Cigre TB 513

513
5

Final Report of the 2004 - 2007
International Enquiry on Reliability of
High Voltage Equipment

Part 5 - Gas Insulated Switchgear (GIS)

Working Group
A3.06

October 2012

Working Group A3.06

Final Report of the 2004 - 2007 International Enquiry on
Reliability of High Voltage Equipment

Part 5 Gas Insulated Switchgear (GIS)

Members

M. Runde (NO) Convener, C. E. Slver (SE) Past Convener, A. Carvalho (BR),
M. L. Cormenzana (ES), H. Furuta (J P), W. Grieshaber (FR), A. Hyrczak (PL), D. Kopejtkova (CZ),
J . G. Krone (NL), M. Kudoke (CH), D. Makareinis (DE), J . F. Martins (PT), K. Mestrovic (HR),
I. Ohno (J P), J . stlund (SE), K.-Y. Park (KR), J . Patel (IN), C. Protze (DE), J . Schmid (DE),
J . E. Skog (US), B. Sweeney (UK), F. Waite (UK).

Corresponding Members

B. Bergman (CA), S. Tsukao (J P)

Copyright 2012
Ownership of a CIGRE publication, whether in paper form or on electronic support only infers right of use for personal
purposes. Are prohibited, except if explicitly agreed by CIGRE, total or partial reproduction of the publication for use other
than personal and transfer to a third party; hence circulation on any intranet or other company network is forbidden.

Disclaimer notice
CIGRE gives no warranty or assurance about the contents of this publication, nor does it accept any responsibility, as to the
accuracy or exhaustiveness of the information. All implied warranties and conditions are excluded to the maximum extent
permitted by law.

ISBN: 978-2- 85873-206-7

ii

Table of Contents
5.1 CommonMattersofthe20042007ReliabilitySurvey.......................................................1
5.2 Introduction......................................................................................................................2
5.2.1 History of GIS experience surveys ............................................................. 2
5.2.2 The 3
rd
GIS experience survey analysis .................................................... 2
5.3 ParticipationintheSurvey.................................................................................................3
5.4 GISServiceExperienceDistribution...................................................................................5
5.4.1 CountrycontributionandGISvoltageclassserviceexperiencedistribution.......................5
5.4.2 GIS extent service experience distribution ................................................. 9
5.4.3 GIS type of enclosure service experience distribution ............................. 12
5.4.4 GIS location service experience distribution ............................................ 14
5.4.5 GIS age service experience distribution................................................... 18
5.4.6 GIS maintenance practices service experience distribution ..................... 21
5.5 GISFailures.......................................................................................................................23
5.5.1 Countries contribution and GIS voltage classes failures distribution ....... 24
5.5.2 GIS extent failures distribution ................................................................. 27
5.5.3 GIS type of enclosure failures distribution ............................................... 30
5.5.4 GIS location failures distribution .............................................................. 33
5.5.5 GIS failed component distribution ............................................................ 36
5.5.6 GIS age failures distribution ..................................................................... 46
5.6 GISMajorFailureFrequencies..........................................................................................50
5.6.1 Completeness of data .............................................................................. 50
5.6.2 GIS voltage class major failure frequency distribution ............................. 52
5.6.3 GIS extent major failure frequencies distribution ..................................... 56
5.6.4 GIS location major failure frequencies distribution ................................... 58
5.6.5 GIS type of enclosure major failure frequencies distribution .................... 61
5.6.6 SF6/air bushings, cable boxes and transformer bushing failure frequencies
................................................................................................................. 63
5.6.7 GIS age major failure frequencies distribution ......................................... 64
5.6.8 GIS maintenance philosophies major failure frequencies distribution ...... 69
5.7 FailureCharacteristics.......................................................................................................72
5.7.1 Major failure mode ................................................................................... 72
5.7.2 Number of major failures which caused fire or explosion......................... 76
5.7.3 Minor failure mode ................................................................................... 77
5.7.4 Failed subassembly ................................................................................. 78
iii

5.7.5 Failure origin ............................................................................................ 83
5.7.6 Failure primary cause .............................................................................. 85
5.7.7 Failure service conditions ........................................................................ 89
5.7.8 Contribution of environmental stresses to failures ................................... 93
5.7.9 Failure repair ............................................................................................ 95
5.7.10 Consequential measures ......................................................................... 98
5.7.11 GIS parts other than CB, DS/ES and IT failures characteristics ........... 100
5.8 CorrelationsBetweenPrevailingMajorFailuresCharacteristics......................................122
5.8.1 Correlations of major failure modes ....................................................... 122
5.8.2 Correlations of failed subassemblies ..................................................... 126
5.8.3 Correlations of major failure primary causes .......................................... 134
5.8.4 Correlations of major failure service conditions ..................................... 139
5.9 RecommendationforFutureSurveys..............................................................................143
5.10 SummaryandConclusions..............................................................................................144
5.10.1 Summary of main findings ..................................................................... 144
5.10.2 Recommendations for manufacturers and utilities ................................. 152
5.10.3 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 154
References .....................................................................................................................155
Appendix1GISQuestionnaire...............................................................................................156
Appendix2Definitions..........................................................................................................164
1

5.1 Common Matters of the 2004-2007 Reliability Survey
The results of the 2004 - 2007 reliability study of high voltage equipment are presented in six
Technical Brochures (TBs):

TB 509 Final Report of the 2004 - 2007 international enquiry on reliability of
high voltage equipment, Part 1 - Summary and General Matters [1].

high voltage equipment, Part 2 - SF6 Circuit Breakers [2].

TB 511, Final Report of the 2004 - 2007 international enquiry on reliability of
high voltage equipment, Part 3 - Disconnectors and Earthing Switches[3].

high voltage equipment, Part 4 - Instrument Transformers [4]

high voltage equipment, Part 5 - Gas Insulated Switchgear [5].

high voltage equipment, Part 6 - GIS practices [6].

TB 509 contains material that concerns the entire work, such as the objectives and scope,
description of how the survey was organized, explanations of the statistical methods being
applied, suggestions on how utilities can use the results, some general definitions and a
short bibliography. In addition, extensive summaries of the most important findings from the
different component types are included.

The four component TBs, i.e., no. 510 - 513, contain much more details as they present all
results for each component type. This includes tables, figures, and graphs presenting
reliability and service experience data and correlations, as well as text with commentaries
and discussions. The relevant parts of the questionnaire and the relevant definitions used in
the survey are shown in their appendices.

TB 514 presents an overview of utility practices concerning commissioning (high voltage
testing) service (monitoring, diagnostics and service problems), major maintenance,
extension as well as experience with new technology for gas insulated switchgear (GIS). The
information was collected by means of a questionnaire that was circulated together with the
reliability enquiry questionnaire. Again, the relevant parts of the questionnaire and the
associated definitions are shown in its appendix.

Each TB is a self contained and complete report, but does also form a part of a bigger
whole. To simplify cross referencing between the different parts, an overall numbering
system that assigns a unique number to all sections, tables and figures is applied. Items in
Part 1 are numbered using the format 1.X.X.X, in Part 2 the format is 2.X.X.X, etc. In Part 5
the format is 5.X.X.X.

2

5.2 Introduction
5.2.1 History of GIS experience surveys

The 1
st
GIS international survey questionnaire was circulated in 1991 and both users and
manufacturers were addressed. It collected experience up to 31.12.1990. 109 users from 34
countries and 18 manufacturers from 9 countries responded to the questionnaire. The users
experience represented 1 817 GIS, 10 531 circuit breaker-bays (CB-bays) and 78 036 CB-
bay-years, the manufacturers experience represented 4 867 GIS, 24 870 CB-bays and
199 473 CB-bay-years. The questionnaire addressed: general data about GIS installations,
factors which contributed to selection of GIS over AIS, adequacy of existing
design/production/site test procedures, reliability, availability and maintainability, cause of
major failures, future trends/condition monitoring /diagnostics and general open-ended
questions. The survey and data analysis were published in [7], [8], [9] and [10] CIGRE
papers during 1992 to 1994.

The 2
nd
GIS international survey questionnaire was circulated five years later, in 1996, with
the aim of collecting service experience data available up to 31.12.1995. 80 users from 30
countries responded to the questionnaire. The collected data referred to 2115 GIS
installations, 13 696 CB-bays and 118 483 CB-bay-years. In comparison to the 1
st

questionnaire, the 2
nd
questionnaire was more focused on installation overview and major
failure statistics (dataset 1) and GIS life cycle issues (dataset 2). Therefore only users were
addressed. Besides the general data about GIS installations (similar to data sheet in the first
survey) the users were asked to report in dataset 1 the characteristics and service
experience (major failures) for each individual GIS from the beginning of their putting into
service and in dataset 2 to answer more general questions concerning maintenance, lifetime
and environmental aspects independently of the number of installed GIS and voltage level.
The survey and data analysis were published in [11], [12] and [13] CIGRE papers during
1998 to 2000.

The 3
rd
GIS international survey questionnaire was circulated in 2003 and collected
population and failure data in 2004 to 2007. The structure of the questionnaire was as much
as useful similar to the 2
nd
survey to enable a comparison. The survey structure is described
in details in technical brochure [1] and the GIS questionnaire cards and their relevant
definitions can be found in Appendix 1 of this brochure.

5.2.2 The 3
rd
GIS experience survey analysis

The below shown analysis follows a structure of the GIS population cards, and GIS failure
cards for circuit breakers, disconnectors/earthing switches, instrument transformers and
other components in GIS. It uses data from all these five questionnaire cards. As questions
and answers in these cards were not identical it was necessary to make their re-coding to
get a common platform. The resulting analysis below includes the following:
Description of the participation in the survey (chapter 5.3)
Overview of collected GIS service experience distribution (chapter 5.4)
Overview of collected GIS failures distribution (chapter 5.5)
Calculation of GIS major failure frequencies (chapter 5.6)
Analysis of collected GIS major and minor failure characteristics (chapter 5.7)
Correlations between prevailing GIS major failure characteristics (chapter 5.8.)
Summary and conclusion

3

All chapters below include introduction (description of subchapters), collected data in
absolute and relative values, interpretation graphs, comparison with the 2
nd
GIS survey
results (if applicable) and final summary of findings and their WGs commentary.

As the failure frequency is concerned there was taken the same unit as in the 2
nd
survey, i.e.
the failure frequency is described as number of failures per 100 circuit-breaker-bay-years
(CB-bay-years). One CB-bay is a 3-phase GIS assembly consisting of one circuit breaker, its
associated isolating switches, instrument transformers, interconnecting bus up to and
including the line disconnecting switch (if applicable), and section of main bus (if applicable).

GIS maintenance card analysis is included in technical brochure [6].

The GIS voltage ranges, i.e. voltage classes, were divided in the questionnaire and are
described here as follows:

Expression of a voltage
class in the
questionnaire
1

Expression of a voltage class in chapter
tables and graphs [kV]
Expression of a voltage class
in a chapter text
60<= ... <100 kV 60 U<100 kV class 1
100<= ... <200 kV 100 U<200 kV class 2
200<= ... <300 kV 200 U<300 kV class 3
300<= ... <500 kV 300 U<500 kV class 4
500<= ... <700 kV 500 U<700 kV class 5
>=700 kV 700 kV class 6
1
To avoid font compatibility problems when the questionnaire was processed on computers around
the globe, only simple characters were used. Using "<=" instead of "" seemed not to have been
misinterpreted by the users.
5.3 Participation in the Survey
Participation in the survey was quite even in individual reference years (i.e. surveyed years
from 2004 up to and including 2007) in spite of the fact that some countries and some
utilities reported only in some survey years and in the others did not. The same is valid for
the reporting of individual GIS substations in some years specific GISs were reported in
some were not. The GIS questionnaire population card requested that one complete GIS
was described in one line. In such a case the total number of lines in individual reference
years would show the number of reported GIS. Unfortunately many respondents did not
follow the instructions and reported each CB-bay in a separate line. If they simultaneously
did not mention identical name for the GIS in each line or did not mention the GIS name at
all, the database (DB) considered each line as a separate GIS. This problem concerned
23 412 lines with only 1 CB bay reported and 59 lines without any CB- bay (from total of
37 707 DB lines). For this reason it is impossible neither to evaluate number of reported GIS
nor to evaluate an average number of CB-bays in one substation. The responses enable
only analyses of number of participating countries, number of participating utilities, number
of reported CB-bays in individual reference years and number of collected service
experience CB-bay-years, i.e. sum of reported CB-bays in all four reference years.

Table 5-1 shows participation of countries and utilities (in brackets), both in individual
reference years and in individual GIS voltage classes. The total is not a sum of lines above
or to the left as most of countries and many utilities referred about GIS in multiple reference
years and in multiple voltage classes.

Table 5-2 shows number of reported GIS population in individual reference years, i.e.
number of reported CB-bays. Table 5-3 shows the same distribution but without one and
Table 5-4 without two prevailing countries.

4

Table 5-1: Number of countries (utilities) participated in GIS survey (absolute)
Voltage class
Number of countries (utilities) contributing to
reference year
Total number
of different
countries
(utilities) in 4
years 2004 2005 2006 2007
60 U<100 kV 6 (15) 5 (14) 5 (14) 5 (14) 6 (15)
100 U<200 kV
19 (38) 16 (36) 15 (36) 16 (38) 20 (44)
200 U<300 kV
12 (22) 12 (23) 12 (24) 12 (24) 13 (25)
300 U<500 kV
14 (24) 11 (21) 13 (22) 13 (22) 16 (26)
500 U<700 kV
3 (11) 3 (11) 3 (11) 3 (11) 3 (11)
700 kV 2 (2) 2 (2) 2 (2) 2 (2) 2 (2)
Total number of
different countries
(utilities) 23 (50) 21 (48) 20 (48) 21 (49) 24 (55)

Table 5-2: Number of GIS population [CB-bays] collected in individual survey years (absolute)
Voltage class
Number of GIS CB/bays population collected in reference year
2004 2005 2006 2007
60 U<100 kV 10 047 10 071 10 116 10 170
100 U<200 kV
6 144 6 263 6 993 7 002
200 U<300 kV
2 005 2 049 2 093 2 160
300 U<500 kV
2 560 2 434 2 665 2 672
500 U<700 kV
776 797 807 807
700 kV 85 85 85 85
Total 21 617 21 699 22 759 22 896

Table 5-3: Number of GIS population [CB-bays] collected in individual survey years
data without one prevailing country (absolute)
Voltage class
2004 2005 2006 2007
60 U<100 kV 43 46 46 46
100 U<200 kV
5 662 5 779 6 508 6 502
200 U<300 kV
281 313 345 410
300 U<500 kV
1 381 1 245 1 476 1 481
500 U<700 kV
29 47 47 47
700 kV 85 85 85 85
Total 7 481 7 515 8 507 8 571

Table 5-4: Number of GIS population [CB-bays] collected in individual survey years data
without two prevailing countries (absolute)
Voltage class
2004 2005 2006 2007
60 U<100 kV 26 29 29 29
100 U<200 kV
945 854 942 936
200 U<300 kV
281 313 345 410
300 U<500 kV
517 360 399 404
500 U<700 kV
29 47 47 47
700 kV 48 48 48 48
Total 1 846 1 651 1 810 1 874

As the GIS population card asked for 3-phase data about Gas Insulated Switchgear
(GIS) and those parts of hybrid substations made from GIS components all of the
above mentioned values are related to 3-phase arrangements.
5

Comparison with previous survey
Number of countries (24) as well as number of utilities (55) participating in the 3
rd
GIS
experience survey is lower than participation in the 2
nd
survey by 20% for countries (30) and
31% for utilities (80). Number of referred GIS CB-bays (22 240) is higher than in the 2
nd

survey (13 696) by about 60%. This reflects an increasing use of GIS technology.

The utilities, that responded to the 3
rd
survey, are not the same and there is only a certain
overlap (less than 50%) in both surveys. This makes the comparison of both surveys results
problematic. The brochure user is therefore kindly asked to keep this fact in mind when
reading the comparison with previous survey paragraphs below.

Findings and commentary
The participation of countries and utilities in the four years (2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007) of
the survey was quite even. The same is valid for their four years contributions in individual
voltage classes. Altogether 24 countries and 55 utilities took part in the survey with an
average total population of about 22 240 GIS CB-bays. As shown later in chapter 5.4 the
WG A3-06 decided to provide two types of analyses the first one for all collected data and
the second one for all data without countries 14 and 23 data. The reason is to analyze the
data without two dominant countries separately to find out if there are any differences.
5.4 GIS Service Experience Distribution

As written in chapter 5.3 a sum of reported CB-bays in individual reference years gives a
value of reported GIS service experience, i.e. number of CB-bay-years. The reported service
experience population data [CB-bay-years] is analyzed here from the following point of
views:
Country contribution to the survey and GIS voltage class distribution (chapter 5.4.1)
GIS extent distribution (chapter 5.4.2)
GIS type of enclosure distribution (chapter 5.4.3)
GIS location distribution (chapter 5.4.4)
GIS age distribution (chapter 5.4.5)
GIS maintenance practices distribution (chapter 5.4.6)

The reported GIS service experience is a number of three phases CB-Bays.

5.4.1 Country contribution and GIS voltage class service experience
distribution

Country contribution to the survey is shown in Table 5-5. It shows voltage class contributions
of the individual countries as well as their contribution to the total. 100% bases are the
service experiences of individual voltage classes, and/or total data (last column) cumulated
over the 4-year survey period.

6

Table 5-5 : GIS service experience country contribution to the survey (absolute and relative values within individual voltage classes)
Country
code
GIS Voltage class
Total
60U<100 kV
(cl.1)
100U<200 kV
(cl.2)
200U<300 kV
(cl.3)
300U<500 kV
(cl.4)
500U<700 kV
(cl.5)
700 kV
(cl.6)
Number of
CB-bay-
years
[%] Number of
CB-bay-
years
[%] Number of
CB-bay-
years
[%] Number of
CB-bay-
years
[%] Number of
CB-bay-
years
[%] Number of
CB-bay-
years
[%] Number
of
CB-bay-
years
[%]
1 72 0,18 136 0,52 96 1,16 216 2,09 0 0 192 56,47 712 0,80
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 0,23 0 0 0 0 24 0,03
4 0 0 166 0,63 56 0,67 0 0 0 0 0 0 222 0,25
5 0 0 8 0,03 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0,01
7 0 0 95 0,36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 95 0,11
8 0 0 661 2,50 0 0 136 1,32 0 0 0 0 797 0,90
9 0 0 116 0,44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 116 0,13
10 0 0 0 0 12 0,14 0 0 44 1,38 0 0 56 0,06
11 12 0,03 192 0,73 44 0,53 72 0,70 0 0 0 0 320 0,36
12 0 0 24 0,09 81 0,98 12 0,12 0 0 0 0 117 0,13
13 0 0 653 2,47 8 0,10 24 0,23 0 0 0 0 685 0,77
14 40 223 99,55 1 951 7,39 6 958 83,76 4748 45,96 3017 94,67 0 0 56 897 63,95
17 2 0,00 68 0,26 29 0,35 159 1,54 0 0 0 0 258 0,29
18 0 0 32 0,12 13 0,13 0 0 0 0 45 0,05
19 27 0,07 80 0,30 49 0,59 4 0,04 126 3,95 0 0 286 0,32
20 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 0,52 0 0 0 0 54 0,06
21 0 0 528 2,00 100 1,20 554 5,36 0 0 0 0 1182 1,33
22 0 0 31 0,12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 0,03
23 68 0,17 20 774 78,68 0 0 3 903 37,78 0 0 148 43,53 24 893 27,98
24 0 0 0 0 762 9,17 288 2,79 0 0 0 0 1 050 1,18
26 0 0 3 0,01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0,00
27 0 0 3 0,01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0,00
28 0 0 324 1,23 52 0,63 116 1,12 0 0 0 0 492 0,55
29 0 0 557 2,11 60 0,72 8 0,08 0 0 0 0 625 0,70
Total 2664 45.41 22548 29.67 9882 9.34 30018 11.61 13128 3.58 2040 0.38 88 971 100,00
7

Collected service experience in individual voltage classes is summarized in table 5-6 in
absolute numbers and in % (the base is total number of collected service experience). Figure
5-1 shows a graph of absolute values for all data and it compares it with all data without two
dominant countries 14 and 23.

Table 5-6: GIS service experience in individual voltage classes (absolute and relative values
within total)
Voltage class
All data Data without countries 14 and 23
Number of CB-bay-years % Number of CB-bay-years %
60U<100 kV 40 404 45,4 113 1,6
100U<200 kV 26 402 29,7 3 677 51,2
200U<300 kV 8 307 9,3 1 349 18,8
300U<500 kV 10 331 11,6 1 680 23,4
500U<700 kV 3 187 3,6 170 2,4
700 kV 340 0,4 192 2,7
Total 88 971 100,0 7 181 100

Figure 5-1: Distribution of GIS service experience absolute values in individual voltage classes

The 2
nd
GIS experience survey collected service experience, number of major failures, for the
whole time of the referred GISs life. The total collected service experience was therefore
higher (118 483 GIS CB-bay-years) than in the 3
rd
survey (88 971 GIS CB-bay-years). In
spite of that the 3
rd
survey collected experience reached 75% of those from the 2
nd
survey. In
the 2
nd
survey there was one dominant country equal to one of the two dominant countries in
the 3
rd
survey (country 14). The second dominant country (country 23) did not participated in
the 2
nd
survey. The 2
nd
survey results were thus provided for all population and for population
without one dominant country to show the GIS performance in Europe and in the rest of the
world. For failure frequency calculation in the 2nd survey one more utility data were
subtracted. This utility had one of the oldest breaker technology in its GIS with extremely
high number of failures. As the voltage class definitions were the same in both surveys it is
possible to provide a comparison of collected service experience as shown in table 5-7.

0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
e
x
p
e
r
i
n
c
e
[
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
GISserviceexperiencevoltageclasses
distribution(alldata)
60U<100kV
100U<200kV
200U<300kV
300U<500kV
500U<700kV
700kV
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
GISserviceexperience
voltageclassesdistribution
(datawithoutcountries14
and23)
8

Table 5-7: Comparison of collected GIS service experience in individual voltage classes in the
2
nd
and the 3
rd
GIS surveys (absolute values)
Voltage class
Collected GIS service experience
2
nd
survey [CB-bay-years]
3
rd
All data
All data without
the worst utility
Data without
country 14 and
the worst utility All data
Data without
countries 14 and 23
60U<100 kV 56 884 56 884 5 114 40 404 113
100U<200 kV 34 060 29 415 20 999 26 402 3 677
200U<300 kV 16 040 16 040 9 576 8 307 1 349
300U<500 kV 6 774 6 371 6 371 10 331 1 680
500U<700 kV 4 525 4 525 1 101 3 187 170
700 kV 200 200 200 340 192
Total 118 483 113 435 43 361 88 971 7 181

As the 3
rd
survey experience without two dominant countries (14 and 23) represents only
15% of comparable collected data in the 2
nd
survey the WG A3-06 decided to provide most of
the survey comparisons below only for all data. The reader can, if he wishes, find result
details for 2
nd
survey without country 14 population in [13].

Graphical interpretation of all data collected service experience is shown in Fig.5-2.

Figure 5-2: Comparison of total collected GIS service experience in individual voltage classes
in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
GIS surveys

The total collected data of service experience in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
GIS experience surveys
in individual voltage classes is comparable and can be used (with restrictions mentioned in
5.3) for their results approximate comparison. An increase of the collected experience has
been observed only in voltage class 4.

0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
e
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
[
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
Voltageclass[kV]
ComparisonofcollectedGISserviceexperience
2ndsurvey
(1995)
3rdsurvey
(2007)
9


From the above shown tables it is evident that the reported service experience is dominated
by countries with codes 14 and 23. Both are countries that are traditionally known of using
modern technologies and of applying effective maintenance strategies. Country with code
number 14 dominates almost absolutely in voltage class 1 (99,6%) and in voltage class 5
(94,7%). In voltage class 3 it represents 83,8 % of reported service experience. Country with
code 23 dominates in voltage class 2 (78,7 %). In class 4 these two countries share the
domination by 46% (country 14) and by 37,8% (country 23). Only two countries reported
about service experience in class 7. These two countries (country 1 and 23) share the total
service experience in class 7 by approximately half and half.

This uneven distribution of service experience shall be kept in mind when reading the rest of
the results analysis. If the further analysis was made only for total data the contribution of
other countries than 14 and 23 would be suppressed. However it might be interesting to see
also the differences between the two prevailing countries and the rest. Therefore the WG
decided to provide the analyses of reported service experience data, where appropriate, for
total data and for data without the two dominant countries.

The difference is already visible when evaluating the division of the service experience in
individual GIS voltage classes in the survey. Evaluating all data, classes 1 (45,5%) and 2
(29,7%) prevail whereas class 4 represents about 12% and the portion of other classes is
less than 10%. Evaluating data without countries 14 and 23 the majority of experience lies in
class 2 (51%), 3 (19%) and 4 (23%).

5.4.2 GIS extent service experience distribution
The respondents were asked to divide their GIS installations population into the following
two categories (for details see Appendix 1 the questionnaire):
Fully GIS - substation the bays of which are fully made from GIS technology
components. Only external HV connections to overhead or cable lines, or
transformers, shunt reactors and capacitors can have external insulation.
Hybrid GIS - substation the bays of which are made from a mix of GIS and AIS
technology components, i.e. in which the CB-bays contains combination of enclosed
gas insulated and air insulated parts.

Collected service experiences in individual voltage classes are summarized in table 5-8 for
all data and in table 5-9 for all data without countries 14 and 23. The values in both tables
are expressed in absolute and in relative values. The calculation bases for relative values are
numbers of collected service experiences in individual voltage classes. Figures 5-3 show
graphically absolute data in Tables 5-8 and 5-9, i.e. portions of fully GIS and hybrid GIS CB-
bays service experiences collected in individual voltage classes.

10

Table 5-8 : Distribution of service experience for the two types of GIS installation extent - all
data (absolute and relative values within individual voltage classes)
Voltage class
Fully GIS [CB-bay-years] Hybrid GIS [CB-bay-years]
Absolute % Absolute %
60U<100 kV 37 819 93,6 2 585 6,4
100U<200 kV 25 732 97,5 670 2,5
200U<300 kV 7 123 85,7 1 184 14,3
300U<500 kV 8 807 85,2 1 524 14,8
500U<700 kV 1 890 59,3 1 297 40,7
700 kV 340 100,0 0 0,0
Total 81 711 91,8 7 260 8,2

Table 5-9 : Distribution of service experience for the two types of GIS installation extent - data
without countries 14 and 23 (absolute and relative values within individual voltage classes)
Voltage class
Fully GIS [CB-bay-years] Hybrid GIS [CB-bay-years]
60U<100 kV 113 100,0 0 0,0
100U<200 kV 3 398 92,4 279 7,6
200U<300 kV 1 266 93,8 83 6,2
300U<500 kV 1 469 87,4 211 12,6
500U<700 kV 170 100,0 0 0,0
700 kV 192 100,0 0 0,0
Total 6 608 92,0 573 8,0

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GISinstallation extentdistribution(alldata)
FullyGIS
HybridGIS
11

Figures 5-3 : Distribution of service experience absolute values for the two types of GIS
installation extent

Comparison with the 2
nd
GIS experience survey is provided in table 5-10 and figures 5-4.

Table 5-10: Comparison of collected fully and hybrid GIS service experience in individual
voltage classes in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
Voltage class
2
nd
3
rd
Fully GIS Hybrid GIS Fully GIS Hybrid GIS
60U<100 kV 54 452 2 432 37 819 2 585
100U<200 kV 31 864 2 196 25 732 670
200U<300 kV 15 018 1 022 7 123 1 184
300U<500 kV 6 680 94 8 807 1 524
500U<700 kV 3 742 783 1 890 1 297
700 kV 200 0 340 0
Total 111 956 6 527 81 711 7 260

Figures 5-4: Comparison of collected fully and hybrid GIS service experience in individual
nd
and the 3
rd
GIS surveys

The difference in absolute as well as relative collected service experience between the 2
nd

and the 3
rd
surveys is visible namely at hybrid GIS installations. With exception of voltage
class 2, there is visible an increase in hybrid GIS utilization.

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HybridGIS
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12

Portion of hybrid GIS installations is still relatively small. Hybrid GIS represents only about
8% of all collected data. There is no difference between relative total data and relative data
without two dominant countries. However there is a certain trend visible in increasing their
portion at higher voltage classes in which mixed technologies (MTS) installation can offer
advantages for new installations as well as for upgrading and extensions of existing AIS (for
details about comparison of AIS-GIS-MTS features see CIGRE technical brochure [15].
5.4.3 GIS type of enclosure service experience distribution
The respondents were asked to divide their GIS installations population in dependence on
number of HV conductors placed in one enclosure into the following two categories (for
details see Appendix 1 the questionnaire):
Single phase enclosure (1-phase)
Three phase enclosure (3-phase)
They were supposed to indentify these categories separately for busbars and for individual
CB-bays.

are expressed in absolute and in relative values. The bases for calculations of relative values
are numbers of collected service experiences in individual voltage classes.

Table 5-11: Distribution of service experience for the two types of GIS enclosure design - all
Voltage class
Number of CB-bay-years in CB-
bay design of
Number of CB-bay-years connected
to busbar design of
1-phase 3-phase 1-phase 3-phase
Absolute % Absolute % Absolute % Absolute %
60U<100 kV 7 752 19,2 32 652 80,8 15 139 37,5 25 265 62,5
100U<200 kV 15 453 58,5 10 949 41,5 2 058 7,8 24 344 92,2
200U<300 kV 3 643 43,9 4 664 56,1 3 409 41,0 4 898 59,0
300U<500 kV 8 555 82,8 1 776 17,2 4 154 40,2 6 177 59,8
500U<700 kV 3 187 100,0 0 0,0 2 233 70,1 954 29,9
700 kV 340 100,0 0 0,0 340 100,0 0 0,0
Total 38 930 43,8 50 041 56,2 27 333 30,7 61 638 69,3

Table 5-12: Distribution of service experience for the two types of GIS enclosure design - data
Voltage class
Number of CB-bay-years in CB-
bay design of
Number of CB-bay-years connected
to busbar design of
60U<100 kV 72 63,7 41 36,3 0,0 113 100,0
100U<200 kV 1 972 53,6 1 705 46,4 1 445 39,3 2 232 60,7
200U<300 kV 1 333 98,8 16 1,2 916 67,9 433 32,1
300U<500 kV 1 670 99,4 10 0,6 1 516 90,2 164 9,8
500U<700 kV 170 100,0 0 0,0 170 100,0 0 0,0
700 kV 192 100,0 0 0,0 192 100,0 0 0,0
Total 5 409 75,3 1 772 24,7 4 239 59,0 2 942 41,0

13

As the questionnaire asked about the design for two separate parts of GIS it was necessary
to synthesize the answers to get an overview about the collected service experience of
uniform design substations and of combined design substations. The results of this synthesis
are shown in table 5-13 for all data and in table 5-14 for all data without countries 14 and 23.
The values in both tables are expressed in absolute and in relative values. The bases for
calculations of relative values are numbers of collected service experiences in individual
voltage classes. Figures 5-5 show graphically absolute data in tables 5-13 and 5-14, i.e.
portions of 1-phase, 3-phase and combined GIS CB-bays service experiences in individual
voltage classes.

Table 5-13: Distribution of service experience for combinations of the two types of GIS
enclosure design - all data (absolute and relative values within individual voltage classes)
Voltage class
Number of CB-bay-years
1-phase GIS 3-phase GIS Busbar 1-phase +
CB-bay 3-phase
Busbar 3-phase +
CB-bay 1-phase
60U<100 kV 3 818 9,4 21 331 52,8 11 321 28,0 3 934 9,7
100U<200 kV 1 826 6,9 10 717 40,6 232 0,9 13 627 51,6
200U<300 kV 2 664 32,1 3 919 47,2 745 9,0 979 11,8
300U<500 kV 4 154 40,2 1 776 17,2 0 0,0 4 401 42,6
500U<700 kV 2 233 70,1 0 0,0 0 0,0 954 29,9
700 kV 340 100,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
Total 15 035 16,9 37 743 42,4 12 298 13,8 23 895 26,9

Table 5-14: Distribution of service experience for combinations of the two types of GIS
enclosure design - data without countries 14 and 23 (absolute and relative values within
individual voltage classes)
Voltage class
1-phase GIS 3-phase GIS Busbar 1-phase +
CB-bay 3-phase
Busbar 3-phase +
CB-bay 1-phase
60U<100 kV 0 0,0 41 36,3 0 0,0 72 63,7
100U<200 kV 1 437 39,1 1 705 46,4 8 0,2 535 14,5
200U<300 kV 912 67,6 16 1,2 4 0,3 421 31,2
300U<500 kV 1 516 90,2 10 0,6 0 0,0 154 9,2
500U<700 kV 170 100,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
700 kV 192 100,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
Total 4 227 58,9 1 772 24,7 12 0,2 1 182 16,5

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GISdesigndistribution(alldata)
1phaseGIS
3phaseGIS
Busbar1phase+
CBbay3phase
Busbar3phase+
CBbay1phase
14

Figures 5-5: Distribution of service experience (absolute values for combinations of the two
types of GIS enclosure design]

The further analysis focuses mainly on CB-bays design. The main reason is that the further
failure frequency analysis is subsequently made for one CB-bay. This is the same way as
made in 1995 in the previous GIS survey. The only place where 1-phase and 3-phase busbar
enclosure will be considered will be the analysis of busbar failures itself.

The 2
nd
GIS survey questionnaire did not ask a question about the referred GIS an enclosure
design.

Combination of 1-phase busbars and 3-phase CB-bays appears very seldom in 13,8% of all
collected experience (thereof in 28% in voltage class 1) and almost does not exist in other
countries than in 14 and 23. Combination of 3-phase busbars and 1-phase CB-bays appears
much more frequently and represents 27% in total and 17% in other countries than 14 and
23 collected experience. It can be found with a high portion (30%) even in voltage class 5
GIS. Evaluating the total data this combination seems to be very popular in voltage classes 2
and 4 in which it reaches 52% and 43% of service experience collected in these voltage
classes. In countries other than 14 and 23 this design combination is used in voltage classes
1 (64%), 2 (15%), 3 (31%) and 4 (9%).

As unified designs are concerned the single phase GIS appears in all voltage classes- the
higher voltage the higher representation. It s representation vary from about 10% at classes
1 and 2 up to nearly a half in voltage classes 3 and 4 and to almost 100% in voltage classes
5 and 6. Countries other than 14 and 23 use single phase GIS design even more frequently
and this design prevails starting already voltage class 3. The three phase GIS design can be
found up to voltage class 4 and it is used in countries 14 and 23 much more often than in
other countries. It prevails in GIS up to voltage class 3, whereas in other counties only up to
voltage class 2.
5.4.4 GIS location service experience distribution
The respondents were asked to divide their GIS installations populations into the following
categories (for details see Appendix 1 the questionnaire):
GIS Indoor Normal (Indoor N) - for normal indoor conditions
GIS Indoor Special (Indoor S) - for special indoor conditions (e.g. for containerized
installations, installations under simple buildings as shelters without heating, altitudes
>1000m, etc.)
GIS Outdoor Normal (Outdoor N) - for normal outdoor conditions
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Voltageclass[kV]
GISdesigndistribution(datawithoutcountries14and23)
1phaseGIS
3phaseGIS
Busbar1phase+
CBbay3phase
Busbar3phase+
CBbay1phase
15

GIS Outdoor Special (Outdoor S) - for special outdoor conditions (e.g. for lower
ambient temperatures than -40C, altitudes >1000m, pollution areas III or IV, ice
coating >20 mm, direct coastal areas, etc.)

Note: GIS whose only outdoor parts are bushings (SF6/air, SF6/transformer) and/or
necessary lengths of connecting busducts are considered as indoor installations.

are expressed in absolute and in relative values. The bases for relative values calculations
are numbers of collected service experiences in individual voltage classes.

Figures 5-6 show graphically absolute data in tables 5-15 and 5-16, i.e. portions of indoor
normal, indoor special, outdoor normal and outdoor special GIS locations CB-bays service
experiences in individual voltage classes.

As special installations portions are almost negligible (with exception of voltage class 1
distribution in data without countries 14 and 23) further analysis is made only in the division
of Indoor/Outdoor locations. To show the difference between installation habits in all
population (dominated by countries 14 and 23) and the rest of the world, table 5-17 shows
absolute and relative data and figure 5-7 illustrates relative values of Indoor/Outdoor
installations in these two groups of population.

Table 5-15: Distribution of service experience for types of GIS installation locations - all data
(absolute and relative values within individual voltage classes)
Voltage class
Indoor N Indoor S Outdoor N Outdoor S
60U<100 kV 12 643 31,3 155 0,4 27 462 68,0 144 0,4
100U<200 kV 17 458 66,1 24 0,1 8 920 33,8 0 0,0
200U<300 kV 2 707 32,6 20 0,2 5 561 66,9 19 0,2
300U<500 kV 2 847 27,6 64 0,6 7 396 71,6 24 0,2
500U<700 kV 336 10,5 9 0,3 2 830 88,8 12 0,4
700 kV 192 56,5 0 0,0 148 43,5 0 0,0
Total 36 183 40,7 272 0,3 52 317 58,8 199 0,2

Table 5-16: Distribution of service experience for types of GIS installation locations - data
Voltage class
Indoor N Indoor S Outdoor N Outdoor S
60U<100 kV 74 65,5 27 23,9 12 10,6 0 0,0
100U<200 kV 3 397 92,4 24 0,7 256 7,0 0 0,0
200U<300 kV 1 282 95,0 7 0,5 60 4,4 0 0,0
300U<500 kV 1 263 75,2 64 3,8 329 19,6 24 1,4
500U<700 kV 32 18,8 0 0,0 138 81,2 0 0,0
700 kV 192 100,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
Total 6 240 86,9 122 1,7 795 11,1 24 0,3

16

Figures 5-6: Distribution of service experience (absolute values for types of GIS installation
locations)

Table 5-17: Distribution of service experience for indoor and outdoor GIS installation locations
all data and data without countries 14 and 23 (absolute and relative values within individual
voltage classes)
Voltage class
Number of CB-bay-years (all
data)
Number of CB-bay-years (data
without countries 14 and 23)
Indoor GIS Outdoor GIS Indoor GIS Outdoor GIS
60U<100 kV 12 798 31,7 27 606 68,3 101 89,4 12 10,6
100U<200 kV 17 482 66,2 8 920 33,8 3 421 93,0 256 7,0
200U<300 kV 2 727 32,8 5 580 67,2 1 289 95,6 60 4,4
300U<500 kV 2 911 28,2 7 420 71,8 1 327 79,0 353 21,0
500U<700 kV 345 10,8 2 842 89,2 32 18,8 138 81,2
700 kV 192 56,5 148 43,5 192 100,0 0 0,0
Total 36 455 41,0 52 516 59,0 6 362 88,6 819 11,4

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IndoorS
OutdoorN
OutdoorS
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IndoorN
IndoorS
OutdoorN
OutdoorS
17

Figure 5-7: Relative distribution and comparison of service experience for indoor and outdoor
GIS installation locations


The distinction between normal and special GIS locations was made only in the 3
rd

survey. Comparison with the 2
nd
GIS experience survey in categories indoor-outdoor is
provided in table 5-18 and figure 5-8.

Table 5-18: Comparison of collected indoor and outdoor GIS service experience in individual
nd
and the 3
rd
Voltage class
2
nd
3
rd
60U<100 kV
22 573 34 311 12 798 27 606
100U<200 kV
28 173 5 887 17 482 8 920
200U<300 kV
9 734 6 306 2 727 5 580
300U<500 kV
4 356 2 418 2 911 7 420
500U<700 kV
2 044 2 481 345 2 842
700 kV
200 0 192 148
Total
67 080 51 403 36 455 52 516

Figures 5-8: Comparison of collected indoor and outdoor GIS service experience in individual
nd
and the 3
rd
GIS surveys

Outdoor GIS experience has relatively increased (in voltage classes 2, 4 and 5 also
absolutely) in all voltage classes in the 3
rd
GIS survey compared to the 2
nd
GIS survey.

0
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Indoor(alldata) Outdoor(alldata) Indoor(data
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Outdoor(data
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700kV
Total
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3rd survey
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Comparisonofcollected outdoorGISserviceexperience
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18

Special locations are very rare. They represents only 0,3 % of indoor and 0,2% of outdoor
installations. Therefore it is possible to neglect the special conditions in further analysis and
to add these installations to only indoor/outdoor categories.

As indoor/outdoor installations are concerned there is a visible difference when evaluating all
data and data without countries 14 and 23. Analyzing all data it seems that outdoor
installations slightly prevail in higher voltage classes starting voltage class 4. The
installations of other voltage classes most probably depend on local needs and not on a
general installation policy. The utilities in countries other than 14 and 23 prefer indoor
installations at all voltage classes (except class 5) in spite of the fact that size of GIS
building or shelter can represent a certain design challenge.

5.4.5 GIS age service experience distribution
As the survey was running in the period of 4 years the reported GIS age overview would be
complicated (floating age). The age aspect is therefore expressed in another way in the
way of analyzing manufacturing years. In the GIS population failure cards there were
identified manufacturing years of individual GIS. In CB and other equipments population
cards there were identified only intervals of manufacturing years. The GIS data were
therefore also classified into the same intervals to provide the data analysis in the same
structure of classes.

Table 5-19 shows a distribution of collected GIS service experience in seven intervals of GIS
manufacturing years for all data and in absolute and relative values (100% is number of GIS
CB-bays service experience collected within individual voltage classes). Table 5-20 shows
the same data but without two dominant countries.

Table 5-19 : Distribution of service experience in seven intervals of GIS manufacturing years -
all data (absolute and relative values within individual voltage classes)
Manufacturing
year
60U
<100 kV
100U
<200 kV
200U
<300 kV
300U
<500 kV
500U
<700 kV
700 kV
abs. % abs. % abs. % abs. % abs. % abs. %
before 1979 2 760 6,8 354 1,3 697 8,4 420 4,1 160 5,0 0 0,0
1979-1983 4 092 10,1 773 2,9 722 8,7 1 153 11,2 574 18,0 0 0,0
1984-1988 8 916 22,1 1 731 6,6 1 590 19,1 1 466 14,2 512 16,1 192 56,5
1989-1993 9 926 24,6 3 532 13,4 1 826 22,0 1 813 17,5 513 16,1 0 0,0
1994-1998 8 965 22,2 7 533 28,5 1 755 21,1 2 662 25,8 863 27,1 0 0,0
1999-2003 5 247 13,0 8 537 32,3 1 264 15,2 1 950 18,9 524 16,4 140 41,2
2004-2007 498 1,2 3 942 14,9 453 5,5 867 8,4 41 1,3 8 2,4
Total 40 404 100 26 402 100 8 307 100 10 331 100 3 187 100 340 100

Table 5-20 : Distribution of service experience in seven intervals of GIS manufacturing years
data without countries 14 and 23 (absolute and relative values within individual voltage
classes)
Manufacturing
year
60U
<100 kV
100U
<200 kV
200U
<300 kV
300U
<500 kV
500U
<700 kV
700 kV
before 1979 72 63,7 288 7,8 189 14,0 172 10,2 0 0,0 0 0,0
1979-1983 0 0,0 504 13,7 108 8,0 501 29,8 138 81,2 0 0,0
1984-1988 12 10,6 691 18,8 29 2,1 374 22,3 32 18,8 192 100,0
1989-1993 2 1,8 706 19,2 130 9,6 285 17,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
1994-1998 0 0,0 412 11,2 136 10,1 98 5,8 0 0,0 0 0,0
1999-2003 27 23,9 729 19,8 403 29,9 64 3,8 0 0,0 0 0,0
2004-2007 0 0,0 347 9,4 354 26,2 186 11,1 0 0,0 0 0,0
Total 113 100 3 677 100 1 349 100 1 680 100 170 100 192 100

19

Table 5-21 shows the same data as tables 5-19 and 5-20 but the relative values are
recalculated to total collected service experience value (100% is total number of GIS CB-
bays service experience). Figures 5-9 provide graphical interpretations of the relative data
from table 5-21.

Table 5-21: Distribution of service experience in seven intervals of GIS manufacturing years
all data and data without countries 14 and 23 (absolute and relative values within all collected
data)
Manufacturing year All data data without countries 14
and 23
abs. % abs. %
before 1979 4 391 4,9 721 10,0
1979-1983 7 314 8,2 1 251 17,4
1984-1988 14 407 16,2 1 330 18,5
1989-1993 17 610 19,8 1 123 15,6
1994-1998 21 778 24,5 646 9,0
1999-2003 17 662 19,9 1 223 17,0
2004-2007 5 809 6,5 887 12,4
Total 88 971 100,0 7 181 100,0

Figures 5-9: Distribution of service experience - absolute values in seven intervals of GIS
manufacturing years for individual voltage classes

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60U<100kV
100U<200kV
200U<300kV
300U<500kV
500U<700kV
700kV
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ReportedGISserviceexperienceindependenceon
manufacturingyearinterval(datawithoutcountries14and
23)
60U<100kV
100U<200kV
200U<300kV
300U<500kV
500U<700kV
700kV
20

In the population card of the 2
nd
GIS survey there was a column for inserting the year when
each GIS substation was put into service. However, in the analysis brochure [13] the
collected service experience used for failure frequency calculation is expressed only in two
categories - for GIS commissioned before 1.1.1985 and after 1.1.1985, i.e. for GIS younger
than 12 years (age of 1 to 11 years) and for older than 12 years. To compare the results with
the 3
rd
survey it was therefore necessary to classify the data into the same two age intervals.
The comparison is shown in table 5-22 and figure 5-10. The table shows data without one
worst utility for the 2
nd
survey and only the complete data (data having its equivalent in failure
cards) for the 3
rd
survey. This data is used for failure frequency comparison (see chapter
5.6).

Table 5-22: Comparison of 2
nd
and 3
rd
GIS surveys collected GIS service experience of GIS
older than 11 years and 11 years old or younger in individual voltage classes (absolute values)
Voltage class
2
nd
3
rd
GIS age
>11 years
GIS age
11 years
GIS age
>11 years
GIS age
11 years
60U<100 kV
28 669 28 215 28 932 11 472
100U<200 kV
16 871 12 544 8 376 18 003
200U<300 kV
10 362 5 678 5 314 2 993
300U<500 kV
3 694 2 677 5 624 4 707
500U<700 kV
3 252 1 273 1 972 1215
700 kV
0 200 192 148
Total
62 848 50 587 50 410 38 538

Figure 5-10: Comparison of 2
nd
and 3
rd
GIS surveys collected GIS service experience of GIS
older than 11 years and 11 years old or younger

In the 2
nd
GIS survey the collected service experience for older GIS was greater than for
younger in all voltage classes. In the 3
rd
survey, this is not valid for voltage class 2. As
relative values are concerned very similar patterns are visible in voltage classes 3, 4 and 5.
In spite of that the figure just reflects a difference between the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
surveys utilities
participation.

0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
S
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C
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Voltageclass[kV]
ComparisonofcollectedGISexperinceintwoagegroups
>11yearsoldGIS
2ndsurvey(1995)
11yearsoldGIS
2ndsurvey(1995)
>11yearsoldGIS
3rdsurvey(2007)
11yearsoldGIS
3rdsurvey(2007)
21

The oldest reported GIS substation was manufactured and installed in 1960 and belongs to
voltage class 1. The oldest voltage class 2 substations were installed in 1963 (1 substation)
and in 1968 (2 substations). The oldest GIS of voltage classes 3 to 6 were installed in 1970,
1975, 1973 and in 1986 respectively.

In all seven manufacturing years intervals there was collected enough data in both data sets
(i.e. total and total without two dominant countries) to be able to provide failure frequencies
time trend analyses.

5.4.6 GIS maintenance practices service experience distribution
The respondents were asked to identify their maintenance philosophy in each reference year
and in each line describing their population in the reference year. Therefore the response
analysis is made in correlation to collected service experience.
The respondent had the following options to select that one which corresponds to their
practice most appropriately:
Time based maintenance philosophy (TBM)
Condition based maintenance philosophy (CBM)
Run to failure (RTF)
Combination of TBM and CBM (e.g. RCM reliability centered maintenance)
Other

Maintenance philosophies in relation to the collected service experiences in individual
voltage classes are summarized in table 5-23 for all data and in table 5-24 for all data without
countries 14 and 23. The values in both tables are expressed in absolute and in relative
values. The bases for relative values calculations are numbers of collected service
experiences in individual voltage classes. No respondent selected the run to failure
philosophy in any voltage class.

Figures 5-11 show graphically relative data in the tables.

Table 5-23: Distribution of service experience for types of GIS maintenance philosophies - all
Voltage class
Number of CB-bay-years referred to different maintenance practices
(all data)
Time based
maintenance
(TBM)
Condition
based
maintenance
(CBM)
Combination of
TBM and CBM
Other
60U<100 kV 27 468 68,0 72 0,2 12 862 31,8 2 0,0
100U<200 kV 24 984 94,6 505 1,9 865 3,3 48 0,2
200U<300 kV 3 994 48,1 152 1,8 4 132 49,7 29 0,3
300U<500 kV 6 520 63,1 740 7,2 2 912 28,2 159 1,5
500U<700 kV 2 327 73,0 0 0,0 860 27,0 0 0,0
700 kV 148 43,5 192 56,5 0 0,0 0 0,0
Total 65 441 73,6 1 661 1,9 21 631 24,3 238 0,3

22

Table 5-24: Distribution of service experience for types of GIS maintenance philosophies data
Voltage class
Number of CB-bay-years referred to different maintenance practices
(data without countries 14 and 23)
Time based
maintenance
(TBM)
Condition
based
maintenance
(CBM)
Combination of
TBM and CBM
Other
60U<100 kV 39 34,5 72 63,7 0 0,0 2 1,8
100U<200 kV 2 259 61,4 505 13,7 865 23,5 48 1,3
200U<300 kV 133 9,9 152 11,3 1 035 76,7 29 2,1
300U<500 kV 209 12,4 740 44,0 572 34,0 159 9,5
500U<700 kV 126 74,1 0 0,0 44 25,9 0 0,0
700 kV 0 0,0 192 100,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
Total 2 766 38,5 1 661 23,1 2 516 35,0 238 3,3

Figures 5-11: Relative distribution of service experience for different types of GIS maintenance
strategies

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
GISserviceexperiencemaintenancestrategiesrelative
Other
Combinationof
timeandcondition
basedmaint.
Conditionbased
maint.
Timebasedmaint.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
GISserviceexperiencemaintenancestrategiesrelativedistribution
(datawithoutcountries14and23)
Other
Combinationoftime
andconditionbased
maint.
Conditionbased
maint.
Timebasedmaint.
23

In the 2
nd
survey, the GIS maintenance aspects were included in a specialized questionnaire
card called GIS life expectancy, maintenance, environmental: This card is similar to 3
rd

survey specialized questionnaire card called GIS maintenance card. The resulting analysis
of responses as well as its comparison with results of the 2nd survey is included in technical
brochure [6].

In either graphs (all data or in data without countries 14 and 23) no trend is visible that could
be related to the voltage class distribution. The result is most probably influenced by the fact
that different companies with different maintenance philosophies contributed to different
voltage classes. There is however a visible difference between the philosophies interpreted
from all data and data without countries 14 and 23. In all data analysis, the traditional policy
of time based maintenance still prevails. Inputs from modern strategies as reliability centered
and condition based maintenance in combination with the time based activities already
appear. However in total they still represent only 26%. Countries other than 14 and 23 seem
to be less conservative since condition based maintenance and combination of condition and
time based maintenance appear more often. In total they represent already 23 and 35 %
respectively.

Maintenance is an extremely important part of any asset management strategy and
influences the GIS reliability and GIS availability very much. Therefore the survey contained
a specialized GIS maintenance card for respondents to answer detailed questions about
maintenance and other aspects of testing and service. The analysis of these cards is
included in technical brochure [6].

5.5 GIS Failures

Respondents were asked to report about major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures that
happened in their GIS in the years 2004 to 2007. Details about GIS CB failures were
reported in CB failure cards (see technical brochure [2]), GIS DE/ES failures in DE/ES failure
cards (see technical brochure [3]), GIS IT failures in IT failure cards (see technical brochure
[4]) and other GIS parts in GIS failure cards (see chapter 5.5.5). Chapter 5.5 and other
chapters below provide a summary of all GIS failures using data from all four mentioned
sources. For definitions of MaF and MiF see Appendix 1.

The reported number of MaF and MiF is analyzed in chapter 5.5 from the following points of
views:
Countries contribution to the survey and GIS voltage classes distribution (chapter
5.5.1)
GIS extent distribution (chapter 5.5.2)
GIS type of enclosure distribution (chapter 5.5.3)
GIS location distribution (chapter 5.5.4)
GIS failed component distribution (chapter 5.5.5)
GIS age distribution (chapter 5.5.6)

The WG has doubts about completeness of minor failures reporting. Most of the utilities have
got a very detailed database about major failures whereas minor failures are sometimes
repaired without reporting into any information systems. The reader thus shall read the
information below only as information about reported events but shall not make a
relative comparison between MaF and MiF events.

24

Collected data about failures is reported as single phase in case of an internal failure
of a single-phase encapsulated GIS or in case a failure occurs in auxiliary parts like in
one of the single phase operating mechanisms. It is reported as three-phase in case of
an internal failure of a three-phase encapsulated GIS or in a common auxiliary part like
in three gang operating mechanism or in common control cubicle.

5.5.1 Countries contribution and GIS voltage classes failures distribution
Countries contribution to the survey is shown in table 5-25. Table 5-25 shows total absolute
and relative data (100% for relative expression is total number of MaF, MiF respectively). The
total number of MaF is too small to analyze the countries contribution to voltage classes.

Table 5-25: Contribution of countries to GIS major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures survey
(absolute and relative values within total)
Country code Number of MaF [%]
Number of MiF [%]
1 7 1,96 3 0,20
2 0 0,00 4 0,27
3 1 0,28 9 0,60
4 2 0,56 4 0,27
7 2 0,56 6 0,40
8 2 0,56 56 3,72
9 5 1,40 69 4,58
10
0
0,00 1 0,07
11
0
0,00 3 0,20
12 1 0,28 33 2,19
13 5 1,40 105 6,98
14 203 56,70 532 35,35
17 20 5,59 417 27,71
18 0 0,00 7 0,47
19 9 2,51 43 2,86
20 9 2,51 65 4,32
21 15 4,19 133 8,84
23 50 13,97 3 0,20
24 16 4,47 1 0,07
27 0 0,00 1 0,07
28 10 2,79 4 0,27
29 1 0,28 6 0,40
Total 358 100,00 1 505 100,00

Collected GIS failures in individual voltage classes are summarized in table 5-26 for all data
and in table 5-27 for all data without countries with dominant population, i.e. countries 14 and
23. The values in both tables are expressed in absolute and in relative values. The bases for
the calculation of relative values are numbers of total collected major and total collected
minor failures. Figures 5-12 show graphically absolute data of tables 5-26 and 5-27, i.e.
portions of MaF and MiF in GIS that contribute to individual voltage classes.

25

Table 5-26: Distribution of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) in GIS - all data (absolute and relative
values within individual voltage classes)
Voltage class
Number of MaF Number of MiF
60U<100 kV 154 43,0 292 19,4
100U<200 kV 64 17,9 291 19,3
200U<300 kV 28 7,8 212 14,1
300U<500 kV 92 25,7 604 40,1
500U<700 kV 16 4,5 106 7,0
700 kV 4 1,1 0 0,0
Total 358 100,0 1 505 100,0

Table 5-27: Distribution of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) in GIS - data without countries 14 and
23 (absolute and relative values within individual voltage classes)
Voltage class
60U<100 kV 0 0,0 1 0,1
100U<200 kV 21 20,0 259 26,7
200U<300 kV 10 9,5 116 12,0
300U<500 kV 62 59,0 562 57,9
500U<700 kV 8 7,6 32 3,3
700 kV 4 3,8 0 0,0
Total 105 100,0 970 100,0

0
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600
700
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Voltageclass[kV]
FailuresinGISdistribution(alldata)
MaF
MiF
26

Figures 5-12: Distribution of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) in GIS (absolute values)

As already written in chapter 5.4, the 2
nd
GIS experience survey collected only major failures
that happened during the whole life time of reported GIS. Their number is thus supposed to
be bigger than in the 3
rd
survey in which there were collected only failures that happened in
four years period between 2004 and 2007.

Table 5-28 provides an overview of collected data. For the data from the 2
nd
survey it was
necessary to exclude the big influence of one utility having had very old and very unreliable
GIS in voltage class 2. The comparisons in all further subchapters of chapter 5.5 provide
numbers of all failures without this worst utility data. This means that 275 failures which
occurred in voltage class 2 substations all of them operated by one user and representing
obsolete breaker technology, was excluded from 2
nd
survey analysis and is thus excluded
from comparisons in the following subchapters as well.

Table 5-28: Comparison of collected GIS major failures in individual voltage classes in the 2
nd

and the 3
rd
Voltage class
Collected number of GIS major failures
2
nd
survey
Collected number of GIS major
failures 3
rd
survey
All data
All data without
the worst utility
Data without
country 14 and the
worst utility All data
Data without
countries 14 and 23
60U<100 kV 28 28 13 154 0
100U<200 kV 465 190 174 64 21
200U<300 kV 138 138 115 28 10
300U<500 kV 179 179 179 92 62
500U<700 kV 49 49 44 16 8
700 kV 12 12 12 4 4
Total 871 596 537 358 105

Regarding the 3rd survey the number of major failures without two dominant countries (14
and 23) represents only 19% of comparable collected data in the 2
nd
survey. The WG A3-06
decided to provide most of the surveys comparisons below only for all data (for the 2
nd
survey
that means all data without the worst utility). The reader can, if he wishes, find result details
for the 2
nd
survey in [13]. Graphical interpretation of collected major failures in both surveys
is shown in figure 5-13.
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
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Voltageclass[kV]
FailuresinGISdistribution(alldatawithoutcountries14nad23)
MaF
MiF
27

Figure 5-13: Comparison of collected major failures in individual voltage classes
in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
GIS surveys (all data)

The 3
rd
GIS survey collected more major failures in voltage class 1 than in the 2
nd
GIS survey
in spite of the fact that the collected service experience was a bit smaller. The comparison of
the other voltage classes show expected relations.

It is necessary to repeat that because of incompleteness of minor failures reporting there
shall not be made any comparison of major and minor number of failures.

The absolute numbers of major failures provided in this chapter and chapters below serve as
input information for chapter 5.6 (failure frequencies calculation) and for 5.7 (failure
characteristics). Their relative expression in individual voltage classes is provided here only
for information. The relative numbers, as well as absolute numbers, cannot be used for any
mutual comparison since they are naturally influenced by scrutiny of minor failure collection
and by different amount of collected service experience as mentioned in chapter 5.4. For this
reason and for the above mentioned reason of incompleteness of minor failure data,
commentaries are therefore provided only for total data of major failures in sub-chapters of
chapter 5.5.

5.5.2 GIS extent failures distribution

The respondents were asked to divide their GIS failures into the same categories of GIS
extent as in the GIS population, i.e. into the following two categories:
Fully GIS - substation the bays of which are fully made from GIS technology
components. Only external HV connections to overhead or cable lines, or
transformers, shunt reactors and capacitors can have external insulation.
Hybrid GIS - substation the bays of which are made from a mix of GIS and AIS
technology components, i.e. in which the CB-bays contains combination of enclosed
gas insulated and air insulated parts.

Collected number of failures in individual voltage classes is summarized in table 5-29 for all
data and in table 5-30 for all data without countries 14 and 23. The values in both tables are
expressed in absolute and in relative values. The bases for calculation of relative values are
numbers of failures in individual voltage classes. Figures 5-14 show graphically absolute
data of tables 5-29 and 5-30, i.e. portions of MaF and MiF collected in individual voltage
classes. Figure 5-15 shows an overview of all data failures in fully/hybrid GIS distribution.

0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
N
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Voltageclass[kV]
ComparisonofcollectedGISmajorfailures
2ndsurvey
(1995)
3rdsurvey
(2007)
28

Table 5-29: Distribution of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures for the two types of GIS extent
- all data (absolute and relative values within individual voltage classes)
Voltage class
60U<100 kV 151 98,1 3 1,9 286 97,9 6 2,1
100U<200 kV 58 90,6 6 9,4 282 96,9 9 3,1
200U<300 kV 23 82,1 5 17,9 193 91,0 19 9,0
300U<500 kV 87 94,6 5 5,4 599 99,2 5 0,8
500U<700 kV 14 87,5 2 12,5 74 69,8 32 30,2
700 kV 4 100,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0
Total 337 94,1 21 5,9 1 434 95,3 71 4,7

Table 5-30: Distribution of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures for the two types of GIS
installation extent - data without countries 14 and 23 (absolute and relative values within
Voltage class
60U<100 kV 0 0,0 0 0 1 100,0 0 0,0
100U<200 kV 19 90,5 2 9,5 255 98,5 4 1,5
200U<300 kV 9 100,0 0 0,0 115 100,0 0 0,0
300U<500 kV 61 98,4 1 1,6 560 99,8 1 0,2
500U<700 kV 8 88,9 1 11,1 32 94,1 2 5,9
700 kV 4 100,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
Total 101 96,2 4 3,8 963 99,3 7 0,7

0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
N
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Voltageclass[kV]
FailuresinfullyorhybridGISdistribution(alldata)
MaFinfullyGIS
MaFinhybridGIS
MiFinfullyGIS
MiFinhybridGIS
29

Figures 5-14: Distribution of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures absolute values for the two
types of GIS extent in individual voltage classes

Figure 5-15: Distribution of total number of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures absolute
values for the two types of GIS extent

Comparison of the 3
rd
GIS survey all data with the 2
nd
GIS experience survey is provided in
table 5-31 and figures 5-16 (the 2
nd
survey data is all data without the worst utility data).

Table 5-31: Comparison of collected fully and hybrid GIS major failures in individual voltage
classes in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
Voltage class
failures 2
nd
survey
3
rd
survey
60U<100 kV 25 3 151 3
100U<200 kV 186 4 58 6
200U<300 kV 133 5 23 5
300U<500 kV 176 3 87 5
500U<700 kV 49 0 14 2
700 kV 12 0 4 0
Total 581 15 337 21

0
100
200
300
400
500
600
N
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Voltageclass[kV]
FailuresinfullyorhybridGISdistribution(alldatawithoutcountries14and23)
MaFinfullyGIS
MaFinhybridGIS
MiFinfullyGIS
MiFinhybridGIS
0
500
1000
1500
2000
FullyGIS HybridGIS
N
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s
]
GISextent
FailuresinGIS(alldata)
MaF
MiF
Total
30

Figures 5-16: Comparison of collected fully and hybrid GIS major failures in individual voltage
classes in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
GIS surveys

The collected number of hybrid GIS major failures is one to two orders of magnitude lower
than for fully GIS in both surveys. The fully GIS dominates the picture.

94 % of all data major failures happened in fully GIS. That correspond quite well to the
distribution of collected service experience 92% of fully GIS. The same picture is obtained
when evaluating data without countries 14 and 23 (96% of MaF and 92% of service
experience in fully GIS). This difference can be explained by two facts :
The GIS part in hybrid is smaller than for fully GIS and thus there are less GIS parts
to fail.
Hybrid GIS are in the average younger than fully GIS in spite of the fact that the
oldest one is from 1968.

5.5.3 GIS type of enclosure failures distribution
The respondents were asked to divide their failures in GIS into the same categories of GIS
enclosure design as in GIS population, i.e. into the following two categories:
Single phase enclosure (1-phase)
Three phase enclosure (3-phase)
They were supposed to do the selection based on the design of an enclosure the specific
component that suffered from a failure.

data of tables 5-32 and 5-33, i.e. portions of MaF and MiF collected in individual voltage
classes. Figure 5-18 shows the failure distribution of 1-phase/3-phase GIS component
design for all data.

0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
N
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s
]
Voltageclass [kV]
ComparisonofcollectedfullyGISmajorfailures
2ndsurvey
(1995)
3rd survey
(2007)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
N
u
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b
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m
a
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s
]
Voltageclass [kV]
ComparisonofcollectedhybridGISmajorfailures
2ndsurvey
(1995)
3rd survey
(2007)
31

enclosure design - all data (absolute and relative values within individual voltage classes)
Voltage class
60U<100 kV 20 13,0 134 87,0 52 17,8 240 82,2
100U<200 kV 34 53,1 30 46,9 231 79,4 60 20,6
200U<300 kV 15 53,6 13 46,4 178 84,0 34 16,0
300U<500 kV 83 90,2 9 9,8 589 97,5 15 2,5
500U<700 kV 16 100,0 0 0,0 106 100,0 0 0,0
700 kV 4 100,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0
Total 172 48,0 186 52,0 1156 76,8 349 23,2

enclosure design - data without countries 14 and 23 (absolute and relative values within
Voltage class
60U<100 kV 0 0,0 0 0 1 100,0 0 0,0
100U<200 kV 16 76,2 5 23,8 216 83,4 43 16,6
200U<300 kV 9 100,0 0 0,0 116 100,0 0 0,0
300U<500 kV 60 98,4 1 1,6 559 99,5 3 0,5
500U<700 kV 8 80,0 2 20,0 32 100,0 0 0,0
700 kV 4 100,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
Total 97 92,4 8 7,6 924 95,3 46 4,7

0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
N
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Voltageclass[kV]
Failuresin1phaseor3phasecomponentdesigndistribution(alldata)
MaFin1phasedesign
MaFin3phasedesign
MiFin1phasedesign
MiFin3phasedesign
32

Figures 5-17: Distribution of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures absolute values for the two
types of GIS enclosure design in individual voltage classes

Figure 5-18: Distribution of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures absolute values for the two
types of GIS enclosure design in total

The 2
nd
GIS survey questionnaire did not ask a question about the referred GIS enclosure
design.

48 % of all data major failures happened in single phase encapsulated GIS. That correspond
quite well to the distribution of collected service experience of 44% of single phase
encapsulated GIS. A bit different picture is obtained when evaluating data without countries
14 and 23 (92% of MaF and 75% of service experience in single phase encapsulated GIS),
where the difference is higher. To explain this difference it is necessary to perform further
analysis as shown in chapter 5.6 and 5.7. However the simplest explanation can be the
same as for hybrid GIS three-phase enclosed GIS contain less material to fail.

0
100
200
300
400
500
600
N
u
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b
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f
f
a
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s
]
Voltageclass[kV]
Failuresin1phaseor3phasecomponentdesigndistribution(all
datawithoutcountries14and23)
MaFin1phase
design
MaFin3phase
design
MiFin1phase
design
MiFin3phase
design
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1phase 3phase
N
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]
FailedGIScomponentenclosuredesign
MaF
MiF
Total
33

5.5.4 GIS location failures distribution
The respondents were asked to divide their failures in GIS into the same categories of GIS
location as in GIS population, i.e. into the following four categories:
GIS Indoor Normal (Indoor N)
GIS Indoor Special (Indoor S)
GIS Outdoor Normal (Outdoor N)
GIS Outdoor Special (Outdoor S)

As there was only 1 major failure reported in Outdoor Special GIS location and only 2 minor
failures reported in indoor special GIS location the further analysis is done only for indoor
outdoor division.

expressed in absolute and in relative values. The bases for relative values calculations are
data in tables 5-34 and 5-35, i.e. portions of MaF and MiF collected in individual voltage
classes. Figure 5-20 shows an overview of all data failures in indoor/outdoor failed GIS
component design distribution.

location - all data (absolute and relative values within individual voltage classes)
Voltage class
60U<100 kV 12 7,8 142 92,2 78 26,7 214 73,3
100U<200 kV 38 59,4 26 40,6 255 87,6 36 12,4
200U<300 kV 9 32,1 19 67,9 71 33,5 141 66,5
300U<500 kV 39 42,4 53 57,6 408 67,5 196 32,5
500U<700 kV 0 0,0 16 100,0 0 0,0 106 100,0
700 kV 4 100,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0
Total 102 28,5 256 71,5 812 54,0 693 46,0

location - data without countries 14 and 23 (absolute and relative values within individual
voltage classes)
Voltage class
60U<100 kV 0 0,0 0 0 1 100,0 0 0,0
100U<200 kV 18 85,7 3 14,3 247 95,4 12 4,6
200U<300 kV 8 80,0 2 20,0 52 44,8 64 55,2
300U<500 kV 37 59,7 25 40,3 398 70,8 164 29,2
500U<700 kV 0 0,0 8 100,0 0 0,0 32 100,0
700 kV 4 100,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
Total 67 63,8 38 36,2 698 72,0 272 28,0

34

Figures 5-19: Distribution of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures numbers for the two types of
GIS location in individual voltage classes

0
50
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150
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400
450
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Voltageclass[kV]
Failuresinindoororoutdoorcomponentdesigndistribution(alldata)
MaFinindoorGIS
MaFinoutdoorGIS
MiFinindoorGIS
MiFinoutdoorGIS
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
N
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s
]
Voltageclass[kV]
Failuresinindoororoutdoorcomponentdesigndistribution(alldatawithout
countries14and23)
MaFinindoorGIS
MaFinoutdoorGIS
MiFinindoorGIS
MiFinoutdoorGIS
35

Figure 5-20: Distribution of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures numbers for the two types of
GIS location in total

Comparison of all data from the 3
rd
GIS survey with the 2
nd
GIS experience survey data is
provided in table 5-36 and figures 5-21 (the 2
nd
survey data is all data without the worst
utility data).

Table 5-36: Comparison of collected indoor and outdoor GIS major failures in individual
nd
and the 3
rd
Voltage class
failures 2
nd
survey
3
rd
survey
60U<100 kV 17 11 12 142
100U<200 kV 183 7 38 26
200U<300 kV 109 29 9 19
300U<500 kV 122 57 39 53
500U<700 kV 45 4 0 16
700 kV 12 0 4 0
Total 488 108 102 256

Figures 5-21: Comparison of collected indoor and outdoor GIS major failures in individual
nd
and the 3
rd
GIS surveys

0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
IndoorGIS OutdoorGIS
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
f
a
i
l
u
r
e
s
]
FailedGIScomponentlocation
MaF
MiF
Total
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
m
a
j
o
r
f
a
i
l
u
r
e
s
]
Voltageclass [kV]
ComparisonofcollectedindoorGISmajorfailures
2ndsurvey
(1995)
3rd survey
(2007)
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
m
a
j
o
r
f
a
i
l
u
r
e
s
]
Voltageclass [kV]
Comparisonofcollected outdoorGISmajorfailures
2ndsurvey
(1995)
3rd survey
(2007)
36

Outdoor GIS experience has relatively increased (in classes 2, 4 and 5 also absolutely) in all
voltage classes in 3
rd
GIS survey compared to 2
nd
GIS survey. That is also valid for number
of major failures namely in classes 1, 2 and 5.

28,5 % of all data major failures happened in indoor GIS that represent 41 % of collected
service experience. When evaluating data without countries 14 and 23, 63,8 % of all data
major failures happened in indoor GIS that represent 88,6 % of collected service experience.
Ratio of these two numbers, i.e. percentage distribution of service experience to percentage
distribution to number of major failures, is almost the same in both cases (1,4 times). That
shows that indoor GIS installations may behave a bit better than outdoor GIS (as later proven
with exception of voltage class 4 in chapter 5.6.4) and that can be explained by a simple fact
that indoor GIS are not so much influenced by environmental effects.

5.5.5 GIS failed component distribution
Details about GIS circuit breakers (CB), disconnectors and earthing switches (DS/ES) and
instrument transformers (IT) failures are given in technical brochures [2], [3] and [4]. Chapter
5.5.5 provides an overview to show different components contributions to failure statistics. In
addition it presents a more detailed analysis of failed components other than CB, DS/ES and
IT. The label "GI" groups failures of busbars, busducts, surge arresters, different joints,
bushings and cable boxes.

5.5.5.1 Basic GIS components in individual voltage classes
Collected major and minor failures of GIS equipment in basic component division (CB,
DS/ES, IT and GI) are summarized in table 5-37 for all data and for data without countries
14 and 23. They are expressed in absolute and in relative values. The bases for relative
values calculations are sums of collected major, minor resp., failures.

Figures 5-22 show graphically relative values of tables 5-37 for all data, i.e. different GIS
components contribution to the total number of MaF and MiF for all collected data.

Table 5-37: Distribution of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures for the four basic GIS CB-bay
components all data and data without countries 14 and 23 (absolute and relative values in
total collected MaF and MiF)
Failed GIS
component
Number of MaF Number of MiF Number of MaF Number of MiF
CB
124 34,6 791 52,6 56 53,3 545 56,2
DS/ES
164 45,8 233 15,5 25 23,8 95 9,8
GI 50 14,0 413 27,4 17 16,2 284 29,3
IT
20 5,6 68 4,5 7 6,7 46 4,7

37

Figures 5-22: Relative distribution of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures for the four basic GIS
CB-bay components

Collected failures in individual voltage classes are summarized in table 5-38 for all data and
in table 5-39 for data without countries 14 and 23. The values in both tables are expressed in
absolute and in relative values. The bases for relative values calculations are numbers of
collected failures in individual voltage classes.

Figures 5-23 show graphically relative values of table 5-38 for individual GIS components
contributions to total number of MaF and MiF within individual voltage classes for all
collected data.

components all data (absolute and relative values in individual voltage classes)
Voltage class
Number of MaF (all data)
CB MaF DS/ES MaF GI MaF IT MaF
60U<100 kV 42 27,3 91 59,1 12 7,8 9 5,8
100U<200 kV 17 26,6 27 42,2 17 26,6 3 4,7
200U<300 kV 7 25,0 13 46,4 5 17,9 3 10,7
300U<500 kV 46 50,0 25 27,2 16 17,4 5 5,4
500U<700 kV 8 50,0 8 50,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
700 kV 4 100,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
Total 124 34,6 164 45,8 50 14,0 20 5,6
Voltage class
Number of MiF (all data)
CB MiF DS/ES MiF GI MiF IT MiF
60U<100 kV 130 44,5 70 24,0 80 27,4 12 4,1
100U<200 kV 72 24,7 53 18,2 134 46,0 32 11,0
200U<300 kV 121 57,1 54 25,5 30 14,2 7 3,3
300U<500 kV 424 70,2 31 5,1 141 23,3 8 1,3
500U<700 kV 44 41,5 25 23,6 28 26,4 9 8,5
700 kV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 791 52,6 233 15,5 413 27,4 68 4,5

35%
46%
14%
5%
GISequipmentmajorfailures(MaF)
CB
DE/ES
GI
IT
53%
15%
27%
5%
GISequipmentminorfailures(MiF)
CB
DE/ES
GI
IT
38

components data without countries 14 and 23 (absolute and relative values in individual
voltage classes)
Voltage class
Number of MaF (data without countries 14 and 23)
CB MaF DS/ES MaF GI MaF IT MaF
60U<100 kV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
100U<200 kV 7 33,3 5 23,8 7 33,3 2 9,5
200U<300 kV 4 40,0 2 20,0 3 30,0 1 10,0
300U<500 kV 36 58,1 15 24,2 7 11,3 4 6,5
500U<700 kV 5 62,5 3 37,5 0 0,0 0 0,0
700 kV 4 100,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
Total 56 53,3 25 23,8 17 16,2 7 6,7
Voltage class
Number of MiF (data without countries 14 and 23)
CB MiF DS/ES MiF GI MiF IT MiF
60U<100 kV 0 0,0 1 100,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
100U<200 kV 62 23,9 41 15,8 124 47,9 32 12,4
200U<300 kV 68 58,6 26 22,4 16 13,8 6 5,2
300U<500 kV 397 70,6 25 4,4 132 23,5 8 1,4
500U<700 kV 18 56,3 2 6,3 12 37,5 0 0,0
700 kV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 545 56,2 95 9,8 284 29,3 46 4,7

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
GISequipmentmajorfailures(MaF)voltageclasses
IT
GI
DS/ES
CB
39

Figures 5-23: Relative distribution of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures for the four basic GIS
CB-bay components all data in individual voltage classes

In the 2
nd
survey there was an analysis provided only for major failures and only for all MaF
data without the worst utility failure data. This data, but without the others category, is used
for comparison with the 3
rd
GIS survey results in table 5-40 (absolute and relative values,
where 100% is total number of major failures) and in figure 5-24 (relative values).

Table 5-40: Comparison of collected GIS basic components major failures in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd

GIS surveys (absolute and relative values)
Failed GIS
component
2
nd
GIS survey 3
rd
GIS survey
Absolute
[number of MaF]
Relative [%] Absolute [number
of MaF]
Relative [%]
CB 176 34,5 124 34,6
DS/ES 116 22,7 164 45,8
GI 175 34,3 50 14,0
IT 43 8,4 20 5,6

Figure 5-24: Comparison of collected major failures of GIS CB-bay components in the 2
nd
and
the 3
rd
GIS survey (relative values)

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
GISequipmentminorfailures(MiF)voltageclasses
IT
GI
DS/ES
CB
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
CB DS/ES GI IT
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
m
a
j
o
r
f
a
i
l
u
r
e
s
[
%
]
ComparisonofGIScomponentmajorfailuresbyfailed
equipment
2ndsurvey
(1995)
3rdsurvey
(2007)
40

In the 2
nd
GIS survey, the portion of major failures of disconnectors and/or earthing switches
was relatively smaller than in the 3
rd
survey and smaller than it would correspond to relative
number of individual equipments in one GIS CB-bay. This fact was relatively compensated
by a higher portion of failed equipment other than circuit breakers, disconnectors/earthing
switches and instrument transformers the portion of which has decreased in the 3
rd
survey.

As total data is concerned the relative distribution of major failure is dominated by
disconnector, earthing and/or combined disconnectors earthing switches MaF (46 %),
followed by 35% MaF of circuit breakers, 5% of instrument transformers and 14% of other
parts of GIS. As total data without countries 14 and 23 is concerned the major failure relative
distribution is dominated by circuit breakers (53%), followed by disconnector, earthing and/or
combined disconnectors earthing switches MaF (24 %), 7% of instrument transformers and
16% of other parts of GIS.

As minor failures distribution is concerned the WG hesitates very much to comment on it as
there is a big suspicious on incompleteness of the data. However if the distribution is at least
similar to reality there might be possible to point out on a small portion of MiF to a big portion
of MaF for DS/ES.

The above shown numbers of major failures contribute to the resulting GIS CB-bay failure
frequency (see chapter 5.6) and cannot be used for failure frequency calculation of individual
components. It is necessary to keep in mind that one CB-bay always contains one circuit
breaker but several disconnectors and earthing switches (based on single line diagram,
usually about 2-3 disconnectors and 3-4 earthing switches). The individual equipments
failure frequencies are provided in technical brochures [2], [3] and [4].

5.5.5.2 GIS components other than CB, DS/ES and IT
The GI failure cards provided the following options for selecting failed component other than
CB, DS/ES and IT :
Busduct and/or busduct interconnecting pieces
Busbar and/or busbar interconnecting pieces
SF6-to-air bushing
Cable box / Cable sealing end
Power transformer or reactor interface chamber or bushing
Surge arrester
Other

Collected major and minor failures of GIS equipment other than CB, DS/ES and IT are
summarized in table 5-41 for all data and for data without countries 14 and 23. They are
sums of major and minor failures of these components.

Figures 5-25 show graphically relative data of tables 5-41 for all data, i.e. different GIS
components other than CB, DS/ES and IT contribution to total number of these components
MaF and MiF for all collected data.

41

Table 5-41: Distribution of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures for GIS CB-bay components
other than CB, DS/ES and IT all data (absolute and relative values in total collected MaF and
MiF)
Failed GIS
component
Busduct
10 20,0 102 24,7 4 23,5 93 32,7
Busbar
9 18,0 58 14,0 4 23,5 20 7,0
SF6-to-air
bushing
5 10,0 77 18,6 1 5,9 77 27,1
Cable box
2 4,0 14 3,4 0 0,0 7 2,5
Transformer
bushing
2 4,0 15 3,6 2 11,8 12 4,2
Surge arrester
0 0,0 2 0,5 0 0,0 1 0,4
Other
22 44,0 145 35,1 6 35,3 74 26,1

Figures 5-25: Relative distribution of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures for GIS CB-bay
components other than CB, DS/ES and IT

20%
18%
10%
4%
4%
0%
44%
DistributionofGISmajorfailures(MaF)of
equipmentotherthanCB,DS/ESandIT(alldata)
busduct
busbar
SF6toairbushing
Cablebox
Transformerbushing
Surgearrester
Other
25%
14%
19%
3%
4%
0%
35%
DistributionofGISminor failures(MiF)ofequipment
otherthanCB,DS/ESandIT(alldata)
busduct
busbar
SF6toairbushing
Cablebox
Transformerbushing
Surgearrester
Other
42

Collected failures in individual voltage classes are summarized in table 5-42 (MaF and MiF)
for all data. The values are expressed in absolute and in relative values. The bases for
calculation of relative values are numbers of collected failures in individual voltage classes.
The number of this kind of failures for countries other than 14 and 23 is too small to provide a
separate analysis. Figures 5-26 show graphical interpretations of the relative values.

Table 5-42: Distribution of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures for GIS CB-bay components
other than CB, DS/ES and IT all data (absolute and relative values in individual voltage
classes)
Voltage class
Busbars and
busducts MaF
Any kind of
bushings MaF
Surge arrester
MaF Other MaF
60U<100 kV 3 25,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 9 75,0
100U<200 kV 6 35,3 4 23,5 0 0,0 7 41,2
200U<300 kV 2 40,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 3 60,0
300U<500 kV 8 50,0 5 31,3 0 0,0 3 18,8
500U<700 kV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
700 kV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 19 38,0 9 18,0 0 0,0 22 44,0
Voltage class
Busbars and
busducts MiF
Any kind of
bushings MiF Surge arrester MiF Other MiF
60U<100 kV 33 41,3 6 7,5 0 0,0 41 51,3
100U<200 kV 16 11,9 63 47,0 2 1,5 53 39,6
200U<300 kV 11 36,7 6 20,0 0 0,0 13 43,3
300U<500 kV 91 64,5 26 18,4 0 0,0 24 17,0
500U<700 kV 9 32,1 5 17,9 0 0,0 14 50,0
700 kV 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 160 38,7 106 25,7 2 0,5 145 35,1

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
GISequipmentotherthanCB,DS/ESandITmajorfailures
(MaF)voltageclassesdistribution(alldata)
other
surgearrester
Anykindof
bushing
busbar+busducts
43

Figures 5-26: Relative distribution of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures for GIS CB-bay
components other than CB, DS/ES and IT in individual voltage classes

Collected failures in seven manufacturing intervals are summarized in table 5-43 (MaF) and
in table 5-44 (MiF) for all data. The values are expressed in absolute and in relative values.
The bases for relative values calculations are numbers of collected failures in individual GIS
components. The number of this kind of failures for countries other than 14 and 23 is too
small to provide a separate analysis. Figures 5-27 show graphical interpretations of the
absolute values.

Table 5-43: Distribution of major failures (MaF) of GIS parts other than CB, DS/ES and IT in
seven intervals of GIS manufacturing years- all data (Absolute and relative values within
individual components)
Busduct Busbar SF6-to-air
bushing
Cable box Transform
er bushing
Surge
arrester
Other
abs. [%] abs. [%] abs. [%] abs. [%] abs. [%] abs. [%] abs. [%]
before
1979
0 0,0 2 22,2 1 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 - 3 13,6
1979-
1983
2 20,0 1 11,1 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 - 0 0,0
1984-
1988
2 20,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 2 100 2 100 0 - 1 4,5
1989-
1993
0 0,0 1 11,1 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 - 9 40,9
1994-
1998
3 30,0 2 22,2 2 40,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 - 3 13,6
1999-
2003
1 10,0 1 11,2 2 40,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 - 3 13,6
2004-
2007
2 20,0 2 22,2 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 - 3 13,6
Total 10 100 9 100 5 100 2 100 2 100 0 - 22 100

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
GISequipmentotherthanCB,DS/ESandITminorfailures
(MiF)voltageclassesdistribution(alldata)
other
surgearrester
Anykindof
bushing
busbar+busducts
44

Table 5-44: Distribution of minor failures (MiF) of GIS parts other than CB, DS/ES and IT in
seven intervals of GIS manufacturing years-all data (absolute and relative values within
individual components)
Busduct Busbar SF6-to-air
bushing
Cable box Transform
er bushing
Surge
arrester
Other
abs. [%] abs. [%] abs. [%] abs. [%] abs. [%] abs. [%] abs. [%]
before
1979
4 3,9 17 29,3 14 18,2 3 21,4 2 13,3 0 0,0 19 13,1
1979-
1983
16 15,7 9 15,5 11 14,3 6 42,9 1 6,7 0 0,0 31 21,4
1984-
1988
4 3,9 6 10,3 20 26,0 3 21,4 5 33,3 0 0,0 18 12,4
1989-
1993
59 57,8 6 10,3 24 31,2 0 0,0 5 33,3 1 50,0 50 34,5
1994-
1998
12 11,8 13 22,4 5 6,5 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 17 11,7
1999-
2003
7 6,9 7 12,1 0 0,0 2 14,3 0 0,0 1 50,0 7 4,8
2004-
2007
0 0,0 0 0,0 3 3,9 0 0,0 2 13,3 0 0,0 3 2,1
Total 102 100 58 100 77 100 14 100 15 100 2 100 145 100

Figures 5-27: Distribution of absolute values of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures of GIS
parts other than CB, DS/ES and IT in seven intervals of GIS manufacturing years

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
M
a
F
]
ReportedGISmajorfailures(MaF)ofGISpartsotherthanCB,
DS/ESandITindependenceonGISmanufacturingyear
interval(Alldata)
Busduct
Busbar
SF6toairbushing
Cablebox
Transformerbushing
Surgearrester
Other
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
M
i
F
]
Reportedminorfailures(MiF)ofGISpartsotherthanCB,DS/ES
andITindependenceonGISmanufacturingyearinterval(all
data)
Busduct
Busbar
SF6toairbushing
Cablebox
Transformerbushing
Surgearrester
Other
45

The 2
nd
survey provided an analysis only for major failures and only for all MaF data without
the worst utility failure data. This data, with the others category included, is used for
comparison with the 3
rd
GIS survey results. Table 5-45 shows absolute and relative values
(where 100% is total number of major failures of equipment other than circuit breakers,
disconnectors/earthing switches and instrument transformers) and figure 5-28 expresses
these relative values graphically.

Table 5-45: Comparison of collected GIS components other than CB, DS/ES and IT major
failures in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
Failed GIS
component
2
nd
GIS survey 3
rd
GIS survey
Absolute
[number of MaF]
Relative [%] Absolute
[number of MaF]
Relative [%]
Busbar+busducts 121 64,4 19 38,0
Any kind of
bushing 49 26,1 9 18,0
Surge arrester 5 2,7 0 0,0
Other 13 6,9 22 44,0

Figure 5-28: Comparison of collected GIS components other than CB, DS/ES and IT major
failures in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
GIS surveys (relative values)
In the 3
rd
survey nearly half of the major failures were not in the list of answers mentioned in
the questionnaire. That is very really puzzling and it causes that a comparison with the 2
nd

survey is almost impossible.

As total data is concerned the major failure relative distribution is dominated by busbars and
busducts MaF (38 %) followed by 18% MaF of different kinds of bushings. A similar picture is
found when evaluating data without countries 14 and 23 (41% and 7,5%). There was no
major failure reported for GIS surge arresters but their installation is extremely rare at low
voltage classes and they are not often used at high voltage classes, either. The portion of
busbar and busducts rises at higher voltages and that is natural as their lengths rise, too. As
the evaluation of the age aspect is concerned the total number of MaF is too low to make any
serious conclusion even if the present data does not show any GIS age dependence. Minor
failure overview is provided only for very rough information as WG doubts about
completeness of the MiF data.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
m
a
j
o
r
f
a
i
l
u
r
e
s
[
%
]
ComparisonofrelativenumberofmajorfailedGIS
componentotherthanCB,DS/ESandIT
2ndsurvey
(1995)
3rdsurvey
(2007)
46

There is a very high portion of other reported in the survey. The questionnaire,
unfortunately, did not provide a space for any respondents commenting and the WG can just
speculate what this other can mean. That could include problems in earthing systems,
supporting systems, cabling, and/or the high number just reflects a fact that the questionnaire
respondent didnt have such an information available.
5.5.6 GIS age failures distribution
Since the survey was running in the period of 4 years the reported GIS age overview would
be complicated (floating age). The age aspect is therefore expressed in the way of
analyzing manufacturing years. Even if the year of each failure is known the overview is
classified in the same way as for service experience to enable further failure frequency
computing.

Tables 5-46 and 5-47 show distributions of collected GIS major (MaF) and minor (MiF)
failures in seven intervals of GIS manufacturing years for all data and in absolute and relative
values. 100% is number of GIS failures collected within individual voltage classes. Tables 5-
48 and 5-49 show the same data but without two dominant countries. Figures 5-29 and 5-30
provide graphical interpretations of the absolute values of all data.

Table 5-46: Distribution of major failures (MaF) in seven intervals of GIS manufacturing years -
Number of MaF

Manufacturing
year
60U
<100 kV
100U
<200 kV
200U
<300 kV
300U
<500 kV
500U
<700 kV
700 kV
before 1979 14 9,1 7 10,9 1 3,6 17 18,5 0 0,0 0 0,0
1979-1983 16 10,4 10 15,6 1 3,6 23 25,0 8 50,0 0 0,0
1984-1988 45 29,2 12 18,8 2 7,1 20 21,7 0 0,0 4 100,0
1989-1993 55 35,7 4 6,3 9 32,1 11 12,0 2 12,5 0 0,0
1994-1998 18 11,7 10 15,6 8 28,6 10 10,9 5 31,3 0 0,0
1999-2003 4 2,6 7 10,9 5 17,9 6 6,5 1 6,3 0 0,0
2004-2007 2 1,3 14 21,9 2 7,1 5 5,4 0 0,0 0 0,0
Total 154 100,0 64 100,0 28 100,0 92 100,0 16 100,0 4 100,0

Table 5-47: Distribution of minor failures (MiF) in seven intervals of GIS manufacturing years -
Number of MiF

Manufacturing
year
60U
<100 kV
100U
<200 kV
200U
<300 kV
300U
<500 kV
500U
<700 kV
700 kV
before 1979 57 19,5 18 6,2 79 37,3 112 18,5 17 16,0 0 0,0
1979-1983 56 19,2 66 22,7 16 7,5 141 23,3 48 45,3 0 0,0
1984-1988 81 27,7 80 27,5 22 10,4 102 16,9 15 14,2 0 0,0
1989-1993 53 18,2 80 27,5 37 17,5 142 23,5 16 15,1 0 0,0
1994-1998 28 9,6 24 8,2 47 22,2 77 12,7 6 5,7 0 0,0
1999-2003 16 5,5 14 4,8 8 3,8 26 4,3 4 3,8 0 0,0
2004-2007 1 0,3 9 3,1 3 1,4 4 0,7 0 0,0 0 0,0
Total 292 100,0 291 100,0 212 100,0 604 100,0 106 100,0 0 0,0

47

Table 5-48: Distribution of major failures (MaF) in seven intervals of GIS manufacturing years -
classes)
Number of MaF

Manufacturing year
60U
<100 kV
100U
<200 kV
200U
<300 kV
300U
<500 kV
500U
<700 kV
700 kV
before 1979 0 4 19,0 0 0,0 14 22,6 0 0,0 0 0,0
1979-1983 0 3 14,3 1 10,0 22 35,5 8 100,0 0 0,0
1984-1988 0 5 23,8 0 0,0 15 24,2 0 0,0 4 100,0
1989-1993 0 2 9,5 2 20,0 5 8,1 0 0,0 0 0,0
1994-1998 0 2 9,5 2 20,0 1 1,6 0 0,0 0 0,0
1999-2003 0 2 9,5 3 30,0 2 3,2 0 0,0 0 0,0
2004-2007 0 3 14,3 2 20,0 3 4,8 0 0,0 0 0,0
Total 0 21 100,0 10 100,0 62 100,0 8 100,0 4 100,0

Table 5-49: Distribution of minor failures (MiF) in seven intervals of GIS manufacturing years -
classes)
Number of MiF

Manufacturing
year
60U
<100 kV
100U
<200 kV
200U
<300 kV
300U
<500 kV
500U
<700 kV
700 kV
before 1979 0 0,0 14 5,4 66 56,9 104 18,5 0 0,0 0 0,0
1979-1983 0 0,0 63 24,3 3 2,6 131 23,3 26 81,3 0 0,0
1984-1988 0 0,0 74 28,6 1 0,9 96 17,1 6 18,8 0 0,0
1989-1993 0 0,0 72 27,8 12 10,3 130 23,1 0 0,0 0 0,0
1994-1998 1 100,0 17 6,6 31 26,7 72 12,8 0 0,0 0 0,0
1999-2003 0 0,0 11 4,2 2 1,7 25 4,4 0 0,0 0 0,0
2004-2007 0 0,0 8 3,1 1 0,9 4 0,7 0 0,0 0 0,0
Total 1 100,0 259 100,0 116 100,0 562 100,0 32 100,0 0 0,0

Figure 5-29: Distribution of the number of major (MaF) failures in seven intervals of GIS
manufacturing years

0
10
20
30
40
50
60
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
M
a
F
]
Majorfailures(MaF)independenceonGISmanufacturing
yearinterval(alldata)
60U<100kV
100U<200kV
200U<300kV
300U<500kV
500U<700kV
700kV
48

Figure 5-30: Distribution of the number of minor (MiF) failures in seven intervals of GIS
manufacturing years

Table 5-50 shows summaries (without classifying into voltage classes) of data from the
tables above but the relative values are recalculated to total collected failure data (100% is
total number of MaF, MiF resp.).

Table 5-50: Distribution of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures in seven intervals of GIS
manufacturing years all data and data without countries 14 and 23 (absolute and relative
values of total collected MaF and MiF)
Manufacturing
year
MaF abs. MaF % MiF abs. MiF % MaF abs. MaF % MiF abs. MiF %
before 1979 39 10,9 283 18,8 18 17,1 184 19,0
1979-1983 58 16,2 327 21,7 34 32,4 223 23,0
1984-1988 83 23,2 300 19,9 24 22,9 177 18,2
1989-1993 81 22,6 328 21,8 9 8,6 214 22,1
1994-1998 51 14,2 182 12,1 5 4,8 121 12,5
1999-2003 23 6,4 68 4,5 7 6,7 38 3,9
2004-2007 23 6,4 17 1,1 8 7,6 13 1,3
Total 358 100,0 1505 100,0 105 100,0 970 100,0

In the population card of the 2
nd
GIS survey, there was a column for inserting the year the
GIS substation was put into service. However, in the analysis brochure [13] the collected
service experience used for failure frequency calculation is expressed only in two categories
- for GIS commissioned before 1.1.1985 and after 1.1.1985, i.e. for GIS younger than 12
years (age of 1 to 11 years) and for older than 12 years. To compare the results with the 3
rd

survey it was therefore necessary to classify the data into the two same two age intervals.
The comparison is shown in table 5-51 and figure 5-31. The table shows data without one
worst utility for the 2nd survey and only the complete data (data having its equivalent in
failure cards) for the 3rd survey. This data will be used for failure frequency comparison (see
chapter 5.6).

0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
M
i
F
]
Minorfailures(MiF)independenceonGISmanufacturing
yearinterval(alldata)
60U<100kV
100U<200kV
200U<300kV
300U<500kV
500U<700kV
49

Table 5-51: Comparison of 2
nd
and 3
rd
GIS surveys collected number of major failures of GIS
older than 11 years and 11 years old or younger in individual voltage classes (absolute values)
Voltage class
2
nd
3
rd
GIS age
>11 years
GIS age
11 years
GIS age
>11 years
GIS age
11 years
60U<100 kV 17 11
107 19
100U<200 kV 76 114
36 26
200U<300 kV 100 38
15 12
300U<500 kV 110 69
74 17
500U<700 kV 32 17
12 4
700 kV 0 12
4 0
Total 335 261
248 78

Figure 5-31: Comparison of major failures from the 2
nd
and 3
rd
GIS survey of GIS older than 11
years and 11 years old or younger

In both surveys and in all voltage classes (with exception of voltage class 2 in the 2
nd
survey)
the number of major failures is less for the younger group of GIS than for the older GIS
group.

The absolute numbers of major failures provided in this chapter serve namely for input
information for chapter 5.6 (failure frequencies calculation) and for chapter 5.7 (failure
characteristics). Their relative expression in individual voltage classes is provided only for
information here. The relative numbers, as well as absolute numbers, cannot be used for any
mutual comparison as they are naturally influenced by the different amount of collected
service experience as mentioned in chapter 5.4.

0
20
40
60
80
100
120
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
m
a
j
o
r
f
a
i
l
u
r
e
s
]
Voltageclass [kV]
ComparisonofcollectedGISexperinceintwoagegroups
>11yearsoldGIS 2ndsurvey
(1995)
11yearsoldGIS 2ndsurvey
(1995)
>11yearsoldGIS 3rdsurvey
(2007)
11yearsoldGIS 3rdsurvey
(2007)
50

5.6 GIS Major Failure Frequencies
5.6.1 Completeness of data
The above shown population (service experience) and failure data were analyzed from their
"completeness" point of view. Data was considered complete, when a failure card was
always accompanied with its population card. If there was no failure card accompanied with a
population card it was clearly stated by the respondent that the respective population did not
have any failure in a specific year. Portion of complete and incomplete population and failure
cards is shown in table 5-52 for all data and in table 5-53 for data without countries 14 and
23. Moreover the WG decided to exclude major failures caused by flood (28 MaF in class 1 -
thereof 17 DE, 4 IT and 7 GI) from the final failure frequency calculation. Flood belongs to
force majeure causes that the equipment cannot be really designed for. In spite of that the
completeness reached more than 99 % for collected service experience and more than 90%
for collected major failure data. The resulting number of "complete" service experience and
"complete" number of major failures without those caused by flood, i.e. data for failure
frequencies calculation, is shown in 3
rd
and 6
th
columns of is shown in tables 5-52 and 5-53.

Table 5-52: Overview of collected data and thereof data entering the failure frequency
calculations - all data
Voltage class
[kV]
Total collected
experience
[CB-bay-years]
Experience
marked as
complete (C)
for failure
frequency
calculation
% of C
marked
experience
Total collected
number of MaF
MaF marked
as complete
(C)
% of C
marked
MaF
60U<100 40 404 40 404 100,0 154 126* 81,8
100U<200 26 402 26 379 99,9 64 62 96,9
200U<300 8 307 8 307 100,0 28 27 96,4
300U<500 10 331 10 331 100,0 92 91 98,9
500U<700 3 187 3 187 100,0 16 16 100,0
700 340 340 100,0 4 4 100,0
Total 88 971 88 948 99,97 358 326 91,1
note * : 28 MaF caused by flood were excluded from failure frequency calculation even if
they were marked as complete

Table 5-53:. Overview of collected data and thereof data entering the failure frequency
calculations - data without countries 14 and 23
Voltage class
[kV]
Total collected
experience
[CB-bay-years]
Experience
marked as
complete (C)
% of C
marked
experience
Total collected
number of MaF
MaF marked
as complete
(C)
% of C
marked
MaF
60U<100 113 113 100,0 0 0 n.a.
100U<200 3 677 3 654 99,4 21 19 90,5
200U<300 1 349 1 349 100,0 10 9 90,0
300U<500 1 680 1 680 100,0 62 62 100,0
500U<700 170 170 100,0 8 8 100,0
700 192 192 100,0 4 4 100,0
Total 7 181 7 158 99,7 105 102 97,1

Using data from tables 5-52 and 5-53 major failure frequencies were calculated. The GIS
major failure are related, similar to previous GIS survey [13] to GIS bays (fields) i.e. they are
expressed in number of major failures per 100 GIS circuit breaker-bay-years [MaF/100.CB-
bay-year]. For the CB-bay definition see Appendix 1. Major failure frequencies for individual
GIS main components, i.e. to circuit breakers (CB), disconnectors/earthing switches (DS/ES)
and to instrument transformers (IT) are mentioned in technical brochures [2], [3] and [4].
51

Minor failure frequencies have not been calculated (there are big doubts about minor failure
reporting completeness).

Some presented results include also statistics calculations described in technical brochure
[1]. The confidence intervals and results of null and alternate hypotheses test between the
results of two independent groups or of a subgroup in relations to the whole population are
provided. The confidence level and significance level are 95% and 5% respectively.

Overview of further provided analyses
GIS major failure frequencies in total and in individual voltage classes for all data and
data without countries 14 and 23 (including confidence intervals), comparison of all
data and data without countries 14 and 23 results, comparison of results of individual
voltage classes - chapter 5.6.2
Time trend of GIS major failure frequencies in individual voltage classes for all data
and data without countries 14 and 23 (including confidence intervals for all data) -
chapter 5.6.7.

The results of major failure frequencies within individual voltage classes for all data and
data without countries 14 and 23 were tested for equality of the estimated failure
frequency. The hypotheses test showed equality of results (except for voltage class 4).
From that point on more detailed calculations (GIS extent, location, encapsulation design
and failure frequencies for different kinds of bushings) were made only for all data. The
following analyses of MaF frequencies are provided for:
Fully GIS and Hybrid GIS in total and in individual voltage classes for all data
(including confidence intervals), comparison of the results of individual voltage
classes - chapter 5.6.3
Indoor GIS and Outdoor GIS in total and in individual voltage classes for all data
(including confidence intervals), comparison of the results of individual voltage
classes - chapter 5.6.4
Single phase GIS bays and three phase GIS bays in total and in individual voltage
classes for all data (including confidence intervals), comparison of the results of
individual voltage classes - chapter 5.6.5
SF6-to-air bushings, cable boxes and transformer bushing failure frequencies
chapter 5.6.6

As the GIS population card asked for 3-phase data about Gas Insulated Switchgear
(GIS) and those parts of hybrid substations made from GIS components population,
the collected service experience is 3-phase. Collected data about failures is single
phase or three-phase as mentioned in the introduction of chapter 5.5. Supposing that
any, even a single phase failure causes an outage of all three GIS phases the values of
subsequently provided failure frequencies are related to 3-phase GIS circuit breaker
bay arrangement.

To get as much as possible a true comparison the WG decided to select only the following
two data sets from the 2
nd
survey :
all data without one the worst utility results set (275 failures which occurred in 18
indoor class 2 substations representing 133 CB-bays, 2633 CB-bay-years)
all data without one utility having the worst results and without one dominant highly
developed country (representing 70074 CB-bay-years and only 59 major failures)

An overview of these two data sets is given in table 5-54. However, it shall be kept in mind
that the comparison is very approximate to make any real final conclusion as the participation
of countries, utilities and reported GIS in the 3
rd
survey was different from the 2
nd
one.

52

Table 5-54:. Overview of collected data in the 2
nd
GIS survey entering the failure frequencies
comparison
Voltage class
[kV]
All data without the worst utility data All data without the worst utility and one
dominant country data
Total collected
experience
[CB-bay-years]
Total collected number
of MaF
Total collected
experience [CB-
bay-years]
Total collected
number of MaF
60U<100
56 884 28 5114 13
100U<200
29 415 190 20 999 174
200U<300
16 040 138 9 576 115
300U<500
6 371 179 6 371 179
500U<700
4 525 49 1 101 44
700
200 12 200 12
Total
113 435 596 43 361 537

More than 99% of service experience collected data and about 91% of major failure data in
total, 97% for data without countries 14 and 23 resp., could have been used for failure
frequencies calculations. The 91% of major failure data in comparison to the total is because
major failures caused by flooding were excluded from calculation. Flood belongs to force
majeure causes that the equipment really cannot be designed for.

5.6.2 GIS voltage class major failure frequency distribution
Similar to chapters 5.4 and 5.5, subchapters 5.6.x provide GIS major failure frequencies from
different points of view. The calculated results are expressed as point estimation of the
number of major failures (in units per 100 CB-bay-years) with their lower and upper limits of
confidence interval for 95% confidence level. For comparison of two independent groups of
data and for evaluation of an influence of a sub-group data to total results the null hypothesis
and alternate hypotheses tests are provided (for details about statistics applied in the
brochure see technical brochure [1].

Chapter 5.6.2 provides the failure frequency analysis from individual voltage class point of
view. Table 5-55 provides major failure frequencies for all data, Table 5-56 provides the
same analysis but for data without two dominant countries and compares these results with
the results based on all data. Figures 5-32 express the results from both tables in graphical
forms. The dot line shows one of many possible real scenarios.

Table 5-55: Distribution of major failure frequency for GIS-CB-bay - all data (absolute values
within individual voltage classes)
Voltage class
Major failure frequency [MaF/100 CB-bay-years] all data
Point estimation Lower limit Upper limit
60U<100 kV 0,31 0,26 0,37
100U<200 kV 0,24 0,18 0,30
200U<300 kV 0,33 0,21 0,47
300U<500 kV 0,88 0,71 1,08
500U<700 kV 0,50 0,29 0,82
700 kV 1,18 0,32 3,01
Total 0,37 0,33 0,41

53

Table 5-56: Distribution of major failure frequency for GIS-CB-bay data without countries 14
and 23 (absolute values within individual voltage classes and results of hypotheses tests on
significant difference from all data failure frequencies)
Voltage class
Major failure frequency [MaF/100 CB-bay-years]
all data without countries 14 and 23
Result of
hypotheses tests:
difference from all
data results
60U<100 kV 0,00 0,00 2,65 not different
300U<500 kV 3,69 2,83 4,73 different
700 kV 2,08 0,57 5,33 not different
Total 1,42 1,16 1,73 different

Figures 5-32: Distribution of GIS-CB-bay major failure frequencies absolute values for
individual voltage classes

0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
]
Volatgeclass[kV]
Pointestimationandconfidenceintervalformajorfailure
frequency(alldata)
MaF
frequency
lowerlimit
MaF
frequency
point
estimation
MaF
frequency
upperlimit
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
9.0
10.0
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
]
Volatgeclass[kV]
Pointestimationandconfidenceintervalformajorfailure
frequency(datawithoutcountries14and23)
MaF
frequency
lowerlimit
MaF
frequency
point
estimation
MaF
frequency
upperlimit
54

Table 5-57 and figure 5-33 provide a comparison of the 2
nd
and 3
rd
GIS surveys. They show
absolute values of major failure frequencies point estimations in individual voltage classes
and results of hypotheses tests.

Table 5-57 : Comparison of 2
nd
and 3
rd
GIS surveys major failure frequencies (absolute values)
Voltage class
Major failure
frequency [MaF/100
CB-bay-years]
Results of
hypotheses
tests
Major failure frequency
[MaF/100 CB-bay-years]
Results of
hypotheses
tests
2
nd
GIS
survey -
all data
without
the worst
utility
3
rd
GIS
survey
all data
2
nd
GIS
survey - all
data without
the worst
utility and a
dominant
country
3
rd
GIS
survey
all data
without
countries
14 and 23
60U<100 kV 0,05 0,31 3
rd
worse than 2
nd
0,25 0,00 equal
100U<200 kV 0,65 0,24 3
rd
better than 2
nd
0,83 0,52 3
rd
better than 2
nd

200U<300 kV 0,86 0,33 3
rd
better than 2
nd
1,20 0,67 3
rd
better than 2
nd

300U<500 kV 2,81 0,88 3
rd
better than 2
nd
2,81 3,69 3
rd
worse than 2
nd
500U<700 kV 1,08 0,50 3
rd
better than 2
nd
4,00 4,71 equal
700 kV 6,00 1,18 3
rd
better than 2
nd
6,00 2,08 3
rd
better than 2
nd

Total 0,53 0,37 3
rd
better than 2
nd
1,24 1,42 equal

Figure 5-33: Comparison of major failure frequencies in the 2
nd
and 3
rd
GIS surveys

Comparison of failure frequencies of GISs collected in the 2
nd
and 3
rd
survey provides the
following results:
2
nd
survey all data without the worst utility result compared to all data in the 3
rd

survey: With exception of voltage class 1 GIS from the 3
rd
survey are more reliable
than those reported in the 2
nd
survey. Voltage class 1 GISs exhibit less reliability.
2
nd
survey all data without the worst utility and without one dominant highly developed
country compared to all data without countries 14 and 23 in the 3
rd
survey: The GIS
failure frequencies of voltage classes 1 and 5 and of the total GIS population have not
changed. GISs of voltage classes 2, 3 and 6 exhibited better reliability but in voltage
class 4 the GISs were less reliable than those reported within the 2
nd
survey.

The comparison did not show unambiguously better behavior of GIS in the 3
rd
survey with
respect to those reported within the 2
nd
survey namely for the data sets without dominant
highly experienced countries. The voltage classes curve shapes are similar.

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
Voltageclass[kV]
ComparisonofMaFfrequenciesin2ndand3rdGISsurveys
2ndGISsurvey all
datawithoutonethe
worstutility
3rdGISsurvey alldata
2ndGISsurvey all
datawithoutonethe
worstutilityandone
dominantcountry
3rdGISsurvey alldata
withoutcountries14
and23
55

Major failure frequency increases with voltage class in both analyses, i.e. for all data as well
as for data without countries 14 and 23. As mentioned in technical brochure [1] the
confidence interval is the wider the less service experience enters the calculation. The point
estimations as well as their confidence limits with confidence level of 95% are given in tables
5-55 and 5-56.

The point estimations for all data for voltage classes 1, 2 and 3 are about 0.3 MaF/100 CB-
bay-years, in voltage classes 4 and 5 the failure frequencies are about twice as higher and in
voltage class 6 about three times higher. The point estimates for all data without countries 14
and 23 for voltage classes 2 and 3 are about 0.6 MaF/100 CB-bay-years, in voltage classes
4 and 5 the failure frequencies are about 6 times higher and in voltage class 6 it is about
three times higher. However, keeping in mind very different bases for calculations, i.e. very
different numbers of collected service experience of all data and data without countries 14
and 23, and applying hypotheses tests on their failure frequencies significant differences, it
yields that only in voltage class 4 and in total the other countries than 14 and 23 influenced
the total result in an inhomogeneous way. This is due to the very large change of collected
service experience when countries 14 and 23 are excluded.

Application of hypotheses tests on significant differences to pairs of voltage classes results
allows comparison of voltage classes behavior. The results are shown in tables 5-58 and 5-
59.

Table 5-58: Comparison of GIS voltage classes behavior hypotheses tests results (all data)
Population 1
(population
within voltage
class)
Population 2
(population
within voltage
class)
Failure
frequency in
population1 is
less than in
population 2
Failure
frequency in
population1 is
greater than in
population 2
Both failure
frequencies are
equal
60U<100 kV 100U<200 kV yes
100U<200 kV 200U<300 kV yes
200U<300 kV 300U<500 kV yes
300U<500 kV 500U<700 kV yes
500U<700 kV 700 kV yes

GIS voltage class 2 behavior is better than the experience in voltage class 1. The results in
voltage classes 2 and 3 are equal. The behavior of voltage class 3 is better than in voltage
class 4 but voltage class 4 behavior is worse than in class 5 equal to voltage class 6. This
comparison does not give as clear message as written below for the data without countries
14 and 23. The result might be explained by a different age distribution of the GIS.

Table 5-59: Comparison of GIS voltage classes behavior hypotheses tests results (all data
without countries 14 and 23
Population 1
(population
within voltage
class)
Population 2
(population
within voltage
class)
Failure
frequency in
population1 is
less than in
population 2
Failure
frequency in
population1 is
greater than in
population 2
Both failure
frequencies are
equal
60U<100 kV 100U<200 kV yes
100U<200 kV 200U<300 kV yes
200U<300 kV 300U<500 kV yes
300U<500 kV 500U<700 kV yes
500U<700 kV 700 kV yes

The behavior in voltage classes 1, 2 and 3 are equal and better than in the other classes.
The other classes (classes 4, 5 and 6) behave the same. This is an expected result due to
slightly different designs (e.g. CB with one interrupter chamber and with two or more
interrupters).

56

5.6.3 GIS extent major failure frequencies distribution

The analysis regarding the behavior of fully GIS and hybrid GIS is made only for all data. The
amount of data for countries other than 14 and 23 is too small to get any precise results.
Table 5-60 provides point estimation and confidence interval limits for major failure frequency
of fully GIS. Table 5-61 provides the same analysis for hybrid GIS and compares this results
with the fully GIS results. Figure 5-34 expresses the point estimations results from both
tables in a graphical form (their confidence limits are provided only in the tables).

Table 5-60: Distribution of major failure frequency for fully GIS-CB-bay - all data (absolute
Voltage class
Fully GIS Major failure frequency [MaF/100 CB-bay-years] all data
60U<100 kV 0,33 0,27 0,39
100U<200 kV 0,22 0,17 0,29
200U<300 kV 0,31 0,19 0,47
300U<500 kV 0,98 0,78 1,21
500U<700 kV 0,74 0,40 1,24
700 kV 1,18 0,32 3,01
Total 0,37 0,33 0,42

Table 5-61: Distribution of major failure frequency for hybrid GIS-CB-bay all data (absolute
values within individual voltage classes and hypotheses tests results for comparison to fully
GIS)
Voltage class
Hybrid GIS Major failure frequency [MaF/100
CB-bay-years] all data
Results of hypotheses tests
60U<100 kV 0,12 0,02 0,34 Hybrid GIS better than Fully GIS
100U<200 kV 0,75 0,24 1,75 Hybrid GIS worse than Fully GIS
200U<300 kV 0,42 0,14 0,99 equal
Total 0,28 0,17 0,43 equal

Figure 5-34: Distribution of major failure frequencies for fully and hybrid GIS-CB-bays in

0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
Voltageclass[kV]
ComparisonofGISextentMaFfrequency(alldata)
FullyGIS(all
data)
HybridGIS(all
data)
57

From the brochure [13] of the 2
nd
GIS survey, it is not clear how many major failures of hybrid
installations happened in the data set 1 (all data) and how many in the population without
one dominant country. Therefore the comparison between fully GIS and hybrid GIS shown
below is provided only for datasets that include all reported data (in case of 2
nd
survey
without the worst utility results).

Table 5-62 and figure 5-35 provide comparison of the 2
nd
and 3
rd
GIS survey. They show
point estimations of major failure frequencies in individual voltage classes and the results of
the significance tests.

Table 5-62: Comparison of major failure frequencies of the 2
nd
and 3
rd
GIS survey of fully and
hybrid GIS (all data)
Voltage class
Results of
hypotheses
tests
[MaF/100 CB-bay-
years]
Results of
hypotheses
tests
2
nd
GIS
survey
fully GIS all
data without
the worst
utility
3
rd
GIS
survey
fully
GIS all
data
2
nd
GIS
survey
hybrid
GIS all
data
3
rd
GIS
survey
hybrid
GIS all
data
60U<100 kV
0,05 0,40 3
rd
worse than 2
nd
0,12 0,12 equal
100U<200 kV
0,68 0,23 3
rd
better than 2
nd
0,18 0,90 3
rd
worse than 2
nd

200U<300 kV 0,89 0,32 3
rd
better than 2
nd
0,49 0,42 equal
300U<500 kV 2,80 0,99 3
rd
better than 2
nd
3,19 0,33 3
rd
better than 2
nd

500U<700 kV 1,31 0,74 3
rd
better than 2
nd
0,00 0,15 equal
700 kV 6,00 1,18 3
rd
better than 2
nd
n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total 0,54 0,41 3
rd
better than 2
nd
0,23 0,29 equal

Figure 5-35: Comparison of major failure frequencies of the 2
nd
and 3
rd
GIS survey of fully and
hybrid GISs

Comparison of failure frequencies of GISs collected in the 2
nd
and 3
rd
surveys provides the
following results:
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
Voltageclass[kV]
ComparisonoffullyandhybridGISMaFfrequenciesin2nd
and3rdGISsurveys(alldata)
2ndGISsurvey
fullyGIS
3rdGISsurvey
fullyGIS
2ndGISsurvey
hybridGIS
3rdGISsurvey
hybridGIS
58

The fully GISs comparison provides the same results as the comparison of all data
(see chapter 5.6.2)
The hybrid GISs comparison shows the more or less the same hybrid GIS
performance in classes 1, 3, 5 and in total, better performance in the 2
nd
survey in
class 2 and better performance in the 3
rd
survey in class 3.

The comparison did not show unambiguously better behavior in the 3
rd
survey than those
reported within the 2
nd
survey namely for the hybrid GIS.
The voltage classes curve shapes for fully GIS are similar. The voltage class curve shapes
for hybrid GIS are completely different.

The result shows an increasing failure frequencies in higher voltage classes in fully GIS in
which the point estimation failure frequency are more or less the same as for all GIS without
distinguishing between their designs. With exception of voltage class 2 hybrid GIS exhibits
better behavior that fully GIS. Their point estimation values are 4 to 5 times lower than fully
GIS namely in voltage classes 4 and 5. Similar to chapter 5.5.2, this can be explained by the
fact that hybrid GIS are in general younger and more tailor made (sometimes even special
type tests are applied) than fully GIS and that they have less GIS parts to fail.

5.6.4 GIS location major failure frequencies distribution

The analysis regarding the performance of indoor GIS and outdoor GIS is made only for all
data. The amount of data for countries other than 14 and 23 is too small to get any
reasonable results. Table 5-63 provides major failure frequency point estimation and
confidence interval limits for indoor GIS, Table 5-64 provides the same analysis for outdoor
GIS and compares this results with the indoor GIS results. Figure 5-36 expresses the point
estimation values results from both tables in a graphical form (their confidence limits are
provided only in the tables).

Table 5-63: Distribution of major failure frequency for indoor GIS-CB-bay - all data (absolute
Voltage class
Indoor GIS Major failure frequency [MaF/100 CB-bay-years] all data
60U<100 kV 0,09 0,05 0,16
100U<200 kV 0,21 0,15 0,29
200U<300 kV 0,29 0,13 0,58
300U<500 kV 1,34 0,95 1,83
500U<700 kV 0,00 0,00 0,87
700 kV 2,08 0,57 5,33
Total 0,27 0,22 0,33

59

Table 5-64: Distribution of major failure frequency for outdoor GIS-CB-bay all data (absolute
values within individual voltage classes and hypotheses tests results for comparison to indoor
GIS)
Voltage class
Outdoor GIS Major failure frequency [MaF/100
CB-bay-years] all data
60U<100 kV 0,41 0,34 0,50 Indoor GIS better than outdoor
100U<200 kV 0,28 0,18 0,41 equal
200U<300 kV 0,34 0,20 0,53 equal
300U<500 kV 0,70 0,52 0,92 Indoor GIS worse than outdoor
500U<700 kV 0,56 0,32 0,91 equal
Total 0,43 0,38 0,49 Indoor GIS better than outdoor

Figure 5-36: Distribution of major failure frequencies for indoor and outdoor GIS-CB-bays in

Table 5-65 provides a comparison of the 2
nd
and 3
rd
GIS survey of failure frequencies for
indoor and outdoor GIS based on all data (in case of the 2
nd
survey without the worst utility).
Table 5-66 provides the same comparison but for data without one (2
nd
survey), two (3
rd

survey) resp., dominant countries data. Figures 5-37 provide graphical interpretations of the
data from both tables. The tables and the figure show estimated major failure frequencies in
individual voltage classes and results of hypotheses tests.

0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
Voltageclass[kV]
ComparisonofGISlocationMaFfrequency(alldata)
IndoorGIS
(alldata)
OutdoorGIS
(alldata)
60

nd
and 3
rd
GIS survey for indoor
and outdoor GIS (all data)
Voltage class
Results of
hypotheses
tests
[MaF/100 CB-bay-
years]
Results of
hypotheses
tests
2
nd
GIS
survey
indoor
GIS
3
rd
GIS
survey
indoor
GIS
2
nd
GIS
survey
outdoor
GIS
3
rd
GIS
survey
outdoor
GIS
60U<100 kV 0,08 0,09 equal 0,03 0,51 3
rd
worse than 2
nd

100U<200 kV 0,78 0,22 3
rd
better that 2nd 0,12 0,29 3
rd
worse than 2
nd

200U<300 kV 1,12 0,33 3
rd
better that 2nd 0,46 0,34 equal
300U<500 kV 3,09 1,34 3
rd
rd
better that 2
nd

500U<700 kV 2,20 0,00 3
rd
rd
worse than 2
nd

700 kV
6,00 2,08 3
rd
rd
worse than 2
nd

Total 0,79 0,28 3
rd
rd
worse than 2
nd

nd
and 3
rd
GIS survey for indoor
and outdoor GIS (data without dominant countries)
Voltage class
Results of
hypotheses
tests
[MaF/100 CB-bay-
years]
Results of
hypotheses
tests
2
nd
GIS
survey
indoor
GIS
3
rd
GIS
survey
indoor
GIS
2
nd
GIS
survey
outdoor
GIS
3
rd
GIS
survey
outdoor
GIS
60U<100 kV 0,33 0,00 equal 0,11 0,00 equal
100U<200 kV 0,85 0,50 3
rd
better that 2nd 0,23 0,79 equal
200U<300 kV 1,30 0,54 3
rd
rd
worse than 2
nd

300U<500 kV 3,09 2,79 equal 2,36 7,08 3
rd
worse than 2
nd

500U<700 kV 4,90 0,00 3
rd
rd
worse than 2
nd

700 kV 6,00 2,08 3
rd
better that 2nd n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total 1,27 1,02 equal 1,08 4,53 3
rd
worse than 2
nd

Figures 5-37: Comparison of major failure frequencies of the 2
nd
and 3
rd
GIS survey of indoor
and outdoor GISs

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
Voltageclass [kV]
Comparisonof indoorandoutdoorGIS MaFfrequenciesin
2ndand3rdGISsurveys(alldata)
2nd GIS survey
indoorGIS
3rdGISsurvey
indoorGIS
2nd GIS survey
outdoorGIS
3rdGISsurvey
outdoorGIS
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
Voltageclass [kV]
Comparisonof indoorandoutdoorGIS MaFfrequenciesin
2ndand3rdGISsurveys(datawithoutdominantcountries)
2nd GIS survey
indoorGIS
3rdGISsurvey
indoorGIS
2nd GIS survey
outdoorGIS
3rdGISsurvey
outdoorGIS
61

Comparison of failure frequencies of indoor GISs collected in the 2
nd
and 3
rd
survey show
equal or better reliability of GISs in the 3
rd
survey for all data as well as for data without
dominant countries. On the other hand the collected outdoor GISs experience in the 3
rd

survey shows less reliability (with exception of voltage class 4) than GISs collected in the 2
nd

survey. This fact is even worse when evaluating data without dominant countries. It is difficult
to say whether the reason is that the populations were different or whether the outdoor GIS
are getting less reliable (the age analysis is provided in chapter 5.6.7).

The result shows an increasing failure frequencies in higher voltage classes in outdoor GIS.
The failure frequencies for voltage classes 1, 2, 3 are stable at a level of about 0,3 MaF/100
CB-bay-years. The failure frequency increases to about twice that value for voltage classes 4
and 5 (0,6 to 0,7 MaF/100 CB-bay-years).

The result also shows an increasing failure frequencies in higher voltage classes in indoor
GIS. The failure frequencies for voltage classes 1, 2, 3 slightly increase from 0,1 to 0,3
MaF/100 CB-bay-years but for voltage class 4 it rises to a value about 5 times that value (1,3
MaF/100 CB-bay-years).
In voltage class 5 there were no failures recorded in the 4 years period of the survey.

As the comparison of total data for outdoor and indoor GIS behavior is concerned, the indoor
GIS exhibits better performance in voltage class 1 and worse performance in voltage class 4.
GIS of the other voltage classes behave equally. No significant difference between outdoor
and indoor GIS was observed. Most manufacturers design their basic components and
sealing for outdoor GIS even if they are installed indoor. The failure frequencies should thus
be very similar and that has been proven by the survey results in spite of the fact that
outdoor design is always more dependent on local environmental impacts (see chapter
5.7.8).

5.6.5 GIS type of enclosure major failure frequencies distribution

The analysis regarding the performance of single-phase and three-phase enclosure CB-bays
is made only for all data. The amount of data for countries other than 14 and 23 is too small
to get any precise results. Table 5-67 provides estimated major failure frequency and
confidence intervals for single-phase GIS CB-bays. Table 5-68 provides the same analysis
for three-phase GIS CB-bays and compares these results with the single-phase GIS CB-
bays. Figure 5-38 expresses the results from both tables in a graphical form (their confidence
limits are provided only in the tables).

Table 5-67: Distribution of major failure frequency for single-phase GIS-CB-bay - all data
(absolute values within individual voltage classes)
Voltage class
Single-phase GIS CB-bays major failure frequency [MaF/100 CB-bay-years] all
data
60U<100 kV 0,26 0,16 0,40
100U<200 kV 0,21 0,14 0,29
200U<300 kV 0,38 0,21 0,64
300U<500 kV 0,96 0,76 1,19
500U<700 kV 0,50 0,29 0,82
700 kV 1,18 0,32 3,01
Total 0,43 0,37 0,50

62

Table 5-68: Distribution of major failure frequency for three-phase GIS-CB-bay all data
(absolute values within individual voltage classes and hypotheses tests results for comparison
to single-phase GIS CB-bays)
Voltage class
Three-phase GIS CB-bays major failure
frequency [MaF/100 CB-bay-years] all data
60U<100 kV 0,32 0,27 0,39 equal
100U<200 kV 0,27 0,19 0,39 equal
200U<300 kV 0,28 0,15 0,48 equal
300U<500 kV 0,51 0,23 0,96 3-phase GIS better than 1-phase
500U<700 kV n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
700 kV n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total 0,32 0,27 0,37 3-phase GIS better than 1-phase

Figure 5-38: Distribution of major failure frequencies for single- and three-phase GIS-CB-bays
in individual voltage classes

The 2
nd
GIS survey questionnaire did not ask a question about the GIS encapsulation design.

The result shows increasing failure frequencies in higher voltage classes in single-phase
encapsulated GIS. The failure frequencies for voltage classes 1, 2 and 3 are stable at a level
of about 0,2 to 0,4 MaF/100 CB-bay-years, then in voltage classes 4 and 7 it increases to
about 3 times that value i.e. 1 MaF/100 CB-bay-years. The only exception in this trend is the
result of voltage class 5 with very low base of collected service experience.

The result shows the same tendency for three-phase encapsulated GIS as for single-phase.
More over the results show approximately the same failure frequencies in voltage class 1, 2
and 3 and slightly lower value in voltage class 4 (about a half of single-phase CB-bays).

0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
60U<100 100U<200200U<300300U<500500U<700 700
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
Voltageclass[kV]
ComparisonofGISCBbayenclosuredesignMaFfrequency (alldata)
CBbay1
phaseGIS(all
data)
CBbay3
phase(all
data)
63

The comparison of single-phase and three-phase GIS behavior can be made only for voltage
classes 1,2,3 and 4. The three-phase CB-bays encapsulation is not used in the highest
voltages, i.e. in classes 5 and 6. Regards the failure frequency of voltage classes 1, 2, 3 they
perform equally and independent of the enclosure design. Voltage class 4 of three-phase
encapsulation exhibits a bit better results. That can be explained by the fact that if both types
are properly designed, less material in three-phase encapsulation gives less room for
failures and three-phase encapsulation transport units are more homogeneous and thus give
less room for assembly faults.

5.6.6 SF6/air bushings, cable boxes and transformer bushing failure
frequencies

In the GIS population cards, respondents were asked to specify in each substation
(questionnaire line) number of:
SF6/air bushings
Cable boxes
Interface chamber bushings (direct interconnections between GIS and power
transformer or reactor)

Since the GIS population card asked for 3-phase data about GIS and those parts of hybrid
substations made from GIS components the number of collected different kind of bushings
service experience is basically 3-phase (see chapter 5.6.1).

The GIS failure cards provided also other options for the identification of a failed component
than only different kinds of bushings. The respondents could also identify busbar and/or
busbar interconnecting pieces, busducts and/or busducts interconnecting pieces or surge
arresters. In population card was no question on the number of installed surge arresters or
on the length of busbars and/or busducts. Therefore it is impossible to calculate accurately
failure frequencies for these parts of GIS.

Table 5-69. shows the collected service experience, number of major failures MaF, estimated
MaF failure frequency and its confidence interval. As there were collected only 9 of such
major failures the results [MaF/100 three-phase bushing arrangement-year] were calculated
only for a sum of all data.

Table 5-69: Overview of collected service experience and number of major failures for GIS
components and failure frequencies and confidence intervals results all data
GIS component Collected service
experience [unit.
years]
Collected
number of
MaF
MaF frequency [MaF/100 three-phase bushing
arrangement-year]
SF6-to-air
bushing
38 887 5 0,013 0,004 0,030
Cable box/ cable
sealing end
45 925 2 0,004 0,001 0,016
Interface
chamber
bushings
5 049 2 0,040 0,005 0,143

After making the hypotheses tests the cable box results are a bit better than the other two
types bushings results that are equal.

64

The number of reported different types of bushings, or the length of busbars and busducts, or
the number of surge arresters are not known from the 2
nd
survey. The only comparison that
can be made is a comparison of their contribution to the whole CB-bay failure frequency.
This contribution is shown in Table 5-70 that provides only results based on all data and
hypotheses tests results.

nd
and 3
rd
GIS survey for GIS
components other than CB, DS/ES and IT (all data)
2
nd
survey MaF
frequency
[MaF/100.CB-bay-
years]
3
nd
survey MaF
frequency
[MaF/100.CB-bay-
years]
Results of hypotheses
tests
Busbar+busducts 0,107 0,021
3
rd
better than 2
nd

Any kind of bushing 0,043 0,010
3
rd
better than 2
nd

Surge arrester 0,004 0,000
equal
Other 0,011 0,025
3
rd
worse than 2
nd

The failure frequency of GIS parts other than CB, DS/ES and IT is extremely low,
nevertheless, the surveys comparison shows a certain improvement in the failure
frequencies of busbar+busducts as well as in all kinds of bushings. In spite of that the biggest
part in the 3
rd
survey surprisingly represents the other category for which, unfortunately, no
additional information exists.

The survey data enabled to calculate failure frequencies only for different kind of bushings.
Their failure frequencies are extremely low (about 40 times better than a total CB-bay
reliability).

5.6.7 GIS age major failure frequencies distribution

Chapter 5.6.7 provides the failure frequency analyses for individual voltage classes and for
seven intervals of GIS manufacturing years. Table 5-71 provides estimated frequencies for
major failures based on all data. Table 5-72 provides the same analysis but for data without
two dominant countries. Figures 5-39 express the results from both tables in graphical forms.

Table 5-71: Distribution of major failure frequency in seven intervals of GIS manufacturing
years - all data (absolute values within individual voltage classes)
MaF frequency
[MaF/100 CB-bay-
years] all data
Voltage class [kV]
60U
<100 kV
100U
<200 kV
200U
<300 kV
300U
<500 kV
500U
<700 kV
700
kV
Total
P
e
r
i
o
d

o
f

m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e

before 1979 0,51 1,98 0,14 4,05 0,00 0 0,89
1979-1983 0,39 1,29 0,14 1,99 1,39 0 0,79
1984-1988 0,50 0,64 0,13 1,36 0,00 2,08 0,57
1989-1993 0,27 0,11 0,49 0,61 0,39 0 0,30
1994-1998 0,20 0,13 0,46 0,34 0,58 0 0,23
1999-2003 0,08 0,08 0,40 0,31 0,19 0,00 0,13
2004-2007 0,40 0,33 0,22 0,58 0,00 0,00 0,36
Total 0,31 0,24 0,33 0,88 0,50 1,18 0,37

65

Table 5-72: Distribution of major failure frequency in seven intervals of GIS manufacturing
years data without countries 14 and 23 (absolute values within individual voltage classes)
MaF frequency
[MaF/100 CB-bay-
years] data without
countries 14 and 23
Voltage class [kV]
60U
<100 kV
100U
<200 kV
200U
<300 kV
300U
<500 kV
500U
<700 kV
700
kV
Total
P
e
r
i
o
d

o
f

m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e

before 1979
0
1,39 0,00 8,14
0 0
2,50
1979-1983
0
0,60 0,93 4,39 5,80
0
2,72
1984-1988
0
0,58 0,00 4,01 0,00 2,08 1,73
1989-1993
0
0,28 1,54 1,75
0 0
0,80
1994-1998
0
0,49 1,47 1,02
0 0
0,77
1999-2003
0
0,28 0,74 3,13
0 0
0,58
2004-2007
0
0,58 0,28 1,61
0 0
0,68
Total
0
0,52 0,67 3,69 4,71 2,08 1,42

Figures 5-39: Distribution of major failure frequency in seven intervals of GIS manufacturing
years within individual voltage classes

0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
Periodofmanufacture
MaFfrequency(alldata)
60U<100kV
100U<200kV
200U<300kV
300U<500kV
500U<700kV
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
Periodofmanufacture
MaFfrequency(datawithoutcountries14and23)
60U<100kV
100U<200kV
200U<300kV
300U<500kV
66

The upper figures call for a more detailed analysis, i.e. for each individual voltage class
separately. These analyses were made for all data in voltage classes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 (tables
and figures 5-73 and 5-40) and for data without countries 14 and 23 for voltage classes 2, 3
and 4 (tables and figures 5-74 and 5-41). As the real value of failure frequency lies with 95%
of confidence level somewhere between the upper and lower limits the time trend of failure
frequencies can be visible more precisely.

Tables 5-73 and figures 5-40: Distribution of major failure frequency in seven intervals of GIS
manufacturing years - all data (point estimations and lower and upper limits of confidence
interval in voltage classes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5)
MaF frequency
[MaF/100 CB-
bay-years]
Voltage class 60U<100 kV
Lower
limit
Point
estimation
Upper
limit
P
e
r
i
o
d

o
f

m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
before 1979 0,28 0,51 0,85
1979-1983 0,22 0,39 0,63
1984-1988 0,37 0,50 0,68
1989-1993 0,18 0,27 0,40
1994-1998 0,1 0,20 0,32
1999-2003 0,02 0,08 0,20
2004-2007 0,05 0,40 1,45
Total 0,26 0,31 0,37
MaF frequency
[MaF/100 CB-
bay-years]
Lower
limit
Point
estimation
Upper
limit
P
e
r
i
o
d

o
f

m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
before 1979 0,80 1,98 4,07
1979-1983 0,62 1,29 2,38
1984-1988 0,32 0,64 1,14
1989-1993 0,03 0,11 0,29
1994-1998 0,06 0,13 0,24
1999-2003 0,03 0,08 0,17
2004-2007 0,18 0,33 0,56
Total 0,18 0,24 0,30
MaF frequency
[MaF/100 CB-
bay-years]
Lower
limit
Point
estimation
Upper
limit
P
e
r
i
o
d

o
f

m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
before 1979 0,004 0,14 0,80
1979-1983 0,004 0,14 0,77
1984-1988 0,015 0,13 0,45
1989-1993 0,225 0,49 0,94
1994-1998 0,197 0,46 0,90
1999-2003 0,128 0,40 0,92
2004-2007 0,006 0,22 1,23
Total 0,214 0,33 0,47
MaF frequency
[MaF/100 CB-
bay-years]
Lower
limit
Point
estimation
Upper
limit
P
e
r
i
o
d

o
f

m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
before 1979 2,36 4,05 6,48
1979-1983 1,26 1,99 2,99
1984-1988 0,83 1,36 2,11
1989-1993 0,30 0,61 1,09
1994-1998 0,15 0,34 0,64
1999-2003 0,11 0,31 0,67
2004-2007 0,19 0,58 1,35
Total 0,71 0,88 1,08
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
0,80
1,00
1,20
1,40
1,60
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
Periodof manufacture
MaFfrequencyclass60U<100kV(alldata)
MaFfrequency
lowerlimit
MaFfrequency
point
estimation
MaFfrequency
upperlimit
0,00
0,50
1,00
1,50
2,00
2,50
3,00
3,50
4,00
4,50
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
MaFfrequency
lowerlimit
MaFfrequency
pointestimation
MaFfrequency
upperlimit
0,000
0,200
0,400
0,600
0,800
1,000
1,200
1,400
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
MaFfrequency
lowerlimit
MaFfrequency
pointestimation
MaFfrequency
upperlimit
0,00
1,00
2,00
3,00
4,00
5,00
6,00
7,00
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
MaFfrequency
lowerlimit
MaFfrequency
point
estimation
MaFfrequency
upperlimit
67

MaF frequency
[MaF/100 CB-
bay-years]
Lower
limit
Point
estimation
Upper
limit
P
e
r
i
o
d

o
f

m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
before 1979 0,00 0,00 1,87
1979-1983 0,60 1,39 2,75
1984-1988 0,00 0,00 0,59
1989-1993 0,05 0,39 1,41
1994-1998 0,19 0,58 1,35
1999-2003 0,00 0,19 1,06
2004-2007 0,00 0,00 7,31
Total 0,29 0,50 0,82

Tables 5-74 and figures 5-41: Distribution of major failure frequency in seven intervals of GIS
manufacturing years data without countries 14 and 23 (point estimations and lower and
upper limits of confidence interval in voltage classes 2, 3 and 4)
MaF frequency
[MaF/100 CB-
bay-years]
Lower
limit
Point
estimation
Upper
limit
P
e
r
i
o
d

o
f

m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
before 1979 0,38 1,39 3,56
1979-1983 0,12 0,60 1,74
1984-1988 0,16 0,58 1,48
1989-1993 0,03 0,28 1,02
1994-1998 0,06 0,49 1,75
1999-2003 0,03 0,28 1,02
2004-2007 0,07 0,58 2,11
Total 0,31 0,52 0,81
MaF frequency
[MaF/100 CB-
bay-years]
Lower
limit
Point
estimation
Upper
limit
P
e
r
i
o
d

o
f

m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
before 1979 0,000 0,00 1,59
1979-1983 0,023 0,93 5,16
1984-1988 0,000 0,00 10,33
1989-1993 0,186 1,54 5,56
1994-1998 0,178 1,47 5,31
1999-2003 0,154 0,74 2,18
2004-2007 0,007 0,28 1,57
Total 0,305 0,67 1,27
MaF frequency
[MaF/100 CB-
bay-years]
Lower
limit
Point
estimation
Upper
limit
P
e
r
i
o
d

o
f

m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
e
before 1979 4,45 8,14 13,66
1979-1983 2,75 4,39 6,65
1984-1988 2,24 4,01 6,62
1989-1993 0,57 1,75 4,09
1994-1998 0,03 1,02 5,69
1999-2003 0,38 3,13 11,29
2004-2007 0,33 1,61 4,71
Total 2,83 3,69 4,73

As already mentioned above the 2
nd
survey analysis brochure [13] provides two basic
categories for GIS failure frequencies age - for GIS commissioned before 1.1.1985 and after
1.1.1985, i.e. for GIS younger than 12 years (age of 1 to 11 years) and for older than 12
years. To compare the results it was therefore necessary to classify the data of the 3
rd
survey
for the two same age intervals. The comparison of estimated failure frequencies is shown in
table 5-75 together with their hypotheses tests results.

0,00
1,00
2,00
3,00
4,00
5,00
6,00
7,00
8,00
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
MaFfrequency
lowerlimit
MaFfrequency
point
estimation
MaFfrequency
upperlimit
0,00
0,50
1,00
1,50
2,00
2,50
3,00
3,50
4,00
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
MaFfrequencyclass100U<200kV (data without
countries14and23)
MaF
frequency
lowerlimit
MaF
frequency
point
estimation
MaF
frequency
upperlimit
0,000
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
countries14and23)
MaFfrequency
lowerlimit
MaFfrequency
point
estimation
MaFfrequency
upperlimit
0,00
2,00
4,00
6,00
8,00
10,00
12,00
14,00
16,00
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
countries14and23)
MaFfrequency
lowerlimit
MaFfrequency
point
estimation
MaFfrequency
upperlimit
68

Figure 5-42 graphically interprets data from table 5-75. Figures 5-43 show failure frequency
trends within these two groups of age intervals separately for the 2
nd
and 3
rd
GIS survey.

Table 5-75: Comparison of major failure frequencies from the 2
nd
and 3
rd
GIS of GIS older than
11 years and 11 years old or younger in individual voltage classes (all data and hypotheses
tests results)
Voltage class
Results of
hypotheses
tests
[MaF/100 CB-bay-
years]
Results of
hypotheses
tests
2
nd
survey
GIS age
>11 years
3
rd
survey
GIS age
>11 years
2
nd
survey
GIS age
11 years
3
rd
survey
GIS age
11 years
60U<100 kV 0,06 0,37 3
rd
worse that 2
nd
0,04 0,17 3
rd
worse that 2
nd

100U<200 kV 0,45 0,43 equal 0,91 0,14 3
rd
better than 2
nd

200U<300 kV 0,97 0,28 3
rd
better than 2
nd
0,67 0,40 equal
300U<500 kV 2,98 1,32 3
rd
better than 2
nd
2,58 0,36 3
rd
better than 2
nd

500U<700 kV 0,98 0,61 equal 1,34 0,33 3
rd
better than 2
nd

700 kV n.a. 2,08 n.a. 6,00 0,00 3
rd
better than 2
nd

Total 0,53 0,49 equal 0,52 0,20 3
rd
better than 2
nd

Figure 5-42: Comparison of major failure frequencies from the 2
nd
and 3
rd
GIS surveys of GIS
older than 11 years and 11 years old or younger in individual voltage classes

Figures 5-43: Comparison of major failure frequencies GIS age trends from the 2
nd
and 3
rd
GIS
survey

0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
ComparisonofGISmajorfailureratesintwoagegroups
>11yearsoldGIS
2ndsurvey(1995)
>11yearsoldGIS
3rdsurvey(2007)
11yearsoldGIS
2ndsurvey(1995)
11yearsoldGIS
3rdsurvey(2007)
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
>11yearsoldGIS 2nd
survey (1995)
11yearsoldGIS 2nd
survey (1995)
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
GISmajorfailureratesintwoagegroups 2ndsurvey(1995)
60U<100kV
100U<200kV
200U<300kV
300U<500kV
500U<700kV
Total
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
1,4
>11yearsoldGIS 3rd
survey (2007)
11yearsoldGIS 3rd
survey (2007)
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
GISmajorfailureratesintwoagegroups 3rdsurvey(2007)
60U<100kV
100U<200kV
200U<300kV
300U<500kV
500U<700kV
Total
69

Major failure frequency of the older as well as the younger GIS groups is better in the 3
rd
GIS
survey than in the 2
nd
GIS survey only in voltage class 4. In voltage classes 2 and 5 the
failure frequencies for older group are more or less equal and for younger group are better.
In voltage class 3 the younger group shows better performance whereas the older group
performance is more or less the same. The only exception is voltage class 1 in which the
reliability in the 2
nd
survey was better than in the 3
rd
survey in both age groups.

As time trends are concerned, in the 3
rd
survey all voltage classes GIS (with exception of
voltage class 3 see details above) show an increasing trend for older GIS. In the 2
nd
survey
this expected result was valid only for the voltage classes 3 and 4. Time trends of the other
classes were either more or less constant (voltage class 1 and total) or showed a better
reliability for older GISs (voltage classes 2 and 5). This was explained in the 2
nd
survey by
the fact that 20% of all reported failures happened during the first year of service. In the 3
rd

survey that concerned only 12 MaF, i.e. less than 4%. That can be the result of more
effective routine and on-site GIS testing.

Voltage classes 1, 2, 4 and 5 for all data as well as voltage classes 2 and 4 for data without
countries 14 and 23 show time trends of failure frequencies similar to a bath-tube curve. The
failure frequencies increase (with different steepness) the older the GISs are and when they
are new some smaller teething failures appear, too. The only one time trend that does not
exhibit the bath tub curve pattern at the first look is a trend for class 3. Lower and upper
confidence limits set a zone in which the real values of failure frequencies are actually
expected. Having that in mind the real values can create any curve shapes, i.e. can show a
stable, increasing as well decreasing trends.
Comparing all data and data without countries 14 and 23 the values and the curve shapes for
voltage classes 1, 2 and 3 are very similar. The curve shapes for voltage class 4 are also
similar but the values are about twice as high for data without countries 14 and 23 than for all
data.

5.6.8 GIS maintenance philosophies major failure frequencies
distribution

In population as well as in failure cards the respondents were supposed to identify what is
their prevailing maintenance philosophy. There were the following options available in the
questionnaire:
Time based maintenance (TBM) = Scheduled maintenance including overhaul that is
performed on defined period of time or number of operations has elapsed.
Condition based maintenance (CBM) = Maintenance that measures/assesses service
conditions from monitoring or diagnostic data. When the condition has changed or
exceeded a limit, a condition directed task is then implemented and the item is
returned to an acceptable operating condition.
Run to failure (RTF) = Item is allowed to fail and at the time of failure, appropriate
corrective actions are taken to return the item to an acceptable operating condition.
Combination (RCM) = A combination of the above tasks that take into to account the
affects of failure and the effectiveness of prevention
Other = Maintenance philosophy not described by any of the above

The analysis regarding the behavior of GIS in dependence on these maintenance
philosophies is made in voltage classes division and for total data. Table 5-76 provides
point estimation values of major failure frequencies based on all data. Table 5-77 provides
the same analysis but for data without two dominant countries. In these tables only three
types of the maintenance philosophies are mentioned as no respondent selected Run to
failure and the Other philosophy was marginal (see chapter 5.4.6). Comparison of major
failure frequencies (point estimation values) from tables 5-76 and 5-77 for GIS maintained in
different philosophies for total populations for all data and data without countries 14 and 23 is
shown in figure 5-44.
70

Table 5-76: Distribution of major failure frequency for different GIS maintenance philosophies -
all data (absolute values within individual voltage classes)
MaF frequency
all data
Voltage class [kV]
60U
<100 kV
100U
<200 kV
200U
<300 kV
300U
<500 kV
500U
<700 kV
700
kV
Total
M
a
i
n
t
e
n
a
n
c
e

p
h
i
l
o
s
o
p
h
i
e
s

TBM 0,46 0,22 0,33 0,44 0,69 0,00 0.37
CBM 20,83 0,59 1,97 2,03 NA* 2,08 2,41
Combination(RCM) 0.09 0,46 0,29 1,55 0,00 NA* 0,34
Total 0,38 0,24 0,34 0,87 0,50 1,18 0,40
NA*: There was no response identifying this maintenance philosophy category.

Table 5-77: Distribution of major failure frequency for different GIS maintenance philosophies
data without countries 14 and 23 (absolute values within individual voltage classes)
MaF frequency
data without countries 14
and 23
Voltage class [kV]
60U
<100 kV
100U
<200 kV
200U
<300 kV
300U
<500 kV
500U
<700 kV
700
kV
Total
M
a
i
n
t
e
n
a
n
c
e

p
h
i
l
o
s
o
p
h
i
e
s

TBM 0,00 0,62 2,26 2,39 6,35 NA* 1,08
CBM 0,00 0,59 1,97 1,89 NA* 2,08 1,44
Combination(RCM) NA* 0,46 0,39 7,34 0,00 NA* 1,99
Total 0,00 0,58 0,76 4,01 4,71 2,08 1,50
NA*: There was no response identifying this maintenance philosophy category.

Figure 5-44: Comparison of major failure frequencies for GIS maintained in different
philosophies for all data and data without countries 14 and 23

As the failure frequencies shown in tables 5-76 and 5-77 and the comparison shown in figure
5-44 represent service experience with different sizes of populations the MaF frequencies
point estimation values were tested for their comparison by hypotheses tests. The results of
these tests are shown in table 5-78 for all data and in table 5-79 for the data without
countries 14 and 23.

0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
TBM CBM Combination
M
a
F
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
[
M
a
F
/
1
0
0
C
B
b
a
y
y
e
a
r
s
]
Maintenancephilosophy
ComparisonofMaFforGISmaintainedindifferent
philosophies
Alldata
results
Data
without
countries14
and23
results
71

Table 5-78: Comparison of major failure frequencies for different GIS maintenance
philosophies (hypotheses test results of total for all data)
Results of hypotheses test
TBM CBM
0,37 2,41 TBM is better than CBM
TBM Combination
0,37 0,34 Equal
CBM Combination
2,41 0,34 Combination is better than CBM

Table 5-79: Comparison of major failure frequencies for different GIS maintenance
philosophies (hypotheses test results for total of data without countries 14 and 23)
TBM CBM
1,08 1,44 Equal
TBM Combination
1,08 1,99 TBM is better than Combination
CBM Combination
1,44 1,99 Equal

In the 2
nd
survey there was no analysis of the major failure frequencies for GIS maintenance
philosophies.

As mentioned in chapter 5.4.6, there is a remarkable difference of the maintenance
philosophies between the individual voltage classes or the different countries (companies).
Therefore the distribution of the major failure frequencies is also visibly different in individual
voltage classes.

In voltage class 1, all major failure data were reported only by the two dominant countries 14
and 23. In this voltage class the distribution of the major failure frequencies shows that the
major failure frequency for GIS maintained in only the CBM way is dramatically higher than in
the GIS maintained in the other maintenance philosophies. In voltage classes 2, 3 and 4, the
distribution of the major failure frequencies for all data shows that the MaF frequency for
CBM is higher than for TBM and combination of philosophies. Evaluating data without
countries 14 and 23 the results show that the MaF frequency of GISs with TBM is higher
than of GISs with CBM and combination in voltage classes 2 and 3 whereas the highest
MaF of GISs in voltage class 4 was observed at GISs with combined maintenance
strategies. In voltage class 5, only two countries reported the major failure data and both
countries apply TBM as their maintenance philosophy for this voltage class. In voltage class
6, only one country reported the major failure data and this country applies CBM as the
maintenance philosophy for this voltage class.

The results of hypothesis tests for calculated major failure frequencies for all data show that
GISs with TBM and combination of maintenance philosophies behave in an equal way and
that is better than GISs reliability with CBM philosophy only. The results of hypothesis tests
for data without two dominant countries show that GISs with TBM philosophy behave better
than if a combination of maintenance philosophies is applied. Comparisons of TBM with CBM
and CBM with combinations give equal results.

This analysis thus shows that the traditional policy of time based maintenance still brings
good results and cannot be avoided, and that there is still a room for improvement in
72

developing effective CBM technique that will enable an application of really effective
combined maintenance strategies.

Maintenance is an extremely important part of any asset management strategy and
influences the GIS reliability and GIS availability very much. Therefore the survey contained
a specialized GIS maintenance card for respondents to answer detailed questions about
maintenance and other aspects of testing and service. The analysis of the maintenance
card is included in technical brochure [6].

5.7 Failure Characteristics

In the failure cards were detailed questions about each failure characteristics. These can be
divided into the following groups:
Major failure mode (see chapter 5.7.1)
Number of major failures which caused fire or explosion (see chapter 5.7.2)
Minor failure mode (see chapter 5.7.3)
Subassembly that has failed and caused major or minor failures (see chapter 5.7.4)
Origin of major and minor failures (see chapter 5.7.5)
Primary cause of major and minor failures (see chapter 5.7.6)
Service circumstances under which the major and minor failures were discovered
(see chapter 5.7.7)
Contribution of environmental stresses to major and minor failures (see chapter 5.7.8)
Repair of major and minor failures (see chapter 5.7.9)
Consequential measures after major and minor failures (see chapter 5.7.10)
Analysis of characteristics of GIS parts other that CB, DS/ES and IT (see chapter
5.7.11)

The failure characteristics are analyzed in relative numbers and where appropriate the
manufacturing year is considered, too.

This chapter also provides a comparison with the 2
nd
GIS experience survey (1995). In the
2
nd
survey, the analysis of major failure characteristics (only major failures were collected in
the 2
nd
survey) was made for all data without 275 failures which occurred in 18 indoor class 2
substations (133 CB-bays, 2633 CB-bay-years). All of this equipment was operated by one
user and represented one of the oldest breaker technology which was no longer used in
1995.

5.7.1 Major failure mode

Major failure mode describes a basic function of the equipment which the equipment is not
able to meet.
As in different equipment failure cards there were mentioned different major failure modes
(for details see technical brochures [2], [3] and [4] specialized for circuit breakers,
disconnectors/earthing switches and instrument transformers) it was necessary to create new
categories that are more or less common for all equipment and cover all aspects mentioned
in individual failure cards. These categories are shown in table 5-80 that provides absolute
and relative number of major failures (MaF) for all data as well as for data without countries
14 and 23. 100% is total number of all MaF. The table also shows the result after merging
breakdowns into one group and that is also graphically expressed in figures 5-45.

73

Table 5-80: Distribution of major failure modes for GIS CB-bay major (MaF) failures all data
and data without countries 14 and 23 (absolute and relative values based on total collected
MaF)
Major Failure mode
Number of MaF (data without
countries 14 and 23)
Failing to perform requested operation,
function resp., (being locked incl.) 227 63,4 56 53,3
Loss of electrical connections integrity
in primary (e.g. fails to carry current) 1 0,3 1 1,0
Loss of electrical connections integrity
in secondary 2 0,6 1 1,0
Dielectric breakdown in normal service
(without switching operation) 67
81
18,7
22,6
18
25
17,1
23,8
Dielectric breakdown in connection
with switching operation 14 3,9 7 6,7
Loss of mechanical integrity
(mechanical damages of different
parts, big SF6 leakage incl.) 16 4,5 14 13,3
Other
31 8,7 8 7,6

Figures 5-45: Relative distribution of major failures modes in GIS CB-bays

Age aspects for all data are shown in table 5-81. 100% for relative expression is number of
major failures collected within individual intervals of manufacturing years.

63%
0%
1%
23%
4%
9%
DistributionofGISmajorfailures(MaF)fromtheir
failuremodepointofview(alldata)
Failingtoperform
requestedoperation
Lossofelectrical
connectionsintegrityin
primary
Lossofelectrical
connectionsintegrityin
secondary
Dielectricbreakdown
Lossofmechanical
integrity
Other
53%
1%
1%
24%
13%
8%
DistributionofGISmajor
failures(MaF)fromtheir
failuremodepointofview
and23)
74

Table 5-81: Distribution of major failure modes for GIS CB-bay major (MaF) failures in seven
intervals of GIS manufacturing years all data (absolute and relative values based on
collected MaF within individual intervals of manufacturing years)
Number of
MaF
Manufacturing
year
Failing to
perform
requested
operation
Loss of
electrical
connections
in primary
Loss of
electrical
connections
in secondary
Dielectric
breakdowns
Loss of
mechanical
integrity
Other Total
Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs.
before 1979 27 69,2 0 0,0 1 2,6 6 15,4 3 7,7 2 5,1 39
1979-1983 41 70,7 1 1,7 0 0,0 10 17,2 3 5,2 3 5,2 58
1984-1988 59 71,1 0 0,0 0 0,0 12 14,5 6 7,2 6 7,2 83
1989-1993 60 74,1 0 0,0 0 0,0 7 8,6 1 1,2 13 16,0 81
1994-1998 28 54,9 0 0,0 0 0,0 19 37,3 1 2,0 3 5,9 51
1999-2003 8 34,8 0 0,0 0 0,0 10 43,5 1 4,3 4 17,4 23
2004-2007 4 17,4 0 0,0 0 0,0 17 73,9 1 4,3 1 4,3 23
Total 227 63,4 1 0,3 1 0,3 81 22,6 16 4,5 32 8,9 358

Figure 5-46: Relative distribution of GIS CB-bay major failure modes in seven intervals of GIS
manufacturing years

In the 2
nd
GIS survey the major failure mode characteristics was called classification of
symptoms. The analysis in brochure [13] was made for indoor and outdoor GIS and for
voltage classes. Comparison of total results is shown in table 5-82 (absolute and relative
values) and in figure 5-47 (relative values). 100% is total number of major failures in each
survey.

Table 5-82: Comparison of GIS major failures modes in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
GIS survey (absolute
and relative values)
Major failure mode

Number of MaF
Failing to perform
requested
operation
Loss of electrical
connections in
primary or secondary
Dielectric
breakdowns
Loss of
mechanical
integrity
Other
Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. %
2nd survey (1995) 49 9,4 14 2,7 334 64,1 81 15,5 43 8,3
3rd survey (2007) 227 63,4 3 0,8 81 22,6 16 4,5 31 8,7

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
DistributionofGISmajorfailures(MaF)fromtheirfailure
modeandmanufacturingperiodpointsofview(alldata)
Other
Lossofmechanical
integrity
Dielectricbreakdowns
Lossofelectrical
connectionsinsecondary
Lossofelectrical
connectionsinprimary
Failingtoperform
requestedoperation
75

Figure 5-47: Comparison of relative distributions of major failures modes in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd

GIS surveys

Relative distributions of major failure modes in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
GIS surveys provide
different patterns. In the 2
nd
survey the prevailing major failure mode was dielectric
breakdown (64%) whereas in the 3
rd
survey it is failing to perform requested operation. If it
was generally true it would be a good message as dielectric breakdowns in GIS always
request very time- and cost-consuming repair. On the other hand, the failing to perform
requested operation event is often caused by operating mechanism failure; the repair of
which is not so difficult.

As major failure modes are concerned the prevailing are failing to perform requested
function and dielectric breakdown that represent 63% and 23% in total. There is no big
difference in distributions of all data and data without countries 14 and 23. Only a portion of
loss of mechanical integrity is in data without countries 14 and 23 a bit bigger, but it can be
explained by the fact that loss of mechanical integrity can also cause failing to perform
requested operation and thus there can be a certain overlapping in these two categories.

As GIS age aspect is concerned the portion of failing to perform requested operation rises
with the increasing age of GISs. The absolute numbers are smallest for new GIS, and then
they reach a maximum when about 15 to 20 years old and they decrease again for older
GIS. The result most probably illustrates a fact that most overhauls for namely operating
mechanisms are scheduled to this age span and that this timing is sometimes too late. More
frequent diagnostics or monitoring might prevent such failures (for details see technical
brochure [6].

As GIS age aspect is concerned the relative portion of dielectric breakdowns increases for
new GIS, then it is reduced for about 15 to 20 years after which it starts rising again. That is
caused by the fact that absolute number of dielectric breakdowns is a bit bigger in younger
GISs whereas the absolute number of other failure modes in new GIS is very small. The
analysis of major failure frequency for dielectric failures however proves this important
observation (see Fig 5-48).

0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
F
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F
[
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]
ComparisonofGISmajorfailuremodes
2ndsurvey
(1995)
3rdsurvey
(2007)
76

Figure 5-48: GIS HV parts dielectric major failure frequencies in dependence on GIS 5years of
manufacturing intervals

Dielectric breakdowns can be avoided, in a certain extent, in early GIS life by extensive
routine and on-site dielectric testing (for details see technical brochure [6].

For detailed analysis of failing to perform requested function and dielectric breakdown
categories of major failures versus failed subassembly, origin and primary cause see
chapter 5.8.1.

5.7.2 Number of major failures which caused fire or explosion

If an electrical protection is not fast enough or does not operate properly, and if a pressure
relief device does not manage to control the internal gas pressure rise during internal
breakdown, fire or enclosure explosion can happen. There were only 7 major failures
identified as causing fire or explosion of the GIS enclosure: 1CB, 2 DE- thereof 1
disconnector and 1 combined disconnector-earthing switch, 2GI thereof 1 busduct and 1
other, and 2IT thereof 1 inductive and 1 capacitive voltage transformer. Further analysis
shows the following:
These 7 events represents 8,6 % of MaFs with breakdowns (81 MaF) and 1,9 % of all
MaF (358 MaF).
3 of these 7 events (1 CB and 2 DE) happened during dielectric breakdown in
connection with switching operation and 4 of them happened during dielectric
breakdown in normal service (without switching operations).
2 of these 7 events (1 CB and 1 IT) happened with equipment manufactured between
1979-1983, 2 of them with equipment manufactured between 1999-2003 (1 DE and 1
IT) and 3 of them (1 DE and 2 GI) happened with brand new equipment, i.e. at
equipment manufactured between 2004 to 2007.
3 of them (1DE, 1 GI, 2 IT) happened with GIS of voltage class 2, 2 of them (1DE and
1GI) of them of voltage class 3 and 1 of them (1CB) of voltage class 4
2 of them happened in 3-phase enclosure and 5 of them in single phase enclosure
4 of them happened in indoor GIS and 3 of them in outdoor GIS

0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
0.50
N
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1
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B
.
b
a
y
s
.
y
e
a
r
GIS manufacturing year
HV components dielectric major failures frequency
Lower limit
Point
estimation
value
Upper limit
77

In the 2
nd
survey there were 13 major failures that caused fire or explosion of a GIS gas
compartment. These 13 events represents about 4 % of MaFs with breakdowns (334 MaF)
and 2,5 % of all MaF (521 MaF). The 4% of MaF with breakdowns in the second survey is
half the value if a similar analysis is made in the 3
rd
survey (8,6%). This is not a good
message. The reduction of all dimensions in new generations of GIS requires more sensitive
design of gas compartment sizes to be compatible with electric protection capabilities to clear
an internal short circuit in time.

The absolute number of major failures accompanied with explosion or fire is extremely low.
Surprising is that majority of them happened at new or quite new equipment. So, the above
mentioned note about extensive routine and on-site testing seems to be even more important
(for details see technical brochure [6].

5.7.3 Minor failure mode

Minor failure mode describes a basic function of the equipment which the is able to meet only
with certain restrictions. As in different equipment failure cards there were mentioned
different minor failure modes (for details see technical brochures [2], [3] and [4] specialized
for circuit breakers, disconnectors/earthing switches and instrument transformers) it was
necessary to create new categories that are more or less common for all equipment and
cover all aspects mentioned in individual failure cards. These categories are shown in table
5-83 that provides absolute and relative number of MiF for all data as well as for data without
countries 14 and 23. 100% is total number of all MiF. The graphical interpretation of table 5-
82 is provided in figures 5-49.

Table 5-83: Distribution of minor failure modes for GIS CB-bay all data and data without
countries 14 and 23 (absolute and relative values based on total collected MiF)
Minor failure mode
Number of MiF (data without
countries 14 and 23)
Leakage in operating mechanism 287 19,1 171 17,6
Small SF6 leakage
597 39,7 497 51,2
Mechanical weakness in primary or in
operating mechanism 120 8,0 64 6,6
Electrical weakness in primary
51 3,4 35 3,6
Mechanical or electrical weakness in
control, auxiliary and monitoring 175 11,6 102 10,5
Changed parameters in function
3 0,2 1 0,1
Other
272 18,1 100 10,3

78

Figure 5-49: Relative distribution of minor failures modes in GIS CB-bays

The 2
nd
GIS survey collected information only about major failures.

In spite of the fact that WG thinks that reporting about minor failures was not complete the
WG decided to provide the basic analysis of minor failures failure modes only for rough
information. The biggest portions represent leakages : 40% of all MiF, 51% of MiF without
countries 14 and 23 resp., small SF6 leakage and 19% of all MiF, 18% of MiF without
countries 14 and 23 resp., leakage in operating mechanism (e.g. pressurized air in
pneumatic mechanisms, oil in hydraulic mechanisms or in dashpots of spring operating
mechanisms). Also mechanical or electrical weaknesses in control, auxiliary and monitoring
circuits represent more than 10% of cases (12%, 10%, resp.). As a conclusion it is possible
to say that as sealing systems are concerned there is still a room for manufacturers to
improve their GIS and operating mechanisms designs.

There is also a high portion of other which shall be also read as unknown modes. That
might be cause by the fact that minor failure reporting in utilities is not so carefully kept as
major failure reporting and some information is lost.

5.7.4 Failed subassembly

To analyze failed subassemblies of all GIS components together (for details see technical
brochures [2], [3] and [4] specialized for circuit breakers, disconnectors/earthing switches
and instrument transformers) it was necessary to group the detailed equipment
subassemblies responsible for the failure into the following categories:

19%
40% 8%
3%
12%
0%
18%
DistributionofGISminorfailures(MiF)fromtheir
failuremodepointofview(alldata)
Laekageinoperating
mechanism
SmallSF6leakage
Mechanicalweaknessin
primaryorinoperating
mechanism
Electricalordielectrical
weaknessinprimary
Mechanicalorelectrical
weaknessincontrol,
auxiliaryandmonitoring
Changedparametersin
sec.outputs,accuracyand
incorrectsignals
Other
18%
51%
7%
4%
10%
0%
10%
DistributionofGIS
minorfailures(MiF)
fromtheirfailuremode
pointofview(data
withoutcountries14
and23)
79

Component in primary circuit that includes making and breaking units, enclosures and
other solid main insulation to earth, grading capacitors, current paths, internal
bushings and spacers, primary IT windings, main SF6 sealing, pressure relief
devices, SF6 gas insulation, etc.
Component in control, auxiliary or monitoring circuit that includes tripping and closing
circuits, auxiliary switches and associated drives, contactors, relays and control
circuits in general, heaters, cables and terminal blocks, gas density supervision and
other monitoring equipment and circuits, etc.
Component in operating mechanism that includes components in operating
mechanisms (compressors, motors, pumps, energy storage, control elements, etc.)
and in kinematic chains (mechanical transmission elements between operating
mechanism and main units)
Component in IT secondary circuit that includes secondary windings, their insulation
and shielding, damping circuits, secondary taps, terminal boards and parts of optical
ITs
Unknown or other

Table 5-84 shows the collected number of major and minor failures in the categories
mentioned above. The table shows absolute and relative data and compares all data
analysis with an analysis in which countries 14 and 23 data was disregarded. Figures 5-50
show the relative number of MaF; figures 5-51 of MiF, in pie charts (100% is total number of
MaF, MiF respectively with identification of this category).

Table 5-84: Distribution of failed subassemblies of GIS CB-bay causing major (MaF) and minor
(MiF) failures all data and data without countries 14 and 23 (absolute and relative values
based on total collected MaF and MiF)
Equipment
subassembly
responsible for
the failure
Component in
primary circuit 102 28,6 616 41,0 40 38,5 510 52,7
Component in
control,
auxiliary or
monitoring
circuit 120 33,6 320 21,3 37 35,6 178 18,4
Component in
operating
mechanism 113 31,7 515 34,3 22 21,2 269 27,8
Component in
IT secondary
circuit 5 1,4 3 0,2 1 1,0 0 0,0
Unknown or
other 17 4,8 49 3,3 4 3,8 11 1,1
Unknown or
other 17 4,8 49 3,3 4 3,8 11 1,1

80

Figures 5-50: Relative distribution of failed subassemblies in GIS CB-bays causing major
failures

Figures 5-51: Relative distribution of failed subassemblies in GIS CB-bays causing minor
failures

As it is not expected that the minor failure data is complete, the manufacturing year aspect
analysis is made only for MaF and all data. The distribution in absolute and relative values is
shown in table 5-85. The bases for relative calculation are sums of MaF in individual GIS
manufacturing periods. The relative results are demonstrated in figure 5-52.

28%
34%
32%
1%
5%
DistributionofGISmajorfailures(MaF)from
theirsubassemblypointofview(alldata)
Componentinprimary
circuit
Componentincontrol,
auxiliaryormonitoring
circuit
Componentin
operatingmechanism
ComponentinIT
secondarycircuit
Unknownorother
38%
36%
21%
1% 4%
failedsubassemblypoint
ofview(datawithout14
and23)
41%
22%
34%
0%
3%
DistributionofGISminor failures(MiF)fromtheir
failedsubassemblypointofview(alldata)
Componentinprimary
circuit
Componentincontrol,
circuit
Componentin
operatingmechanism
ComponentinIT
secondarycircuit
Unknownorother
53%
18%
28%
0%
1%
DistributionofGISminor
failures(MiF)fromtheir
failedsubassembly
pointofview(data
without14and23)
81

Table 5-85: Distribution of failed subassemblies for GIS CB-bay major (MaF) failures in seven
intervals of GIS manufacturing years all data (absolute and relative values based on
collected MaF within individual intervals of manufacturing years)
Failed subassembly

Manufacturing year
Component
in primary
circuit
Component
in control,
auxiliary or
monitoring
circuit
Component
in operating
mechanism
Component
in IT
secondary
circuit
Unknown or
other
Total
Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs.
before 1979 8 20,5 14 35,9 15 38,5 0 0,0 2 5,1 39
1979-1983 13 22,4 27 46,6 16 27,6 0 0,0 2 3,4 58
1984-1988 17 20,7 31 37,8 32 39,0 0 0,0 2 2,4 82
1989-1993 9 11,1 26 32,1 34 42,0 4 4,9 8 9,9 81
1994-1998 22 43,1 15 29,4 13 25,5 0 0,0 1 2,0 51
1999-2003 14 60,9 6 26,1 3 13,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 23
2004-2007 19 82,6 1 4,3 0 0,0 1 4,3 2 8,7 23
Total 102 28,6 120 33,6 113 31,7 5 1,4 17 4,8 357

Figure 5-52: Relative distribution of GIS CB-bay major failed subassemblies in seven intervals
of GIS manufacturing years


The analysis in brochure [13] was made for indoor and outdoor GIS and for voltage classes.
Comparison of total results is shown in table 5-86 (absolute and relative values) and in figure
5-53 (relative values). 100% is total number of major failures in each survey.

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
DistributionofGISmajorfailures(MaF)fromtheirfailed
subassemblyandmanufacturingperiodpointsofview(all
data)
Unknownorother
ComponentinIT
secondary
Componentin
operating
mechanism
Componentin
control,auxiliaryor
monitoring
Componentin
primary
82

Table 5-86: Comparison of failed subassemblies causing GIS major failures in the 2
nd
and the
3
rd
GIS survey (absolute and relative values)
Failed subassembly

Number of MaF
Component
in primary
circuit
Component in
control,
auxiliary or
monitoring
circuit
Component in
operating
mechanism
Component in
IT secondary
circuit
Unknown or
other
2nd survey (1995) 375 71,8 45 8,6 87 16,7 0 0 15 2,9
3rd survey (2007) 102 28,6 120 33,6 113 31,7 5 1,4 17 4,8

Figure 5-53: Comparison of relative distributions of failed subassemblies in major failures in
the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
GIS survey

The 2
nd
and 3
rd
survey comparison just confirms the major failure mode comparison. In the
2
nd
survey the prevailing failure mode was a dielectric breakdown and thus the prevailing
failed subassembly should be and really was a component in primary circuits. In the 3
rd

survey the prevailing major failure was failing to perform requested operation and thus the
prevailing responsible subassemblies should be - and are - either component in operating
mechanisms or in control circuits.

When subassemblies responsible for major failures are analyzed on all data, the component
in primary circuit, component in control, auxiliary or monitoring circuit and component in
operating mechanism share the responsibility by about one third each. The data without
countries 14 and 23 shows a little bigger portion for "primary circuits" (38%) than for
"components in operating mechanisms" (21%).

As GIS age aspect is concerned, the portion of component of primary circuit responsible
for the failure changes with the increasing age of GISs in a similar way as the breakdown
failure mode (see chapter 5.7.1). To avoid these breakdowns the same comment as in 5.7.1
about routine and on-site testing is valid. Component in secondary circuits, on the other
hand, prevails in older GISs, namely in GISs of age between 15 and 20 years and the same
trend is visible in the category component in operating mechanism. These numbers also
just prove what has been already written in chapter 5.7.1, i.e. that 15 to 20 years interval
seems to be just the right time for performing overhauls, or at least a detailed investigation of
conditions, for operating mechanisms and secondary circuits. A positive message is that the
portion of unknown or other responses is very small. The more utilities know about details
of their major failures the more they can prevent them at other installations.

0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
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M
a
F
[
%
]
ComparisonofmajorfailureGISsubassemblies
2ndsurvey
(1995)
3rdsurvey
(2007)
83

For detailed analysis on how the categories component in primary circuit, component in
secondary circuit and component in operating mechanism depend on "environmental
stresses", "service conditions", "origin" and "primary cause" see chapter 5.8.2.

As minor failures are concerned, the data here is provided only for a very rough information.
The biggest portion of primary circuit responsibility (41%, 53% resp.) corresponds very well
to prevailing minor failure mode, i.e. to the "small SF6 leakage". The category component in
operating mechanism corresponds to minor failure modes where component in operating
mechanism can be connected with leakages and with mechanical weaknesses in operating
mechanism. The category component in control, auxiliary or monitoring circuit can be
connected with mechanical or electrical weaknesses in secondary minor failure mode.
However the sums do not give the more or less same numbers as in minor failure mode
analysis there appears a very big portion of the other or unknown category.

5.7.5 Failure origin

Failure origin is basically either electrical or mechanical. To analyze failure origin of all GIS
components together (for details see technical brochures [2], [3] and [4] specialized for circuit
breakers, disconnectors/earthing switches and instrument transformers) it was necessary to
group the origin aspects into the following categories :
Mechanical in other than operating mechanism Note it was not possible to
introduce separate categories for primary and secondary circuits and for SF6
leakage since as in CB part this distinction was missing and in DS/ES part the SF6
leakage category was missing
Mechanical in operating mechanism (earthed)
Electrical in main circuit
Electrical in secondary circuit
Unknown or other

mentioned above. The table shows absolute and relative data and compares all data
analysis with an analysis in which countries 14 and 23 data was disregarded. Figures 5-54
show the relative number of MaF, Figures 5-55 relative number of. MiF resp., in pie charts
(100% is total number of MaF, MiF respectively).

Table 5-87: Distribution of origins of GIS CB-bay major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures all data
and data without countries 14 and 23 (absolute and relative values based on total collected
MaF and MiF)
Origin of the
failure
Mechanical in
other than
operating
mechanism 50 14,0 650 43,2 31 29,5 520 53,6
Mechanical in
operating
mechanism
(earthed) 78 21,8 364 24,2 17 16,2 240 24,7
Electrical in
main circuit 54 15,1 27 1,8 17 16,2 15 1,5
Electrical in
secondary
circuit 114 31,8 193 12,8 29 27,6 109 11,2
Unknown or
other 62 17,3 271 18,0 11 10,5 86 8,9

84

Figures 5-54: Relative distribution of the origin of major failures in GIS CB-bay

Figures 5-55: Relative distribution of the origin of minor failures in GIS CB-bay

The distribution of all data and data without countries 14 and 23 is similar for both, MaF as
well as MiF. Since it is not expected that the minor failure data is complete, the distribution of
failures depending on manufacturing year is made only for MaF. The MaF analysis is based
on all data and for basic categories in which all mechanical origins were summarized in one
category. The distribution in absolute and relative values is shown in Table 5-88. The bases
for relative calculation are sums of MaF in individual GIS manufacturing periods. The relative
results are demonstrated in figure 5-56.

Table 5-88: Distribution of major failure origins for GIS CB-bay over seven intervals of GIS
manufacturing years all data (absolute and relative values based on collected MaF within
individual intervals of manufacturing years).
Manufacturing year
Mechanical
Electrical in
main circuit
Electrical in
secondary circuit
Unknown or
other Total
Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs.
before 1979
18 46,2 1 2,6 14 35,9 6 15,4 39
1979-1983
22 37,9 8 13,8 25 43,1 3 5,2 58
1984-1988
34 41,0 11 13,3 27 32,5 11 13,3 83
1989-1993
21 25,9 3 3,7 25 30,9 32 39,5 81
1994-1998
19 37,3 12 23,5 16 31,4 4 7,8 51
1999-2003
8 34,8 6 26,1 4 17,4 5 21,7 23
2004-2007
6 26,1 13 56,5 3 13,0 1 4,3 23
Total
128 35,8 54 15,1 114 31,8 62 17,3 358

14%
22%
15%
32%
17%
theiroriginpointofview(alldata)
Mechanicalinotherthan
operatingmechanism
Mechanicalinoperating
mechanism(earthed)
Electricalinmaincircuit
Electricalinsecondary
circuit
Unknownorother
30%
16%
16%
28%
10%
originpointofview(data
without14and23)
43%
24%
2%
13%
18%
DistributionofGISminor failures(MiF)from
theiroriginpointofview(alldata)
operatingmechanism
Mechanicalinoperating
mechanism(earthed)
circuit
Unknownorother
54%
25%
1%
11%
9%
originpointofview(data
without14and23)
85

Figure 5-56: Relative distribution of major failures origin in GIS CB-bay over seven intervals of
GIS manufacturing years

There was no such a major failure characteristic included in the 2
nd
GIS survey.

The biggest relative portion of major failures origins within all data is an electrical problem in
secondary circuit (32%) and the second biggest is a mechanical problem in operating
mechanisms (22%). Both of these two origin problems, most probably, lead to the failure
mode "fail to perform requested operation" (63% see chapter 5.7.1). The picture for data
without dominant countries 14 and 23 shows that the most frequent failure origin is a
mechanical problem in other GIS part than in operating mechanism (29%). This origin
prevails in both data sets of minor failure (43%, 54% resp.). Also these figures are in a very
good correlation with prevailing minor failure mode represented by small SF6 leakages.
There is quite a big portion of unknown major as well as minor failures origin (around 18% in
all data and around 10% in data without countries 14 and 23). Looking for the roots of
failures can help to prevent their re-occurrence.

As the major failures time aspect (GISs manufacturing years interval) is concerned there is
a visible trend towards an increasing portion of electrical problems in main circuits the
younger GISs are. That is also in very good correlation with an increasing portion of dielectric
breakdowns major failure modes (see chapter 5.7.1). On the other hand older GISs tend to
suffer more from mechanical problems.

5.7.6 Failure primary cause

Failure primary cause is a root cause of a failure that leads sooner or later to a failure and
can be basically divided into two groups:
Cause introduced during a period before putting into service
Cause introduced during service
The first one includes all problems that can lead to deteriorated service conditions and are
caused by problems inserted in the period of GIS design, manufacturing, transport and
erection. The second one includes any deterioration that happens during service and include
any kind of service conditions exceeding the GIS rated parameters (electrical, mechanical,
environmental), damages made by adjacent equipment or animals (electrical and
mechanical), human errors and incorrect service. Categories specified in the survey are
listed in the table below. All four different kinds of the survey failure cards (CB, DS/ES, IT
and GI) had the same categories so it was not necessary to make any re-coding.

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
DistributionofGISmajorfailures(MaF)fromtheirorigin
andmanufacturingperiodpointsofview(alldata)
Unknownorother
circuit
Mechanical
86

mentioned in the survey. The table shows absolute and relative data and compares all data
analysis with an analysis in which countries 14 and 23 were disregarded. In the survey
questionnaire there were two other categories (Inadequate instructions for transport, erection
or operation and Current in excess of rating) that have not been selected by any respondent.

Figures 5-57 show the relative number of MaF, Figures 5-58 relative number of. MiF resp.,
in pie charts (100% is total number of MaF, MiF respectively).

Table 5-89: Distribution of primary causes of GIS CB-bay major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures
all data and data without countries 14 and 23 (absolute and relative values based on total
collected MaF and MiF)
Primary cause of the
failure
Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. %
Design fault
(manufacturer
responsibility) 11 3,1 40 2,7 4 3,8 32 3,3
Engineering fault (utility
responsibility) 3 0,8 3 0,2 3 2,9 3 0,3
Manufacturing fault (poor
quality control) 33 9,2 55 3,7 8 7,6 27 2,8
Incorrect transport or
erection 16 4,5 27 1,8 4 3,8 14 1,4
Other 13 3,6 67 4,5 7 6,7 22 2,3
Voltage at power
frequency in excess of
rating 1 0,3 0 0,0 1 1,0 0 0,0
Switching overvoltage in
excess of rating 1 0,3 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
Lightning overvoltage in
excess of rating 7 2,0 1 0,1 0 0,0 0 0,0
Mechanical stress in
excess of rating 2 0,6 2 0,1 1 1,0 2 0,2
Environmental stresses
(other than lightning) in
excess of ratings 1 0,3 2 0,1 0 0,0 1 0,1
Corrosion 10 2,8 148 9,8 3 2,9 132 13,6
Wear / Ageing 141 39,4 721 47,9 39 37,1 426 43,9
Incorrect operation 2 0,6 3 0,2 1 1,0 3 0,3
Incorrect monitoring 1 0,3 3 0,2 1 1,0 2 0,2
Electrical failure of
adjacent equipment 2 0,6 6 0,4 2 1,9 2 0,2
Mechanical failure of
adjacent equipment 2 0,6 9 0,6 2 1,9 9 0,9
Human error 11 3,1 5 0,3 4 3,8 2 0,2
Incorrect maintenance
(incl. inadequate
instruction) 17 4,7 20 1,3 3 2,9 8 0,8
External damage caused
by animals, humans etc. 4 1,1 4 0,3 0 0,0 0 0,0
Other abnormal service
conditions 1 0,3 3 0,2 1 1,0 1 0,1
Unknown or other causes 79 22,1 386 25,6 21 20,0 284 29,3
total 358 100,0 1505 100,0 105 100,0 970 100,0

87

Primary cause of the
failure
Summary of the above (in summarized categories division):
Cause introduced during
a period before putting
into service 76 21,2 192 12,8 26 24,8 98 10,1
Cause other than wear
introduced during service 52 14,5 58 3,9 16 15,2 30 3,1
Wear/Ageing+corrosion 151 42,2 869 57,7 42 40,0 558 57,5
Unknown other causes 79 22,1 386 25,6 21 20,0 284 29,3

Figures 5-57: Relative distribution of primary causes of major failures in GIS CB-bay

Figures 5-58: Relative distribution of primary causes of minor failures in GIS CB-bay

The distribution of all data and data without countries 14 and 23 is quite the same for both,
MaF as well as MiF. Since it is not expected that the minor failure data is complete, the
distribution of failures depending on manufacturing year is made only for MaF. The MaF
analysis is based on all data and for basic categories from the summary. The distribution in
absolute and relative values is shown in Table 5-90. The bases for calculation of relative
values are sums of MaF in individual GIS manufacturing periods. The relative results are
shown in figure 5-59.

21%
15%
42%
22%
theirprimarycausepointofview(alldata)
Causeintroducedduring
aperiodbeforeputting
intoservice
Causeotherthanwear
introducedduring
service
Wear/Ageing+corrosion
Unknownothercauses
25%
15%
40%
20%
primarycausepointofview
and23)
13% 4%
58%
25%
DistributionofGISminorfailures(MiF)from
theirprimarycausepointofview(alldata)
Causeintroduced
duringaperiodbefore
puttingintoservice
Causeotherthanwear
introducedduring
service
Unknownothercauses
10%
3%
58%
29%
primarycausepointofview
and23)
88

Table 5-90: Distribution of primary causes of major failure in GIS CB-bay over seven intervals
of GIS manufacturing years all data (absolute and relative values based on collected data in
individual intervals of manufacturing years)
Manufacturing year
Cause introduced
during a period before
putting into service
Cause other than
wear introduced
during service
Wear/
Ageing+
corrosion
Unknown
other
causes Total
Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs.
before 1979 3 7,7 3 7,7 26 66,7 7 17,9 39
1979-1983 7 12,1 13 22,4 29 50,0 9 15,5 58
1984-1988 12 14,5 15 18,1 43 51,8 13 15,7 83
1989-1993 8 9,9 4 4,9 31 38,3 38 46,9 81
1994-1998 14 27,5 10 19,6 18 35,3 9 17,6 51
1999-2003 14 60,9 3 13,0 3 13,0 3 13,0 23
2004-2007 18 78,3 4 17,4 1 4,3 0 0,0 23
Total 76 21,2 52 14,5 151 42,2 79 22,1 358

Figure 5-59: Relative distribution of primary causes of major failures in GIS CB-bay over seven
intervals of GIS manufacturing years

Comparison of total results is shown in Table 5-91 (absolute and relative values) and in
figure 5-60 (relative values). 100% is total number of major failures in each survey.

Table 5-91: Comparison of causes of collected GIS major failures in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
GIS
survey (absolute and relative values)
MaF cause

Number of MaF
Cause introduced
Cause other than
wear introduced
during service
Wear/
Ageing+
corrosion
Unknown
other causes
2nd survey (1995) 364 70,1 51 9,8 60 11,6 44 8,5
3rd survey (2007) 76 21,2 52 14,5 151 42,2 79 22,1

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
DistributionofGISmajorfailures(MaF)fromtheirprimary
causeandmanufacturingperiodpointsofviews(alldata)
Unknownothercauses
Causeotherthanwear
introducedduringservice
Causeintroducedduringa
periodbeforeputtinginto
service
89

Figure 5-60: Comparison of relative distributions of major failures causes in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd

GIS survey

The portion of major failures causes that were introduced before the GISs putting into
service has significantly decreased in the 3
rd
GIS survey in comparison to the 2
nd
survey.
That could be a good sign of the fact that GIS are becoming mature and manufacturers,
engineering and construction companies have already got to know how to perform their work
well. The increase of portion of wear and ageing causes in the 3
rd
survey is also natural. The
population of GISs is getting old and thus it can be expected that this type of the failure
cause will have an increasing trend also in the future.

The relative distributions of major failure causes for all data and data without countries 14
and 23 are almost equal. The most frequent cause is wear/ageing/corrosion (about 40%),
then a defect introduced before putting the GIS into service (about 23%, thereof
manufacturing fault covers about 10%), followed by about 15% of service conditions not
meeting the equipment capability (thereof about 7% corresponds to human error or
incorrectly performed maintenance). The relative distribution of minor failure causes for all
data and data without countries 14 and 23 is also almost equal. Wear/ageing/corrosion was
identified as main cause in 58% of cases. The other two causes are in the same order and
represent about 12% and 3% respectively.

There is still a very high portion of major as well as minor failure causes that were not
identified. It is again necessary to repeat that even if a detailed investigation of a failure may
be time consuming and costs money, the investigation is the only way to prevent failures re-
occurrence and utilities should not miss a chance to learn something.

As the major failures time aspect is concerned (GISs manufacturing years interval), the
analysis shows a logical picture. The younger the GISs are the more a cause introduced
before putting into service prevails. The older the GISs are the more wear/ageing/ corrosion
cause prevails.

The message for manufacturers and users is clear. It is necessary to focus on: ageing tests
of material and assemblies, higher effectiveness of manufacturing quality, routine and on-site
tests, and higher quality of operation and maintenance staff skills.

5.7.7 Failure service conditions

Failure circumstances, i.e. GIS service conditions when the failure was discovered, are
basically the following :
GIS was de-energized and available for service
GIS was out of service because of a maintenance or was just put into service after
maintenance or testing
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
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80
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[
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ComparisonofGISmajorfailurescauses
2ndsurvey
(1995)
3rdsurvey
(2007)
90

GIS was in normal steady state service without any switching manipulation
GIS was in service and there was normal switching operation in the substation
GIS was in service and there was fault clearing switching-off operation in the
substation

To analyze service conditions of all GIS components together (for details see technical
and instrument transformers) it was necessary to re-code the characteristics included in
individual failure cards into categories shown in table 5-92. This table provides the collected
number of major and minor failures. The table shows absolute and relative data and
compares all data analysis with an analysis in which countries 14 and 23 data were
disregarded. Figures 5-61 show the relative number of MaF, Figures 5-62 relative number
of. MiF resp., in pie charts (100% is total number of MaF, MiF respectively).

Table 5-92: Distribution of service conditions of GIS CB-bay major (MaF) and minor (MiF)
failures all data and data without countries 14 and 23 (absolute and relative values based on
total collected MaF and MiF)
Service conditions when
the failure was
discovered
De-energized - available
for service 16 4,6 63 4,5 11 11,5 34 3,9
Normal service - no
operation command in
S/S 132 37,8 1062 76,1 34 35,4 723 83,8
During or directly after
testing/maintenance 30 8,6 180 12,9 12 12,5 62 7,2
During fault clearing in
S/S (applies to parts of
GIS other than CB) 1 0,3 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
During normal switching
operation in S/S (applies
to parts of GIS other than
CB, DS, ES) 13 3,7 22 1,6 7 7,3 19 2,2
During switching
misoperations in S/S
(applies to parts of GIS
other than CB, DS, ES) 1 0,3 1 0,1 0 0,0 1 0,1
During normal switching
operation (applies to CB,
DS, ES) 148 42,4 68 4,9 31 32,3 24 2,8
During fault clearing
operation (applies to CB) 7 2,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
During fault making
operation (applies to ES) 1 0,3 0 0,0 1 1,0 0 0,0
Total 349 100,0 1396 100,0 96 100,0 863 100,0
De-energized 16 4,6 63 4,5 11 11,5 34 3,9
During or directly after
maintenance 30 8,6 180 12,9 12 12,5 62 7,2
Normal service without
operation 132 37,8 1062 76,1 34 35,4 723 83,8
During normal switching 161 46,1 90 6,4 38 39,6 43 5,0
During fault switching
(i.e. fault clearing) 10 2,9 1 0,1 1 1,0 1 0,1
Note : No indication of During switching misoperation (applies to CB, DS, ES)

91

Figures 5-61: Relative distribution of service conditions when GIS CB-bay major failures were
discovered

Figures 5-62: Relative distribution of service conditions when GIS CB-bay minor failures were
discovered

Comparison of total results between the 2
nd
and 3
rd
survey is shown in table 5-93 (absolute
and relative values) and in figure 5-63 (relative values). 100% is the total number of major
failures in each survey. The 2
nd
and 3
rd
surveys comparison can provide only the major
failure comparison. The 2
nd
survey does not distinguish between normal open and tripped
(fault) operation. Therefore the comparison uses a summarized category During switching
operation.

4%
9%
38%
46%
3%
theirserviceconditionspointofview(alldata)
Deenergized
Duringordirectly
aftermaintenance
Normalservice
withoutoperation
Duringnormal
switching
Duringfault
switching
11%
13%
35%
40%
1%
serviceconditionspointof
view(datawithoutcountries
14and23)
5%
13%
76%
6%
0%
DistributionofGISminorfailures(MiF)from
theirserviceconditionspointofview(alldata)
Deenergized
Duringordirectly
aftermaintenance
Normalservice
withoutoperation
Duringnormal
switching
Duringfault
switching
4%
7%
84%
5%
0%
serviceconditionspointof
view(datawithoutcountries
14and23)
92

Table 5-93: Comparison of GIS service conditions when GIS major failures were discovered in
the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
MaF service
conditions
De-energized
During or directly
after testing/
maintenance
Normal service
without operation
During switching
operation in
substation
Number of MaF Abs. [%] Abs. [%] Abs. [%] Abs. [%]
2nd survey (1995) 13 2,5 31 5,9 318 60,8 161 14,9
3rd survey (2007) 16 4,6 30 8,6 132 37,8 171 24,5

Figure 5-63: Comparison of relative distributions of GIS service conditions when GIS major
failures were discovered in the 2
nd
and 3
rd
GIS survey.

The portion of major failures that happened during switching operation in a substation has
increased and the portion of normal service without operation has decreased in the 3
rd
GIS
survey in comparison to the 2
nd
survey. That corresponds to the change of major failure
modes from prevailing breakdowns in the 2
nd
survey to prevailing failing to perform
requested operation in the 3
rd
survey. However there is a certain overlapping of the prevailing
service conditions for the breakdown failure mode (breakdown can happen during switching
operation as well as during service without any manipulation). Slightly increasing trend in
during maintenance category could be a sign of more effective maintenance, diagnostics
resp.

The relative distributions of major failure service conditions for all data and data without
countries 14 and 23 are similar. The two most frequent types of service condition when the
failure occurred are "normal switching operation" (46 to 40%) and "normal service without
operation" (about 36%). The "de-energized" and "during or directly after maintenance events"
represent about 13% for all data and about 24% for data without countries 14 and 23.

The relative distribution of minor failure service conditions for all data and data without
countries 14 and 23 is also similar. The most frequent type of service condition when the
failure occurred is "normal service without operation" (76 to 84%). That corresponds very well
to the prevailing minor failure modes like "small SF6 leakage" or different types of
weaknesses. "Normal switching operation" as the service condition of minor failure
occurrence is very small (about 5 %). Situations when the GIS was de-energized,
maintenance was performed or the GIS was just after maintenance represent about the
same portion as for major failures.

The during or directly after maintenance category includes two controversial parts. If a
failure is discovered during maintenance that is good sign of effective and on-time corrective
activity; if it happens directly after maintenance that is a bad sign of incorrectly performed
maintenance. Unfortunately the survey did not provide data to analyze these aspects.

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[
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ComparisonofmajorfailureGISservicecircumstances
2ndsurvey
(1995)
3rdsurvey
(2007)
93

5.7.8 Contribution of environmental stresses to failures

The environmental considerations are getting more and more important under the presently
changing climate. Therefore the survey asked whether the reported failures could have been
influenced by environmental conditions exceeding the equipment service limits or not. All four
different types of survey failure cards (CB, DS/ES, IT and GI) had the same categories so it
was not necessary to re-code. Categories specified in the survey are listed in Table 5-94.

Table 5-95 shows the collected number of major and minor failures in which the environment
was presumed to have contributed to their development and in which it was not. The table
shows absolute and relative data (100% is number of MaF, MiF respectively) and compares
all data analysis with an analysis in which countries 14 and 23 data were disregarded.

Table 5-96 shows the same information from the GIS location point of view. It shows the
collected number of major and minor failures in which the environment contributed to their
development and in which it did not for two categories of all data, i.e. for indoor GIS and
outdoor GIS.

Detailed analysis of individual stress contributions are shown in Table 5-94. The
questionnaire allowed for multiple answers in this question and thus the total number of
identified stresses is higher than the number of answers with a positive indication (100% is
total number of ticks in MaF, MiF resp.). Figure 5-64 shows relative distribution of
environmental stresses that contributed to GIS CB-bay major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures
(100% is the number of MaF, MiF respectively, in which the respondents identified
environmental contribution).

Table 5-94: Distribution of environmental stresses that contributed to GIS CB-bay major (MaF)
and minor (MiF) failures all data (absolute and relative values based on total MaF and MiF that
were influenced by the environment)
Kind of environment
contribution (all data)
Number of
MaF %MaF
Number
of MiF %MiF
Temperature too low 1 1,3 5 3,3
Temperature too high 2 2,5 8 5,3
Strong wind 1 1,3 4 2,6
Rain 4 5,1 18 11,9
Sudden variation in
temperature 4 5,1 8 5,3
Snow, ice or hoar-frost 2 2,5 10 6,6
Corrosive atmosphere 3 3,8 0 0,0
Fog or high humidity 3 3,8 13 8,6
Pollution including dust 4 5,1 7 4,6
Lightning 21 26,6 49 32,5
Earthquake 0 0,0 1 0,7
Flood 28 35,4 0 0,0
Other 6 7,6 28 18,5
Total 79 100,0 151 100,0
Temperature 7 8,9 21 13,9
Water in the air 9 11,4 41 27,2
Atmosphere 7 8,9 7 4,6
Wind 1 1,3 4 2,6
Lightning 21 26,6 49 32,5
Flood and earthquake 28 35,4 1 0,7
Other 6 7,6 28 18,5

94

Table 5-95: Distribution of GIS CB-bay major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures that were not and
were influenced by an environmental stress - all data and data without countries 14 and 23
(absolute and relative values based on total MaF and MiF)
Environmental
contribution to the failure
No contribution 285 79,6 1380 91,7 100 95,2 957 98,7
Contribution 73 20,4 125 8,3 5 4,8 13 1,3

Table 5-96: Distribution of outdoor and indoor GIS CB-bay major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures
that were not and were influenced by an environmental stress all data (absolute and relative
values based on total MaF and MiF)
Environmental
contribution to the failure
Outdoor GIS (all data) Indoor GIS (all data)
No contribution 189 73,8 608 87,7 96 94,1 772 95,1
Contribution 67 26,2 85 12,3 6 5,9 40 4,9

Figure 5-64: Relative distribution of environmental stresses that contributed to GIS CB-bay
major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures

In the 2
nd
GIS survey there were not any questions on environment stresses that would have
presumed to contribute to failures. In the 2
nd
survey was a separate category called
operational conditions of a failure (a part of service conditions characteristic in 3
rd
survey)
and one of the options was lightning overvoltage. In the 2
nd
survey there were 6 MaF
identified in this category. That is about 1,5% of MaF. This value is much lower than the
same category in the 3
rd
survey (almost 27%).

Presumed environmental contribution to a failure was identified in 20% of MaF and 8% of
MiF for all data and in 5% of MaF and 1% of MiF for data without countries 14 and 23.
Having a look at the same question from the GIS location point of view, the outdoor GISs
suffer more from the environment influence than indoor GIS. Presumed environmental
contribution was identified in 26% of MaF and 12% of MiF that happened in outdoor GIS and
only in 6% of MaF and 5% of MiF that happened in indoor GIS.

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
MaF MiF
Distributionofenvironmentalcontributiontoafailure(alldata)
Other
Floodandearthquake
Lightning
Wind
Atmosphere
Water
Temperature
95

As already written in chapter 5.6 there were 28 MaF in voltage class 1 caused by a flood.
These failures represent 35% of all positively identified MaF influenced by nature. These
failures were excluded from any other analysis than this one. The second most frequent
environmental influence is lightning representing 27% of positively identified answers. As
lightning overvoltage is concerned, in contrary to a flood, utilities can protect their equipment
by installing surge arresters. However it is possible that the effect of lightning has been
overestimated. It is much more difficult to estimate if the lightning has stressed the
equipment in excess of its rating than if the temperature was out of the specified range.

Minor failures were more influenced by different kinds of humidity in the air and by air
temperatures than major failures. Beside the lightning activity (32%) they represent 27% and
14% of positive answers. Keeping in mind that tightness and ageing problems were identified
as the most frequent minor problems it is natural that humidity and air temperature can
accelerate their development. The comment about possible overestimation of the effect of
lightning applies also to the MiF.

5.7.9 Failure repair

The way of a failure repair can provide information about the severity of the failure from the
time as well as cost demands. Both major as well as minor failures could be such that a very
simple action brings the equipment back into normal service. On the other hand they could
demand an extremely time and cost consuming replacement of the whole GIS gas
compartment. All four different types of the survey failure cards (CB, DS/ES, IT and GI) had
the same categories so it was not necessary to re-code. Categories specified in the survey
are listed in Table 5-97.

Table 5-97 shows the different ways of repair of the collected number of major and minor
failures. The table shows absolute and relative data (100% is number of MaF, MiF
respectively) and compares all data analysis with an analysis in which countries 14 and 23
data were disregarded. Figures 5-65 show the relative number of MaF, Figures 5-66 relative
number of. MiF resp., in pie charts (100% is total number of MaF, MiF respectively).

Table 5-97: Distribution of repairs of GIS CB-bay major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures all data
and data without countries 14 and 23 (absolute and relative values based on total MaF and MiF)
The way of the failure
repair
Repair of failed
component on site 164 45,8 666 44,3 34 32,4 336 34,6
Repair in factory or shop 61 17,0 0 0,0 10 9,5 0 0,0
Replacement of failed
component on site
(without replacement of
enclosure) 81 22,6 290 19,3 31 29,5 211 21,8
component and its
enclosure 21 5,9 9 0,6 12 11,4 7 0,7
equipment with another
design 10 2,8 9 0,6 7 6,7 8 0,8
Replacement of seals or
refilling only 6 1,7 346 23,0 4 3,8 282 29,1
Placed back into service
without repair 15 4,2 185 12,3 7 6,7 126 13,0

96

Figures 5-65: Relative distribution of GIS CB-bay major failures repairs

Figures 5-66: Relative distribution of GIS CB-bay minor failures repairs

Comparison of total results is shown in table 5-98 (absolute and relative values) and in figure
5-67 (relative values). 100% is total number of major failures in each survey.

46%
17%
22%
6%
3%
2%
4%
DistributionofGISmajorfailures(MaF)fromtheirwayof
repairpointofview(alldata)
Repairoffailedcomponentonsite
Repairinfactoryorshop
Replacementoffailedcomponent
onsite(withoutreplacementof
enclosure)
anditsenclosure
Replacementoffailedequipment
withanotherdesign
Replacementofsealsorrefilling
only
Placedbackintoservicewithout
repair
32%
9%
30%
11%
7%
4%
7%
DistributionofGIS
majorfailures
(MaF)fromtheir
wayofrepairpoint
ofview(data
withoutcountries
14and23)
44%
0%
19%
1%
1%
23%
12%
DistributionofGISminorfailures(MiF)fromtheirwayof
repairpointofview(alldata)
Repairoffailedcomponentonsite
Replacementoffailedcomponenton
site(withoutreplacementof
enclosure)
anditsenclosure
Replacementoffailedequipment
withanotherdesign
Replacementofsealsorrefillingonly
repair
34%
0% 22%
1% 1%
29%
13%
DistributionofGIS
minorfailures(MiF)
fromtheirwayof
repairpointofview
(datawithout
countries14and23)
97

Table 5-98: Comparison of repair types of GIS major failures in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
GIS survey
(absolute and relative values)
The way of the failure repair Number of MaF
2
nd
survey (1995) 3
rd
survey (2007)
Abs. % Abs. %
Repair of failed component on site 114 21,8 164 45,8
Repair in factory or shop 17 3,3 61 17,0
Replacement of failed component on site (without
replacement of enclosure) 221 42,3 81 22,6
Replacement of failed component and its enclosure 120 23,0 21 5,9
Replacement of failed equipment with another
design 24 4,6 10 2,8
Replacement of seals or refilling only 17 3,3 6 1,7
Placed back into service without repair 9 1,7 15 4,2

Figure 5-67: Comparison of relative distributions of major failure repair types in the 2
nd
and the
3
rd
GIS survey

A portion of major failure repairs that could be made on site has increased in the 3
rd
GIS
survey and portions of time and cost demanded work that needed replacement have
decreased. On the other hand in the 3
rd
survey there is also observed a certain increase in
failures that needed a transport of the failed component to a factory shop. In spite of that it is
possible to conclude that major failures collected in the 3
rd
survey had a bit less severe
consequences regarding the equipment repairs themselves that major failures collected in
2
nd
GIS survey.

Type of repair can to a certain extent describe the severity of the failure, i.e. its time and
expenditures demands. There is only a small difference (expressed as a percentage interval
below) between the analysis results of all data and data without countries 14 and 23.

The most frequent activities for major failures repairs are repair of failed component on site
and replacement of failed component on site (without replacement of an enclosure), which
can overlap to a certain extent, and which represent together 68% for all data and 62% for
data without countries 14 and 23. They also represent majority of cases for minor failure
repairs (63%, 56% respectively). The second most frequent type of repair of minor failures is
0
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10
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20
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30
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40
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M
a
F
[
%
]
ComparisonofGISmajorfailuresrepairs
2nd
survey
(1995)
3rdsurvey
(2007)
98

replacement of seals or SF6 refilling only (23 to 29%). The most time and cost demanded
activities, i.e. repair in factory or shop , replacement of failed component and its enclosure
and replacement by another design , were mentioned almost only at major failures. They
represent about 26% of cases together (17% 6% - 3% in all data analysis and 9% 11%
7% in data without countries 14 and 23). This percentage corresponds quite well to the
percentage of breakdowns occurrence (23 to 24%). The least time and cost demanded
activity, i.e. placed back into service without repair appears in 4%, 7% respectively, of major
failures repair, and in 12%, 13% respectively, of minor failures repair.

5.7.10 Consequential measures

To analyze consequential measures of all GIS components together (for details see technical
and instrument transformers) it was necessary to group the details into the following
categories:
removal of similar equipment from service for inspection or modification to prevent
recurrence
implementation of changes in purchasing specifications (design, layout, single line
diagram, arrangement, sectioning) or factory test requirements
decision to implement additional monitoring
implementation of changes into original operating instructions (op. sequence incl.)
and/or safety instructions
implementation of changes into original maintenance, diagnostics or monitoring
instructions
no measures

Table 5-99 provides a binary analysis that distinguishes only if any action was undertaken or
the absence of any consequential measures at all. It shows collected answers for all data
and data without countries 14 and 23 in absolute and relative values (100% is total number
of MaF, MiF respectively).

Table 5-99: Distribution of GIS CB-bay major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures that were and were
not followed by special consequential measures - all data and data without countries 14 and 23
(absolute and relative values based on total MaF and MiF)
Consequential measures
after failure accepted
YES 106 29,6 133 8,8 28 26,7 77 7,9
NO 252 70,4 1372 91,2 77 73,3 893 92,1

Details about accepted consequential measures are shown in table 5-100. The questionnaire
allowed multiple answers in this question and thus the total number of consequential
measures is higher than a number of answers with a positive indication (100% is the total
number of ticks in MaF, MiF respectively). Figure 5-68 provides a detail analysis of
precautions within positive answers that identified at least one preventive activity after a
major failure (100% is total number of only positive answers).

99

Table 5-100: Distribution of active consequential measures that followed GIS CB-bay major
(MaF) and minor (MiF) failures all data (absolute and relative values based on total MaF and
MiF)
Accepted consequential
measures after failure
Removal similar
equipment from service
for inspection 44 29,7 53 32,5 16 29,1 27 26,2
Implementation of
changes in purchasing
specifications 23 15,5 38 23,3 15 27,3 33 32,0
Implementation of
additional monitoring 10 6,8 4 2,5 2 3,6 3 2,9
Implementation of
changes into original
operating instructions 18 12,2 9 5,5 8 14,5 9 8,7
Implementation of
changes into original
maintenance, diagnostics
or monitoring instructions 53 35,8 59 36,2 14 25,5 31 30,1
Total of positive answers 148 100,0 163 100,0 55 100,0 103 100,0

Figure 5-68: Relative distribution of active consequential measures that followed GIS CB-bay
major failures

In the 2
nd
GIS survey there was a category immediate consequences of the failure however
this category included options that asked questions about the extent of an outage followed
the failure (e.g. one CB-bay or one section of busbars up to whole substation out of service)
rather than questions about consequential measures to prevent the failure re-occurrence. A
direct comparison of both surveys results is therefore impossible.

30%
15%
7%
12%
36%
DistributionofactiveconsequentialmeasuresafterMaF(all
data)
Removalsimilarequipmentfromservice
forinspection
Implementationofchangesin
purchasingspecifications
Implementationofadditionalmonitoring
Implementationofchangesintooriginal
operatinginstructions
Implementationofchangesintooriginal
maintenance,diagnosticsormonitoring
instructions
100

There is no significant difference between the relative approaches of all participating utilities
and utilities excluding countries 14 and 23. Both analyses show that at about one third of
major failures some additional consequential measures were carry out to prevent the failures
re-occurrence at other units. That means that the other two thirds of major failures must have
been considered as random events without any danger to reappear on other units. As minor
failures are concerned the additional measures were accepted in a little bit less than 10% of
cases. That is a surprising discrepancy because if minor failure are corrected in time it often
prevents the occurrence of a major failure and thus consequential activities should be to a
certain extent similar as for major failures.

As the preventive measures themselves are concerned the most frequent are removal of
similar equipment from service for inspection and implementation of changes into original
maintenance, diagnostics or monitoring instructions. They both concern planned
maintenance activities and represent together about two thirds of all measures. The other
third is divided more or less equally among implementation of changes into original
purchasing specifications (15%) or original operating instructions (12%) and implementation
of additional monitoring (7%).

5.7.11 GIS parts other than CB, DS/ES and IT failures characteristics

In the questionnaire GIS failure cards there were provided the following options for selection
of failed component other than CB, DS/ES and IT (as also mentioned in chapter 5.5.5.2).
Busduct and/or busduct interconnecting pieces
Busbar and/or busbar interconnecting pieces
SF6-to-air bushing
Cable box / Cable sealing end
Power transformer or reactor interface chamber or bushing
Surge arrester
Other
Collected major and minor failures of GIS equipment other than CB, DS/ES and IT are
summarized in table 5-41 in chapter 5.5.5.2. There were 50 major failures and 413 minor
failures reported in this 3
rd
GIS survey.

As the number of failures is very low, there were selected the following combined options to
analyze the failure characteristics of GIS equipment other than CB, DS/ES and IT:
Busduct + Busbar (including interconnecting pieces)
Any kind of bushing (including SF6-to-air bushing, cable box and transformer
bushing)
Surge arrester
Other
In the failure cards there were also detail questions about each failure characteristics. These
can be divided into the following groups:
Major failure mode (see chapter 5.7.11.1)
Number of major failures which caused fire or explosion (see chapter 5.7.11.2)
Minor failure mode (see chapter 5.7.11.3)
Major and minor failures failed subassembly (see chapter 5.7.11.4)
Major and minor failures origin (see chapter 5.7.11.5)
Major and minor failures primary cause (see chapter 5.7.11.6)
Major and minor failures service circumstances (see chapter 5.7.11.7)
Major and minor failures and contribution of environmental stresses to failures (see
chapter 5.7.11.8)
Major and minor failures repair (see chapter 5.7.11.9)
Major and minor failures consequential measures (see chapter 5.7.11.10)
Age distribution of GIS failures (see chapter 5.5.5.2)

101

The failure characteristics are analyzed in absolute and relative numbers. As there was only
a very small number of these parts failures (only 50 MaF and 413 MiF) reported the analysis
is provided only for all data and where appropriate, the manufacturing year intervals are
considered, too. Data without countries 14 and 23 are not mentioned in this chapter. There is
also provided a comparison with the 2
nd
GIS experience survey (1995) for major failures
(MaF). In the 2
nd
survey, 185 major failures were reported for GIS parts other than CB,
DS/ES and IT.

5.7.11.1 Major failure mode

In this chapter, the analysis of major failure modes for GIS equipment other than CB, DS/ES
and IT is provided in the same way as for all GIS equipment in chapter 5.7.1. Table 5-101
shows the distribution of major failure modes of GIS parts other than CB, DS/ES and IT. The
table also shows the results in the relative numbers (100% is total number of individual parts
MaF). Figure 5-69 shows graphically the relative distribution in which 100% is total number
of these GIS parts MaFs together.

Table 5-101: Distribution of major failure modes for major failures (MaF) of GIS parts other than
CB, DS/ES and IT (Absolute and relative values for all data)
MaF modes
Busduct
+Busbar
Any kind of
bushing
Surge
arrester
Others
Abs
.
[%] Abs. [%] Abs
.
[%] Abs
.
[%]
Failing to perform requested function (SF6
density monitoring function incl.)
0 0,0 0 0,0 0 - 1 4,5
Loss of electrical connections integrity in
primary (e.g. fails to carry current)
1 5,3 0 0,0 0 - 0 0,0
Loss of electrical connections integrity in
secondary (enclosure and earthing system)
1 5,3 0 0,0 0 - 0 0,0
Dielectric breakdown
16 84,2 6 66,7 0 - 8 36,4
Loss of mechanical integrity (mechanical
damages of different parts, big SF6 leakage
incl.)
1 5,3 1 11,1 0 - 3 13,6
Other
0 0,0 2 22,2 0 - 10 45,5
Total
19 100,0 9 100,0 0 - 22 100,0

Figure 5-69: Relative distribution of major failure modes of GIS parts
other than CB, DS/ES and IT
2% 2%
2%
60%
10%
24%
Distributionofmajorfailures (MaF) ofGISparts otherthanCB,DS/ESand
ITfromtheirfailuremodepointofview (alldata)
Failingtoperformrequestedoperation,
functionresp.
Lossofelectricalconnectionsintegrityin
primary
Lossofelectricalconnectionsintegrityin
secondary(enclosureandearthingsystem)
Dielectricbreakdown
Lossofmechanicalintegrity(bigSF6leakage
incl.)
Other
102

Age aspects for major failure modes are shown in table 5-102. It shows absolute and relative
numbers for individual manufacturing year intervals. The relative expression is shown in
figure 5-70 graphically.

Table 5-102: Distribution of major failure modes for GIS parts other than CB, DS/ES and IT in
seven intervals of GIS manufacturing years (Absolute and relative values for all data)
Number of
MaF

Manufacturing
year
Failing to
perform
requested
operation
Loss of
electrical
connection
s
in primary
Loss of
electrical
connection
s in
secondary
Dielectric
break-
downs
Loss of
mechanical
integrity
Other
Abs. [%] Abs. [%] Abs. [%] Abs. [%] Abs. [%] Abs. [%]
before 1979 0 0,0 0 0,0 1 16,7 3 50,0 2 33,3 0 0,0
1979-1983 0 0,0 1 33,3 0 0,0 2 66,7 0 0,0 0 0,0
1984-1988 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 5 71,4 0 0,0 2 28,6
1989-1993 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 2 20,0 1 10,0 7 70,0
1994-1998 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 8 80,0 1 10,0 1 10,0
1999-2003 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 5 71,4 0 0,0 2 28,6
2004-2007 1 14,3 0 0,0 0 0,0 5 71,4 1 14,3 0 0,0
Total 1 2,0 1 2,0 1 2,0 30 60,0 5 10,0 12 24,0

Figure 5-70: Relative distribution of major failures modes of GIS parts other than
CB, DS/ES and IT in seven intervals of GIS manufacturing years

In the 2
nd
GIS survey the major failure mode characteristic was called classification of
symptoms. Comparison of total results is shown in Table 5-103 (absolute and relative
values) and in figure 5-71 (relative values). 100% is total number of major failures in each
survey.

0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
DistributionofmajorfailuremodesforGISpartsotherthanDS/ESandITin
sevenintervalsofGISmanufacturingyears(alldata)
Other
Lossofmechanicalintegrity
Dielectricbreakdowns
Lossofelectrical
connectionsinsecondary
Lossofelectrical
connectionsinprimary
Failingtoperformrequested
operation
103

Table 5-103: Comparison of major failure modes of collected major failures (MaF) of GIS parts
other than CB, DS/ES and IT in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
surveys (Absolute and relative values for all
data)
Major failure mode Failing to
perform
requested
operation
Loss of
electrical
connections
integrity in
primary or
secondary
Dielectric
breakdowns
Loss of
mechanical
integrity
Other
Number of MaF Abs. [%] Abs. [%] Abs. [%] Abs. [%] Abs. [%]
2nd survey (1995) 0 0,0 10 5,4 130 70,3 35 18,9 10 5,4
3rd survey (2007) 1 2,0 2 4,0 30 60,0 5 10,0 12 24,0

Figure 5-71: Comparison of relative distribution of major failure modes of GIS parts
nd
and the 3
rd
GIS surveys

Relative distributions of major failure modes in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
GIS surveys provide similar
patterns for GIS equipment other than CB, DS/ES and IT. In the 2
nd
and 3
rd
surveys, the
prevailing major failure mode was Dielectric breakdown (70% for 2
nd
survey and 60% for 3
rd

survey). In the 3
rd
survey, there is a higher portion of other and no information responses.

As major failure modes for GIS equipment other than CB, DS/ES and IT are concerned, the
prevailing mode is Dielectric breakdown that represents 60% in total and more than a half
of them occurred at bus-bar or bus-duct. As GIS age aspect is concerned the relative
numbers of Dielectric breakdown within individual manufacturing years intervals are more
or less the same over all spans with exception of 1989 to 1993 category. However the
number of collected MaF does not seem to be sufficiently large for more precise evaluation.

For detailed analyses of Dielectric breakdown categories, other characteristics such as the
primary cause, the origin and the failed subassembly, see the following chapters.

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
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F
[
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ComparisonofGISmajorfailuremodes
2ndsurvey(1995)
3rdsurvey(2007)
104

5.7.11.2 Number of major failures which caused fire or explosion

There are only 2 major failures which caused fire or explosion for GIS equipment other than
CB, DS/ES and IT. One of them occurred at bus duct and the other one occurred at other
equipment.
the first case of the major failure at bus-duct happened because of manufacturing
fault (poor quality control) in normal service without switching operation.
the second case of the major failure at other equipment happened because of
mechanical failure of the adjacent equipment during normal switching operation.

The absolute number of major failures accompanied with explosion or fire is extremely low
for GIS equipment other than CB, DS/ES and IT. Surprising is that both failures happened at
new or quite new equipment. So, the note about extensive routine and on-site testing
mentioned in chapter 5.6 seems to be valid (see technical brochure [6] for testing practices
issues).

5.7.11.3 Minor failure mode

The same categories of minor failures (MiF) as in chapter 5.7.3 are used for the analysis of
GIS equipment other than CB, DS/ES and IT. These categories are shown in table 5-104 that
provides absolute and relative numbers of MiF for individual GIS parts. Figure 5-72 shows
graphically the relative distribution in which 100% is total number of these GIS parts MiFs
together.

Table 5-104: Distribution of minor failure modes for GIS parts other than CB, DS/ES and IT
(Absolute and relative values for all data)
MiF mode
Busduct
+Busbar
Any kind of
bushing
Surge
arrester
Others
Abs. [%] Abs. [%] Abs. [%] Abs. [%]
Small SF6 leakage 141 88,1 76 71,7 1 50,0 44 30,3
Mechanical weakness in
primary (change of mechanical
functional characteristics)
1 0,6 1 0,9 0 0,0 2 1,4
Electrical or dielectric weakness
in primary
6 3,8 4 3,8 0 0,0 7 4,8
Mechanical or electrical
weakness in control, auxiliary
and monitoring
4 2,5 7 6,6 0 0,0 30 20,7
Other 8 5,0 18 17,0 1 50,0 62 42,8
Total
160 100,0 106 100,0 2 100,0 145 100,0

105

Figure 5-72: Relative distribution of minor failures modes of GIS parts
other than CB, DS/ES and IT

In the 2
nd
survey there was an analysis provided only for major failures.

As mentioned before, in spite of the fact that WG thinks that reporting about minor failures
was not complete the WG decided to provide the basic analysis of the failure modes for the
minor failures but only for a rough information. The biggest portion represents small SF6
leakage (63% of all MiF). Mechanical or electrical weakness in control, auxiliary and
monitoring circuits represents about 10% of all MiF. As a conclusion it is possible to say that
improvement of the reliability of the gas sealing system could lead to a higher reliability of
GIS equipment.

There is also a high portion of other which shall be also read as unknown modes. That
might be caused by the fact that minor failure reporting in utilities is not so carefully kept as
major failure reporting and some information is lost.

5.7.11.4 Failed subassembly

For GIS equipment other than CB, DS/ES and IT the following categories for identification of
failed subassembly are applicable:
Component in primary circuit, that includes making and breaking units, enclosures
and other solid main insulation to earth, current paths, internal bushings and spacers,
main SF6 sealing, pressure relief devices and SF6 gas insulation
Component in control, auxiliary or monitoring circuit, that includes control circuits in
general, heaters, cables and terminal blocks, gas density supervision and other
monitoring equipment and circuits, etc.
Unknown or other

63%
1%
4%
10%
22%
Distributionofminorfailures(MiF)ofGISpartsotherthanCB,DS/ESandIT
fromtheirfailuremodepointofview(alldata)
SmallSF6leakage
Mechanicalweaknessinprimaryorinoperating
mechanism(changeofmechanicalfunctional
chrakteristics)
Electricalordielectricalweaknessinprimary
Mechanicalorelectricalweeknessincontrol,
auxiliaryandmonitoring
Other
106

Table 5-105 shows the collected number of major and minor failures in relevant categories in
absolute and relative values. Figures 5-73 show the relative distributions of MaF and MiF in
pie charts (100% is total number of MaF, MiF resp.).

Table 5-105: Distribution of failed subassembly of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures of GIS
parts other than CB, DS/ES and IT (absolute and relative values for all data)
Equipment subassembly
responsible for the failure
Absolute Relative [%] Absolute Relative [%]
Component in primary circuit 37 74,0 309 74,8
Component in control,
auxiliary or monitoring circuit 0 0,0 68 16,5
Unknown or other 13 26,0 36 8,7
Total 50 100,0 413 100,0

Figures 5-73: Relative distribution of failures of GIS parts other than CB, DS/ES and IT from the
failed subassembly point of view (all data)

Table 5-106 shows the major failed subassemblies from their GIS manufacturing year
interval point of view. As it is not expected that the minor failure data is complete, the
manufacturing year aspect analysis is made only for MaF and all data. In case of GIS
equipment other than CB, DS/ES and IT, the failed subassemblies are grouped into only two
categories positively identified in the survey. The graphical distribution of the relative
numbers is also shown in figure 5-74.

Table 5-106: Distribution of failed subassemblies of major failures (MaF) of GIS parts other than
CB, DS/ES and IT in seven intervals of GIS manufacturing years (absolute and relative values
for all data)
Failed subassembly Component in primary circuit Unknown or other
Manufacturing year Absolute Relative [%] Absolute Relative [%]
before 1979 4 66,7 2 33,3
1979-1983 2 66,7 1 33,3
1984-1988 6 85,7 1 14,3
1989-1993 3 30,0 7 70,0
1994-1998 9 90,0 1 10,0
1999-2003 7 100,0 0 0,0
2004-2007 6 85,7 1 14,3
Total 37 74,0 13 26,0

74%
0%
26%
Failedsubassemblyofmajor
failures(MaF)ofGISparts
otherthanCB,DS/ESandIT
75%
16%
9%
Failedsubassemblyofminorfailures(MiF)of
GISpartsotherthanCB,DS/ESandIT
Componentinprimary
circuit
Componentincontrol,
circuit
Unknownorother
107

Figure 5-74: Relative distribution of major failed subassemblies of GIS parts other than
CB, DS/ES and IT in seven intervals of GIS manufacturing years (all data)

nd
and 3
rd
and relative values) and in figure 5-75 (relative values). 100% is total number of major
nd
and 3
rd
failure comparison.

Table 5-107: Comparison of failed subassemblies in collected major failures (MaF) of GIS parts
nd
and the 3
rd
surveys (absolute and relative values for all
data)
Failed
subassembly
Component
in primary circuit
auxiliary or monitoring circuit
Unknown or other
Number of MaF Abs. [%] Abs. [%] Abs. [%]
2nd survey (1995) 172 92,0 6 3,7 8 4,3
3rd survey (2007) 37 74,0 0 0,0 13 26,0

Figure 5-75: Comparison of relative distribution of major failed subassemblies of GIS parts
nd
and 3
rd
survey (all data)

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Distributionofmajorfailures(MaF)ofGISpartsotherthanCB,DS/ES
andITfromtheirfailedsubassemblyandmanufacturingperiodpointsof
views(alldata)
Unknownorother
Componentinprimary
circuit
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
C
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n
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f
M
a
F
[
%
]
ComparisonofmajorfailedsubassembliesofGISparts
otherthanCB,DS/ESandIT(alldata)
2ndsurvey
(1995)
3rdsurvey
(2007)
108

In both surveys, the prevailing failure mode was Dielectric breakdown. Therefore the
prevailing failed subassembly should be and really is a component in primary circuits in both
the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
surveys. In the 3
rd
survey there is also a high portion of other which shall
also be read as unknown failed subassembly.

Prevailing (74%) subassemblies responsible for major failures of GIS equipment other than
CB, DS/ES and IT are components in primary circuit. This result can be expected from the
fact that the prevailing major failure mode is a dielectric breakdown (60%). Therefore also
the age aspect for responsible subassemblies has a similar pattern as the dielectric
breakdown failure mode (see chapter 5.7.11.1). For detailed analyses of component in
primary circuit , the environmental stresses, service conditions, origin and primary cause see
following chapters.

As minor failures are concerned, the data here is provided only for a very rough information.
The biggest portion of primary circuit responsibility (75%) corresponds very well to prevailing
minor failure mode, i.e. to the small SF6 leakage. The category of component in control,
auxiliary or monitoring circuit can be connected with mechanical or electrical weaknesses in
secondary minor failure mode.

The high portion of other or unknown for both MaF and MiF is a bit alarming. As already
mentioned several times above, a detail investigation and understanding of any failure
mechanisms is a unique source of know-how that should not be missed.

5.7.11.5 Failure origin

For GIS equipment other than CB, DS/ES and IT the following categories for identification of
failure origin are applicable:
Mechanical in other than operating mechanism
Electrical in main circuit
Electrical in secondary circuit
Unknown or other

mentioned above. The table shows absolute and relative data. Figures 5-76 show the
relative number of MaF and MiF in pie charts (100% is total number of MaF, MiF resp.).

Table 5-108: Distribution of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures origin of GIS parts other than
CB, DS/ES and IT (absolute and relative values for all data)
Failure origin Number of MaF Number of MiF
Mechanical in other than operating
mechanism
22 44,0 305 73,8
Electrical in main circuit 10 20,0 2 0,5
Electrical in secondary circuit 9 18,0 17 4,1
Unknown 9 18,0 89 21,5
Total 50 100,0 413 100,0

109

Figures 5-76: Relative distribution of GIS parts other than CB, DS/ES and IT failures from their
origin point of view (all data)

The manufacturing year aspect is considered only for major failures (MaF). The distribution in
absolute and relative values is shown in table 5-109 and the relative results are shown in
figure 5-77 by a bar graph (100% is total number of MaF).

Table 5-109: Distribution of major failure origin of GIS parts other than CB, DS/ES and IT in
seven intervals of GIS manufacturing years (absolute and relative values for all data)
Major failure
origin
Manufacturing
year
Mechanical Electrical in
main circuit
Electrical in
secondary
circuit
Unknown or
other
Total
Abs. [%] Abs. [%] Abs. [%] Abs. [%] Abs.
before 1979 4 66,7 0 0,0 0 0,0 2 33,3 6
1979-1983 1 33,3 1 33,3 0 0,0 1 33,3 3
1984-1988 2 28,6 2 28,6 1 14,3 2 28,6 7
1989-1993 2 20,0 0 0,0 7 70,0 1 10,0 10
1994-1998 6 60,0 2 20,0 1 10,0 1 10,0 10
1999-2003 4 57,1 2 28,6 0 0,0 1 14,3 7
2004-2007 3 42,9 3 42,9 0 0,0 1 14,3 7
Total 22 44,0 10 20,0 9 18,0 9 18,0 50

Figure 5-77: Relative distribution of major failure origin of GIS parts other than
CB, DS/ES and IT failures in seven intervals of GIS manufacturing years (all data)

44%
20%
18%
18%
DistributionofGISmajorfailures(MaF)
74%
0%
4%
22%
DistributionofGISminorfailures(MiF)
Mechanicalinother
thanoperating
mechanism
Electricalinmain
circuit
circuit
Unknownorother
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Distributionofmajorfailures(MaF)ofGISpartsotherthanCB,
DS/ESandITfromtheiroriginandmanufacturingperiodpoints
ofviews(alldata)
Unknownorother
circuit
operatingmechanism
110

There was no such a major failure characteristic included in the 2
nd
survey.

The biggest portion of major failures origins for GIS component other than CB, DS/ES and
IT within all data is Mechanical weakness (44%). Two types of electrical origins have similar
portion (20% of in main circuit and 18% of in secondary circuit weaknesses). In case of
MaF of GIS components other than CB, DS/ES and IT, almost all MaF occur at Bus-bar and
Bus-duct or Any kind of bushing and the biggest portion of the failure modes is Dielectric
breakdown. Therefore it is considered obvious that the result of the failure origin analysis
lead to the poor performance of SF6 gas sealing or a poor Electrical connection.
Regarding the minor failures (MiF) it is not expected that the data is complete. But the
distribution of the failure origins of MiF indicates an appropriate characteristic with high
portion of Mechanical weaknesses which leads to Small SF6 gas leakage.

Regarding the major failures time aspect, the mechanical and electrical problems in main
circuit occur at the younger and at older GISs, whereas the electrical problem in secondary
circuit concentrates at the middle age of GIS. However the total number of major failures is
not big enough to make more precise conclusions. Also the notable characteristic is that the
unknown or other problem occurs at the older GISs more often. It may indicate the fact that
the utilities have a problem to solve the unknown phenomena for ageing equipments.

5.7.11.6 Failure primary cause

The failure primary causes categories of GIS components other than CB, DS/ES and IT are
the same as for any kind of GIS component and are the same as in chapter 5.7.6 (for their
list see the table below).

mentioned in the survey. The table shows absolute and relative data. Figures 5-78 show the

Table 5-110: Distribution of primary cause of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures of GIS parts
other than CB, DS/ES and IT (absolute and relative values for all data)
Failure primary cause Number of MaF Number of MiF
Design fault (manufacturer responsibility) 2 4,0 8 1,9
Manufacturing fault (poor quality control) 7 14,0 17 4,1
Incorrect transport or erection 9 18,0 7 1,7
Other 0 0,0 14 3,4
Lightning overvoltage in excess of rating 4 8,0 1 0,2
Mechanical stress in excess of rating 0 0,0 1 0,2
Corrosion 1 2,0 38 9,2
Wear / Ageing 5 10,0 107 25,9
Incorrect operation 2 4,0 1 0,2
Electrical failure of adjacent equipment 0 0,0 4 1,0
Mechanical failure of adjacent equipment 1 2,0 1 0,2
Human error 1 2,0 1 0,2
Incorrect maintenance (incl. inadequate
instruction for maintenance) 3 6,0 5 1,2
Other abnormal service conditions 0 0,0 2 0,5
Unknown other causes 15 30,0 206 49,9
Total 50 100,0 413 100,0

111

Failure primary cause Number of MaF Number of MiF
Cause introduced during
a period before putting into service
18 36,0 46 11,1
introduced during service
11 22,0 16 3,9
Wear / ageing + corrosion 6 12,0 145 35,1

Figures 5-78: Relative distribution of GIS parts other than CB, DS/ES and IT failures from their
primary cause point of view (all data)

The manufacturing year aspect is considered only for Major failures (MaF). The distribution of
absolute and relative values is shown in table 5-111 and the relative results are shown in
figure 5-79 by a bar graph (100% is total number of MaF).

Table 5-111: Distribution of major failure primary cause of GIS parts other than CB, DS/ES and
IT in seven intervals of GIS manufacturing years (absolute and relative values for all data)
Major failure
Primary cause

Manufacturing
year
Cause introduced
during a period
before putting into
service
Cause other
than wear
introduced
during service
Wear/Ageing
+corrosion
Unknown other
causes
Total
Abs. [%] Abs. [%] Abs. [%] Abs. [%] Abs.
before 1979 0 0,0 2 33,3 2 33,3 2 33,3 6
1979-1983 1 33,3 2 66,7 0 0,0 0 0,0 3
1984-1988 2 28,6 2 28,6 2 28,6 1 14,3 7
1989-1993 1 10,0 1 10,0 1 10,0 7 70,0 10
1994-1998 3 30,0 2 20,0 1 10,0 4 40,0 10
1999-2003 5 71,4 1 14,3 0 0,0 1 14,3 7
2004-2007 6 85,7 1 14,3 0 0,0 0 0,0 7
Total 18 36,0 11 22,0 6 12,0 15 30,0 50

36%
22%
12%
30%
GISmajorfailures(MaF)
11%
4%
35%
50%
GISminorfailures(MiF)
Causeintroduced
duringaperiodbefore
puttinginto service
Causeotherthan wear
introducedduring
service
Unknownothercauses
112

Figure 5-79: Relative distribution of major failure primary causes of GIS parts other than
CB, DS/ES and IT in seven intervals of GIS manufacturing years (all data)

nd
and 3
rd
nd
and 3
rd
failure comparison.

Table 5-112: Comparison of primary causes of collected major failures (MaF) of GIS parts other
than CB, DS/ES and IT in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
surveys (absolute and relative values for all data)
Major failure
prime cause
Cause introduced
Cause other than
wear introduced
during service
Wear / Ageing
+corrosion
Unknown other
causes
2nd survey 1995) 134 72,0 30 16,1 11 5,9 11 5,9
3rd survey (2007) 18 36,0 11 22,0 6 12,0 15 30,0

Figure 5-80: Comparison of relative distribution of primary causes of GIS parts other than CB,
DS/ES and IT major failures in the 2
nd
and 3
rd
survey (all data)

0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
100.0%
Distributionofmajorfailures(MaF)ofGISpartsotherthanCB,DS/ES
andITfromtheirprimarycauseandmanufacturingperiodpointsof
views(alldata)
Unknownothercauses
Causeotherthanwear
introducedduring
service
Causeintroduced
duringaperiodbefore
puttingintoservice
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
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M
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[
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ComparisonofprimarycausesofmajorfailuresofGISpartsotherthanCB,
DS/ESandITinthe2ndandthe3rdGISsurveys(absoluteandrelative
values)
2ndsurvey(1995)
3rdsurvey(2007)
113

The portion of major failures causes that was introduced before the GISs were put into
service has significantly decreased in the 3
rd
GIS survey in comparison to the 2
nd
survey.
That could be a good sign of the fact that GIS are becoming mature and manufacturers,
engineering and construction companies are learning how to perform their work well. The
increase of portion of wear and ageing causes in the 3
rd
survey is also natural. The
population of GISs is getting old and thus it can be expected that this type of the failure
cause will have an increasing trend also in the future. Both with and without switching device
as CB and DS/ES analyses show the same trend for the primary cause of MaF from the
manufacturing year point of view.

The most frequent cause of MaF for GIS component other than CB, DS/ES and IT is still
Cause introduced during a period before putting into service (36%). This cause is followed
by Cause other than wear introduced during service (22%) and wear/ageing/corrosion
(12%). Regarding minor failures, the most frequent cause is wear/ageing/corrosion (35%),
followed by Cause introduced during a period before putting into service (11%).

However the portion of Unknown other causes (30% in MaF and 50% in MiF) is very
alarming. As mentioned in chapter 5.7.5, it is again necessary to repeat that even if a
detailed investigation of a failure may be time consuming and costs money, the investigation
is the only way how to prevent failures re-occurrence and utilities should not miss a chance
to learn something.

As the major failures GIS age aspect (GISs manufacturing years interval) is concerned the
analysis shows a logical picture. The younger the GISs are the more the cause introduced
before putting into service prevails. The older the GISs are the more the wear/ageing/
corrosion cause prevails.

The message for manufacturers and users is clear. It is necessary to focus on material and
assemblies ageing tests, on higher effectiveness of manufacturing quality, routine and on-
site tests, and on higher quality of operation and maintenance staff skills. This trend is similar
in both with and without the switching devices such as CB and DS/ES analyses.

5.7.11.7 Failure service circumstances

To analyze failure service circumstance of GIS components other than CB, DS/ES and IT,
failures the following categories are applicable:
GIS was de-energized and available for service
GIS was out of service because of a maintenance or was just put into service after
maintenance or testing
GIS was in normal steady state service without any switching manipulation
GIS was in service and there was a normal switching operation in the substation
GIS was in service and there was a fault clearing switching-off operation in the
substation
GIS was in service and there was a miss-operation in the substation

mentioned above. The table shows absolute and relative data only for all data. Figures 5-81
show the relative number of MaF and MiF in pie charts (100% is total number of MaF, MiF
resp.).

114

Table 5-113: Distribution of service circumstances of major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures of
GIS parts other than CB, DS/ES and IT (absolute and relative values for all data)
Service circumstances
when failed
De-energized - available for service 2 4,1 8 2,0
Normal service - no operation command in
S/S
31 63,3 306 77,7
During or directly after testing/ maintenance 4 8,2 59 15,0
During fault clearing in S/S 1 2,0 0 0,0
During normal switching operation in S/S 10 20,4 20 5,1
During switching miss-operations in S/S 1 2,0 1 0,3
Total 49 100,0 394 100,0
De-energized 2 4,1 8 2,0
During or directly after testing/maintenance 4 8,2 59 15,0
Normal service without operation 31 63,3 306 77,7
During normal switching operation 10 20,4 20 5,1
During fault switching 2 4,1 1 0,3

Figures 5-81: Relative distribution of GIS parts other than CB, DS/ES and IT failures from
service circumstance point of view (all data)

nd
and 3
rd
nd
and 3
rd
failure comparison. The 2
nd
survey does not distinguish between normal open and tripped
(fault) operation. Therefore the comparison uses a summarized category During switching
operation.

4%
63%
8%
2%
21%
2%
Majorfailures(MaF) ofGIS
partsotherthanCB,DS/ES
andIT service
circumstances
2%
78%
15%
0%
5%
0%
Majorfailures(MaF) ofGISpartsotherthanCB,
DS/ESandIT servicecircumstances
Deenergized available
forservice
Normalservice no
operationcommandinS/S
Duringordirectlyafter
testing/maintenance
DuringfaultclearinginS/S
Duringnormalswitching
operationinS/S
Duringswitching
misoperationsinS/S
115

Table 5-114: Comparison of service circumstances of collected GIS parts other than CB, DS/ES
and IT major failures (MaF) in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
surveys (absolute and relative values for all
data)
Major failure
service
circumstance
De-energized
During or directly
after testing/
maintenance
Normal service
without operation
During switching
operation in
substation
2nd survey (1995) 4 2,1 13 6,9 143 76,1 28 14,9
3rd survey (2007) 2 4,1 4 8,2 31 63,3 12 24,4

Figure 5-82: Comparison of relative distributions of GIS service conditions when collected GIS
parts other than CB, DS/ES and IT major failures were discovered in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
GIS
surveys

The portion of major failures that happened during switching operation in a substation has
increased and the portion of normal service without operation has decreased in the 3
rd
GIS
survey in comparison to the 2
nd
survey. However this change is not as big as in comparison
of all GIS equipment experience (see chapter 5.7.7).

For GIS equipment other than CB, DS/ES and IT, the most frequent type of service when the
failure occurred is Normal service no operation command in S/S in both total MaF and
MiF (63% in MaF and 78% in MiF).

As mentioned before, the failures in GIS components other than CB, DS/ES and IT occur at
Bus-bar and Bus-duct or Any kind of bushing and the failure modes of MaF and MiF are
Dielectric breakdown and Small SF6 gas leakage. Therefore it is expected that these MaF
and MiF failures would be discovered during GIS service both with and without operation.
This information may give an idea to utilities what type of maintenance is efficient to improve
the quality of gas insulated components.

5.7.11.8 Contribution of environmental stresses to failures

For the analysis of the environmental stresses contributions to GIS components other than
CB, DS/ES and IT, the same categories as in chapter 5.7.8 were applied (see table below for
their list).

Table 5-115 shows the collected number of major and minor failures in which environment
was presumed to contribute to their development and in which it was not. The table shows
absolute and relative data only for all data (100% is number of MaF, MiF resp.)

0.0
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[
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Comparisonof servicecircumstancesofGISpartsotherthanCB,
DSESandITmajorfailures
2ndsurvey
(1995)
3rdsurvey
(2007)
116

Table 5-116 shows the same information from the GIS location point of view. It shows the
collected number of major and minor failures in which environment contributed to their
development and in which did not for two categories of all data, i.e. for indoor GIS and
outdoor GIS.

Table 5-115: Distribution of environmental stresses presumed to contribute to GIS parts
failures other than CB, DS/ES and IT major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures (absolute and
relative values for all data)
Environmental stress Number of MaF Number of MiF
No contribution 36 72,0 372 90,1
Contribution 14 28,0 41 9,9

Table 5-116: Distribution of environmental stresses presumed to contribute to outdoor and
indoor GIS parts other than CB, DS/ES and IT for GIS CB-bays major (MaF) and minor (MiF)
failures (absolute and relative values for all data)
Environmental
stress
Outdoor GIS Indoor GIS
Abs. [%] Abs. [%] Abs. [%] Abs. [%]
No contribution 19 59,4 97 78,9 17 94,4 275 94,8
Contribution 13 40,6 26 21,1 1 5,6 15 5,2

Detail analysis, i.e. individual stresses contributions are shown in table 5-117. The
questionnaire allowed multiple answers in this question and thus the total number of
identified stresses is higher than a number of answers with a positive indication (100% is
total number of ticks in MaF, MiF resp.). Figure 5-83 shows relative distribution of
environmental stresses that contributed to GIS CB-bay major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures
(100% is number of MaF, MiF resp., in which the respondents identified environmental
contribution).

Table 5-117: Distribution of environmental stresses that contributed to GIS parts other than CB,
DS/ES and IT major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures (absolute and relative values for all data)
Kind of environment contribution (all data)
Number of
MaF %MaF
Number of
MiF %MiF
Temperature too low 0 0,0 0 0,0
Temperature too high 2 13,3 0 0,0
Strong wind 0 0,0 2 3,2
Rain 0 0,0 12 19,4
Sudden variation in temperature 1 6,7 4 6,5
Snow, ice or hoar-frost 0 0,0 5 8,1
Corrosive atmosphere 0 0,0 0 0,0
Fog or high humidity 0 0,0 12 19,4
Pollution including dust 0 0,0 7 11,3
Lightning 5 33,3 0 0,0
Earthquake 0 0,0 1 1,6
Flood 7 46,7 0 0,0
Other 0 0,0 19 30,6
Total 15 100,0 62 100,0

117

Kind of environment contribution (all data)
Number of
MaF %MaF
Number of
MiF %MiF
Summary of the above (in summarized categories division)::
Temperature 3 20,0 4 6,5
Water in the air 0 0,0 29 46,8
Atmosphere 0 0,0 7 11,3
Wind 0 0,0 2 3,2
Lightning 5 33,3 0 0,0
Flood and earthquake 7 46,7 1 1,6
Other 0 0,0 19 30,6

Figure 5-83: Relative distribution of environmental stresses that contributed to GIS parts other
than CB, DS/ES and IT major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures (all data)

In the 2
nd
survey there was not included a question on environmental stresses presumed to
contribute to collected failures. But short commentary on environmental stresses is described
in chapter 5.7.8.

There was a presumed environmental contribution to a failure for GIS component other than
CB, DS/ES and IT identified in 28% of MaF and 10% of MiF for all data. Having a look at the
same question from the GIS location point of view, the outdoor GISs suffer more from the
environment influence than indoor GIS. There was a presumed environmental contribution
identified in 40% of MaF and 21% of MiF that happened in outdoor GIS and only in 6% of
MaF and 5% of MiF that happened in indoor GIS. This trend is the same as in the analysis
that evaluated all GIS components together.

The most prevailing environmental conditions are Flood and earthquake and Lightning for
MaF and Water in the air for MiF. As shown in chapter 5.7.8, utilities can protect their
equipment by installing surge arresters to restrict the lightning overvoltage. Also as tightness
and ageing problems were identified as the most frequent minor problems it is natural that
humidity and air temperature can accelerate their development.

0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
MaF MiF
DistributionofenvironmentalcontributiontoafailureforGIS
failuresotherthanCB,DS/ESandIT(alldata)
Other
Floodandearthquake
Lightning
Wind
Atmosphere
Waterintheair
Temperature
118

5.7.11.9 Failure repair of components

The way of failure repair description (failure repair categories) of GIS components other
than CB, DS/ES and IT is the same for any kind of GIS component and is the same as in
chapter 5.7.9 (for their list see the table below).

mentioned in the survey. The table shows absolute and relative data. Figures 5-84 show the

Table 5-118: Distribution of repair type of GIS parts other than CB, DS/ES and IT major (MaF)
and minor (MiF) failures (absolute and relative values for all data)
Repair type Number of MaF Number of MiF
Replacement of failed component on site
(without replacement of enclosure) 14 28,0 33 8,0
Replacement of failed component
and its enclosure 6 12,0 3 0,7
Replacement of failed equipment
with another design 1 2,0 2 0,5
Total 50 100,0 413 100,0

Figures 5-84: Relative distribution of GIS parts other than CB, DS/ES and IT failures from repair
type point of view (all data)

16%
38%
28%
12%
2% 2%
2%
GISmajorfailures(MaF)
32%
0%
8%
1%
1%
49%
9%
GISminorfailures(MiF)
Repairoffailedcomponent on
site
Replacementoffailed
componenton site(without
replacementofenclosure)
Replacementoffailed
componentand its enclosure
Replacementoffailed equipment
withanotherdesign
Replacementofseals orrefilling
only
repair
119

nd
and 3
rd
nd
and 3
rd
failure comparison.

Table 5-119: Comparison of repair type of collected GIS CB-bays major (MaF) other than CB,
DS/ES and IT in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
surveys (Absolute and relative values for all data)
Repair type of MaF 2
nd
survey (1995) 3
rd
survey (2007)
Replacement of failed component on site
(without replacement of enclosure) 64 34,0 14 28,0
Replacement of failed component
and its enclosure 52 27,7 6 12,0
Replacement of failed equipment
with another design 10 5,3 1 2,0
Total 188 100,0 50 100,0

Figure 5-85: Comparison of relative distribution of Repair type of GIS CB-bay major failures
(MaF) other than CB, DS/ES and IT in the 2
nd
and 3
rd
survey (all data)

It seems that the relative portion of repairs in factory or shop in the 3
rd
survey increased and
the portion of replacement including enclosure decreased. However, because of the nature
of the prevailing major failure mode in both surveys, i.e. dielectric breakdowns, the true trend
has most probably not changed just the respondents in the 2
nd
survey preferred the
replacement category to repair in factory category whereas in the 3
rd
survey it was
opposite. The fact is that any replacement of a component with its enclosure simultaneously
requires an activity in a factory or a shop.

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[
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]
ComparisonofGISpartsotherthanCB,DS/ESandITmajorfailurerepairs
2ndsurvey
(1995)
3ndsurvey
(2007)
120

The way of the repair distribution of GIS components other than CB, DS/ES and IT shows
that these components major failures are more demanding as their repairs are concerned. As
most of them were dielectric failures, they had to be repaired in a factory and shop in 38% of
cases and in 12% of cases even the enclosure had to be replaced. That represents 50% in
comparison to only 23% of these cases when considering all equipment in GIS (see chapter
5.7.9). This is natural as these kinds of component do not include any operating mechanisms
whose repairs are usually much simpler than repairs of failures occurring inside the GIS
enclosure.

As minor failures repairs are concerned, the most frequent types of repairs are replacement
of sealing or refilling only (49%) and repair of failed component on site (32%) which can
overlap in their interpretation and which together correspond very well to the prevailing minor
failure mode (63% of small SF6 leakage).

5.7.11.10 Consequential measures for components

The consequential measures adopted after failure categories of GIS components other than
CB, DS/ES and IT are the same for any kind of GIS component and are the same as in
chapter 5.7.10 (for their list see the table below).

Table 5-120 shows the collected number of major and minor failures in the categories YES or
NO. The table shows absolute and relative data

Table 5-120: Distribution of GIS CB-bay major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures other than CB,
DS/ES and IT that were and were not followed by special consequential - all data(absolute and
relative values in total collected MaF and MiF)
Consequential measures
after failure accepted
All data
Abs. % Abs. %
Yes
30 60,0% 43 10,4%
No
20 40,0% 369 89,6%

Details about accepted consequential measures are shown in Table 5-121. The
questionnaire allowed multiple answers in this question and thus the total number of
consequential measures is higher than a number of answers with a positive indication (100%
is total number of ticks in MaF, MiF resp.).

Figure 5-86 provides a detail analysis of precautions within positive answers that identified
at least one preventive activity after a major failure (100% is total number of only positive
answers).

121

Table 5-121: Distribution of consequential measures descriptions that followed GIS parts other
than CB, DS/ES and IT major (MaF) and minor (MiF) failures
(Absolute and relative values for all data)
Accepted consequential measures
after failure
Abs. [%] Abs. [%]
Removal similar equipment from
service for inspection 10 18,9% 28 65,1%
Implementation of changes in
purchasing specifications 15 28,3% 6 14,0%
Implementation of additional
monitoring 4 7,5% 1 2,3%
Implementation of changes into
original operating instructions 4 7,5% 0 0,0%
Implementation of changes into
original maintenance, diagnostics
or monitoring instructions 20 37,7% 8 18,6%
Total of positive answers 53 100,0% 43 100,0%

Figure 5-86: Relative distribution of accepted consequential measures that followed major
failures in GIS parts other than CB, DS/ES and IT

A direct comparison of both surveys is not possible (see explanation in chapter 5.7.10.

The relative portion of consequential measures taken after major failure in GIS components
other than CB, DS/ES and IT increased to 60% in comparison to about 30% when a major
failure occurred in any part of GIS. That can be explained by a severity of GIS internal major
failure in busbars, busducts and bushings. As minors failures are concerned, the about 10%
of minor failures after which the consequential measures were taken, has not changed.

19%
28%
7%
8%
38%
Distributionofpositiveconsequentialmeasuresfollowedmajorfailures
(MaF)inGISpartsotherthanCB,DS/ESandIT(alldata)
Removalsimilarequipmentfrom
serviceforinspection
Implementationofchangesin
purchasingspecifications
Implementationofadditional
monitoring
Implementationofchangesinto
originaloperatinginstructions
Implementationofchangesinto
originalmaintenance,diagnosticsor
monitoringinstructions
122

As the preventive measures themselves are concerned, the most frequent are
implementation of changes into original maintenance, diagnostics or monitoring instructions
(38%) and implementation of changes in purchasing specifications (28%). The removal of
similar equipment from service for inspection represents only 19% of cases that less than
when evaluating all data together where this category was the biggest one (36% - see
chapter 5.7.10). The result corresponds quite well to the failed component character as for
busbars and busducts it is more appropriate to extend maintenance and diagnostics in favor
to remove these parts of similar equipment for detail investigation.

5.8 Correlations Between Prevailing Major Failures
Characteristics

The following analysis is made only for major failure (MaF), only for all data, only for the
characteristics that represent biggest portion in individual characteristics and only for those
cross links that make sense or can provide additional value and for those that are not already
mentioned in specific equipment chapters.

Overview:
Failure mode versus failed subassembly, origin and primary cause (see chapter
5.8.1)
Failed subassembly versus environmental stresses, service conditions, origin and
primary cause (see chapter 5.8.2)
Primary cause versus failure mode, origin and failed subassembly (see chapter 5.8.3)
Service conditions versus failure mode and maintenance philosophy (see chapter
5.8.4)

In the 2
nd
GIS survey [13] there was not provided any correlation analysis among different
major failure characteristics. Therefore in chapter 5.8 there are no subchapters with a
comparison with the previous survey. In the 2
nd
survey, there was provided only detail
correlation of different characteristics and main components involved in the GIS CB-bay
major failure there. These comparisons are included in separate equipment technical
brochures [2], [3] and [4] and in chapter 5.7.11.

5.8.1 Correlations of major failure modes

Major failure modes offered the following categories:
Failing to perform requested operation, function resp., (being locked incl.)
Loss of electrical connections integrity in primary (e.g. fails to carry current)
Loss of electrical connections integrity in secondary
Dielectric breakdown in normal service (without switching operation)
Dielectric breakdown in connection with switching operation
Loss of mechanical integrity (mechanical damages of different parts, big SF6 leakage
incl.)
Other
The following chapter exposed only the two main prevailing categories (see chapter 5.7.1),
i.e. Failing to perform request operation and Dielectric breakdown. In all the other
categories the number of failures is too small.

123

5.8.1.1 Major failure modes in correlation with failed subassembly

Table 5-122 shows the major failure mode subdivided into the two main categories failing to
perform request operation and dielectric breakdown in correlation with failed subassembly.
The table shows absolute and relative data. As the results in the table are evident (prevailing
characteristics marked by red numbers) it has been decided that graphical interpretation is
not necessary.

Table 5-122: Distribution of major failure modes in correlation with failed subassemblies (all
data absolute and relative values)
Failed subassembly
Major failure mode
Failing to perform requested
operation, function resp.,
(being locked incl.)
(normal and switching
operation)
Abs. % Abs. %
Component in primary circuit 7 3,1 76 93,8
Component in control, auxiliary or
monitoring circuit
112 49,3 0 0,0
Component in operating mechanism 106 46,7 1 1,2
Component in IT secondary circuit 1 0,4 0 0,0
Unknown or other 1 0,4 4 4,9
Total 227 100,0 81 100,0

Failure mode Failing to perform requested operation or function can have its basis in any
part of the equipment, i.e. all categories of failed subassemblies can be responsible for. The
survey shows that components in operating mechanisms and components in control, supply
and auxiliary circuit are the most frequent ones and they split the responsibility by
approximately half to half.

Failure mode Dielectric breakdown can also appear in all parts of the equipment. However
the absolutely prevailing failed subassemblies were components in primary circuits (94%).

5.8.1.2 Major failure modes in correlation with origin

Table 5-123 shows the major failure modes subdivided into the two main categories failing
to perform request operation and dielectric breakdown in correlation with origin of failure.
The table shows absolute and relative data. Figures 5-87 show the relative distribution of
these major failure modes in pie charts.

124

Table 5-123: Distribution of major failure modes in correlation with the failure origins (absolute
and relative values)
Origin
Major failure mode
Failing to perform
requested operation,
function resp., (being
locked incl.)
operation)
Abs. % Abs. %
Mechanical in other than
operating mechanism 15 6,6 19 23,5
Mechanical in operating
mechanism (earthed) 74 32,6 1 1,2
Electrical in main circuit 1 0,4 50 61,7
Electrical in secondary circuit 100 44,1 3 3,7
Unknown 37 16,3 8 9,9
Total 227 100,0 81 100,0

Figures 5-87: Relative Distribution of major failure modes in correlation with failure origins

Failing to perform requested operation or function major failure mode origins share
approximately the same division as failed components responsible. If subassemblies in
operating mechanisms and components in control, monitoring and auxiliary circuit split the
responsibility by approximately half to half then mechanical problems in operating
mechanisms and electrical problems in secondary circuits should share the responsibility
approximately by half and half, too. It is like so but there is quite a big portion of unknown
origins reported which most probably means that the utility did not make an investigation of
the major failure origin, and/or the respondent did not know the investigation results.

7%
33%
0%
44%
16%
MaF Mode " Failing to
perform requested
operation" in Correlation
with Failure Origin
23%
1%
62%
4%
10%
MaF Mode " Dielectric
breakdown (normal and
switching operation)" in
Correlation with Failure Origin
Mechanical in other
than operating
mechanism
Mechanical in
operating mechanism
(earthed)
Electrical in main
circuit
Electrical in
secondary circuit
Unknown
125

Dielectric breakdowns mode origins split between electrical in main circuit (62%) and
mechanical in other than operating mechanism (24%). However it is necessary to mention
that origin determination needs a really deep detailed investigation. Dielectric breakdown is
an electrical problem, however its origin can be mechanical in main circuit (e.g. void in GIS
spacers) caused by mechanical imperfection in solid insulation materials as well as
mechanical in other parts e.g. in kinematic chain or SF6 gas sealing system. On the other
hand an example of pure electrical origin is a breakdown caused by any kind of overvoltage
stresses. The subassembly is in majority of cases a component in primary circuits.

5.8.1.3 Major failure modes in correlation with primary cause

Table 5-124 shows the major failure (MaF) mode subdivided into failing to perform
requested operation and dielectric breakdown in correlation with primary cause of failure.
The table shows absolute and relative data. Figures 5-88 show the relative distribution of
these two MaF modes in dependence on primary cause in pie charts.

Table 5-124: Distribution of major failure modes in correlation with failure primary causes
(relative and absolute values)
Primary cause
Major failure mode
operation, function resp.,
(being locked incl.)
operation)
Abs. % Abs. %
Cause introduced during a period
before putting into service 29 12,8 37 45,7
Cause other than wear introduced
during service 19 8,4 27 33,3
Wear/Ageing & Corrosion 130 57,3 9 11,1
Total 227 100,0 81 100,0

Figures 5-88: Relative distribution of major failure modes in correlation with failure primary
causes

13%
8%
57%
22%
MaF Mode
" Failing to perform
requested operation"
by primary cause
46%
33%
11%
10%
MaF Mode " Dielectric
breakdown (normal and
switching operation)"
by primary cause
Cause introduced during a
period before putting into
service
introduced during service
Wear/Ageing & Corrosion
Unknown other causes
126

As expected, more than a half of failing to perform requested operation was caused by
wear, ageing and corrosion. Unfortunately there is again a relatively large portion with
unknown causes (22 %).

The dielectric breakdown failure mode (for both under normal and switching operation)
cause was introduced during a period before putting into service in about 50 % of the cases.
That is a surprising result as the required IEC tests before putting into operation should be
sufficient to detect the most failures, e.g. material, manufacturing, transport and erection
defects. Another relatively large portion of dielectric breakdowns modes causes are failures
caused by other than wear phenomenon introduced during service (mainly different
overstresses). Portion of ageing signs is relatively small and represents only 11%. It leads to
a possible conclusion that ageing concerns more mechanical than electrical equipment
properties.

5.8.2 Correlations of failed subassemblies
5.8.2.1 Subassemblies with major failures in correlation with
environmental stress

Table 5-125 shows the distribution of subassemblies with major failure in correlation with
environmental stresses. The table shows absolute and relative data but only for those major
failures in which the probable environment stress was indicated. Figure 5-89 shows the
distribution in absolute values.

Table 5-125: Distribution of major failed subassemblies in correlation with environmental
stresses (relative and absolute values)
Environmental
stress
Subassembly
Component in
primary circuit
Component
in control,
auxiliary or
monitoring
circuit
Component
in operating
mechanism
Component
in IT
secondary
circuit
Unknown or
other
Total
Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % Abs. %
Temperature 2 13,3 3 15,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 2 22,2 7 8,9
Water 2 13,3 4 20,0 3 9,7 0 0,0 0 0,0 9 11,4
Atmosphere 2 13,3 4 20,0 1 3,2 0 0,0 0 0,0 7 8,9
Wind 0 0,0 0 0,0 1 3,2 0 0,0 0 0,0 1 1,3
Lightning 9 60,0 6 30,0 6 19,4 0 0,0 0 0,0 21 26,6
Flood and
earthquake 0 0,0 0 0,0 17 54,8 4 100,0 7 77,8 28 35,4
Other 0 0,0 3 15,0 3 9,7 0 0,0 0 0,0 6 7,6
Total 15 100,0 20 100,0 31 100,0 4 100,0 9 100,0 79 100,0

127

Figure 5-89: Distribution of major failed subassemblies in correlation with environmental
stresses

If an environmental stress was identified as a contribution factor to the major failure the
ambient temperature influenced mainly components in primary and secondary circuits, water
content in the air as well as other atmosphere factors influenced all components
subassemblies (but naturally more those component in the air than in SF6) and lightning
influenced mainly primary circuits but also secondary circuits (the component in operating
mechanism most probably concerned supply and control circuits situated directly in operating
mechanisms boxes). Flood and earthquake are force majeure phenomena that can influence
all parts.

Components in control, auxiliary or monitoring circuits are very sensitive to all environmental
stresses with exception of wind. The same is valid for the components in the primary circuit
however lightning is a stress a special attention should be paid to. Stresses as temperature,
water and atmosphere influences lead to wear, ageing and corrosion.

5.8.2.2 Subassemblies with major failures in correlation with service
conditions

Table 5-126 shows the absolute and relative number of major failures in individual
subassemblies in correlation to service conditions under which the major failures happened.
Figures 5-90 show the relative distribution of the green marked (prevailing) subassemblies
major failures in table 5-126 and their service conditions in pie charts.

0
5
10
15
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25
30
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u
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o
f

M
a
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[
-
]
Failed Subassembly in view of environmental stress
Component in primary
circuit
auxiliary or monitoring
circuit
Component in operating
mechanism
Component in IT
secondary circuit
Unknown or other
128

Table 5-126: Distribution of major failed subassemblies in correlation with service conditions

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129

Figures 5-90: Relative distribution of major failed subassemblies in correlation with service
conditions

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130

More than a half of major failures in components in primary circuits happened during normal
steady state service conditions, i.e. no operation command in the substation occurred. About
20 % of the failures in the primary circuit appeared during or directly after testing or
maintenance. The during or directly after maintenance category includes two controversial
parts. If a failure is discovered during maintenance that is a good sign of effective and on-
time corrective activity; if it happens directly after maintenance that is a bad sign of
incorrectly performed maintenance. Unfortunately the survey did not provide data to analyze
these two completely opposite aspects. However it is to say that incorrectly performed major
maintenance can introduce problems and that it is essential so that only skilled staff
equipped with the right spare parts may make this work. The other service circumstances are
marginal.

Failures in the components of control, auxiliary and monitoring circuits and failures in
operating mechanisms occurred mostly during normal switching operation. Another relatively
large portion of about 25 % (30 % resp.) of major failures happened during normal service
conditions. The other circumstances are negligible. The result is quite expectable.

5.8.2.3 Subassemblies with major failures in correlation with origin

Table 5-127 shows a distribution of major failures in different subassemblies in correlation
with origin of failures. The failure mechanical origin in other than operating mechanism
subassembly includes the following categories:
Mechanical in secondary circuits
Mechanical in main circuits (HV parts, earth potential parts and internal insulation)
Tightness of SF
6
-gas system.

Table 5-127 shows absolute and relative values. Figures 5-91 show the relative distribution
of major failure origins in the three main failed subassemblies (marked green in the table 5-
127) in pie charts.

Table 5-127: Distribution of major failed subassemblies in correlation with failure origins
(relative and absolute values)
Subassembly
Failure origin
Mechanical
in other than
operating
mechanism
Mechanical
in operating
mechanism
(earthed)
Electrical in
main circuit
Electrical in
secondary
circuit Unknown Total
Component in
primary circuit 34 69,4 2 2,6 51 94,4 3 2,6 12 19,4 102 28,6
Component in
control, auxiliary
or monitoring
circuit 3 6,1 3 3,8 3 5,6 97 85,1 14 22,6 120 33,6
Component in
operating
mechanism 9 18,4 73 93,6 0 0,0 4 3,5 27 43,5 113 31,7
Component in IT
secondary circuit 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 1 0,9 4 6,5 5 1,4
Unknown or other
3 6,1 0 0,0 0 0,0 9 7,9 5 8,1 17 4,8
Total 49 100,0 78 100,0 54 100,0 114 100,0 62 100,0 357 100,0

131

Figures 5-91: Relative distribution of major failed subassemblies in correlation with failure
origins

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132

Half of major failures in the primary circuit had their origin in electrical fault in the main circuit
and one third in mechanical faults in other than operating mechanism parts. Almost the entire
portion of failures in the control, auxiliary or monitoring circuit had their origin in electrical
fault in the secondary circuit. The prevailing failure origin for operating mechanisms
components was mechanical. The results are natural as they follow the main design tasks
for the subassemblies.

No SF6 gas leakage was identified as a major failure origin.

5.8.2.4 Subassemblies with major failures in correlation with primary
cause

Table 5-128 shows a distribution of major failures in different subassemblies in correlation
with primary causes of the failures. The table 5-128 shows absolute and relative values.
Figures 5-92 show the relative distribution of major failure primary causes in the three main
failed subassemblies (marked green in the table 5-128) in pie charts.

Table 5-128: Distribution of major failed subassemblies in correlation with failure primary
causes (relative and absolute values)
Subassembly
Prim. Cause
Cause
introduced
during a
period
before
putting into
service
Cause other
than wear
introduced
during
service
Wear/
Ageing &
Corrosion
Unknown
other
causes Total
circuit 45 59,2 26 50,0 19 12,6 12 15,4 102 28,6
circuit 16 21,1 8 15,4 77 51,0 19 24,4 120 33,6
Component in
operating mechanism 13 17,1 15 28,8 52 34,4 33 42,3 113 31,7
Component in IT
secondary circuit 1 1,3 0 0,0 0 0,0 4 5,1 5 1,4
Unknown or other
1 1,3 3 5,8 3 2,0 10 12,8 17 4,8
Total 76 100,0 52 100,0 151 100,0 78 100,0 357 100,0

133

Figures 5-92: Relative distribution of major failed subassemblies in correlation with failure
primary causes

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134

About 44 % of major failures in the primary circuit were caused by a fault introduced during a
period before putting into service and a quarter of major failures in the primary circuits was
caused by wear, ageing and corrosion. The rest was other or unknown cause. The results in
the first pie chart are affected by dielectric breakdowns that represent 94% of all primary
circuits major failures (see chapter 5.8.1.1). As the high portion of before putting into
service primary cause is concerned, the same comment as in chapter 5.8.1.3 is valid
many of them could be avoided by proper testing.

The portion of causes introduced during a period before putting into service was much
smaller in the other two categories (components in secondary circuits and components in
operating mechanisms) of failed subassemblies (only about 12 %). Their prevailing primary
cause of major failures was wear, ageing and corrosion. Nevertheless it is necessary to point
out a high portion of unknown and other causes (16, 30% resp.). It may have two reasons:
Failures in other parts than primary circuits are not taken as serious to justify
spending time and money for their detailed investigation.
In case of a operating mechanism it is sometimes difficult to find out the difference
between a normal defect and a sign of ageing and so the respondent preferred to
select the unknown category.
5.8.3 Correlations of major failure primary causes
5.8.3.1 Primary causes of major failures in correlation with failure modes

Table 5-129 shows a distribution of primary causes of major failures in correlation with major
failure mode. The table shows absolute and relative values. Figures 5-93 show the relative
distribution of major failures modes for three main major failure causes (marked green in the
table) in pie charts.
Table 5-129: Distribution of major failure primary causes in correlation with failure modes
Major failure mode
Primary cause
Cause
introduced
before
putting into
service
Cause other
than wear
introduced
during
service
Wear/
Ageing &
Corrosion
Unknown
other
causes Grand Total
operation 29 38,2 19 36,5 130 86,1 49 62,0 227 63,4
Loss of electrical connections
integrity in primary 1 1,3 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 1 0,3
integrity in secondary 0 0,0 1 1,9 1 0,7 0 0,0 2 0,6
Dielectric breakdown in
normal service (without
switching operation) 31 40,8 20 38,5 9 6,0 7 8,9 67 18,7
Dielectric breakdown in
connection with switching
operation 6 7,9 7 13,5 0 0,0 1 1,3 14 3,9
(big SF6 leakage incl.) 6 7,9 2 3,8 3 2,0 5 6,3 16 4,5
Other 3 3,9 3 5,8 8 5,3 17 21,5 31 8,7
Total 76 100,0 52 100,0 151 100,0 79 100,0 358 100,0

135

Figures 5-93: Relative distribution of major failure primary causes in correlation with failure
modes

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Relatively large portions (about 40 % each) of major failures the roots of which were
introduced during a period before putting into service led to dielectric breakdowns under
normal service conditions without switching operation or to failing to perform requested
operation. The other major failure modes were marginal (less than 8%).

More or less the same distribution is valid for causes other than wear ageing signs. The
prevailing major failures modes are again dielectric breakdowns and failing to perform
requested operation.

Wear, ageing and corrosion led in most cases (86%) to failing to perform requested
operation failure mode. The other categories were marginal.

That proves the previously (see chapters 5.8.1.3, 5.8.2.1 and 5.8.2.4) found results that
ageing phenomenon influences mainly a control, auxiliary or monitoring circuits and
operating mechanism functions and the problem appears mainly at the moment of requested
switching operation. On the other hand, faults introduced before the equipment was put into
service and causes that appear during the equipment service and are not related to ageing,
influenced the dielectric and switching characteristics of the equipment by approximately half
to half.

5.8.3.2 Primary causes of major failures in correlation with origin

Table 5-130 shows the distribution of primary causes of major failures in correlation with
origin of the failures. The table shows absolute and relative values. Figures 5-94 show the
relative distribution of major failures origins for three main major failure causes (marked
green in the table 5-130) in pie charts.

Table 5-130: Distribution of major failure primary causes in correlation with failure origins
Origin
Primary cause
Cause
introduced
during a period
before putting
into service
Cause other than
wear introduced
during service
Wear/
Ageing &
Corrosion
Unknown
other
causes Grand Total
Mechanical in other
than operating
mechanism 20 26,3 9 17,3 13 8,6 8 10,1 50 14,0
Mechanical in
operating mechanism
(earthed) 9 11,8 10 19,2 49 32,5 10 12,7 78 21,8
Electrical in main
circuit 26 34,2 17 32,7 7 4,6 4 5,1 54 15,1
Electrical in
Unknown 7 9,2 8 15,4 11 7,3 36 45,6 62 17,3
Total 76 100,0 52 100,0 151 100,0 79 100,0 358 100,0

Figures 5-94: Relative distribution of major failure primary causes in correlation with failure
origins

137

The distribution of major failure origins, the roots of which were introduced during a period
before putting into service, is more or less even. The electrical origin in main circuit (34%)
and mechanical problems in operating mechanism and outside the operating mechanism
(38% together) correspond very well to data obtained for major failure modes (38% and 41%
- see chapter 5.8.3.2). Regarding the mechanical problems outside operating mechanism
(26%), the analysis, shown later in chapter 5.8.3.3, shows that most of them concerned
mechanical problems in primary circuits, too.

More or less the same distribution is valid for causes other than wear ageing signs.

Wear, ageing and corrosion led in most cases (47%) to electrical problems in secondary
circuits and secondly (32%) to mechanical problems in operating mechanism. The other
categories are marginal. It just implies a need that secondary circuits ageing phenomenon
requires special attention.

5.8.3.3 Primary causes of major failures in correlation with failed
subassembly

Table 5-131 shows the distribution of primary causes of major failures in correlation with their
failed subassemblies. The table 5-131 shows absolute and relative values. Figures 5-95
show the relative distribution of failed subassemblies for three main major failure causes
(marked green in the table 5-131) in pie charts.

Table 5-131: Distribution of major failure primary causes in correlation with failed
subassemblies (absolute and relative values)
Failed subassembly
Primary cause
Cause
introduced during
a period before
putting into
service
Cause other
than wear
introduced
during service
Wear/
Ageing &
Corrosion
Unknown
other
causes Grand Total
circuit 45 59,2 26 50,0 19 12,6 12 15,4 102 28,6
circuit 16 21,1 8 15,4 77 51,0 19 24,4 120 33,6
Component in
operating mechanism 13 17,1 15 28,8 52 34,4 33 42,3 113 31,7
Component in IT
Unknown or other 1 1,3 3 5,8 3 2,0 10 12,8 17 4,8
Total 76 100,0 52 100,0 151 100,0 78 100,0 357 100,0

138

Figures 5-95: Relative distribution of major failure primary causes in correlation with failed
subassemblies

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The distribution of GIS subassemblies, suffered from major failures the roots of which were
introduced during a period before putting into service, shows that more than a half (about
60%) affected subassemblies concerned components in primary circuits. Components in
secondary circuits and in operating mechanisms suffered from major failures in about 20% of
cases each.

The distribution of GIS subassemblies suffered from major failures, the roots of which were
introduced during service but not caused by ageing, showed again the prevailing influence
on subassemblies in primary circuits (50 %). The second most frequent subassembly
influenced by these causes was an operating mechanism (29%) followed by components in
secondary circuits (15%). A more detail analysis of raw data for these causes showed that
primary circuits were in about 35% of the cases affected by different service stresses (mainly
lightning) and in about 60% affected by different human errors (mainly incorrect
maintenance). Operating mechanism failures were caused by human errors (incorrect
maintenance) in about 65% of the cases whereas the overstressing (mechanical) was
identified in only 13% of the cases.

Wear, ageing and corrosion led in most cases (51%) to a failure of a component in
secondary circuits followed by problems in operating mechanisms (34%). That corresponds
very well to already mentioned findings that ageing phenomenon influences mainly a control,
auxiliary or monitoring circuits and operating mechanism functions.

5.8.4 Correlations of major failure service conditions

5.8.4.1 Service condition in correlation with failure mode

Table 5-132 shows the distribution of service conditions when major failures were discovered
in correlation with different major failure modes. The table 5-132 shows absolute and relative
values. Figures 5-96 show the relative distribution of major failure modes for two main
service conditions (marked green in the table 5-132) in pie charts.

140

Table 5-132: Distribution of major failures service conditions in correlation with failure modes

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141

Figures 5-96: Relative distribution of major failures service conditions in correlation with
failure modes

The distribution of major failure modes for failures happened in GIS steady state service, i.e.
in service but without any operation command, showed almost equal portions for dielectric
breakdown (34%) and failing to perform requested function (43%). The sub-category failing
to perform requested operation does not make sense in this respect. As mentioned in
chapter 5.8.2.2 primary circuits failed under steady state conditions in 55% of the cases,
secondary systems in 23% of the cases and operating mechanisms in 30% of the cases.
These numbers are in correlation (having also in mind that 14% were identified as other or
unknown). Secondary systems as well operating mechanisms include self checking
signalization functions that warn about a failure independently on whether a switching
command comes or not.

The absolutely prevailing major failure mode during normal switching operation (92%) was
failing to perform requested operation. That would imply that breakdowns appeared almost
only at steady state conditions. Working group has certain doubts about such a result.
Breakdowns are dielectric faults triggered by voltage stresses. The higher stresses the
higher probability of a breakdown and switching operation in a substation generates
switching overvoltage stresses that could trigger a breakdown. When a breakdown occurs
during switching operation the switching equipment simultaneously fails to switch or other
equipment fails to perform its function. The respondent might have been confused when
selecting the right category.

43%
1%
1%
34%
2%
5%
14%
Failure in normal service -
no operation command
in view of major
failure mode
92%
0%
0%
3%
3%
1%
1%
Failure during normal
switching operation in
view of major failure mode
operation, function resp., (being
locked incl.)
integrity in primary (e.g. fails to
carry current)
integrity in secondary
Dielectric breakdown in normal
service (without switching
operation)
Dielectric breakdown in connection
with switching operation
(mechanical damages of different
parts, big SF6 leakage incl.)
Other
142

5.8.4.2 Service condition of major failures in correlation with
maintenance philosophy

Table 5-133 shows the distribution of service conditions when major failures were discovered
in correlation with different maintenance philosophies applied by different utilities before the
major failure occurred. The table 5-133 shows absolute and relative values. Figures 5-97
show the relative distribution of maintenance philosophies for two main service conditions
(marked green in the table 5-133) in pie charts.

Table 5-133: Distribution of major failures service conditions in correlation with maintenance
philosophy (absolute and relative values)
Service conditions
when major failure
was discovered
Maintenance philosophies before the major failure
Time based
maintenanc
e
Condition
based
maintenanc
e
Run to
failure
Combination
of different
methods
(e.g. RCM) Other Total
De-energized -
available for service 7 2,9 0 0,0 0 0,0 9 12,7 0 0,0 16 4,6
Normal service - no
operation command
in substation 94 39,0 8 23,5 1 5,0 29 40,8 0 0,0 132 37,8
During or directly
after
testing/maintenance 19 7,9 3 8,8 0 0,0 8 11,3 0 0,0 30 8,6
in substation
(applies to parts of
GIS other than CB) 1 0,4 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 1 0,3
During normal
switching operation
in substation
(applies to parts of
GIS other than CB,
DS, ES) 7 2,9 1 2,9 0 0,0 4 5,6 1 100,0 13 3,7
During switching
misoperations in
substation (applies
to parts of GIS other
than CB, DS, ES) 1 0,4 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 1 0,3
During normal
switching operation
(applies to CB, DS,
ES) 106 44,0 22 64,7 0 0,0 20 28,2 0 0,0 148 42,4
operation (applies
to CB) 6 2,5 0 0,0 1 50,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 7 2,0
During fault making
operation (applies to
ES) 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 1 1,4 0 0,0 1 0,3
Total 241 100,0 34 100,0 2 100,0 71 100,0 1 100,0 349 100,0

143

Figures 5-97: Relative distribution of major failures service conditions in correlation with
maintenance philosophy

The distributions of both prevailing service conditions of major failures, i.e. steady state and
normal service operation, in correlation to utilities maintenance philosophies are similar. The
most failures occurred when only time based maintenance was applied (about 70%).
This relative value is almost the same as the relative value of time based maintenance in
correlation the collected service experience (population in four years) in chapter 5.4.6 (73%).
This relative number also copes very well with findings included in technical brochure [6] in
Fig. 7-11 which show that the proportion between time based maintenance and condition
based maintenance application is about 2:1.

To evaluate these results it is necessary to calculate major failure frequencies. Having a look
into chapter 5.6.8 the major failure frequencies of GIS CB/bays are almost equal for time
based philosophy and for combined time based and condition based philosophy. The only
condition based maintenance philosophy led to worse major failure frequency.

5.9 Recommendation for Future Surveys

Based on the data evaluation the following improvements for the future surveys are
recommended:

The voltage class boundaries should me more specific, i.e. there should be
specifically written whether the questionnaire asks for rated voltage of the network the
equipment is installed in (independently on the rated voltage of the equipment itself)
or whether the questionnaire asks for rated voltage of the equipment (independently
on the network rated voltage level the equipment is installed in).

Any question on maintenance (past before failure, future planned, utilities strategies
and philosophies) should be more specific and should ask separately on minor
maintenance, diagnostic measurement and major maintenance (overhaul). Utilities
approaches and practices can differ significantly in these three different maintenance
categories.

71%
6%
1%
22%
0%
Failure in normal service -
no operation command
in view of maintenance
philosophy
72%
15%
0%
13%
0%
Failure during normal
switching operation in
view of maintenance philosophy
Time based
maintenance
Condition based
maintenance
Run to failure
Combination of
different methods
(e.g. RCM)
Other
144

The category other should be split into two categories other and unknown. In the
questionnaire, there should be a place for further description of what the other
category means.

The service conditions of the failure category should contain more detail division for
the during or directly after testing/maintenance option. It would be worth introducing
more categories such as monitoring warning, diagnostic measurement, minor
maintenance, major maintenance and to add a cell for description of the kind of
diagnostic measurement or monitoring that disclosed the problem. Moreover the
during or directly after maintenance headline includes two controversial parts. If a
failure is discovered during maintenance that is good sign of effective and on-time
corrective activity; if it happens directly after maintenance that is a bad sign of
incorrectly performed maintenance. The combination of during or directly after is
thus misleading and these two time circumstances should be separated.

The questionnaire should contain as many automatic self-checking and self-cleaning
functions as possible to prevent impossible combinations of answers or to warn the
respondent about them.

To avoid questions that enable misinterpretations and that seem to be complicated for
the respondent to get data about them.

5.10 Summary and Conclusions

The participation of countries and utilities in the four years (2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007) of
the survey was quite even. The same is valid for their four years contributions in individual
voltage classes. Altogether 24 countries and 55 utilities took part in the survey with an
average total population of about 22 240 GIS CB-bays. There was collected GISs service
experience of 88971 circuit-breaker-bay-years (CB-bay-years) having had 358 major failures
and 1505 minor failures. As the collected service experience is dominated by two countries
most of analyses are made twice for all data and for data without these dominant countries
to show the difference. Comparison with the previous GIS service experience survey (data
up to 1995) is provided where possible, too.

5.10.1 Summary of main findings
5.10.1.1 GIS population

The portion of hybrid GIS installations is still relatively small. Hybrid GIS represents
only about 8% of all collected data however there is an increasing trend in their
installation comparing to the past (previous GIS survey) visible at higher voltage
classes.

The three phase GIS design can be found up to voltage class 4, and it is used in the
two dominant countries much more often than in other countries. It prevails in GIS up
to voltage class 3, whereas in other counties only up to voltage class 2.

Analyzing all data it seems that outdoor installations slightly prevail in higher voltage
classes starting voltage class 4, and are used more frequently than in the past. The
utilities in countries other than the two dominant prefer indoor installations at all
voltage classes (except class 5) in spite of the fact that size of GIS building or shelter
can represent a certain design challenge.

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The oldest reported GIS substation was manufactured and installed in 1960 and
belongs to voltage class 1. The oldest voltage class 2 substations were installed in
1963. The oldest GIS of voltage classes 3 to 6 were installed in 1970, 1975, 1973 and
in 1986 respectively. In all seven manufacturing year intervals there were collected
enough data in both data sets (i.e. total and total without two dominant countries) to
be able to provide failure frequencies time trend analyses.

5.10.1.2 Major failure frequency

Voltage classes distribution:
The point estimates for all data for voltage classes 1, 2 and 3 are about 0.3 MaF/100
CB-bay-years, in voltage classes 4 and 5 the failure frequency is about twice as
higher and in voltage class 6 about three times higher. The point estimates for all data
without two dominant countries for voltage classes 2 and 3 are about 0.6 MaF/100
CB-bay-years, in voltage classes 4 and 5 the failure frequencies are about 6 times
higher and in voltage class 6 it is about three times higher. The comparison did not
show unambiguously better behavior of GIS in the 3
rd
survey with respect to those
reported within the 2
nd
survey mainly for the data sets without dominant highly
experienced countries. The voltage classes major failure frequency curve shapes are
similar. Applying hypothesis tests on data without two dominant countries the GIS
behavior in voltage classes 1, 2 and 3 is equal and better than in the other classes.
The other classes (classes 4, 5 and 6) behave the same. This is an expected result
due to slightly different designs (e.g. CB with one interrupter chamber and with two or
more interrupters). When applying the hypothesis tests on all data results the
message is not as clear. The result might be explained by a different age distribution
of the GIS.

GIS extent distribution:
The result shows an increasing failure frequencies in higher voltage classes in fully
GIS in which the point estimation failure frequencies are more or less the same as for
all GIS without distinguishing between their designs. With exception of voltage class 2
hybrid GIS exhibits better a behavior that fully GIS. Their point estimation values are
4 to 5 times lower than fully GIS mainly in voltage classes 4 and 5. This can be
explained by the fact that hybrid GIS are in general younger and more tailor made
(sometimes even special type tests are applied) than fully GIS and that they have
fewer GIS parts to fail. However the comparison with the previous GIS survey did not
show unambiguously better behavior in the 3rd survey than those reported within the
2nd survey mainly for the hybrid GIS.

GIS location distribution:
The results show increasing failure frequencies in higher voltage classes in outdoor
GIS. The failure frequency for voltage classes 1, 2, 3 is stable at a level of about 0,3
MaF/100 CB-bay-years. The failure frequency increases to about twice that value for
voltage classes 4 and 5 (0,6 to 0,7 MaF/100 CB-bay-years). The same trend is visible
in indoor GIS. The failure frequency for voltage classes 1, 2, 3 slightly increases from
0,1 to 0,3 MaF/100 CB-bay-years but for voltage class 4 it rises to a value about 5
times that value (1,3 MaF/100 CB-bay-years. As the comparison (using hypothesis
tests) of total data for outdoor and indoor GIS behavior is concerned, the indoor GIS
exhibits better performance in voltage class 1 and worse performance in voltage class
4. GIS of the other voltage classes behave equally. No significant difference between
outdoor and indoor GIS was observed. Most manufacturers design their basic
components and sealing for outdoor GIS even if they are installed indoor. The failure
frequencies should thus be very similar, and that has been proven by the survey
results in spite of the fact that outdoor design is always more dependent on local
environmental impacts. Comparison of failure frequencies of indoor GISs collected in
the 2nd and 3rd survey show equal or better reliability of GISs in the 3rd survey for all
data as well as for data without dominant countries. On the other hand, the collected
outdoor GISs experience in the 3rd survey shows less reliability (with exception of
146

voltage class 4) than GISs collected in the 2nd survey. This fact is even more visible
when evaluating data without dominant countries. It is difficult to say whether the
reason is that the populations were different or whether the outdoor GIS are
becoming less reliable.

GIS type of enclosure:
The results show increasing failure frequencies in higher voltage classes in single-
phase encapsulated GIS. The failure frequency for voltage classes 1, 2 and 3 is
stable at a level of about 0,2 to 0,4 MaF/100 CB-bay-years, then in voltage classes 4
and 7 it increases to about 3 times that value, i.e. 1 MaF/100 CB-bay-years. The only
exception in this trend is the result of voltage class 5 with very low base of collected
service experience. The same tendency is visible for three-phase encapsulated GIS.
The comparison of single-phase and three-phase GIS behavior can be made only for
voltage classes 1, 2, 3 and 4. Regarding the failure frequencies of voltage classes 1,
2, 3 they perform equally and independent of the enclosure design. Voltage class 4 of
three-phase encapsulation exhibits somewhat better results. That can be explained
by the fact that if both types are properly designed, less material in three-phase
encapsulation gives less room for failures and three-phase encapsulation transport
units are more homogeneous and thus give less room for assembly faults.

GIS age (manufacturing year intervals):
The age aspect is expressed in seven (mostly 5 years wide) intervals of GIS
manufacturing years. Voltage classes 1, 2, 4 and 5 for all data as well as voltage
classes 2 and 4 for data without two dominant countries show time trends of failure
frequencies similar to a bath-tube curve. The failure frequencies increase (with
different steepness) the older the GISs are and when they are new some teething
failures appear, too. The single trend that does not exhibit the bath tub curve pattern
at the first look is a trend for class 3. Lower and upper confidence limits set a zone in
which the real values of failure frequencies are actually expected. Having that in mind
the real values can create any curve shapes, i.e. can show a stable, increasing as
well decreasing trends. Comparing all data and data without two dominant countries
the values and the curve shapes for voltage classes 1, 2 and 3 are very similar. The
curve shapes for voltage class 4 are also similar but the values are about twice as
high for data without countries 14 and 23 than for all data. The comparison with
previous GIS survey could be done only in two groups GIS older and younger than
11 years. As time trends are concerned, in the 3rd survey all voltage classes GIS
(with exception of voltage class 3 see details above) show an increasing major
failure frequency trend for older GIS. In the 2nd survey this expected result was valid
only for the voltage classes 3 and 4. Time trends of the other classes were either
more or less constant (voltage class 1 and total) or showed a better reliability for older
GISs (voltage classes 2 and 5). This was explained in the 2nd survey by the fact that
20% of all reported failures happened during the first year of service. In the 3rd
survey that concerned only 12 MaF, i.e. less than 4%.

Major failure frequency for individual GIS components:
Detailed analysis of GIS circuit breakers (CB), disconnectors and earthing switches
(DS/ES) and for instrument transformers (IT) failure frequencies is included in CIGRE
brochures [2], [3] and [4]. As the failure frequency of GIS parts other than CB, DS/ES
and IT is concerned it is extremely low. The survey data enabled to calculate failure
frequencies only for different kind of bushings. Their failure frequencies are about 40
times better than a total CB-bay reliability. The comparison with previous survey was
made on the basis of these part contributions to the whole CB-bay failure frequency.
It shows a certain improvement in the failure frequencies of busbar+busducts as well
as in all kinds of bushings. In spite of that the biggest part in the 3
rd
survey
surprisingly represents the other category for which, unfortunately, no additional
information exists.

147

5.10.1.3 GIS maintenance philosophies

There is a visible difference between the philosophies interpreted from all data and
data without two dominant countries. In all data analysis, the traditional policy of time
based maintenance still prevails. Inputs from modern strategies as reliability centered
and condition based maintenance in combination with the time based activities
already appear. However in total they still represent only 26% of reported service
experience. Countries other than the dominant ones seem to be less conservative
since condition based maintenance and combination of condition and time based
maintenance are used more often (23% and 35 % respectively).

The results of hypothesis tests for calculated major failure frequencies for all data
show that GISs with time based maintenance and combination of maintenance
philosophies behave in an equal way and that their reliability is better than GISs
reliability with condition based maintenance philosophy only. The results of
hypothesis tests for data without two dominant countries show that GISs with time
based maintenance philosophy behave better than if a combination of maintenance
philosophies is applied.

Note : If a company applies diagnostic measurement in pre-fixed time intervals and
applies maintenance based on the results of these diagnostic measurements the
philosophy of such a company shall be considered as the combined strategy. It is not
sure whether all respondents referred about their approaches in this way.

5.10.1.4 Failure characteristics

In spite of the fact that WG thinks that reporting about minor failures was not complete the
WG decided to provide the basic analysis of minor failures characteristics, too. The findings
are included in the chapters above. In the Summary chapter, only the findings for major
failures are repeated.

Major failure mode:
o As major failure modes are concerned the prevailing are failing to perform
requested function and dielectric breakdown that represent 63% and 23% in
total. There is no big difference in distributions of all data and data without two
dominant countries. There were only 7 major failures identified as causing fire
or explosion of the GIS enclosure
o Relative distributions of major failure modes in the 2
nd
and the 3
rd
GIS surveys
provide different patterns. In the 2
nd
survey the prevailing major failure mode
was dielectric breakdown (64%) whereas in the 3
rd
survey it is failing to
perform requested operation. If it was generally true it would be a good
message as dielectric breakdowns in GIS usually request very time- and cost-
consuming repair. The failing to perform requested operation event is often
caused by operating mechanism failure; the repair of which is not so difficult.
o As GIS age aspect is concerned, the portion of failing to perform requested
operation rises with the increasing age of GISs. The absolute numbers are
smallest for new GIS, and then they reach a maximum when about 15 to 20
years old and they decrease again for older GIS. The result most probably
illustrates a fact that most overhauls for operating mechanisms are scheduled
to this age span and that this timing is sometimes too late. In contrary, the
relative portion of dielectric breakdowns increases for new GIS, then it is
reduced for about 15 to 20 years after which it starts rising again. The analysis
of major failure frequency for dielectric failures proved this important
observation.

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Major failed subassembly:
o When subassemblies responsible for major failures are analyzed for all data,
the component in primary circuit, component in control, auxiliary or
monitoring circuit and component in operating mechanism share the
responsibility by about one third each. The data without two dominant
countries shows a little bigger portion for "primary circuits" (38%) than for
"components in operating mechanisms" (21%).
o The 2nd and 3rd survey comparison just confirms the major failure mode
comparison. In the 2nd survey the prevailing failure mode was a dielectric
breakdown and thus the prevailing failed subassembly should be and really
was a component in primary circuits. In the 3rd survey the prevailing major
failure was failing to perform requested operation and thus the prevailing
responsible subassemblies should be - and are - either component in
operating mechanisms or component in control circuits.
o As GIS age aspect is concerned, the portion of component of primary circuit
responsible for the failure changes with the increasing age of GISs in a similar
way as the breakdown failure mode. Component in secondary circuits, in
contrary, prevails in older GISs, mainly in GISs of age between 15 and 20
years and the same trend is visible in the category component in operating
mechanism.

Major failure origin:
o The largest relative portion of major failures origins within all data is an
electrical problem in secondary circuit (32%) and the second biggest is a
mechanical problem in operating mechanisms (22%). Both of these two origin
problems lead to the failure mode "fail to perform requested operation" (63%).
The picture for data without dominant countries shows that the most frequent
failure origin is a mechanical problem in other GIS part than in operating
mechanism (29%). There is quite a big portion (more than 10%) of unknown
major failures origins.
o As the major failures time aspect (GISs manufacturing years interval) is
concerned there is a visible trend towards an increasing portion of electrical
problems in main circuits the younger GISs are. That is also in very good
correlation with an increasing portion of dielectric breakdowns major failure
modes. On the other hand older GISs tend to suffer more from mechanical
problems.

Major failure primary cause:
o The relative distributions of major failure causes for all data and data without
two dominant countries are almost equal. The most frequent cause is
wear/ageing/corrosion (about 40%), then a defect introduced before putting
the GIS into service (about 23%, thereof manufacturing fault covers about
10%), followed by about 15% of service conditions not meeting the equipment
capability (thereof about 7% corresponds to human error or incorrectly
performed maintenance).
o The portion of major failures causes that were introduced before the GISs
putting into service has significantly decreased in the 3rd GIS survey in
comparison to the 2nd survey. That could be a good sign of the fact that GIS
are becoming mature and manufacturers, engineering and construction
companies have already learned how to perform their work well. The increase
of portion of wear and ageing causes in the 3rd survey is also natural. The
population of GISs is getting old and thus it can be expected that this type of
the failure cause will have an increasing trend also in the future.
o As the major failures time aspect is concerned the analysis shows a logical
picture. The younger the GISs are the more a cause introduced before putting
into service prevails. The older the GISs are the more wear/ageing/ corrosion
cause prevails.

149

Major failure service conditions:
o The relative distributions of major failure service conditions for all data and
data without two dominant countries are similar. The two most frequent types
of service conditions when the failure occurred are "normal switching
operation" (46 to 40%) and "normal service without operation" (about 36%).
The "de-energized" and "during or directly after maintenance events"
represent about 13% for all data and about 24% for data without two dominant
countries.
o The portion of major failures that happened during switching operation in a
substation has increased and the portion of normal service without operation
has decreased in the 3rd GIS survey in comparison to the 2nd survey. That
corresponds to the change of major failure modes from prevailing breakdowns
in the 2nd survey to prevailing failing to perform requested operation in the
3rd survey. However there is a certain overlapping of the prevailing service
conditions for the breakdown failure mode (breakdown can happen during
switching operation as well as during service without any manipulation).
Slightly increasing trend in during maintenance category could be a sign of
more effective maintenance or diagnostics.

Contribution of environmental stresses to major failures:
o Presumed environmental contribution to a major failure was identified in 20%
for all data and in 5% for data without two dominant countries. Having a look
at the same question from the GIS location point of view, the outdoor GISs
suffered more from the environment influence than indoor GIS. Presumed
environmental contribution was identified in 26% of major failures that
happened in outdoor GIS and only in 6% that happened in indoor GIS. There
were 28 major failures in voltage class 1 caused by a flood. These failures
represent 35% of all positively identified major failures influenced by nature.
These failures were excluded from any other analysis than this one. The
second most frequent environmental influence is lightning that represents 27%
of positively identified answers. As lightning overvoltage is concerned, in
contrary to a flood, utilities can protect their equipment by installing surge
arresters. However it is possible that the effect of lightning has been
overestimated. It is much more difficult to estimate if the lightning has stressed
the equipment in excess of its rating than if the temperature was out of the
specified range. In the previous GIS survey lightning was identified much less
frequently (in about 1,5% of major failures).

The way of major failure repair:
o The most frequent activities for major failures repairs were repair of failed
component on site and replacement of failed component on site (without
replacement of an enclosure), which can overlap to a certain extent, and
which represent together 68% for all data and 62% for data without two
dominant countries. The most time and cost demanding activities, i.e. repair
in factory or shop, replacement of failed component and its enclosure and
replacement by another design, represent about 26% of cases together.
This percentage corresponds quite well to the percentage of breakdowns
occurrence (23 to 24%). The least time and cost demanding activity, i.e.
placed back into service without repair, appears in about 5% of cases.
o A portion of major failure repairs that could be made on site has increased in
the 3rd GIS survey and portions of time and cost demanding work have
decreased. On the other hand in the 3rd survey there is also observed a
certain increase in failures that needed a transport of the failed component to
a factory shop. In spite of that, it is possible to conclude that major failures
collected in the 3rd survey had a bit less severe consequences regarding the
equipment repairs than the major failures collected in 2nd GIS survey.

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After failure consequential measures:
o There is no significant difference between the relative approaches of all
participating utilities and utilities excluding two dominant countries. Both
analyses show that in about one third of major failures some additional
consequential measures were carried out to prevent the failures re-occurrence
at other units. That means that the other two thirds of major failures must have
been considered as random events without any danger to reappear on other
units. As the preventive measures themselves are concerned the most
frequent are removal of similar equipment from service for inspection and
implementation of changes into original maintenance, diagnostics or
monitoring instructions. They both concern planned maintenance activities
and represent together about two thirds of all positive measures. The other
third is divided more or less equally among implementation of changes into
original purchasing specifications (15%) or original operating instructions
(12%) and implementation of additional monitoring (7%).

GIS parts other that CB, DS/ES and IT major failure characteristics:
o As major failure modes are concerned, the prevailing mode is Dielectric
breakdown that represents 60% in total and more than a half of them
occurred at bus-bar or bus-duct. Prevailing (74%) subassemblies responsible
for major failures are components in primary circuit. As GIS age aspect is
concerned the relative numbers of Dielectric breakdown within individual
manufacturing years intervals are more or less the same over all spans with
exception of 1989 to 1993 category.
o The biggest relative portion of major failures origins is Mechanical weakness
(44%). Two types of electrical origins have similar portion (20% of in main
circuit and 18% of in secondary circuit weaknesses). Regarding the major
failures time aspect, the mechanical and electrical problems in main circuit
occur at the younger and at older GISs, whereas the electrical problem in
secondary circuit concentrates at the middle age of GIS.
o The most frequent cause of major failures is still Cause introduced during a
period before putting into service (36%). This cause is followed by Cause
other than wear introduced during service (22%) and wear/ageing/corrosion
(12%). However the portion of Unknown other causes (30%) is alarming.
o The most frequent type of service when the failure occurred is Normal service
no operation command in S/S (63%). A presumed environmental
contribution to the failure was identified in 28% of all major failures and in 40%
of major failures happened in outdoor GIS. This trend is the same as in the
analysis that evaluated all GIS components together.
o The way of the repair distribution of GIS components other than CB, DS/ES
and IT shows that these components major failures are more demanding as
their repairs are concerned. As most of them were dielectric failures they had
to be repaired in a factory and shop in 38% of cases and in 12% of cases
even the enclosure had to be replaced. That represents 50% in comparison to
only 23% of these cases when considering all equipment in GIS. This is
natural as these kinds of component do not include any operating
mechanisms whose repairs are usually much simpler than repairs of failures
occurring inside the GIS enclosure.
o The relative portion of consequential measures taken after major failure in GIS
components other than CB, DS/ES and IT increased to 60% in comparison to
about 30% when a major failure occurred in any part of GIS. That can be
explained by a severity of GIS internal major failure in busbars, busducts and
bushings. As the preventive measures themselves are concerned, the most
frequent are implementation of changes into original maintenance,
diagnostics or monitoring instructions (38%) and implementation of changes
in purchasing specifications (28%). The removal of similar equipment from
service for inspection represents only 19% of cases that less than when
evaluating all data together where this category was the biggest one. The
result corresponds quite well to the failed component character as for busbars
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and busducts it is more appropriate to extend maintenance and diagnostics
instead of removing parts of similar equipment for detailed investigation.

5.10.1.5 Major failures characteristics correlations

Major failure modes:
o Failing to perform requested operation or function failure mode can have its
basis in any part of the GIS. The survey shows that components in operating
mechanisms and components in control, supply and auxiliary circuit are the
most frequent ones and they split the responsibility by approximately half to
half. Dielectric breakdown failure mode can also appear in all parts of the
equipment. However the absolutely prevailing failed subassemblies were
components in primary circuits (94%).
o Failing to perform requested operation or function major failure mode origins
share approximately the same division as failed components responsible. If
subassemblies in operating mechanisms and components in control,
monitoring and auxiliary circuit split the responsibility by approximately half to
half then mechanical problems in operating mechanisms and electrical
problems in secondary circuits should share the responsibility approximately
by half and half, too. Dielectric breakdowns mode origins split between
electrical in main circuit (62%) and mechanical in other than operating
mechanism (24%). Dielectric breakdown is an electrical problem, however its
origin can be mechanical in main circuit (e.g. void in GIS spacers) caused by
mechanical imperfection in solid insulation materials as well as mechanical in
other parts e.g. in kinematic chain or SF6 gas sealing system. On the other
hand, an example of pure electrical origin is a breakdown caused by any kind
of overvoltage stresses.
o As expected, more than a half of failing to perform requested operation was
caused by wear, ageing and corrosion. The dielectric breakdown failure
mode (for both under normal and switching operation) cause was introduced
during a period before putting into service in about 50 % of cases. That is a
surprising result as the required IEC tests before putting into operation should
be sufficient to detect the most failures, e.g. material, manufacturing, transport
and erection defects. Another relatively large portion of dielectric breakdowns
modes causes are failures caused by other than wear phenomena introduced
during service (mainly different overstresses).

Failed subassemblies:
o If an environmental stress was identified as a contribution factor to the major
failure the ambient temperature influenced namely components in primary and
secondary circuits, water content in the air as well as other atmosphere
factors all components subassemblies and lightning influenced mainly
primary circuits but also secondary circuits. Components in control, auxiliary
or monitoring circuits are very sensitive to all environmental stresses. The
same is valid for the components in the primary circuit however lightning is a
stress a special attention is to be paid to. Stresses as temperature, water and
atmosphere influences lead to wear, ageing and corrosion.
o More than a half of major failures in components in primary circuits happened
during normal steady state service conditions, i.e. no operation command in
the substation occurred. About 20 % of the failures in the primary circuit
appeared during or directly after testing or maintenance. Failures in the
components of control, auxiliary and monitoring circuits and failures in
operating mechanisms occurred mostly during normal switching operation;
however a relatively large portion of about 25 % of major failures happened
during normal service conditions, too.
o A half of major failures in the primary circuit had an origin in electrical fault in
the main circuit and one third in mechanical faults in other than operating
mechanism parts. Almost all of failures in the control, auxiliary or monitoring
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circuit had their origin in electrical fault in the secondary circuit. The prevailing
failure origin for operating mechanisms components was mechanical.
o About 44 % of major failures in the primary circuit were caused by a fault
introduced during a period before putting into service and a quarter of major
failures in the primary circuits were caused by wear, ageing and corrosion.
Portion of causes introduced during a period before putting into service was
much smaller (only about 12 %) in the other two categories of failed
subassemblies (components in secondary circuits and components in
operating mechanisms). Their prevailing primary cause of major failures was
wear, ageing and corrosion.

Major failure primary causes:
o Relatively large portions (about 40 % each) of major failures the roots of which
were introduced during a period before putting into service led to dielectric
breakdowns under normal service conditions without switching operation or to
failing to perform requested operation. The prevailing major failures modes
are again dielectric breakdowns and failing to perform requested operation.
Wear, ageing and corrosion led in most cases (86%) to failing to perform
requested operation failure mode.
o The distribution of major failure origins the roots of which were introduced
during a period before putting into service is more or less even. The electrical
origin in main circuit (34%) and mechanical problems in operating mechanism
and outside the operating mechanism (38% together) correspond very well to
data got for major failure modes (38% and 41%). More or less the same
distribution is valid for causes other than wear ageing signs. Wear, ageing
and corrosion led in most cases (47%) to electrical problems in secondary
circuits and secondly (32%) to mechanical problems in operating mechanism.
o The distribution of GIS subassemblies suffered from major failures the roots of
which were introduced during a period before putting into service shows that
more than a half (about 60%) affected subassemblies concerned components
in primary circuits. Components in secondary circuits and in operating
mechanisms suffered from major failures in about 20% of cases each. Wear,
ageing and corrosion led in most cases (51%) to a failure of a component in
secondary circuits followed by problems in operating mechanisms (34%). That
corresponds very well to already mentioned findings that ageing phenomenon
influences mainly a control, auxiliary or monitoring circuits and operating
mechanism functions.

Major failure service conditions:
o The distribution of major failure modes for failures happened during GIS
steady state service, i.e. in service but without any operation command,
shows almost 1:1 portions for dielectric breakdown (34%) and failing to
perform requested function (43%). The absolutely prevailing major failure
mode during normal switching operation (92%) is failing to perform requested
operation.
o The major failure frequencies of GIS CB/bays are almost equal for time based
philosophy and for combined time based and condition based philosophy. The
only condition based maintenance philosophy led to worse major failure
frequency.

5.10.2 Recommendations for manufacturers and utilities

The high portion of other or unknown failure characteristics chosen by respondents in the
survey is alarming. A detailed investigation and understanding of any failure mechanisms is a
unique opportunity for obtaining know-how that should not be missed. The more utilities
know about details of their major (but also minor) failures the more they can prevent them at
other installations. Looking for the roots of failures can help to prevent their re-occurrence.
Another notable characteristic is that the unknown or other problem occurs at the older GISs
153

more often. It may indicate the fact the utility have a problem to solve the unknown
phenomena for ageing equipments. Manufacturers should also be more active in this respect
to be able to provide a deep expertise. They shall actively seek for a feedback from utilities
service experience by e.g. distributing an annual service experience questionnaire in which
both major as well minor failures are to be reported.

As the time trends of GIS major failure frequencies exhibit a typical bath-tube curve both
manufacturers and utilities shall focus mainly on the teething and ageing parts of the curve.
They should ask questions such as: Is there any room for improvement? How to discover
before putting into service faults? How to discover ageing in time? How to discover the
other service causes than ageing in time? What maintenance strategy is the most effective?

Is there any room for improvement?
The survey showed that the problems introduced before the equipment was put into
service concern in absolute majority only primary circuits. Most of dielectric
breakdowns in early GIS life can be avoided by extensive routine and on-site
dielectric testing.
Ageing phenomena influence mainly a control, auxiliary or monitoring circuits and
operating mechanism functions. It concerns mechanical as well as electrical
equipment properties. The secondary circuits electrical ageing requires special
attention. As the secondary circuits characteristics are concerned, they are
sometimes a bit neglected in comparison to HV electrical characteristics. As a matter
of fact they are also very important for the reliable HV part service. They are placed in
more aggressive environment, i.e. in the air, and their life time shall be designed for
the same tens of years as the HV part. Actually there no ageing type tests for the
secondary equipment in standards.

How to discover before putting into service faults?
Many failures, the roots of which lay in the period before putting into service (manufacturing,
transport and erection problems), usually appear in the first years of service. Most of them
should be discovered by proper routine and on-site testing. There are also other causes, e.g.
engineering or design faults that cannot be always discovered by testing. Their resulting
failures can appear at any time during the whole equipment life cycle.

How to discover ageing in time?
From the manufacturers perspective it is rather difficult to evaluate and precise the
development of ageing during the normal life cycle of the equipment. Type tests can provide
only limited information in this respect. Therefore it is necessary and extremely important to
introduce a close collaboration with utilities to get a feedback from the equipment life cycle
behavior. This information is to be used by manufacturers to keep continuously updating their
instruction manuals for maintenance and diagnostics (from time intervals, occasions and the
content of the work point of views). Ageing can be discovered by continues monitoring and if
diagnostic tests and maintenance activities are set to proper time.

How to discover the other service causes than ageing in time? The discovering of these
causes is related namely to two main categories:
service stressing - Here monitoring and cumulative evaluation of external service
conditions (e.g. lightning, severe short circuits, extraordinary switching operations or
mechanical stresses) can help to apply for a maintenance or replacement in time
(Condition based maintenance principle). There already exists models and application
that collect this service data and calculate so called health index to trigger the right
activity in the right time.
human errors Human errors such as incorrect operation or maintenance shall be
avoided by applying proper know-how (selection of effective maintenance activities
and determining the way how to evaluate diagnostics and monitoring data) and by
employing only skilled and experienced staff. The utilities should collaborate with their
manufacturers to be sure that both aspects are met. For example, major maintenance
should preferably be made only by the manufacturer (and/or under his supervision) or
by a company that is certificated by the manufacturer for performing such work.

154

What maintenance strategy is the most effective?
The analysis showed that the traditional policy of time based maintenance, in combination
with other strategies (e.g. condition based maintenance CBM) resp., still brings good results
and cannot be avoided. 15 to 20 years interval seems to be just the right time for performing
overhauls (or at least a detailed investigation of conditions) for operating mechanisms and
secondary circuits. Simultaneously, there is still a room for improvement in developing
effective CBM technique that will enable an application of really effective combined
maintenance strategies. As the CBM alone is concerned, it is important to set correctly
intervals and contents of the equipment conditions checks (not all parameters can be
monitored).

The message for manufacturers and users is clear. It is necessary to focus on: ageing tests
of material and assemblies, higher effectiveness of manufacturing quality, routine and on-site
tests effectiveness, ageing tests for secondary equipment and higher quality, diagnostic tests
and monitoring effectiveness and on operation and maintenance staff skills.

5.10.3 Conclusion

Developing a survey to obtain reliability information on GIS major failure frequencies and
failures characteristics is an worth effort that has a potential of positively impacting the
electric utility industry. When performed in an innocuous manner, equipment manufacturers,
utilities, and consumers of electric energy can benefit greatly from the aggregated
experiences.

Electrical networks worldwide have an increasingly aged population of electrical equipment.
The surveys application helps the owners and operators of these networks to understand
signs of ageing and items to pay special attention to prevent major failures and system
outages. It helps to mitigate the effects through proper operation, effective maintenance,
monitoring, asset refurbishment and asset replacement. For new and expanding networks,
the survey helps to optimize pre-service activities like routine and on-site tests and helps to
define operation, maintenance and monitoring of the assets to achieve the desired level of
network performance. It can also serve as benchmarking database for utilities and can
provide failure statistics data for those utilities that do not have long history in gathering their
own data or too small population for having enough data for making their own statistics.

155

References
Final Report of the 2004 - 2007 international enquiry on reliability of high voltage
equipment associated CIGRE technical brochures

[1] TB 509 Final Report of the 2004 - 2007 international enquiry on reliability of
high voltage equipment, Part 1 - Summary and General Matters
high voltage equipment, Part 2 - SF6 Circuit Breakers
[3] TB 511, Final Report of the 2004 - 2007 international enquiry on reliability of
high voltage equipment, Part 3 - Disconnectors and Earthing Switches
high voltage equipment, Part 4 - Instrument Transformers
high voltage equipment, Part 5 Gas Insulated Switchgear (GIS)
high voltage equipment, Part 6 - GIS practices

1
st
GIS experience survey results:
[7] I.M.Welch GIS Experience Survey and Database (ELECTRA No. 157,
December 1994, page 81-83)
[8] I.M.Welch, C.J. Jones, D. Kopejtkova, S. Kobayashi, T. Molony, P. OConnell
GIS in Service - Experience and Recommendations (CIGRE Paris 1994,
paper SC 23 No. 23-104)
[9] T.Molony, D. Kopejtkova, S. Kobayashi, I.M.Welch Twenty-five-year Review
of Experience with SF6 Gas Insulated Substations (GIS) (CIGRE Paris 1992,
paper SC 23 No.23-101)
[10] D.Kopejtkova GIS Failure Frequency Trend, (CIGRE Paris 1994 Proceedings,
SC23, Preferential subject No. 1, Question No.6)

2
nd
GIS experience survey results:
[11] T.M. Chan, F. Heil, D. Kopejtkova, P. OConnell, J.-P. Taillebois, I. Welch
Report on the Second International Survey on High Voltage gas Insulated
Substation (GIS) Service Experience, (CIGRE Paris 1998, paper SC 23 No.
23-102)
[12] C.N.Cheung, F. Heil, D. Kopejtkova, P. OConnell, J.P. Taillebois, I. Welch
Report on the Second International Survey on High Voltage gas Insulated
Substation (GIS) - Experience in Life Expectancy, Maintenance and
Environmental Issues (CIGRE London Conference 1999, paper No. 500-05)
[13] CIGRE WG 23.02 Report on the Second International Survey on High Voltage
Gas Insulated Substations (GIS) Service Experience, Brochure 150, issued in
2000

Related Final Report of the 2004 - 2007 international enquiry on reliability of high
voltage equipment papers and Cigre brochures
[14] F. Waite, D. Kopejtkova, K.Mestrivic, J. E. Skog, C. E. Solver Use of Data
from CIGRE High Voltage Equipment Reliability Survey, CIGRE regional
conference in Cape Town 2009
[15] CIGRE B3-20 Evaluation of Different Switchgear technologies (AIS, MTS, GIS)
for Rated Voltages of 52 kV and above, Brochure390. issued in 2009

Appendix 1-156

Appendices
Appendix 1 - GIS Questionnaire

1.1 Covering page

Appendix 1-157

1.2 GIS population card

You are about to fill in a
GIS Population Card
If this was en error, you can return to the main menu.
To proceed, please keep in mind the following rules:
The rated voltage must be greater than or equal to 60 kV.
For further information please click on the '?' buttons
If text in the cells is cut off, adjust the line height or zoom.
GIS circuit breakers should be included in the "Circuit Breaker Population Card".
GIS disconnectors and earthing switches should be included in the "Disconnector & Earthing Switch
Population Card".
GIS instrument transformers should be included in the "Instrument Transformer Population Card".
Treat each individual substation stage of construction as a separate substation and separate year
Please send an updated card each year to the CIGRE working group.
Except for the substation name, the table has to be filled in with integers only
This card asks for 3-phase data about Gas Insulated Switchgear (GIS) and those parts of hybrid substations
made from GIS components.
back to main
menu
Go to GIS Population card
Appendix 1-158

1.3. GIS failure card

You are about to fill in a
GIS Failure Card
If this was en error, you can return to the main menu.
To proceed, please keep in mind the following rules:
The rated voltage must be greater than or equal to 60 kV.
For further information please click on the '?' buttons
For a GIS circuit breaker failure please use the "Circuit Breaker Failure Card".
For a GIS disconnector or earthing switch failure please use the "Disconnector & Earthing Switch Failure
Card".
For a GIS instrument transformer failure please use the "Instrument Transformer Failure Card".
One failure card should be filled in per failure event.
Do not leave any answers incomplete: populate with best available information or expert opinion
back to main
menu
Go to GIS Failure card
Appendix 1-159

Appendix 1-160

Appendix 1-161

Appendix 1-162

Appendix 1-163

Appendix 2-164

Appendix 2 - Definitions

Busbar/Busduct
Busbar (busbar component) is that part of the switchgear which serves for
interconnection between CB-bays. Based on single line diagram, in the switchgear
there may be one to several main busbars, transfer busbar or a ring busbar.

Busduct (busduct component) is that part of the switchgear which serves for
interconnection of individual apparatus and for connection to outer interface (overhead
line bushings, cable boxes, transformer bushings, etc.) within one CB-bay.

Circuit breaker bay (CB-bay)
A three phase assembly consisting of one circuit breaker or switch, its associated
disconnectors, instrument transformers, interconnecting busducts up to and including
the line disconnect switch (if applicable), and the section of main busbar (if applicable).

Note: One exit bay can consist of more than only one CB-bays, e.g. single line diagram with 1.5 circuit breakers per
exit consists of 3 CB-bays per one diameter, single line diagram with two breakers for an exit consists of 2 CB-bays.

Component
IEC 60517 (IEC 62271-203)
Essential part of the main or earthing circuits of GIS which serves a specific function
(e.g. circuit breakers, disconnector, earthing switch, instrument transformer, bushings,
busbar, bushing, termination, etc.).

Corrective maintenance
Additional work found necessary to do arising from equipment defects or failures found
on other similar equipment or recommended by the manufacturer or repair of the major
or minor failure or defect of the equipment itself .

Note: Observations resulting from maintenance (wherein some disassembly has been done to determine actual
condition that an external inspection could not reveal) can lead to the decision to carry out other types of
maintenance (including an overhaul).

Diagnostic
IEC 60694 (IEC 62271-1)
Investigative tests of the characteristic parameters of switchgear and control gear to
verify that it performs its functions, by measuring one or more of these parameters.

Note: The result from diagnostic tests can lead to the decision to carry out overhaul.

Note: The measurement is performed on purpose (periodically or condition based) and can be performed ON/LINE
or OFF/LINE.

Examination
IEC 60694 (IEC 62271-1)
Inspection with the addition of partial dismantling, as required, supplemented by means
such as measurements and non-destructive tests in order to reliably evaluate the
condition of the switchgear and control gear.

Note: Observations resulting from examination can lead to the decision to carry out other types of maintenance (up
to an overhaul).

Appendix 2-165

Failure
Lack of performance by an item of its required function or functions.

NOTE: The occurrence of a failure does not necessarily imply the presence of a defect if the stress or the stresses are
beyond those specified.

Failure mode
Failure mode describes a basic function of the equipment which the equipment is not
able to meet (at major failure mode) or is able to meet with certain restrictions (minor
failure mode).

NOTE: Basic functions of HV equipment are usually the following:
to perform desired switching operations (at switching equipment), including not operating when not
required/controlled,
to provide HV and low voltage insulation,
to provide and accept signals to and from connected systems (protection systems, control systems, metering
systems, auxiliary and supply systems),
to provide self-checking (monitoring functions if they are implemented).

GIS - Gas Insulated Switchgear
A substation the bays of which are fully made from GIS technology components. Only
external HV connections to overhead or cable lines, or transformers, shunt reactors
and capacitors can have external insulation.

Note 1: GIS technology components are characterized by SF6 or SF6 mixtures insulation, and by metal enclosure
effectively earthed.

Note 2: In hybrid switchgear (switchgear the bays of which are made from a mix of GIS and AIS technology
components), please refer to AIS or GIS in dependence of specific design of the referred component.

GIS part extent
Identification of the extent of the GIS part within the substation (switchgear and control
gear at one voltage level), i.e. use:
Full GIS installation - substation the bays of which are fully made from GIS
technology components. Only external HV connections to overhead or cable
lines, or transformers, shunt reactors and capacitors can have external
insulation.

Hybrid GIS installation - substation the bays of which are made from a mix of
GIS and AIS technology components, i.e. in which the CB-bays contains
combination of enclosed gas insulated and air insulated parts.

There are two exceptions from this rule:
If the only one component in AIS technology is HV connection (bushing, box) to
overhead line, cable or transformer the substation is considered as fully GIS
substation (1).
If the only one component in GIS technology is a dead tank breaker substation
is considered as AIS.
Any other combinations are considered as hybrid substations (e.g. where only busbars
are SF6 insulated, or where an enclosed gas insulated CB contains additional
equipment as instrument transformers, or earthing switches).

Note: In a substation, which consists of two separated but interconnected parts at the same voltage level where one
part is full GIS installation and the other part is full air insulated installation, please, refer only about the full GIS
part and identify this part as 1 (fully GIS installation).

Appendix 2-166

GIS Service conditions / Location
Identification of the service conditions according to IEC 60517 (IEC 62271-203)and
furthermore:
(valid for 'fully GIS' and 'hybrid GIS' installation)
GIS Indoor Normal - for normal indoor conditions
GIS Indoor Special - for special indoor conditions (e.g. for containerized
installations, installations under simple buildings-shelters without heating,
altitudes >1000m, etc.)
GIS Outdoor Normal - for normal outdoor conditions
GIS Outdoor Special - for special outdoor conditions (e.g. for lower ambient
temperatures than -40C, altitudes >1000m, pollution areas III or IV, ice coating
>20 mm, direct coastal areas, etc.)
Note: GIS whose only outdoor parts are bushings (SF6/air, SF6/transformer) and/or necessary lengths of connecting
busducts are considered as indoor installations.

Inspection
IEC 60694 (IEC 62271-1)
Periodic visual investigation of the principal features of the switchgear and control gear
in service without dismantling.

This investigation is generally directed toward pressures and/or levels of fluids,
tightness, position of relays, pollution of insulating parts, but actions such as
lubricating, cleaning, washing, etc. which can be carried out with the switchgear and
control gear in service are also included.

Note: Observations resulting from inspection can lead to the decision to carry out other types of maintenance (up to
an overhaul).

Interface chamber bushings
Interface chamber bushings are direct interconnections between GIS and power
transformer or reactor.

Maintenance
IEC 60694 (IEC 62271-1) ; IEV 191-07-01
The combination of all technical and administrative actions, including supervision
actions, intended to retain an item in, or restore it to, a state in which it can perform a
required function.

Major failure
IEC 60694 (IEC 62271-1)
Failure of a switchgear and control gear which causes the cessation of one or more of
its fundamental functions.

A major failure will result in an immediate change in the system operating conditions,
e.g. the backup protective equipment will be required to remove the fault, or will result
in mandatory removal from service within 30 minutes for unscheduled maintenance.

Note: or will result in unavailability for required service.

Appendix 2-167

Minor failure
IEC 60694 (IEC 62271-1)
Failure of equipment other than a major failure or any failure, even complete, of a
constructional element or a sub-assembly which does not cause a major failure of the
equipment.

Note: Do not mix with "defect:
Imperfection in the state of an item (or inherent weakness) which can result in one or more failures of the item itself
or of another item under the specific service or environmental or maintenance conditions for a stated period of time.

Monitoring
Continuous service procedure on HV equipment in service which uses a permanently
installed device intended to observe automatically the state of an item, i.e. intended to
measure and evaluate of one or more characteristic parameter of switchgear and
control gear to verify that it performs its functions.

Note: Do not mix with "diagnostic measurements" (see definition 1.14)

Overhaul (Major Maintenance)
IEC 60694 (IEC 62271-1)
Work done with the objective of repairing or replacing parts which are found to be out
of tolerance by inspection, test, examination, or as required by the manufacturer's
maintenance manual, in order to restore the component and/or the switchgear to an
acceptable condition.

Note : For the purpose of this questionnaire the major maintenance = Overhaul.

Rated voltage classes
Rated voltage of the equipment. (The rated voltage indicates the upper limit of the
highest voltage of systems for which the switchgear and control gear is intended / the
nameplate value)

Class 1 : 60<= Un<100 kV
Class 2 : 100<= Un<200 kV
Class 3 : 200<= Un<300 kV
Class 4 : 300<= Un<500 kV
Class 5 : 500<= Un<700 kV
Class 6 : Un>=700 kV

Note for utilities in Japan:
The voltage class 2 includes the JEC rated voltage level of 204 kV.

Scheduled maintenance
IEC 60694 (IEC 62271-1) ; IEV 191-07-10
The preventive maintenance carried out in accordance with an established time
schedule or with established condition based rules.
Time Based:
Scheduled maintenance including overhaul that is performed on defined
period of time or number of operations has elapsed.

Condition Based:
Maintenance that measures/assesses service conditions from monitoring or
diagnostic data. When the condition has changed or exceeded a limit, a
condition directed task is then implemented and the item is returned to an
acceptable operating condition.

Appendix 2-168

Run-to-Failure:
Item is allowed to fail and at the time of failure, appropriate corrective actions
are taken to return the item to an acceptable operating condition.

Combination (RCM):
A combination of the above tasks that take into to account the affects of failure
and the effectiveness of prevention.

Other:
Maintenance philosophy not described by any of the above.

Stage of installation
If the substation consists of two or more GIS or hybrid parts the bays of which were put
into service in different years (may be of the same design and manufactured by the
same supplier or not), please refer about these parts separately as 1st stage, 2nd
stage, etc.

Substation name
The name of the substation (switchgear and controlgear at one voltage level; usually a
name which is mentioned in the postal address) or any other artificial name the
respondent decided to use for that specific substation.

Note: Usually a name which is mentioned in the postal address (do not include manufacturer)

Type of enclosure
Identification of HV conductors number placed in one component enclosure. The
components can be either single phase or three phased enclosed

Type of busbar enclosure
Identification of HV conductors number placed in one busbar enclosure. The busbar
component can be either 1 phase enclosed or 3 phase enclosed.

Type of CB-bay enclosure
Identification of HV conductors number placed in one CB-bay enclosure (except the
busbar part of the bay). The CB-bay component can be either single phase enclosed or
three phase enclosed.

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513

The rated voltage must be greater than or equal to 60 kV.

For further information please click on the '?' buttons

The rated voltage must be greater than or equal to 60 kV.

For further information please click on the '?' buttons

One failure card should be filled in per failure event.

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