To: DCR

From: JBA
Re: 9494.8 Excessive Trauma Charge Memorandum
Date: August 5, 2014

EXCESSIVE TRAUMA CHARGE MEMORANDUM

In the present case, it appears likely that a judge would allow the Defendant to implead
the hospital (Grand Strand Medical Center), based on the existing South Carolina case law. This
would be primarily due to the unfair prejudice which would result to the Defendant if he was not
allowed to implead the hospital under Rule 14(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.
This memorandum incorporates collateral estoppel issues as well as issues surrounding Rule
14(a).
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
In the recent case of Patel v. Garrett Law Firm, PC, 2013 WL 8538731 (Ct. App. 2013),
the Plaintiff was held to be collaterally estopped from suing his law firm for drafting an allegedly
defective contract which omitted a necessary option section of the contract. The Plaintiff had
previously been involved in litigation over the subject contract with the party that had signed the
contract. The Court of Appeals held in Patel, supra, that the Plaintiff had fully litigated the issue
of whether the allegedly improper drafting of the contract proximately caused the Plaintiffs
injuries against the party that signed the contract. Therefore, the Plaintiff was barred through
collateral estoppel from filing suit against the law firm in the second action, because the Plaintiff
litigated the issue of the defectiveness of the contract in the first suit against the party that signed
the contract.
In the present case, the Defendant will suffer the same fate that the Plaintiff did in Patel,
supra, if he is not allowed to join the hospital in his action. The Defendant will necessarily have
to argue about the $20,000.00 trauma charge in the damages section of the trial in the present


case, and Plaintiff will attempt to object on relevancy grounds due to the validity of the trauma
charge being irrelevant to any of the issues surrounding the Defendants negligence in an
automobile accident case. Therefore, there is a possibility that the Plaintiff will be able to
prohibit the Defendant from arguing about the validity of the trauma charge at trial, only to have
the Defendant forbidden from bringing a second action against the hospital for the improper
billing charges, because of the same collateral estoppel principles espoused in Patel, supra. A
judge will likely appreciate the severely prejudicial predicament that the Defendant in the present
case is placed in and approve of the Defendants efforts to join the hospital in the present case
under Rule 14(a).
APPLICABILITY OF RULE 14(a), SCRCP
Because the Defendants claim against the hospital for improper billing practices is
separate and distinct from the Plaintiffs claims against the Defendant for negligently operating
his vehicle, many of the traditional rules for joinder of parties do not apply. However, Rule 14(a)
of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides a potential avenue for allowing the
Defendant to implead the hospital into this case. Rule 14(a), SCRCP, provides the following:
At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a third-
party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a
person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part
of the plaintiff's claim against him. The third-party plaintiff need not obtain
leave to make the service if he files the third-party complaint not later than 10
days after he serves his original answer. Otherwise he must obtain leave on
motion upon notice to all parties to the action.
Rule 14(a), SCRCP (emphasis added).
Rule 14(a) is most typically associated with allowing the Defendant to bring insurance
companies into litigation, when those companies may be required to indemnify the Defendant in
the event a judgment is rendered against the Defendant. However, Rule 14(a) has also been used


in the past in South Carolina to bring in parties who directly caused the Plaintiffs injuries. For
example, in the case of Parks v. Characters Night Club, 345 S.C. 484, 548 S.E.2d 605 (Ct. App
2001), the Plaintiff was injured when a fellow patron at a nightclub threw a pool ball at the
Plaintiff and injured her. The Plaintiff later sued the nightclub in a premises liability action for
failing to properly monitor and secure its premises. The Court of Appeals, in dismissing the
claims against the nightclub, did not object to the nightclub impleading the individual who
actually threw the pool ball as a third-party Defendant, on the grounds that the third-party
Defendant was the party chiefly responsible for causing the Plaintiffs injuries. Therefore, Parks,
supra, stands for the proposition that a Defendant may implead a party as a third-party Defendant
if the Defendant believes that party is liable for the Plaintiffs actual injuries.
In the present case, the overwhelming portion of the Plaintiffs damages comes from the
exaggerated Level II trauma charge, which does not correlate to either the statements from the
EMS technician or the overall medical conclusions contained within the hospital records.
Therefore, it is the exaggerated trauma charge which principally caused the Plaintiffs monetary
damages. The Defendants actions, much like the nightclub in Parks, supra, had little to do with
the actual funds the Plaintiff was forced to expend due to the ER visit after the accident.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis regarding the applicability of Rule 14(a) and the
prejudice the Defendant will suffer under collateral estoppel principles if he may not bring the
hospital into this action, it is likely that a judge will allow the Defendant to implead the hospital
as a third-party defendant under Rule 14(a). The amount of the trauma charge, placed at roughly
$20,000.00, simply dwarfs the combination of all the other medical bills which may be
correlated to the Defendants actions. In all likelihood, a judge will understand that the Plaintiffs


principal harm is related to the trauma charge and not any negligence of the Defendant in causing
the wreck.