G.R. No.

81269 July 19, 1989

LIBERTY COMMERCIAL CENTER, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PURA FERRER CALLEJA-BLR DIRECTOR/SAMAHANG
MANGGA-GAWA NG LIBERTY COMMERCIAL CENTER
ORGANIZED LABOR ASSOCIATION IN LINE INDUSTRIES
AND AGRICULTURE (SMLCC-OLALIA-
KMU), respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The principal issue in this case is whether or not public
respondent Pura Ferrer Calleja, in her capacity as the
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) of the
Department of Labor and Employment, can order a
certification election among the rank and file
employees working in the Tabaco, Albay office and in
the Legaspi City office of petitioner Liberty Commercial
Center, Inc., despite the existence of two separate
collective bargaining agreements for each of the two
said office.
Petitioner questions the decision of Director Calleja
dated September 2,1987 in BLR Case No. A-6-205-87
(MED-ARB-Case No. R05-41-87), the dispositive portion
of which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the
Order of the Med-Arbiter dated May 8,
1987 is hereby set aside and vacated
and a new one entered, calling for a
certification election among the rank
and file employees of Liberty
Commercial Center, Inc., Tabaco and
Legaspi City, with the following choices:
1. Samahan ng Mangagawa sa Liberty
Commercial Center-Olalia;
2. Association of L.C.C. Employees;
3. Liberty Employees Association; and
4. No union.
Let, therefore, the records of this case
be immediately remanded to the Office
of Origin for the conduct of the
certification election.
SO ORDERED.
1

On February 10, 1988, this Court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the execution of the said
decision.
2

The undisputed pertinent facts follow:
Petitioner has its principal business office at Tabaco,
Albay, and a branch office at Legaspi City. Private
respondent SMLCC Olalia KMU is an organized labor
union. The Association of Liberty Commercial Center
Employees (ALCCE) and the Liberty Employees
Association (LEA) are registered labor unions since July
29, 1986.
3
Their certificates of registration bear the
signatures of Director of Labor Cresenciano B. Trajano
and then Minister of Labor and Employment Augusto S.
Sanchez. The authenticity of these two certificates has
never been successfully assailed.
The ALCCE represented all the rank and file employees
of the petitioner in Legaspi City, while the LEA
represented the rank and file employees of petitioner in
Tabaco, Albay. Both unions are represented by a lawyer
from the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG).
After five months of negotiation, two separate
collective bargaining agreements were executed. They
both took effect on December 1, 1986, and were to last
for a period of three years.
The collective bargaining agreement between the
petitioner and the ALCCE is a notarized document
consisting of eleven pages.
4
The said document is
accompanied by a certification of union secretary Lina
Pasmayor that the collective bargaining agreement was
posted in two places within the premises of the office
five days before ratification, and that it had been
ratified by a majority of the members of the union.
5

Similarly, the collective bargaining agreement between
petitioner and the LEA is a notarized document
consisting of eleven (11) pages
6
together with a
certification by union secretary Lorna Kallos that the
said agreement was posted in two places within the
premises of the office five days before ratification, and
that it was ratified by a majority of the members of the
union.
7

It is recorded in the minutes of the board membership
meeting for the ratification of the collective bargaining
agreement between petitioner and the ALCCE that the
majority of the members signed for ratification (221
signatures).
8
The minutes of the general membership
meeting for the ratification of the collective bargaining
agreement between petitioner and the LEA also show
that the majority of the members signed for ratification
(124 signatures).
9

In the meantime, the SMLCC-Olalia-KMU filed a petition
for certification election with the Bureau of Labor
Relations.
On April 2, 1987, a group led by the SMLCC-Olalia-KMU
picketed the Legaspi City office of petitioner at around
8:00 o'clock in the morning. Petitioner learned that the
said group consisted of slum dwellers and employees
dismissed as early as January, 1983.
At around 11: 00 o'clock in the morning of the same
day, Atty. Domingo Reyes, a conciliator from the
Department of Labor and Employment arrived at the
office of petitioner. He informed the management that
a Notice of Strike was filed by the SMLCC-Olalia-KMU. In
a conference organized by the conciliator and attended
by the officers of petitioner, the SMLCC-Olalia-KMU
demanded the reinstatement of the dismissed
employees of petitioner.
While the conference was going on, the SMLCC- Olalia-
KMU picket continued. As there was no settlement, the
group became unruly and started to harass petitioner's
customers and other employees. Petitioner sought
relief in court. In due time, the SMLCC-Olalia-KMU was
ordered to desist from committing acts of grave threats,
grave coercion and disturbance of the peace, and from
barricading the business establishment of petitioner.
After arrests were made, there was a lull.
On May 3, 1987, the same group led by the SMLCC-
Olalia-KMU picketed the Tabaco, Albay office of
petitioner. Inasmuch as the same acts of harassment
had been committed in the picket line, petitioner
sought police intervention.
On April 9,1987, petitioner was furnished a copy of the
notice setting the initial hearing of the petition for
certification election, as well as the petition for direct
certification filed by the SMLCC-Olalia-KMU, docketed
as Med-ARB Case No. R05-41-87 and now BLR Case No.
A-6-205-87.
On April 20,1987, petitioner filed an "Answer With
Motion To Dismiss the Petition For Direct Certification"
on the ground that the petition has no legal and factual
basis.
On May 8, 1987, the Med-Arbiter dismissed the Petition
for Direct Certification on the ground that the same had
been filed before the sixty-day freedom period.
10
On
May 22, 1987, the SMLCC-Olalia-KMU interposed an
appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations, and on
September 2, 1987, the BLR Director penned the
questioned decision in BLR Case No. A-6-205-87. Hence,
this petition.
The petition is meritorious.
An examination of the record clearly shows that both
the ALCCE and the LEA are duly registered unions of
petitioner's employees in its two separate offices, one
at Tabaco, Albay and the other at Legaspi City. The
certificates of registration of both unions appear to be
authentic even considering that both unions were
organized and registered on the same date. In the
absence of strong evidence to the contrary, both ALCCE
and LEA must be considered registered unions
representing the employees of petitioner in two
separate offices.
Likewise, there is no denying that two separate
collective bargaining agreements were entered into
between petitioner and the ALCCE on one hand, and
between petitioner and the LEA on the other. Both
agreements were to be in force until December 1, 1989.
Again, notwithstanding the observation of public
respondent that the certificates of registration were
executed on the same dates thus casting doubt on their
authenticity, it appears that the two collective
bargaining agreements are notarized documents
bearing the certifications of ratification and the
signatures of the ratifying employees. The authenticity
of both collective bargaining agreements must be
sustained.
Examining the Petition for Direct Certification filed by
the SMLCC-Olalia-KMU, it clearly appears that only
fourteen supposed employees of petitioner signed
it.
11
Petitioner contends, and this was never
controverted by the SMLCC-Olalia-KMU, that those
signatories are dismissed employees of petitioner. It
also appears that the said petition was filed before the
sixty-day freedom period prior to the expiration of the
said collective bargaining agreements.
The law is explicit. A petition filed before or after the
sixty-day freedom period shall be dismissed outright.
12

What could be immediately perceived in this case is that
notwithstanding the existence of two legitimate labor
unions (ALCCE and LEA) representing the employees of
petitioner, and despite the existence of two collective
bargaining agreements as ratified by an overwhelming
majority of the said employees, the SMLCC-Olalia-KMU
pretended to represent the employees of petitioner by
committing illegal acts of picketing and by filing a
petition for certification election. The said petition had
only fourteen signatories and petitioner's contention
that all of them were previously dismissed employees
was never controverted.
The only logical conclusion is that the SMLCC-Olalia-
KMU had questionable motives in filing the petition for
certification election and in resorting to illegal acts to
coerce petitioner to allow it to intrude upon the
activities of two legitimate unions. We cannot agree
with the perceptions of the public respondent who,
without supporting evidence, doubted the authenticity
of the certificates of registration of the two labor
unions. Inasmuch as the authenticity of the certificates
of registration has not been successfully assailed, this
Court cannot accept the gratuitous statement of the
public respondent that both unions are company unions
in the absence of evidence to establish the imputation.
The SMLCC-Olalia-KMU obviously does not have any
lawful basis in filing a petition for direct certification.
Indeed, by its Coercive acts tending to harass petitioner,
it betrayed its motives to be far from sincere.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of
the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations dated
September 2, 1987 in BLR Case No. A-6-205-87 is hereby
SET ASIDE. The petition for certification election filed by
the private respondent is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU)-TUCP, Petitioners,
v. HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO, as Officer-In-
Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations, ASSOCIATION
OF DEMOCRATIC LABOR ORGANIZATION (ADLO) and
MITSUMI PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents.

Romeo S. Occea for Petitioner.

Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio and
Associates for private respondent ADLO.

The Solicitor General for public Respondent.


D E C I S I O N


PARAS, J.:


This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking review of the
resolution of the Director of Labor Relations* dated
January 30, 1987 in BLR Case No. A-1-18-87 ordering a
certification election among the rank and file
employees of respondent company and the order of
public respondent** dated February 24, 1987
dismissing petitioners motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit.

The dispositive portion of the questioned resolution of
the Bureau of Labor Relations dated January 30, 1987
(Rollo. p. 55), reads, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Accordingly, let a certification election be conducted
within twenty (20) days from receipt of this Resolution,
subject to the usual pre-election conference, with the
following as choices:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Association of Democratic Labor Union (ADLO);

2. Associated Labor union-ALU; and

3. No Union.

Let, therefore, the records be forwarded to the Office of
origin for the immediate implementation of this
Resolution."cralaw virtua1aw library

The undisputed facts of the case are as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Petitioner herein is the recognized collective bargaining
representative of all the rank and file employees of
respondent company with a collective bargaining
agreement effective January 1, 1984 to December 31,
1986. Article XX of the collective bargaining agreement
provides that the CBA shall be for a period of three (3)
years effective January 1, 1984 to December 31, 1986,
provided that within sixty (60) days before its expiration
the parties shall renegotiate for a new one
(Memorandum for the Petitioner, Rollo, p.
208).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

On October 22, 1986, a big majority of the covered
employees of respondent Company petitioned for the
renewal of the expiring agreement which petitioner and
the respondent Company agreed to negotiate. The
parties, however, failed to arrive at an acceptable
agreement so that a bargaining deadlock on CBA
negotiation was declared (Memorandum for the
Petitioner, Rollo, p. 209).

On November 3, 1986, petitioner filed a notice of strike
(Rollo, p. 27). Failing to arrive at an agreement during
the conciliation following the filing of the notice of
strike, on December 1, 1986 petitioner went on strike.

Meanwhile, on November 4, 1986 private respondent
Union, Association of Democratic Labor Organization
(ADLO) file with the Ministry of Labor and Employment,
Panlalawigang Tanggapan ng Paggawa, Bataan Export
Processing Zone, a verified petition for certification
election among the regular rank and file workers of
private company, docketed as Case No. BZED-CE-11-
011-86 (Rollo, p. 87).

On December 4, 1986, petitioner and respondent
company came to an agreement with representatives of
the parties setting their signature on the resulting CBA
on the same date (Rollo, p. 28), ratified by a big majority
of the covered employees, 584 out of 742 covered
employees, also on the same date (Rollo, p. 43).
Petitioner registered the new CBA with the Regional
Director of the Ministry of Labor and Employment San
Fernando, Pampanga on December 4, 1986 (Rollo, p.
41) as required under Article 231 of the Labor Code.

Petitioner herein intervened in the petition for
certification election. On December 9, 1986, the Med-
Arbiter called for a conference to see whether a consent
election could be agreed upon between the intervenor
union and the petitioner union, but the parties failed to
reach an agreement despite several conferences (Rollo,
pp. 59; 78).

The Med-Arbiter, Eladio de Jesus, issued an order for
the holding of a certification election in a resolution
dated December 10, 1986, premised on the fact that
the petitioner, respondent union herein, "has
satisfactorily complied with the jurisdictional
requirement of this Office. The same records show that
the instant petition was seasonably filed within the
sixty-day freedom period." (Rollo, p. 59). The said
resolution was appealed by petitioner to the Director of
Bureau of Labor Relations but the appeal was dismissed
for lack of merit, in the questioned resolution of January
30, 1987 (Rollo, p. 53). Petitioners motion for
reconsideration dated February 12, 1987 (Rollo, p. 19)
was likewise dismissed in the equally questioned order
of February 24, 1987 (Rollo, p. 17). The Med-Arbiter
then set the certification election for March 17, 1987
(Rollo, p. 60).

Instant petition was filed with the Court on March 9,
1987 (Rollo, p. 2). On the same date, petitioner filed an
urgent ex parte motion for issuance of a temporary
restraining order (Rollo, p. 6). On March 16, 1987, the
Second Division of this Court, without giving due course
to the petition, required the respondents to comment
thereon and issued a temporary restraining order
effective on the same date that the resolution was
passed, to continue until otherwise ordered by the
Court (Rollo, p. 64).

The comment of public respondent was filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General on June 3, 1987 (Rollo, p.
75). In a resolution dated June 29, 1987, petitioner was
require to file a reply thereto and the letters addressed
to then Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, of twenty one
(21) progressive democratic labor unions in Japan
protesting the temporary restraining order issued by
the Court on March 16, 1987 was noted (Rollo, p. 129).
Again on August 31, 1987, the Court resolved to note
the letters of the progressive democratic organization in
Japan (Rollo, p. 140).

On August 10, 1987, the petition was given due both
parties were required to submit their simultaneous
memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice (Rollo,
p. 166). On September 18, 1987, the Office of the
Solicitor General manifested that it was adopting for its
memorandum its comment on the petition
for certiorari filed with the Court on June 3, 1987 (Rollo,
p. 194) which was noted by the Court in its resolution
dated November 11, 1987 (Rollo, p. 202). In the same
resolution, the Court also noted receipt of two
telegrams of the Mitsumi Workers Union ALDO of
Mariveles, Bataan dated September 3 and September 9,
1987 (Rollo, pp. 184, 185), requesting for information
on the status of the case and for its expeditious
resolution, and the letters all addressed to the Chief
Justice from progressive unions in Japan together with
two undated letters signed in Japanese characters, all
demanding for a certification election (Rollo, pp. 170-
182).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Memorandum for the Petitioner was filed on November
27, 1987 (Rollo, p. 208) noted by the Court in its
resolution dated February 15, 1988 (Rollo, p. 231). The
motion to admit memorandum filed by respondent
union on April 7, 1988 (Rollo, p. 232) was granted by the
Court in its resolution dated April 18, 1988 (Rollo, p.
259) wherein the Court also noted the memorandum of
respondent union attached to the motion (Rollo, p.
234).

The issues raised by petitioner (Rollo, p. 212), are as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I


THAT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT NO CERTIFICATION ELECTION MAY BE
HELD DUE TO THE FACT THAT A BARGAINING
DEADLOCK TO WHICH PETITIONER IS A PARTY IS
SUBMITTED TO CONCILIATION/ARBITRATION AND
THERE IS A VALID NOTICE OF STRIKE PRIOR TO THE
FILING OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION
ON DECEMBER 4, 1986.
II


THAT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO AS A RESULT OF A
BARGAINING DEMAND CONCILIATION DURING THE
PROGRESS OF A STRIKE HAVING BEEN ACCORDINGLY
REPORTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF
ARTICLE 231 OF THE LABOR CODE RENDERS THE FILING
OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION
PREMATURE.
III


THAT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN NOT
DISMISSING THE PETITION, ANNEXED "D" AND
HOLDING THAT THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT (ANNEX "B" to ANNEX "B" HEREOF)
HAVING BEEN RATIFIED BY THE MEMBERS AND THE
BENEFITS THEREIN ENJOYED IS A BAR TO THE HOLDING
OF A CERTIFICATION ELECTION.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Simply stated, the sole issue is whether or not public
respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering a
certification election considering that at the time the
petition for certification election was filed there was a
bargaining deadlock between company and the
petitioner union, as a result of which petitioner union
filed a notice of strike.

In fact, it actually went on strike, and pending decision
on the said petition, petitioner and respondent
company came to terms on the collective bargaining
agreement duly ratified by a big majority of the covered
members and duly registered with the Department of
Labor and Employment.

Public respondent denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration, finding "no compelling justification to
effect a consideration, much less a reversal" of the
resolution of January 30, 1987 (Rollo, p. 18). The
aforesaid resolution dismissed the appeal of petitioner
as intervenor in the petition for certification election
based on the following: (1) the records show that the
petition for certification election was seasonably filed
within the sixty (60) day freedom period; and (2) the
records likewise reveal that the petition is supported by
two hundred forty-two (242) of the more or less six
hundred (600) rank-and-file employees of Mitsumi
Philippines, Inc., hence, has complied with the thirty
percent (30%) statutory requirement (Rollo, p. 54). The
provision of the law then in force was Article 258 of the
Labor Code inasmuch as Executive Order No. 111 which
amended it took effect only on March 4, 1987. Article
258 reads, as follows:chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 258. Requisites for certification election. Any
petition for certification election filed by any legitimate
labor organization shall be supported by the written
consent of at least thirty percent (30%) of all the
employees in the bargaining unit. Upon receipt and
verification of such petition, it shall be mandatory for
the Bureau to conduct a certification election for the
purpose of determining the representative of the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and
certify the winner as the exclusive collective bargaining
representative of all the employees in the unit."cralaw
virtua1aw library

There is no question that the 30% support requirement
for a certification election had been met even if the
covered employees number 742, as alleged by
petitioner (Memorandum for Petitioner, Rollo, p. 217)
not 600. Hence, it became mandatory for the Director
of Labor Relations to call a certification election (Atlas
Free Workers Union (AFWU-PSSLU Local v. Noriel, 104
SCRA 565 [1981]; Vismico Industrial Workers
Association (VIWA) v. Noriel, 131 SCRA 569 [1984];
Samahang Manggagawa ng Pacific Mills, Inc. v. Noriel,
134 SCRA 152 [1985]), and in the language of the Labor
Code, "mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a
certification election for the purpose of determining the
representative of the employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit and certify the winner as the exclusive
bargaining representative of all employees in the unit"
(Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros
Trabajadores de Filipinas v. Noriel, 72 SCRA 24 [1976];
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Noriel, 77 SCRA 414
[1977]).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"No administrative agency can ignore the imperative
tone of the above article. The language used is one of
command. Once it has been verified that a petition for
certification election has the support of at least 30% of
the employees in the bargaining unit, it must be
granted. The specific word used yields no other
meaning" (Federation of Free Workers v. Noriel, 86
SCRA 132 [1978]; Warren Manufacturing Workers
Union (WMWU) v. Bureau of Labor Relations, G.R. No.
76185, March 30, 1988).

Petitioner, however, insists that the deadlock in
negotiation already submitted to
conciliation/arbitration after the filing of a valid notice
of strike based on deadlock in negotiation the filing of
the petition for certification election bars the holding of
a certification election, basing its argument on the
contract bar rule under Section 3 of Rule V, Book V of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
(Memorandum for the Petitioner, Rollo, p. 213), which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 3. When to file In the absence of a collective
agreement submitted in accordance with Article 231 of
the Code, a petition for certification election may be
filed at any time. However, no certification election may
be held within one year from the date of issuance of
declaration of a final certification election result.
Neither may a representation question be entertained
if, before the filing of a petition for certification
election, a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent
or certified bargaining agent is a party had been
submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become
the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.

"If a collective agreement has been submitted in
accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for
certification election or a motion for intervention can
only be entertained within 60 days to the prior to expiry
date of such agreement."cralaw virtua1aw library

As the introductory sentence of the first paragraph
states, said paragraph applies where there is no existing
collective bargaining agreement. This circumstance is
not obtaining in the instant case. As admitted by
petitioner (Memorandum in the Petitioner, Rollo, p.
208) there was an existing collective bargaining
agreement when the petition for certification election
was filed, which was to expire on December 31, 1986. It
is the second paragraph which is applicable to the case
at bar.

In a recent decision, this Court interpreted the above in
provision as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"This rule simply provides that a petition for
certification election or a motion for intervention can
only be entertained within 60 days prior to the expiry
date of an existing collective bargaining agreement.
Otherwise put, the rule prohibits the filing of for
certification election during the existence of a collective
bargaining agreement except within the freedom
period, as it is called when the said agreement is about
to expire. The purpose, obviously, is to ensure stability
in the relationship of the workers and the management
by preventing frequent modifications of any collective
bargaining agreement earlier entered into by them in
good faith and for the stipulated original period."
(Associated Trade Unions (ATU) v. Trajano, G.R. No.
75321, June 20, 1988)

Undoubtedly, the petition for certification election was
filed during the 60-day freedom period. The fact that
petitioner was able to negotiate a new CBA with
respondent company on December 4, 1986 within the
freedom period of the existing CBA, does not foreclose
the right of a rival union, which in this instant case is the
respondent union, to challenge petitioners claim to
majority status, by filing earlier on November 4, 1986, a
timely petition for certification election before the old
CBA expired on December 31, 1986 and before
petitioner signed a new CBA with respondent company
(Kapatiran Sa Meat and Canning Division (TUPAS Local
Chapter No. 1027) v. Calleja, G.R. No. 82914, June 20,
1988). There should be no obstacle to the right of the
employees to petition for a certification election at the
proper time, that is, within sixty (60) days prior to the
expiration of the life of a certified collective bargaining
agreement (General Textiles Allied Workers Association
(GTAWA v. Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, 84
SCRA 430 [1978]; Warren Manufacturing Workers
Union (WMWU) v. Bureau of Labor Relations, supra),
not even by a collective agreement submitted during
the pendency of a representation case.chanrobles law
library

On said subject, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code,
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 4. Effects of early agreements. The
representation case shall not, however, be adversely
affected by a collective agreement submitted before or
during the last 60 days of a subsisting agreement or
during the pendency of the representation case."cralaw
virtua1aw library

The new CBA negotiated by petitioners whether or no
submitted to the MOLE in accordance with Article 231
of the Labor Code cannot be deemed permanent,
precluding commencement of negotiations by another
union with management, considering that it was
entered into at a time when the petition for
certification election had already been filed by
respondent union (Associated Trade Unions (ATU) v.
Trajano, supra). Meantime this interim agreement must
be recognized and given effect on a temporary basis so
as not to deprive the workers of the favorable terms of
the agreement (Vassar Industries Employers Union
(VIEW) v. Estrella, 82 SCRA 280 [1978]; National Mines
and Allied Workers Union (NAMAWUMIF) v. Estrella, 87
SCRA 84 [1978], cited in Associated Trade Unions (ATU)
v. Trajano, Ibid.)

If, as a result of the certification election, respondent
union or a union other than petitioner union which
executed the interim agreement, is certified as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file
employees of respondent company, then, such union
may adopt the interim collective bargaining agreement
or negotiate with management for a new collective
bargaining agreement (Associated Trade Unions (ATU)
v. Trajano, Ibid).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED for lack of merit; (b) the resolution of the
Bureau of Labor Relations dated January 30, 1987 and
the order of the Bureau dated February 24, 1987 are
AFFIRMED; and (c) temporary restraining order issued
by the Court on March 9, 1987 is LIFTED permanently.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 94929-30 March 18, 1992
PORT WORKERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES
(PWUP), petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, ATTY.
ANASTACIO L. BACTIN, MED-ARBITER NCR-DOLE,
Public Respondents; INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER
TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., (ICTSI) and ASSOCIATED
PORT CHECKERS AND WORKERS UNION (APCWU),
Private Respondents; SANDIGAN NG MANGGAGAWA
SA DAUNGAN (SAMADA) and PORT EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION AND LABOR UNION (PEALU), Nominal
Private Respondents,respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
There was muffled excitement among the workers of
the International Container Terminal Services, Inc.
(ICTSI) because its collective bargaining agreement with
private respondents Associate Port Checkers and
Workers Union (APCWU), the incumbent union, was
due to expire on April 14, 1990. Other unions were
seeking to represent the laborers in the negotiation of
the next CBA and were already plotting their moves.
The first challenge to APCWU was hurled on March 14,
1990, when the Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa Daungan
(SAMADA) filed a petition for certification election. The
consent signatures of at least 25% of the employees in
the bargaining unit were submitted on March 26, 1990,
or eleven days after the petition.
On April 2, 1990, herein petitioner Port Workers Union
of the Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition for
intervention.
Still another petition for certification election was filed
by the Port Employees Association and Labor Union
(PEALU), on April 6, 1990. The consent signatures were
submitted on May 11, 1990, or thirty-five days after the
filing of the petition.
The petitions of SAMADA and PEALU were consolidated
for joint decision. On April 26, 1990, APCWU filed a
motion to dismiss them on the ground that they did not
comply with the requirement set forth in Section 6, Rule
V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, quoted in part as
follows:
In a petition involving an organized
establishment or enterprise where the
majority status of the incumbent
collective bargaining union is
questioned through a verified petition
by a legitimate labor organization, the
Med-Arbiter shall immediately order
the certification election by secret
ballot if the petition is filed during the
last sixty (60) days of the collective
bargaining agreement and supported by
the written consent of at least twenty-
five percent (25%) of all the employees
in the bargaining unit. Any petition filed
before or after the sixty-day freedom
period shall be dismissed outright. The
twenty-five percent (25%) requirement
shall be satisfied upon the filing of the
petition, otherwise the petition shall be
dismissed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Specifically, APCWU faulted both petitions for non-
compliance with the requirement for the 25% consent
signatures at the time of filing. This contention was
upheld by the Med-Arbiter in an order dated June 5,
1990, dismissing the consolidated petitions.
1

PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor on June 28,
1990, arguing that Article 256 of the Labor Code did not
require the written consent to be submitted
simultaneously with the petition for certification
election. The principal petitioners did not appeal. On
August 21, 1990, DOLE Undersecretary Bienvenido
Laguesma affirmed the order of the Med-Arbiter and
dismissed PWUP's appeal.
2

Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for
a new collective bargaining agreement, which was
concluded on September 28, 1990. This was ratified on
October 7, 1990, by a majority of the workers in the
bargaining unit, i.e., 910 out of the 1,223 members, and
subsequently registered with the DOLE.
PWUP is now before us, claiming grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the public respondent in the
application of Article 256 of the Labor Code. The article
provides in part as follows:
Art. 256. Representation issue in
organized establishments. In
organized establishments, when a
verified petition questioning the
majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent is filed before the
Department of Labor and Employment
within the sixty-day period before the
expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement, the Med-Arbiter shall
automatically order an election by
secret ballot when the verified petition
is supported by the written consent of
at least twenty-five (25%) percent of all
the employees in the bargaining unit to
ascertain the will of the employees in
the appropriate bargaining unit. . . .
The petitioner argues that under this article, the Med-
Arbiter should automatically order election by secret
ballot when the petition is supported by at least 25% of
all employees in the bargaining unit. SAMADA and
PEALU substantially complied with the law when they
submitted the required consent signatures several days
after filing the petition. The petitioner complains that
the dismissal of the petitions for certification election,
including its own petition for intervention, had the
effect of indirectly certifying APCWU as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of the ICTSI
employees.
Private respondent ICTSI maintains that the dismissal
was based on Article 256 of the Labor Code as
implemented by Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the
Implementing Rules, quoted above. Moreover, under
Section 10, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules,
decisions of the Secretary in certification election cases
shall be final and unappealable.
ICTSI also cites the following ruling of this Court in
Tupas v. Inciong:
3

We find no merit in the petition. As
observed by the Solicitor General, while
the petition of TUPAS for a certification
election may have the written support
of 30 per cent of all the workers of the
bargaining unit, it is also an undisputed
fact that UMI (the rival union of TUPAS)
has a clear majority of the said workers,
as shown by the fact that 499 workers
out of the total working force of 641
have not only ratified the collective
bargaining agreement concluded
between UMI and LUSTEVECO, but also
affirmed their membership in UMI so
that there is no more need for holding a
certification election. (Emphasis
supplied.)
For its part, APCWU questions PWUP's personality in
these proceedings in view of the lack of consent
signatures in its petition, and argues as well that the
petitioner has no authority to represent SAMADA or
PEALU, which had not appealed. The private respondent
also invokes Tupas and maintains that the ratification of
the new CBA by the majority of the workers was an
affirmation of their membership in the union that
negotiated that agreement.
In his own Comment, the Solicitor General agrees with
the petitioner that there has been substantial
compliance with the requirements of the law. He
submits that Article 256 should be liberally interpreted
pursuant to Article 4 of the Labor Code, stating as
follows:
Art. 4. Construction in favor of labor.
All doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of this
Code including its implementing rules
and regulations, shall be resolved in
favor of labor.
The Court has deliberated on the arguments of the
parties in their respective pleadings and finds for the
petitioner.
We have held that pursuant to the constitutional
provision guaranteeing workers the right to self-
organization and collective bargaining, "the constant
and unwavering policy of this Court" has been "to
require a certification election as the best means of
ascertaining which labor organization should be the
collective bargaining representative."
4

The certification election is the most democratic and
expeditious method by which the laborers can freely
determine the union that shall act as their
representative in their dealings with the establishment
where they are working.
5
As we stressed in Belyca
Corporation vs. Ferrer-Calleja,
6
the holding of a
certification election is a statutory policy that should
not be circumvented.
This Court also held in Western Agusan Workers Union-
Local 101 of the United Lumber and General Workers of
the Philippines vs. Trajano:
7

. . . it has long been settled that the
policy of the Labor Code is indisputably
partial to the holding of a certification
election so as to arrive in a manner
definitive and certain concerning the
choice of the labor organization to
represent the workers in a collective
bargaining unit. Conformably to said
basic concept, this Court recognized
that the Bureau of Labor Relations in
the exercise of sound discretion, may
order a certification election
notwithstanding the failure to meet the
30% requirement. (Scout Ramon V.
Albano Memorial College v. Noriel, 85
SCRA 494 [1978]; Vicmico Industrial
Wokers Asso. v. Noriel, 131 SCRA 569
[1984])
In line with the policy, we feel that the administrative
rule requiring the simultaneous submission of the 25%
consent signatures upon the filing of petition for
certification election should not be strictly applied to
frustrate the determination of the legitimate
representative of the workers. Significantly, the
requirement in the rule is not found in Article 256, the
law it seeks to implement. This is all the more reason
why the regulation should at best be given only a
directory effect. Accordingly, we hold that the mere
filing of a petition for certification election within the
freedom period is sufficient basis for the issuance of an
order for the holding of a certification
election, 8 subject to the submission of the consent
signatures within a reasonable period from such filing.
This interpretation is consonant with Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor
Relations,
9
where we declared:
. . . even conceding that the statutory
requirement of 30% of the labor force
asking for a certification election had
not been strictly complied with,
respondent Director is still empowered
to order that it be held precisely for the
purpose of ascertaining which (of the
contending labor organizations) shall be
the exclusive collective bargaining
representative. (National Mines and
Allied Workers Union v. Luna, et al., 83
SCRA 607)
It is not denied that the petition to intervene filed by
PWUP did not carry the 25% consent signatures, but
that the requirement is in fact not applicable to a
petition in intervention. We so held in PAFLU v. Ferrer-
Calleja thus:
10

It is crystal clear from the said
provisions that the requisite written
consent of at least 20% of the workers
in the bargaining unit applies to
petitioners for certification election
only and not to motions for
intervention. . . . As long as the motion
for intervention has been properly and
timely filed and the intervention would
not cause any injustice to anyone, it
should not be denied and this is so even
if the eventual purpose of the Motion
for Intervention is to participate in the
Certification Election. After all, the
original applicant had already met the
20% requirement.
The contention that the petitioners had no right to
represent the principal petitioners which had not
appealed the dismissal order is also not acceptable. We
repeat that the certification election is not litigation but
a mere investigation of a non-adversary character
where the rules of procedure are not strictly
applied.
11
Technical rules and objections should not
hamper the correct ascertainment of the labor union
that has the support of confidence of the majority of
the workers and is thus entitled to represent them in
their dealings with management.
The above-quoted decision affirms the right of PWUP to
call for the holding of the election although it was
initially only an intervenor. That recognition should not
be defeated by the circumstance that the other
petitioning unions have not seen fit to appeal the
dismissal of their petitions even if such dismissal was
questionable and is in fact being reversed here. The
petition for intervention was viable at the time it was
filed because the principal petitions had complied with
the requirement for the consent signatures as specified
by Article 256. Hence, its intervention should not be
disallowed simply because of the withdrawal or failure
to appeal of SAMADA and PEALU.
It is correct to say that as a matter of strict procedure, a
petition for intervention should be deemed
automatically dismissed where the principal petition
itself fails. However, that technical rule should be
allowed to prevent a correct determination of the real
representative of the workers in line with their
constitutional rights to self-organization and collective
bargaining.
Regarding the invocation of Inciong by the private
respondents, the Court has modified that decision
inAssociated Labor Unions vs. Calleja,
12
where we held:
Finally, the petitioner assails the
decision of the respondent Director on
the ground that "the ratification of the
collective bargaining agreement
renders the certification election moot
and academic."
This contention finds no basis in law.
The petitioner was obviously referring
to the contract-bar rule where the law
prohibits the holding of certification
elections during the lifetime of the
collective bargaining agreement. Said
agreement was hastily and prematurely
entered into apparently in an attempt
to avoid the holding of a certification
election.
Deviation from the contract-bar rule is justified only
where the need for industrial stability is clearly shown
to be imperative.
13
Subject to this singular exception,
contracts where the identity of the authorized
representative of the workers is in doubt must be
rejected in favor of a more certain indication of the will
of the workers. As we stated in Philippine Association of
Free Labor Union vs. Estrella,
14
any stability that does
not establish the type of industrial peace contemplated
by the law must be subordinated to the employees'
freedom to choose their real representative.
The private respondents contend that the
overwhelming ratification of the CBA is an affirmation
of their membership in the bargaining agent, rendering
the representation issue moot and academic and
conclusively barring the holding of a certification
election thereon. That conclusion does not follow. Even
Tupas did not say that the mere ratification of the CBA
by the majority of the workers signified their
affirmation of membership in the negotiating union.
That case required, first, ratification of the CBA, the
second, affirmation of membership in the negotiating
union. The second requirement has not been
established in the case at bar as the record does not
show that the majority of the workers, besides ratifying
the new CBA, have also formally affiliated with APCWU.
Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
implementing the Labor Code provides that the
representation case shall not be adversely affected by a
collective agreement submitted before or during the
last 60 days of a subsisting agreement or during the
pendency of the representation case. As the new CBA
was entered into at the time when the representation
case was still pending, it follows that it cannot be
recognized as the final agreement between the ICTSI
and its workers.
On the allegation that the decision of the Secretary of
Labor on certification election is final and inappealable,
this Court held in San Miguel Corp. v. Secretary of
Labor
15
that:
It is generally understood that as to
administrative agencies
exercising quasi-judicial or legislative
power there is an underlying power in
the courts to scrutinize the acts of such
agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of
review is given by statute. (73, C.J.S.
506, note 56). . . . judicial review is
proper in case of lack of jurisdiction,
grave abuse of discretion. error of law,
fraud or collusion (Timbancaya v.
Vicente, 82 O.G. 9424; Macatangay v.
Secretary of Public Works and
Communication, 63 O.G. 11236; Ortua
v. Singson Encarnacion, 59 Phil. 440).
There was indeed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public
respondents when they dismissed the petitions for
certification election because the consent signatures
had not been submitted simultaneously with the
petition. The issue of majority representation thus
remains open and awaits settlement. Following the
rulings above-quoted, we hereby declare that the
newly-concluded CBA cannot constitute a bar to the
holding of a certification election.
It is possible that the APCWU will prevail in the
certification election, in which event the new CBA it
concluded with ICTSI will be upheld and recognized. It is
also possible that another union will be chosen, in
which event it will have to enter into its own
negotiations with ICTSI that may result in the adoption
of a new CBA. In the meantime, however, the old CBA
having expired, it is necessary to lay down the rules
regulating the relations of the workers with the
management. For this reason, the Court hereby orders
that the new CBA concluded by ICTSI and APCWU shall
remain effective between the parties, subject to the
result and effects of the certification election to be
called.
The certification election is the best method of
determining the will of the workers on the crucial
question of who shall represent them in their
negotiations with the management for a collective
bargaining agreement that will best protect and
promote their interests. It is essential that there be no
collusion against this objective between an
unscrupulous management and a union covertly
supporting it while professing its loyalty to labor, or at
least that the hopes of labor be not frustrated because
of its representation by a union that does not enjoy its
approval and support. It is therefore sound policy that
any doubt regarding the real representation of the
workers be resolved in favor of the holding of the
certification election. This is preferable to the
suppression of the voice of the workers through the
prissy observance of technical rules that will exalt
procedure over substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged
order dated August 21, 1990, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the public respondent is DIRECTED to
schedule and hold certification election among the
workers of the International Container Terminal
Services, Inc., this to be done with all possible dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-34069-70 February 28, 1973
B.F. GOODRICH PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
B.F. GOODRICH (MARIKINA FACTORY) CONFIDENTIAL
& SALARIED EMPLOYEES UNION-NATU, B.F. GOODRICH
(MAKATI OFFICE) CONFIDENTIAL & SALARIED
EMPLOYEES UNION-NATU, and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents.
Manuel O. Chan for petitioner.
Domingo E. de Lara and Associates for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:
The specific question raised impressed with an aspect of
novelty, sustained with vigor and plausibility, persuaded
this Court that the petition was worth looning into. It is
whether the determination of an unfair labor practice
case, brought against respondent-unions, must precede
the holding of a certification election. A negative
response came from respondent Court of Industrial
Relations, through Judge Ansberto Paredes. His order,
affirmed by respondent Court en banc, is sought to be
nullified in this certiorari proceeding. The answer filed
on behalf of respondent-unions would sustain its
validity. What is more, it called attention to what is
characterized as a consistent pattern of anti-union
practices on the part of petitioner intended to defeat
the rights of labor to collective bargaining. A careful
study of the specific legal issue posed, namely, whether
the existence of an unfair labor practice case against a
labor organization, consisting of an illegal strike, would
suffice to call for the postponement of a proposed
certification election, incidentally started at the
instance of petitioner itself, yields the same conclusion
reached by respondent Court. The objectives of the
Industrial Peace Act
1
would be sooner attained if, at the
earliest opportunity, the employees, all of them of an
appropriate collective bargaining unit, be polled to
determine which labor organization should be its
exclusive representative. Moreover, the discretion on
the matter vested in respondent Court is rarely
interfered with. We dismiss the petition.
It was shown in the petition that on February 27, 1971,
one Rodolfo Pajaro, as President of B.F. Goodrich
(Makati Office) Confidential and Salaried Employees
Union-NATU, sent a letter to the petitioner, seeking
recognition as the bargaining agent of such employees
so that thereafter there could be negotiations for a
collective contract.
2
Similarly, on the same date, one
Pablo C. Fulgar, as President of B.F. Goodrich (Marikina
Factory) Confidential and Salaried Employees Union-
NATU and one Marcelino Lontok, Jr., representing
himself as Vice-President, NATU, sent a letter to the
petitioner, of a similar tenor.
3
Petitioner, as employer,
countered by filing on March 6, 1971, two petitions for
certification election with respondent Court of
Industrial Relations.
4
Then came on March 10, 1971,
two strike notices from respondents, filed with the
Bureau of Labor Relations, demanding union
recognition.
5
It was not until April 13, 1971, that
respondent Court commenced the hearings of the
petitions for certification election.
6
It was then alleged
that on two days in April 19 and 20, 1971, there was a
strike staged by those affiliated with private
respondents, to force recognition of their
unions.
7
Subsequently, after preliminary investigation
first had, on a finding of a prima facie case of illegal
strike and unfair labor practice committed by the
members of the two unions, Case No. 5612-ULP of the
Court of Industrial Relations for unfair labor practice
was filed against them.
8
There was on May 27, 1971, an
answer with affirmative defenses filed in such
case.
9
Earlier, on May 20, 1971, the petitioner filed
identical motions in MC Cases Nos. 2995 and 2996 to
hold in abeyance the hearings of the petitions for
certification election.
10
Then, on August 5, 1971,
respondent Court, through Judge Ansberto Paredes,
denied the petitioner's motions to hold in abeyance the
hearing of MC Cases Nos. 2995 and 2996.
11

The challenged order of Judge Paredes stated the
nature of the issue before him as well as the respective
positions of the parties: "Submitted for resolution
without further arguments are petitioner's motions
filed in each of the above-entitled cases, praying that
the proceedings therein be held in abeyance pending
final judgment in Case No. 5612-ULP and the
oppositions thereto filed by the respondent unions. It is
petitioner's stand that if Case No. 5612-ULP will prosper
and the strike staged by respondent unions during the
pendency of the instant cases will be declared illegal
and the individual members cited therein as
respondents found guilty of the unfair labor practice
acts complained of, the latter will consequently lose
their status as employees and will be disqualified to
vote in a certification election that may be ordered by
the Court. On the other hand, respondents-oppositors
maintain that the pendency of said unfair labor practice
case is not a bar to the hearing of the instant cases,
following the ruling of this Court in Case No. 2536-MC
entitled "In re: Petition for Certification Election at the
Central Textile Mills, Inc., Vicente Flores, et al." "
12
This
was his ruling: "The motions can not be granted.
Individual respondents in the ULP case are still
employees and possessed of the right to self-
organization. Included therein is their choice of a
bargaining representative (Secs. 2 [d], 3 & 12, R. A. 875).
To hold the certification proceedings in abeyance until
final judgment of the ULP case will be a denial of the
aforesaid statutory right, the employees being left
without a collective bargaining representative."
13
The
dispositive portion was to deny the motions for lack of
merit. There was a motion for reconsideration, but such
motion did not prosper. It was denied on August 31,
1971.
14

These certiorari proceedings were then filed with this
Court, with petitioners maintaining through copious
references to National Labor Relations Board cases that,
with the declaration of what it considered to be an
illegal strike resulting in an unfair labor practice case,
the status as employees of members of the two
respondent Labor Unions would be placed in doubt and
thus should be determined before the certification
election. This Court, in a resolution of November 10,
1971, required private respondents to file an answer.
There is, on the whole, an admission of the allegations
of the petition. In addition, the following special and
affirmative defenses were interposed: "That up to the
present, the strike of the respondent unions is still on,
thus the striking employees cannot be considered to
have abandoned, quit, or otherwise terminated their
employment relationship with the petitioner company,
on the basis of the doctrine that a strike does not serve
to sever the employer-employee relationship; ... That
the respondent unions were virtually coerced by the
petitioner company's blatant resort to all kinds of
union-busting tactics, topped by the technical refusal to
recognize and bargain with the respondent unions
through the neat trick of filing a baseless petition for
certification election and questioning therein the right
of over 90% of the unions' membership to join the
unions; ... That the members of the respondent unions
are still employees of the petitioner company and as
such are qualified to vote in any certification election
that the Court of Industrial Relations may direct to be
held on the petitioner company's own petition,
pursuant to Section 2(d) of Republic Act 875, ...
."
15
They sought the dismissal of these certiorari
proceedings for lack of merit. Subsequently,
memoranda were filed by the parties, and the case was
deemed submitted on February 14, 1972.
As made clear at the outset, petitioner has not made
out a case for the reversal of the challenged order of
Judge Ansberto Paredes.
1. There is novelty in the specific question raised, as to
whether or not a certification election may be stayed at
the instance of the employer, pending the
determination of an unfair labor practice case filed by it
against certain employees affiliated with respondent-
unions. That is a matter of which this Court has not had
an opportunity to speak on previously. What is settled
law, dating from the case of Standard Cigarette
Workers' Union v. Court of Industrial
Relations,
16
decided in 1957, is that if it were a labor
organization objecting to the participation in a
certification election of a company-dominated union, as
a result of which a complaint for an unfair labor practice
case against the employer was filed, the status of the
latter union must be first cleared in such a proceeding
before such voting could take place. In the language of
Justice J.B.L. Reyes as ponente: "As correctly pointed
out by Judge Lanting in his dissenting opinion on the
denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration, a
complaint for unfair labor practice may be considered a
prejudicial question in a proceeding for certification
election when it is charged therein that one or more
labor unions participating in the election are being
aided, or are controlled, by the company or employer.
The reason is that the certification election may lead to
the selection of an employer-dominated or company
union as the employees' bargaining representative, and
when the court finds that said union is employer-
dominated in the unfair labor practice case, the union
selected would be decertified and the whole election
proceedings would be rendered useless and
nugatory."
17
The next year, the same jurist had
occasion to reiterate such a doctrine in Manila Paper
Mills Employees and Workers Association v. Court of
Industrial Relations,
18
thus: "We agree with the CIR on
the reasons given in its order that only a formal charge
of company domination may serve as a bar to and stop
a certification election, the reason being that if there is
a union dominated by the Company, to which some of
the workers belong, an election among the workers and
employees of the company would not reflect the true
sentiment and wishes of the said workers and
employees from the standpoint of their welfare and
interest, because as to the members of the company
dominated union, the vote of the said members in the
election would not be free. It is equally true, however,
that the opposition to the holding of a certification
election due to a charge of company domination can
only be filed and maintained by the labor organization
which made the charge of company domination,
because it is the entity that stands to lose and suffer
prejudice by the certification election, the reason being
that its members might be overwhelmed in the voting
by the other members controlled and dominated by the
Company,"
19
It is easily understandable why it should
be thus. There would be an impairment of the integrity
of the collective bargaining process if a company-
dominated union were allowed to participate in a
certification election. The timid, the timorous and the
faint-hearted in the ranks of labor could easily be
tempted to cast their votes in favor of the choice of
management. Should it emerge victorious, and it
becomes the exclusive representative of labor at the
conference table, there is a frustration of the statutory
scheme. It takes two to bargain. There would be instead
a unilateral imposition by the employer. There is need
therefore to inquire as to whether a labor organization
that aspires to be the exclusive bargaining
representative is company-dominated before the
certification election.
2. The unique situation before us, however, it exactly
the reverse. It is management that would have an unfair
labor practice case filed by it for illegal strike engaged in
by some of its employees concluded, before it would
agree to the holding of a certification election. That is
the stand of petitioner. It does not carry conviction. The
reason that justifies the postponement of a certification
election pending an inquiry, as to the bona fides of a
labor union, precisely calls for a different conclusion. If
under the circumstances disclosed, management is
allowed to have its way, the result might be to dilute or
fritter away the strength of an organization bent on a
more zealous defense of labor's prerogatives. The
difficulties and obstacles that must be then hurdled
would not be lost on the rest of the personnel, who had
not as yet made up their minds one way or the other.
This is not to say that management is to be precluded
from filing an unfair labor practice case. It is merely to
stress that such a suit should not be allowed to lend
itself as a means, whether intended or not, to prevent a
truly free expression of the will of the labor group as to
the organization that will represent it. It is not only the
loss of time involved, in itself not likely to enhance the
prospect of respondent-unions, but also the fear
engendered in the mind of an ordinary employee that
management has many weapons in its arsenal to bring
the full force of its undeniable power against those of
its employees dissatisfied with things as they are. There
is no valid reason then for the postponement sought.
This is one instance that calls for the application of the
maxim, lex dilationes semper exhorret. Moreover, is
there not in the posture taken by petitioner a
contravention of what is expressly set forth in the
Industrial Peace Act, which speaks of the labor
organizations "designated or selected for the purpose of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees
in an appropriate collective bargaining unit [be the
exclusive] representative of all the employees in such
unit for the purpose of collective bargaining."
20
The law
clearly contemplates all the employees, not only some
of them. As much as possible then, there is to be no
unwarranted reduction in the number of those taking
part in a certification election, even under the guise that
in the meanwhile, which may take some time, some of
those who are employees could possibly lose such
status, by virtue of a pending unfair labor practice case.
3. Nor would any useful purpose be served by such a
postponement of the holding of a certification election
until after the determination of the unfair labor practice
case filed. The time that might elapse is hard to predict,
as the matter may eventually reach this Tribunal. In the
meanwhile, there is no opportunity for free choice on
the part of the employees as to which labor
organization shall be their exclusive bargaining
representative. The force of such an objection could be
blunted if after a final decision to the effect that the
employees complained of were engaged in illegal strike,
they would automatically lose their jobs. Such is not the
law, however.
21
It does not necessarily follow that
whoever might have participated in a strike thus
proscribed has thereby forfeited the right to
employment. What will be gained then by holding in
abeyance the certification election? There is no
certitude that the final decision arrived at in the
pending unfair labor practice case would sustain the
claim of petitioner. Even if success would attend such
endeavor, it cannot be plausibly asserted that its
employees adjudged as having been engaged in such
illegal strike are ipso facto deprived of such status.
There is thus an aspect of futility about the whole thing.
Why should not respondent Court then decide as it did?
4. This Court, moreover, is led to sustain the challenged
order by another consideration. In General Maritime
Stevedores' Union v. South Sea Shipping Line,
22
a 1960
decision, Justice Labrador, speaking for this Court,
stated that the question of whether or not a
certification election shall be held "may well be left to
the sound discretion of the Court of Industrial Relations,
considering the conditions involved in the case, ...
."
23
This Court has since then been committed to such a
doctrine.
24
As a matter of fact, the only American
Supreme Court decision cited in the petition, National
Labor Relations Board v. A.J. Tower Co.,
25
likewise,
sustains the same principle. It was there held that the
discretion of the labor tribunal, in this case, the National
Labor Relations Board of the United States, is not lightly
to be interfered with. The issue in that case, as noted in
the opinion of Justice Murphy, equally noted for his
labor law decisions, as well as his civil libertarian views,
"concerns the procedure used in elections under the
National Labor Relations Act in which employees
choose a statutory representative for purposes of
collective bargaining. Specifically, we must determine
the propriety of the National Labor Relations Board's
refusal to accept an employers post-election challenge
to the eligibility of a voter who participated in a consent
election."
26
His opinion then went on to state that the
First Circuit Court of Appeals set aside the Board's
order. The matter was then taken to the United States
Supreme Court oncertiorari. In reversing the Circuit
Court of Appeals, Justice Murphy made clear the
acceptance of such a doctrine in the light of the
National Labor Relations Act thus: "As we have noted
before, Congress has entrusted the Board with a wide
degree of discretion in establishing the procedure and
safeguards necessary to insure the fair and free choice
of bargaining representatives by employees."
27
Hence,
this ruling of American Supreme Court: "It follows that
the court below erred in refusing to enforce the Board's
order in full."
28
In the United States as in the
Philippines, the decision in such matters by the
administrative agency is accorded the utmost respect.
Relevant is this affirmation by the then Justice, now
Chief Justice, Concepcion that in such proceedings, the
determination of what is an appropriate bargaining unit
is "entitled to almost complete finality."
29
The
prevailing principle then on questions as to certification,
as well as in other labor cases, is that only where there
is a showing of clear abuse of discretion would this
Tribunal be warranted in reversing the actuation of
respondent
Court.
30
There is no showing of such a failing in this
case.

G. R. No. L-53406 December 14, 1981
NATIONAL UNION OF BANK EMPLOYEES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR, THE
HONORABLE DEPUTY MINISTER OF LABOR, THE
HONORABLE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR
RELATIONS, PRODUCERS BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioner
Union to compel public respondents to conduct a
certification election among the rank and file
employees of the respondent employer in Case No.
LRD-M-8-360-79 or in the alternative, to require the
respondent Minister of Labor or his Deputy to act on
private respondent's "Appeal" and on petitioner's
"Motion to Dismiss with Motion to Execute."
It appears that on August 17, 1979, petitioner Union
filed a petition to be directly certified as collective
bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of
private respondent corporation (Annex "A"; p. 26, rec.).
On September 7, 1979, the date of the hearing, private
respondent was required to submit on October 5, 1979
a payroll of employees as of July 31, 1979. On the same
date, in a handwritten manifestation, respondent
employer through counsel, agreed that as soon as the
registration certificate of the local union was issued by
the Ministry of Labor and that it was shown that the
local union represents the majority of the rank and file,
the Bank would recognize the said union and would
negotiate accordingly (Annex "B" p. 27, rec.).
On October 5, 1979, the above said registration
certificate of the local union [Certificate No. 9352-LC,
issued by the Ministry of Labor] was secured. On
October 15, 1979, petitioner filed a Manifestation and
Urgent Motion to Decide and submitted a copy of the
Registration Certificate of the local union and union
membership application of 183 members out of more
or less 259 rank and file employees of employer Bank,
authorizing the National Union of Bank Employees
(NUBE) [herein petitioner] to represent them "as their
sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent in all
matters relating to salary rates, hours of work and other
terms and conditions of employment in the Producers
Bank of the Philippines" (p. 38, rec.). Nonetheless,
respondent corporation failed to submit the required
payroll and the list of rank and file workers based on
said payroll.
On October 18, 1979, Med-Arbiter Climaco G. Plagata
issued an order directing the holding of a certification
election, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a
certification election is hereby ordered
held, conducted, and supervised by
representation officers of this office
within 20 days from receipt hereof. The
same representation officers shall
conduct pre-election conferences in
order to thresh out the mechanics and
other minor details of this election
including the inclusion and exclusion
proceedings to determine the qualified
electors in this election. The choice shall
be either YES, for Petitioner, or No, for
NO UNION DESIRED.
SO ORDERED (Annex "C", pp. 28-29,
rec.).
On October 19, 1979, respondent corporation filed a
motion to suspend further proceedings in view of an
allegedly prejudicial issue consisting of a pending
proceeding for cancellation of the registration of
petitioning union for allegedly engaging in prohibited
and unlawful activities in violation of the laws (Annex
"D" pp. 30-32, rec.).
On October 23, 1979, by agreement of the parties,
respondent then Deputy Minister of Labor Amado
Inciong, acting for the Minister of Labor, assumed
jurisdiction over the certification election case and the
application for clearance to terminate the services of
thirteen (13) union officers by private respondent
corporation. Thus, an order was issued on the same
date which reads:
On October 23, 1979 the parties
entered into an agreement that the
Office of the Ministry of Labor shall
assume jurisdiction over the following
disputes under P.D. No. 823 in the
interest of speedy labor justice and
industrial peace:
1. certification election
case; and
2. application for
clearance to terminate
thirteen (13) employees
with preventive
suspension.
(Agreement, October
23, 1979).
Accordingly, the Deputy Minister
deputized Atty. Luna C. Piezas, Chief of
the Med- Arbiter Section, National
Capital Region, to conduct summary
investigations for the purpose of
determining the definition of the
appropriate bargaining unit sought to
be represented by the petitioning union
as wen as compliance with the 30%
mandatory written consent in support
of the petition under the bargaining
unit as shall have been defined.
On the application for clearance to
terminate with preventive suspension,
this Office deems it necessary, for the
mutual protection of each party's
interest and to assure continuance of
the exercise of their respective rights
within legal limits, to lift the imposition
of preventive suspension on the subject
employees. The lifting of the preventive
suspension shall include Messrs. Castro
and Sumibcay who are presently on
leave of absence with pay in pursuance
of the agreement reached at the level
of the Regional Director. Further,
should the two (2) employees' leave
credits be exhausted, they are to go on
leave without pay, but this shall not be
construed as done in pursuance of the
preventive suspension.
Finally, the lifting of the preventive
suspension shall be without prejudice
to the continuance of the hearing on
the application for clearance involving
the thirteen (13) employees the
determination of the merits of which
shall be disposed of at the Regional
level (Annex "E", pp. 33-34, rec.).
Hence, Med-Arbiter Luna Piezas conducted hearings but
withdrew, in view of the alleged utter disrespect for
authority, gross bad faith, malicious refusal to
appreciate effective, prompt and honest service and
resorting in malicious and deliberate lying in dealing
with Ministry of Labor officials by a certain Mr. Jun
Umali, spokesman of the Producers' Bank Employees
Association. The case was then transferred to Med-
Arbiter Alberto Abis on November 7, 1979 (Annex " F ",
p. 35, rec.).
During the hearing on November 9, 1979, respondent
Bank failed to submit a list of rank and file employees
proposed to be excluded from the bargaining unit.
Respondent Bank's counsel however, in a verbal
manifestation pressed for the exclusion of the following
personnel from the bargaining unit:
1. Secretaries;
2. Staff of Personnel
Department;
3. Drivers;
4. Telephone
Operators;
5. Accounting
Department;
6. Credit Investigators;
7. Collectors;
8. Messengers;
9. Auditing Department
Personnel;
10. Signature Verifiers;
11. Legal Department
Personnel;
12. Loan Security
Custodians; and
13. Trust Department
Personnel.
On November 19, 1979, Med-Arbiter Alberto Abis Jr.
ordered the holding of certification election among the
rank and file employees but sustained the stand of
respondent company as to the exclusion of certain
employees. Thus, the pertinent portion of said order
reads:
After a careful perusal of the records,
evaluation of the evidence on hand and
consideration of the positions taken by
the parties, we find and so hold that
Petitioner-Union has substantially
complied with the mandatory and
jurisdictional requirement of 30%
subscription of all the employees in the
bargaining unit as prescribed by Section
2, Rule 5, Book V of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code. Submission by the Petitioner
during the hearing of copies of the
application and membership forms of
its members wherein they have duly
authorized Petitioner 'as their sole and
exclusive collective bargaining agent
constitutes substantial compliance of
the mandatory and jurisdictional 30%
subscription requirement, it appearing
from the records that out of the 264
total rank and file employees, 188 are
union members who have so authorized
Petitioner to represent.
With respect to respondent bank's
motion to suspend the proceedings in
the instant case pending resolution of
the cancellation proceedings now
pending in the Bureau of Labor
Relations, we find that the same is not
tenable in the absence of a restraining
order.
In consideration of the agreement of
the parties, it is hereby ordered that the
scope or coverage of the appropriate
bargaining unit should include the Head
Office of the Producers Bank of the
Philippines and all its branch offices and
shall comprise of an the regular rank
and file employees of the bank.
Excluded are all managerial and
supervisory employees, probationary,
contractual and casual employees and
security guards. It is further ordered
that by virtue and in consonance with
industry practice as revealed by the
CBAs of 18 banks submitted by
Petitioner-Union, the following positions
should likewise be excluded from the
bargaining unit; Secretaries of bank
officials; employees of the Personnel
Department; EXCEPT Manuel Sumibcay
Primi Zamora and Carmelita Sy;
employees of the Accounting
Department; employees of the Legal
Department employees of the Trust
Department, credit investigators,
telephone operators, and loan security
custodians. Signature verifiers, drivers,
messengers and other non-confidential
employees included in the bank's list of
proposed exclusions should be allowed
to vote, but the votes should be
segregated as challenged. In case a
doubt arises as to whether or not the
position held by an employee is
confidential in nature, the employee
should be allowed to vote, but his vote
should be segregated as challenged .
WHEREFORE, in the light of the
foregoing considerations, it is hereby
ordered that a certification election be
conducted among the regular rank and
file employees of the Producers Bank of
the Philippines (the appropriate
bargaining unit of which is defined
above) after the usual pre-election
conference called to formulate the list
of qualified voters and discuss the
mechanics of the election.
It is further ordered that the election in
the bank's branches outside the Metro
Manila area be conducted by the
appropriate Regional Offices of the
Ministry of Labor having jurisdiction
over them.
SO ORDERED (pp. 5-7, Annex "G"; pp.
41-43, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On November 29, 1979, petitioner filed a partial appeal
to the Director of Bureau of Labor Relations questioning
the exclusions made by Med-Arbiter Abis of those
employees who are not among those expressly
enumerated under the law to be excluded. It vigorously
urged the inclusion of the rest of the employees which
is allegedly the usual practice in the banking industry. It
likewise urged the holding of a certification election
allowing all those excluded by Med-Arbiter Abis to vote
but segregating their votes as challenged in the
meantime. Hence, it averred:
It is in the position of the petitioner that
notwithstanding the statements above
that the petition for certification should
be held immediately by allowing all
those not excluded from Arbiter Abis'
order to vote without prejudice to a
final decision on the matters subject of
these appeal. Which we also submit
that in order to expedite the
proceedings these exclusions should
also be allowed to vote even pending
resolution of the appeal but segregating
them for further consideration (pp. 3-4,
Annex "H"; p. 46- 47, rec.).
On December 4, 1979, respondent bank likewise
appealed from the aforesaid November 19, 1979 order
of Med-Arbiter Alberto Abis, Jr. to the Minister of Labor
on the following grounds:
(1) that the act of Med-Arbiter Abis in
issuing the abovesaid Order is ultra
vires, full and complete jurisdiction over
the questioned petition being vested in
the office of the Minister of Labor and
hence the only adjudicative body
empowered to resolve the petition;
(2) that the fact that petitioner's Union
registration was subject of cancellation
proceedings with the Bureau of Labor
Relations rendered the issuance of the
abovequestioned Order directing the
holding of a certification election
premature; and
(3) that the bargaining unit was not
appropriately defined [Annex " I " pp.
49-57, rec.].
On December 7, 1979, the entire records of the case
were allegedly elevated as an appealed case by Regional
Director Francisco L. Estrella to the Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations and was docketed thereat as
appealed case No. A-1599-79.
On January 21, 1980, the Union of Producers Bank
Employees Chapter-NATU filed a motion to intervene in
the said petition for certification election alleging
among other things that it has also some signed up
members in the respondent Bank and consequently has
an interest in the petition for certification election filed
by petitioner as it will directly affect their rights as to
who will represent the employees in the collective
bargaining negotiations (Annex "P"; pp. 100-101, rec.).
On January 24, 1980, the Bureau of Labor Relations
Director Carmelo C. Noriel rendered a decision affirming
the Med-Arbiter's order with certain modifications, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
Preliminarily, the issue of jurisdiction is
being raised by respondent bank but we
need not be drawn into nor tarry in this
issue but instead proceed to consider
the merits of the case. Suffice it rather
to say that the appealed order was
signed by the med-arbiter a quo and
the records of the case were elevated
on appeal to this Bureau by the
Regional Director of the National
Capital Region. Besides respondent
should not unduly press the
jurisdictional issue. Such question does
not lead nor contribute to the
resolution of the real pressing issue
the certification election issue. What is
at stake here is the right of the
employees to organize and be
represented for collective bargaining
purposes by a union at the respondent
bank where none existed up to the
present time. On this consideration
alone, respondent's vigorous objection
alleging want of jurisdiction cracks from
tangency of the issue.
xxx xxx xxx
The matter of defining the bargaining
unit, that is to say the appropriateness
thereof, usually presents for
determination three questions to wit,
the general type of the bargaining unit
or whether it should be an industrial
unit embracing an the employees in a
broad class or a craft unit that is
confined to a small specialized group
within a broad class, the scope of the
bargaining unit or whether it would
embrace all employees in a given class
at only one plant or at several plants of
an employer, and the specific
composition of the bargaining unit, that
is, whether or not the unit should
include employees of different
occupational groups, like clerks,
inspectors, technical employees, etc.
On these questions, we are not without
legal guidelines. The law and the Rules
are clear. The petition for certification
election, whether filed by a legitimate
labor organization or by an employer
case, shall contain inter alia, the
description of the bargaining unit which
shall be the employer unit unless
circumstances otherwise require. Thus,
the policy under the Labor Code on the
matter of fixing the bargaining unit is to
favor larger units and this is sought to
be implemented on a two-tiered basis.
On the lower tier, the law mandates the
employer unit as the normal unit of
organization at the company level, thus
discouraging if not stopping
fragmentation into small craft or
occupational units as what prevailed
prior to the Labor Code. But the Code
envisions further consolidation into
larger bargaining units. Thus, on the
higher tier, the law mandates the
eventual restructuring of the labor
movement along the "one union, one
industry" basis. There should therefore
be no doubt as to the law and policy on
the fixing of the appropriate bargaining
unit which is generally the employer
unit. Applying this rule to the instant
case, the appropriate bargaining unit
should embrace all the regular rank and
file employees at the head as well as
branch offices of respondent bank. Of
course, the exception to this employer
unit rule is when circumstances
otherwise require. But such is not at
issue here, respondent not having
adduced circumstances that would
justify a contrary composition of the
bargaining unit.
Respondent however insists on the
definition of the appropriate bargaining
unit upon the question of whether or
not to exclude admittedly regular rank
and file employees which it considers
confidential, managerial and technical.
This question, it should be pointed out,
does not enter the matter of defining
the bargaining unit. The definition of
the appropriate unit refers to the
grouping or more precisely, the legal
collectivity of eligible employees for
purposes of collective bargaining. The
presumption is that these employees
are entitled to the rights to self-
organization and collective bargaining,
otherwise they would not be, in the
first place be considered at all in the
determination of the appropriate
bargaining unit.
The question therefore of excluding
certain rank and file employees for
being allegedly confidential, managerial
or technical does not simply involve a
definition of the bargaining unit but
rather raises the fundamental issue of
coverage under or eligibility for the
exercise of the workers' rights to self-
organization and collective bargaining.
On this score, the law on coverage and
exclusion on the matter should by now
be very clear. Article 244 of the Labor
Code states that all persons employed
in commercial, industrial and
agricultural enterprises, including
religious, charitable, medical or
educational institutions operating for
profit shall have the right to self-
organization and to form, join, or assist
labor organizations for purposes of
collective bargaining. Articles 245 and
246 (ibid) provide that security guards
and managerial employees are not
eligible to form, assist or join any labor
organization. As defined by the Code, a
managerial employee is one who is
vested with powers or prerogatives to
lay down and execute management
policies and/or to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge,
assign or discipline employees, or to
effectively recommend such managerial
actions. All employees not falling within
this definition are considered rank and
file employees for purposes of self-
organization and collective bargaining.
It is in the light of the foregoing
provisions of law that the challenged
order, in so far as it excludes all
managerial and supervisory employees,
secretaries of bank officials, credit
investigators, telephone operators, loan
security custodians, employees in the
accounting, auditing, legal, trust and
personnel departments respectively,
should be modified for being either
superfluous, discriminatory or simply
contrary to law. The express exclusion
of managerial employees in the Order is
superfluous for the same is already
provided for by law and is presumed
when the bargaining unit was defined
as comprising all the regular rank and
file employees of the bank. It is also
anomalous and discriminatory when it
excluded employees of the personnel
department but included specific
individuals like Manuel Simibcay Primi
Zamora and Carmelita Sy. Exclusion as
managerial employee is not based on
the personality of the occupant but
rather on the nature and function of the
position. The exclusion of the other
positions is likewise contrary to law,
there being no clear showing that they
are managerial employees. The mere
fact of being a supervisor or a
confidential employee does not exclude
him from coverage. He must strictly
come within the category of a
managerial employee as defined by the
Code. The Constitution assures to all
workers such rights to self-organization
and collective bargaining. Exclusions,
being the exception and being in
derogation of such constitutional
mandate, should be construed
in strictissimi juris.
Furthermore, to uphold the order of
exclusion would be to allow the
emasculation of the workers' right to
self-organization and to collective
bargaining, statutory rights which have
received constitutional recognition
when they were enshrined in the 1973
Constitution. Indeed, the further rulings
that 'other non-confidential employees
included in the bank's list of proposed
exclusion be allowed to vote but the
votes should be segregated as
challenged and that in case of doubt as
to whether or not the position held by
an employee is confidential in nature,
the employee should be allowed to
vote but his vote should be segregated
as challenged' both complete the said
order's self-nullifying effects.
At the most and indeed as a policy,
exclusion of confidential employees
from the bargaining unit is a matter for
negotiation and agreement of the
parties. Thus, the parties may agree in
the CBA, to exclude certain highly
confidential positions from the
bargaining unit. Absent such
agreement, coverage must be
observed. In any event, any negotiation
and agreement can come after the
representation issue is resolved and this
is just the situation in the instant case.
In fine, the appropriate bargaining unit
shall include a regular rank and file
employees of the respondent including
the positions excluded in the challenged
order dated 19 November 1979, with
the exception of the secretaries to the
Bank President, Executive Vice-
President, Senior Vice President and
other Vice-Presidents as agreed upon
by the parties during the hearings.
Respondent vehemently interposes also
the pendency of cancellation
proceedings against petitioner as a
prejudicial issue which should suspend
the petition for certification election.
We cannot fully concur with this
contention Unless there is an order of
cancellation which is final the union's
certificate of registration remains and
its legal personality intact. It is entitled
to the rights and privileges accorded by
law, including the right to represent its
members and employees in a
bargaining unit for collective bargaining
purposes including participation in a
representation proceeding. This is
especially true where the grounds for
the cancellation of its union certificate
do not appear indubitable.
The rights of workers to self-
organization finds general and specific
constitutional guarantees. Section 7,
Article IV of the Philippine Constitution
provides that the right to form
associations or societies purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
This right more pronounced in the case
of labor. Section 9, Article II (ibid)
specifically declares that the State shall
assure the rights of workers to self-
organization ,collective bargaining,
security of tenure and just and humane
conditions of work. Such constitutional
guarantees should not be lightly taken
much less easily nullified. A healthy
respect for the freedom of association
demands that acts imputable to officers
or members be not easily visited with
capital punishments against the
association itself.
On the 30% consent requirement,
respondent contends that the
bargaining unit is not appropriately
defined 'hence, the med-arbiter's
finding that there was compliance with
the 30% 'jurisdictional requirement is
patently erroneous. To this we must
disagree. As earlier stated, the
definition of the appropriate bargaining
unit does not call for an actual head
count or Identification of the particular
employees belonging thereto. That is
done in the pre-election conference. It
is sufficient that the bargaining unit is
defined such that the employees who
are part thereof may be readily
ascertained for purposes of exclusions
and inclusions during the pre-election
conference when the list of eligible
voters are determined.
In this regard, respondent does not
really seriously question the 264 total
number of employees except for the
alleged exclusion which should reduce
the number thus allegedly affecting the
sufficiency of the supporting signatures
submitted. We have already ruled
against the exclusions as violative of the
constitutional guarantee of workers'
right to self-organization. Consequently,
since 188 of the 264 employees
subscribed to the petition, which
constitutes 70% of the total employees
in bargaining unit, the 30% consent
requirement has been more than
sufficiently complied with. In any case,
even if we grant the alleged exclusions
totalling about 45, the same will not
give any refuge to respondent's
position. For assuming momentarily
that the exclusions are valid, the same
will not fatally affect the 30% consent
compliance.
Finally, lest it be so easily forgotten, a
certification election is but an
administration device for determining
the true choice of the employees in the
appropriate bargaining unit as to their
bargainer representative. Unnecessary
obstacles should not therefore be
thrown on its way. Rather, the parties
should take their case, if they have,
directly to the real and ultimate arbiter
on the matter, the employees sought to
be represented in the bargaining unit.
WHEREFORE, in the light of the
foregoing considerations, the Order
dated 19 November 1979 calling for a
certification election is hereby affirmed
with the modification that the same
shall be conducted among all the
regular rank and file employees of the
respondent bank at its head and branch
offices, including those excluded in said
Order, except only the positions of
secretary to the Bank President,
Executive Vice-President and other
Vice-Presidents which agreed to be
excluded from the bargaining unit by
the parties during the hearings. The
choice shall be between the petitioner
and no union.
Let the certification election be
conducted within twenty (20) days from
receipt hereof. The pre-election
conference shall be immediately called
to thresh out the mechanics of the
election. The list of qualified voters shall
be based on the July 1979 payroll of the
company.
SO ORDERED (pp. 5-9, Annex "J" pp. 63-
67, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On February 11, 1980, petitioner received an undated
and unverified appeal of the respondent bank to the
Minister of Labor questioning the decision of Bureau of
Labor Relations Director Carmelo C. Noriel which appeal
alleged that:
I. THE QUESTIONED ORDER IS NULL
AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN ISSUED
WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION SINCE
(i) It is this Honorable Office, not the
BLR, that has jurisdiction over the
parties' appeals from the Order of Med-
Arbiter Alberto A. Abis, Jr.
II. ASSUMING, AD ARGUENDO, THAT
THE BLR HAS JURISDICTION, THE
APPEALED ORDER IS NONETHELESS
NULL AND VOID, THE BLR HAVING
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
NOT FINDING THAT THE ORDER, DATED
NOVEMBER 19, 1979, OF MED-ARBITER
ABIS IS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING
BEEN ISSUED WITHOUT
AUTHORITY/JURISDICTION
CONSIDERING THAT
(i) Full and complete
jurisdiction over this
petition is vested in this
Office, which, under
P.D. 823, as amended,
and by agreement of
the parties, is the
adjudicative body solely
and exclusively
empowered to resolve
this petition.
(ii) The fact that
petitioner's Union
registration is now the
subject of cancellation
proceedings before the
BLR renders the
issuance of an Order
directing the holding of
a certification election
premature; and
(iii) The bargaining unit
is not appropriately
defined; hence, the
BLR'S and before it, the
Med-Arbiter's finding
that there was
compliance with the
30% jurisdictional
requirement is
completely without
basis and, therefore,
grossly erroneous.
III. THE MOTION FOR INTERVENTION
FILED BY INTERVENOR UNION OF
PRODUCERS BANK EMPLOYEE'S
CHAPTER-NATU WHICH THE BLR, FOR
UNKNOWN REASON(S), FAILED TO
RESOLVE, RENDERS IMPERATIVE THE
REDETERMINATION OF WHETHER OR
NOT THE MANDATORY 30%
JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT HAS
BEEN MET. (Pp. 2-3, Annex "K", pp. 69-
70, rec.).
On February 21, 1980, petitioner union filed a
manifestation on respondent's undated and unverified
appeal (Annex "L"; pp. 91-94, rec.).
On the same date, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
with motion to execute (Annex " M " pp. 95-96, rec.).
On March 3, 1980, petitioner filed an urgent motion to
resolve respondent's appeal together with pertitioner's
motion to dismiss and motion for execution ( Annex
"N"; pp. 97-98, rec.).
On March 14, 1980, petitioner received a copy of a
letter endorsement dated March 7, 1980 which reads:
Respectfully referred to the Honorable
Minister of Labor, the herein attached
Motion to Execute and Manifestation to
Dismiss with Motion to Execute and
Manifestation on Respondent's undated
and unverified Appeal dated Feb. 21,
1980 and February 20, 1980
respectively, for appropriate action.
In a memorandum dated 9 November
1979, the Deputy Minister of Labor
completely inhibited himself in this case
(p. 169, rec.).
Public respondent Director Carmelo C. Noriel did not
proceed to hold the certification election, neither did
the Minister of Labor act on the appeal of private
respondent and on petitioner's motion to dismiss with
motion to execute.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition on March 19,
1980.
On May 2, 1980, private respondent Bank filed its
comments (pp. 111-122, rec.).
On June 25, 1980, public respondents filed their
comment (pp. 131-142, rec.).
On August 16, 1980, petitioner filed its memorandum
(pp. 155-169, rec.).
On September 2, 1980, private respondent Bank filed its
memorandum (pp. 179-197, rec.).
On October 1, 1980, public respondents filed a
manifestation in lieu of memorandum alleging inter
alia that:
1. The instant petition for mandamus
seeks to compel the respondent
Minister of Labor to act on respondent
Producers Bank's Appeal and on
petitioner's motion to execute the
decision of respondent Director of
Labor Relations dated January 24, 1980,
directing the holding of a certification
election in said bank;
2. The said petition, however, is now
moot and academic because:
(a) Respondent Minister
of Labor had already
acted on the said
appeal in his decision
dated April 11, 1980 the
dispositive portion of
which is as follows:
Wherefore, respondent
Bank's Appeal is hereby
dismissed and the
validity of the Decision
of January 24, 1980,
herein adopted is
hereby recognized. No
motion for
reconsideration of this
Order shall be
entertained.
(b) Petitioner may now
file, if it so desires, with
respondent Director of
Labor Relations, a
motion for the
execution of his
decision so that the
certification election
can be held at
respondent bank;
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed
that the instant petition be dismissed
for being moot and academic (pp. 201-
202, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On October 10, 1980, petitioner filed a "Manifestation
Re: Decision of the Minister of Labor" alleging among
other things that.
xxx xxx xxx
2. Petitioner had not received any copy
of such April 11, 1980 decision of the
Minister of Labor mentioned by the
Honorable Solicitor General. In fact, the
Comment of the public respondents
dated June 11, 1980 signed by Assistant
Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez
and Trial Attorney Elihu A. Ybaez made
no mention of the same in the private
respondent's memorandum of
September 2, 1980" (p. 204, rec.).
On October 28, 1980, petitioner filed a comment on
manifestation of the Honorable Solicitor General dated
30 September 1980 and motion alleging therein that
despite inquiries made, no official copy of the
alleged April 11, 1980 decision of the Minister of
Labor mentioned in the manifestation of the Solicitor
General has been furnished the petitioner. Hence, it
prayed that the Minister of Labor be requested to
submit to this Court a certified copy of the
aforesaid April 11, 1986 decision of the Minister of
Labor.
On October 30, 1980, petitioner filed a manifestation
and comment stating that:
1. On October 29, 1980, it received a
copy of the decision of the Honorable
Minister of Labor in Case No. NCR-LRD-
8-360-79 as may be seen from Annex
"A".
2. The decision is dated October 23,
1980 and not April 11, 1980 as stated in
the Manifestation in Lieu of
Memorandum of the Office of the
Honorable Solicitor General, dated 30
September 1980.
3. Petitioner respectfully request an
explanation from the public
respondents on this apparent
discrepancy which has in fact misled
even this Honorable Court (p. 21 1,
rec.).
On November 11, 1980, private respondent Bank filed a
manifestation/motion stating that the aforementioned
April 11, 1980 decision of the Minister of Labor is non-
existent, as in fact the Minister of Labor issued an order
affirming the decision of BLR Director Noriel only on
October 23, 1980.
xxx xxx xxx
3. Notwithstanding the issuance of the
October 23, 1980 Order by the Minister
of Labor, the Bank respectfully submits
that this petition for mandamus,
initiated by petitioner on March 19,
1980 and given due course by this
Honorable Court should not be
dismissed. The petitioner herein prays
from this Honorable Court that public
respondents be ordered to conduct the
certification election as ordered by
Med-Arbiter Plagata, Abis and BLR
Director Noriel among the rank-and-file
employees ... of the Bank. Alternatively,
the petitioner prays that the Minister of
Labor or his Deputy be required "to act
forthwith" on the appeal filed by
petitioner herein As could be gleaned
clearly from the allegations and prayer
in this petition for mandamus, the
petitioner primarily seeks the holding of
a certification election Only secondarily
is it asking this Court to command the
Minister of Labor or his Deputy to
resolve the appeal filed by the Bank.
4. The affirmance by the Minister of the
disputed order of BLR Director Noriel
thus renders moot and academic only
the secondary or alternative prayer of
the Union in this mandamus case. What
still remains for resolution by this
Honorable Courts the issue squarely put
before it on the propriety or impropriety
of holding a certification election. This
issue has been traversed by the
petitioner and the Bank in their
respective memoranda filed with this
Court, with the Bank stressing that a
certification election would be
improper because, among others, the
petitioning Union violated the strike
ban, there is a pending case for
cancellation of its registration
certificate, and applications for
clearance to dismiss the Union's striking
members are pending approval by the
BLR Director.
5. A dismissal of this petition for
mandamus would unduly delay the
resolution of the issue of whether a
certification election should be held or
not.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully moved
that this Honorable Court rule on the issue of whether
or not a certification election should be held under
circumstances obtaining in the present case (pp. 214-
216, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On November 24, 1980, public respondents filed a reply
to the manifestation and comment of petitioner
explaining the discrepancy of the two datesOctober
23, 1980, the actual date of the order of the Minister of
Labor affirming the decision of the BLR Director and
April 11, 1980, the date mentioned by the Solicitor
General as the alleged date of the aforesaid order of the
Minister of Labor. Thus, the pertinent portion of the
letter of Director Noriel to the Solicitor General likewise
explaining the apparent discrepancy of the aforesaid
dates reads:
It should likewise invite your attention
to the date of the Order which is
October 23, 1980 and not April 11, 1980
as indicated in the "Manifestation in
Lieu of Memorandum" dated
September 30, 1980 of the Solicitor
General filed with the Supreme Court.
The April 11, 1980 date must have been
based on a draft order which was
inadvertently included in the records of
the case that was forwarded to your
office. We wish to point out, however,
that the dispositive portion as quoted in
the Manifestation is exactly the same as
that in the Order eventually signed and
released by the Labor Minister on
October 23, 1980 (p. 220, rec.).
Public respondents further averred that "(I)n any event,
whether the order is dated April 11, 1980 or October
23, 1980 will not matter since both 'orders' dismissed
the appeal of the respondent Bank, upon which
dismissal the Manifestation in Lieu of Memorandum
dated September 30, 1980, of public respondents, was
based." Public respondents thus reiterated their prayer
that the instant petition be dismissed for being
allegedly moot and academic (pp. 219-222, rec.).
On December 5, 1980, petitioner filed a comment to
manifestation/motion of counsel for private respondent
alleging inter alia that "... should the Honorable Court
be minded to resolve the issue raised in the
Manifestation/Motion of private respondent-i.e.-
whether the alleged strike ban violation is a bar to a
certification election, it will be noted that the matter of
whether there has been a 'violation' of the strike ban or
not is still to be heard by the Regional Director through
Labor Arbiter Crescencio Trajano after this Honorable
Court dismissed G.R. No. L-52026 on the matter of
jurisdiction competence of the Regional Director to hear
the question raised therein. To the present, although,
the Regional Director has commenced to act on the
case, there is no decision on whether the strike ban has
been violated by the petitioner union." Petitioner union
vigorously asserted that while private respondent Bank
has a pending petition for cancellation of the
registration certificate of herein petitioner union, it is
still premature for private respondent Bank to claim
that the petitioner union has violated the strike ban.
Petitioner then alleged that "(T)here is also no
proof or decision that acts indulged in by the petitioner
and its members amounted to a strike and even
assuming arguendo that such act (which was the
holding of a meeting for 30 minutes before office time
in the morning) constitutes a 'strike' and further that
such act violates the strike ban. It has been held
through Honorable Justice Antonio P. Barredo in
Petrophil. vs. Malayang Manggagawa sa ESSO (75 SCRA
73) that only the leaders and members who
participated in the illegal activity are held responsible. If
this were so, then the rest of the members who are
innocent are still entitled to the benefits of collective
bargaining. There is thus no need to delay the holding
of a certification election on the alleged ground that
there is a pending action of the respondent company
against the petitioner union for 'violation of the strike
ban' " (pp. 226-227, rec.).
It is likewise pointed out by petitioner union that even if
it would be ultimately confirmed that indeed petitioner
union has violated the strike ban, cancellation of the
registration certificate of petitioner union is not the
only disciplinary action or sanction provided for under
the law but other penalties may be imposed and not
necessarily cancellation of its registration certificate.
On January 12, 1981, pursuant to the resolution of this
Court dated December 4, 1980, petitioner union filed its
rejoinder which reiterated the stand of the Solicitor
General that the present case has become moot and
academic by virtue of the decision of the Minister of
Labor affirming the decision of the BLR Director which
ordered a certification election (p. 230, rec.).
It is quite obvious from the facts set forth above that
the question of jurisdiction vigorously asserted by
herein private respondent Bank has become moot and
academic.
What therefore remains for this Court to resolve is the
issue as to whether or not a certification election should
be held under the circumstances obtaining in the
present case. Is it proper to order a certification
election despite the pendency of the petition to cancel
herein petitioner union's certificate of registration?
The Court rules in the affirmative. The pendency of the
petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of
herein petitioner union is not a bar to the holding of a
certification election. The pendency of the petition for
cancellation of the registration certificate of petitioner
union founded on the alleged illegal strikes staged by
the leaders and members of the intervenor union and
petitioner union should not suspend the holding of a
certification election, because there is no order
directing such cancellation (cf. Dairy Queen Products
Company of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, et al. No. L-35009, Aug. 31, 1977). In said
Dairy Queen case, one of the issues raised was whether
the lower court erred and concomitantly committed
grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the fact that
therein respondent union's permit and license have
been cancelled by the then Department of Labor and
therefore could not be certified as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file
employees of therein petitioner company.
While the rationale of the decision was principally
rested on the subsequent rescission of the decision
ordering the cancellation of the registration certificate
of the respondent union, thereby restoring its legal
personality and an the rights and privileges accorded by
law to a legitimate organization, this Court likewise
declared: "There is no showing, however, that when the
respondent court issued the order dated December 8,
1971, certifying the Dairy Queen Employees Association
CCLU as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of all regular rank and file employees of
the Dairy Queen Products Company of the Philippines,
Inc., for purposes of collective bargaining with respect to
wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and
conditions for appointment, the order of cancellation of
the registration certificate of the Dairy Queen
Employees Association-CC-1,U had become final" 78
SCRA 444-445. supra, emphasis supplied).
It may be worthy to note also that the petition for
cancellation of petitioner union's registration certificate
based on the alleged illegal strikes staged on October
12, 1979 and later November 5-7, 1979 was evidently
intended to delay the early disposition of the case for
certification election considering that the same was
apparently filed only after the October 18,
1979 Order of Med-Arbiter Plagata which directed the
holding of a certification election.
Aside from the fact that the petition for cancellation of
the registration certificate of petitioner union has not
yet been finally resolved, there is another fact that
militates against the stand of private respondent Bank,
the liberal approach observed by this Court as to
matters of certification election. In a recent case, Atlas
Free Workers Union (AFWU)-PSSLU Local vs. Hon.
Carmelo C. Noriel, et al. (No. 51005, May 26, 1981),
"[T]he Court resolves to grant the petition (for
mandamus) in line with the liberal approach
consistently adhered to by this Court in matters of
certification election. The whole democratic process is
geared towards the determination of representation,
not only in government but in other sectors as well, by
election. Thus, the Court has declared its commitment
to the view that a certification election is crucial to the
institution of collective bargaining, for it gives substance
to the principle of majority rule as one ' of the basic
concepts of a democratic policy" (National Mines and
Allied Workers Union vs. Luna, 83 SCRA 610).
Likewise, Scout Ramon V. Albano Memorial College vs.
Noriel, et al. (L-48347, Oct. 3, 1978, 85 SCRA 494, 497,
498), this Court citing a long catena of cases ruled:
... The institution of collective
bargaining is, to recall Cox, a prime
manifestation of industrial democracy
at work. The two parties to the
relationship, labor and management,
make their own rules by coming to
terms. That is to govern themselves in
matters that really count. As labor,
however, is composed of a number of
individuals, it is indispensable that they
be represented by a labor organization
of their choice. Thus may be discerned
how crucial is a certification election. So
our decisions from the earliest case
of PLDT Employees Union v. PLDT Co.
Free Telephone Workers Union to the
latest, Philippine Communications,
Electronics & Electricity Workers'
Federation (PCWF) v. Court of Industrial
Relations, had made clear. The same
principle was again given expression in
language equally emphatic in the
subsequent case of Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions v.
Bureau of Labor Relations: 'Petitioner
thus appears to be woefully lacking in
awareness of the significance of a
certification election for the collective
bargaining process. It is the fairest and
most effective way of determining
which labor organization can truly
represent the working force. It is a
fundamental postulate that the will of
the majority, if given expression in an
honest election with freedom on the
part of the voters to make their choice,
is controlling. No better device can
assure the institution of industrial
democracy with the two parties to a
business enterprise, management and
labor, establishing a regime of self-rule.'
That is to accord respect to the policy of
the Labor Code, indisputably partial to
the holding of a certification election so
as to arrive in a manner definitive and
certain concerning the choice of the
labor organization to represent the
workers in a collective bargaining unit
(emphasis supplied).
It is true that under Section 8, Rule II, Book V of the
Labor Code, cancellation of registration certificate may
be imposed on the following instances:
(a) Violation of Articles 234, 238, 239
and 240 of the Code;
(b) Failure to comply with Article 237 of
the Code;
(c) Violation of any of the provisions of
Article 242 of the Code; and
(d) Any violation of the provisions of
this Book.
The aforementioned provisions should be read in
relation to Article 273, Chapter IV, Title VIII which
explicitly provides:
Art. 273. Penalties. (a) Violation of
any provision of this Title shall be
punished by a fine of One Thousand
Pesos [P l, 000.00] to Ten Thousand
Pesos [P 10, 000.00] and/or
imprisonment of one (1) year to five (5)
years.
(b) Any person violating any provision
of this Title shall be dealt with in
accordance with General Order No. 2-A
and General Order No. 49.
(c) Violation of this Title by any
legitimate labor organization shall be
grounds for disciplinary action
including, but not limited to, the
cancellation of its registration permit.
x x x x x x x x x
(emphasis supplied).
From the aforequoted provisions, We are likewise
convinced that as it can be gleaned from said
provisions, cancellation of the registration certificate is
not the only resultant penalty in case of any violation of
the Labor Code.
Certainly, the penalty imposable should be
commensurate to the nature or gravity of the Legal
activities conducted and to the number of members and
leaders of the union staging the illegal strike.
As aptly ruled by respondent Bureau of Labor Relations
Director Noriel: "The rights of workers to self-
organization finds general and specific constitutional
guarantees. Section 7, Article IV of the Philippine
Constitution provides that the right to form associations
or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not
be abridged. This right is more pronounced in the case
of labor. Section 9, Article II (ibid) specifically declares
that the State shall assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure
and just and humane conditions of work. Such
constitutional guarantees should not be lightly taken
much less easily nullified. A healthy respect for the
freedom of association demands that acts imputable to
officers or members be not easily visited with capital
punishments against the association itself" (p. 8, Annex
"J"; p. 66, rec.).
WHEREFORE, THE WRIT OF mandamus PRAYED FOR IS
GRANTED AND RESPONDENT BLR DIRECTOR NORIEL
HEREBY ORDERED TO CALL AND DIRECT THE
IMMEDIATE HOLDING OF A CERTIFICATION ELECTION.
NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-44350 November 25, 1976
U.E. AUTOMOTIVE EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS
UNION-TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
ALLIED SERVICES, petitioners,
vs.
CARMELO C. NORIEL, PHILIPPINE FEDERATION OF
LABOR, AND U. E. AUTOMOTIVE MANUFACTURING
CO., INC., respondents.
Tupaz & Associates for petitioners.
Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant
Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and Trial Attorney
Joselito B. Floro for respondent Carmelo C. Noriel.
Alejandro C. Villaviza for respondent Phil. Federation of
Labor.
Poblador, Nazareno, Azada, Tomacruz & Paredes for
respondent Company.

FERNANDO, J.:
It is a notable feature of our Constitution that freedom
of association is explicitly ordained;
1
it is not merely
derivative, peripheral or penumbral, as is the case in the
United States.
2
It can trace its origin to the Malolos
Constitution.
3
More specifically, where it concerns the
expanded rights of labor under the present Charter, it is
categorically made an obligation of the State to assure
full enjoyment "of workers to self-organization [and]
collective bargaining."
4
It would be to show less than
full respect to the above mandates of the fundamental
law, considering that petitioner union obtained the
requisite majority at a fair and honest election, if it
would not be recognized as the sole bargaining agent.
The objection by respondent Director finds no support
in the wording of the law. To sustain it, however, even
on the assumption that it has merit, just because when
petitioner asked for a certification election, there was
lacking the three-day period under the Industrial Peace
Act then in force
5
for it to be entitled to the rights and
privileges of a labor organization, would be to accord
priority to form over substance. Moreover, it was not
denied that respondent Director of Labor Relations on
January 2, 1975 certified that it was petitioner which
should be "the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of all rank and file employees and
workers of the U.E. Automotive Manufacturing,
Inc."
6
He had no choice as the voting was 59 in favor of
petitioner and 52 for private respondent Union. It
would appear evident, therefore, that in the light of the
constitutional provisions set forth above and with the
present Labor Code, the challenged order of February
24, 1975 setting aside such certification and ordering
the holding of a new election did amount to a grave
abuse of discretion. That was to run counter to what
the law commands.
7

The facts are undisputed. The comment submitted by
respondent Director Carmelo C. Noriel, through Acting
Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. and Assistant
Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno,
8
made it clear. There
was, on August 15, 1974, a petition for certification
election with the National Labor Relations Commission
filed by petitioner. Thereafter, on August 26, 1974,
private respondent Philippine Federation of Labor
submitted a motion for intervention. Three conferences
between such labor organizations resulted in an
agreement to hold a consent election actually
conducted on September 19, 1974 among the rank and
file workers of respondent management firm. Petitioner
obtained fifty-nine votes, with respondent union having
only fifty-two votes in such consent election. There was,
on September 19, 1974, a motion by petitioner to issue
an order of certification duly granted on January 2, 1975
by respondent Director who did certify petitioner as the
sole land exclusive collective bargaining representative
of such rank and file employees of respondent firm.
There was, however, a motion for reconsideration
which was granted notwithstanding opposition by the
union on January 22, 1975, setting aside the previous
order certifying petitioner as the sole bargaining
representative. It is such an order sustaining a motion
for reconsideration that resulted in this petition.
9

The submission of respondent Director to sustain the
validity of his order in the comment submitted on his
behalf follows: "Petitioner union is not a legitimate
labor organization. Section 2(f) of, Republic Act Number
875 defines a legitimate labor organization as any labor
organization registered by the Department of Labor.
Petitioner union isnot duly registered with the
Department of Labor. The records of the Labor
Registration Division of the Bureau of Labor Relations,
Department of Labor show that the application for
registration of petitioner union was filed therein on July
19, 1974. Petitioner union filed a petition for
certification on August 15, 1974 or merely after a period
of twenty-seven (27) days. Section 23(b) of Republic Act
Number 875 explicitly provides, thus: 'Any labor
organization, association or union of workers duly
organized for the material, intellectual and moral well-
being of the members shall acquire legal personality
and be entitled to all the rights and privileges within
thirty days of filing with the Office of the Secretary of
Labor notice of its due application and existence and
the following documents, together with the amount of
five pesos as registration fee, except as provided in
paragraph "d" of this section (emphasis supplied).' It is
clear therefore that the petition for certification
election was filed before the expiration of the period of
thirty (30) days. It is futile therefore for the petitioner to
claim that it has already legal personality and is entitled
to all the rights and privileges granted by law to
legitimate labor organizations by virtue of Section 23(b)
of Republic Act Number 875."
10
As noted at the outset,
such an argument rests on an infirm and shaky
foundation. It definitely runs counter to what this Court
has held and continues to hold in a number of cases in
accordance with the constitutional freedom of
association, more specifically, where labor is concerned,
to the fundamental rights of self-organization. Hence
the merit in the present petition.
1. There is pertinent to this excerpt from a recent
decision, Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera
v. Noriel:
11
"Clearly, what is at stake is the
constitutional right to freedom of association on the
part of employees. Petitioner labor union was in the
past apparently able to enlist the allegiance of the
working force in the Anglo-American Tobacco
Corporation. Thereafter, a number of such individuals
joined private respondent labor union. That is a matter
clearly left to their sole uncontrolled judgment. There is
this excerpt from Pan American World Airways, Inc. v.
Pan American Employees Association: 'There is both a
constitutional and statutory recognition that laborers
have the right to form unions to take care of their
interests vis-a-vis their employees. Their freedom to
form organizations would be rendered nugatory if they
could not choose their own leaders to speak on their
behalf and to bargain for them.' It cannot be otherwise,
for the freedom to choose which labor organization to
join is an aspect of the constitutional mandate of
protection to labor. Prior to the Industrial Peace Act,
there was a statute setting forth the guideline for the
registration of labor unions. As implied in Manila Hotel
Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, it was enacted
pursuant to what is ordained in the Constitution. Thus
in Umali v. Lovina, it was held that mandamus lies to
compel the registration of a labor organization. There is
this apt summary of what is signified in Philippine Land-
Air-Sea Labor Union v. Court of Industrial Relations, 'to
allow a labor union to organize itself and acquire a
personality distinct and separate from its members and
to serve as an instrumentality to conclude collective
bargaining agreements * * *.' It is no coincidence that in
the first decision of this Court citing the Industrial Peace
Act, Pambujan United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining
Company, the role of a labor union as the agency for the
expression of the collective will affecting its members
both present and prospective, was stressed. That
statute certainly was much more emphatic as to the
vital aspect of such a right as expressly set forth in the
policy of the law. What is more, there is in such
enactment this categorical provision on the right of
employees to self-organization: 'Employees shall have
the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist
labor organizations of their own choosing for the
purpose of collective bargaining through
representatives of their own choosing and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. The new
Labor Code is equally explicit on the matter. Thus: 'The
State shall assure the rights of workers of self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure
and just and humane conditions of work.'"
12

2. The matter received further elaboration in the
Federacion Obrera decision in these words: "It is thus of
the very essence of the regime of industrial democracy
sought to be attained through the collective bargaining
process that there be no obstacle to the freedom
Identified with the exercise of the right to self-
organization. Labor is to be represented by a union that
can express its collective will. In the event, and this is
usually the case, that there is more than one such group
fighting for that privilege, a certification election must
be conducted. That is the teaching of a recent decision
under the new Labor Code, United Employees Union of
Gelmart Industries v. Noriel. There is this relevant
except: 'The institution of collective bargaining is, to
recall Cox, a prime manifestation of industrial
democracy at work. The two parties to the relationship,
labor and management, make their own rules by
coming to terms. That is to govern themselves in
matters that really count. As labor, however, is
composed of a number of individuals, it is indispensable
that they be represented by a labor organization of
their choice. Thus may be discerned how crucial is a
certification election. So our decisions from the earliest
case of PLDT Employees Union v. PLDT Co. Free
Telephone Workers Union to the latest, Philippine
Communications, Electronics & Electricity Workers'
Federation (PCWF) v. Court of Industrial Relations, have
made clear.' An even later pronouncement in Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor
Relations, speaks similarly: 'Petitioner thus appears to
be woefully lacking in awareness of the significance of a
certification election for the collective bargaining
process. It is the fairest and most effective way of
determining which labor organization can truly
represent the working force. It is a fundamental
postulate that the will of the majority, if given
expression in an honest election with freedom on the
part of the voters to make their choice, is controlling.
No better device can assure the institution of industrial
democracy with the two parties to a business
enterprise, management and labor, establishing a
regime of self-rule.' "
13

3. Deference to the above principles so often reiterated
in a host of decisions ought to have exerted a
compelling force on respondent Director of Labor
Relations. As a matter of fact, that appeared to be the
case. He did certify on January 2, 1975 that petitioner
should be "the sole and exclusive collective bargaining
representative of all rank-and-file employees and
workers of the UE Automotive Manufacturing,
Inc."
14
The voting, having been 59 in favor of petitioner
and 52 for private respondent Union, had to be
respected. Had he stood firm, there would have been
no occasion for the certiorari petition. He did, however,
have a change of mind. On February 24, 1975, he set
aside such certification. In his comment, earlier referred
to, he would predicate this turnabout on the Union
lacking the three-day period before filing the petition
for certification under the appropriate provision of the
Industrial Peace Act then in force. That could be an
explanation, but certainly not a justification. It would
amount, to use a phrase favored by Justice Cardozo, to
a stultification of a constitutional right.
4. The excuse offered for the action taken lacks any
persuasive force. It may even be looked upon as
insubstantial, not to say flimsy. The law is quite clear;
the expression is within thirty days, not after thirty
days. Even if meritorious, however, it can be
disregarded under the maxim de minimis non curat
lex.
15
Then, too, the weakness of such a pretext is made
apparent by the well-settled principle in the Philippines
that where it concerns the weight to be accorded to the
wishes of the majority as expressed in an election
conducted fairly and honestly, certain provisions that
may be considered mandatory before the voting takes
place becomes thereafter merely directory in order that
the wishes of the electorate prevail.
16
The indefensible
character of the order of February 24, 1975 setting
aside the previous order certifying to petitioner as the
exclusive bargaining representative becomes truly
apparent.
5. Nor is the different outcome called for just because
at the time of the challenged order, there was as yet no
registration of petitioner Union. If at all, that is a
circumstance far from flattering as far as the Bureau of
Labor Relations is concerned. It must be remembered
that as admitted in the comment of respondent
Director, the application for registration was filed on
July 19, 1974. The challenged order was issued seven
months later. There is no allegation that such
application suffered from any infirmity. Moreover, if
such were the case, the attention of petitioner should
have been called so that it could be corrected. Only thus
may the right to association be accorded full respect. As
far back as Umali v. Lovina,
17
a 1950 decision, it was
held by this Court that under appropriate
circumstances, mandamus lies to compel registration.
There is, in addition, a letter signed by a certain Jesus C.
Cuenca, who Identified himself as the Acting Registrar
of Labor Organizations, stating that this
Office "has taken due note of your letter of July 25,
1974 informing us that this union has been accepted by
the Federation as local chapter No. 580."
18
When it is
taken into consideration that the Bureau of Labor
Relations itself had allowed another labor union not
registered but affiliated with the same Federation to be
entitled to the rights of a duly certified labor
organization, there would appear clearly an element of
arbitrariness in the actuation of respondent
Director.
19
It is likewise impressed with a character of a
denial of equal protection. Lastly, this Court,
in Nationalists Party v. Bautista,
20
where one of the
defenses raised is lack of capacity of petitioner as a
juridical person entitled to institute proceedings, after
holding that it was entitled to the remedy of prohibition
sought, allowed it either to amend its petition so as to
substitute a juridical person, or to show that it is
entitled to institute such proceeding. So it should be in
this Case. In the absence of any fatal defect to the
application for registration, there is no justification for
withholding it from petitioner to enable it to exercise
fully its constitutional right to freedom of association. In
the alternative, the petition could very well be
considered as having been filed by the parent labor
federation. What is decisive is that the members of
petitioner Union did exercise their fundamental right to
self-organization and did win in a fair and honest
election.
WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is granted, the
challenged order of February 24, 1975 setting aside the
certification is nullified and declared void, and the
previous order of January 2, 1975 certifying to
petitioner Union as the "sole and exclusive collective
bargaining representative of all rank and file employees
and workers of the U.E. Automotive Manufacturing
Company, Inc.," declared valid and binding. Whatever
other rights petitioner Union may have under the
present Labor Code should likewise be accorded
recognition by respondent Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations. This decision is immediately executory.
No costs.

G.R. No. 92391 July 3, 1992
PHILIPPINE FRUITS AND VEGETABLE INDUSTRIES,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, in his capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Labor and Employment and TRADE
UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES
(TUPAS), respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction assails the following:
(1) The Resolution dated December 12, 1989 of public
respondent Secretary of Labor
1
affirming on appeal the
Order dated March 7, 1989 issued by Med-Arbiter
Danilo T. Basa, and certifying private respondent Trade
Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (or TUPAS)
as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all regular
rank-and-file and seasonal workers at Philippine Fruits
and Vegetable Industries, Inc. (or PFVII), petitioner
herein; and
(2) The Order dated February 8, 1990 issued by public
respondent Secretary of Labor
2
denying petitioner's
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner PFVII contends the questioned resolution and
order are null and void as they are contrary to law and
have been issued with grave abuse of discretion, and
having no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, it filed with this Court the
petition now at hand.
The facts of the case are well-stated in the Comment
filed by the Solicitor General, and are thus reproduced
hereunder, as follows:
On October 13, 1988, Med-Arbiter Basa
issued an Order granting the petition
for Certification election filed by the
Trade Union of the Philippines and
Allied Services (TUPAS). Said order
directed the holding of a certification
election among the regular and
seasonal workers of the Philippine
Fruits and Vegetables, Inc. (p. 42, NLRC,
Records).
After a series of pre-election
conferences, all issues relative to the
conduct of the certification election
were threshed out except that which
pertains to the voting qualifications of
the hundred ninety four (194) workers
enumerated in the lists of qualified
voters submitted by TUPAS.
After a late submission by the parties of
their respective position papers, Med-
Arbiter Basa issued an Order dated
December 9, 1988 allowing 184 of the
194 questioned workers to vote,
subject to challenge, in the certification
election to be held on December 16,
1989. Copies of said Order were
furnished the parties (p. 118, NLRC,
Records) and on December 12, 1988 the
notice of certification election was duly
posted. One hundred sixty eight (168)
of the questioned workers actually
voted on election day.
In the scheduled certification election,
petitioner objected to the proceeding,
through a Manifestation (p. 262, NLRC,
Records) filed with the Representation
Officer before the close of the election
proceedings. Said Manifestation
pertinently reads:
The posting of the list
of eligible voters
authorized to
participate in the
certification election
was short of the five (5)
days provided by law
considering that it was
posted only on
December 12, 1988 and
the election was held
today, December 16,
1988 is only four days
prior to the scheduled
certification election.
By agreement of petitioner and TUPAS,
workers whose names were
inadvertently omitted in the list of
qualified voters were allowed to vote,
subject to challenge (p. 263, NLRC,
Records). Thirty eight of them voted on
election day.
Initial tally of the election results
excluding the challenged votes showed
the following:
Total No. of the Votes
291
Yes votes 40
No votes 38
Spoiled 7
Challenged (Regular) 38

Total No. of Votes Cast
123
On January 6, 1989, Management and
TUPAS agreed to have the 36
challenged votes of the regular rank-
and-file employees opened and a
canvass thereof showed:
Yes votes 20
No votes 14
Spoiled 4

Total 38
Added to the initial election results of
December 16, 1988, the canvass of
results showed:
Yes 60
No 52
Spoiled 11

Total 123
Based on the foregoing results, the yes
votes failed to obtain the majority of
the votes cast in said certification
election, hence, the necessity of
opening the 168 challenged votes to
determine the true will of the
employees.
On January 20, 1989, petitioner filed a
position paper arguing against the
opening of said votes mainly because
said voters are not regular employees
nor seasonal workers for having
allegedly rendered work for less than
180 days.
Trade Union of the Philippines and
Allied Services (TUPAS), on the other
hand, argued that the employment
status of said employees has been
resolved when Labor Arbiter Ricardo N.
Martinez, in his Decision dated
November 26, 1988 rendered in NLRC
Case No. Sub-Rab-01-09-7-0087-88,
declared that said employees were
illegally dismissed.
In an Order dated February 2, 1989 (pp.
278-280, NLRC, Records) Med-Arbiter
Basa ordered the opening of said 168
challenged votes upon his observation
that said employees were illegally
dismissed in accordance with the
foregoing Decision of Labor Arbiter
Martinez. As canvassed, the results
showed
Yes votes 165
No votes 0
Spoiled 3

Total 168
On February 23, 1989, petitioner
formally filed a Protest (pp.
284-287, NLRC, Records) claiming that
the required five day posting of notice
was not allegedly complied with and
that the list of qualified voters so
posted failed to include fifty five regular
workers agreed upon by the parties as
qualified to vote. The Protest further
alleged that voters who were ineligible
to vote were allowed to vote.
Med-Arbiter Basa, in his Order dated
March 7, 1989, dismissed said Protest
which Order was affirmed on appeal in
the Resolution dated December 12,
1989 of then Secretary of Labor,
Franklin Drillon.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
was denied for lack of merit in public
respondent's Order dated February 28,
1990.
(pp. 84-88, Rollo)
3

The instant petition has, for its Assignment of Errors,
the following:
(1) The Honorable Secretary of Labor
and Employment acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction and committed manifest
error in upholding the certification of
TUPAS as the sole bargaining agent
mainly on an erroneous ruling that the
protest against the canvassing of the
votes cast by 168 dismissed workers
was filed beyond the reglementary
period.
(2) The Honorable Secretary of Labor
committed an abuse of discretion in
completely disregarding the issue as to
whether or not non-regular seasonal
workers who have long been separated
from employment prior to the filing of
the petition for certification election
would be allowed to vote and
participate in a certification election.
4

The Court finds no merit in the petition.
For it is to be noted that the formal protest of petitioner
PFVII was filed beyond the reglementary period. A close
reading of Sections 3 and 4, Rule VI, Book V of the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, which read as
follows:
Sec. 3. Representation officer may rule
on any-on-the-spot questions. The
Representation officer may rule on any
on-the-spot question arising from the
conduct of the election. The interested
party may however, file a protest with
the representation officer before the
close of the proceedings.
Protests not so raised are deemed
waived. Such protest shall be contained
in the minutes of the proceedings.
(Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 4. Protest to be decided in twenty
(20) working days. Where the protest
is formalized before the med-arbiter
with five (5) days after the close of the
election proceedings, the med-arbiter
shall decide the same within twenty
(20) working days from the date of
formalization. If not formalized within
the prescribed period, the protest shall
be deemed dropped. The decision may
be appealed to the Bureau in the same
manner and on the same grounds as
provided under Rule V. (Emphasis
supplied)
would readily yield, as a matter of procedure, the
following requirements in order that a protest filed
thereunder would prosper, to wit:
(1) The protest must be filed with the
representation officer and made of
record in the minutes of the
proceedings before the close of election
proceedings, and
(2) The protest must be formalized
before the Med-Arbiter within five (5)
days after the close of the election
proceedings.
The records before Us quite clearly disclose the fact that
petitioner, after filing a manifestation of protest on
December 16, 1988, election day, only formalized the
same on February 20, 1989, or more than two months
after the close of election proceedings (i.e., December
16, 1988). We are not persuaded by petitioner's
arguments that election proceedings include not only
casting of votes but necessarily includes canvassing and
appreciation of votes cast and considering that the
canvassing and appreciation of all the votes cast were
terminated only on February 16, 1989, it was only then
that the election proceedings are deemed closed, and
thus, when the formal protest was filed on February 20,
1989, the five-day period within which to file the formal
protest still subsisted and its protest was therefore
formalized within the reglementary period.
5

As explained correctly by the Solicitor General, the
phrase "close of election proceedings" as used in
Sections 3 and 4 of the pertinent Implementing Rules
refers to that period from the closing of the polls to the
counting and tabulation of the votes as it could not
have been the intention of the Implementing Rules to
include in the term "close of the election proceedings"
the period for the final determination of the challenged
votes and the canvass thereof, as in the case at bar
which may take a very long period.
6
Thus, if a protest
can be formalized within five days after a final
determination and canvass of the challenged votes have
been made, it would result in an undue delay in the
affirmation of the employees' expressed choice of a
bargaining representative.
7

Petitioner would likewise bring into issue the fact that
the notice of certification election was posted only on
December 12, 1988 or four days before the scheduled
elections on December 16, 1988, instead of the five-day
period as required under Section 1 of Rule VI, Book V of
the Implementing Rules. But it is not disputed that a
substantial number, or 291 of 322 qualified voters, of
the employees concerned were informed, thru the
notices thus posted, of the elections to be held on
December 16, 1988, and that such employees had in
fact voted accordingly on election day. Viewed thus in
the light of the substantial participation in the elections
by voter-employees, and further in the light of the all-
too settled rule that in interpreting the Constitution's
protection to labor and social justice provisions and the
labor laws and rules and regulations implementing the
constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court adopts the
liberal approach which favors the exercise of labor
rights, 8 We find the lack of one day in the posting of
notices insignificant, and hence, not a compelling
reason at all in nullifying the elections.
As regards the second assignment of error, the public
respondent Secretary of Labor did not completely
disregard the issue as to the voting rights of the alleged
separated employees for precisely, he affirmed on
appeal the findings of the Med-Arbiter when he ruled
The election results indicate that TUPAS
obtained majority of the valid votes cast
in the election 60 plus 165, or a total
of 225 votes out of a possible total of
291.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appeal is hereby denied and the Med-
Arbiter's order dated 7 March 1989
affirmed. Petitioner TUPAS is hereby
certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all regular rank-and-
file and seasonal workers at Philippine
Fruits and Vegetable Industries,
Inc.
9
(p. 26, Rollo)
At any rate, it is now well-settled that employees who
have been improperly laid off but who have a present,
unabandoned right to or expectation of re-employment,
are eligible to vote in certification elections.
10
Thus, and
to repeat, if the dismissal is under question, as in the
case now at bar whereby a case of illegal dismissal
and/or unfair labor practice was filed, the employees
concerned could still qualify to vote in the elections.
11

And finally, the Court would wish to stress once more
the rule which it has consistently pronounced in many
earlier cases that a certification election is the sole
concern of the workers and the employer is regarded as
nothing more than a bystander with no right to
interfere at all in the election. The only exception here
is where the employer has to file a petition for
certification election pursuant to Article 258 of the
Labor Code because it is requested to bargain
collectively. Thus, upon the score alone of the
"Bystander Rule", the instant petition would have been
dismissed outright.
WHEREFORE, the petition filed by Philippine Fruits and
Vegetable Industries, Inc. (PFVII) in hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 97189 May 11, 1993
JISSCOR INDEPENDENT UNION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RUBEN TORRES and BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA,
in their capacity as Secretary and Undersecretary of
Labor, respectively; ASSOCIATED LABOR UNI0N (ALU)
and SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG
JISSCOR, respondents.
Romeo B. Igot Law Office for petitioner.
Joji L. Barrios for private respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
On June 27, 1990, petitioner JISSCOR Independent
Union (JIU) filed a petition for certification election
among the rank-and-file employees of the Jacinto Iron
and Steel Sheets Corporation (JISSCOR) before the Med-
Arbitration Unit of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), National Capital Region, Manila.
By agreement of the petitioner, JIU, the intervenor SMJ-
ALU and the JISSCOR management, the Med-Arbiter
issued an Order on August 29, 1990, setting the
certification election on September 4, 1990.
However, on the appointed date, instead of an election,
as previously agreed upon by all the parties, another
pre-election conference was held in the Department of
Labor and Employment. Another agreement was
entered into by JIU, JISSCOR and SMJ-ALU, providing
that the election would be conducted on September 6,
1990 from 8:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M., and that "the
mandatory five (5) days posting is hereby waived by
agreement of the parties" (p. 172, Rollo).
The results of the certification election held on
September 6, 1990 were the following:
JISSCOR Independent Union 46
Samahang Manggagawa ng JISSCOR-
ALU 50
No Union 0
Spoiled 3
Total Votes Cast 99 (p. 21, Rollo.)
The JIU, which obtained only the second highest
number of votes, registered a protest in the minutes of
the election stating that: "we file protest on the
following grounds using visor, emblem" (p. 174, Rollo).
On September 11, 1990, the JIU filed a formal protest
before the Department of Labor, National Capital
Region, on the following grounds:
I. The election was conducted very
disorderly and irregular (sic) as there
was no compliance of (sic) mandatory
posting of notice of certification
election and necessary list of qualified
voters in accordance to (sic) Section 1
of Rule VI of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations;
II. The lack of the required posting had
mislead (sic) and/or misinformed the
voters/workers of the manner of voting,
thus it resulted to some spoiled votes;
III. Escorting of workers by SMJ-ALU
officers and members, especially a
certain Rene Tan from their place of
work to the election registration;
IV. Forcing the workers to vote for SMJ-
ALU by posting of a very big streamer
with printed words: Vote! Samahang
Manggagawa Ng JISSCOR-ALU at the
entrance front door of the chapel
where the election was held;
V. Forcing the workers to vote for SMJ-
ALU by wearing of sunvisors and pins
with printed words: Vote! SMJ-ALU
before and during voting inside the
polling place (chapel). (pp- 45-
46, Rollo.)
On November 21, 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas F.
Falconitin issued an Order declaring the September 6,
1990 certification election null and void.
On December 12, 1990, the winner, respondent SMJ-
ALU appealed to the DOLE Secretary and prayed that it
be declared the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of
the rank-and-file employees of JISSCOR.
On January 18, 1991, a decision was rendered by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment granting the appeal
of SMJ-ALU and setting aside the Order dated
November 21, 1990 of the Med-Arbiter. A new order
was entered certifying SMJ-ALU as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank-and-file
workers of JISSCOR pursuant to the results of the
certification election conducted on September 6, 1990.
In due time, the JIU filed this petition
for certiorari alleging that the public respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction in certifying SMJ-ALU as the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of JISSCOR.
The petition has no merit.
Section 3, Rule VI, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
implementing the Labor Code provides that the grounds
of a protest may be filed on the spot or in writing with
the representation officer and shall be contained in the
minutes of the proceedings. Protests not so raised are
deemed waived.
The minutes of the certification election show,
however, that JIU only protested against the use of
emblem, visor, pin. Hence, other "protests [such as the
posting in the chapel entrance of a huge streamer with
the words: "Vote! Samahang Manggagawa ng JISSCOR-
ALU"]not so raised are deemed waived" (Sec. 3, Rule VI,
Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code).
There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the
non-posting of the notice of the certification election as
prescribed by Section 1, Rule VI, Book V of the Onmibus
Rules Implementing the labor Code misled and
confused the workers regarding the mechanics of the
election. The petitioner is estopped from raising that
issue for it signed an agreement with the private
respondent to waive the mandatory five (5) days
posting of election notices. The doctrine of estoppel is
based on grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good
faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to
speak against his own act, representations, or
commitments to the injury of one to whom they were
directed and who reasonably relied thereon (PNB vs.
Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 357).
The results of the certification election belie the
petitioner's allegation that the workers were
misinformed about the election for the records show
that out of 104 eligible voters, 99 were able to cast their
votes and only 3 were spoiled ballots.
On the alleged use of sunvisors, pins, emblems and the
posting of a huge streamer, the Undersecretary found:
. . . nothing in the records shows that
the alleged wearing of sunvisors and
pins, the posting of huge streamers, as
well as the alleged escorting of voters
by SMJ-ALU have unduly pressured,
influenced, vitiated, or in any manner
affected the choice of the workers of
their bargaining agent. (p. 49, Rollo.)
That finding of fact of the head of an administrative
agency is conclusive upon the court (Reyes vs. Minister
of Labor, 170 SCRA 134).
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the public respondents, the Secretary and
Undersecretary of Labor and Employment, in rendering
the questioned decision, the petition for certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the
Undersecretary of Labor, by authority of the Secretary
of Labor, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24711 April 30, 1968
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
BCI EMPLOYEES and WORKERS UNION-PAFLU,
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS,
CIPRIANO CID and JUANITO GARCIA, defendants-
appellees.
Ross, Selph, Del Rosario, Bito and Misa for plaintiff-
appellant.
Cipriano Cid and Associates for defendants-appellees.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The contending parties in this case Benguet
Consolidated, Inc., ("BENGUET") on the one hand, and
on the other, BCI Employees & Workers Union
("UNION") and the Philippine Association of Free Labor
Unions ("PAFLU") do not dispute the following factual
settings established by the lower court.
On June 23, 1959, the Benguet-Balatoc Workers Union
("BBWU"), for and in behalf of all BENGUET employees
in its mines and milling establishment located at
Balatoc, Antamok and Acupan, Municipality of Itogon,
Mt. Province, entered into a Collective Bargaining
Contract, Exh. "Z" ("CONTRACT") with BENGUET.
Pursuant to its very terms, said CONTRACT became
effective for a period of four and a half (4-) years, or
from June 23, 1959 to December 23, 1963. It likewise
embodied a No-Strike, No-Lockout clause.
1

About three years later, or on April 6, 1962, a
certification election was conducted by the Department
of Labor among all the rank and file employees of
BENGUET in the same collective bargaining units.
UNION obtained more than 50% of the total number of
votes, defeating BBWU, and accordingly, the Court of
Industrial Relations, on August 18, 1962, certified
UNION as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining
agent of all BENGUET employees as regards rates of
pay, wages, hours of work and such other terms and
conditions of employment allowed them by law or
contract.
Subsequently, separate meetings were conducted on
November 22, 23 and 24, 1962 at Antamok, Balatoc and
Acupan Mines respectively by UNION. The result
thereof was the approval by UNION members of a
resolution
2
directing its president to file a notice of
strike against BENGUET for:
1. [Refusal] to grant any amount as monthly
living allowance for the workers;
2. Violation of Agreements reached in
conciliation meetings among which is the taking
down of investigation [sic] and statements of
employees without the presence of union
representative;
3. Refusal to dismiss erring executive after
affidavits had been presented, thereby
company showing [sic] bias and partiality to
company personnel;
4. Discrimination against union members in the
enforcement of disciplinary actions.
The Notice of Strike
3
was filed on December 28, 1962.
Three months later, in the evening of March 2, 1963,
UNION members who were BENGUET employees in the
mining camps at Acupan, Antamok and Balatoc, went
on strike. Regarding the conduct of the strike, the trial
court reports:
4

... Picket lines were formed at strategic points
within the premises of the plaintiff. The
picketers, by means of threats and intimidation,
and in some instances by the use of force and
violence, prevented passage thru the picket
lines by personnel of the plaintiff who were
reporting for work. Human blocks were formed
on points of entrance to working areas so that
even vehicles could not pass thru, while the
officers of the plaintiff were not allowed for
sometime to leave the "staff" area.
The strikers forming picket lines bore placards
with the letters BBWU-PAFLU written thereon.
As a general rule, the picketers were unruly,
aggressive and uttered threatening remarks to
staff members and non-strikers who desire to
pass thru the picket lines. On some occasions,
the picketers resorted to violence by pushing
back the car wherein staff officers were riding
who would like to enter the mine working area.
The picketers lifted one side of the vehicle and
were in the act of overturning it when they
were prevented from doing so by the timely
intervention of PC soldiers, who threw tear gas
bombs to make the crowd disperse. Many of
the picketers were apprehended by the PC
soldiers and criminal charges for grave coercion
were filed against them before the Court of
First Instance of Baguio. Two of the strike
leaders and twenty-two picketers, however,
were found guilty of light coercion while
nineteen other accused were acquitted.
There was a complete stoppage of work during
the strike in all the mines. After two weeks
elapsed, repair and maintenance of the water
pump was allowed by the strikers and some of
the staff members were permitted to enter the
mines, who inspected the premises in the
company of PC soldiers to ascertain the extent
of the damage to the equipment and losses of
company property.
x x x x x x x x x
On May 2, 1963, the parties agreed to end the raging
dispute. Accordingly, BENGUET and UNION executed
the AGREEMENT, Exh. 1. PAFLU placed its conformity
thereto and said agreement was attested to by the
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations. About a year
later or on January 29, 1964, a collective bargaining
contract was finally executed between UNION-PAFLU
and BENGUET.
5

Meanwhile, as a result, allegedly, of the strike staged by
UNION and its members, BENGUET had to incur
expenses for the rehabilitation of mine openings, repair
of mechanical equipment, cost of pumping water out of
the mines, value of explosives, tools and supplies lost
and/or destroyed, and other miscellaneous expenses,
all amounting to P1,911,363.83. So, BENGUET sued
UNION, PAFLU and their respective Presidents to
recover said amount in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, on the sole premise that said defendants
breached their undertaking in the existing CONTRACT
not to strike during the effectivity thereof .
In answer to BENGUET's complaint, defendants unions
and their respective presidents put up the following
defenses: (1) they were not bound by the CONTRACT
which BBWU, the defeated union, had executed with
BENGUET; (2) the strike was due, inter alia, to unfair
labor practices of BENGUET; and (3) the strike was
lawful and in the exercise of the legitimate rights of
UNION-PAFLU under Republic Act 875.
Issues having been joined, trial commenced. On
February 23, 1965, the trial court rendered judgment
dismissing the complaint on the ground that the
CONTRACT, particularly the No-Strike clause, did not
bind defendants. The latters' counterclaim was likewise
denied. Failing to get a reconsideration of said decision,
BENGUET interposed the present appeal.
The several errors assigned by BENGUET basically ask
three questions:
(1) Did the Collective Bargaining Contract
executed between BENGUET and BBWU on
June 23, 1959 and effective until December 23,
1963 automatically bind UNION-PAFLU upon its
certification, on August 18, 1962, as sole
bargaining representative of all BENGUET
employees?
(2) Are defendants labor unions and their
respective presidents liable for the illegal acts
committed during the course of the strike and
picketing by some union members?
(3) Are defendants liable to pay the damages
claimed by BENGUET?
In support of an affirmative answer to the first question,
BENGUET first invokes the so-called "Doctrine of
Substitution" referred to in General Maritime
Stevedores' Union v. South Sea Shipping Lines, L-14689,
July 26, 1960. There it was remarked:
x x x x x x x x x
We also hold that where the bargaining
contract is to run for more than two years, the
principle of substitution may well be adopted
and enforced by the CIR to the effect that after
two years of the life of a bargaining agreement,
a certification election may be allowed by the
CIR; that if a bargaining agent other than the
union or organization that executed the
contract, is elected, said new agent would have
to respect said contract, but that it may bargain
with the management for the shortening of the
life of the contract if it considers it too long, or
refuse to renew the contract pursuant to an
automatic renewal clause. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x x x x x x x
The submission utterly fails to persuade Us. The above-
quoted pronouncement was obiter dictum. The only
issue in the General Maritime Stevedores' Union case
was whether a collective bargaining agreement which
had practically run for 5 years constituted a bar to
certification proceedings. We held it did not and
accordingly directed the court a quo to order
certification elections. With that, nothing more was
necessary for the disposition of the case. Moreover, the
pronouncement adverted to was rather premature. The
possible certification of a union different from that
which signed the bargaining contract was a mere
contingency then since the elections were still to be
held. Clearly, the Court was not called upon to rule on
possible effects of such proceedings on the bargaining
agreement.
6

But worse, BENGUET's reliance upon the Principle of
Substitution is totally misplaced. This principle,
formulated by the NLRB
7
as its initial compromise
solution to the problem facing it when there occurs a
shift in employees' union allegiance after the execution
of a bargaining contract with their employer, merely
states that even during the effectivity of a collective
bargaining agreement executed between employer and
employees thru their agent, the employees can change
said agent but the contract continues to bind them up to
its expiration date. They may bargain however for the
shortening of said expiration date.
8

In formulating the "substitutionary" doctrine, the only
consideration involved was the employees' interest in
the existing bargaining agreement. The agent's interest
never entered the picture. In fact, the justification
9
for
said doctrine was:
... that the majority of the employees, as an
entity under the statute, is the true party in
interest to the contract, holding rights through
the agency of the union representative. Thus,
any exclusive interest claimed by the agent is
defeasible at the will of the principal....
(Emphasis supplied)
Stated otherwise, the "substitutionary" doctrine only
provides that the employees cannot revoke the validly
executed collective bargaining contract with their
employer by the simple expedient of changing their
bargaining agent. And it is in the light of this that the
phrase "said new agent would have to respect said
contract" must be understood. It only means that the
employees, thru their new bargaining agent, cannot
renege on their collective bargaining contract, except of
course to negotiate with management for the
shortening thereof.
The "substitutionary" doctrine, therefore, cannot be
invoked to support the contention that a newly certified
collective bargaining agent automatically assumes all
the personal undertakings like the no-strike
stipulation here in the collective bargaining
agreement made by the deposed union. When BBWU
bound itself and its officers not to strike, it could not
have validly bound also all the other rival unions
existing in the bargaining units in question. BBWU was
the agent of the employees, not of the other unions
which possess distinct personalities. To consider UNION
contractually bound to the no-strike stipulation would
therefore violate the legal maxim thatres inter alios nec
prodest nec nocet.
10

Of course, UNION, as the newly certified bargaining
agent, could always voluntarily assume all the personal
undertakings made by the displaced agent. But as the
lower court found, there was no showing at all that,
prior to the strike,
11
UNION formally adopted the
existing CONTRACT as its own and assumed all the
liability ties imposed by the same upon BBWU.
BENGUET also alleges that UNION is now in estoppel to
claim that it is not contractually bound by the
CONTRACT for having filed on September 28, 1962, in
Civil Case No. 1150 of the Court of First Instance of
Baguio, entitled "Bobok Lumber Jack Ass'n. vs. Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. and BCI Employees Workers Union-
PAFLU"
12
a motion praying for the dissolution of the ex
parte writ of preliminary injunction issued therein,
wherein the following appears:
In that case, the CIR transfered the contactual
rights of the BBWU to the defendant union. One
of such rights transferred was the right to the
modified union-shop checked off union dues
arrangement now under injunction.
The collective bargaining contract mentioned in
the plaintiff's complaint did not expire by the
mere fact that the defendant union was
certified as bargaining agent in place of the
BBWU. The Court of Industrial Relations in the
case above mentioned made it clear that the
collective bargaining contract would be
respected unless and until the parties act
otherwise. In effect, the defendant union by act
of subrogation took the place of the BBWU as
the UNION referred to in the contract.
(Emphasis supplied)
There is no estoppel. UNION did not assert the above
statement against BENGUET to force it to rely upon the
same to effect the union check-off in its favor. UNION
and BENGUET were together as co-defendants in said
Civil Case No. 1150. Rather, the statement was directed
against Bobok Lumber Jack Ass'n., plaintiff therein, to
weaken its cause of action. Moreover, BENGUET did not
rely upon said statement. What prompted Bobok
Lumber Jack Ass'n. to file the complaint for declaratory
relief was the fact that "... the defendants [UNION and
BENGUET] are planning to agree to the continuation of
a modified union shop in the three camps mentioned
above without giving the employees concerned the
opportunity to express their wishes on the matter ..."
BENGUET even went further in its answer filed on
October 18, 1962, by asserting that "... defendants
havealready agreed to the continuation of the modified
union shop provision in the collective bargaining
agreement...."
13

Neither can we accept BENGUET's contention that the
inclusion of said aforequoted motion in the record on
appeal filed in said Civil Case No. 1150, now on appeal
before Us docketed as case No. L-24729, refutes
UNION's allegation that it has subsequently abandoned
its stand against Bobok Lumber Jack Ass'n., in said case.
The mere appearance of such motion in the record on
appeal is but a compliance with the procedural
requirement of Rule 41, Sec. 6, of the Rules of Court,
that all matters necessary for a proper understanding of
the issues involved be included in the record on appeal.
This therefore cannot be taken as a rebuttal of the
UNION's explanation.
There is nothing then, in law as well as in fact, to
support plaintiff BENGUET's contention that defendants
are contractually bound by the CONTRACT. And the
stand taken by the trial court all the more becomes
unassailable in the light of Art. 1704 of the Civil Code
providing that:
In the collective bargaining, the labor union or
members of the board or committee signing the
contractshall be liable for non-fulfillment
thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no question, defendants were not signatories
nor participants in the CONTRACT.
Lastly, BENGUET contends, citing Clause II in connection
with Clause XVIII of the CONTRACT, that since all the
employees, as principals, continue being bound by the
no-strike stipulation until the CONTRACT's expiration,
UNION, as their agent, must necessarily be bound also
pursuant to the Law on Agency. This is untenable. The
way We understand it, everything binding on a duly
authorized agent, acting as such, is binding on the
principal; not vice-versa, unless there is a mutual
agency, or unless the agent expressly binds himself to
the party with whom he contracts. As the Civil Code
decrees it:
14

The agent who acts as such is not personally
liable to the party with whom he contracts,
unless he expressly binds himself or exceeds the
limits of his authority without giving such party
sufficient notice of his powers. (Emphasis
supplied)1wph1.t
Here, it was the previous agent who expressly bound
itself to the other party, BENGUET. UNION, the new
agent, did not assume this undertaking of BBWU.
In view of all the foregoing, We see no further necessity
of delving further into the other less important points
raised by BENGUET in connection with the first
question.
On the second question, it suffices to consider, in
answer thereto, that the rule of vicarious liability has,
since the passage of Republic Act 875, been expressly
legislated out.
15
The standing rule now is that for a
labor union and/or its officials and members to be
liable, there must be clear proof of actual participation
in, or authorization or ratification of the illegal
acts.
16
While the lower court found that some strikers
and picketers resorted to intimidation and actual
violence, it also found that defendants presented
uncontradicted evidence that before and during the
strike, the strike leaders had time and again warned the
strikers not to resort to violence but to conduct
peaceful picketing only.
17
Assuming that the strikers did
not heed these admonitions coming from their leaders,
the failure of the union officials to go against the erring
union members pursuant to the UNION and PAFLU
constitutions and by-laws exposes, at the most, only a
flaw or weakness in the defense which, however,
cannot be the basis for plaintiff BENGUET to recover.
Lastly, paragraph VI of the Answer
18
sufficiently
traverses the material allegations in paragraph VI of the
Complaint,
19
thus precluding a fatal admission on
defendants' part. The purpose behind the rule requiring
specific denial is obtained: defendants have set forth
the matters relied upon in support of their denial.
Paragraph VI of the Answer may not be a model
pleading, but it suffices for purposes of the rule.
Pleadings should, after all, be liberally construed.
20

Since defendants were not contractually bound by the
no-strike clause in the CONTRACT, for the simple reason
that they were not parties thereto, they could not be
liable for breach of contract to plaintiff. The lower court
therefore correctly absolved them from liability.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court appealed
from is hereby affirmed. No costs. So ordered

[G.R. No. 111836. February 1, 1996]
PAMBANSANG KAPATIRAN NG MGA ANAK PAWIS SA
FORMEY PLASTIC NATIONAL WORKERS
BROTHERHOOD, petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF
LABOR, SECRETARY BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA,
FORMEY PLASTIC, INC., KALIPUNAN NG
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (KAMAPI) and
MED-ARBITER RASIDALI C.
ABDULLAH, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The rank and file workers of Formey Plastic, Inc.
(FORMEY), formed a local union known as Pambansang
Kapatiran ng mga Anak Pawis sa Formey
Plastic (KAPATIRAN) under the auspices of the National
Workers Brotherhood (NWB). They ratified their
Constitution and By-Laws on 4 April 1993.
On 22 April 1993 KAPATIRAN filed a Petition for
Certification Election
[1]
with the Department of Labor
and Employment Med-Arbiter Division alleging that
there was no existing and effective Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) between FORMEY and any union;
neither was there any recognized union within the
company.
FORMEY moved to dismiss the
petition
[2]
while Kalipunan ng Manggagawang
Pilipino (KAMAPI) intervened and likewise moved to
dismiss
[3]
on the ground that there was already a duly
registered CBA covering the period 1 January 1992 to 31
December 1996 hence the contract bar rule
[4]
would
apply. KAPATIRAN opposed both motions to
dismiss
[5]
with an Addendum
[6]
thereto claiming that the
CBA executed between FORMEY and KAMAPI was
fraudulently registered with the Department of Labor
and Employment and that it was defective since what
was certified as bargaining agent was KAMAPI which, as
a federation, only served as mere agent of the local
union hence without any legal personality to sign in
behalf of the latter.
Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah found that a valid
and existing CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI
effectively barred the filing of the petition for
certification election.
[7]

KAPATIRAN appealed
[8]
imputing grave abuse of
discretion to the Med-Arbiter in applying the contract
bar rule and in not adopting the case ofProgressive
Development Corporation v. Secretary, Department of
Labor and Employment,
[9]
as authority to disregard the
CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI. The Secretary of
Labor acting through Undersecretary Bienvenido E.
Laguesma upheld the decision of the Med-
Arbiter.
[10]
The Motion for Reconsideration having been
denied
[11]
KAPATIRAN now files this Petition for
Certiorari
[12]
charging the Secretary of Labor with grave
abuse of discretion in applying the contract bar rule
literally and in ruling that the Progressive Development
Corporation
[13]
case could not be invoked.
Pending resolution of the petition KAMAPI filed
an Urgent Motion to Dismiss
[14]
the instant petition
contending that it had become moot and academic due
to the cancellation of NWBs
[15]
certificate of
registration and its delisting from the roll of
labor federations.
[16]
KAPATIRAN opposed the
motion
[17]
claiming that the cancellation and delisting
were not yet final and executory considering that it had
filed a motion for reconsideration
[18]
with the Bureau of
Labor Relations.
The rule is that findings of facts of quasi-judicial
agencies will not be disturbed unless there is a showing
of grave abuse of discretion. We find none in the case
at bench. We therefore affirm that there is a validly
executed collective bargaining agreement between
FORMEY and KAMAPI.
Art. 253-A of the Labor Code provides that (n)o
petition questioning the majority status of the
incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no
certification election shall be conducted by the
Department of Labor and Employment outside of the
sixty (60) day period immediately before the date of
expiry of such five-year term of the collective bargaining
agreement. Sec. 3, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides that x x x
(i)f a collective bargaining agreement has been duly
registered in accordance with Article .231 of the Code, a
petition for certification election or a motion for
intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60)
days prior to the expiry date of such agreement.
The subject agreement was made effective 1
January 1992 and is yet to expire on 31 December
1996. The petition for certification election having been
filed on 22 April 1993 it is therefore clear that said
petition must fail since it was filed before the so-called
60-day freedom period. KAPATIRAN insists that the CBA
was a fake it having been surreptitiously registered with
the Department of Labor and Employment.
The resolution of this issue hinges on the
determination of factual matters which certainly is not
within the ambit of the present petition for
certiorari. Besides, the contention is without any legal
basis at all; it is purely speculative and bereft of any
documentary support. Petitioner itself even admitted
the existence of an agreement but argued that its
provisions were not being implemented nor adhered to
at all. Suffice it to mention that the filing of the petition
for certification election is not the panacea to this
allegedly anomalous situation. Violations of collective
bargaining agreements constitute unfair labor practice
as provided for under Art. 248, par. (i), of the Labor
Code. In consonance thereto, Art. 261 equips petitioner
with the proper and appropriate recourse
-Art. 261. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances
arising from the interpretation or implementation of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement x x x Accordingly,
violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except
those which are gross in character, shall no longer be
treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved
under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For
purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or
malicious refusal to comply with the economic provision
of such agreement.
The CBA entered into between FORMEY and
KAMAPI stipulates among others
Article IX - GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
Sec. 1. Any complaint, grievance, difficulty,
disagreement or dispute arising out of any section
taken (sic) by the Company and/or by the Union
concerning the interpretation of the terms and
conditions of the agreement and/or which may arise
regarding (sic) the terms and conditions of employment
shall be settled in the manner provided for under this
Article.
Sec. 2. The Company and the Union agree to create and
establish a Grievance Committee composed of two (2)
representatives from the Company and two (2) from
theUnion to receive complaint, grievance or dispute
from the workers and/or from the Company with the
view to settle it amicably.
Sec. 3. In case a complaint or grievance has been filed
by either the Union or the Company, the grievance
committee shall discuss the same and have (sic) to
settle it. If after the meeting of the grievance
committee no satisfactory settlement is reached the
matter shall be referred to the top officers of
the Union and the Company for the settlement of the
said grievance or dispute.
Sec. 4. Within five (5) days from the time the top
officers of the Union and the Company has (sic) failed to
reach an amicable settlement of the grievance or
dispute, the same shall be submitted for voluntary
arbitration. The arbitrator or arbitrators shall be chosen
by lottery and the union and the Company shall
avail (sic) the list of arbitrators of the Honorable Bureau
of Labor Relations.
Sec. 5. The mutually agreed or chosen arbitrator shall
proceed to try and hear the case and for (sic) the
reception of evidence and to call witnesses to testify
and after the submission of the case by both parties an
award or order shall be issued in accordance with the
rules and guidelines promulgated by the Honorable
Department of Labor and Employment based on the
pertinent laws and established jurisprudence. The
expenses of the arbitration proceedings shall be
borned (sic) equally by the Company and theUnion.
[19]

By filing the petition for certification election it is
clear that KAPATIRAN did not avail of the
abovementioned grievance procedure.
It is further argued that the CBA has no binding
force since it was entered into by KAMAPI as a
federation and not by the local union. Perusal of the
agreement proves the contention flawed. The
signatories for KAMAPI consisted of its national
president and of the duly elected officers of the local
union. Thus the fact that KAMAPI was particularly
mentioned as the bargaining party without specifying
the local union cannot strip it of its authority to
participate in the bargaining process. The local union
maintains its separate personality despite affiliation
with a larger national federation.
[20]

The doctrine laid down in Progressive Development
Corporation
[21]
is a mere clarification of the principle
enunciated in Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v.
Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc.
[22]
Both cases have provided
that the mother union acting for and in behalf of its
affiliate ha(s) the status of an agent while the local
union remained the basic unit of the association free to
serve the common interest of all its members subject
only to the restraints imposed by the Constitution and
By-Laws of the association. Nonetheless, the facts and
principles laid down in both cases do not jibe squarely
with the case at bench. The controversy in Progressive
Development Corporation
[23]
centered on the
requirements before a local or chapter of a federation
may file a petition for certification election and be
certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent,
while in Liberty Cotton Mills Workers
[24]
the issue
involved was the disaffiliation of the local union from
the federation The question of whether there was a
valid and existing CBA, which is the question being
resolved in the case at bench, was never raised in the
two cited cases since it was already an accepted fact
that the CBA was validly executed and existing.
Anent the Urgent Motion to Dismiss
[25]
filed by
KAMAPI on the ground that the instant petition had
become moot and academic due to the cancellation by
the Bureau of Labor Relations of NWBs certificate of
registration and its consequent delisting from the roll of
labor federations, suffice it to state that at this juncture
we cannot properly rule on the issue considering that
KAMAPI has not proven that the decision of the Bureau
of Labor Relations has become final and executory
taking into account KAPATIRANs filing of a motion for
reconsideration with the Bureau. This notwithstanding,
Sec. 9, Rule II, Book V of theOmnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Cose requires that an appeal be
filed with the Bureau, or in case of cancellation by the
Bureau, with the Secretary of Labor and Employment
whose decision shall become final and no longer subject
of appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision
of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated 15
August 1993 sustaining the order of the Med-Arbiter
dated 31 May 1993 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Note: Different from citation.. cant find the one fr
gave.
G.R. No. 82759 June 8, 1990
RIZAL WORKERS UNION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PURA FERRER CALLEJA, in her capacity as
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and the
CONFEDERATION OF FILIPINO WORKERS, respondents.
Jimenez & Associates for petitioner.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for
intervenor.

NARVASA, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to set
aside the decision of the respondent Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations annulling the result of a
certification election held among the workers of the La
Campana Fabrica de Tabacos, Inc. (La Campana).
The records show that the Confederation of Filipino
Workers (CFW) had challenged the incumbency of
present petitioner Rizal Workers Union (RWU) as the
collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of La Campana and had, within the freedom
period, petitioned the Bureau of Labor Relations for a
certification election. The petition, initially denied for
allegedly lacking the support of at least 20% of the
membership of the bargaining unit,
1
was subsequently
granted, and the certification election was held on
September 5, 1987 under the supervision of
representatives of the Department of Labor and
Employment headed by Adelaida C. Gregorio. RWU won
over CFW by a 3-to-1 margin, the tally sheets showing
the following voting results: for RWU, 304 votes; for
CFW, 102 votes; No union, 1 vote; Spoiled Ballots, 7;
Total, 414. Accordingly, and the supervision team
having certified in the election minutes that the election
had been "... free, clean, honest, peaceful and
orderly,"
2
RWU was proclaimed the winner.
The defeated union (CFW) signed the minutes under
protest and thereafter filed a formal protest
3
with the
Bureau of Labor Relations, seeking annulment of the
election results for these alleged irregularities:
a) Company owners stayed inside the
polling place campaigning for RWU and
harassing voters sympathetic to CFW;
b) Management prevented 200 workers
from leaving the plant on the eve of the
election;
c) Many persons, not workers of the
company, were allowed to vote using
employee Identification cards;
d) Management distributed free T-shirts
and money on the eve of the election to
induce the recipients to vote for RWU;
e) Workers Identified with the CFW
were barred from the company
premises.
4

These claims were subsequently amplified in a
supplemental protest which made mention of at least
one instance of an outsider who had been caught
attempting to vote with the use of an employee's
Identification card and of 115 employees not being able
to vote, It was further alleged that the frauds were
deliberately calculated to ensure the victory of RWU
because it was a company union, as was evident from
the fact that despite its 33-year incumbency during
which no less then eleven (11) collective bargaining
agreements were executed with the company, the
workers' wages had remained very low.
In an order dated November 12, 1987,
5
Med-Arbiter
Manages T. Cruz dismissed the protest for lack of merit
and declared the election results final and RWU the
certified exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank-and-
file workers of La Campana. He found no substantial
evidence to support the protestant's charges of fraud
and gave credit to the Election Minutes attesting to the
integrity of the election.
On appeal, however, to the respondent Director of
Labor Relations, the decision was reversed and another,
dated February 12, 1988
6
was rendered annulling the
certification election and ordering that another election
be held. In her decision, said respondent accorded full
credence to the allegations made in the protest, found
these to have been sufficiently proven by the
protestant's evidence consisting of a
"Kapasyahan/Resolusyon" dated September 24,
1987
7
and signed by some 100 workers (111 according
to the respondent Director; 109 by the Med-Arbiter's
court), and a sworn statement purportedly executed by
one Eric Gamueda.
8
According to the first of said
documents: (1) before the election about 200 workers
were detained in their work stations and thereby
prevented from voting; (2) early in the morning of the
election, management distributed free T-shirts to
workers who were then taken to the elections booths to
vote; (3) construction men, not company employees,
working in a building within the company premises
were issued employee Identification cards enabling
them to vote in the election. The sworn statement in
allegedly to the effect that the declarant (Eric
Gamueda) was one of those construction workers who
was issued a La Campana employees' Identification card
so that he could vote in the election. Respondent
Director also faulted the petitioner for opposing the
protest by mere general averment without categorically
refuting the charges of fraud.
Having twice filed for reconsideration and been
rebuffed both times, RWU finally instituted the present
petition, impugning the respondent Directories decision
as rendered with grave abuse of discretion in that the
factual conclusions made therein are without support in
the evidence and rest on nothing more substantial than
the protestant's bare allegations.
In a motion to intervene accompanied by a petition-in-
intervention,
9
La Campana took up the cudgels for the
petitioner, denied having intervened in the election or
connived with the petitioner in any cheating, and
echoed the charge that the Director's decision was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion for want of
substantial evidentiary basis.
It being well-settled rule that the findings of fact of
quasi-judicial agencies of the Department of Labor and
Employment are binding on this Court if supported by
substantial evidence,
10
all that is necessary in order to
resolve this case is to determine whether or not
evidence of such character exists or has been presented
which would justify the decision of the respondent
Director. From even a perfunctory assessment, it
becomes apparent that the "evidence" upon which said
decision is professedly based does not come up to that
standard of substantiality.
Neither the "Kapasyahan/Resolusyon" nor the
Gamueda statement was Identified by their purported
authors or signatories. None of the one hundred or
more employees who supposedly signed that manifesto
was presented at the hearing to claim authorship or,
howsoever routinely, affirm that what is narrated
therein had in fact transpired. The same is true of the
statement attributed to Eric Gamueda. As far as the
protest was concerned, therefore, both documents
were nothing but mere scraps of paper without
evidentiary value and, indeed, were not even admissible
against herein petitioner, deprived as it was of the right
and opportunity to confront their authors and examine
them about the truth of their declarations.
11

It is of course also sound and settled rule that
administrative agencies performing quasi-judicial
functions are unfettered by the rigid technicalities of
procedure observed in the courts of courts of
law,
12
and this so that disputes brought before such
bodies may be resolved in the most expeditious and
inexpensive manner possible. But what is involved here
transcends mere procedural technicality and concerns
the more paramount principles and requirements of
due process, which may not be sacrificed to speed or
expediency. Such a primary, made inherent in the
judicial process by constitutional fiat, is implicitly
recognized in Art. 221 of the Labor Code, as amended,
which in part provides:
Art. 221. Technical rules not binding and
prior resort to amicable settlement.
In any proceeding before the
Commission or any of the Labor
Arbiters, the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law or equity
shall not be controlling, and it is the
spirit and intention of this code that the
Commission and its members and the
Labor Arbiters shall use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts
in each case speedily and objectively,
without regard to technicalities of law
or procedure, all in the interest of due
process. ...
The clear message of the law is that even in the
disposition of labor cases, due process must never be
subordinated to expediency or dispatch. Upon this
principle, the unidentified documents relied upon by
the respondent Director must be seen and taken for
what they are, mere inadmissible hearsay. They cannot,
by any stretch of reasoning, be deemed substantial
evidence of the election frauds complained of. And as
this Court held in Ang Tibay vs. CIR:
13

... (the) assurance of a desirable
flexibility in administrative procedure
does not go so far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having
rational probative force. Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does
not constitute substantial evidence.
But even given the benefit of every doubt as to their
admissibility, said statements still fail to qualify as
credible or persuasive evidence of the alleged frauds.
The 'Resolusyon/ Kapasyahan," for one, is so sketchy in
content that it gives the impression of being no more
than a collection of general allegations presented ready-
made to people who signed it without really knowing or
caring about whether they were true or not. It states,
for example, that more than 200 employees were not
allowed to vote. But that figure must have been plucked
out of thin air because there are repeated references in
the record
14
which the respondent union (CFW) has
never seriously disputed that the voters list agreed
upon by the parties showed only 495 eligible voters out
of which number 414 in fact voted, as shown by the
official tally, thus leaving only 81 who failed to vote for
one reason or another. The existence of an agreed
voters list against which the Identity of every
prospective voter could be checked also renders quite
implausible the insinuation made in said statements
that anyone who presented himself at the polling place
with an employee's Identification card would be
allowed to vote without question. The election minutes
record that in the one instance where a voter's status as
an employee was questioned by a CFW representative,
although his name appeared in the voters list and he
presented an Identification card, his ballot was ordered
segregated by the DOLE supervision team when he
failed to produce his residence certificate, which
decision however did not satisfy the CFW
representatives, who walked out of the proceedings.
15

It results that the only relevant and competent evidence
regarding the conduct of the certification election is the
election minutes accomplished and signed by the DOLE
supervision team, and according to which the election
proceeded in a "... free, clean, honest, peaceful and
orderly manner." Based on said evidence, it is the Med-
Arbiter's decision according it faith and credit that
should be upheld, in preference to that of the
respondent Director which, in ignoring said minutes and
relying on mere unproven allegations of fraud, was
rendered with manifest grave abuse of discretion.
The role played by La Campana in the disputed election
as well as in these proceedings has not escaped the
Court's attention. Although the charges of its active
intervention and electioneering have not been
substantiated, the record shows that it sat with parties
and the DOLE representatives during the election
proceedings.
16
This Court has time and again ruled that
the employer is not a party in a certification election,
which activity is the sole concern of the workers. The
only instance in which an employer may involve itself in
that process is where it is obliged to file a petition for
certification election by reason of its workers' request
to bargain collectively, pursuant to Article 258 of the
Labor Code. Even then, the employer's involvement
ceases, and it becomes a neutral bystander, after the
order for a certification election issues.
17
It was entirely
improper for La Campana to be present at all during the
proceedings, even as an observer, let alone sit in and
participate therein through a representative, as the
minutes show it did.
WHEREFORE, certiorari is GRANTED. The questioned
decision of the public respondent is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.
The Med-Arbiter's order of November 12, 1987
declaring final the result of the certification election of
September 5, 1987 and certifying petitioner Rizal
Workers' Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of all rank-and-file workers of La Campana Fabrica
de Tabacos, Inc. is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. This
Court's restraining order of April 27, 1988
18
against the
execution or implementation of the respondent
Director's order of February 12, 1988 subject of the
petition is made permanent. La Campana Fabrica de
Tabacos, Inc. is ADMONISHED for its improper
participation and involvement in its workers'
certification election of September 5, 1987 and
WARNED against repetition thereof. Costs against the
private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 76185 March 30, 1988
WARREN MANUFACTURING WORKERS UNION
(WMWU), petitioner,
vs.
THE BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS; PHILIPPINE
AGRICULTURAL, COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
WORKERS UNION (PACIWU); and SAMAHANG
MANGGAGAWA SA WARREN MANUFACTURING
CORP.-ALLIANCE OF NATIONALIST AND GENUINE
LABOR ORGANIZATIONS (SMWMC-
ANGLO), respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for
a preliminary injunction and/or the issuance of a
restraining order seeking to set aside: (1) Order of the
Med-Arbiter dated August 18,1986, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a
certification election is hereby ordered
conducted to determine the exclusive
bargaining representative of all the rank
and file employees of Warren
Manufacturing Corporation, within 20
days from receipt of this Order, with
the following choices:
1. Philippine
Agricultural,
Commercial and
Industry Workers Union
(PACIWU);
2. Warren Mfg.
Workers Union;
3. Samahan ng
Manggagawa sa
Warren Mfg.
Corporation petition-
ANGLO; and
4. No Union.
The representation Officer is hereby
directed to call the parties to a pre-
election conference to thresh out the
mechanics for the conduct of the actual
election.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 15).
and (2) the Resolution dated October 7, 1986 of the
Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor dismissing the
appeals of Warren Manufacturing Corporation and
herein petitioner (Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 16-18).
This certification case had its inception in an intra-union
rivalry between the petitioner and the respondent
Philippine Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial
Workers Union (PACIWU for short) since 1985.
The undisputed facts of this case as found by the Med-
Arbiter of the Bureau of Labor Relations are as follows:
On June 13,1985, PACIWU filed a
petition for certification election,
alleging compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements.
On July 7, 1985, respondent thru
counsel filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the ground that there exist
a C.BA between the respondent and the
Warren Mfg. Union which took effect
upon its signing on July 16, 1985 and to
expire on July 31, 1986.
While the petition was under hearing,
PACIWU filed a Notice of Strike and on
conciliation meeting, a Return-to-Work
Agreement was signed on July 25,1985,
stipulating, among others, as follows:
To resolve the issue of
union representation at
Warren Mfg- Corp.
parties have agreed to
the holding of a
consent election among
the rank and file on
August 25, 1985 at the
premises of the
company to be
supervised by MOLE. ...
It is cleanly understood
that the certified union
in the said projected
election shall respect
and administer the
existing CBA at the
company until its expiry
date on July 31, 1986.
On 12 August 1985, an Order was
issued by this Office, directing that a
consent election be held among the
rank and file workers of the company,
with the following contending unions:
1. Philippine
Agricultural,
Commercial and
Industrial Workers
Union (PACIWU)
2. Warren Mfg.
Workers Union;
3. No Union.
On August 25, 1985, said consent
election was held, and yielded the
following results:
PACIWU--------------------
--------94
WMWU---------------------
-------193
Feeling aggrieved, however, PACIWU
filed an Election Protest.
In December, 1985 a Notice of Strike
was again filed by the union this time
with the Valenzuela branch office of
this Ministry, and after conciliation, the
parties finally agreed, among others, to
wit:
In consideration of this
payment, ... individual
complaints and
PACIWU hereby agree
and covenant that the
following labor
complaints/disputes
are considered
amicably settled and
withdrawn/dismissed,
to wit: ...
On the basis of a Joint Motion to
Dismiss filed by the parties, the Election
Protest filed by the PACIWU was
ordered dismissed. (Rollo, pp. 12-13).
On June 5, 1986, the PACIWU filed a petition for
certification election followed by the filing of a petition
for the same purposes by the Samahan ng Manggagawa
sa Warren Manufacturing Corporation-Alliance of
Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organizations (Anglo for
short) which petitions were both opposed by Warren
Manufacturing Corporation on the grounds that neither
petition has 30% support; that both are barred by the
one-year no certification election law and the existence
of a duly ratified CBA. The therein respondent,
therefore, prayed that the petitions for certification
election be dismissed. (Rollo, pp. 11-12).
As above stated, the Med-Arbiter of the National
Capital Region, Ministry of Labor and Employment,
ordered on August 8, 't 986 the holding of a certification
election within twenty 20) days from receipt to
determine the exclusive bargaining representative of all
the rank and file employees of the Warren se
Manufacturing Corporation, with the above-mentioned
choices.
Both Warren Manufacturing Corporation and petitioner
herein filed separate motions, treated as appeals by the
Bureau of Labor Relations, which dismissed the same
for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
This petition was filed solely by the Warren
Manufacturing Workers Union, with the company itself
opting not to appeal.
The Second Division of this Court in the resolution of
November 3, 1986 without giving due course to the
petition, required the respondents to comment and
issued the temporary, restraining order prayed for
(Rollo, pp. 18-20).
The comment of the respondent PACIWU was filed on
November 27, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 29-32). The public
respondent through the Hon. Solicitor General filed its
Comment to the petition on December 10, 1986 (Ibid.,
pp. 34-43) and private respondent ANGLO, filed its
comment on December 16, 1986 (Ibid., pp. 45- 51). The
petitioner with leave of court filed its reply to comment
entitled a rejoinder on January 6,1987 (Ibid., pp. 52-62).
In the resolution of January 26, 1987, the petition was
given due course and the parties were required to
submit their respective memoranda (Ibid., p. 76).
Memorandum for public respondent was filed on
February 20,1987 (Ibid., p. 82-88). Respondent
PACIWU's memorandum was filed on March 18, 1987
(Ibid., pp. 95-99). SMWMCANGLO'S Memorandum was
filed on March 23,1987 (Ibid., pp. 100-1 09) and the
petitioner's memorandum was filed on March 31,1987
(Ibid., pp. 110-120).
In its memorandum, petitioner raised the following
issues:
A. The holding of a certification election
at the bargaining unit is patently
premature and illegal.
B. The petition filed by private
respondents do not have the statutory
30% support requirement.
C. Petitioner was denied administrative
due process when excluded from med-
arbitration proceedings.
The petition is devoid of merit.
A.
Petitioner's contention is anchored on the following
grounds:
Section 3, Rule V of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code provides, among others:
... however no certification election
may be held within one (1) year from
the date of the issuance of the
declaration of a final certification result.
and
Article 257, Title VII, Book V of the Labor Code provides:
No certification election issue shall be
entertained by the Bureau in any
Collective Bargaining Agreement
existing between the employer and a
legitimate labor organization.
Otherwise stated, petitioner invoked the one-year no
certification election rule and the principle of the
Contract Bar Rule.
This contention is untenable.
The records show that petitioner admitted that what
was held on August 25,1985 at the Company's premises
and which became the root of this controversy, was a
consent election and not a certification
election (Emphasis supplied). As correctly distinguished
by private respondent, a consent election is an agreed
one, its purpose being merely to determine the issue of
majority representation of all the workers in the
appropriate collective bargaining unit while a
certification election is aimed at determining the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in
an appropriate bargaining unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining. From the very nature of consent
election, it is a separate and distinct process and has
nothing to do with the import and effect of a
certification election. Neither does it shorten the terms
of an existing CBA nor entitle the participants thereof to
immediately renegotiate an existing CBA although it
does not preclude the workers from exercising their
right to choose their sole and exclusive bargaining
representative after the expiration of the sixty (60) day
freedom period. In fact the Med-Arbiter in the Return
to Work Agreement signed by the parties emphasized
the following:
To resolve the issue of union
representation at Warren Mfg. Corp.,
parties have agreed to the holding of a
consent election among the rank and
file on August 25,1985 at the premises
of the company to be supervised by the
Ministry of Labor and Employment .....
It is clearly understood that the
certified union in the said projected
election shall respect and administer
the existing CBA at the company until
its expiry date on July 31, 1986. (Rollo,
pp. 46, 48-49).
It is, therefore, unmistakable that the election thus held
on August 25, 1985 was not for the purpose of
determining which labor union should be the bargaining
representative in the negotiation for a collective
contract, there being an existing collective bargaining
agreement yet to expire on July 31, 1986; but only to
determine which labor union shag administer the said
existing contract.
Accordingly, the following provisions of the New Labor
Code apply:
ART. 254. Duty to bargain collectively
when there exists a collective
bargaining agreement.When there is
a collective bargaining agreement, the
duty to bargain collectively shall also
mean that neither party shall terminate
or modify the agreement at least sixty
(60) days prior to its expiration date. It
shall be the duty of both parties to keep
the status quo and to continue in full
force and effect the terms and
conditions of the existing agreement
during the 60-day period and/or until a
new agreement is reached by the
parties.
Corollary to the above, Article 257 of
the New Labor Code expressly states
that No certification election issue shall
be entertained if a collective agreement
which has been submitted in
accordance with Article 231 of this
Code exists between the employer and
a legitimate labor organization except
within sixty (60) days prior to the
expiration of the life of such certified
collective bargaining agreement."
(Rollo, pp. 83-84)
Thus, as stated by this Court in General Textiles Allied
Workers Association v. the Director of the Bureau of
labor Relations (84 SCRA 430 [19781) "there should be
no obstacle to the right of the employees to petition for
a certification election at the proper time. that is, within
60 days prior to the expiration of the three year period
...
Finally, such premature agreement entered into by the
petitioner and the Company on June 2, 1986 does not
adversely affect the petition for certification election
filed by respondent PACIWU (Rollo, p. 85).
Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code clearly provides:
Section 4. Effect of Early Agreement.
There representation case shall not,
however, be adversely affected by a
collective agreement submitted before
or during the last sixty days of a
subsisting agreement or during the
pendency of the representation case.
Apart from the fact that the above Rule is clear and
explicit, leaving no room for construction or
interpretation, it is an elementary rule in administrative
law that administrative regulations and policies enacted
by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they
are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law and are
entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans
Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985)).
As aforestated, the existing collective bargaining
agreement was due to expire on July 31, 1 986. The
Med-Arbiter found that a sufficient number of
employees signified their consent to the filing of the
petition and 107 employees authorized intervenor to
file a motion for intervention. Otherwise stated, he
found that the petition and intervention were
supported by more than 30% of the members of the
bargaining unit. In the light of these facts, Article 258 of
the Labor Code makes it mandatory for the Bureau of
Labor Relations to conduct a certification election
(Samahang Manggagawa ng Pacific Mills, Inc. v. Noriel,
et al., 134 SCRA 152 [1985]). In the case of Federation of
Free Workers (Bisig ng Manggagawa sa UTEX v. Noriel
etc., et al., 86 SCRA 132 [1978]), this Court was even
more specific when it stated "No administrative agency
can ignore the imperative tone of the above article. The
language used is one of command. Once it has been
verified that the petition for certification election has
the support of at least 30% of the employees in the
bargaining unit, it must be granted, The specific word
used can yield no other meaning. It becomes under the
circumstances, "mandatory"..."
The finality of the findings of fact of the Med-Arbiter
that the petition and intervention filed in the case at
bar were supported by 30% of the members of the
workers is clear and definite.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED,
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 97020 June 8, 1992
CALIFORNIA MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR
BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, ABD FEDERATION OF FREE
WORKERS (FFW), CALIFORNIA MFG. CORP.
SUPERVISORS UNION CHAPTER
(CALMASUCO),respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order seeking to annul and set aside the (a)
resolution * of the Department of Labor and
Employment dated October 16, 1990 in OS-A-10-283-90
(NCR-OD-M-90-05-095) entitled "In Re: Petition for
Certification Election Among the Supervisors of
California Manufacturing Corporation, Federation of
Free Workers (FFW) California Mfg. Corp. Supervisors
Union Chapter (CALMASUCO), petitioner-appellee,
California Manufacturing Corporation, employer-
appellant" which denied herein petitioner's appeal and
affirmed the order of Med-Arbiter Arsenia Q. Ocampo
dated August 22, 1990 directing the conduct of a
certification election among the supervisory employees
of California Manufacturing Corporation, and (b) the
Order ** of the same Department denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
As culled from the records, the following facts appear
undisputed:
On May 24, 1990, a petition for certification election
among the supervisors of California Manufacturing
Corporation (CMC for brevity) was filed by the
Federation of Free Workers (FFW) California
Manufacturing Corporation Supervisors Union Chapter
(CALMASUCO), alleging inter alia, that it is a duly
registered federation with registry certificate no. 1952-
TTT-IP, while FFW-CALMASUCO Chapter is a duly
registered chapter with registry certificate no. 1-AFBI-
038 issued on May 21, 1990 (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 63);
that the employer CMC employs one hundred fifty (150)
supervisors; that there is no recognized supervisors
union existing in the company; that the petition is filed
in accordance with Article 257 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6715; and that the
petition is nevertheless supported by a substantial
member of signatures of the employees concerned
(Annexes "E" and "F", Ibid., pp. 28-29).
In its answer, CMC, now petitioner herein, alleged
among others, that the petition for the holding of a
certification election should be denied as it is not
supported by the required twenty-five percent (25%) of
all its supervisors and that a big number of the
supposed signatories to the petition are not actually
supervisors as they have no subordinates to supervise,
nor do they have the powers and functions which under
the law would classify them as supervisors (Annex
"D", Ibid., P. 25).
On July 24. 1990, FFWCALMASUCO filed its reply
maintaining that under the law, when there is no
existing unit yet in a particular bargaining unit at the
time a petition for certification election is filed, the 25%
rule on the signatories does not apply; that the
"organized establishment" contemplated by law does
not refer to a "company"per se but rather refers to a
"bargaining unit" which may be of different
classifications in a single company; that CMC has at
least two (2) different bargaining units, namely, the
supervisory (unorganized) and the rank-and-file
(organized); that the signatories to the petition have
been performing supervisory functions; that since it is
CMC which promoted them to the positions, of
supervisors. it is already estopped from claiming that
they are not supervisors; that the said supervisors were
excluded from the coverage of the collective bargaining
agreement of its rank-and-file employees; and that the
contested signatories are indeed supervisors as shown
in the "CMC Master List of Employees" of January 2,
1990 and the CMS Publication (Annex "G", Ibid., p 30).
On August 12, 1990, the Med-Arbiter issued an order,
the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is
hereby ordered that a certification
election be conducted among the
supervisory employees of California
Manufacturing Corporation within
twenty (20) days from receipt hereof
with the usual pre-election conference
of the parties to thresh out the
mechanics of the election The payroll of
the company three (3) months prior to
the filing of the petition shall be used as
the basis in determining the list of
eligible voters.
The choices are:
1. Federation of Free
Workers (FFW)
California
Manufacturing
Corporation
Supervisors Union
Chapter (CALMASUCO);
and
2. No union.
SO ORDERED. (Annex
"H" Ibid., p. 33).
CMC thereafter appealed to the Department of Labor
and Employment which, however, affirmed the above
order in its assailed resolution dated October 16, 1990
(Annex, "B", Ibid, a 18) CMC's subsequent motion for
reconsideration was also denied in its order dated
November 17, 1990 (Annex "A", Ibid., p. 15), hence, his
petition.
a) whether or not the term
"unorganized establishment' in Article
257 of the tabor Code refers to a
bargaining unit or a business
establishment;
b) whether or not non-supervisors can
participate in a supervisor's certification
election; and
c) whether or not the two (2) different
and separate plants of herein petitioner
in Paraaque and Las Pias can be
treated as a single bargaining unit.
The petition must be denied.
The Court has already categorically ruled that Article
257 of the Labor code is applicable to unorganized labor
organizations and not to establishments where there
exists a certified bargaining agent which had previously
entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the
management (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v. Calleja,
G.R. No. 85085, November 6, 1989, 179 SCRA 127)
(Emphasis supplied). Otherwise stated, the
establishment concerned must have no certified
bargaining agent (Associated Labor Unions [ALU] v.
Calleja G.R. No. 82260, July 19, 1989, 175 SCRA 490). In
the instant case, it is beyond cavil that the supervisors
of CMC which constitute a bargaining unit separate and
distinct from that of the rank-and-file, have no such
agent. thus they correctly filed a petition for
certification election thru union FFW-CALMASUCO,
likewise indubitably a legitimate labor organization.
CMC's insistence on the 25% subscription requirement,
is clearly immaterial. The same has been expressly
deleted by Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6715 and is
presently prescribed only in organized establishments,
that is, those with existing bargaining agents.
Compliance with the said requirement need not even
be established with absolute certainty. The Court has
consistently ruled that "even conceding that the
statutory requirement of 30% (now 25%) of the labor
force asking for a certification election had not been
strictly compiled with, the Director (now the Med-
Arbiter) is still empowered to order that it be held
precisely for the purpose of ascertaining which of the
contending labor organizations shall be the exclusive
collective bargaining agent (Atlas Free Workers Union
(AFWU)-PSSLU Local v. Noriel, G.R. No. L-51905, May
26, 1981, 104 SCRA 565). The requirement then is
relevant only when it becomes mandatory to conduct a
certification election. In all other instances, the
discretion, according to the rulings of this Tribunal,
ought to be ordinarily exercised in favor of a petition for
certification (National Mines and Allied Workers Union
(NAMAWU-UIF) v. Luna, et al., G.R. No. L-46722, June
15, 1978, 83 SCRA 607).
In any event, CMC as employer has no standing to
question a certification election (Asian Design and
Manufacturing Corporation v. Calleja, et al., G.R. No.
77415, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA 477). Such is the sole
concern of the workers. The only exception is where the
employer has to file the petition for certification
election pursuant to Article 259 (now 258) of the Labor
Code because it was requested to bargain collectively.
Thereafter, the role of the employer in the certification
process ceases. The employer becomes merely a
bystander. Oft-quoted is the pronouncement of the
Court on management interference in certification
elections, thus:
On matters that should be the exclusive
concern of labor, the choice of a
collective bargaining representative,
the employer is definitely an intruder,
His participation, to say the least,
deserves no encouragement. This Court
should be the last agency to lend
support to such an attempt at
interference with purely internal affair
of labor. (Trade Unions of the
Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS)
v. Trajano. G.R. No. L-61153 January 17,
1983, 120 SCRA 64 citing Consolidated
Farms, Inc. v. Noriel, G.R No. L-47752
July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 469, 473).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for
utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
G.R. No. L-54334 January 22, 1986
KIOK LOY, doing business under the name and style
SWEDEN ICE CREAM PLANT, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC)
and PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG PAGGAWA
(KILUSAN), respondents.
Ablan and Associates for petitioner.
Abdulcadir T. Ibrahim for private respondent.

CUEVAS, J.:
Petition for certiorari to annul the decision
1
of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated July
20, 1979 which found petitioner Sweden Ice Cream
guilty of unfair labor practice for unjustified refusal to
bargain, in violation of par. (g) of Article 249
2
of the
New Labor Code,
3
and declared the draft proposal of
the Union for a collective bargaining agreement as the
governing collective bargaining agreement between the
employees and the management.
The pertinent background facts are as follows:
In a certification election held on October 3, 1978, the
Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa (Union for short), a
legitimate late labor federation, won and was
subsequently certified in a resolution dated November
29, 1978 by the Bureau of Labor Relations as the sole
and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of Sweden Ice Cream Plant (Company for
short). The Company's motion for reconsideration of
the said resolution was denied on January 25, 1978.
Thereafter, and more specifically on December 7, 1978,
the Union furnished
4
the Company with two copies of
its proposed collective bargaining agreement. At the
same time, it requested the Company for its counter
proposals. Eliciting no response to the aforesaid
request, the Union again wrote the Company reiterating
its request for collective bargaining negotiations and for
the Company to furnish them with its counter
proposals. Both requests were ignored and remained
unacted upon by the Company.
Left with no other alternative in its attempt to bring the
Company to the bargaining table, the Union, on
February 14, 1979, filed a "Notice of Strike", with the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground of
unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining.
5

Conciliation proceedings then followed during the
thirty-day statutory cooling-off period. But all attempts
towards an amicable settlement failed, prompting the
Bureau of Labor Relations to certify the case to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for
compulsory arbitration pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 823, as amended. The labor arbiter, Andres
Fidelino, to whom the case was assigned, set the initial
hearing for April 29, 1979. For failure however, of the
parties to submit their respective position papers as
required, the said hearing was cancelled and reset to
another date. Meanwhile, the Union submitted its
position paper. The Company did not, and instead
requested for a resetting which was granted. The
Company was directed anew to submit its financial
statements for the years 1976, 1977, and 1978.
The case was further reset to May 11, 1979 due to the
withdrawal of the Company's counsel of record, Atty.
Rodolfo dela Cruz. On May 24, 1978, Atty. Fortunato
Panganiban formally entered his appearance as counsel
for the Company only to request for another
postponement allegedly for the purpose of acquainting
himself with the case. Meanwhile, the Company
submitted its position paper on May 28, 1979.
When the case was called for hearing on June 4, 1979 as
scheduled, the Company's representative, Mr. Ching,
who was supposed to be examined, failed to appear.
Atty. Panganiban then requested for another
postponement which the labor arbiter denied. He also
ruled that the Company has waived its right to present
further evidence and, therefore, considered the case
submitted for resolution.
On July 18, 1979, labor arbiter Andres Fidelino
submitted its report to the National Labor Relations
Commission. On July 20, 1979, the National Labor
Relations Commission rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the respondent Sweden
Ice Cream is hereby declared guilty of
unjustified refusal to bargain, in
violation of Section (g) Article 248 (now
Article 249), of P.D. 442, as amended.
Further, the draft proposal for a
collective bargaining agreement (Exh.
"E ") hereto attached and made an
integral part of this decision, sent by
the Union (Private respondent) to the
respondent (petitioner herein) and
which is hereby found to be reasonable
under the premises, is hereby declared
to be the collective agreement which
should govern the relationship between
the parties herein.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner now comes before Us assailing the aforesaid
decision contending that the National Labor Relations
Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in rendering the challenged decision. On
August 4, 1980, this Court dismissed the petition for
lack of merit. Upon motion of the petitioner, however,
the Resolution of dismissal was reconsidered and the
petition was given due course in a Resolution dated
April 1, 1981.
Petitioner Company now maintains that its right to
procedural due process has been violated when it was
precluded from presenting further evidence in support
of its stand and when its request for further
postponement was denied. Petitioner further contends
that the National Labor Relations Commission's finding
of unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain is not
supported by law and the evidence considering that it
was only on May 24, 1979 when the Union furnished
them with a copy of the proposed Collective Bargaining
Agreement and it was only then that they came to know
of the Union's demands; and finally, that the Collective
Bargaining Agreement approved and adopted by the
National Labor Relations Commission is unreasonable
and lacks legal basis.
The petition lacks merit. Consequently, its dismissal is in
order.
Collective bargaining which is defined as negotiations
towards a collective agreement,
6
is one of the
democratic frameworks under the New Labor Code,
designed to stabilize the relation between labor and
management and to create a climate of sound and
stable industrial peace. It is a mutual responsibility of
the employer and the Union and is characterized as a
legal obligation. So much so that Article 249, par. (g) of
the Labor Code makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to refuse "to meet and convene promptly and
expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours
of work, and all other terms and conditions of
employment including proposals for adjusting any
grievance or question arising under such an agreement
and executing a contract incorporating such agreement,
if requested by either party.
While it is a mutual obligation of the parties to bargain,
the employer, however, is not under any legal duty to
initiate contract negotiation.
7
The mechanics of
collective bargaining is set in motion only when the
following jurisdictional preconditions are present,
namely, (1) possession of the status of majority
representation of the employees' representative in
accordance with any of the means of selection or
designation provided for by the Labor Code; (2) proof of
majority representation; and (3) a demand to bargain
under Article 251, par. (a) of the New Labor Code . ... all
of which preconditions are undisputedly present in the
instant case.
From the over-all conduct of petitioner company in
relation to the task of negotiation, there can be no
doubt that the Union has a valid cause to complain
against its (Company's) attitude, the totality of which is
indicative of the latter's disregard of, and failure to live
up to, what is enjoined by the Labor Code to bargain
in good faith.
We are in total conformity with respondent NLRC's
pronouncement that petitioner Company is GUILTY of
unfair labor practice. It has been indubitably established
that (1) respondent Union was a duly certified
bargaining agent; (2) it made a definite request to
bargain, accompanied with a copy of the proposed
Collective Bargaining Agreement, to the Company not
only once but twice which were left unanswered and
unacted upon; and (3) the Company made no counter
proposal whatsoever all of which conclusively indicate
lack of a sincere desire to negotiate.
8
A Company's
refusal to make counter proposal if considered in
relation to the entire bargaining process, may indicate
bad faith and this is specially true where the Union's
request for a counter proposal is left
unanswered.
9
Even during the period of compulsory
arbitration before the NLRC, petitioner Company's
approach and attitude-stalling the negotiation by a
series of postponements, non-appearance at the
hearing conducted, and undue delay in submitting its
financial statements, lead to no other conclusion except
that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement
with the Union. Petitioner has not at any instance,
evinced good faith or willingness to discuss freely and
fully the claims and demands set forth by the Union
much less justify its opposition thereto.
10

The case at bar is not a case of first impression, for in
the Herald Delivery Carriers Union (PAFLU) vs. Herald
Publications
11
the rule had been laid down that "unfair
labor practice is committed when it is shown that the
respondent employer, after having been served with a
written bargaining proposal by the petitioning Union,
did not even bother to submit an answer or reply to the
said proposal This doctrine was reiterated anew
in Bradman vs. Court of Industrial Relations
12
wherein it
was further ruled that "while the law does not compel
the parties to reach an agreement, it does contemplate
that both parties will approach the negotiation with an
open mind and make a reasonable effort to reach a
common ground of agreement
As a last-ditch attempt to effect a reversal of the
decision sought to be reviewed, petitioner capitalizes
on the issue of due process claiming, that it was denied
the right to be heard and present its side when the
Labor Arbiter denied the Company's motion for further
postponement.
Petitioner's aforesaid submittal failed to impress Us.
Considering the various postponements granted in its
behalf, the claimed denial of due process appeared
totally bereft of any legal and factual support. As herein
earlier stated, petitioner had not even honored
respondent Union with any reply to the latter's
successive letters, all geared towards bringing the
Company to the bargaining table. It did not even bother
to furnish or serve the Union with its counter proposal
despite persistent requests made therefor. Certainly,
the moves and overall behavior of petitioner-company
were in total derogation of the policy enshrined in the
New Labor Code which is aimed towards expediting
settlement of economic disputes. Hence, this Court is
not prepared to affix its imprimatur to such an illegal
scheme and dubious maneuvers.
Neither are WE persuaded by petitioner-company's
stand that the Collective Bargaining Agreement which
was approved and adopted by the NLRC is a total nullity
for it lacks the company's consent, much less its
argument that once the Collective Bargaining
Agreement is implemented, the Company will face the
prospect of closing down because it has to pay a
staggering amount of economic benefits to the Union
that will equal if not exceed its capital. Such a stand and
the evidence in support thereof should have been
presented before the Labor Arbiter which is the proper
forum for the purpose.
We agree with the pronouncement that it is not
obligatory upon either side of a labor controversy to
precipitately accept or agree to the proposals of the
other. But an erring party should not be tolerated and
allowed with impunity to resort to schemes feigning
negotiations by going through empty gestures.
13
More
so, as in the instant case, where the intervention of the
National Labor Relations Commission was properly
sought for after conciliation efforts undertaken by the
BLR failed. The instant case being a certified one, it
must be resolved by the NLRC pursuant to the mandate
of P.D. 873, as amended, which authorizes the said
body to determine the reasonableness of the terms and
conditions of employment embodied in any Collective
Bargaining Agreement. To that extent, utmost
deference to its findings of reasonableness of any
Collective Bargaining Agreement as the governing
agreement by the employees and management must be
accorded due respect by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The
temporary restraining order issued on August 27, 1980,
is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Note: Different citation by fr. But this is the one that
contains the kiok loy quote..
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL MILLING
CORPORATION INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION
(GMC-ILU), and RITO
MANGUBAT, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari assailing the
decision
[1]
dated July 19, 2000, of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 50383, which earlier reversed the
decision
[2]
dated January 30, 1998 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-0112-
94.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In its two plants located at Cebu City and Lapu-
Lapu City, petitioner General Milling Corporation (GMC)
employed 190 workers. They were all members of
private respondent General Milling Corporation
Independent Labor Union (union, for brevity), a duly
certified bargaining agent.
On April 28, 1989, GMC and the union concluded a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) which included
the issue of representation effective for a term of three
years. The CBA was effective for three years retroactive
to December 1, 1988. Hence, it would expire on
November 30, 1991.
On November 29, 1991, a day before the
expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed
CBA, with a request that a counter-proposal be
submitted within ten (10) days.
As early as October 1991, however, GMC had
received collective and individual letters from workers
who stated that they had withdrawn from their union
membership, on grounds of religious affiliation and
personal differences. Believing that the union no longer
had standing to negotiate a CBA, GMC did not send any
counter-proposal.
On December 16, 1991, GMC wrote a letter to the
unions officers, Rito Mangubat and Victor
Lastimoso. The letter stated that it felt there was no
basis to negotiate with a union which no longer existed,
but that management was nonetheless always willing to
dialogue with them on matters of common concern and
was open to suggestions on how the company may
improve its operations.
In answer, the union officers wrote a letter dated
December 19, 1991 disclaiming any massive
disaffiliation or resignation from the union and
submitted a manifesto, signed by its members, stating
that they had not withdrawn from the union.
On January 13, 1992, GMC dismissed Marcia
Tumbiga, a union member, on the ground of
incompetence. The union protested and requested
GMC to submit the matter to the grievance procedure
provided in the CBA. GMC, however, advised the union
to refer to our letter dated December 16, 1991.
[3]

Thus, the union filed, on July 2, 1992, a complaint
against GMC with the NLRC, Arbitration Division, Cebu
City. The complaint alleged unfair labor practice on the
part of GMC for: (1) refusal to bargain collectively; (2)
interference with the right to self-organization; and (3)
discrimination. The labor arbiter dismissed the case
with the recommendation that a petition for
certification election be held to determine if the union
still enjoyed the support of the workers.
The union appealed to the NLRC.
On January 30, 1998, the NLRC set aside the labor
arbiters decision. Citing Article 253-A of the Labor
Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715,
[4]
which fixed
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, the
NLRC ordered GMC to abide by the CBA draft that the
union proposed for a period of two (2) years beginning
December 1, 1991, the date when the original CBA
ended, to November 30, 1993. The NLRC also ordered
GMC to pay the attorneys fees.
[5]

In its decision, the NLRC pointed out that upon the
effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6715, the duration of a CBA,
insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, is five
(5) years which, in the case of GMC-Independent Labor
Union was from December 1, 1988 to November 30,
1993. All other provisions of the CBA are to be
renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its
execution. Thus, the NLRC held that respondent union
remained as the exclusive bargaining agent with the
right to renegotiate the economic provisions of the
CBA. Consequently, it was unfair labor practice for GMC
not to enter into negotiation with the union.
The NLRC likewise held that the individual letters of
withdrawal from the union submitted by 13 of its
members from February to June 1993 confirmed the
pressure exerted by GMC on its employees to resign
from the union. Thus, the NLRC also found GMC guilty
of unfair labor practice for interfering with the right of
its employees to self-organization.
With respect to the unions claim of discrimination,
the NLRC found the claim unsupported by substantial
evidence.
On GMCs motion for reconsideration, the NLRC set
aside its decision of January 30, 1998, through a
resolution dated October 6, 1998. It found GMCs
doubts as to the status of the union justified and the
allegation of coercion exerted by GMC on the unions
members to resign unfounded. Hence, the union filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. For
failure of the union to attach the required copies of
pleadings and other documents and material portions
of the record to support the allegations in its petition,
the CA dismissed the petition on February 9, 1999. The
same petition was subsequently filed by the union, this
time with the necessary documents. In its resolution
dated April 26, 1999, the appellate court treated the
refiled petition as a motion for reconsideration and
gave the petition due course.
On July 19, 2000, the appellate court rendered a
decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
NLRC Resolution of October 6, 1998 is hereby SET
ASIDE, and its decision of January 30, 1998 is, except
with respect to the award of attorneys fees which is
hereby deleted, REINSTATED.
[6]

A motion for reconsideration was seasonably filed
by GMC, but in a resolution dated October 26, 2000, the
CA denied it for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari alleging
that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION VIOLATED
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE THAT NO
DECISION SHALL BE RENDERED BY ANY COURT
WITHOUT EXPRESSING THEREIN CLEARLY AND
DISTINCTLY THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON
WHICH IT IS BASED.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION IN THE ABSENCE OF
ANY FINDING OF SUBSTANTIAL ERROR OR
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS ERROR IN NOT APPRECIATING THAT
THE NLRC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO
DETERMINE THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF
A COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT.
[7]

Thus, in the instant case, the principal issue for our
determination is whether or not the Court of Appeals
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in (1) finding GMC guilty of
unfair labor practice for violating the duty to bargain
collectively and/or interfering with the right of its
employees to self-organization, and (2) imposing upon
GMC the draft CBA proposed by the union for two years
to begin from the expiration of the original CBA.
On the first issue, Article 253-A of the Labor Code,
as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715, states:
ART. 253-A. Terms of a collective bargaining
agreement. Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that
the parties may enter into shall, insofar as the
representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five
(5) years. No petition questioning the majority status of
the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained
and no certification election shall be conducted by the
Department of Labor and Employment outside of the
sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry
of such five year term of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later
than three (3) years after its execution....
The law mandates that the representation
provision of a CBA should last for five years. The
relation between labor and management should be
undisturbed until the last 60 days of the fifth year.
Hence, it is indisputable that when the union requested
for a renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on
November 29, 1991, it was still the certified collective
bargaining agent of the workers, because it was seeking
said renegotiation within five (5) years from the date of
effectivity of the CBA on December 1, 1988. The unions
proposal was also submitted within the prescribed 3-
year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA,
albeit just before the last day of said period. It was
obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to
negotiate in good faith with the union. For refusing to
send a counter-proposal to the union and to bargain
anew on the economic terms of the CBA, the company
committed an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of
the Labor Code, which provides that:
ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall
be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the
following unfair labor practice:
. . .
(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as
prescribed by this Code;
. . .
Article 252 of the Labor Code elucidates the
meaning of the phrase duty to bargain collectively,
thus:
ART. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively.
The duty to bargain collectively means the performance
of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly
and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement....
We have held that the crucial question whether or
not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in
good faith typically turn$ on the facts of the individual
case.
[8]
There is no per se test of good faith in
bargaining.
[9]
Good faith or bad faith is an inference to
be drawn from the facts.
[10]
The effect of an employers
or a unions actions individually is not the test of good-
faith bargaining, but the impact of all such occasions or
actions, considered as a whole.
[11]

Under Article 252 abovecited, both parties are
required to perform their mutual obligation to meet
and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith
for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The union
lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals
for a new CBA to GMC within three (3) years from the
effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty
under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy
excuse, by questioning the existence of the union and
the status of its membership to prevent any
negotiation.
It bears stressing that the procedure in collective
bargaining prescribed by the Code is mandatory
because of the basic interest of the state in ensuring
lasting industrial peace. Thus:
ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. The
following procedures shall be observed in collective
bargaining:
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it
shall serve a written notice upon the other party with a
statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a
reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such notice. (Underscoring supplied.)
GMCs failure to make a timely reply to the
proposals presented by the union is indicative of its
utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union. Its
excuse that it felt the union no longer represented the
workers, was mainly dilatory as it turned out to be
utterly baseless.
We hold that GMCs refusal to make a counter-
proposal to the unions proposal for CBA negotiation is
an indication of its bad faith. Where the employer did
not even bother to submit an answer to the bargaining
proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the
duty to bargain collectively.
[12]

Failing to comply with the mandatory obligation to
submit a reply to the unions proposals, GMC violated
its duty to bargain collectively, making it liable for unfair
labor practice. Perforce, the Court of Appeals did not
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in finding that GMC is, under the
circumstances, guilty of unfair labor practice.
Did GMC interfere with the employees right to
self-organization? The CA found that the letters
between February to June 1993 by 13 union members
signifying their resignation from the union clearly
indicated that GMC exerted pressure on its
employees. The records show that GMC presented
these letters to prove that the union no longer enjoyed
the support of the workers. The fact that the
resignations of the union members occurred during the
pendency of the case before the labor arbiter shows
GMCs desperate attempts to cast doubt on the
legitimate status of the union. We agree with the CAs
conclusion that the ill-timed letters of resignation from
the union members indicate that GMC had interfered
with the right of its employees to self-organization.
Thus, we hold that the appellate court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in finding GMC guilty of unfair
labor practice for interfering with the right of its
employees to self-organization.
Finally, did the CA gravely abuse its discretion
when it imposed on GMC the draft CBA proposed by the
union for two years commencing from the expiration of
the original CBA?
The Code provides:
ART. 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there
exists a collective bargaining agreement. ....It shall be
the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to
continue in full force and effect the terms and
conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day
period [prior to its expiration date] and/or until a new
agreement is reached by the parties. (Underscoring
supplied.)
The provision mandates the parties to keep
the status quo while they are still in the process of
working out their respective proposal and counter
proposal. The general rule is that when a CBA already
exists, its provision shall continue to govern the
relationship between the parties, until a new one is
agreed upon. The rule necessarily presupposes that all
other things are equal. That is, that neither party is
guilty of bad faith. However, when one of the parties
abuses this grace period by purposely delaying the
bargaining process, a departure from the general rule is
warranted.
In Kiok Loy vs. NLRC,
[13]
we found that petitioner
therein, Sweden Ice Cream Plant, refused to submit any
counter proposal to the CBA proposed by its employees
certified bargaining agent. We ruled that the former
had thereby lost its right to bargain the terms and
conditions of the CBA. Thus, we did not hesitate to
impose on the erring company the CBA proposed by its
employees union - lock, stock and barrel. Our findings
in Kiok Loy are similar to the facts in the present case, to
wit:
petitioner Companys approach and attitude stalling
the negotiation by a series of postponements, non-
appearance at the hearing conducted, and undue delay
in submitting its financial statements, lead to no other
conclusion except that it is unwilling to negotiate and
reach an agreement with the Union. Petitioner has not
at any instance, evinced good faith or willingness to
discuss freely and fully the claims and demands set
forth by the Union much less justify its objection
thereto.
[14]

Likewise, in Divine Word University of Tacloban vs.
Secretary of Labor and Employment,
[15]
petitioner
therein, Divine Word University of Tacloban, refused to
perform its duty to bargain collectively. Thus, we upheld
the unilateral imposition on the university of the CBA
proposed by the Divine Word University Employees
Union. We said further:
That being the said case, the petitioner may not validly
assert that its consent should be a primordial
consideration in the bargaining process. By its acts, no
less than its action which bespeak its insincerity, it has
forfeited whatever rights it could have asserted as an
employer.
[16]

Applying the principle in the foregoing cases to the
instant case, it would be unfair to the union and its
members if the terms and conditions contained in the
old CBA would continue to be imposed on GMCs
employees for the remaining two (2) years of the CBAs
duration. We are not inclined to gratify GMC with an
extended term of the old CBA after it resorted to
delaying tactics to prevent negotiations. Since it was
GMC which violated the duty to bargain collectively,
based on Kiok Loy and Divine Word University of
Tacloban, it had lost its statutory right to negotiate or
renegotiate the terms and conditions of the draft CBA
proposed by the union.
We carefully note, however, that as strictly
distinguished from the facts of this case, there was no
pre-existing CBA between the parties in Kiok
Loy andDivine Word University of Tacloban.
Nonetheless, we deem it proper to apply in this case the
rationale of the doctrine in the said two cases. To rule
otherwise would be to allow GMC to have its cake and
eat it too.
Under ordinary circumstances, it is not obligatory
upon either side of a labor controversy to precipitately
accept or agree to the proposals of the other. But an
erring party should not be allowed to resort with
impunity to schemes feigning negotiations by going
through empty gestures.
[17]
Thus, by imposing on GMC
the provisions of the draft CBA proposed by the union,
in our view, the interests of equity and fair play were
properly served and both parties regained equal
footing, which was lost when GMC thwarted the
negotiations for new economic terms of the CBA.
The findings of fact by the CA, affirming those of
the NLRC as to the reasonableness of the draft CBA
proposed by the union should not be disturbed since
they are supported by substantial evidence. On this
score, we see no cogent reason to rule
otherwise. Hence, we hold that the Court of Appeals
did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it imposed on GMC,
after it had committed unfair labor practice, the draft
CBA proposed by the union for the remaining two (2)
years of the duration of the original CBA. Fairness,
equity, and social justice are best served in this case by
sustaining the appellate courts decision on this issue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the
assailed decision dated July 19, 2000, and the resolution
dated October 26, 2000, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 50383, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.