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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS


DALLAS DIVISION

VIRGINIA CONNOR, as Next
Friend of C. K., A MINOR CHILD
Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO.

JACK KERMES AND
THE CITY OF RICHARDSON,
TEXAS
Defendants

PLAINTIFFS ORIGINAL COMPLAINT

TO THE HONORABLE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
COMES NOW, VIRGINIA CONNOR, as next Friend of C.K., A Minor Child,
complains of JACK KERMES and the CITY OF RICHARDSON, TEXAS,
(hereinafter referred to as City of Richardson) and for cause of action will respectfully
show unto the Court as follows:
I. PARTIES
1. Plaintiff VIRGINIA CONNOR, as Next Friend of C.K., A Minor Child,
is a resident of the State of Michigan.
2. Defendant City of Richardson is a municipality located in Dallas
County, Texas which is in the Northern District of Texas. The City of Richardson, Texas
can be served through Dan Johnson, City Manager at the City of Richardson Manager's
Office located at 411 W. Arapaho Rd., Richardson, Texas 75080.
3. Defendant Jack Kermes is an individual residing in Richardson, Dallas,
County Texas and a police officer for City of Richardson Police Department and can be
served at his place of employment at the Richardson Police Department located at 140 N

Plaintiffs Original Complaint and Jury Demand
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Greenville Ave, Richardson, TX 75081.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. The Court has original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1331 and 1343 since Plaintiff is suing for relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Any state law
claims are brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367 and are subject to this courts
supplemental jurisdiction. Venue is proper in the Northern District of Texas pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. 1391 because the Defendants are domiciled and/or reside in the Northern
District of Texas, and all or a substantial part of the cause of action accrued in the
Northern District.
III. NATURE OF THE ACTION

5. This is a civil rights and wrongful death action for damages arising under
the Constitution of the United States, particularly the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, under the laws of the United
States, particularly the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988
resulting from actions a law enforcement pursuit of Emily Krumrei on April 8, 2013,
in Richardson, Texas, by Richardson Police Officer Jack Kermes. This incident
resulted in the death of Emily Krumrei, who was shot by Defendant Jack Kermes, at
the intersection the 500 block of Dumont and Southbound Central Expressway service
road in Dallas County, Texas. Plaintiff is the next friend of Emily Krumreis minor
child of C.K., and brings this action to recover for the unlawful police activity, which
caused Emily Krumreis death.






Plaintiffs Original Complaint and Jury Demand
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IV. FACTS

6. At all times relevant to the acts alleged in this complaint, Defendant Jack
Kermes was acting under the color of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs,
and policies of the Defendant City of Richardson.
7. On April 8, 2013 at approximately 8:25 a.m. Richardson Police Officer J.
Neitsch #923 was conducting stationary speed enforcement in the area of West Beltline
Road and Lindale Lane. Officer Neitsch attempted to stop a grey Lexus ES 350 with
dealer tags for speeding.
1

8. While in full uniform and wearing a bright yellow traffic vest, Officer
Neitsch stepped into the roadway, put up his hand indicating the traditional stop
command while issuing verbal commands to stop. The Lexus slowed down but did not
stop. The Lexus swerved to avoid hitting Officer Neitsch and continued westbound on
Beltline. The Lexus turned left onto Floyd Road and traveled southbound out of sight.
Officer Neitsch broadcasted a description of the Lexus to other officers in the area.
Defendant Kermes badge #612, who is a City of Richardson Police Officer, heard the
description of the Lexus on his portable radio as he was working a traffic accident
nearby.
9. At approximately 8:30 a.m., Defendant Kermes attempted to stop the
gray 2012 Lexus ES 350 four door sedan which was later determined to have been
driven by Emily Josephine Krumrei, while Kermes was working a traffic accident
near the intersection of Dumont Drive and the 600 block of the Southwest Frontage
Road of South Central Expressway.
1
The facts described in paragraphs 7-9 are from paragraph 5 of Richardson Police Officer J. Sanders
#1131, Affidavit for a Search Warrant attached hereto as Exhibit 1

Plaintiffs Original Complaint and Jury Demand
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10. According to eyewitnesses working at Auto Flex, located in the 500 block
of Dumont Drive, Defendant Kermes commanded the Lexus to stop as it approached.
Kermes had his hands out toward the Lexus. The Lexus came to a brief stop in the
center of Dumont. Moments later, the Lexus began moving again, but the driver cut the
wheels to the right. Upon information and belief, the Lexus made minor contact with
Kermes. Upon information and belief, any impact between the Lexus and Kermes
body was of the nature and degree that it did not knock him to the ground or cause him
to lose his balance or injure Kermes. The Lexus went around Kermes toward the
south curb which placed Kermes on the drivers side of the Lexus as it passed him.
11. The Auto Flex employees described Kermes as being at an arms length
distance from the drivers side window of the Lexus when the Lexus pulled to the right
and attempted to go around Kermes. At that time, Defendant Kermes drew his
weapon and made one or more verbal commands of, Stop or I'll shoot! and then
immediately fired a shot through the drivers side window, striking Krumrei, killing her.
The Lexus accelerated briefly along the south curb and traveled a short distance to the
frontage road before stopping on the far side.
12. The City of Richardson use of force policy requires that deadly force will
only be utilized in response to the immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury to
any person(s).
13. At the time Kermes utilized and deployed his firearm, the danger, if any,
that Kermes could have perceived from Krumreis vehicle had since passed and was
unreasonable for Kermes to employ or use deadly force to stop the slowly moving
Lexus.

Plaintiffs Original Complaint and Jury Demand
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14. Furthermore, at the time Kermes shot and killed Krumrei, Defendant
Kermes was not in imminent danger. Upon information and belief Kermes declined
any medical attention at the scene. Defendant Kermes displayed no signs of any
visible injuries or bruising to his body that would indicate that he was at any time in
immediate danger of death or serious bodily injury.
V. COUNT I 42 U.S.C. 1983 Against Defendant Jack Kermes

15. Plaintiffs here repeat and re-allege the allegations contained in paragraphs
1 through 14 as though fully set forth herein.
16. Defendant Jack Kermes, acting under color of law, deprived Decedent
and Plaintiff of certain constitutionally protected rights wherein Defendant:
a. Made an unlawful and unreasonable seizure of the Decedents person;
b. Used excessive and unreasonable force to accomplish this unlawful
seizure, in that the Defendant Jack Kermes fired at least one round from
his service weapon into the torso of Decedent Emily Krumrei which
action was unwarranted, unreasonable, and excessive according to the
circumstances in which the Defendant Kermes found himself.

17. Moreover, no reasonably competent police officer would have concluded
that the actions of Defendant Kermes, as described herein, would not violate Emily
Krumreis rights. In other words, no reasonably prudent police officer under similar
circumstances, could have believed that Defendant Kermes conduct was justified.
18. Defendant Jack Kermes acted willfully, deliberately, maliciously, or with
reckless disregard for Emily Krumreis clearly established constitutional rights.
VI. COUNT II 42 U.S.C. 1983 Against Defendant City of Richardson

19. Plaintiff hereby repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 through 14 as though fully set forth herein.


Plaintiffs Original Complaint and Jury Demand
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20. Defendant City of Richardson has or had established policies and
procedures for its officers regarding the use of deadly force in connection with fleeing
subjects.
21. In establishing these policies and procedures, Defendant City of
Richardson had a duty under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States to refrain from enforcing or continuing in effect
policies and procedures that created a substantial likelihood that citizens would be
subjected to unlawful seizures of their person and/or the use of excessive force by
Defendants law enforcement officers.
22. Notwithstanding its aforementioned duties, Defendant City of
Richardson, was guilty of one or more of the following wrongful acts or omissions to
act in violation of the Decedents and Plaintiffs constitutional rights, in that they:
a. Allowed policies and procedures to continue in force and effect that
resulted in the use of outrageous and excessive force against Emily
Krumrei;

b. Had a custom and practice of failing to independently and adequately
investigate complaints of excessive force;

c. Had a custom and practice of failing to effectively discipline or retrain
police officers who wrongfully utilized excessive force;

d. Failed to establish appropriate policies and procedures to address and
correct the unnecessary use of deadly force in connection with pursuits;

e. Failed to establish adequate policies and procedures regarding the proper
use of the Department issued service weapons as a deadly force
instrumentality; and

f. Failed to adequately train its police officers regarding the proper use of the
Department issued service weapons;

g. Failed to establish adequate policies and procedures in regards
discharging of a firearm to end a chase;


Plaintiffs Original Complaint and Jury Demand
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h. To the extent that an official policy, custom, or practice exists regarding
discharging a firearm to end a chase, the City of Richardson failed to
adequately train Defendant Kermes in the proper application of any
such policy, custom or practice.

23. As a direct and proximate result of one or more of Defendant City of
Richardsons wrongful acts or omissions to act, the Decedent and Plaintiff sustained a
violation of their rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States.
24. Defendant City of Richardson acted willfully, deliberately, maliciously,
or with reckless disregard for Decedents and Plaintiffs clearly established
constitutional rights.
25. Plaintiffs would further show that Defendant Kermes actions were the
result of, or within the scope of, wrongful and reckless customs, policies, practices
and/or procedures of the City of Richardson in regards to the use of deadly force for
which the City of Richardson knew or should have known but never provided the
requisite and proper training.
VII. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
26. It is anticipated that the Defendant Kermes will raise, or attempt to raise, a
defense of qualified immunity. In this regard, Plaintiff pleads that it was well-
established law, as of well before April 8, 2013, that every citizen of the United States
has a clearly defined constitutional right to be free from an unlawful seizure by law
enforcement officials in accordance with the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, as applied to the several States through the Fourteenth Amendment, and
to be free from unlawful excessive force. No reasonable law enforcement official would
have acted as Defendant did under these circumstances, by shooting and killing a

Plaintiffs Original Complaint and Jury Demand
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motorist who failed to stop for a traffic violation. The use of force was grossly excessive
and unwarranted. The Defendant is not, therefore, entitled to the protection of qualified
immunity for his actions.
VIII. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AGAINST DEFENDANT JACK KERMES

27. Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations contained in paragraphs 1
through 14 as though fully set forth herein.
28. When viewed objectively from the standpoint of Defendant Jack
Kermes, at the time of the occurrence, said Defendants conduct involved an extreme
degree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to
others. In addition, Defendant, Jack Kermes was actually, subjectively aware of the
risk involved, but nevertheless proceeded with conscious indifference to the rights,
safety, or welfare of others, which constitutes gross neglect pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC.
REM. CODE 41.001(7)(B). Therefore, pursuant to Section 26, Article XVI, Texas
Constitution as defined by TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE 41.003(b), Plaintiff seeks
exemplary damages in an amount which is reasonable and just as determined by the
jury.
29. As a direct, proximate, and producing result of Defendant, Jack Kermes
gross negligence, Plaintiff is entitled to exemplary damages pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC.
REM. CODE 41.001 et. al.
IX. DAMAGES
30. Plaintiff here repeats and re-alleges the allegations contained in
paragraphs 1 through 14 as though fully set forth herein by reference.
31. At all times relevant hereto, Plaintiff C.K. was the natural child of Emily
Krumrei.

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32. As the direct and proximate result of the unlawful conduct of all
Defendants, Emily Krumrei suffered death. Plaintiff, as next Friend for C.K., as the
natural child of Emily Krumrei is therefore entitled to bring, and hereby does bring,
this action under Chapter 71 of the TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE, the Wrongful Death Act
of the State of Texas.
33. As a result of this claims under the Wrongful Death Act, Plaintiff, As Next
Friend for Conner Krumrei is entitled to recover damage arising from the death of
Emily Krumrei within the jurisdictional limits of this court, for the following:
a. Pecuniary loss in the past;
b. Pecuniary loss that, in reasonable probability they will sustain in
the future;

c. Loss of companionship and society in the past;
d. Loss of companionship and society that, in reasonable probability,
they will sustain in the future;

e. Mental anguish sustained in the past;
f. Mental anguish that, in reasonable probability, they will sustain in
the future; and

g. Loss of inheritance.
X. ATTORNEY FEES

34. It was necessary for Plaintiff to hire the undersigned attorneys to file this
lawsuit. Upon judgment, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs
under 42 U.S.C. 1988(b).
XI. DEMAND FOR A JURY TRIAL
35. Plaintiff hereby requests a jury trial.


Plaintiffs Original Complaint and Jury Demand
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PRAYER FOR RELIEF

36. For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff ask for judgment against
Defendants for the following:
a. Actual damages in an amount to be proved at trial;

b. Punitive damages in an amount deemed appropriate to punish
Defendant Kermes for his outrageous conduct in killing Emily
Krumrei;

c. Prejudgment and post-judgment interest;

d. Costs of suit, including attorney fees; and

e. All other, further and different relief as this Court deems just and
proper.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Scott H. Palmer
SCOTT H. PALMER
State Bar No. 00797196
J.R. FLETCHER
State Bar No. 24038304

SCOTT H. PALMER, P.C.
15455 Dallas Parkway
Suite 540, LB 36
Addison, Texas 75001
(214) 987-4100
(214) 922-9900 Fax
scott@scottpalmerlaw.com

ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER

Plaintiffs Original Complaint and Jury Demand
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