Descartes on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities

C. P. Ragland
Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 44, Number 3, July 2006,
pp. 377-394 (Article)
Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI: 10.1353/hph.2006.0049
For additional information about this article
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377 descartes on alternati ve possi bi li ti es
Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 44, no. 3 (2006) 37794
[377]
Descartes on the Principle of
Alternative Possibilities
C . P. R A G L A N D *
descartes certainly believed in free will, but it is far from clear how he un-
derstood the nature of freedom. This paper aims to clarify Descartess view of
freedom to some extent by determining whether he accepted the principle of
alternative possibilities (PAP).
1
According to PAP, doing something freely implies
being able to do otherwise; freedom consists in a two-way power to do or not do.
Commentators do not agree about Descartess relation to PAP: some suggest that
he never accepted it,
2
others that he did so only in later texts;
3
and still others
that he accepted it throughout his career.
4
Commentators also disagree about
whether or not PAP conicts with other things Descartes says about freedom
(thus some accuse Descartes of incoherence).
5
Here I will argue that Descartes
* C. P. Ragland is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Saint Louis University.
1
This terminology follows Harry Frankfurt, Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,
Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969), 82939.
2
See Anthony Kenny, Descartes on the Will, in Cartesian Studies, ed. R. J. Butler (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1972), 131; and Jean-Marie Beyssade, La Philosophie Premire de Descartes: Le temps et la co-
hrence de la mtaphysique (Paris: Flammarion, 1979), 177214.
3
See Etienne Gilson, La libert chez Descartes et la thologie [La libert] (Paris: Alcan, 1913), 31019;
Alexander Boyce Gibson, The Philosophy of Descartes (London: Methuen, 1932), 33239; and Michelle
Beyssade, Descartess Doctrine of Freedom: Differences between the French and Latin Texts of the
Fourth Meditation [Descartess Doctrine], in Reason, Will, and Sensation: Studies in Descartess Meta-
physics, ed. John Cottingham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 191206.
4
See S. V. Keeling, Descartes (London: Ernest Benn, 1934), 18690; Lucien Laberthonnire,
tudes sur Descartes in Oeuvres de Laberthonnire, vol. 1 (Paris: J. Vrin, 1935) 41831; Jean Laporte, La
libert selon Descartes, Revue de Mtaphysique et de Morale 44 (1937): 10164; Jean-Marc Gabaude,
Libert et raison (La libert cartsienne et sa rfraction chez Spinoza et chez Leibniz), Vol. I: Philosophie rexive
de la volont (Toulouse: Association des publications de la facult des lettres et sciences humanines de
Toulouse, 1970), 16197; Robert Imlay, Descartes and Indifference, Studia Leibnitiana 14 (1982):
8797; Georges J. D. Moyal, The Unity of Descartes Conception of Freedom [Unity], International
Studies in Philosophy 19 (1987): 3351; James Petrik, Descartes Theory of the Will (Durango, CO: Hol-
lowbrook Publishing, 1992); and Joseph Keim Campbell, Descartes on Spontaneity, Indifference,
and Alternatives [Descartes on Spontaneity], in New Essays on the Rationalists, ed. Rocco J. Gennaro
and Charles Huenemann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17999.
5
On the basis of Descartess apparent wafing on PAP, Gilson concluded that he had no real
theory of freedom, but simply told various interlocutors what they wanted to hear. Focusing on problems
regarding PAP, Imlay and Laberthonnire accuse Descartes of holding an incoherent theory
378 j ournal of the hi story of phi losophy 44: 3 j uly 2006
embraced PAP throughout his career in a way that coheres with his other main
claims about freedom.
In what follows, I examine each of Descartess main texts on freedom in chrono-
logical order: the Meditations (1641), the Principles (1644), and the two letters to
Mesland (164445). Each of these works, read in isolation, is best interpreted as
endorsing PAP.
6
Joined together and read in light of one another, they make it
virtually certain that Descartes believed in PAP throughout his career.
But rst, a disclaimer. Philosophers who agree that freedom requires alterna-
tive possibilities may still disagree about whether such alternatives are compatible
with determinism. The incompatibilists among them say that if our every choice
were predetermined, we could never choose otherwise and hence would not be
free. The compatibilists claim that there is more than one sense of could have
done otherwise, and that the sense of could have done otherwise. . . denied
by determinism is irrelevant to the sense required for freedom.
7
My goal in this
paper is simply to establish that Descartes uniformly endorsed PAP. With respect
to exactly how he understood PAPs relation to determinism, I explore some op-
tions, but leave the question open.
1 . me d i t a t i o n s o n f i r s t p h i l o s o p h y
In the Fourth Meditation, Descartes denes the will as follows:
. . . [i] the will, or freedom of choice . . . simply consists in this: that we are able to
do or not do (that is, to afrm or deny, to pursue or avoid); [ii] or rather [vel potius],
simply in this: that we are carried in such a way toward what the intellect proposes for
afrmation or denial or for pursuit or avoidance, that we feel ourselves determined
to it by no external force. (AT 7:57 / CSM 2:40)
8
This passage contains two important claims. First, the opening seems straightfor-
wardly committed to PAP. Whether we are engaged in an act of judgment (afrming
of freedom. For similar reasons, Vere Chappell suggests Descartess theory may be incoherent (Vere
Chappell, Descartess Compatibilism, in Reason, Will, and Sensation: Studies in Descartess Metaphysics,
ed. John Cottingham [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994], 181). Kenny sees Descartess theory of freedom
as incoherent for different reasons (Descartes on the will, 3031). Randal Marlin defends Descartes
against Kennys criticisms, but raises some worries of his own about the coherence of Descartess view
(Randal Marlin, Cartesian Freedom and the Problem of the Mesland Letters [Cartesian Freedom],
in Early Modern Philosophy: Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Politics, ed. Georges J. D. Moyal and Stanley
Tweyman (Delmar, NY: Caravan Books, 1985), 195216.
6
In saying this, I treat the letters to Mesland as one work because they constitute an ongoing
philosophical interchange about the same topic. It does not become clear that the 1644 letter to
Mesland endorses PAP until we read it in light of the 1645 letter.
7
Daniel Dennett, Elbow Room: Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984),
131.
8
Parenthetical references to Descartes in the body of the paper use the following abbrevia-
tions:
AT: Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, eds., Oeuvres de Descartes, 2
nd
ed., 11 vols. (Paris:
Vrin/C.N.R.S., 197486).
CSM: John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, trans., The Philosophical
Writings of Descartes, vols. 1 and 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
CSMK: John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny, trans., The
Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
Translations are from CSM or CSMK unless otherwise noted.
379 descartes on alternati ve possi bi li ti es
or denying a proposition) or choice (pursuing or avoiding a course of action),
our freedom consists in our power to do otherwise. Second, Descartes here uses
freedom of choice (arbitrii libertas) as a synonym for the will (voluntas), suggest-
ing the principle that freedom is essential to the will (FEW): the will is free by its very
nature, and every voluntary act is free.
9
FEW combines with PAP to imply that the
will can always do otherwise than it does, that we enjoy two-way power with respect
to every one of our voluntary actions.
However, a few paragraphs later, Descartes seems to give a counterexample to
this conclusion. In what I call the great light passage, Descartes reects on his
experience of the cogito argument, and says:
. . . I could not but judge [non potui . . . non judicare] something which I understood
so clearly to be true; not because I was compelled so to judge by any external force,
but because a great light in the intellect was followed by a great inclination in the
will, and thus I have believed this more spontaneously and freely as I have been less
indifferent to it. (AT 7:5859 / CSM 2:41; my translation and italics)
Like the earlier passage, this one seems to express two key assumptions. The rst
is a doctrine of clear and distinct determinism (CDD): in at least some cases where
we perceive a proposition P clearly and distinctly, we cannot refrain from assent-
ing to P. CDD implies that we lack two-way power with respect to at least some
acts of will. Second, Descartes assumes that judgment is a voluntary act (JVA).
10

These two assumptions combine to imply that the will cannot always do otherwise
than it does, that we do not enjoy two-way power with respect to every one of our
voluntary actions.
Therefore, the denition of the will and the great light passage seem diametri-
cally opposed, each implying the opposite of the other. More generally, PAP, FEW,
CDD, and JVA form an inconsistent quartet: the truth of any three of them logically
entails the falsehood of the fourth. There is little wonder that some commentators
question the coherence of Descartess remarks on freedom.
11
But Descartes was too smart to miss such an obvious contradiction. Interpre-
tive charity requires us to look for some coherent doctrine beneath the surface of
these two passages. Descartes seems clearly committed to FEW and JVA, so I will
concentrate on the tension between PAP and CDD. Commentators have tried two
basic strategies for resolving it. The rst is to deny that Descartes really endorsed
PAP. The second is to claim that Descartes uses power in two different senses: the
two-way power that PAP requires for freedom is not the same as the power ruled
out by CDD. I will now explain what I take to be the most plausible version of the
rst strategy, show why I do not nd it promising, and then explore the second
strategy in more detail.
9
Descartes states FEW explicitly in several other places: AT 7:166 / CSM 2:117; AT 7:191 / CSM
2:134; AT 11:359 / CSM 1:343.
10
In Principles I.32, Descartes says that assertion, denial, and doubt are various modes of willing
(AT 8a:17 / CSM 1:204). JVA is also expressed in Comments on a Certain Broadsheet (AT 8b:363 / CSM
1:307) and above, in the denition of freedom, where Descartes suggests that voluntary acts are of two
kinds: acts of judgment (to afrm or deny) and acts of choice (to pursue or avoid).
11
Laberthonniere, tudes sur Descartes, 43032.
380 j ournal of the hi story of phi losophy 44: 3 j uly 2006
Though the denition of freedoms rst part seems to endorse PAP, the latter
part may show that Descartes does not accept PAP after all. Anthony Kenny offers
the most plausible version of this sort of reading.
12
Kenny distinguishes between
liberty of indifference (two-way power) and liberty of spontaneity, which we
enjoy with respect to an act if and only if we do it because we want to do it.
13

According to Kenny, the rst clause denes freedom as liberty of indifference,
the second as liberty of spontaneity, and the or rather means that freewill often
does consist in liberty of indifference, but that sometimes it consists only in liberty
of spontaneity, and that is all that is essential to it.
14
In other words, Descartes adds
the or rather and second clause to make it clear that alternative possibilities are
not necessary for freedom.
Though Kenny does not mention this, on his interpretation Cartesian freedom
is asymmetrical in Susan Wolfs sense: if we are doing the right thing, freedom
does not require that we be able to do otherwise, but if we are doing the wrong
thing, it does.
15
On such a view, freedom is ultimately just the ability to avoid error.
God has given me the freedom to assent or not assent in those cases where he
did not endow my intellect with a clear and distinct perception (AT 7:61 / CSM
2:42) because when obscurity in the intellect makes it possible for us to err, our
freedom requires that it is also possible for us to suspend judgment, and hence
avoid error (AT 7:59 / CSM 2:41). That is why freedom often consists in liberty
of indifference. However, as the great light passage seems to illustrate, when clear
perceptions determine us to assent to the truth (and thus avoid error), freedom
does not require that we also be able to suspend judgment. That is why spontaneity
alone is essential to freedom.
Kenny interprets Descartes via a distinction (indifference vs. spontaneity) from
Hume (Treatise [III.2.1]), and thus may seem guilty of anachronism. However,
the term spontaneum is Descartess own (see AT 4:175 / CSMK 246), and Kenny
is correct that the second clause denes spontaneity: in the great light passage,
Descartes suggests that he assented to the cogito spontaneously because he satis-
ed the conditions laid down in the second clause.
But does Kenny offer an accurate account of Cartesian spontaneity? Doing
what you want to do may look more like an account of voluntariness than sponta-
neity.
16
However, the second clause of Descartess denition identies spontaneity
as a way of being carried, and the very next sentence reads: For in order to be
free it is not necessary that I can be carried [ferri posse] in both directions, but on
the contrary, the more I incline [propendeo] in one direction . . . the more freely
do I choose it (AT 7:5758 / CSM 2:40; my translation). This suggests that we
can be carried in both directions only if we are inclined in both directions, which
in turn suggests that what carries us is an inclination or desire. Furthermore, the
great light passage associates spontaneity with a great inclination in the will. So
Kenny is right to associate spontaneity with doing what we want to do.
12
For other versions of this sort of reading, see Gilson, La libert, 310, and M. Beyssade, Descartess
Doctrine, 194, 206.
13
Kenny, Descartes on the Will, 17.
14
Kenny, Descartes on the Will, 18; my italics.
15
Susan Wolf, Asymmetrical Freedom, Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 15166.
16
I am grateful to an anonymous referee of JHP for calling this to my attention.
381 descartes on alternati ve possi bi li ti es
However, Kennys account ignores Descartess reference to external determina-
tion. In the second clause, Descartes says that freedom consists in being carried
in such a way toward what the intellect proposes . . . that we feel ourselves deter-
mined to it by no external force (a nulla vi externa nos ad id determinari sentiamus)
(AT 7:57 / CSM 2:40). Vere Chappell glosses this passage as follows: an action
is spontaneous if it is performed by its agent entirely on his own, without being
forced . . . by any external factor.
17
Descartess text itself requires for spontaneity
only that we feel undetermined, not that we actually be undetermined. However,
there are at least two reasons to think that Chappells gloss is correct. First, Des-
cartes is probably using the word feel (sentiamus) here to reiterate his frequently
stated opinion that we have an inner feeling or experience of freedom.
18
Descartes
suggests that this experience of freedom is clear and distinct, and hence (given
the divine guarantee) veridical.
19
So if in the experience of freedom we feel un-
determined, we really are undetermined. Second, one of the main points of the
Fourth Meditation seems to be that because we are certain that we err freely, we
can also be certain that God is not causing our errors.
20
But if freedom is merely a
feeling, and is thus consistent with behind-the-scenes external control, then how
can we be sure that God is not making us err after all?
So Kennys account of spontaneity is incomplete. Cartesian spontaneity involves
both acting on inclination and being free from external determination. However,
Kenny could easily rectify this problem without giving up his basic interpretation
of the or rather. The real trouble with Kennys reading is this: Descartes intends
his denition of freedom to explain why there is an analogy between the divine
and human will, and Kennys reading is hard pressed to deal with this aspect of
the denition. A reading on which the denition endorses PAP does a much
better job. Before discussing the analogy, I must rst lay some groundwork by
explaining Descartess notion of indifference as it relates to both divine and hu-
man freedom.
As Descartes normally uses the term, indifference denotes a motivational
state that comes in degrees. Perfect indifference is the state the will is in when it
is not impelled more in one direction than in another by any perception of truth
or goodness (AT 4:173 / CSMK 245; see also AT 7:58 / CSM 2:40; AT 4:174 /
CSMK 245). In a state of perfect indifference, the motivations for and against a
given act of will are perfectly balanced. We become progressively less indifferent
as the motivations on one side outweigh those on the other, and we lose indiffer-
ence altogether when we are motivated in only one direction (AT 4:115 / CSMK
233; AT 4:174 / CSMK 24546; AT 4:155 / CSMK 233).
21

17
Chappell, Descartess Compatibilism, 180.
18
AT 7:56, 191, 377 / CSM 2:39, 134, 259; AT 8a:6 / CSM 1:194; AT 4:332 / CSMK 277; AT
5:159 / CSMK 342. See also Campbell, Descartes on Spontaneity, 181.
19
See especially Principles I.39 (AT 8a:1920 / CSM 1:20506). See also AT 3:259 / CSMK 161;
AT 7:191 / CSM 2:134; and Campbell, 181.
20
As Principles I.29 says: God is not the Cause of our Errors (AT 8a:16 / CSM 1:203). See also
Principles I.31 and I.38 and the Fourth Meditation (AT 7:54,60 / CSM 2:38, 41).
21
For an excellent alternative discussion of indifference as it relates to divine and human freedom,
see Dan Kaufman, Inmus gradus libertatis? Descartes on indifference and divine freedom, Religious
Studies 39 (2003): 391406.
382 j ournal of the hi story of phi losophy 44: 3 j uly 2006
Perfect indifference comes in two forms. The rst is balanced multi-directional
motivation, in which we recognize many reasons pro but as many reasons contra (AT
4:174/CSMK 245). For example, we might be motivated to afrm a proposition,
but equally motivated not to afrm it. The second form of perfect indifference is
non-motivation. If we recognize no reasons at all, either pro or contra, then we are
not inclined more in one direction than in another.
In the Sixth Replies, Descartes ascribes the second sort of indifference to
God:
It is self-contradictory to suppose that the will of God was not indifferent from eternity
with respect to everything which has happened or will ever happen; for it is impos-
sible to imagine that anything is thought of in the divine intellect as good or true,
or worthy of belief or action or omission, prior to the decision of the divine will to
make it so . . . Thus the supreme indifference to be found in God is the supreme
indication of his omnipotence. (AT 7:43132 / CSM 2:291)
Because Gods creative decisions are not motivated at all, God has (trivially) a
perfect balance with respect to them, and thus enjoys the supreme degree of
indifference. As a direct implication of Gods power over standards of truth and
goodness, this indifference signies Gods omnipotence.
Human indifference, on the other hand, is very different from divine indif-
ference:
But as for man, since he nds that the nature of all goodness and truth is already
determined by God, and his will cannot tend toward anything else, it is evident that
he will embrace what is good and true all the more willingly, and hence more freely,
in proportion as he sees it more clearly. He is never indifferent except when he does
not know which of the two alternatives is the better or truer, or at least when he
does not see this clearly enough to rule out any possibility of doubt. (AT 7:43233
/ CSM 2:292)
Unlike the divine will, the human will cannot act unless the intellect rst puts
forward some object for its consideration.
22
The intellect must conceive this object
as good or true in some respect,
23
so that the will is inclined toward it. Therefore,
unlike the divine will, the human will cannot choose from a state of non-motivation;
insofar as it bears on choice, human indifference always involves multi-directional
motivation. Because we experience indifference only if we fail to see things with
perfect clarity,
24
it is a sign of our weakness.
Despite these differences, Descartes insists that it is principally because of
this innite will within us that we can say we are created in [Gods] image . . .
22
According to the Fifth Replies, when we direct our will towards something, we always have some
sort of understanding of some aspect of it (AT 7:377; CSM 2:259); and Principles I.34 says: In order
to make a judgment, the intellect is of course required since, in the case of something which we do not
in any way perceive, there is no judgment we can make (AT 8a:18; CSM 1:204). See also Comments on
a Certain Broadsheet (AT 8b:363; CSM 1:307) and Chappell, Descartess Compatibilism, 187.
23
Further evidence: the will does not tend toward evil except in so far as it is presented to it by
the intellect under some aspect of goodness (AT 1:366; CSMK 56).
24
Descartes may mean that the human will never experiences multidirectional motivation unless
there is obscurity in the intellect. Or he may reserve the term indifference to denote only instances
of multidirectional motivation produced by ignorance, leaving it open that there could be other
multidirectional motivation not thus produced.
383 descartes on alternati ve possi bi li ti es
(AT 2:628; CSMK 14142). Descartes expands on this idea in the passage that
introduces his denition of freedom:
It is only the will, or freedom of choice, which I experience within me to be so great
that the idea of any greater faculty is beyond my grasp; so much so that it is above
all in virtue of the will that I understand myself to bear in some way the image and
likeness of God. For although Gods will is incomparably greater than mine, both
in virtue of the knowledge and power that accompany it and make it more rm and
efcacious, and also in virtue of its object, in that it ranges over a greater number
of items, nevertheless it does not seem any greater than mine when viewed as will
formally and precisely in itself [in se formaliter & praecise spectata]. This is because the
will simply consists in this: that we are able to do or not do, or rather . . . (AT 7:5657
/ CSM 2:3940; my translation)
Note the phrase this is because (quia): the denition of freedom is supposed to
explain why Gods will isqua willno greater than ours. It does so by explain-
ing what will is, as CSM puts it, in the essential and strict sense. Descartes might
seem to be claiming that the divine and human will share the same essence. But
in his reply to an objection about this passage, he states clearly: no essence can
belong univocally to both God and his creatures (AT 7:433 / CSM 2:292). How,
then, is our will an image of Gods?
Descartess position seems to be that there is an analogy between divine and
human will, just as there is an analogy between divine and created substance.
25
In
Principles I.51 Descartes denes substance as a thing which exists in such a way
as to depend on no other things for its existence, and notes that only God is a
substance in this sense. Therefore, he concludes that the term substance does
not apply univocally . . . to God and to other things (AT 8a:24; CSM 1:210).
However, he goes on to dene created substances as things that need only the
ordinary concurrence of God in order to exist, and hence do not depend on any
other created things (AT 9b:47; CSM 1:210). The essence of divine substance is
different from that of created substance, but there is an analogy between the two
because they share a common feature: both involve the general idea of ontologi-
cal independence. In the same way, Descartes seems to think that there is some
point of similarity between the divine will and the human will, and the denition
of freedom is supposed to explain what it is.
26

25
Other passages asserting similarity between divine and human will include AT 11:445 / CSM
1:384 and AT 5:85 / CSMK 326. The idea of an analogy between divine and created substance is also
suggested near the end of the Third Meditation (AT 7:51 / CSM 2:35) and discussed at length in the
Conversation with Burman (AT 5:156 / CSMK 33940). For an excellent discussion of these passages
and relevant scholastic background, see Tad Schmaltz, The Disappearance of Analogy in Descartes,
Spinoza, and Regis, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (2000): 85114. Schmaltz argues, in effect, that
Descartess understanding of divine simplicity conicts with his belief in an analogy between the divine
and human wills. Schmaltz may be correct, but it still seems that the Fourth Meditation (coherently
or not) posits an analogy.
26
Descartess denial of univocity might seem to mean that (1) there is no feature that belongs
essentially to both divine and human wills. However, the denial responds to the following argument
in the Sixth Set of Objections: if indifference cannot be a proper part of human freedom, neither
will it nd a place in divine freedom, since the essences of things are, like numbers, indivisible and
immutable (AT 7:417 / CSM 2:281). The objectors assume that (2) a feature is essential to the divine
will if and only if it is also essential to the human will. Descartes intends his remark as a denial of (2),
not as an assertion of (1).
384 j ournal of the hi story of phi losophy 44: 3 j uly 2006
The rst clause of the denition seems to identify two-way power as the point
of similarity. This makes sense because Descartes identies divine freedom with
two-way power: God was free to make it not true that all the radii of the circle
are equaljust as free as he was not to create the world (AT 1:152; CSMK 25).
However, on Kennys reading, two-way power is not essential to human freedom,
so we must look to the second clause to nd the point of similarity. As we have
seen, the second clause involves two main ideas: doing what we want to do, and
being free from external determination. Unfortunately for Kenny, neither of these
notions works very well.
Doing what we want to do cannot be the point of resemblance because it involves
being carried toward what the intellect puts forward for our consideration, and for
Descartes such motivation (reasons of truth or goodness grasped prior to choice)
cannot possibly apply to Gods will. Spontaneity is essential to the human will, but
not the divine will. Self-determination, or freedom from outside constraint, is a
more plausible candidate for the point of similarity: God must be essentially free
from external determination because there is nothing outside him before he freely
creates.
27
However, three considerations make self-determination less plausible
than two-way power as the point of similarity.
First, to identify self-determination as the point of similarity, we must gloss over
a key detail in the second clause: the phrase in such a way . . . that we feel ourselves
determined by no external force modies that we are carried . . . toward what
the intellect proposes. Strictly speaking, the second clause identies freedom not
simply with being undetermined, but with being carried in an undetermined way.
As I noted earlier, the second clause describes a kind of spontaneity that involves
both being undetermined by external forces and doing what we want to do. Since
the latter notion does not apply to God, and infects (as it were) the entire second
clause, it seems unlikely that Descartes intended the second clause to describe
divine freedom at all. It looks more like a clarication of the nature of human
freedom.
Second, and more worrying: if self-determination is the point of similarity, then
it is hard to make sense of the rst clause. In context, the denition would mean
something like: Divine and human freedom have two-way power in common.
Well, actually, no. Rather they have self-determination in common. If two-way
power is not essential to human freedom, then the rst clause fails to explain the
point of similarity and is extremely misleading. It is hard to see why Descartes
would leave it in place.
28
Finally, the best textual evidence for the idea that self-determination is essen-
tial to Gods freedom also suggests that self-determination implies having two-way
power. Descartes says that God cannot have been determined to make it true that
27
Charles Larmore, who seems to agree with Kennys reading of the denition of freedom, notes
that the similarity between the divine and human will creates a problem for his interpretation, and
suggests that the idea of freedom from external determination may provide a solution. See Charles
Larmore, Descartes Psychologistic Theory of Assent [Descartes Psychologistic], History of Philosophy
Quarterly 1 (1984): 6668.
28
Especially in the early parts, the Meditations involve internal dialogue or thinking out loud,
and in some cases use the process of assertion and retraction to make a philosophical point. In this
case, however, that process would only create confusion.
385 descartes on alternati ve possi bi li ti es
contradictories cannot be true together, and therefore . . . he could have done the
opposite (AT 4:118 / CSMK 235). Descartess inference here seems to depend
on the following suppressed premise: if an agent is not determined to perform an
action, then that agent could have not performed it. This premise seems correct:
to be determined by some factor F just is to be unable to do otherwise, given F, so
to be not determined by F just is to be able to do otherwise, given F. So if Descartes
identies human freedom with being undetermined by external forces, it seems
he would also take this lack of determinism to imply that we are able to do otherwise,
given external forces.
I cannot pretend that these considerations completely rule out Kennys read-
ing, but I do think they should motivate us to explore alternatives. The obvious
alternative is to consider two-way power the point of similarity, in which case it
must be essential to human freedom. The or rather does not retract PAP, but
claries Descartess understanding of it. Or rather means in other words, so
that the second clause spells out necessary and sufcient conditions for humans
to possess the two-way power mentioned in the rst clause. For humans, being
undetermined by external forces and being able to do otherwisein the sense
necessary for freedomare two sides of the same coin.
On this alternative reading, the rst clause of the denition of freedom explains
the essential similarity between divine and human freedom: both involve two-way
power. The second clause shifts the focus exclusively to human freedom in order to
forestall a potential misunderstanding. Descartes thinks that indifference is neces-
sary for divine freedom: If some reason for a things being good had preceded
[Gods] preordination, Descartes says, that reason would have determined him to
make that which is best (AT 7:435 / CSM 2:294; my translation and italics).
29
Were
he not indifferent, God would be unable to refrain from making the best, and
hence would not be free. Descartess readers might conclude that our freedom is
like Gods not only in being a two-way power, but also in requiring indifference.
Descartes adds the or rather and second clause to clarify that human freedom
does not require indifference: For in order to be free it is not necessary that I
can be carried [i.e., motivated] in both directions, but on the contrary, the more
I incline in one direction . . . the more freely do I choose it (AT 7:5758 / CSM
2:40).
30
So there is a further parallel with the analogy of substance. Just as divine
and created substances enjoy two different kinds of ontological independence,
the divine and created will enjoy two different kinds of two-way power: Gods kind
requires indifference, but our kind does not.
29
The relevant sentence reads: nam si quae ratio boni eius praeordinationem antecessisset, illa ipsum
determinasset ad id quod optimum est faciendum. CSM translates it thus: If some reason for somethings
being good had existed prior to his preordination, this would have determined God to prefer those
things which it was best to do. Unfortunately, in English to prefer sometimes means to choose,
and sometimes merely to be inclined toward. However, the idiomatic Latin phrase ad id faciendum is
not ambiguous at all: it means to make it.
30
This passage immediately follows the second clause. The for indicates that it is supposed
to explain Descartess reason for adding the or rather (see M. Beyssade, Descartess Doctrine,
19899). Descartes reiterates that human freedom does not require indifference at AT 7:433 / CSM
2:292 and AT 4:116 / CSMK 234.
386 j ournal of the hi story of phi losophy 44: 3 j uly 2006
At the same time, the second clause also claries the sense in which human
freedom requires alternative possibilities. When discussing freedom, Descartes
uses the modal terms can and could in two distinct ways. Sometimes, as in the
passage above, being able to go in more than one direction is associated with be-
ing motivated in more than one direction: I could have done otherwise means
I had a reason or motive for doing otherwise. Whenever the will is indifferent, it
has alternative possibilities in this sense, because it has motives both pro and contra
a course of action. So we can call these alternatives of indifference. In other places,
Descartes uses I could have done otherwise to mean external forces did not
determine me to do what I did. Call these alternatives of self-determination. Given
these two senses of can, the rst clause is ambiguous in requiring the ability to
do or not do for freedom. Sensing this ambiguity, Descartes added the second
clause to clarify that he means to require alternatives of self-determination. He
then followed the second clause with the passage quoted just above, to further
clarify that freedom does not require alternatives of indifference.
If, as I have suggested, Descartes distinguished implicitly between two senses
of could have done otherwise, this would explain why he was not fazed by the
apparent contradiction between the rst clause of the denition (which endorses
PAP), and the great light passage (which seems to deny PAP). When Descartes
says that he could not but judge the cogito true, he means that he had no reason
to do otherwise, that all of his inclinations were on the side of assent. But he states
explicitly that he was not determined to assent by any external force. He lacked
alternatives of indifference, but still enjoyed alternatives of self-determination. And
the rst clause requires only alternatives of self-determination for freedom.
Thus far I have explained a general strategy of interpretation that makes two
key claims. First, the second part of Descartess denition claries rather than re-
tracts his commitment to PAP, and second, the great light passage does not conict
with the denition because each employs a different sense of can. All things
considered, I believe this reading ts the texts more snugly than Kennys reading.
My general strategy can develop into at least three more specic interpretations,
depending on how we answer two key questions about the second clauses crucial
phrase, determined to it by no external force.
First, what does determined mean? There are two basic answers. On a com-
patibilist reading, an act of will is determined in Descartess sense just in case an
external force directly determines the act of will at the time of action and thereby
blocks the causal efcacy of the wills own motives, as in the following diagram.
External Force
Internal Forces (Motives) // Act of Will
In other words, an act is determined only if it would have occurred no matter
what the wills inclinations were. On this reading, free actions can be sufciently
caused by internal forces, even if those internal forces are themselves causally
determined by external forces acting at an earlier time, like this:
External Forces Internal Forces Act of Will.

387 descartes on alternati ve possi bi li ti es

On an incompatibilist reading, we are determined to an action just in case an
external force sufciently causes the act of will either directly or indirectly. So in
the situation just diagrammed, the act of will would be externally determined.
On this reading, freedom requires both that the act of will not be causally deter-
mined by an external force at the time of action, and that if the act is determined
by internal forces, those internal forces cannot themselves be causally determined
by prior external forces.
Now for the second key question: what does Descartes count as an external
force? It seems God would be such a force, and that is perhaps why Descartes
insists, in Principles I.41, that Gods providence leaves the free actions of men
undetermined (AT 8a:20 / CSM 1:206).
31
The body, too, seems external (see
Passions of the Soul, esp. AT 11:328 / CSM 1:328). But Descartess position regard-
ing the intellect is ambiguous: does external mean external to the self (thinking
substance), so that the intellect is internal, or does it mean external to the will,
so that the intellect is external?
If we assume an incompatibilist interpretation of determined and further
suppose that the intellect is an external force, then we will be led to what I call the
radical freedom interpretation. Consider again the great light passage, where
a clear perception in Descartess intellect causes him to be inclined in only one
direction (to assent to the cogito). If that inclination in turn determined the wills
act, then Descartess assent would be indirectly determined by an external force.
Since Descartes was not thus determined, it must have been psychologically pos-
sible for him to withhold assent in the face of this one-way motivation. In scholastic
terms, he must retain freedom with regard to the exercise of his will (to act or
not act) even if (due to his motives) he lacks freedom with regard to the speci-
cation of his act (say, to afrm or deny).
32
On this view, the claim that Descartes
lacked alternatives of indifferencethat he had no reason or motive for doing
otherwisemeans that for him to do otherwise would be immoral or irrational,
but not psychologically impossible.
33

The two remaining interpretations agree that for Descartes it is psychologically
impossible to withhold assent unless we have a reason for holding back. Therefore,
if Descartes had no motive to do otherwise than assent to the cogito, then he was
(at that moment) psychologically unable to do otherwise. The two interpreta-
tions differ over why this psychological inability to do otherwise is compatible
with freedom.
31
For more on this topic, see my Descartes on Divine Providence and Human Freedom, Archiv
fr Geschichte der Philosophie 87 (2005):15988.
32
See Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers, eds., The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philoso-
phy, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 119899. For an argument that Descartes
follows Duns Scotus in claiming that the will always enjoys the power to elicit or not elicit its acts, see
Lilli Alanen, Descartes on the Will and the Power to Do Otherwise [Do Otherwise], in Emotions
and Choice from Boethius to Descartes, eds. Henrik Lagerlund and Mikko Yrjnsuuri (Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2002) 27998.
33
This general sort of reading is advanced by Ferdinand Alqui, La dcouverte mtaphysique de
lhomme chez Descartes, 2
nd
ed. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966), 286, and in Alanen, Do
Otherwise, 294; Moyal, Unity, 39; and Marlin, Cartesian Freedom, 20708. Moyal defends it at
length in his Magicians, Doubters, and Perverts: On Doubting the Clear and Distinct [Magicians],
Revue Internationale de Philosophie 50 (1996): 73107.
388 j ournal of the hi story of phi losophy 44: 3 j uly 2006
The rst adopts the compatibilist reading of determined. On this view, the
clear perception in the intellect determines the will to be inclined in only one
way, which in turn determines the will to act in that way. However, even if the intel-
lect is external, this indirect determinism is no threat to freedom. If the wills
inclinations had been different, the will would have done something else, and so
the agent could have done otherwise in the only sense necessary for freedom. On
this reading, Descartes endorses what Joseph K. Campbell calls two-way compati-
bilism, which endorses PAP, but then gives a hypothetical account of alternative
possibilities, rendering them compatible with determinism.
34
The nal interpretation adopts the incompatibilist reading of determined,
but insists that in the great light passage (and all relevantly similar situations), the
intellect is not an external force. On this view, external really means external
to the will or its inuence. In the great light passage, Descartess clear perceptions
are internal because they were brought about by an earlier act of will regarding
how to focus attention (and this earlier act was not determined by the intellects
contents). On this reading, the will can be both free and determined by the
intellect in specic cases, but it could not be free if always determined by the
intellect.
35
So on this reading, Descartes does not endorse what Laura Eckstrom
calls a narrowly construed version of PAP, according to which an act of will is
free at a given time only if the agent is psychologically able to do otherwise at that
time. Rather he endorses a broader version of PAP that allows for inability to do
otherwise at the time of action, provided that the agent enjoyed the relevant sort
of alternatives at some earlier time.
36

There is much to be said both for and against each of these interpretations.
However, this is not the place to determine how exactly Descartes understood PAP.
We must move on to examine whether he also afrms PAP in his later writings.
2 . p r i n c i p l e s o f p h i l o s o p h y
In the Part One of the Principles, Descartess discussion of freedom is less detailed
than in the Meditations. He claims neither that divine and human freedoms are
essentially similar, nor that indifference is unnecessary for human freedom. He
is also silent concerning liberty of spontaneous self-determination. However, he
says nothing to contradict any of those earlier claims, and he clearly remains com-
mitted to PAP, FEW, CDD, and JVA.
He asserts CDD in Principle 43: the minds of all of us have been so molded
by nature that whenever we perceive something clearly, we spontaneously give our
assent to it and are quite unable to doubt its truth (AT 8a:21 / CSM 1:207). As
before, clear and distinct perceptions determine the will.
34
Campbell, Descartes on Spontaneity, 180. Petrik also defends this sort of interpretation (see
note 4).
35
Laporte advances this sort of interpretation. On this view, Descartess core condition for freedom
is basically the same as Robert Kanes: the will must be the ultimate causal origin of its own acts. See
Robert Kane, The Signicance of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 3740.
36
Laura Waddell Eckstrom, Libertarianism and Frankfurt-Style Cases, in The Oxford Handbook
of Free Will, ed. Robert Kane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 31015.
389 descartes on alternati ve possi bi li ti es
Principle 39 could be taken to suggest that the when the will is thus determined,
it does not enjoy two-way power. Descartes says that we have power in many cases
to give or withhold assent at will, and that in the past when we imagined ourselves
the victims of an omnipotent deceiver, our freedom was nonetheless so great as to
enable us to abstain from believing whatever was not quite certain or fully examined
(AT 8a:1920 / CSM 1:20506; my italics) These remarks could be taken to mean
that we lack any sort of two-way power with respect to what is fully certain.
37

However, consider the following passage from Principle 37:
it is a supreme perfection in man that he acts voluntarily, that is, freely; this makes
him in a special way the author of his actions and deserving of praise for what he does.
We do not praise automatons for accurately producing all the movements they were
designed to perform, because the production of these movements occurs necessarily.
It is the designer who is praised . . . for in constructing [automatons] he acted not
out of necessity but freely. By the same principle, when we embrace the truth, our
doing so voluntarily is much more to our credit than would be the case if we could
not do otherwise [quam si non possemus non amplecti]. (AT 8a:19 / CSM 1:205)
The opening of this passage might seem to work against my reading, for Descartes
equates freedom with voluntariness (FEW again), and it seems that we can do
something voluntarily even if we could not have done otherwise (as Frankfurt-Style
Counterexamples to PAP show). However, the rest of the passage indicates that
in Descartess opinion, we act voluntarily only if we could have done otherwise.
The example of the automatons and their designer suggests that for Descartes, a
good action is worthy of praise (i.e., to our credit) only if we perform it freely (i.e.,
voluntarily), and we perform an action freely only if we do not do so necessarily.
In this context, the locution Doing so voluntarily is more to our credit than
would be the case leads us to expect the completion if we did so necessarily. But
instead, Descartes says: if we could not do otherwise. This suggests that for Descartes
the phrases we did so necessarily and we could not have done otherwise are
equivalent. And if these phrases are equivalent, then Descartes must think that we
perform an action freely or voluntarily only if we could have done otherwise.
Furthermore, Descartes here imagines a case where we deserve credit for em-
bracingi.e., believingthe truth. But for Descartes, we deserve credit for believ-
ing something only if we perceive it clearly and distinctly. We deserve blame for
believing what we do not clearly perceive: when we give our assent to something
which is not clearly perceived, this is always a misuse of our judgment, even if by
chance we stumble on the truth (AT 8a:21 / CSM 1:207). So in the passage above,
Descartes must be imagining a case in which we assent to a clearly perceived truth.
In such a case, he maintains, we assent voluntarily (JVA) and freely, and therefore
could have done otherwise (PAP).
Principle 37 thus commits Descartes to JVA, FEW, and PAP; Principle 43 com-
mits him to CDD. His apparent problem is the samehe seems to maintain both
that we can and that we cannot withhold assent from clear perceptionsand
there is nothing to suggest that he has altered his solution to this problem since
the Meditations.
37
See Kenny, Descartes on the Will, 21.
390 j ournal of the hi story of phi losophy 44: 3 j uly 2006
3 . t h e l e t t e r s t o me s l a n d
In the mid-1640s the young Jesuit Denis Mesland wrote to Descartes with some
questions about the Meditations. One of these concerned free will, particularly our
ability to suspend judgment. In a letter dated 2 May 1644, Descartes responded
to Mesland as follows:
I agree with you when you say that we can suspend our judgment; but I tried to
explain in what manner this can be done. For it seems to me certain that a great
light in the intellect is followed by a great inclination in the will; so that upon see-
ing very clearly that a thing is good for us, it is very difcult, and even, as I believe,
impossible, while one remains in this thought, to stop the course of our desire. But
the nature of the soul is such that it hardly attends for more than a moment to a
single thing; hence, as soon as our attention turns from the reasons which show us
that the thing is good for us, and we merely keep in our memory the thought that
it appeared desirable to us, we can call up before our mind some other reason to
make us doubt it, and so suspend our judgment, and perhaps even form a contrary
judgment. (AT 4:116 / CSMK 23334)
This passage implies an analogue of CDD, afrming with respect to the Good
what earlier texts said about the True: if we see it clearly, it is impossible to hold
back from it.
However, Descartess commitment to PAP is less clear in this text. He says that to
suspend judgment, we must turn our attention away from the reasons that make a
things goodness clear and distinct to us. This seems to imply that we can suspend
judgment only after our perceptions are no longer clear. Descartes may mean that
at the time of clear perception, we are unable to refrain from pursuing the good.
Nevertheless, our pursuit is voluntary, and Descartes goes on to say (re-asserting
FEW): I call free in the general sense whatever is voluntary (AT 4:116 / CSMK
234). So this 1644 letter leaves it open that we can be free at a time without hav-
ing two-way power at that time.
In a subsequent letter to Mesland from 1645, Descartes expands on the rela-
tion of free will to time. He says: freedom considered in the acts of the will at
the moment when they are elicited does not involve two-way power, for what
is done cannot remain undone as long as it is being done (AT 4:174 / CSMK
246). This shows that Descartes would reject a version or interpretation of PAP
requiring that the will be able to do otherwise both before and during its act.
However, in the same letter Descartes explicitly accepts a more modest version of
PAP, according to which being free implies having alternative possibilities during
the interval after the intellect puts forward an object for deliberation but before
the will elicits its act of choice or judgment. Considered with respect to the time
before [acts of will] are elicited, Descartes says, freedom entails a positive faculty
of determining oneself to one or other of two contraries, that is to say, to pursue
or avoid, to afrm or deny (my italics; AT 4:173 / CSMK 245).
This last quotation reafrms both JVA and PAP. It also suggests that Descartes
was committed to PAP in his earlier letter to Mesland. The quotation identies
the wills essential positive power of self-determination as a two-way power. Thus
Descartes was probably hinting at the wills two-way power in 1644, when he told
Mesland: since you regard freedom not simply as indifference but rather as a real
and positive power to determine oneself, the difference between us is merely a verbal
391 descartes on alternati ve possi bi li ti es
onefor I agree that the will has such a power (AT 4:116 / CSMK 234; my italics).
It seems that in his correspondence with Mesland, Descartes is still committed to
FEW, JVA, PAP, and CDD. His apparent problem is still the same.
In what I call the two senses passage from the 1645 letter, Descartes tries to
solve his problem by further explaining our positive two-way power:
I do not deny that the will has this positive faculty. Indeed, I think it has it not only
with respect to those actions to which it is not pushed by any evident reasons on one
side rather than on the other, but also with respect to all other actions; so that when
a very evident reason moves us in one direction, although morally speaking we can
hardly move in the contrary direction, absolutely speaking we can. For it is always open
to us to hold back from pursuing a clearly known good, or from admitting a clearly
perceived truth, provided we consider it a good thing to demonstrate the freedom
of our will by so doing. (AT 4:173; CSMK 245; my italics)
Descartes reiterates that that two-way power is essential to the will (PAP). He rec-
onciles PAP with CDD by distinguishing two different senses of can, explicitly
employing the sort of strategy that (I claim) he used implicitly in the Fourth
Meditation. Georges Moyal is correct in saying that this passage provides the key
to the unity of Descartes thoughts on freedom.
38
But before declaring the two senses passage a smoking gun, we should pause
to consider Kennys reading of it. Kenny takes the Meditations, Principles, and 1644
letter all to deny that two-way power is essential to freedom, and he thinks that
this 1645 letter is no exception.
39
He builds his case on the last sentence of the
two senses passage. According to Kenny,
when Descartes says . . . that it is always open to us to hold back from pursuing a
clearly known good, or from admitting a clearly perceived truth, he need not mean
that we can do this at the very moment of perceiving the good and the true. Rather,
we must distract our attention, as he said in the 1644 letter. One way of doing this
would be to dwell on the thought that it would be a good thing to demonstrate our
free will . . . this would render the perception of truth and goodness unclear. (Des-
cartes on the Will, 2829)
As Kenny reads them, neither letter to Mesland claims that we enjoy two-way power
during clear perception. We enjoy it only after we have distracted our attention.
Kenny reads the last sentence of the two senses passage as a gloss on the proce-
dure for suspending judgment outlined in the 1644 letter. This reading of the last
sentence might be correct, but it does not support Kennys overall interpretation of the
passage. Kenny ignores the distinction between moral and absolute senses of can, but
Descartes clearly intends the last sentence of the passage to elucidate that distinction.
It explains why, absolutely speaking, the will has two-way power with respect to all its
acts, including those that occur when a very evident reason moves us in one direc-
tion (and thus determines the will morally speaking). Therefore, the last sentence
cannot be denying that two-way power is in some sense essential to freedom.
40

38
Moyal, Unity, 47.
39
Kenny, Descartes on the Will, 26.
40
If Kenny reads it correctly, the last sentence implies that morally speaking we cannot hold back
until a later time, and Descartess point must be that we count as absolutely able to hold back from
what we now clearly perceive precisely because we could (morally speaking) turn our attention from
it in the future.
392 j ournal of the hi story of phi losophy 44: 3 j uly 2006
Furthermore, the last sentence is probably not merely a gloss on the 1644 re-
marks about suspending judgment. In the Second Replies, Descartes distinguishes
two classes of clear and distinct truths: some are so transparently clear and at the
same time so simple that we cannot ever think of them without believing them to
be true (these are clear and distinct per se), while others are perceived very clearly
by our intellect so long as we attend to the arguments on which our knowledge of
them depends (these are clear and distinct per aliud) (AT 7:14546 / CSM 2:104).
The 1644 passage explains how to suspend judgment with respect to pursuing an
object that is good per aliud (by turning our attention from the reasons which
show us that the thing is good for us), but does not show how we could suspend
judgment with respect to objects that are per se clear and distinct. The two-senses
passage, however, concerns an ability to hold back that we have with respect to
both per se and per aliud clear truths. Thus it is unwise to use the 1644 passage as
our primary lens for understanding the two-senses passage.
As I understand it, the two senses passage maintains that with respect to one
and the same act of will, and at the same time, we can be both morally unable to
hold back and absolutely able to hold back. Much about this moral/absolute distinc-
tion is puzzling, but I suspect that it maps onto the earlier distinction between two
senses of can in the Fourth Meditation: moral alternatives are alternatives of
indifference, and absolute alternatives are alternative of self-determination. If I
am right, then the moral/absolute distinction could mean at least three different
things, corresponding to the three interpretations discussed above.
First, moral necessity may be a kind of deontic necessity. If so, Descartess claim
that we are morally unable to hold back means that morality (or rationality) does
not permit us to hold back, that we ought to act in accord with a very evident reason.
Though this normative reading of moral necessity is compatible with the other
two interpretations below,
41
it has been stressed mainly by advocates of the radical
freedom interpretation, who insist that for Descartes it is always psychologically
possible for us to out the rules of reason or morality (hence we can hold back
absolutely speaking).
42
On this reading, the phrase we can hardly move in the
contrary direction is making only a normative point, and does not mean that clear
perceptions can psychologically determine assent. The last sentence of the passage
(for it is always open to us to hold back . . . provided we consider it a good thing
to demonstrate the freedom of our will) seems to cause a problem for this read-
ing: if we can hold back when our motives drive us in only one direction, then why
does Descartes seem to make our ability to hold back depend on the presence of
a countervailing motive? Perhaps Descartes means that such a motive is needed
not to render holding back psychologically possible, but to render it rational.
43
When Descartes says that it is morally impossible to hold back from an evident
reason, he may mean not only that we ought to act in accord with the reason, but
41
I am grateful to an anonymous referee of JHP for calling this to my attention.
42
For a very interesting discussion of the normative interpretation of moral necessity, see Lilli
Alanen, Intuition, Assent, and Necessity: The Question of Descartess Psychologism, Acta Philosophica
Fennica 64 (1999): 99121.
43
For an argument to this effect, see Moyal, Magicians, 8991.
393 descartes on alternati ve possi bi li ti es
also that it is psychologically impossible for us not to.
44
On the two-way compati-
bilist reading, what is morally possible is what is psychologically possible in the
actual circumstances of choice. Given my awareness of a very evident reason to
do A, I cannot but do A. What is absolutely possible is what would (or could) have
happened in a relevantly similar choice situation: if, in addition to being aware of
A, I were also experiencing a countervailing motive (such as the desire to prove
my freedom), I would be psychologically able to hold back from A.
45

The distinction is similar on the less radical incompatibilist interpretation, but
with an important twist. On that reading, moral possibility would be psychological
possibility in the actual choice situation. But to say that an action is absolutely
possible for me would be to say both that I could have performed it in an alterna-
tive situation, and that in the past it was in my powermorally speakingto bring
about that alternative situation, or not. On this view, it is not enough that I could
have held back if there had been a countervailing motive: I must also have been
able to determine whether or not such a motive would be present.
4 . C o n c l u s i o n
I have argued that over time Descartes consistently believed in PAP, FEW, JVA,
and CDD. I have also tried to show that the language of the Fourth Meditation
suggests a distinction between two different kinds of alternatives: to say that we
can do or not do means either that we are motivated in alternative directions, or
that no external force determines our action. This distinction allows Descartes
to claim that PAP and CDD can be true of one and the same action, because PAP
requires alternatives in the latter sense, and CDD removes them only in the for-
mer sense. I have argued, further, that with his appeal to the difference between
moral and absolute possibility in the 1645 letter to Mesland, Descartes attempts
to make basically the same distinction. So Descartes not only consistently afrmed
both PAP and CDD, but also consistently employed the same general strategy for
reconciling them with each other.
Because it is not immediately obvious how Descartes understood the nature
of moral and absolute alternatives, I have explored three different ways of
cashing out the distinction between them. In doing so, I do not mean to suggest
that Descartes had no clear or precise view about the nature of these alternatives
(though that is possible, and it is also possible that his view of these alternatives
developed across time). On the contrary, I think it likely that Descartes did have
a clear and consistent view about the nature of moral and absolute alternatives.
But I cannot argue for my opinion here, because doing so is beyond the scope of
this paper. It would require making an involved textual case for one of the three
interpretations discussed above, and that effort is best left for another time.
46
44
It is also possible that he intends only to make the descriptive psychological point, and not the
normative point at all. This seems to be the reading favored by Larmore, Descartes Psychologistic,
61.
45
See Campbell, Descartess Compatibilism, 19294.
46
See my Is Descartes a Libertarian, forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy,
vol. 3, eds. Daniel Garber and Steven Nadler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
394 j ournal of the hi story of phi losophy 44: 3 j uly 2006
Some might object that my interpretation makes too much of the nal letter
to Mesland. Although in that letter Descartes purports to clarify the Meditations
account of freedom,
47
there is some reason to doubt his sincerity. Mesland was a
Jesuit, and Jesuits were erce defenders of PAP-like principles. Descartes may have
simply been telling Mesland what he wanted to hear. For it seems that at that stage
of his career, Descartes was trying to curry favor with Jesuits.
48

Though I am inclined to take Descartes at his word, I agree that it would be a
dubious procedure to simply (as Vere Chappell says) read the qualication ex-
pressed by the phrase morally speaking back into Descartes earlier statement.
49

But that is not what I have done. I have argued that the Fourth Meditation itself
suggests a distinction between two different kinds of alternatives. Indeed, I think
considerations about the analogy between divine and human freedom would make
this the most plausible reading of the Fourth Meditation even if we did not have
the 1645 letter to Mesland. If I am correct, there is good reason to think that in
the 1645 letter Descartes was sincere after all: he had accepted PAP all along.
50

47
The letter refers to two different remarks from the Fourth Meditation and explains the sense
in which Descartes intended them.
48
Gilson makes an extensive case for this view. See La libert, especially chapters 37 and the
conclusion. See also Imlay, Descartes and Indifference, 90.
49
Chappell, Descartess Compatibilism, 183.
50
I am grateful to Robert Adams, Marilyn Adams, and Michael Della Rocca, who discussed this
material with me extensively and read many early drafts of this paper. I also beneted from discussions
with Keith DeRose, Sukjae Lee, and Dan Kaufman. Finally, I would like to thank William Charron and
two anonymous referees of JHP for their very helpful comments on the penultimate draft.