NOT BROUGHT BY THE PERSON IN WHOSE NAME THE TITLE IS
ISSUED; Man-ikx
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS WERE
GUILTY OF LACHES FOR HAVING SLEPT ON THEIR RIGHTS FOR MORE THAN 25
YEARS."
[16]

We grant the consolidated petitions, the same being impressed with merit.
First. Petitioners are proper parties to bring an action for quieting of title. Persons having legal as well as equitable
title to or interest in a real property may bring such action and "title" here does not necessarily denote a certificate
of title issued in favor of the person filing the suit.
[17]
Moreover, if the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title is in
possession of the property being litigated, such action is imprescriptible.
[18]
One who is in actual possession of a
land, claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking
steps to vindicate his right because his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of the
courts to ascertain the nature of the adverse claim and its effects on his title.
[19]
Manik-s
Although prescription and laches are distinct concepts, we have held, nonetheless, that in some instances, the
doctrine of laches is inapplicable where the action was filed within the prescriptive period provided by law.
[20]
Thus,
laches does not apply in this case because petitioners possession of the subject lot has rendered their right to
bring an action for quieting of title imprescriptible and, hence, not barred by laches. Moreover, since laches is a
creation of equity, acts or conduct alleged to constitute the same must be intentional and unequivocal so as to
avoid injustice.
[21]
Laches operates not really to penalize neglect or sleeping on ones rights, but rather to avoid
recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation.
[22]
Man-ikan
In this case at bench, the cloud on petitioners title to the subject property came about only on December 1, 1983
when Angel Chaves transmitted respondents letters to petitioners, while petitioners action was filed on December
22, 1983. Clearly, no laches could set in under the circumstances since petitioners were prompt and vigilant in
protecting their rights.
Second. Lot No. 5872 is no longer common property of the heirs of the deceased spouses Ramon and
Rosario Chaves. Petitioners ownership over said lot was acquired by reason of the oral partition agreed
upon by the deceased spouses heirs sometime before 1956. That oral agreement was confirmed by the
notarized quitclaims executed by the said heirs on August 16, 1977 and September 8, 1977, supra.
It appeared that the decision in Civil Case No. 867, which ordered the partition of the decedents estate, was not
presented by either party thereto. The existence of the oral partition together with the said quitclaims is the bone of
contention in this case. It appeared, however, that the actual partition of the estate conformed to the alleged oral
partition despite a contrary court order. Despite claims of private respondents that Lot No. 5872 was mistakenly
delivered to the petitioners, nothing was done to rectify it for a period of twenty-seven (27) years from 1983. Ol-
dmiso
We are convinced, however, that there was indeed an oral agreement of partition entered into by the heirs/parties.
This is the only way we can make sense out of the actual partition of the properties of the estate despite claims that
a court order provided otherwise. Prior to the actual partition, petitioners were not in possession of Lot No. 5872 but
for some reason or another, it was delivered to them. From 1956, the year of the actual partition of the estate of the
deceased Chaves spouses, until 1983, no one among the heirs questioned petitioners possession of or ownership
over said Lot No. 5872. Hence, we are convinced that there was indeed an oral agreement of partition among the
said heirs and the distribution of the properties was consistent with such oral agreement. In any event, the parties
had plenty of time to rectify the situation but no such move was done until 1983.
A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the adverse claimant establishes a
better right.
[23]
In the instant case it is the petitioners, being the possessors of Lot No. 5872, who have established a
superior right thereto by virtue of the oral partition which was also confirmed by the notarized quitclaims of the
heirs.
Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may
belong.
[24]
It may be effected extra-judicially by the heirs themselves through a public instrument filed before the
register of deeds.
[25]
Nc-m
However, as between the parties, a public instrument is neither constitutive nor an inherent element of a contract of
partition.
[26]
Since registration serves as constructive notice to third persons, an oral partition by the heirs is valid if
no creditors are affected.
[27]
Moreover, even the requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds
does not apply to partitions effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such transaction
is not a conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation and segregation of that
part which belongs to each heir.
[28]
Nc-mmis
Nevertheless, respondent court was convinced that Lot No. 5872 is still common property of the heirs of the
deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves because the TCT covering the said property is still registered in the
name of the said deceased spouses. Unfortunately, respondent court was oblivious to the doctrine that the act of
registration of a voluntary instrument is the operative act which conveys or affects registered land insofar as third
persons are concerned. Hence, even without registration, the contract is still valid as between the parties.
[29]
In fact,
it has been recently held and reiterated by this Court that neither a Transfer Certificate of Title nor a subdivision
plan is essential to the validity of an oral partition.
[30]

In sum, the most persuasive circumstance pointing to the existence of the oral partition is the fact that the terms of
the actual partition and distribution of the estate are identical to the sharing scheme in the oral partition. No one
among the heirs disturbed this status quo for a period of twenty-seven (27) years.
Finally. The said notarized quitclaims signed by the heirs in favor of petitioners are not vitiated by fraud. Hence,
they are valid.
Since the oral partition has been duly established, the notarized quitclaims confirmed such prior oral agreement as
well as the petitioners title of ownership over the subject Lot No. 5872. More importantly, independent of such oral
partition, the quitclaims in the instant case are valid contracts of waiver of property rights. Scnc-m
The freedom to enter into contracts, such as the quitclaims in the instant case, is protected by law
[31]
and the courts
are not quick to interfere with such freedom unless the contract is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
policy or public order.
[32]
Quitclaims, being contracts of waiver, involve the relinquishment of rights, with knowledge
of their existence and intent to relinquish them.
[33]
The intent to waive rights must be clearly and convincingly
shown. Moreover, when the only proof of intent is the act of a party, such act should be manifestly consistent and
indicative of an intent to voluntary relinquish a particular right such that no other reasonable explanation of his
conduct is possible.
[34]
Sd-aamiso
In the instant case, the terms of the subject quitclaims dated August 16, 1977 and September 8, 1977 are clear;
and the heirs signatures thereon have no other significance but their conformity thereto resulting in a valid waiver
of property rights.
[35]
Herein respondents quite belatedly and vainly attempted to invoke alleged fraud in the
execution of the said quitclaims but we are not convinced. In other words, the said quitclaims being duly notarized
and acknowledged before a notary public, deserve full credence and are valid and enforceable in the absence of
overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
[36]
In the case at bench, it is our view and we hold that the execution of the
said quitclaims was not fraudulent.
Fraud refers to all kinds of deception, whether through insidious machination, manipulation, concealment or
misrepresentation to lead another party into error.
[37]
The deceit employed must be serious. It must be sufficient to
impress or lead an ordinarily prudent person into error, taking into account the circumstances of each
case.
[38]
Silence or concealment, by itself, does not constitute fraud, unless there is a special duty to disclose
certain facts.
[39]
Moreover, the bare existence of confidential relation between the parties, standing alone, does not
raise the presumption of fraud.
[40]
S-daad
Dolo causante or fraud which attends the execution of a contract is an essential cause that vitiates consent and
hence, it is a ground for the annulment of a contract.
[41]
Fraud is never presumed, otherwise, courts would be
indulging in speculations and surmises.
[42]
It must be established by clear and convincing evidence but it was not so
in the case at bench. A mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud.
[43]

The instances of fraud allegedly committed in the case at bench are not the kind of fraud contemplated by law. On
the contrary, they constitute mere carelessness in the conduct of the affairs of the heirs concerned. We have
consistently denied relief to a party who seeks to avoid the performance of an obligation voluntarily assumed
because they turned out to be disastrous or unwise contracts, even if there was a mistake of law or
fact.
[44]
Moreover, we do not set aside contracts merely because solicitation, importunity, argument, persuasion or
appeal to affection were used to obtain the consent of the other party.
[45]

In a nutshell, the quitclaims dated August 16, 1977 and September 8, 1977 in the case at bench are valid, duly
confirmed and undeniably established the title of ownership of the petitioners over the subject Lot No. 5872. Scs-
daad
WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
November 28, 1997, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioners action praying for the quieting of their
title of ownership over Lot No. 5872, located in Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro, is granted. Cost against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
RLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF DONATA ORTIZ
BRIONES, namely: ESTELA, ERIBERTO AND
VIRGILIO SANTOS, ANA SANTOS CULTURA, ELVIRA
SANTOS INOCENTES, ERNESTO MENDOZA,
RIZALINA SANTOS, ADOLFO MENDOZA and PACITA
MENDOZA,
Petitioners,


- versus-


HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES, namely:
SILVERIO S. BRIONES, PETRA BRIONES, BONIFACIO
CABAHUG, JR., ANITA TRASMONTE, CIRILITA
FORTUNA, CRESENCIA BRIONES, FUGURACION
MEDALLE and MERCEDES LAGBAS,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 150175





Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
*

CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.









Promulgated:


February 5, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x


R E S O L U T I O N


CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:



On 10 March 2006, this Court promulgated its Decision
[1]
in the above-entitled case, ruling in favor of the
petitioners. The dispositive portion
[2]
reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 55194,
dated 31 August 2001, affirming the Decision of the Cebu City RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794, dated 28
September 1986, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the Complaint for partition, annulment, and
recovery of possession filed by the heirs ofMaximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 is hereby DISMISSED.


On 10 May 2006, a Motion for Reconsideration
[3]
of the foregoing Decision was filed by Atty. Celso C. Reales of
the Reales Law Office on behalf of the respondents, heirs ofMaximino R. Briones. On 19 May 2006,
petitioners Erlinda Pilapil and the other co-heirs of Donata Ortiz Vda. de Briones, through counsel, filed an Opposition to
Respondents Motion for Reconsideration,
[4]
to which the respondents filed a Rejoinder
[5]
on 23 May 2006. Thereafter, Atty.
Amador F. Brioso, Jr. of the Canto Brioso Arnedo Law Office entered his appearance as collaborating counsel for the
respondents.
[6]
Atty. Brioso then filed on 11 June 2006 and 16 June 2006, respectively, a Reply
[7]
and Supplemental Reply
[8]
to
the petitioners Opposition to respondents Motion for Reconsideration. Finally, petitioners filed a Rejoinder
[9]
to the
respondents Reply and Supplemental Reply on 5 July 2006.

The facts of the case, as recounted in the Decision,
[10]
are as follows

Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones (Donata), consisting of her surviving
sister, Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila (Rizalina); Rizalinas daughter, Erlinda Pilapil (Erlinda); and the other nephews
and nieces of Donata, in representation of her two other sisters who had also passed away. Respondents,
on the other hand, are the heirs of the late MaximinoBriones (Maximino), composed of his nephews and
nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, in representation of the deceased siblings of Maximino.

x x x x

Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any
children. When Maximino died on 1 May 1952, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her
husbands estate with the Cebu City Court of First Instance (CFI), 14
th
Judicial District, designated as Special
Proceedings No. 928-R. On 8 July 1952, the CFI issued Letters of Administration appointing Donata as
the administratrix of Maximinos estate. She submitted an Inventory of Maximinos properties, which
included, among other things, the following parcels of land x xx.

x x x x

The CFI would subsequently issue an Order, dated 2 October 1952, awarding ownership of the
aforementioned real properties to Donata. On 27 June 1960, Donata had the said CFI Order recorded in the
Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, and by virtue thereof, received new TCTs, covering the said
properties, now in her name.

Donata died on 1 November 1977. Erlinda, one of Donatas nieces, instituted with the RTC a
petition for the administration of the intestate estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio, were
appointed by the RTC as administrators of Donatas intestate estate. Controversy arose
among Donatas heirs when Erlinda claimed exclusive ownership of three parcels of land, covered
by TCTs No. 21542, 21545, and 58684, based on two Deeds of Donation, both dated 15 September 1977,
allegedly executed in her favor by her aunt Donata. The other heirs of Donata opposed Erlindas claim. This
Court, however, was no longer informed of the subsequent development in the intestate proceedings of
the estate of Donata; and as far as this Petition is concerned, all the heirs of Donata, including Erlinda,
appear to be on the same side.

On 21 January 1985, Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew of Maximino, filed a Petition with the RTC
for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino, which was initially granted by the
RTC. The RTC also issued an Order, dated 5 December 1985, allowing Silverio to collect rentals
from Maximinos properties. But then, Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to Set Aside the Order, dated 5
December 1985, claiming that the said properties were already under his and his wifes administration as
part of the intestate estate ofDonata. Silverios Letters of Administration for the intestate estate
of Maximino was subsequently set aside by the RTC.

On 3 March 1987, the heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC against the heirs
of Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real property, docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-5794. They later filed an Amended Complaint, on 11 December 1992. They alleged that Donata,
as administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and
without the knowledge of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the real properties
belonging to the intestate estate ofMaximino.

x x x x

After trial in due course, the RTC rendered its Decision, dated 8 April 1986, in favor of the heirs
of Maximino x x x.

x x x x

x x x[T]he RTC declared that the heirs of Maximino were entitled to of the real properties covered
by TCTs No. 21542, 21543, 21544, 21545, 21546, and 58684. It also orderedErlinda to reconvey to the heirs
of Maximino the said properties and to render an accounting of the fruits thereof.

The heirs of Donata appealed the RTC Decision, dated 8 April 1986, to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals, in its Decision, promulgated on 31 August 2001, affirmed the RTC Decision, x x x.

x x x x

Unsatisfied with the afore-quoted Decision of the Court of Appeals, the heirs of Donata filed the
present Petition, x x x.


In its Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this Court found the Petition meritorious and, reversing the Decisions of
the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court (RTC), dismissed the Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery
of possession of real property filed by the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794. This Court summed up its
findings,
[11]
thus

In summary, the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that Donata managed, through fraud, to have the real properties, belonging to the intestate estate
of Maximino, registered in her name. In the absence of fraud, no implied trust was established
between Donata and the heirs of Maximino under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code. Donata was able to
register the real properties in her name, not through fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order, dated 2
October 1952, issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to be fairly and
regularly issued, declared Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of Maximino; hence,
making Donata the singular owner of the entire estate of Maximino, including the real properties, and not
merely a co-owner with the other heirs of her deceased husband. There being no basis for the Complaint of
the heirs of Maximinoin Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the same should have been dismissed.

Respondents move for the reconsideration of the Decision of this Court raising still the arguments
that Donata committed fraud in securing the Court of First Instance Order, dated 2 October 1952, which declared her as
the sole heir of her deceased husband Maximino and authorized her to have Maximinos properties registered
exclusively in her name; that respondents right to succession to the disputed properties was transmitted or vested from
the moment of Maximinos death and which they could no longer be deprived of; that Donatamerely possessed and held
the properties in trust for her co-heirs/owners; and that, by virtue of this Courts ruling in Quion v. Claridad
[12]
and Sevilla,
et al. v. De Los Angeles,
[13]
respondents action to recover title to and possession of their shares in Maximinos estate,
held in trust for their benefit by Donata, and eventually, by petitioners as the latters successors-in-interest,
is imprescriptible. Respondents also advance a fresh contention that the CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, being based
on the fraudulent misrepresentation of Donata that she was Maximinos sole heir, was a void order, which produced no
legal effect. Lastly, respondents asseverate that, by relying on certain procedural presumptions in its Decision, dated 10
March 2006, this Court has sacrificed their substantive right to succession, thus, making justice subservient to the
dictates of mere procedural fiats.
[14]


While this Court is persuaded to reexamine and clarify some points in its previous Decision in this case, it does not
find any new evidence or argument that would adequately justify a change in its previous position.

On the finding of fraud

As this Court declared in its Decision, the existence of any trust relations between petitioners and respondents shall be
examined in the light of Article 1456 of the New Civil Code, which provides that, [i]f property is acquired through mistake or
fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes. Hence, the foremost question to be answered is still whether an implied trust under Article
1456 of the New Civil Code had been sufficiently established in the present case.

In the Decision, this Court ruled in the negative, since there was insufficient evidence to establish
that Donata committed fraud. It should be remembered that Donata was able to secure certificates of title to the disputed
properties by virtue of the CFI Order in Special Proceedings No. 928-R (the proceedings she instituted to
settle Maximinos intestate estate), which declared her as Maximinos sole heir. In the absence of proof to the contrary, the
Court accorded to Special Proceedings No. 928-R the presumptions of regularity and validity. Reproduced below are the
relevant portions
[15]
of the Decision

At the onset, it should be emphasized that Donata was able to secure the TCTs covering the real
properties belonging to the estate of Maximino by virtue of a CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952. It is
undisputed that the said CFI Order was issued by the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, instituted
by Donata herself, to settle the intestate estate of Maximino. The petitioners, heirs of Donata, were unable
to present a copy of the CFI Order, but this is not surprising considering that it was issued 35 years prior to
the filing by the heirs of Maximino of their Complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 on 3 March 1987. The
existence of such CFI Order, nonetheless, cannot be denied. It was recorded in the Primary Entry Book of
the Register of Deeds on 27 June 1960, at 1:10 p.m., as Entry No. 1714. It was annotated on
the TCTs covering the real properties as having declared Donata the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir
ofMaximino. The non-presentation of the actual CFI Order was not fatal to the cause of the heirs
of Donata considering that its authenticity and contents were never questioned. The allegation of fraud by
the heirs of Maximino did not pertain to the CFI Order, but to the manner or procedure by which it was
issued in favor of Donata. Moreover, the non-presentation of the CFI Order, contrary to the declaration by
the RTC, does not amount to a willful suppression of evidence that would give rise to the presumption that
it would be adverse to the heirs ofDonata if produced. x x x.

x x x x

The CFI Order, dated 2 October 1952, issued in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, effectively settled
the intestate estate of Maximino by declaring Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of her
deceased husband. The issuance by the CFI of the said Order, as well as its conduct of the entire Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, enjoy the presumption of validity pursuant to the Section 3(m) and (n) of Rule 131
of the Revised Rules of Court, reproduced below

SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory
if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

x x x x

(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or
elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction.

By reason of the foregoing provisions, this Court must presume, in the absence of any clear and
convincing proof to the contrary, that the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R had jurisdiction of the
subject matter and the parties, and to have rendered a judgment valid in every respect; and it could not
give credence to the following statements made by the Court of Appeals in its Decision.

x x x x

There was totally no evidentiary basis for the foregoing pronouncements. First of all, the Petition
filed by Donata for Letters of Administration in Special Proceedings No. 928-R before the CFI was not even
referred to nor presented during the course of the trial of Civil Case No. CEB-5794 before the RTC. How
then could the Court of Appeals make a finding thatDonata willfully excluded from the said Petition the
names, ages, and residences of the other heirs of Maximino? Second, there was also no evidence showing
that the CFI actually failed to send notices of Special Proceedings No. 928-R to the heirs of Maximino or that
it did not require presentation of proof of service of such notices. It should be remembered that there
stands a presumption that the CFI Judge had regularly performed his duties in Special Proceedings No. 928-
R, which included sending out of notices and requiring the presentation of proof of service of such notices;
and, the heirs of Maximino did not propound sufficient evidence to debunk such presumption. They only
made a general denial of knowledge of Special Proceedings No. 928-R, at least until 1985. There was no
testimony or document presented in which the heirs of Maximino categorically denied receipt of notice
from the CFI of thependency of Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The only evidence on record in reference to
the absence of notice of such proceedings was the testimony of Aurelia Briones (Aurelia), one of the heirs
of Maximino, x x x.

x x x x

Aurelias testimony deserves scant credit considering that she was not testifying on matters within
her personal knowledge. The phrase I dont think is a clear indication that she is merely voicing out her
opinion on how she believed her uncles and aunts would have acted had they received notice of Special
Proceedings No. 928-R.

It is worth noting that, in its foregoing ratiocination, the Court was proceeding from an evaluation of the evidence on
record, which did not include an actual copy of the CFI Order in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. Respondents only submitted
a certified true copy thereof on 15 June 2006, annexed to their Supplemental Reply to petitioners opposition to their motion
for reconsideration of this Courts Decision. Respondents did not offer any explanation as to why they belatedly produced a
copy of the said Order, but merely claimed to have been fortunate enough to obtain a copy thereof from the Register of
Deeds of Cebu.
[16]


Respondents should be taken to task for springing new evidence so late into the proceedings of this
case. Parties should present all their available evidence at the courts below so as to give the opposing party the
opportunity to scrutinize and challenge such evidence during the course of the trial. However, given that the existence
of the CFI Order in Special Proceedings No. 928-R was never in issue and was, in fact, admitted by the petitioners; that
the copy submitted is a certified true copy of the said Order; and that the said Order may provide new information vital
to a just resolution of the present case, this Court is compelled to consider the same as part of the evidence on record.

The CFI Order
[17]
in question reads in full as

O R D E R

This is with reference to the Motion of the Administratrix, dated January 5, 1960, that she be
declared the sole heir of her deceased husband, Maximino Suico Briones, the latter having died without any
legitimate ascendant nor descendant, nor any legitimate brother or sister, nephews or nieces.

At the hearing of this incident today, nobody appeared to resist the motion, and based on
the uncontradicted testimony of Donata G. Ortiz that she was the nearest surviving relative of the
deceasedMaximino Suico Briones at the time of the latters death, and pursuant to the pertinent provisions
of the new Civil Code of the Philippines, the Court hereby declares the aforesaid Donata G. Ortiz the sole,
absolute and exclusive heir of the estate of the deceased Maximino Suico Briones, and she is hereby
entitled to inherit all the residue of this estate after paying all the obligations thereof, which properties are
those contained in the Inventory, dated October 2, 1952.

Cebu City, January 15, 1960.


From the contents of the afore-quoted Order, this Court is able to deduce that the CFI Order was in fact issued on 15
January 1960 and not 2 October 1952, as earlier stated in the Decision. It was the inventory of properties, submitted
by Donata as administratrix of Maximinos intestate estate, which was dated 2 October 1952.
[18]
Other than such
observation, this Court finds nothing in the CFI Order which could change its original position in the Decision under
consideration.

While it is true that since the CFI was not informed that Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the court was
not able to order that these siblings be given personal notices of the intestate proceedings, it should be borne in mind that
the settlement of estate, whether testate or intestate, is a proceeding in rem,
[19]
and that the publication in the newspapers
of the filing of the application and of the date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, i s a notice to
the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the
publication. The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of informing all interested
parties in the estate of the deceased of the existence of the settlement proceedings, most especially those who were not
named as heirs or creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such omission was voluntarily or involuntarily made.

This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order was the result of the intestate proceedings instituted
by Donata before the trial court. As this Court pointed out in its earlier Decision, the manner by which the CFI judge
conducted the proceedings enjoys the presumption of regularity, and encompassed in such presumption is the order of
publication of the notice of the intestate proceedings. A review of the records fails to show any allegation or concrete proof
that the CFI also failed to order the publication in newspapers of the notice of the intestate proceedings and to require proof
from Donata of compliance therewith. Neither can this Court find any reason or explanation as to why Maximinos siblings
could have missed the published notice of the intestate proceedings of their brother.

In relying on the presumptions of the regular performance of official duty and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by the
CFI in rendering the questioned Order, dated 15 January 1960, this Court is not, as counsel for respondents all ege, sacrificing
the substantive right of respondents to their share in the inheritance in favor of mere procedural fiats. There is a rationale
for the establishment of rules of procedure, as amply explained by this Court in De Dios v. Court of Appeals
[20]


Procedural rules are designed to insure the orderly and expeditious administration of justice by
providing for a practical system by which the parties to a litigation may be accorded a full and fair
opportunity to present their respective positions and refute each other's submissions under the prescribed
requirements, conditions and limitations. Adjective law is not the counterfoil of substantive law. In fact,
there is a symbiotic relationship between them. By complying faithfully with the Rules of Court, the bench
and the bar are better able to discuss, analyze and understand substantive rights and duties and
consequently to more effectively protect and enforce them. The other alternative is judicial anarchy.

Thus, compliance with the procedural rules is the general rule, and abandonment thereof should only be done in the most
exceptional circumstances. The presumptions relied upon by this Court in the instant case are disputable presumptions,
which are satisfactory, unless contradicted or overcome by evidence. This Court finds that the evidence presented by
respondents failed to overcome the given presumptions.

Although Donata may have alleged before the CFI that she was her husbands sole heir, it was not established
that she did so knowingly, maliciously and in bad faith, so as for this Court to conclude that she indeed committed
fraud. This Court again brings to the fore the delay by which respondents filed the present case, when the principal
actors involved, particularly, Donata and Maximinos siblings, have already passed away and their lips forever sealed as
to what truly transpired between them. On the other hand, Special Proceedings No. 928-R took place when all these
principal actors were still alive and each would have been capable to act to protect his or her own right
to Maximinos estate. Letters of Administration ofMaximinos estate were issued in favor of Donata as early as 8 July
1952, and the CFI Order in question was issued only on 15 January 1960. The intestate proceedings for the settlement
of Maximinos estate were thus pending for almost eight years, and it is the burden of the respondents to establish that
their parents or grandparents, Maximinos surviving siblings, had absolutely no knowledge of the said proceedings all
these years. As established in Ramos v. Ramos,
[21]
the degree of proof to establish fraud in a case where the principal
actors to the transaction have already passed away is proof beyond reasonable doubt, to wit

"x x x But length of time necessarily obscures all human evidence; and as it thus removes from
the parties all the immediate means to verify the nature of the original transactions, it operates by way of
presumption, in favor of innocence, and against imputation of fraud. It would be unreasonable, after a
great length of time, to require exact proof of all the minute circumstances of any transaction, or to expect
a satisfactory explanation of every difficulty, real or apparent, with which it may be encumbered. The most
that can fairly be expected, in such cases, if the parties are living, from the frailty of memory, and human
infirmity, is, that the material facts can be given with certainty to a common intent; and, if the parties are
dead, and the cases rest in confidence, and in parol agreements, the most that we can hope is to arrive at
probable conjectures, and to substitute general presumptions of law, for exact knowledge. Fraud, or breach
of trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to the living; for, the legal presumption is the other way; as to
the dead, who are not here to answer for themselves, it would be the height of injustice and cruelty, to
disturb their ashes, and violate the sanctity of the grave, unless the evidence of fraud be clear, beyond a
reasonable doubt(Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U.S.], 481, 498).

Moreover, even if Donatas allegation that she was Maximinos sole heir does constitute fraud, it is insufficient
to justify abandonment of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960,
[ 22]
considering the nature of intestate proceedings as
being in rem and the disputable presumptions of the regular performance of official duty and lawful exercise of
jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R.

On prescription of the right to recover based on implied trust

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Donatas misrepresentation constitutes fraud that would impose upon her
the implied trust provided in Article 1456 of the Civil Code, this Court still cannot sustain respondents contention that their
right to recover their shares in Maximinos estate is imprescriptible. It is already settled in jurisprudence that an implied
trust, as opposed to an express trust, is subject to prescription and laches.

The case of Ramos v. Ramos
[23]
already provides an elucidating discourse on the matter, to wit

"Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention of the trustor or
of the parties. Implied trusts come into being by operation of law" (Art. 1441, Civil Code). "No express trusts
concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proven by oral evidence. An implied trust may be
proven by oral evidence" (Ibid; Arts. 1443 and 1457).

"No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a
trust is clearly intended" (Ibid; Art. 1444; Tuason de Perez vs. Caluag, 96 Phil. 981;Julio vs. Dalandan, L-
19012, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 543, 546). "Express trusts are those which are created by the direct and
positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly
evincing an intention to create a trust" (89 C.J. S. 122).

"Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the
transaction as matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the transaction byoperation of law as
matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties" (89 C.J.S. 724). They are
ordinarily subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts (89 C.J.S. 722).

"A resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by the act or construction
of law, but in its more restricted sense it is a trust raised by implication of law and presumed always to have
been contemplated by the parties, the intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their transaction,
but not expressed in the deed or instrument of conveyance" (89 C.J.S. 725). Examples of resulting trusts are
found in Article 1448 to 1455 of the Civil Code. See Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, L-31569, September 28,
1973, 53 SCRA 168, 179).

On the other hand, a constructive trust is a trust "raised by construction of law, or arising by
operation of law." In a more restricted sense and as contradistinguished from a resulting trust, a
constructive trust is "a trust not created by any words, either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct
intention to create a trust, but by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice. It
does not arise by agreement or intention but by operation of law." (89 C.J.S. 726-727). "If a person obtains
legal title to property by fraud or concealment, courts of equity will impress upon the title a so-called
constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party." A constructive trust is not a trust in the technical sense
(Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the P.I., 49 Phil. 244; See Art. 1456, Civil Code).

There is a rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription the ownership of property entrusted
to him (Palma vs. Cristobal, 77 Phil. 712), or that an action to compel a trustee to convey property
registered in his name in trust for the benefit of the cestui qui trust does not prescribe
(Manalang vs. Canlas, 94 Phil. 776; Cristobal vs. Gomez, 50 Phil. 810), or that the defense of prescription
cannot be set up in an action to recover property held by a person in trust for the benefit of another
(Sevilla vs. De los Angeles, 97 Phil. 875), or that property held in trust can be recovered by the beneficiary
regardless of the lapse of time (Marabilles vs. Quito, 100 Phil. 64; Bancairen vs. Diones, 98 Phil. 122,
126; Juan vs. Zuiga, 62 O.G. 1351; 4 SCRA 1221; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-17957, May 31, 1962.
See Tamayo vs. Callejo, 147 Phil. 31, 37).

That rule applies squarely to express trusts. The basis of the rule is that the possession of a trustee
is not adverse. Not being adverse, he does not acquire by prescription the property held in trust. Thus,
Section 38 of Act 190 provides that the law of prescription does not apply "in the case of a continuing and
subsisting trust" (Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado, 103 Phil. 261, 266; Laguna vs. Levantino, 71 Phil.
566; Sumira vs. Vistan, 74 Phil. 138; Golfeo vs. Court of Appeals, 63 O.G. 4895, 12 SCRA 199; Caladiao vs.
Santos, 63 O.G. 1956, 10 SCRA 691).

The rule of imprescriptibility of the action to recover property held in trust may possibly apply to
resulting trusts as long as the trustee has not repudiated the trust (Heirs ofCandelaria vs. Romero, 109 Phil.
500, 502-3; Martinez vs. Grao, 42 Phil. 35; Buencamino vs. Matias, 63 O. G. 11033, 16 SCRA 849).

The rule of imprescriptibility was misapplied to constructive trusts (Geronimo and Isidoro vs. Nava
and Aquino, 105 Phil. 145, 153. Compare with Cuison vs. Fernandez andBengzon, 105 Phil. 135,
139; De Pasion vs. De Pasion, 112 Phil. 403, 407).

Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against the trustee in an express
trust for the recovery of the property held in trust where (a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the cestui qui trust and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive (Laguna
vs. Levantino, supra; Salinas vs. Tuason, 55 Phil. 729. Compare with the rule regarding co-owners found in
the last paragraph of Article 494, Civil Code;Casaas vs. Rosello, 50 Phil. 97; Gerona vs. De Guzman, L-
19060, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153, 157).

With respect to constructive trusts, the rule is different. The prescriptibility of an action
for reconveyance based on constructive trust is now settled (Alzona vs. Capunitan, L-10228, February 28,
1962, 4 SCRA 450; Gerona vs. De Guzman, supra; Claridad vs. Henares, 97 Phil. 973; Gonzales vs. Jimenez, L-
19073, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 80; Boaga vs.Soler, 112 Phil. 651; J. M. Tuason & Co., vs. Magdangal, L-
15539, January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 84). Prescription may supervene in an implied trust (Bueno vs. Reyes, L-
22587, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 1179; Fabian vs. Fabian, L-20449, January 29, 1968; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-
17957, May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 371).

And whether the trust is resulting or constructive, its enforcement may be barred by laches (90
C.J.S. 887-889; 54 Am Jur. 449-450; Diaz vs. Gorricho and Aguado, supra; Compare with Mejia vs. Gampona,
100 Phil. 277). [Emphases supplied.]

A present reading of the Quion
[24]
and Sevilla
[25]
cases, invoked by respondents, must be made in conjunction with
and guided accordingly by the principles established in the afore-quoted case. Thus, while respondents right to inheritance
was transferred or vested upon them at the time of Maximinos death, their enforcement of said right by appropriate legal
action may be barred by the prescription of the action.

Prescription of the action for reconveyance of the disputed properties based on implied trust is governed by Article
1144 of the New Civil Code, which reads

ART. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of
action accrues:

(1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon an obligation created by law;

(3) Upon a judgment.

Since an implied trust is an obligation created by law (specifically, in this case, by Article 1456 of the New Civil Code), then
respondents had 10 years within which to bring an action forreconveyance of their shares in Maximinos properties. The next
question now is when should the ten-year prescriptive period be reckoned from. The general rule is that an action
forreconveyance of real property based on implied trust prescribes ten years from registration and/or issuance of the title to
the property,
[26]
not only because registration under the Torrens system is a constructive notice of title,
[27]
but also because
by registering the disputed properties exclusively in her name, Donata had already unequivocally repudiated any other claim
to the same.

By virtue of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, Donata was able to register and
secure certificates of title over the disputed properties in her name on 27 June 1960. The respondents filed with the RTC
their Complaint for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of the disputed real properties, docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-5794, only on 3 March 1987, almost 27 years after the registration of the said properties in the name
of Donata. Therefore, respondents action for recovery of possession of the disputed properties had clearly prescribed.

Moreover, even though respondents Complaint before the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 also prays for partition of
the disputed properties, it does not make their action to enforce their right to the said properties imprescriptible. While as a
general rule, the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or
impliedly recognized, as provided for in Article 494, of the New Civil Code, it bears to emphasize that Donata had never
recognized respondents as co-owners or co-heirs, either expressly or impliedly.
[28]
Her assertion before the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R that she was Maximinos sole heir necessarily excludes recognition of some other co-owner or co-heir
to the inherited properties; Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of action for partition of property owned in common
does not apply to the case at bar.

On laches as bar to recovery

Other than prescription of action, respondents right to recover possession of the disputed properties, based on
implied trust, is also barred by laches. The defense of laches, which is a question of inequity in permitting a claim to be
enforced, applies independently of prescription, which is a question of time. Prescription is statutory; laches is equitable.
[29]


Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is based
upon grounds of public policy, which requires the discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society.
[30]


This Court has already thoroughly discussed in its Decision the basis for barring respondents action for recovery of
the disputed properties because of laches. This Court pointed out therein
[31]
that

In further support of their contention of fraud by Donata, the heirs of Maximino even emphasized
that Donata lived along the same street as some of the siblings of Maximino and, yet, she failed to inform
them of the CFI Order, dated [15 January 1960], in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and the issuance in her
name of new TCTs covering the real properties which belonged to the estate of Maximino. This Court,
however, appreciates such information differently. It actually works against the heirs of Maximino. Since
they only lived nearby,Maximinos siblings had ample opportunity to inquire or discuss with Donata the
status of the estate of their deceased brother. Some of the real properties, which belonged to the estate
ofMaximino, were also located within the same area as their residences in Cebu City,
and Maximinos siblings could have regularly observed the actions and behavior of Donata with regard to the
said real properties. It is uncontested that from the time of Maximinos death on 1 May 1952, Donata had
possession of the real properties. She managed the real properties and even collected rental fees on some of
them until her own death on 1 November 1977. After Donatas death, Erlinda took possession of the real
properties, and continued to manage the same and collect the rental fees thereon. Donata and,
subsequently, Erlinda, were so obviously exercising rights of ownership over the real properties, in exclusion
of all others, which must have already put the heirs of Maximino on guard if they truly believed that they still
had rights thereto.

The heirs of Maximino knew he died on 1 May 1952. They even attended his wake. They did not
offer any explanation as to why they had waited 33 years from Maximinos death before one of
them, Silverio, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino on 21
January 1985. After learning that the intestate estate of Maximino was already settled in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, they waited another two years, before instituting, on 3 March 1987, Civil Case No.
CEB-5794, the Complaint for partition, annulment and recovery of the real property belonging to the estate
of Maximino. x x x


Considering the circumstances in the afore-quoted paragraphs, as well as respondents conduct before this
Court, particularly the belated submission of evidence and argument of new issues, respondents are consistently
displaying a penchant for delayed action, without any proffered reason or justification for such delay.

It is well established that the law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not those who sleep when the
law requires them to act. The law does not encourage laches, indifference, negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for
a party to deserve the considerations of the courts, he must show that he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings.
[32]


On void judgment or order

Respondents presented only in their Reply and Supplemental Reply to the petitioners Opposition to their Motion for
Reconsideration the argument that the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R is void and, thus,
it cannot have any legal effect. Consequently, the registration of the disputed properties in the name of Donata pursuant to
such Order was likewise void.

This Court is unconvinced.

In the jurisprudence referred to by the respondents,
[33]
an order or judgment is considered void when rendered by
the court without or in excess of its jurisdiction or in violation of a mandatory duty, circumstances which are not present in
the case at bar.

Distinction must be made between a void judgment and a voidable one, thus

"* * * A voidable judgment is one which, though not a mere nullity, is liable to be made void when
a person who has a right to proceed in the matter takes the proper steps to have its invalidity declared. It
always contains some defect which may become fatal. It carries within it the means of its own overthrow.
But unless and until it is duly annulled, it is attended with all the ordinary consequences of a legal judgment.
The party against whom it is given may escape its effect as a bar or an obligation, but only by a proper
application to have it vacated or reversed. Until that is done, it will be efficacious as a claim, an estoppel, or
a source of title. If no proceedings are ever taken against it, it will continue throughout its life to all intents a
valid sentence. If emanating from a court of general jurisdiction, it will be sustained by the ordinary
presumptions of regularity, and it is not open to impeachment in any collateral action. * * *"

But it is otherwise when the judgment is void. "A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it
no rights are divested. From it no rights can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded
upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims
flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as trespassers. The
purchaser at a sale by virtue of its authority finds himself without title and without redress." (Freeman on
Judgments, sec. 117, citing Campbell vs. McCahan, 41 Ill., 45; Roberts vs. Stowers, 7 Bush,
295, Huls vs. Buntin, 47 Ill., 396; Sherrell vs. Goodrum, 3 Humph., 418; Andrews vs. State, 2 Sneed, 549;
Hollingsworthvs. Bagley, 35 Tex., 345; Morton vs. Root, 2 Dill., 312; Commercial Bank of Manchester vs.
Martin, 9 Smedes & M., 613; Hargis vs. Morse, 7 Kan., 259. See also Cornell vs. Barnes, 7 Hill, 35; Dawson
and Another vs. Wells, 3 Ind., 399; Meyer vs. Mintonye, 106 Ill., 414; Olson vs. Nunnally, 47 Kan., 391;
White vs. Foote L. & M. Co., 29 W. Va., 385.)

It is not always easy to draw the line of demarcation between a void judgment and a voidable one,
but all authorities agree that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is essential to the validity of a judgment
and that want of such jurisdiction renders it void and a mere nullity. In the eye of the law it is non-existent.
(Fisher vs. Harnden, 1 Paine, 55; Towns vs. Springer, 9 Ga., 130; Mobley vs. Mobley, 9 Ga., 247; Beverly and
McBride vs. Burke, 9 Ga., 440; Central Bank of Georgia vs. Gibson, 11 Ga., 453; Johnson vs. Johnson, 30 Ill.,
215; St. Louis and Sandoval Coal and Mining Co. vs. Sandoval Coal and Mining Co., 111 Ill.,
32; Swiggart vs. Harber, 4 Scam., 364; Miller vs. Snyder, 6 Ind., 1; Seely vs. Reid, 3 Greene [Iowa], 374.)
[34]



The fraud and misrepresentation fostered by Donata on the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R did not deprive the
trial court of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case, namely, the intestate estate of Maximino. Donatas fraud and
misrepresentation may have rendered the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, voidable, but not void on its face. Hence, the
said Order, which already became final and executory, can only be set aside by direct action to annul and enjoin its
enforcement.
[35]
It cannot be the subject of a collateral attack as is being done in this case. Note that respondents
Complaint before the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 was one for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of the
disputed properties. The annulment sought in the Complaint was not that of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, but of the
certificates of title over the properties issued in Donatas name. So until and unless respondents bring a direct action to
nullify the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and attain a favorable judgment therein, the
assailed Order remains valid and binding.

Nonetheless, this Court also points out that an action to annul an order or judgment based on fraud must be brought
within four years from the discovery of the fraud.
[36]
If it is conceded that the respondents came to know
of Donatas fraudulent acts only in 1985, during the course of the RTC proceedings which they instituted for the settlement
of Maximinosestate, then their right to file an action to annul the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings
No. 928-R (earlier instituted by Donata for the settlement of Maximinosestate), has likewise prescribed by present time.

In view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-29727 December 14, 1988
PEDRO OLIVERAS, TEODORA GASPAR, MELECIO OLIVERAS and ANICETA MINOR, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
CANDIDO LOPEZ, SEVERO LOPEZ, HIPOLITO LOPEZ, EUGENIA LOPEZ, PRIMITIVO GASPAR, CORAZON
LOPEZ, ALEJANDRO CACAYURIN, FAUSTINA BOTUYAN, MODESTO SALAZAR, ADORACION BOTUYAN,
CLAUDIO GANOTICE and ENONG BOTUYAN, defendants-appellants.
Venancio B. Fernando for defendants-appellants.

FERNAN, C.J .:
This case exemplifies the Filipino custom of keeping inherited property in a prolonged juridical condition of co-
owner ship.
Lorenzo Lopez owned Lot 4685 of the Cadastral survey of Villasis, Pangasinan with an area of 69,687 square
meters as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 15262.
1
In December, 1931, Lorenzo Lopez died,
2
leaving
said property to his wife, Tomasa Ramos and six (6) children. From that time on, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez did not
initiate any moves to legally partition the property.
More than twenty-one years later, or on February 11, 1953, Tomasa Ramos and her eldest son, Candido Lopez,
executed a deed of absolute sale of the "eastern undivided four thousand two hundred and fifty seven-square
meters (4,257) more or less, of the undivided portion of (their) interests, rights and participation" over Lot 4685, in
favor of the spouses Melecio Oliveras and Aniceta Minor, in consideration of the amount of one thousand pesos
(P1,000).
3

On the same day, Tomasa and Candido executed another deed of absolute sale of the "undivided" four thousand
two hundred and fifty-seven (4,257) square meters of the "eastern part" of Lot 4685 in favor of the spouses Pedro
Oliveras and Teodora Gaspar, also in consideration of P1,000.
4
Each of the said documents bear the thumbmark
of Tomasa and the signature of Candido.
In his affidavit also executed on February 11, 1953, Candido stated that a month prior to the execution of the deed
of sale in favor of Melecio Oliveras, he offered his: "undivided portion" of Lot 4685 to his "adjacent owners" but
none of them was "in a position to purchase" said property.
5

Since the execution of the two deeds of absolute sale, the vendees, brothers Melecio and Pedro, had been paying
the real property taxes for their respectively purchased properties.
6
They also had been in possession of their
purchased properties which, being planted to palay and peanuts, were segregated from the rest of Lot 4685 by
dikes.
7

More than thirteen years later or on November 21, 1966, the counsel of the Oliveras brothers wrote the heirs of
Lorenzo Lopez reminding them of the Oliverases' demands to partition the property so that they could acquire their
respective titles thereto without resorting to court action, and that, should they fail to respond, he would be forced to
file a case in court.
8
Apparently, the Lopezes did not answer said letter since on December 15, 1966, the Oliveras
brothers and their wives filed a complaint for partition and damages
9
in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan.
10

The Oliverases stated in their complaint that possession of the disputed properties was delivered to them with the
knowledge and consent of the defendants; that they had been paying the real estate taxes thereon; that prior to the
sale, said properties were offered to the other co-owners for sale but they refused to buy them; that on February 18,
1953, the transactions were duly annotated and entered in the Memorandum of encumbrances of OCT No. 15262
as adverse claims; and that their desire to segregate the portions of Lot 4685 sold to them was frustrated by
defendants' adamant refusal to lend them the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 15262 and to execute a deed of
partition of the whole lot.
In claiming moral damages in the amount of P2,000.00 plaintiffs alleged that defendants also refused to allow them
to survey and segregate the portions bought by them. Plaintiffs prayed that the court order the defendants to
partition Lot 4685 and to allow them to survey and segregate the portions they had purchased. They also
demanded payment of P800.00 as attorney's fees and cost of the suit.
In their answer, the defendants alleged that no sale ever transpired as the alleged vendors could not have sold
specific portions of the property; that plaintiffs' possession and occupation of specific portions of the properties
being illegal, they could not ripen into ownership; and that they were not under any obligation to lend their copy of
the certificate of title or to accede to plaintiffs' request for the partition or settlement of the property. As special and
affirmative defenses, the defendants contended that the deeds of sale were null and void and hence, unenforceable
against them; that the complaint did not state a cause of action and that the cause or causes of action if any, had
prescribed.
Defendants averred in their counterclaim that despite repeated demands, plaintiffs refused and failed to vacate the
premises; that the properties occupied by the plaintiffs yielded an average net produce in palay and peanuts in the
amount of P1,600.00 annually, and that the complaint was filed to harass them. They prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint and the payment of P1,600.00 per year from 1953 until plaintiffs shall have vacated the premises and
P1,000.00 for attorney's fees.
Plaintiffs filed an answer to defendants' counterclaim, denying all the allegations therein and stating that defendants
never demanded that plaintiffs vacate the portions of Lot 4685 they had bought.
The lower court explored the possibility of an amicable settlement between the parties without success. Hence, it
set the case for trial and thereafter, it rendered a
decision
11
declaring valid the deeds of absolute sale
12
and ordering the defendants to allow the segregation of the
sold portions of Lot 4685 by a licensed surveyor in order that the plaintiffs could obtain their respective certificates
of title over their portions of said lot.
In resolving the case, the lower court passed upon the issue of whether the two deeds of absolute sale were what
they purported to be or merely mortgage documents. It considered as indicia of plaintiffs' absolute dominion over
the portions sold to them their actual possession thereof without any opposition from the defendants until the filing
of the complaint, their payment of taxes thereon and their having benefited from the produce of the land. The court
ruled that the defendants' testimonial evidence that the deeds in question were merely mortgage documents cannot
overcome the evidentiary value of the public instruments presented by the plaintiffs.
On the issue of whether the two deeds of absolute sale were null and void considering that the land subject thereof
had not yet been partitioned, the court observed that the total area of 8,514 square meters sold to plaintiffs by
Candido was less than his share should Lot 4685 with an area of 69,687 square meters be divided among the six
children of Lorenzo Lopez and their mother. In this connection, the lower court also found that during his lifetime,
and before Candido got married, Lorenzo Lopez had divided Lot 4685 among his children who then took
possession of their respective shares. *
The defendants appealed said decision to this Court contending that the lower court erred in declaring the two
deeds of absolute sale as valid, in ordering the segregation of the sold portions of Lot 4685 to enable the plaintiffs
to obtain their respective certificates of title, and in not considering their defense of prescription.
The extrinsic validity of the two deeds of absolute sale is not in issue in this case in view of the finding of the trial
court that the defendants admittedly do not question their due execution.
13
What should pre-occupy the Court is the
intrinsic validity of said deeds insofar as they pertain to sales of designated portions of an undivided, co-owned
property.
In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no
individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract
quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.
14

However, the duration of the juridical condition of co-ownership is not limitless. Under Article 494 and 1083 of the
Civil Code, co-ownership of an estate should not exceed the period of twenty (20) years. And, under the former
article, any agreement to keep a thing or property undivided should be for a ten-year period only. Where the parties
stipulate a definite period of in division which exceeds the maximum allowed by law, said stipulation shall be void
only as to the period beyond such maximum.
15

Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the in division of a property for more than twenty years, it would
be contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond the period set by the law. Otherwise, the 20-year
limitation expressly mandated by the Civil Code would be rendered meaningless.
In the instant case, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez maintained the co-ownership for more than twenty years. We hold
that when Candido and his mother (who died before the filing of the complaint for partition) sold definite portions of
Lot 4685, they validly exercised dominion over them because, by operation of law, the co-ownership had ceased.
The filing of the complaint for partition by the Oliverases who, as vendees, are legally considered as subrogated to
the rights of Candido over portions of Lot 4685 in their possession,
16
merely served to put a stamp of formality on
Candido's otherwise accomplished act of terminating the co-ownership.
The action for partition has not prescribed. Although the complaint was filed thirteen years from the execution of the
deeds of sale and hence, as contended by the defendants-appellants, prescription might have barred its filing under
the general provision of Article 1144 (a) of the Civil Code, Article 494 specifically mandates that each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned.
Hence, considering the validity of the conveyances of portions of Lot 4685 in their favor and as subrogees of
Candido Lopez, the Oliverases' action for partition was timely and properly filed.
17

We cannot write finis to this decision without commenting on the compliance with the resolution of September 1,
1986 of counsel for defendants-appellants. In said resolution, the court required the parties to move in the premises
"considering the length of time that this case has remained pending in this Court and to determine whether or not
there might be supervening events which may render the case moot and academic.
18
In his manifestation and
motion dated August 12, 1987, said counsel informed the Court that he had contacted the defendants-appellants
whom he advised "to move in the premises which is the land in question and to maintain the status quo with respect
to their actual possession thereon" and that he had left a copy of said resolution with the defendants-appellants" for
their guidance in the compliance of their obligations (sic) as specified in said
resolution."
19

Obviously, said counsel interpreted literally the Court's directive "to move in the premises." For the enlightenment of
said counsel and all others of similar perception, a "move in the premises" resolution is not a license to occupy or
enter the premises subject of litigation especially in cases involving real property. A "move in the premises"
resolution simply means what is stated therein: the parties are obliged to inform the Court of developments
pertinent to the case which may be of help to the Court in its immediate disposition.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court insofar as it declares the validity of the two deeds of sale and directs
the partition of Lot 4685, is AFFIRMED. The lower court is hereby ordered to facilitate with dispatch the preparation
of a project of partition which it should thereafter approve. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.