Nawa was supposed to be the next Fallujah.

It wasn’t but it had its fair share of

Taliban. Five months after the assault, it is now one of the few major success
stories in Afghanistan. It would be easy to throw objectivity out and make claims of
superior leadership, tactical and technical training, performance and uncanny
decision making abilities –the old we’re just better than you story line or to use the
other common approach and provide a litany of acronyms and speak of brilliance in
the basics, COIN and recite a few authors’ quotes, without any original thought, but
making myself sound just short of genius in the process. Although I am a big fan of
our team and we have made some decisions paving the way for wins, we have also
made our share of mistakes and did quite a bit of learning along the way. I will
attempt to list both good and bad of what I learned throughout this deployment and
anything I believe will help you with your training cycle and upcoming deployment.

1. One of the major reasons for success in Nawa, is we had enough people for the
job. Although we complain about not having enough, other battalions are covering
two to three times the battle space we are. I believe this is the most important
reason for our relative success compared to limited gains in the other areas. You
have to be seen, if not each day then every other day, in all of your areas you
expect to control. There are a lot of book answers out there as to the right amount
of troops per capita of population and I think there is some truth to that but the real
answer lies somewhere in between population and area covered. Don’t allow
yourself to get caught up in the pure game of numbers. Think about how much
ground that squad leader has to cover by foot in 120 degree temperatures to
accomplish his mission. If you go by the numbers game and put half the amount of
Marines in an area just because it is not as densely populated as the next, those
squad leaders have to travel twice the amount of space to accomplish the same
mission. In my experience, and from looking at other battalion’s experiences, that
is precisely where the Taliban will form relative safe havens and maintain control of
the local population. Think space as well as population density.

2. Commanders have to understand where to use economy and where to employ

larger forces and you may have to adjust as the situation does. We had a mixed
bag of employment, by company, throughout our area of operations. Along key
routes, we utilized picket techniques straight from the mountain warfare manual,
even though the ground was flat. In population centers different company
commanders used different force dispersion in accordance with their own analysis.
From what I have seen throughout deployments, you should have a position for
every platoon and your company COC should be its own position, controlling its own
battle space with its own patrols. Companies should divide up their battle space
into manageable areas with enough people to cover all of their areas of
responsibilities. If you write off an area as safe and not needing attention, it will
quickly get attention from the enemy. You have to control your entire area,
including every route.
3. Our COIN training doesn’t meet our requirements. We have made vast
improvements with our officer corps but we are not providing the education that our
squad leader’s and individual Marines need, who are the guys out there every single
patrol, every day. As I traveled throughout the AO, I would see large differences in
capabilities with weapons handling and employment, patrolling tactics and
techniques, and of course with individual and unit discipline. This tells me that we
are comfortable enough to apply some individual, complex thought to how we
accomplish our mission using these fundamentals. The one constant was our ability
to deal with the local populace (this is based on the 03’s in the battalion; I will cover
log packs and route clearance later). Didn’t matter what unit I was with, Marines
handled dealing with the local populace in the same manner. Marines see ASCOPE
and dealing with locals as another task included in their patrol’s mission, which is
good as long as they see it as the most important task not a lesser one. They
conduct what I call the COIN rape, when it should be the COIN foreplay. Our
number one mission as infantrymen is to separate the enemy from the local
populace. Think about how challenging that is. The Afghans have a tribal system
where outsiders are not trusted based on five millennia of civilization. You will not
gain that trust unless you are sincere. Bypassing locals along the route in order to
make it to the one mosque your patrol was assigned to ASCOPE that day, will not
nor will it ever accomplish the mission. Talk to folks and get your message out
there. Don’t solely stick to rattling off a couple of pre-arranged sentences from the
IO campaign – talk to them and let them know why you are here. Ask them about
their families and their health. Lead up to the questions that you are trying to get
at. Couple examples:

Most common: Peace be upon you. What’s your name? What’s your tribe? Is that
your house? How old are you? Have you seen the Taliban? What’s the most
important thing for you and your tribe? Second most? Have people recently moved
from or to your area? Why? Peace be upon you. And on to the next guy or back to
the FOB.

What it should be: Peace be upon you Aga Wali (if you have talked to him before,
you should know his name and use it. Keep a patrol log and reference it when prior
to going to the area you are in). How are your sons today? Do you have a few
minutes for some questions? Would you like to move to the shade and have a seat?
You told me before, that you lived here all your life and know everyone in the area.
I also know that some locals are helping emplace IEDs; this is dangerous for
everyone including your young children. When do the Taliban come to your area? –
you get the idea.

Doesn’t matter if you like the people or not. Don’t really care if you think their
ideology is bullshit. Fact is if you want to win, the people have to believe that you
are sincere and convincing them that it is in their best interest to support you vice
your enemy is a key part. Winning is what matters and the only way to do that is
getting better at COIN and IO, regardless of how much we hate it.
4. Partnering with the Afghanistan Forces. Like dealing with the local populace, we
will never succeed unless these guys know we care and get them proficient enough
to do the job. First understand that they are not Americans and have a different
culture. You will more than likely not be able to keep them from having sex with
each other, smoking pot, or taking a little off the top. You can take their drugs
when you find it and remind them it is against their religion and diminishes their
capabilities in combat and if you are truly partnered with them you can prevent
them from stealing from the locals, because you are with them 24/7. Focus on how
we can make them a better force. You don’t have that far to go with the ANCOP
and ANA (they already have an acceptable level of corruptness and the people
respect them and are proud of them. Additionally in my experience they are braver
than Iraqis and not as lazy). Just teach them basics fundamentals – patrolling
formations and techniques, weapons handling, fire discipline, and TTPs that you
commonly train to. You have to have patience and treat them with respect. Include
them in the planning process, rehearsals, and allow for patrol orders to be
translated.

I honestly am not convinced that the ANP will be an acceptable force in the next few
years. I have had numerous locals on patrol tell me that they don’t trust them and
would rather have the Taliban in charge. Locals here have long memories and it
will be a herculean effort to change the attitude towards the ANP. They go far
beyond the bounds of acceptable graft and indicators lead me to believe are not
always on our side of the fight. They are a localized force, unlike the ANA and
ANCOP, and in turn probably have relatives fighting for the Taliban. We had similar
problems in Iraq with the IPs. We solved that problem by putting squads in police
stations and keeping a constant eye on them – different type of partnering.

5. EOF – Our guys out amongst the civilian populace on a daily basis have few
problems sharing the road and interacting. They are also confident enough in their
abilities to identify threats and employ weapon systems that there are very few
incidents. I would guess that the majority of our platoons have not fired a single
pen flare or a warning shot throughout the deployment. Our guys that are vehicle
bound, either as part of a log train or a route clearance section, however, shoot pen
flares at the cyclic rate and far too many warning shots and use smoke to screen.
As time goes on they get better and use less but until they learn some lessons, they
do a bit of damage to your area and you have to pay for it. Training to recognize
threats (EOF is a tool to de-escalate a perceived threat, recognize it as such) and be
proficient in your weapons systems is a must and we don’t spend enough focused
time on these elements. Realize that you are a local show. It is as if Transformers
just dropped in to Afghanistan and people are going to stop and watch (definitely
not a reason to shoot M203 smoke at a farmer leaning on a shovel to obscure your
activities – yep seen it). Everyone here carries a shovel and works next to canal
roads (they are farmers). Locals drive up and down the roads (it is their road and
the ISAF directive states we share it). At the end of the day, there just aren’t
Afghanis lining up to be martyrs over here. They care about self preservation.
Besides, if a scooter carrying explosives rams into the front of your MRAP, set back
and enjoy the show. One bad guy down and no civilian or friendly casualties - chalk
up a win.

6. Shooting Dogs. There is no dog in Nawa province not accounted for by a local.
They love their dogs and keep them for security purposes and treasured pets. You
kill one and you have problems. It would be like shooting a West Virginian’s dog. If
he wasn’t actively supporting the Taliban before hand, he is now. Unfortunately, we
had to learn some hard lessons. Guys, who have deployed to Iraq, shoot the
fuckers like it is going out of style. It’s different here. There are not a thousand
stray, rabid dogs running about. Dogs are owned and cared for. Throw a rock at
them or stand your ground and they will stop or run away. The dogs here are
intimidating, some resembling Lycans, but they are just dogs.

7. Drive slow and stop rewarding failure. Out of three units who regularly drove
Route 605, the number of IED strikes to finds was significant. The solution is a
training one, not one dealing with luck. IED strikes are preventable. If you are
driving slow enough (below five miles per hour) you will recognize things like rocks
the locals put across the road or a line of foot tracks that suddenly veer off the side
of the road or a break in vehicle tracks. The get back to the FOB mentality, coupled
with the sure knowledge that Marines will not get hurt in an MRAP but be rewarded
with a Combat Action Ribbon kills us. Giving a Marine a CAR for screwing up and
hitting an IED is one of the dumbest things we have ever done, especially when the
guy who finds a dozen IEDs is not “engaged by the enemy” but the asshole that
drives like mad and hits one is a hero. Let’s be honest with ourselves and recognize
an IED strike for what it is, a failure, and take the time to investigate what went
wrong.

Drive slow enough to identify irregularities in your environment. Log and MRAP
Company (Amtrackers turned into an MRAP Company) should be masters at Combat
Hunter. You have to get out of your vehicles and V-Sweep areas that you expect to
find IEDs in.

8. We have to get back our patrolling capabilities. Ninety percent of everything we

do is patrolling but we aren’t good at it. The Iraq experience has done some good
things for our Corps but it has diminished our patrolling capabilities. Our NCOs
experience in Iraq has fostered a sure knowledge that the double column is the
preferred formation and moving along roads is acceptable, which is exactly the
wrong things to do. Right now we operate at an acceptable level but with some
focused training we can limit our casualties, while killing more of the enemy.
Everyone can spout 5-3-5 rules but few know what it is and even fewer practice it.
A) Each patrol needs a viable mission that accomplishes a needed task. Going here
because we went over there yesterday is beyond stupid and you are failing as a
leader with that reasoning.

B) Go through the orders process in its entirety when able. At a minimum do route
planning and brief an order covering Situation (past 24 or 48 hours and other
patrols) Mission (what, where and purpose), Execution (intent, where you expect to
make contact or find IEDs and actions when that happens, IA drills for contact, IED
strike, Medevac, and cover formation types – where you will satellite/guardian
angel, wedge echelon etc).

C) Do a confirmation brief with the platoon commander.

D) Conduct Initial and Final Inspections.

E) Use an Initial Rally Point inside the wire to conduct your final inspection, do last
minute rehearsals or rehearsal of concept drills, final com checks, get in your initial
combat formation and be counted out of the wire by the APL – use your APL, most of
the Marines now days don’t even know what that is.

F) Point men need to be trained along with flanks. Use a dual point system – one
guy looking close for IED threat and one far scanning tree lines. Walk at a pace that
facilitates your mission, not which gets you back to the patrol base quicker.

G) Take security halts and observe your surroundings frequently. Have one of your
patrol elements set up in observation covertly while the other element moves into
the village. Watch the actions the locals do. Want atmospherics, see if there are
runners or people move towards the patrol to greet them. If something happens,
this observation team is already set as a base of fire.

H) Investigate what is happening. Marines often see locals doing routine tasks, like
pumping water or kids playing, when if they investigated vice just continuing to
patrol on by, they would see the hole perfectly shaped for an IED amongst the
playing children dug by the guy with a pick axe being shielded by the pretty kids
playing in the road. The Taliban are masters at using the obvious to deploy IEDs
right under your nose.

I) Use deception. Send out two patrols at a time in different directions, and then
have one circle back. All too often we rotate patrols in and out. The Taliban quickly
figure out that if the patrol just went west, he has complete freedom of movement
to the East.

J) Use Satellites, traveling and bounding over watch and a variety of formations to
match the threat.

K) Do not set patterns.

L) Stay the fuck off of roads and trails. I believe that every casualty our battalion
has taken from IEDs, with the exception of two incidents, has been on a road or trail
and it has been at times when the Marines were not required to be on the road or
trail as part of a sweep/clearance mission.

M) Use rally points.

N) Use the appropriate formation to be in the most advantageous position to

immediately gain the initiative and kill the enemy. We are very lacking in this area
and a lot of our squad leaders just don’t get it. Use TDGs and a variety of training
scenarios to get them up to speed and understand a variety of terrain and tactical
based scenarios.

O) Crossing Linear Danger areas is a lost art, especially when a patrol will walk
three hundred meters along a canal to find a foot bridge to cross it – terrible at
setting patterns, just walk through the water but set up near and far side security
first and use a variety of techniques so you don’t set patterns.

P) Communication Procedures need work. Rehearse them and have competent

Marines on the radio.

Q) Proper dispersion. Make sure it’s enough to mitigate the IED threat but not too
much where you are not in a position to get combat power where it needs to be. If
you have to do ten “I’m up they see me, I’m downs” prior to getting your weapon
into action, your spent before you go into the assault. It’s all fun and games when
someone is shooting at you via pop shots at 300 meters, a completely different
story when you have a few machine guns hammering down on you from less than
100 meters.

R) Individual movement and actions such as using available cover and making eye
contact with the guy behind you every ten steps or so.

S) Stay in zone a while. We have become too bogged down with timelines. More
often than not, the Iraq standard of four hour patrols is the constant. One platoon
commander had his guys doing 12 hour patrols. Initially, when I heard about it, I
thought it was stupid. After visiting the patrol base and going on some of his
patrols, I realized he was a genius. He solved several problems at once. His
Marines automatically set up to observe areas because they had to in order to rest.
They spent a good deal of time speaking with locals, because it’s another way to
rest. They moved slowly and deliberately, because the Marines realized iPod time
doesn’t come until that 12 hours is up. They covered their entire AO almost daily
and 24 hours a day. Marines had enough time to focus on patrol prep. There is a
lot of ways to accomplish your mission and you have to try a variety. Change things
up and never count anything out.
In short before I run through the entire alphabet read the 6-5 and 6-7 and know it.
Go through it frequently and test your Marines on it via written and performance
test as part of their proficiency scores.

9. Recognize small arms fire for what it is in accordance with the enemy’s local
TTPs. If it is just a few pop shots, more than likely the enemy is attempting to get a
reaction from you and see what you do. They will shoot a couple shots at you, while
using observers. You set up a base of fire and conduct an action left, then two days
from now, they will conduct an identical SAF attack. If you go left this time, you will
quickly locate an IED the wrong way. On the other hand, if the bad guys start
shooting at you like they mean it, they are there to fight. You have to be immediate
in your drill if you want to fix them and kill them. I hear all the time, how the bad
guys get away. Well, don’t fuck’n wait ten minutes for mortars or air. You kill
enemy squads and fire teams with Marine infantry squads. Fucking assault them
and utilize your weapon systems organic to the squad and superior marksmanship.

10. Fire Discipline and marksmanship fundamentals. Got to get your guys to buy in
to only shooting at targets. I think we did a good job of this but there were some
units, who got engaged by an estimated enemy force of fire team size and
managed to shoot 4 magazines per man for a platoon – complete horse shit. I think
everyone realizes that the enemy generally does a good job of selecting firing
positions with a decent amount of cover and concealment. If 4 guys are shooting at
you, probably not 4 or 5 guys from your side can identify the positions. In addition,
the guy who is waiting for a target will see a Marine shooting at a random bush or
window and believe that’s where the bad guys are and add his fires to the mix, next
thing you know you have an entire squad/platoon dumping rounds into an empty
bush or window and there is so much fire from your side of the canal, you don’t
know if or where fire from the other side is coming. This boils down to training, unit
discipline, and whether or not the individual Marines have combat action ribbons.
Suggest you speak with the officers and convince your commander that if an
incident appears where a platoon shoots a few thousand 5.56 and some rockets at
an estimated 3-4 enemy, while rapidly turning in CAR requests a preliminary inquiry
should soon follow with some punitive action. The guys who only shoot at targets
and employs his weapon systems to his advantage will overwhelm and defeat these
clowns over here every time. The guys who sit back and shoot a lot, while awaiting
fire support, just make noise and waste money and convince the Taliban to continue
attacking.

11. Defensive Positions. Every position is not laid out for Final Protective Fires.
Despite what IOC says, sometimes Close Defensive Fires is your best option.
Recognize the most likely place for the enemy to take a few shots at you i.e.
covered and concealed escape route, within small arms range and lay your weapon
system on that. Proof your range cards frequently. You may have set in your guns
initially when no corn was up and a month later the tactical situation has changed.
Guns are also heavy and generally they are resting in sand. As they sink, your
range card becomes worthless, guns become unleveled and your traverse ends up
becomes a search and traverse. Conduct frequent training with the Marines on post
on machine gunnery and how to manipulate the weapon system/use the range card;
along with telling them why the gun is positioned where it is and aimed at that spot.
Commanders at individual positions should tour their posts daily.

Make sure your guns are cleaned and lubed. Most Marines make sure the weapon is
clean and to keep it clean, they don’t lube it. Take that into account with failure to
clean the ammo and then you will have a guaranteed jam when you need that
weapon the most – this happened to one of our COPs when they caught a couple of
guys laying in an IED and the guys got away.

Make sure you use good judgment on where optics are placed, what kind of optics
you use, and do detailed sketches of the surrounding areas. Not sure how many
times, I have gotten on post and asked, how long has that loop hole been in that
wall across that field? A Marine has never been able to give me an answer and a lot
of them look like recent additions to the local décor.

You have to battle track you squads and get frequent position and radio checks.
Keep abreast of the type of air on station and where it is. You should have
redundant com and be able to operate your COC effectively day or night.

Use the right weapon system for the right threat. .50 cals and MK-19s are great but
if your sector of fire/observation is 200 yards probably don’t need it, especially if
your Marines aren’t competent in using the system.

Have supplementary and alternate positions. Basic fundamental but most posts
don’t have them. Also make sure they are labeled. A good system I saw was
numbers for posts and letters for Supplementary and alternate positions. It’s
confusing to the Marine if you tell him to take his men to the position next to the
post at two in the morning under attack. Be able to say take your team and divide
them between bravo and charlie.

Have a planned reactionary force on standby. The leader of that force attends the
patrol brief the Marines going outside the wire.

Your briefing area needs to be set up as user friendly as possible, so your Marines
will use it. Have a GRG map up big enough to trace a route along with a regular
1:50,000. Put up a skeleton order with freqs and call signs on it. If you can put
benches in there to encourage Marines to sit down and take notes, do so. Make a
write board so Marines can draw formations and do ROC talks for cordons etc. (I
used the back of a laminated map and it worked fine).

Make sure you are conducting continuing actions. Take a look at those claymores
and your wire every day. Often when I walked the wire, claymores were
camouflaged with mud in front of them or had fallen over and were pointing to the
sky.

Know your neighbors. You should know each of them by name and visit them a few
times a week. If you aren’t visiting them frequently, bet your ass the enemy is and
probably observing you from their homes. But it just isn’t as exotic to stop by the
neighbor’s house and visit, besides who wants to add more time to their patrol by
stopping just outside the wire either coming or going. Generally, your neighbors are
the most important people to talk to and know.

Use log books on post and log in things that are important tactically, not radio
checks and worthless shit. Change your relief times (had one post where they only
got shot at right after or before changeover and Marines could only identify general
directions vice locations, just change up your times and make sure the COG is
keeping an eye out prior to relief).

Just like patrolling, get a hold of a 6-4 and read the chapter on defense. Lost art
and you will never be surprised with what you find. By the middle of the second
company, I could tell platoon commanders what I was going to find. They thought,
never on my post and they ended up walking back steaming in most cases and
changing how they did business.

12. One of our more, savvy platoon commanders assumed his own AO. When I
went to visit him I noticed that he had a twice rewarded PFC keeping accountability
of chow and water and fixing the UGR-As daily. I might also add that this shit bird
probably did it better than most SNCOs. Here is my point. The platoon sergeant
should be the most experienced infantrymen in that platoon. He is responsible for
not only chow and water but most importantly helping train and advise the platoon
commander and squad leaders. He can’t do that sleeping 12 hours a day and never
going outside the wire. We are about 50 percent with some doing the right thing
and some making a stab at what the shit bird PFC does. If these guys are spending
their time sleeping all day and counting chows, they need to be relieved not
rewarded with Navy Coms. On the other side of things you need to make sure the
squad leaders are able to be squad leaders. Figure if the plt sgt and cmdr are going
out with a different squad every other day it should keep things moving in the right
direction. In addition, all hands will have a good grasp on the atmospherics and
tactical situation because there is no substitute for seeing things first hand.

13. Communications. You have to continually train to this and have redundancy in
your patrols. I wish we still had the PRRs for squads. Motorola’s work well but are
bulky and often you don’t have a pouch to store them in, so they become a pain in
the ass. As far as handsets, I used to think the old school one was the way to go
but now, I am a huge fan of the quiet pro. When the fight is sporadic and you have
some space in between you and the enemy, the old school handset is fine but
during close in fights with a lot of noise, nothing substitutes for an ear piece and
nothing sucks as much as running 50 meters this way and that passing direction
while you are getting fired up by machine guns. There has to be better gear out
there that isn’t as cumbersome or hot with a big piece of plastic covering your ear.

14. Pinned down. I have heard this term a few times out here. Being pinned down
is a state of mind, nothing is holding you there. Get your base of fire going, firing
only at targets and at the sustained rate. Use the marksmanship fundamentals and
you will rapidly reduce their numbers. Then assault. In areas we have done this,
we killed them and they didn’t come back to play. They go and play in other folk’s
areas, which sit and wait for supporting arms.

15. Technology. Used appropriately, can be a force multiplier. Unfortunately,

Marines look at our technology as short cut tools. If I got my trusty G-Boss aimed
down that road, I don’t need to patrol it or if there is a boom in the area, no reason
to go and investigate as I will just tract it on my handy G-Boss. No doubt these
things are impressive tools and can help considerably but nothing compares to a
Marine being there or seeing it with his own eyes. I don’t know how many times I
have seen stuff on G-Boss that I was 100 percent convinced a hostile act is
occurring but when I got down there, I found the guy was slaughtering a goat in the
middle of the road at five in the morning and that historic IED spot was just the
place to do it at or just farming at night because it’s hot in the day time. Things
aren’t always what they appear, especially when it’s two clicks away and at a
sloping angle. We used to claim that the difference in the Marine Corps and other
services was that we trained the man and equipped him, where the other branches
just manned the equipment and it did the job. Most of our leaders are doing the
right thing but some have become trapped into the economy via G-Boss and Scan
Eagle.

The image on Scan Eagle does more harm than good; I can’t honestly tell what is
going on the screen. The sound will compromise continually and the folks from MEB
love flying it over your patrols and when you tap into the image it is only focused on
your guys, not the surrounding area. Easy fix for this is to get on the radio and tell
your CP, to get on the mirc and task them to go somewhere else. Have them push
off where it will not notify everyone of your patrols location but they can support
contact. Push them to an area where you expect the bad guys to be operating in
since you aren’t there. Have those following convoys to catch the enemy trying to
backfill a route with IEDs that has just been cleared.

16. Tactical Patience. We have done pretty well limiting civilian casualties but not
as well as we could have if we observed a little longer – a couple is too many
sometimes. A guy pulling a pitch fork out of the hay at night looks just like a guy
taking a weapon out of a cache at first glance. Take the time to wait a few minutes
and observe what the guys are doing before you shoot. The damage you cause
may be irreparable. Along with that, if you are still covert and have the drop on
folks, hold off they may bring in some of their friends and you can kill them too.
17. We had one company commander tell his guys they couldn’t bring things like
iPods, personal electronic equipment etc. I initially thought he was full of shit and
Marines needed something when they were inside the wire to spend their time with.
I agree with him 100 percent at this point and no doubt his guys are tighter as a
company for it. Give a Marine the ability to get away with something and they will.
Recommend if you find one on PCC/PCIs confiscate it until after deployment. If you
find a kid with one on patrol, vehicle or foot mobile, they should be NJP’d and
reduced, especially if they are in a leadership position. No shit found a turret
gunner watching a movie on an iPod, looked across the seat and realized the back
seater was listening to music on his like it was SOP, neither paid me any mind. Was
catching a ride with the same unit one day and they hit an IED, driving too fast over
a filled in hole. I asked didn’t they just drive that route. Reply was yes but there
was a hole in the ground right there so we went around it, of course on the way
back the hole was filled in with an IED. So after the cordon and medevac was
complete, I jumped back in the rear of a different vehicle and as soon as the radio
checks were complete, the iPod was hooked into the speaker system like it was SOP
– not organic 1/5 but not saying some of my guys weren’t doing the same. Different
levels of discipline in all units and this was a Marine unit that lost 15 out of 20
vehicles in about a month – on the same road that we had guys finding plenty of
IEDs and hitting a total of three.

18. Discipline matters. Look at the above example. Look at the casualties we had.
They were few in comparison to other units but if you really look at it, most could
have been avoided as they occurred via IED and almost solely on roads. Marines
make a lot of comfort based decisions like patrolling on roads because walking
through the farm fields is a pain in the ass. If you are a squad leader and get a kid
killed on a road because you made a comfort based decision, you are at fault.
There are times when you need to clear the roads and you use a metal detector and
V-sweep for that. During routine patrols, you stay off danger areas, not walk along
them for easy traveling. Marines know this, it isn’t a training problem, it is a
discipline problem. Same goes with weapons handling. Some things we aren’t
good at because we are not trained well in it or have lost that perishable skill but
many of the failures we have are solely a lack of discipline. You should have seen it
day two after the assault. Hard to find a Marine that didn’t have his sleeves rolled
to the elbow or were wearing eye protection or gloves. Luckily company
commanders immediately corrected the problem but unfortunately; it was at the
company commander level. I hate to say it but our push to equivocate squad leader
school and platoon sergeants course with the sergeant’s and career course is
costing us. What’s the difference between when we were NCOs and today’s group?
They have more combat experience than we did, so they should be better. So why
are they so lacking when it comes to self and unit discipline? Yep, we have some
truly talented guys out there that are very disciplined and have some tremendous
squads but the norm is not as disciplined as I remember it. The norm is poor
weapons handling, taking shortcuts, and dirty patrol bases. Fortunately or
unfortunately, depending on how you look at it, you don’t get punished for making
mistakes every time. You can walk that road ten or twenty times and it just turns
out it is easier to walk but man you pay a fucking steep price on that twenty-first
jaunt down that motherfucker.

19. Not that we can do anything about it but realize it and make adjustments but
our pilots and aircraft suck in comparison to the Army and Air Force. I noticed it
before when these units have flown for me but not like this time. We used Army
guys for some training, along with Marines, prior to D-Day and the differences were
very noticeable and undeniable even amongst our own FACs. The Army guys will
come in and land at the grid you give them, with very limited dispersion between
birds – allowing you to link up with your other elements, and will set the thing right
down on the deck in the inbound flight appearing not to lose much speed. In
comparison, Marine pilots will bring in their aircraft and attempt several flaring
techniques and then wave off. Sooner or later they will land in the midst of a brown
out and probably a few hundred meters off target with dispersion of about ½ click
between aircraft is the norm. Luckily the Army and Air Force guys will drop right
where you want them to pick up casualties, we are lucky to have them. I have
heard a lot of excuses on why this is and here are the two most plausible ones. 1)
They have superior aircraft with better handling capabilities; 2) Their pilots are
pilots, whereas our pilots fill a dozen different billets and get about a tenth of the
actual stick time these guys do. Like most of you, I love the Corps and it hurts me
to say it but I think we have been chasing the wrong aircraft. We don’t need to
create a capability; the other branches already have it in the aircraft they use. We
need that capability for when they aren’t there. You just can’t fit a 46 or 53 and
definitely not an Osprey where these things will land.

20. Rules of Engagement. There is a lot of grumbling regarding perceived

restrictions with the ROE. This is all bullshit. You can kill who you need to and with
whatever you want to and justify it. The question isn’t can I use mortars or HIMARS,
it is should I. I was down at Sullivan one day, and they have the mIRC strolling
across a big screen TV. I look up and catch the bottom of a BDA from a different
unit assigned to the MEB. I see, two 500lb bombs, one 2,000 lb bomb, 6 HIMARS,
and I believe two gun runs and 18 or so 81mm. I was like Huahhh! Bet these guys
just smoked a shit load of them. So I scrolled up and started to read “Two possible
enemy observing our COP, near a compound that is a known enemy observation
position.” Really! You are fucking shitting me. How come you have a spot in direct
view of your COP that is frequented by the enemy? You got two possible enemy
observing your patrol base, COP, or FOB tell one of the patrols you have outside the
wire to move to that position, maintain eyes on until then with a designated
marksman or something, confirm they are bad guys and kill them or ask them why
they are stopped there and explain to them how dangerous it is if they don’t appear
to be enemy. More than likely, guys like this didn’t have any patrols outside the
wire. The overwhelming fire guys will do nothing but cause more problems in this
fight and prolong our stay and ultimately cause more Marine casualties and deaths.
Stop reading so much Ralph Peters; most of it is hyperbole bullshit. If it is the “we
don’t have enough folks to patrol” well then your leadership fucked you, if that is
true and not just laziness and you were improperly employed as bait in lieu of
being an effective unit.

If you have guys that you can PID out of range of small arms and at a place you can
engage with IDF without civilian casualties, fucking have at it drop a MOAB. But if
there is a chance of smoking some poor fuckers wife and kids, along with his house,
then standby. Turns out the Taliban are smart enough to never shoot from their
compound and attempts to bait Marines and soldiers into destroying it, along with
killing civilians. Want to turn a population over to the enemy, destroy their houses
and kill some innocent farmers. You just lost the strategic battle in that village to
kill two jackasses, who probably took off the second they heard the aircraft. Why do
the Taliban continue to do this? Because it is continually successful and we
continue to fall for it along with that, it is the one thing the media loves to hear “we
have casualties because of our ROEs?”

21. Weapon systems:

M9s – after multiple deployments the only effective employment I have seen is on
the way to the chow hall. Still easier to carry around than your assigned TO weapon
and after a while you forget it’s even there. Plus you can have a variety of holsters
to add to your coolness while at the FOB. Same goes for MCMAP – utterly worthless
waste of time, closest I came to using it on deployment was with a double cheese
burger at Leatherneck. Recommend spending that time doing close order drill
building discipline or watching porno. Maybe if we colored our magazines different
colors and you could only get black ones if you master reloading drills the
MCMAPers would have more interest. You could no shit get desert MARPAT mags if
you fired expert and mastered reload drills. Unqualified guys get red mags,
Marksman get blue mags, and sharpshooters could get green ones and you could
buy whatever fucking color belt you thought worked best or was cheapest. I think
the thing that pisses me off most is you see all these fuckers at the FOBs MCMAPing
it up, when they can’t properly employ one fucking weapon system in our arsenal.

M4 and M16A4 - performed and held up well. Few maintenance issues and hard to
find a Marine that had any sort of failure to fire or malfunction during a fight. RCOs
held their zeroes very well with about 50% claiming they were still dead center if
they got the opportunity to rezero and the other half within a couple inches. I
consider this a big success with the abuse they go through. PEQ 16’s – like the
product and ease of getting a zero but it doesn’t maintain it well. Recommend
setting up a point at each patrol base where you can do a confirmation a few times
a week without firing by getting 100m standoff and making sure that the visible
laser rests near the tip of the chevron at 100m. Yep I know the book tells you to
zero for 300m but the most likely range you will engage at is 100m or less and you
can’t get PID beyond that distance anyway. At most with this technique you will be
within a few inches at 100m and just left or right and 8 to 9 inches low around
300m.

M203 – I am a big fan and the bad guys aren’t. They do have some maintenance
issues. I think the leave sight is all a Marine needs for daytime firing in this
environment. You will get the most benefit employing this guy with his rifleman or
another Marine. One Marine marks the target and the gunner shoots it. If the
round doesn’t hit dead on, the bad guy will more than likely vacate his position and
the other guy can shoot him with direct fire. Yep, I know what you are thinking,
“the 203 gunner has an M16,” unfortunately, while he is attempting to reload his
203 is when the bad guy makes a run for it. Also saw some Marines shooting
rounds at targets beyond max effective range, without result of course. The
weapon system only works to around 400, trying to shoot bad guys at 450 or 500 is
just a waist of ammo. Focus on range estimation with these guys. The right
amount of ammo to carry was another concern. I think ten is probably the right
answer. We didn’t purchase the leg harnesses for the Marines but a few had them
and they looked uncomfortable to me but I checked with the Marines throughout
the deployment cycle and they liked them – of course, they bought them with their
own money; I say this as Marines are less likely to admit it doesn’t work if they are
the ones that forked out the money. I remember seeing guys wearing Spartan
vests (MTV) in Iraq that they had purchased with their own money and claiming how
great it was. Of course once the Corps bought them, everyone continued to
compalin about how much they suck, which they do.

M249 – worked relatively well. I think the SAW will always seem to work well, as
most of us have very low expectations. So when it fires, we go man that is a good
system. Still a light machine gun and agree that an automatic rifle is what’s
needed.

LAW – worked well with the construction standards in Nawa and Marines much
prefer them over the AT-4. Recommend carrying two on each patrol. The time you
need them will always be the first patrol you left them back because you haven’t
had contact in a while.

SMAW – rounds worked well and do the job. I personally think it is a near worthless
weapon with the LAW accomplishing the same mission. Hard to believe that this
has been a key component to our fighting over the last 9 years and we still have an
Israeli weapon system produced in the early 80s accomplishing the task. No doubt
when I retire we will still be switching different types of optics on and off it and
claiming our gunners suck due to training and needing to bore sight it every 15
minutes so it stays accurate.

Mk-12 – We had a ten day training package put together by a couple of our snipers
and Sgt Husky from sniper school. With this limited training our guys got a good
number of kills from 250 to 600 meters with one shot – also a big fan of the 77 grain
round. I held much tighter groups with this out of my M-4 than the regular M855. I
would never go the route of having this type of scope on all rifles, but having one
per squad seems about right. I would think about going completely suppressed in
rifle squads. I think you would get several benefits out of this, including have the
bad guys stick around long enough to kill more of them.

Mk-11 – we had two and got some use out of them. As you know, it’s a Mk-12 firing
a round designed to kill man sized game. Sweet!

M40’s - snipers usually went for the suppressed weapons and didn’t use these
much.

SASSR – took a few long range shots but missed.

.50 cal – been around for years and no issues. Think API-T is the way to go. As
Marines see the SLAP rounds they of course want to use them, as it is special, but
they quickly turn back to API-T as it gets the job done and you can make
adjustments more easily. Also think about ground mounting these in the assault. It
works well. Think about tri-pods in vehicles, you don’t have enough to go around.

Mk-19 – devastating to a tree line or canal in the proper hands. Make your
adjustments while the rounds are in the air. One platoon commander used them to
push enemy down a canal into an awaiting sniper team that was able to get some
good work in.

Javelins – we didn’t get our Command Launch Units until the end of September, so
we didn’t get much use out of them but by watching on the range and talking with
other folks it looks like about a 50% failure rate. I continue to hear what a great
piece of gear this is and for a while believed it myself. Look through a Saber and
then a CLU or even a PAS 13 and then a CLU. The optic was great when we first got
them ten years ago but sucks now. A missile that is too expensive to train with is a
great scam, especially with the failure rate. Oh no, it’s expensive, ah just use this
computer to train with, ah you don’t need to actually fire it but continue to stock up
these eighty grand a pop missiles – must be several generals and retired gunners
on that board raking in the cash. For a system that is as expensive as it is, it should
be intuitive. I pick it up, put a dot on the target and press a button. I press the
button again and it fires. That’s it. Shouldn’t be closing gates, and time limits and
several different warnings and a shit load of misfire procedures. - I will say, I have
heard the Brits use these at the cyclic rate and don’t have much problems –
probably because they shoot them frequently solving the training issue. Great to
hear that in a couple years, once the war is over, we will be able to begin training
with missiles. Sweet!

Sabers – great all around piece of gear. Think that each system should come with a
LIAC, instead of one per four systems – great to use at patrol bases ground
mounted, like a G-Boss with a missile, fuck yeah. You should be able to mount
them on any vehicle, not just the one type of HMMWV.

Mortars – didn’t get a lot of use from them with the exception of illume? Yep, every
squad leader will want to call in an IR illumination mission in 95% illum and you
can’t even see the round to adjust. These rounds are not the silver bullet I was led
to believe. Every member of the section needs to be trained in basic FDC. The
school is a couple weeks long and a savvy NCO can train everyone in afternoon
sessions for the basics in a couple of days. You need to run split sections when you
are this dispersed and have redundancy in FDC procedures. Boards and MBCs
should be run in tandem, not one or the other. Still like the idea of mortars hand-
held in the assault and I think that’s the way to go, just didn’t get to apply it.

22. Body Armor – plate carriers are definitely far superior to previous vests. It may
only be a few pounds lighter but it gives you greater mobility, you can actually get
in a good firing position and use your optic and it is much cooler due to air flow. I
do think we could do away with side SAPPIs. I have never heard of anyone having a
bullet stopped by them. I could be wrong and there may be some out there but
Dinger and I was having this conversation and neither had a case where it worked.
Yep front and back plates catch the occasional bullet but never heard of a side plate
doing it. Not saying it wouldn’t just saying the rounds usually is just above or
below. That would take quite a bit of weight off right there, drop them. I also used
a belt vice attaching everything to my vest. That way all the weight was on my hips
vice shoulders and I could get completely flat in a good prone position.

23. Binos – the Cascades are a good optic and serve the purpose but they are
large. I got a set of Katmais and they are a solid piece of glass fitting in my all
purpose pouch, along with my smart pack and NODs. Most recognize the need and
benefit of having an 8 or 10 power optic but few take the Cascades out due to size
and being cumbersome. Great piece of gear especially, in this environment. No,
you don’t nor should you have a reticle pattern in them. You want to adjust fire, use
your RCO or the finger method. When you want a capability to observe small
details, slapping a reticle pattern in the middle of it is counter- productive.
Sometimes combining capabilities is a good thing, other times realizing that you
already have things that can fulfill that requirement and focusing on one capability
is the way to go.

24. Vehicles – mobility is challenging in the green zone and MRAPs of all variants
put you in the position of loosing situational awareness. But if you are going to be
in a vehicle over here you need to be in an MRAP. I thought this was bullshit at the
beginning and was a believer in the HMMWV. Fact is that although they could take
a relatively good IED strike in Iraq, you hit one of these HME jugs over here and it
will kill the kids in it. Not it may kill them, it will every time, and if the charge is
over 50lbs you will probably have to execute the missing Marine plan to find the
guys who were riding in it.
Drive slow and focus on your surrounding and not your Best Friends Tracker.

Have metal detectors out front and run V-Sweeps off the road and at a distance like
good flanks changing up their distance away from the main body. If not, the bad
guys will put anti-personnel mines at set distances along the routes. If you have the
people, run foot patrols out in front of your convoy and set up guardian angels
along the way.

25. Like Nagl said, you have to be a learning organization. Some things are
transferable from Iraq but many are not. Conduct an analysis of your environments
and make just decisions, thinking about second and third order effects. Continue to
learn and watch for changing enemy TTPs.

There is a lot of negative stuff in this document and for every Marine I saw doing it
wrong, I saw three doing it right. I also spent some time bashing some of our non-
infantry guys. While some of their failures are discipline issue, as are ours, most are
training issues. We throw these guys together a week prior to Mojave Viper and tell
that Marine he is no longer a mechanic, he is now a turret gunner on an MRAP,
which is horse shit but it is the reality. I failed at this training piece and should have
spent more time with them.

The buzz words “brilliance in the basics” and “blocking and tackling” are the “no
shitters.” Those things that are or used to be fundamentals to infantrymen is what
will make you successful and better war fighters here. You can’t spend too much
time patrolling or shooting unknown distance or movers, because that’s all you
have here – wish we had one of those shooting trailers at every regiment. Move
and shoot like you are stalking deer. Spend a fair amount of time on cultural
training – you don’t have to love the son-of-a- bitches but you need to understand
them and be able to say some basic phrases. No LCpl from our day would have
ever thought of going to TJ without knowing how to say how much or two beers etc.
but we will deploy to war with less capabilities. Our main purpose, in my mind, is to
separate the enemy from the civilian population. Sometimes you do that by killing
him, but more often than not, you do that by building trust with the local populace
and convincing them you are the most promising choice.

Read all the Galula, Peters, Nagl, Chayes, Mortenson, Rashid, Medby, Tanner,
Stewart, Kilcullen and Kaplan you want. I have, and it is some great information but
you have to take it in context. Don’t get sold on one idea and treat it as gospel.
The British use of the ink blot was after all much more successful in Malaysia than
France’s use in Algieria but everyone thinks Galula is a genius. There is some truth
to Peters claim that the enemy needs to feel the full weight of American power and
the local populace needs to witness it but Kilcullen is closer to the road to victory.
Mortensen is a school building mother fucker and an ambassador of good will but
building schools will not solve all the problems. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife
isn’t bad. Probably not a single original idea in that book but Nagl has paraphrased
almost every author listed above and some additional ones to build “his” book, so
you get a lot of good in a short read. Key thing is no one has all the answers with
COIN and few “new” ideas aren’t already mentioned in our Small Wars Manual of
1940 pick that fucker up and read it, you will be surprised with what you learn.

Don’t be afraid of doing non-traditional tasks. Marines are Marines and can
accomplish it with the right guidance – we have our 81’s platoon along with a
conglomeration of attachments in our most contentious area working as 0311s and
doing better in some cases, than our 0311s.

We have been using most of our snipers as 0311s. They are great intel gathers and
observers because they have specific training in it. If your platoon are winners,
man they can work wonders for you, along with finding hides and doing some key
targeting in conjunction with COIN.

Our Marines are doing a great job but we haven’t even begun to grasp our potential.
Focus on shoot, move, communicate and educate in counter-insurgency during your
training cycle.

One last thought, we need to start hunting down the acronym bandits and begin
kicking the shit out of them. Tired of continuing to call the same things, with new
names every time I deploy. It’s a pain in the ass and I am getting tired of it.

I apologize for the spelling and grammatical errors in this document but realize I
wrote the damned thing in one setting. I may re-read it and add some things on my
leave period but may not.

Any questions, hit me up on my email here for the next few days or hit me up on my
home address at marine_ka@hotmail.com.

See you guys in a few weeks.

s/f

Keith