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LLB 2-1. The Leftists. Magugulong Magagandat Pogi sa Left Side.
Rubberworld and Yao Ong v. NLRC

July 26, 2000
Facts:
1. Petitioner Rubberworld was engaged in manufacturing of footwear, bags and garments. Private respondents
were employed by petitioner in different positions.
2. Rubberworld filed with the DOLE a notice of temporary shutdown operations to take effect on Sept. 26, 1994
but before its effectivity it was forced to prematurely shutdown.
3. Private respondents filed with the NLRC a complaint against petitioner for illegal and non-payment of separation
pay.
4. Rubberworld filed with the SEC a petition for declaration of suspension of payments with a proposed
rehabilitation plan. SEC suspended all claims against Rubberworld.
5. Petitioner submitted to the LA a motion to suspend the proceedings invoking the SEC order. The LA did not act
on the motion. The LA declared Rubberworld guilty of shutdown.
6. Rubberworld appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA. Motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON the claims of respondents against Rubberworld under rehabilitation by a management committee
created by SEC VALID
Held:
1. PD 902-A provides that all actions for claims against corporations, partnership, or associations under
management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be SUSPENDED accordingly.
The law did not make any exceptions in favor of labor claims.
2. The justification for the automatic stay of all pending actions for claims is to enable the management committee
or the rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or extra judicial
interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the 'rescue' of the debtor company.
3. Even if an award is given to private respondents, the ruling could not be enforced as long as petitioner is under
management committee.
4. The power to hear and decide labor disputes is deemed suspended when the SEC puts the corporation under
rehabilitation. NLRC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
5. Wherefore, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

Oriental Shipmanagement Co. Inc. v. CA
January 25, 2006
Facts:
1. Petitioner Oriental is a recruitment agency licensed by the POEA to recruit seafarers for employment on board
vessels accredited to it. Kara Seal is Orientals foreign-based principal, which owns and manages M/V Agios
Andreas, a vessel accredited to Oriental.
2. Private respondents Cuesta and Gonzaga were hired as Third Engineers on M/V Agios Andreas through Oriental
3. Kara Seal and M/V Agios Andreas Shipmaster signed an Agreement with the International Transport Workers
Federation (ITF) increasing the salary of vessels employees.
4. When the ITF Inspector boarded M/V Agios Andreas, it was discovered that the employees were not paid.
Respondents were ordered repatriated to Manila.
5. Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal for failure of Oriental and Kara Seal to pay according to
the ITF Agreement.
6. As defense, they allege that respondents voluntarily resigned, as evidenced by the Letter of Indemnity bearing
their signatures and they were duly paid.
7. The LA dismissed the complaint and held in favor of Oriental and Kara Seal.
8. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of LA. Motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
9. Respondents filed a special civil action with the CA. The CA set aside the questioned decision of the NLRC and
held in favor of private respondents. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: WON private respondents resigned from employment as shown by the Letter of Indemnity and WON they were
illegally dismissed
Held:
1. Yes, they were illegally dismissed.
2. Quitclaims signed by our migrant workers, such as the Letters of Indemnity in the instant case, are viewed with
strong disfavor. Public policy dictates that they be presumed to have been executed at the behest of the
employer. It is the employers duty to prove that such quitclaims were voluntary.
3. The employees acknowledgment of his termination with nary a protest or objection is not enough to satisfy the
requirement of voluntariness on his part.
4. Resignation is defined as the voluntary act of an employee who finds himself in a situation where he believes
that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and he has no other choice but
to disassociate himself from his employment
5. It would have been illogical for respondents to resign and then claim that they were illegally terminated. Well-
entrenched is the rule that resignation is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal.
6. Based on the foregoing disquisition, we are convinced that respondents were forced to sign the Letter of
Indemnity.
7. Private respondents were illegally dismissed because Oriental and/or Kara Seal failed to serve two written
notices to respondents prior to their termination from employment as required by the LC. There was no due
process in their dismissal.
8. R.A. 8042, Sec. 10, par. 5 provides that In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
9. Settled is the rule that quitclaims are ineffective in barring full recovery of the benefits due the employee. The
acceptance of any monetary benefit, such as repatriation expenses and accrued wages in this case, would not
divest respondents of the right to fully claim the remainder of what is rightfully due them.
10. Wherefore, the petition is DENIED.

Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services Inc.
March 24, 2009
Facts:
1. Petitioner Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant and Marlow under POEA-approved Contract of
Employment as Chief Officer
2. At the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the
position of Second Officer upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief
Officer.
3. Respondents did not deliver on the promise. Hence, Serrano refused to stay and was repatriated to the
Philippines.
4. Petitioner filed with the LA a complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and payment of money
claims. LA held in favor of Serrano by awarding $8,770, representing the complaints salary for tree (3) months
of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment.
5. On appeal, the NLRC modified the LAs decision by reducing the applicable salary rate because R.A. 8042 does
not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven not to have been actually performed, and
for vacation leave pay. Serrano filed a motion for reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the subject clause. The motion was denied.
6. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari questioning R.A. 8042, Sec. 10, par. 5. The CA affirmed
NLRCs decision. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this present petition
Issue: WON R.A. 8042, Sec. 10, par. 5 limiting the entitlement in case of illegal dismissal to their lump-sum salary
either for (1) the unexpired potion of their employment contract or (2) for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less violates the constitutional rights of OFWs (impairment of contract, equal protection
and due process)
Held:
Does the subject clause violate the non-impairment of contract?
1. Petitioners claim that the subject unduly interferes with the stipulation in his contract on the term of his
employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is not tenable
2. The enactment of R.A. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the employment contract between petitioner
and respondents in 1998. It cannot be argued that R.A. 8042 impaired the employment contract of the parties.
3. R.A. 8042 was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or
calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end view of ensuring respect for
the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.
Does the subject clause violate Sec. 1 of Art. III (due process), Sec. 18 of Art. II and Sec. 3 of Art. XIII on labor as
protected sector
1. The answer is in the affirmative.
2. Imbued with the sense of obligation to afford protection to labor, the Court in the present case also employs
the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to
OFWs
3. The subject clause reveals a discriminator intent against OFWs at three levels:
a. OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts of
one year or more
b. OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year
c. OFWs vis-vis local workers with fixed period employment

OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or
more
1. A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount to award an illegally dismissed
overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or
three (3) months salary for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the
employment contract concerned has a term of at least one (1) year or more. This is evident from the words "for
every year of the unexpired term" which follows the words "salaries for three months.
2. This is contrary to the well-established rule in legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care should be
taken that every part or word thereof be given effect since the law-making body is presumed to know the
meaning of the words employed in the statue and to have used them advisedly.
3. It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the unexpired portions thereof,
were treated alike in terms of the computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their
claims were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired
portion of their employment contracts.
4. The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of computation of the
money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment periods, in the process singling out one
category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar
disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion
thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply because the
latter's unexpired contracts fall short of one year.
5. The Court notes that the subject clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less" contains the qualifying phrases "every year" and "unexpired term." By its ordinary meaning, the word
"term" means a limited or definite extent of time.105 Corollarily, that "every year" is but part of an "unexpired
term" is significant in many ways: first, the unexpired term must be at least one year, for if it were any shorter,
there would be no occasion for such unexpired term to be measured by every year; and second, the original
term must be more than one year, for otherwise, whatever would be the unexpired term thereof will not reach
even a year. Consequently, the more decisive factor in the determination of when the subject clause "for three
(3) months forevery year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" shall apply is not the length of the original
contract period as held in Marsaman,106 but the length of the unexpired portion of the contract period -- the
subject clause applies in cases when the unexpired portion of the contract period is at least one year, which
arithmetically requires that the original contract period be more than one year.
6. Viewed in that light, the subject clause creates a sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs whose contract
periods are for more than one year: those who are illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their
contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally
dismissed with one year or more remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the subject clause, and their
monetary benefits limited to their salaries for three months only.
OFWs vis--vis Local Workers with fixed period of employment
1. prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were
treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries
for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the
adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their
employment contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month
cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the
monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of
OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local
workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a
peculiar disadvantage.
1. Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect the employment of
OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will have to
be rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates the burden of
one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed of
private businesses such as placement agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose
protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea that private business interest can be elevated to
the level of a compelling state interest is odious.
2. Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner
and other OFWs to equal protection
WHEREFORE, the court GRANTS the Petition. The The subject clause "or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less" in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is
DECLAREDUNCONSTITUTIONAL

San Miguel Corp. v. NLRC and Vega
May 31, 1988
Facts:
1. An innovation program was sponsored by petitioner SMC under which management undertook to grant cash
awards to all SMC employees except ED-HO staff, Division Managers and higher ranked personnel. They were
asked to submit ideas and suggestions found to be beneficial to the corporation.
Private respondent Vega had been employed to petitioner for 13 years and was then holding the position of mechanic
in the Bottling Department
2. Respondent Vega submitted an innovation proposal entitled Modified Grande Pasteurization Process which
was supposed to eliminate certain alleged defects in the quality and taste of San Miguel Beer Grande
3. Despite demand of Vega, SMC refused to pay him the cash award for the said program.
4. Vega filed a complaint with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the Ministry of Labor and Employment.
5. The LA dismissed the petition because the said claim is not among those mentioned in Art. 217 of the LC.
6. Both parties appealed to the NLRC, the decision of which was held in favor of private respondent Vera. Hence,
this petition.
Issue: WON the LA and NLRC has jurisdiction over the case as provided by Art. 217 of the LC
Held: ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the commission. (a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties for
decision, the following cases involving are workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Those that workers may file involving wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
3. All money claims of workers, including those based on non-payment or underpayment of wages, overtime
compensation, separation pay and other benefits provided by law or appropriate agreement, except claims for
employees' compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits;
4. Cases involving household services; and
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this; Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes
and lockouts.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.
1. While par. 3 above refers to "all money claims of workers," it is not necessary to suppose that the entire
universe of money claims that might be asserted by workers against their employers has been absorbed into the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters.
2. Par. 3 must be read not in isolation but within the context of par. 1, 2, 4 and 5 because they all refer to cases or
disputes arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee relationship.
3. Money claims of workers which not fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of LA are those money
claims which have some reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship.
4. Applying the foregoing, without the existing employer-employee relationship between the parties here, there
would have been no occasion to consider the petitioners Innovation Program or the submission by Mr. Vega of
his proposal concerning beer grande; without that relationship, private respondent Vegas suit against petitioner
SMC would never have arisen.
5. Before the enactment of BP 227 on June 1, 1982, Labor Arbiters, under par. 5 of Article 217 of the Labor Code
had jurisdiction over "all other cases arising from employer-employee relation, unless, expressly excluded by this
Code." Even then, the principle followed by this Court was that, although a controversy is between an employer
and an employee, the Labor Arbiters have no jurisdiction if the Labor Code is not involved.
6. Where the claim to the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the LC or other labor
relations statute or a CBA but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the reguar
courts of justice and not the LA and the NLRC.
7. In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor in wage
structures and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general civil law.
Clearly, such claims fall outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to Labor Arbiters and
the NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies disappears.
8. Thus, whether or not an enforceable contract, albeit implied arid innominate, had arisen between petitioner
Corporation and private respondent Vega in the circumstances of this case, and if so, whether or not it had been
breached, are preeminently legal questions, questions not to be resolved by referring to labor legislation and
having nothing to do with wages or other terms and conditions of employment, but rather having recourse to
our law on contracts.
9. Wherefore, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED.

Molave Motors Sales vs Laron
May 28, 1984

Facts: Petitioner, PLAINTIFF in this case, is a corporation engaged in the sale and repair of motor vehicles in Dagupan
City. Private respondent, the DEFENDANT in this case, was, or is, the sales manager of PLAINTIFF. Plaintiff sought to
collect from defendant through court action payments accounts the latter incurred during his incumbency for the
repairs on his personal car and purchase of vehicle parts. Defendant denies such allegations and questions the
jurisdiction of the trial court alleging that the case is under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC since the
money claims is during the occurrence of employer-employee relationship of the parties. The court dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the case.
Ruling: The dismissal of the case below on the ground that the sum of money and damages sued upon arose from
employer-employee relationship was erroneous. Claims arising from employer-employee relations are now limited to
those mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 217. There is no difficulty on our part in stating that those in the case
below should not be faulted for not being aware of the last amendment to the frequently changing Labor Code. The
claim of DEFENDANT that he should still be considered an employee of PLAINTIFF, because the latter has not sought
clearance for his separation from the service, will not affect the jurisdiction of respondent Judge to resolve the
complaint of PLAINTIFF. DEFENDANT could still be liable to PLAINTIFF for payment of the accounts sued for even if he
remains an employee of PLAINTIFF.

Sanyo Phil. Workers Union - PSSLU vs Canizares if grievance machinery, dispute must be bet. Union & company
July 8, 1992
Facts: It was stated in the CBA of herein petitioners that the union shall have the right to demand the company the
dismissal of the employed union members should the latter failed to maintain its good standing as members. In a letter
dated February 7, 1990, PSSLU, through its national president, informed the management of Sanyo that the following
employees were notified that their membership with PSSLU were cancelled for anti-union, activities, economic
sabotage, threats, coercion and intimidation, disloyalty and for joining another union: Benito Valencia, Bernardo Yap,
Arnel Salvo, Renato Baybon, Eduardo Porlaje, Salvador Solibel, Conrado Sarol, Angelito Manzano, Allan Misterio,
Reynaldo Ricohermoso, Mario Ensay and Froilan Plamenco. The same letter informed Sanyo that the same employees
refused to submit themselves to the union's grievance investigation committee (p. 53, Rollo). It appears that many of
these employees were not members of PSSLU but of another union, KAMAO. The company received no information on
whether or not said employees appealed to PSSLU. Hence, it considered them dismissed as of March 23, 1991. On May
20, 1991, the dismissed employees filed a complaint (pp. 32-35, Rollo) with the NLRC for illegal dismissal. On June 20,
1991, PSSLU filed a motion to dismiss the complaint alleging that the Labor Arbiter was without jurisdiction over the
case, relying on Article 217 (c) of P.D. 442, as amended by Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6715 which provides that cases
arising from the interpretation or implementation of the collective bargaining agreements shall be disposed of by the
labor arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration.
Issue: Whether or not the labor arbiter have jurisdiction to hear the case?
Ruling: In the instant case, however, We hold that the Labor Arbiter and not the Grievance Machinery provided for in
the CBA has the jurisdiction to hear and decide the complaints of the private respondents. While it appears that the
dismissal of the private respondents was made upon the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the union security
clause provided in the CBA, We are of the opinion that these facts do not come within the phrase "grievances arising
from the interpretation or implementation of (their) Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies," the jurisdiction of which pertains to the Grievance
Machinery or thereafter, to a voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. Article 260 of the Labor Code on
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator states that "(t)he parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement shall
include therein provisions that will ensure the mutual observance of its terms and conditions. They shall establish a
machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of their
Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel
policies." It is further provided in said article that the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective
representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is not settled in that level, it shall automatically be
referred to voluntary arbitrators (or panel of voluntary arbitrators) designated in advance by the parties. It need not be
mentioned that the parties to a CBA are the union and the company. Hence, only disputes involving the union and the
company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.
In the instant case, both the union and the company are united or have come to an agreement regarding the dismissal of
private respondents. No grievance between them exists which could be brought to a grievance machinery. The problem
or dispute in the present case is between the union and the company on the one hand and some union and non-union
members who were dismissed, on the other hand. The dispute has to be settled before an impartial body. The grievance
machinery with members designated by the union and the company cannot be expected to be impartial against the
dismissed employees. Due process demands that the dismissed workers grievances be ventilated before an impartial
body. Since there has already been an actual termination, the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.

San Miguel Corp. Employees Union - PTGWO vs Bersamira labor disputes are under jurisdiction of LAs
June 13, 1990
Facts: A Writ of Preliminary Injunction was issued by herein judge respondent against the petitioners action of strike
against herein private respondent corporation. Herein petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the court to issue the writ
since the issue covers an employee-employer relationship which is under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. The
issuance of the writ is pursuant to the following events: Petitioner is the duly authorized representative of monthly paid
rank-in file employee. The Union through a letter advised the San Miguel Corporation that some Lipercon and D'Rite
workers had signed up for union membership and sought the regularization of their employment with SMC. The Union
alleged that this group of employees, while appearing to be contractual workers supposedly independent contractors,
have been continuously working for SanMig for a period ranging from six (6) months to fifteen (15) years and that their
work is neither casual nor seasonal as they are performing work or activities necessary or desirable in the usual business
or trade of SanMig. Thus, it was contended that there exists a "labor-only" contracting situation. Due to unfavorable
response of the corporation, the Union filed a notice to strike for unfair labor practice, CBA violations, and union
busting. Due to the unsettled dispute and issuance of other notices of strike, The Union held a picket at the premises of
the corporation, thus the issuance of the writ of injunction.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case?
Ruling: That a labor dispute, as defined by the law, does exist herein is evident. At bottom, what the Union seeks is to
regularize the status of the employees contracted by Lipercon and D'Rite in effect, that they be absorbed into the
working unit of SanMig. This matter definitely dwells on the working relationship between said employees vis-a-vis
SanMig. Terms, tenure and conditions of their employment and the arrangement of those terms are thus involved
bringing the matter within the purview of a labor dispute. Further, the Union also seeks to represent those workers, who
have signed up for Union membership, for the purpose of collective bargaining. SanMig, for its part, resists that Union
demand on the ground that there is no employer-employee relationship between it and those workers and because the
demand violates the terms of their CBA. Obvious then is that representation and association, for the purpose of
negotiating the conditions of employment are also involved. In fact, the injunction sought by SanMig was precisely also
to prevent such representation. Again, the matter of representation falls within the scope of a labor dispute. Neither can
it be denied that the controversy below is directly connected with the labor dispute already taken cognizance of by the
NCMB-DOLE.
As the case is indisputably linked with a labor dispute, jurisdiction belongs to the labor tribunals. As explicitly
provided for in Article 217 of the Labor Code, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 6715 on 21 March 1989, since the suit
below was instituted on 6 March 1989, Labor Arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the
following cases involving all workers including "1. unfair labor practice cases; 2. those that workers may file involving
wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; ... and 5. cases arising from any violation of Article
265 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strike and lockouts. ..." Article 217 lays down the plain
command of the law.

A "labor dispute" is defined as "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or arranging the terms and
conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
employee."

De Rossi vs NLRC if arises on corporate act or controversies in a relnship w/in corp, under SEC jurisdiction
September 14, 1999
Facts: Herein petitioner was the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of private respondent, Matling
Industrial and Commercial Corporation (MICC) whose employment was terminated on the ground that the petitioner
failed to secure his employment permit, grossly mismanaged the business affairs of the company, and misused
corporate funds. Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the NLRC, National Capital Region on September 21, 1989, a complaint
3 for illegal dismissal with corresponding damages. Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the petitioner ordering private
respondent to reinstate petitioner and pay the appropriate backwages. MICC appealed the decision of the labor arbiter
to the NLRC (First Division) on the ground that Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in reinstating the petitioner and awarding him backwages and damages, because the termination of
petitioner was for a valid cause. Also the respondents contend that the SEC and not the NLRC has the jurisdiction over
the case.
Issue: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case?
Ruling: Note that a corporate officer's removal from his office is a corporate act. If such removal occasions an intra-
corporate controversy, its nature is not altered by the reason or wisdom, or lack thereof, with which the Board of
Directors might have in taking such action. When petitioner, as Executive Vice-President allegedly diverted company
funds for his personal use resulting in heavy financial losses to the company, this matter would amount to fraud. Such
fraud would be detrimental to the interest not only of the corporation but also of its members. This type of fraud
encompasses controversies in a relationship within the corporation covered by SEC jurisdiction. Perforce, the matter
would come within the area of corporate affairs and management, and such a corporate controversy would call for the
adjudicative expertise of the SEC, not the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC.

Soliman vs. CA when appeal is perfected
Facts: Respondent Valenzuela was a regular security guard of Soliman assigned at the BPI-Family Bank. He received a
memo from Soliman relieving him from his post at the bank upon the latters request and requiring him to report to the
security agency for reassignment. The following month, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on the ground that he
was terminated without a valid cause. He averred that after getting a shot reassignment, he was then put on floating
status. While Soliman contended that his relief from post was only temporary and it was respondent who refused after
being offered new assignment. It further argued that the floating status was only for 29 days and does not amount to
constructive dismissal. Labor Arbiter held petitioners guilty of illegal dismissal. Petitioners filed an appeal to the NLRC.
On 11 November 1998, the NLRC issued an order directing petitioners to submit an affidavit to the effect that their
appeal bond was genuine and that it would be in force and effect until the final disposition of the case. In his reply
memorandum, dated 28 November 1998, respondent, asseverating that petitioners failed to deposit the required bond
for the appeal, sought the appeal to be declared as not having been validly perfected.
Issue: WoN Valenzuela was illegally/constructively dismissed and an appeal was perfected.
Ruling: The charge of illegal dismissal was prematurely filed. Temporary off-detail is not equivalent to dismissal. In
security parlance, it means waiting to be posted. It is a recognized fact that security guards employed in a security
agency may be temporarily sidelined as their assignments primarily depend on the contracts entered into by the agency
with third parties. However, it must be emphasized that such temporary inactivity should continue only for six months.
Otherwise, the security agency concerned could be liable for constructive dismissal. Constructive dismissal exists when
an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain, on the part of an employer has become so unbearable as to leave
an employee with no choice but to forego continued employment. The temporary "off-detail" of respondent Valenzuela
is not such a case.
An appeal to the NLRC is perfected once an appellant files the memorandum of appeal, pays the required appeal fee
and, where an employer appeals and a monetary award is involved, the latter posts an appeal bond or submits a surety
bond issued by a reputable bonding company. In line with the desired objective of labor laws to have controversies
promptly resolved on their merits, the requirements for perfecting appeals are given liberal interpretation and
construction.

NEECO I vs. NLRC substantial compliance with the law, Cooperative filed appeal & bond issued w/in reg period
Facts: Petitioner employees were permanent employees of respondent Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative (NEECO I) and
members and officers of petitioner NEECO I Employees Association.
The Board of Directors adopted a policy setting the guidelines for NEECO Is retirement benefits. A few months later all
regular employees were ordered by NEECO I to accomplish Form 87, which were applications for retirement,
resignation, or separation from service. The applications of petitioners Petronilo Baguisa and Ever Guevarra were
approved and they were paid the appropriate separation pay. These successive events, followed by the promotion of
certain union officers to supervisory rank, caused apprehension in the labor association. They were considered as
harassment threatening the union members, and circumventing the employees security of tenure hence to strengthen
and neutralize managements arbitrary moves, the union held a snap election of officers wherein four of petitioners
were elected. Petitioner labor association then passed a resolution withdrawing the applications for retirement of all its
members. Later, petitioners Ernesto Marin, Reynaldo Fajardo and Victorino Carillo were compulsorily retired by
management. Erdie Javate was terminated from employment allegedly due to misappropriation of funds and
dishonesty. A complaint for illegal dismissal was thereafter filed. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioners.
Thereafter, herein private respondents elevated the case to respondent NLRC. They filed their appeal on December 28,
1992, and posted a surety bond on January 5, 1993. But herein petitioners filed an omnibus motion to dismiss on the
ground of late appeal, claiming that insufficient bond was filed by NEECO I only on January 5, 1993.
Issue: WoN appeal was perfected.
Ruling: Petitioners contend that although respondent NEECO I filed its appeal on December 28, 1992, such appeal was
not completed for failure to file the necessary supersedeas bond, during the period prescribed by law, or until January 4,
1993. Hence, no appeal was perfected.
Indisputable is the legal doctrine that the appeal of a decision involving a monetary award in labor cases may be
perfected "only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond." Also, the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary
period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional, and noncompliance with such legal requirement is fatal and
effectively renders the judgment final and executory. However, in a number of cases,

this Court relaxed the rule to
resolve controversies on the merits,

specifically, when there are special meritorious circumstances and issues.

We
relaxed the requirement of posting a supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal, when there was substantial
compliance with the rule, so that on balance, we made technical considerations to give way to equity and justice. In the
case before us, the decision of the labor arbiter was issued on December 21, 1992. Private respondents filed their appeal
on December 28, 1992, barely seven days from receipt thereof. The bonding company issued the bond dated January 4,
1993, the last day for filing an appeal. However, it was forwarded to respondent NLRC only on the following day, January
5, 1993. Considering these circumstances and the holiday season, we find it equitable to ease the rules and consider that
there was substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.

Star Angel vs. NLRC reduction of appeal bond
Facts: Private respondents Fribaldos filed a complaint against Star Angel Handicrafts for ID, underpayment of wages, OT
pay, premium pay for holidays and rest days, SIL pay and 13
th
month pay. By agreement, the Fibaldos were allowed to
report back for work, leaving the money claims for the determination of the LA. Private respondents filed their position
paper on April 20, but petitioner failed to submit one despite several directives issued to it to do so. On June 24, the case
was set for hearing, but petitioner's counsel failed to appear. Thus, the case was submitted for resolution. On August 19,
petitioner received a copy of the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter dated July 22, 1992. In the decision, the money
claims were resolved in favor of private respondents with Helen Fribaldos receiving an award of P45,347.00 and Jolito
Fribaldos an award of P48,125.00, or a total sum of P93,472.00. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the decision
of the Labor Arbiter. After the denial of the motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the NLRC with an Urgent
Motion to Reduce Bond. Without resolving the motion to reduce Bond, the NLRC dismissed the appeal of petitioner for
appellant's failure to put up a bond.
Issue: The pivotal issue raised by petitioner is whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it refused to
act on the motion to reduce the appeal bond and when it dismissed the appeal for failure of petitioner to post the
appeal bond.
Ruling: Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, an appeal to the NLRC from the decisions, awards or orders of the Labor
Arbiter must be made "within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders." Under Section
3(a) of Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the appeal fees must be paid and the memorandum of appeal
must be filed within the ten-day reglementary period. Neither the Labor Code nor its implementing rules specifically
provide for a situation where the appellant moves for a reduction of the appeal bond. Inasmuch as in practice the NLRC
allows the reduction of the appeal bond upon motion of appellant and on meritorious grounds, it follows that a motion
to that effect may be filed within the reglementary period for appealing. Such motion may be filed in lieu of a bond
which amount is being contested. In the meantime, the appeal is not deemed perfected and the Labor Arbiter retains
jurisdiction over the case until the NLRC has acted on the motion and appellant has filed the bond as fixed by the NLRC.
We have, heretofore, relaxed the requirement of the posting of an appeal bond as a condition for perfecting an appeal
under Article 223 of the Labor Code.

Aba vs. NLRC
Facts: Wilson Aba filed against Hda. Sta Ines and/or Alfonso Villegas a complaint for ID and other monetary claims. Aba
claimed that he worked for Hda. Sta Ines until his termination allegedly due to his union activities. Hda. Sta. Ines and
Villegas denied Aba's accusations and claimed that the latter was not even in their employ. To prove their point, they
copy of a complaint filed by Aba, this time against Hda. Fatima and/or Alfonso Villegas for underpayment of salaries. In
view of the overlapping periods of employment, Hda. Sta. Ines and Villegas concluded it was impossible for Aba to have
been employed simultaneously by Hda. Fatima and by Hda. Sta. Ines as he could not have served two (2) employers at
the same time, especially when these employers were 15 kilometers apart from each other. LA dismissed the case
holding that no E-E relationship exist. Nonetheless, upon verification of the appeal, it was shownthat Aba had failed to
pay the appeal docketing fee contrary to his assertion in the prefatory paragraph of his Memorandum of
Appeal. Consequently, the NLRC dismissed his appeal for non-payment of the appeal docketing fee.
Issue: Is delay in paying the appeal docketing fee fatal to petitioner's appeal?
Ruling: The petition is impressed with merit.

An appeal bond is necessary only in case of a judgment involving a
monetary award, in which case, the appeal may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond in the
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

In the instant case, it is undisputed that the
appeal was filed within the reglementary period. The memorandum of appeal contained an assignment of errors, the
arguments in support thereof, and the reliefs sought. No appeal bond was necessary as the decision being appealed did
not contain any monetary award. Nowhere is it written that payment of appeal docketing fee is necessary for the
perfection of the appeal. Therefore, there is no question that the appeal in the instant case has been perfected and the
failure to pay the appeal docketing fee is not fatal. Besides, it is settled jurisprudence that technical rules of evidence are
not binding in any proceedings before the Commission or any of the labor arbiters. It has been the policy of this Court to
resolve labor disputes with the view of compassionate justice towards working class.
As to the issue of the non-payment of the appeal fee on time, this Court held in Del Rosario & Sons
Logging Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC that "failure to pay the appeal docketing fee confers a directory and
not mandatory power to dismiss an appeal and such power must be exercised with a sound discretion
and with a great deal of circumspection considering all attendant circumstances." It is true that in Acda
v. Minister of Labor we said that the payment of the appeal fee is "by no means a mere technicality but
is an essential requirement in the perfection of an appeal." However, where as in this case the fee had
been paid belatedly, the broader interest of justice and the desired objective in deciding the case on the
merits demand that the appeal be given due course.
Significantly, Aba is even excused from paying dockets fees pursuant to Art. 277, par. (d), of the Labor Code which
provides that no docket fee shall be assessed in labor standards disputes,
15
and instant case is a labor standards dispute
as it involves not only the issue of illegal dismissal but also payment of legal holiday pay, premium pay on holiday and
rest day, service incentive leave pay, separation pay, salary and 13th month differentials.

UNITED PLACEMENT INTERNATIONAL, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LEONARDO ARAZAS, LIVY DACILLO and CESAR HERNANDEZ,
Facts : Private respondents, applied for overseas employment before Placementhaus and General Services, private
respondents were made to sign two-year employment contracts. Prior to their departure, in December of 1986, for
Dammam, Saudi Arabia, private respondents were each provided with a sealed envelope with the instruction that the
envelopes were to be opened only if and when required by the authorities to show their employment contracts at the
port of destination. After only a five-month stay in Saudi Arabia, or on 19 April 1986, private respondents' employment
contracts were pre-terminated, and they were sent back to the Philippines. Private respondents filed with the ("POEA")
their complaint for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of bonus and a refund of placement fees against Placementhaus and
the United Placement International. Trial ensued. While the case was pending with the POEA, petitioner moved its
offices from Suite 450 Padilla de los Reyes Bldg., 232 Juan Luna, Binondo, Manila, to the second floor of the C. Rivilla
Bldg., 115 Aguirre St., Legaspi Village, Makati, Metro Manila. The transfer was approved by Cecilia E. Curso, Chief of the
Licensing and Evaluation Department of the POEA, on 19 November 1986. On 18 July 1988, the POEA through then
Administrator Tomas Achacoso rendered decision in favor of the respondents. The POEA sent a copy of its decision to
petitioner by registered mail (Registered Letter No. 2432) at the latter's address of record (Binondo office). The post
office sent the registered mail notice on 04 August 1988. Two other notices were sent, one on 11 August 1988 and
another on 17 August 1988, to petitioner. On 17 September 1988, since the registered matter still remained unclaimed,
the post office returned the mail to the POEA.
Petitioner would now have this Court reverse the NLRC on the argument that since the transfer to the new address of
petitioner was sanctioned by the POEA itself, the date of service of the decision to the old address should not be
considered as the starting point of the ten-day reglementary period for appeal but as of 01 September 1989, or about a
year later, when petitioner received the decision "through the initiative of Luz R. Abad." Hence, petitioner asserted, the
appeal was timely filed on 11 September 1989.
Issue : WON NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners appeal for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period.
Ruling: The argument is bereft of merit. Petitioner's notice of change of address, duly acknowledged by the
POEA Licensing and Evaluation Department, was made in compliance with Section 12,
5
Rule II, Book II, of the 1985 POEA
Rules and Regulations. This Book deals with the licensing and regulation of participants in the overseas employment
program. It has nothing to do with the adjudication of complaints by overseas employees against recruitment agencies,
a matter separately treated in Book VI of the Rules. In the adjudication of such complaints, it is the hearing officer, the
government official charged with evaluating and recommending to the POEA Administrator the proper action in
adjudicatory cases, who has custody of the records.
6
In the discharge of his functions, the hearing officer acts on the
basis of the records before him. Even when a particular matter of interest, like a party's change of address, is furnished a
department of the POEA, the hearing officer would quite likely still be incognizant thereof; thus, such as it should be, he
must instead be bound by and act on the basis of what appears on record.
7
Notices of processes are also handled by
clerks who themselves must be guided by the records of the case. It is incumbent upon, and it behooves, the parties or
counsel to themselves make certain that all official communications, either by mail or personally, properly reach them at
their correct addresses,
8
a matter they can do by simply making that data of record
Petitioner's asseveration that it has been denied due process is not borne out by the records. Even before the
acknowledgment by POEA of the transfer to Makati of petitioner's offices, notices had already been sent to petitioner at
its Binondo office for the seven (7) hearing dates. It would appear that petitioner simply ignored the notices. Luz R. Abad
herself merely considered the complaint a "nuisance suit, more than anything else."
12
What the law proscribes is lack of
opportunity to be heard.
13
That opportunity, the Court is convinced, has sufficiently been accorded to petitioner.

ERNESTO S. DIZON, JR.
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SECOND DIVISION, HON. LABOR ARBITER VIRGINIA G. SON, AGUINALDO
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, JOSE G. RICAFORT, CONRADO T. CALALANG, EDGAR D. DE CASTRO and BENJAMIN V.
ARITAO.
Facts: Petitioner Ernesto S. Dizon, Jr. was an employee of respondent Aguinaldo Development Corporation (ADECOR for
short) serving as Assistant to the President. He worked for respondent company for about seventeen (17) years. On
February 1, 1982, petitioner filed a complaint seeking reinstatement to his former position and charging private
respondents with illegal dismissal. Petitioner alleges that respondent Ricafort allegedly ordered petitioner to tender his
written resignation. At the same time, Ricafort allegedly promised that if the petitioner would resign, he would be paid
all his entitlements and privileges, including backwages and salaries. The averments of petitioner were all denied by
private respondents. On the same day, petitioner prepared his letter of resignation stating that, as instructed by
Ricafort, petitioner was tendering his resignation from the company effective October 31, 1981. Respondent Ricafort
accepted petitioner's resignation in a memorandum dated October 30, 1981. However, said memorandum advised
petitioner that "pending completion and/or outcome of the investigations now being conducted regarding your
activities in the field, the issuance of your clearance, if ever warranted, will have to be held in abeyance. On November
4, 1981, petitioner withdrew his resignation. The withdrawal of the resignation was not given consideration; instead, in a
memorandum dated November 9, 1981, respondent Aritao referred him to respondent Ricafort's memorandum of
October 30, 1981 which accepted his resignation and declared that petitioner was no longer connected with the
company. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: WON the resignation of the petitioner was forced to resign, hence he was illegally dismissed.
Ruling: No. Verily, respondent commission cannot be faulted for holding that petitioner's resignation was voluntary.
Petitioner himself declared that he resigned on the basis of the alleged commitment of respondent Ricafort to pay him
the entitlements and benefits hereinbefore specified.
7
In fact, even conceding that respondent Ricafort asked him to
resign, it cannot be denied that petitioner was not forced to draft the two (2) letters of resignation; the contents thereof
and the terms therein were formulated personally by him. With petitioner's educational and professional background, it
would be absurd to assume that he did not understand the import of his own words and the consequences of his own
acts.
Additionally, the tenor of the letter withdrawing the resignation likewise reveals that such resignation was not against
his will but that he was withdrawing it only because of his alleged desire to "defend himself in connection with the
investigations consequent to his request for clearance. Thus, respondent commission was correct in observing that the
allegation of involuntariness was a mere afterthought "conceived only after his clearance was withheld and after the
substantial entitlements and privileges including unpaid salaries he expected to receive were denied."

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI)vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ELEANOR BARREDO
Facts: Since July 19, 1979 the private respondent Eleanor D. Barredo had been employed as Accounting Clerk at the RCPI
branch office in Roxas City since July 19, 1979. In June, 1983, she was extended a permanent appointment.On July 27,
1987, private respondent applied for sick leave of absence duly supported by a medical certificate. Having been advised
by her attending physician to rest for a period of from four to five months, she requested an extension of he sick leave of
absence on October 26, 1987.On December 12, 1987, she received a letter from Reynaldo Alovera, Net Control Manager
of RCPI, instructing her to report for duty. In reply, she explained that she could not as yet report for duty because her
physician found her not yet fit to resume working. RCPI reiterated its order, requiring her to report for work. When she
failed to comply, her employment was terminated on February 11, 1988.private respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal. In its position paper, RCPI claimed that Barredo's dismissal was for a valid cause. Since the two (2) medical
certificates submitted by her in support of her application for sick leave appeared to have been written by two (2)
different persons, the petitioner required her to report for work to enable the company physician to check and examine
her. Furthermore, the company physician who was consulted regarding Barredo's alleged ailment opined that the
latter's "length of absence due to allergic dermatitis is not in any medical knowledge compatible Petitioner gave Barredo
three (3) chances to report and submit herself for medical examination, but she did not comply. Her conduct was
considered by petitioner "reprehensible and constitute serious misconduct and/or willful disobedience to lawful orders
of her superior as will warrant her termination. Both labor arbiter and the NLRC finds for private respondent. Hence this
appeal.
Issue: WON RCPI had complied with the procedural requirements in the dismissal of barredo.
Ruling: No. The pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code mandate, to wit:
Sec. 1. Security of tenure and due process. No worker shall be dismissed except for a just or authorized
cause provided by law and after due process.
Sec. 2. Notice of dismissal. Any who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating
the particular act or omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of
work, the notice shall be served at the worker's last known address.
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. The worker may answer the allegations stated against him in the notice of
dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the worker
ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so
desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to
dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor. (Rule XIV, Book V, Rules and Regulations Implementing
the Labor Code; Emphasis supplied.)
These guidelines mandate that the employer should send the employee two (2) written notices of dismissal before a
termination of employment can be legally effected. These are: (1) the notice which apprises the employee of the
particular, acts omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of
the employer's decision to dismiss him. (National Service Corporation vs. NLRC,168 SCRA 122).
In the case at bar, RCPI did not comply with the above-stated guidelines in effecting Barredo's dismissal. Barredo was
never apprised nor given the chance to explain the charges filed against her. The three (3) notices sent to Barredo to
report for work and submit herself for physical examination by RCPI's physician did not constitute "in itself opportunity
to be heard.

JESUS B. DIAMONON vs.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, as the undersecretary of Labor;
MANASES 1T. CRUZ, in his capacity as the Med-Arbiter; ATTY. ZOILO DE LA CRUZ, JR., and MEMBERS OF THE
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF UNIONS IN THE SUGAR INDUSTRY OF THE PHILIPPINES (NACUSIP) and PHILIPPINE
AGRICULTURAL COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL WORLER'S UNION (PACIWU)
Facts: Petitioner served as the National Executive Vice President of (NACUSIP) and Vice President for Luzon of the
(PACIWU). Petitioner learned of his removal from the positions he held in both unions in a resolution approved during a
meeting of the National Executive Boards of both unions.
On April 22, 1991, petitioner sought reconsideration of the resolution on his removal. At the same time, he initiated a
complaint before the DOLE against the National President of NACUSIP and PACIWU, private respondent Atty. Zoilo V. de
la Cruz, Jr., and the members of the National Executive Boards of NACUSIP and PACIWU questioning the validity of his
removal from the positions he held in the two unions. Public respondent Laguesma, acting as the then Undersecretary of
DOLE, decided on the case and issued a Resolution declaring his removal from the positions be held. In view of the
adverse order. Hence this appeal.
Issue: WON the dismissal of the case of the public respondent is valid pursuant to non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
Ruling: Yes. Generally, an appellate court may only pass upon errors assigned.
25
However, this rule is not without
exceptions.
26
In the following instances,
27
the Supreme Court ruled that an appellate court is accorded a broad
discretionary power to waive the lack of assignment of errors and consider errors not assigned:
(a) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter;
(b) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of
law;
(c) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just decision
and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interests of a justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal
justice;
(d) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of record
having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower court ignored;
(e) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned;
(f) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly assigned,
is dependent.
There is no reason why this rule should not apply to administrative bodies as well, like the case before us, for the instant
controversy falls squarely under the exceptions to the general rule.
In the instant case, not only did petitioner fail to comply with Section 2, Rule VIII, Book V of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code as amended
28
but also the record reveals that neither did he exhaust the remedies
29
set
forth by the Constitution and by-laws of both unions. In the National Convention of PACIWU and NACUSIP held on
August 10 and 11, 1991, respectively, nothing was heard of petitioner's complaint against private respondents on the
latter's alleged unauthorized and illegal disbursement of union funds. In fact, what the National Convention resolved
was to approve and adopt the resolution of the National Executive Board removing petitioner from the positions he
held.
30
His failure to seek recourse before the National Convention on his complaint against private respondents taints
his action with prematurity.1wphi1
When the Constitution and by-laws of both unions dictated the remedy for intra-union dispute, such as petitioner's
complaint against private respondents for unauthorized or illegal disbursement of unions funds, this should be resorted
to before recourse can be made to the appropriate administrative or judicial body, not only to give the grievance
machinery or appeals' body of the union the opportunity to decide the matter by itself, but also to prevent unnecessary
and premature resort to administrative or judicial bodies. Thus, a party with an administrative remedy must not merely
initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before
seeking judicial intervention.
31
This rule clearly applies to the instant case. The underlying principle of the rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies rests on the presumption that when the administrative body, or grievance
machinery, as in this case, is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly.
32
Petitioner's
premature invocation of public respondent's intervention is fatal to his cause of action.
33

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.

The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga.
Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on
February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his
name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly
misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR). .Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and,
therefore, his office had no jurisdiction over the case.
Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC .On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a
resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate
proceedings.
5
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated
August 18, 1997 for lack of merit,
6
hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion.

Issue:

Whether or not decisions of NLCR must first be reviewed by the Court of Appeals before the Supreme Court may
take cognizance of the same in view of the hierarchy of courts.

On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same to take effect six months after its
promulgation.
8
Created and regulated therein is the present NLRC which was attached to the Department of Labor and
Employment for program and policy coordination only.
9
Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an
aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391
subsequently amended said provision and abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then been provided
for.
Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals from the decision of the
NLRC.
10
The present Section 223, as last amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that the
Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and that such decision
shall be final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.
When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of
the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court
nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such
agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of
judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the
parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls
arbitrary and unjust adjudications.
11

Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to
timely file a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy,
12
and then seasonably
avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65,
13
for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of
sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may
already have lapsed as contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still take
cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed within the reglementary
period under Rule 65.
14
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the
Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or
specifically referred to therein except, among others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ."
This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the
NLRC.
17
Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court
of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of Appeals has no appellate
jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These
cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However,
because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and
Congress could not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any other court
for that matter.
A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us that there may have been an
oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine,
Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court,
but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. This conclusion which we have
reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been drawn from the considerations extant in the records of Congress, more
particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452.
18

The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were
eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for
judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the instances we have
noted could have been a lapsusplumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both
modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however, and with
which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action ofcertiorari is within the concurrent original
jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals;
23
whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to
the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the
sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the wisdom of a law, on this score we
add the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being
a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous
factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the increased number
of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a
major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme
Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all
such petitions should hence forth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the
hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.
Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in accordance with their hierarchical order, this
pronouncement in Santiago vs. Vasquez, et al.
25
should be taken into account:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that
matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the hierarchy of
courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the
lower courts in the exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought therein.
This practice must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because
of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be
remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to
resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not
entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent
records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent
with the views and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

REBECCA R. VELOSO, petitioner,
vs.
CHINA AIRLINES, LTD., K.Y. CHANG and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), respondent.

Petitioner was employed as supervisor of the ticketing section at the Manila branch office of respondent China Airlines
Ltd. (CAL). CAL decided to permanently close said ticketing section. Thus, on November 5, 1986, petitioner and her staff
members were informed that their recent lay-off from employment will be considered permanent, effective one month
from receipt of such notice. A notice of said retrenchment was filed with the labor department on November 11, 1986.
On July 1, 1987, petitioner filed with the Arbitration Branch of NLRC a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement, payment of backwages, damages and attorney's fees.
1
In a decision dated June
8, 1990, the labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner.
Dissatisfied with the above judgment, private respondents appealed to the NLRC which in its resolution dated January 2,
1992, set aside the decision of the labor arbiter..
Petitioner received copy of the aforesaid resolution of public respondent on January 7, 1992.
4
However, instead of filing
the required motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari. In doing so, petitioner boldly
avers that a recourse to the NLRC via a motion for reconsideration is futile and will only injure further her rights to a
speedy and unbiased judgment of the case. She did not expect the labor tribunal to rectify itself.
ISSUE: WON the petition is proper.
RULING: No. This precipitate filing of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without first moving for reconsideration
of the assailed resolution warrants the outright dismissal of this case. As we have consistently held in numerous
cases,
5
a motion for reconsideration is indispensable, for it affords the NLRC an opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes
it might have committed before resort to the courts can be had.It is settled that certiorari will lie only if there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against acts of public
respondent.
6
In this case, the plain and adequate remedy expressly provided by law is a motion for reconsideration of
the impugned resolution, to be made under oath and filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the questioned resolution
of the NLRC, a procedure which is jurisdictional.
7
Hence, the filing of the petition for certiorari in this case is patently
violative of prevailing jurisprudence and will not prosper without undue damage to the fundamental doctrine that
undergirds the grant of this prerogative writ.Further, it should be stressed that without a motion for reconsideration
seasonably filed within the ten-day reglementary period, an order, decision or resolution of the NLRC, becomes final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof.

MARIETTA SALDANA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Petitioner Marietta Saldana was charged with the crime of estafa under the following information:
That on or about and during the periods comprised of from April, 1982 to December, 1983 in the Municipality of Pasig,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then a
Collecting Officer of the Valle Verde BagongLipunan Community Association, Inc., represented by Miguel Roberto and
Mercedes Tan, President and Director, respectively, and as such, she was authorized to collect from the members of the
association payments representing their amortization dues and other association fees, received from the members the
amount of P642,538.00 with the obligation on the part of the accused to remit said collections to the said association,
but the accused once in possession of the said amount, far from complying with her obligation, with unfaithfulness and
abuse of confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert to her
own personal use and benefit the amount of P642,538.00 and despite demands to remit and/or turn over the said
collections, she failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the offended
party in the aforementioned amount of P642,538.00. (
ISSUE: Where the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of the prosecution's evidence and forthwith
dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence, may the case be remanded for further proceedings?
RULING: The prosecution's failure to file a motion for reconsideration in the trial court before commencing
certiorari proceedings in the Court of Appeals, was not fatal to the petition for this rule does not apply "where the
proceeding in which the error occurred is a patent nullity," or "where the deprivation of petitioner's fundamental right
to due process taints the proceedings against him in the court below not only with irregularly but nullity," or "when
special circumstances warrant immediate and more direct action" (Matute vs. CA, 26 SCRA 768). Since the prosecution
was deprived of due process, the case is an exception to the rule requiring a previous motion for reconsideration before
a petition for certiorari may be filed.
The order of the Court of Appeals reinstating the criminal case for further hearing by the trial court does not violate the
rule on double jeopardy. One of the elements of double jeopardy is a competent court. The trial court in this case was
ousted from its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process by aborting its right to complete
the presentation of its evidence. Hence, the first jeopardy had not been terminated. The remand of the case for further
hearing or trial is merely a continuation of the first jeopardy. It does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy
(People vs. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166).
HINDI NAMAN LABOR CASE ITO..PROCEDURE ITO EH AT CONSTI..HAHA

ANGEL JARDIN, DEMETRIO CALAGOS, URBANO MARCOS, ROSENDO MARCOS, LUIS DE LOS ANGELES, JOEL ORDENIZA
and AMADO CENTENO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) and GOODMAN TAXI (PHILJAMA INTERNATIONAL,
INC.) respondents.
Petitioners were drivers of private respondent, Philjama International Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the
operation of "Goodman Taxi." Petitioners used to drive private respondent's taxicabs every other day on a 24-hour work
schedule under the boundary system. Under this arrangement, the petitioners earned an average of P400.00 daily.
Nevertheless, private respondent admittedly regularly deducts from petitioners, daily earnings the amount of P30.00
supposedly for the washing of the taxi units. Believing that the deduction is illegal, petitioners decided to form a labor
union to protect their rights and interests.
Upon learning about the plan of petitioners, private respondent refused to let petitioners drive their taxicabs when they
reported for work on August 6, 1991, and on succeeding days. Petitioners suspected that they were singled out because
they were the leaders and active members of the proposed union. Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the labor arbiter a
complaint against private respondent for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and illegal deduction of washing fees. In a
decision
3
dated August 31, 1992, the labor arbiter dismissed said complaint for lack of merit.
On appeal, the NLRC (public respondent herein), in a decision dated April 28, 1994, reversed and set aside the judgment
of the labor arbiter. The labor tribunal declared that petitioners are employees of private respondent, and, as such, their
dismissal must be for just cause and after due process.
Private respondent's first motion for reconsideration was denied. Remaining hopeful, private respondent filed another
motion for reconsideration. This time, public respondent, in its decision
5
dated October 28, 1994, granted aforesaid
second motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES: 1) WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting
the second motion for reconsideration of the private respondent.
2) WON there exist employer-employee relationship between taxi operator and taxi drivers.
RULING: 1)YES. In this case before us, private respondent exhausted administrative remedy available to it by
seeking reconsideration of public respondent's decision dated April 28, 1994, which public respondent denied. With this
motion for reconsideration, the labor tribunal had ample opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it may have
committed before resort to courts of justice can be had.
14
Thus, when private respondent filed a second motion for
reconsideration, public respondent should have forthwith denied it in accordance with Rule 7, Section 14 of its New
Rules of Procedure which allows only one motion for reconsideration from the same party, thus:
Sec. 14. Motions for Reconsideration. Motions for reconsideration of any order, resolution or decision of the
Commission shall not be entertained except when based on palpable or patent errors, provided that the motion is under
oath and filed within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the order, resolution or decision with proof of service that a
copy of the same has been furnished within the reglementary period the adverse party and provided further, that only
one such motion from the same party shall be entertained. [Emphasis supplied]
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the second motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent is indubitably a
prohibited pleading
16
which should have not been entertained at all. Public respondent cannot just disregard its own
rules on the pretext of "satisfying the ends of justice",
17
especially when its disposition of a legal controversy ran afoul
with a clear and long standing jurisprudence in this jurisdiction as elucidated in the subsequent discussion. Clearly,
disregarding a settled legal doctrine enunciated by this Court is not a way of rectifying an error or mistake. In our view,
public respondent gravely abused its discretion in taking cognizance and granting private respondent's second motion
for reconsideration as it wrecks the orderly procedure in seeking reliefs in labor cases.
2) YES. In a number of cases decided by this Court,
19
we ruled that the relationship between jeepney
owners/operators on one hand and jeepney drivers on the other under the boundary system is that of employer-
employee and not of lessor-lessee. We explained that in the lease of chattels, the lessor loses complete control over the
chattel leased although the lessee cannot be reckless in the use thereof, otherwise he would be responsible for the
damages to the lessor. In the case of jeepney owners/operators and jeepney drivers, the former exercise supervision
and control over the latter. The management of the business is in the owner's hands. The owner as holder of the
certificate of public convenience must see to it that the driver follows the route prescribed by the franchising authority
and the rules promulgated as regards its operation. Now, the fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get
only that in excess of the so-called "boundary" they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the
relationship between them from that of employer and employee. We have applied by analogy the abovestated doctrine
to the relationships between bus owner/operator and bus conductor,
20
auto-calesa owner/operator and driver,
21
and
recently between taxi owners/operators and taxi drivers.
22
Hence, petitioners are undoubtedly employees of private
respondent because as taxi drivers they perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business
or trade of their employer.

JOHNSON G. CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Third Division) and JESUS G. CHUA, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondents are brothers running the family corporation, City Air International Brokerage
Corporation. Private respondent Jesus Chua is the president while petitioner Johnson Chua is the vice president.
Johnson filed complaint w/ NLRC for illegal dismissal and recovery of unpaid wages. Labor Arbiter ruled in favor Johnson
ordering City Air and Jesus Chua in solidum to pay Johnson his unpaid wages. NLRC affirmed Labor Arbiter.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held personally liable for the unpaid wages of the private respondent. He contends
that the corporation alone, which has a personality separate and distinct from its members or stockholders, should be
the one held liable for corporate obligations.
ISSUE: Can the vice-president (Johnson Chua) be held jointly and severally liable with the corporation for the unpaid
wages of the company's former president (Jesus Chua)?
HELD: Yes. It was correct for Jesus Chua to have impleaded petitioner Johnson since Johnson, as the VP, was the highest
ranking official of the company after respondent Jesus, as the President, resigned. , There should be an officer directly
responsible for the failure to pay the wages of the corporation's president. Moreover, petitioner showed personal
interest in the case despite the fact that a new corporate president had been elected. Since the records fail to show that
the petitioner was authorized by the corporation to pursue or defend the case filed against it by the private respondent
and yet the petitioner personally acted in the case and showed keen interest in its progress, he must be held responsible
for its outcome.
No reversible error committed by the NLRC in applying Article 289 (this is now Art 295) of the Labor Code which
provides:
Art. 289. Who are liable when committed by other than natural person. If the offense is committed by a corporation,
trust, firm, partnership, association or any other entity, the penalty shall be imposed upon the guilty officer or officers of
such corporation, trust, firm, partnership, association or entity.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (4th Division), and RAUL G. DIAMANTE, respondents.
FACTS: Pineda, along w/ others, went to Bacolod Airport to have their tickets booked for their flight to Manila. Through
references (may contact si ganito kay ganito), Pineda was introduced to private respondent Diamante, who works for
PAL as Integrated Ticket Representative. Pineda requested Diamante to book them for Apr 8 flight especially yung isang
kasama nila na may important meeting sa Manila. Diamante said all flights for the week were booked so he suggested na
ibigay nina Pineda ang ticket nila kay Diamante para magawan niya ng paraan. After receipt of P1k, Diamante assured
Pineda, etc. that they will be accommodated. In the end, sina Pineda and friends ay nakauwi naman ng matiwasay sa
Manila.
Upon arrival in Manila, Pineda executed an affidavit charging Diamante with bribery/corruption. PALs Bacolod Branch
Manager required Diamante to comment on the affidavit. Diamante submitted his sworn statement denying the
allegations against him. After evaluation of the complaint and finding the explanation of Diamante insufficient, PAL's
manager charged Diamante administratively with bribery/extortion and violation of PAL's Code of Discipline.
Nagbuo ng adhoc committee ang PAL for investigation. Nagkaroon ng investigation. Diamante was represented by
counsel and PALEA (union). Sa hearing, it was agreed that Diamante will be given the opportunity to confront Pineda but
no such confrontation occurred. And after several postponements of the hearing, the committee resolved the case with
evidence on record. Diamante then received notice of dismissal. O syempre nag-file si Diamante ng complaint for illegal
dismissal, reinstatement with backwages. Labor Arbiter declared dismissal legal and valid but NLRC set aside Labor
Arbiters decision and ordered reinstatement of Diamante with backwages. PAL appealed syempre.
ISSUE: whether Diamante was illegally dismissed which would entitle him to reinstatement with backwages
HELD: No. In general, management has the prerogative to discipline its employees and to impose appropriate penalties
on erring workers pursuant to company rules and regulations. (Obvious naman di ba na na-follow ng PAL ang due
process requirements.)
With respect to the procedural aspect of private respondent's dismissal, he was given ample opportunity to present his
side and to defend himself against the charges against him. He had every opportunity to be heard. Petitioner sent a
letter to respondent, requiring him to answer the charges against him. He participated in the investigation conducted by
the company and he appeared with his counsel. After investigation, he was notified of his dismissal. The fact that
respondent Diamante was not able to confront Pineda did not mean that he was deprived of his right to due process.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one's side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due
process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy.
Since private respondent's dismissal was for just and valid cause, the order of public respondent for the reinstatement of
private respondent with award of backwages has no factual and legal basis.

EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (EMAPALICO) AND NAPOLEON
CAPARAS, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
(PHILAMLIFE), respondents.
FACTS: Labor Arbiter ordered Philippine American Life Insurance Co. to reinstate Caparas to his original position as
accounting clerk or any equivalent position with backwages from date of termination to actual reinstatement. NLRC
affirmed but on motion for reconsideration NLRC ordered payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement on
grounds of estranged relations/antagonism between employer and employee and no showing that a same or an
equivalent position is available to Caparas.
ISSUE: whether Caparas is entitled to reinstatement, assuming this is possible, or only to back wages and separation pay
from the respondent company.
HELD: Entitled to reinstatement and not simply given separation pay and backwages. SC reinstated Labor Arbiters
decision.
While there is no denying that relations between Caparas and the company have been strained, it is not of such serious
nature or degree that would preclude Caparas reinstatement. Ang hinala ng SC, ayaw i-reinstate si Caparas dahil head
sya ng union (EMPALICO). Madami kasing inire-reklamo tong si Caparas but SC held that Caparas was only acting as any
responsible union president would and he was not merely reacting as an individual but he was expressing the official
position and opposition of EMPALICO. If by doing all these, a union president should be considered to have irremediably
strained his relations with management, he can then, following the respondent's theory, be separated for this reason by
management, subject only to the grant to him of separation pay. This is a dangerous doctrine that would seriously
imperil the cause of unionism.
Respondents argue that Caparas' reinstatement is no longer possible because his former position has been abolished
and there is no comparable position to which he can now be appointed. But SC said Caparas was occupying an ordinary
clerical position, not a top executive post for which an equivalent office may indeed be difficult to find. Considering the
size of Philamlife, it is not believable that not a single position similar to Caparas's abolished position was available, let
alone the fact that he was the President of the EMAPALICO and as such perhaps deserved a little extra accommodation.
The Court cannot help wondering if it was precisely because of his status as union head that he was denied such
accommodation.
In the case at bar, we find that the evidence of record does not support the conclusion of the NLRC that the relations of
the employee and management have been so seriously strained as to prevent the former's reinstatement. We also
reject the plea that there is absolutely no other position in the whole organization of Philamlife to which Caparas can be
appointed to restore to him his original compensation and seniority.

ALFREDO CANUTO, JR. and ROMEO DE LA CORTE, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and COLGATE PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
FACTS: Petitioners work for respondent company (Canuto as statistical quality supervisor, De La Corte as production
foreman). Colgate terminated petitioners for loss of confidence for they were found to be involved in a scheme to
defraud the company (the plot consisted of an attempt to induce the company to purchase several drums of perfume
used in the manufacture of its toilet soaps and shampoos. The deception was that Colgate already owned the drums of
perfume). The plot was uncovered when Colgates Manufacturing Director, William Christopher, received two (2)
confidential letters detailing the anomaly. An investigation resulted, leading to the entrapment of the malefactors,
among whom were petitioners. Notice of termination signed by Colgate officers were served on petitioners.
Petitioners filed complaint for illegal termination. Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioners. NLRC overruled Labor
Arbiter and declared that petitioners were dismissed for just cause but ordered Colgate to pay petitioners indemnity
(Php1k) because of Colgates failure to accord petitioners due process.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners were illegally dismissed.
HELD: Ewan. SC dismissed the case on the ground of forum shopping. There is no doubt that at the time the complaint
for illegal dismissal was filed, there was already pending before the regular courts another action involving substantially
the same issues.
Ang nangyari kasi dito, petitioners filed illegal dismissal complaint before the Labor Arbiter. After that, nag-file uli sila ng
complaint for damages against Colgate officers, who signed the termination papers, with the RTC. So ang sabi ng SC:
It is material that the issues and causes of action involved in both actions revolve around the legality of their dismissal.
From the very same act of termination, petitioners seek damages either from herein respondent which they claim
unlawfully fired them, or failing that, from respondents officers whom they claim terminated them without the sanction
of the company. Both claims are, quite obviously, contradictory, which only underscores their attempt to canvass for a
friendly forum, namely, that if their claim is defeated in the regular court, then they would attempt to prevail in the
labor tribunal, or vice versa.

PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC., vs.HONORABLE ACTING SECRETARY OF LABOR JOSE BRILLANTES and PHIMCO INDUSTRIES
LABOR ASSOCIATION
FACTS: On March 9, 1995, the private respondent, Phimco Industries Labor Association (PILA), duly certified collective
bargaining representative of the daily paid workers of the petitioner PHIMCO filed a notice of strike with the NCMB
against PHIMCO, a corporation engaged in the production of matches, after a deadlock in the collective bargaining and
negotiation. Parties failed to resolve their differences PILA (during the conciliation conferences), composed of
352 members, staged a strike. PHIMCO sent notice of termination to some 47 workers including several union officers.
Secretary Brillantes assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute; issued a return-to-work order. Hence, petitioner files
this petition.
ISSUE: whether or not the public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in assuming jurisdiction over subject labor dispute.
HELD: YES, the petition is impressed with merit.
Art. 263, paragraph (g) of the Labor Code, provides:
(g) When, in his opinion, there exist a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute
and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration . . .
The Labor Code vests in the Secretary of Labor the discretion to determine what industries are indispensable to the
national interest. Accordingly, upon the determination by the Secretary of Labor that such industry is indispensable to
the national interest, he will assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in the said industry. This power, however, is not
without any limitation. The limitation set by the legislature on the power of the Secretary of Labor to assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute, is being limited to strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest. While
the case at bar appears on its face not to fall within the strict categorization of cases imbued with national interest,
this office believes that the obtaining circumstances warrant the exercise of the powers under Article 263 (g) of the
Labor Code, as amended. The private respondent did not even make any effort to touch on the indispensability of the
match factory to the national interest. It must have been aware that a match factory, though of value, can scarcely be
considered as an industry indispensable to the national interest as it cannot be in the same category as generation
and distribution of energy, or those undertaken by banks, hospitals, and export-oriented industries. Yet, the public
respondent assumed jurisdiction thereover. To uphold the action of the public respondent under the premises would be
stretching too far the power of the Secretary of Labor as every case of a strike or lockout where there are
inconveniences in the community, or work disruptions in an industry though not indispensable to the national interest,
would then come within the Secretarys power. It would be practically allowing the Secretary of Labor to intervene in
any Labor dispute at his pleasure. This is precisely why the law sets and defines the standard: even in the exercise of his
power of compulsory arbitration under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary must follow the law.
PETITION GRANTED.

FRANCISCO GUICO vs. HON. LEONARDO QUISIMBING et. al.
FACTS: The case started when the Office of the Regional Director, Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Region
I, San Fernando, La Union, received a letter-complaint dated April 25, 1995, requesting for an investigation of
petitioner's establishment, Copylandia Services & Trading, for violation of labor standards laws. Pursuant to the visitorial
and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representative under Article
128 of the Labor Code, as amended, inspections were conducted at Copylandia's outlets on April 27 and May 2, 1995.
The inspections yielded the following violations involving twenty-one (21) employees who are copier operators: (1)
underpayment of wages; (2) underpayment of 13th month pay; and (3) no service incentive leave with pay.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction over the labor standards case.
HELD: Yes. The Court sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent Secretary. As the respondent correctly pointed out,
this Court's ruling in Servando case that the visitorial power of the Secretary of Labor to order and enforce compliance
with labor standard laws cannot be exercised where the individual claim exceeds P5,000.00, can no longer be applied in
view of the enactment of R.A. No. 7730 amending Article 128(b) of the Labor Code.
Moreover, the records of the House of Representatives show that Congressmen Alberto S. Veloso and Eriberto V. Loreto
sponsored the law. In his sponsorship speech, Congressman Veloso categorically declared that "this bill seeks to do away
with the jurisdictional limitations imposed through said ruling (referring to Servando) and to finally settle any lingering
doubts on the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor and Employment." Thus, petitioner's reliance
on Servando is untenable.

SSK Parts Corporation vs Teodorico Camas
FACTS: Several cases were filed against the petitioner involving illegal deductions complained by Teodorico Camas,
underpayment of wages, non-payment of legal holiday pay and service incentive leave filed by the union in behalf of its
members and for non-payment of employees service incentive leave, underpayment of allowance, overtime pay,
premium pay and non-payment of 2 regular holidays in December which were discovered upon routine inspection
conducted by the labor regulation officers. Upon submission of position papers and evidence the Regional Director
resolved the cases in favor of the respondents. However, the petitioner appeal to the Secretary of Labor but was
dismissed hence, this petition for certiorari with one of the allegations that he is denied of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due process.
HELD: No. The petitioner actively participated in the proceedings a quo by filing its answer to the complaint, presenting
a position paper to the Regional Director, submitting evidence in support of its claim and appealing the decision of the
latter to the Secretary of Labor. Each of these steps was a part and parcel of its right of due process. Therefore, there is
no reason to complain that he was denied of due process.

28 Abalos vs. Philex Mining
Facts: A manpower audit conducted by respondent Philex, for brevity, revealed that 241 of its employees were
redundant. Thus, Philex undertook a retrenchment program that resulted in the termination of petitioners
employment effective June 30, 1993. Consequently, petitioners filed a case for illegal dismissal against respondent. The
case was submitted for arbitration through a submission agreement coursed through the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board, Cordillera Administrative Region, Baguio City. The Voluntary Abritrator decided in favor of the labor,
reinstating the complainants and intervenors to their former positions with back wages without loss of seniority and
privileges. Philex Mining appealed to the CA and denied their petition for lack of merit. Philex Mining, however, filed a
manifestation and motion for leave to offer separation pay to petitioners, in lieu of reinstatement, before the Office of
Voluntary Arbitrator. The Voluntary Arbitrator modified his previous decision and only decided for the payment of
separation pay and backwages. Petitioners now appealed to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not, the voluntary arbitrator still has jurisdiction to modify his previous decision notwithstanding the
fact that it is already final and executory.
Ruling: Yes. A basic tenet in our rules of procedure is that an award that is final and executory cannot be amended or
modified anymore. Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted
to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. However, this rule is subject to exceptions. One
exception is that where facts and/or events transpire after a decision has become executory, which facts and/or events
present a supervening cause or reason which renders the final and executory decision no longer enforceable. Under the
law, the court may modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances
transpire rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring
such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory.

29 Maternity Childrens Hospital v Sec of Labor

Issue: Whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling: Yes. Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises both visitorial and enforcement power over labor
standards cases, and is therefore empowered to adjudicate money claims, provided there still exists an employer-
employee relationship, and the findings of the regional office is not contested by the employer concerned.
The Regional Director also correctly applied the award with respect to those employees who signed the complaint, as
well as those who did not sign the complaint, but were still connected with the hospital at the time the complaint was
filed.

30 Odin Security Agency vs. Dela Serna
Facts: On July 8, 1986, a complaint was filed by Sergio Apilado and fifty-five (55) others charging the petitioner Odin
Security Agency (hereafter "OSA"), underpayment of wages, illegal deductions, non-payment of night shift differential,
overtime pay, premium pay for holiday work, rest days and Sundays, service incentive leaves, vacation and sick leaves,
and 13th-month pay. Petitioner, on the other hand, contended that on July 21, 1986, some 48 security guards
threatened mass action against it. Alarmed by a possible abandonment of post by the guards and mindful of its
contractual obligations to its clients/principals, petitioner relieved and re-assigned the complaining guards to other
posts in Metro Manila. Those relieved were ordered to report to the agency's main office for reassignment. Only few
complied, so those who failed to comply were placed on "AWOL" status. Petitioner claimed it complied with the Labor
Code provisions, and in support thereof, it submitted the "Quitclaim and Waiver" of thirty-four (34) complainants. It
further alleged that complainants who rendered over-time work as shown by their time sheets were paid accordingly;
that service incentive leaves not availed of, night shift differential, rest days, and holidays were paid in cash. There were
however, seventeen (17) complainants who repudiated their quitclaim and waiver. But they alleged that management
pressured them to sign documents which they were not allowed to read and that if such waiver existed, they did not
have any intention of waiving their rights under the law. The Regional Diretor then decided petitioner to pay 16 guards
out of 17 their corresponding awards. The complaining guards filed a motion for reconsideration which was treated by
Usec. Dela Serna as an appeal. Usec. Dela Serna then decided and modified the earlier decision of the Regional Director
making the 16 guards to only 15. The petitioner then filed a petition for review in the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process of law, both substantive and procedural and Whether or
not both the Regional Director and the Undersecretary has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling: The petitioner was not denied due process for several hearings were in fact conducted by the hearing officer of
the Regional Office of the DOLE and the parties submitted position papers upon which the Regional Director based his
decision in the case. There is abundant jurisprudence to the effect that the requirements of due process are satisfied
when the parties are given an opportunity to submit position papers. What the fundamental law abhors is not the
absence of previous notice but rather the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. here is no denial of due process
where a party is given an opportunity to be heard and present his case. The petitioner is also estopped from questioning
the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the Regional Director over the private respondents' claims. Petitioner submitted to the
jurisdiction of the Regional Director by taking part in the hearings before him and by submitting a position paper. The
fact is, the Regional Director and the Undersecretary did have jurisdiction over the private respondents' complaint which
was originally for violation of labor standards (Art. 128[b], Labor Code). Only later did the guards ask for backwages on
account of their alleged constructive dismissal. Once vested, that jurisdiction continued until the entire controversy was
decided.

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LLB 2-1. The Leftists. Magugulong Magagandat Pogi sa Left Side.

Rubberworld and Yao Ong v. NLRC

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