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Adriano(second marriage kids) vs Adriano (legal wife kids)CA:

The testator, Lucio Adriano, also known as Ambrocio Adriano, married Gliceria Dorado on October 29,
Out of their lawful marriage, they had three children, namely, Celestina, Manolo, and Aida, private
respondents in this case
in 1942 or prior thereto, Lucio and Gliceria separated, and Gliceria settled in Rizal, Laguna where she
died on June 11, 1968. Also in 1942 or even earlier, Lucio cohabited with Vicenta Villa, with whom he
had eight children:all surnamed Adriano.
November 22, 1968, or five months after the death of Gliceria, Lucio married Vicenta. Lucio and
Vicenta and their children lived in Candelaria, Quezon until the spouses separated in 1972.
On October 10, 1980, Lucio executed a last will and testament disposing of all his properties, and
assigning, among others, his second wife Vicenta and all his children by his first and second marriages
as devisees and legatees therein. Among the properties bequeathed in the will were a 45,000 square
meter lot and the residential house, rice mill, warehouse and equipment situated thereon located in
Candelaria, Quezowhich was disposed of in the following manner: (1) to private respondents, Lucio's
children by his first wife, 10,000 square meters of the disputed property, including the warehouse, rice
mill, and equipment situated thereon; (2) to Vicenta and petitioners, his children by his second
marriage, the remaining 35,000 square meters; and (3) to private respondents, the residential house
also within the same property.
On February 11, 1981, Lucio died and private respondent Celestina Adriano, who was instituted in
Lucio's will as its executrix, filed a petition for the probate of the will on February 18, 1981 before the
RTC of Lucena City After due hearing and despite the Opposition filed by Vicenta, the RTC allowed the
probate of the will On November 10, 1983, Vicenta appealed said Order to the then Intermediate
Appellate Court, which in turn affirmed the probate of the will. Vicenta died on July 2, 1985.
while the proceedings for settlement of estate were pending before the RTC, petitioners instituted an
action for annulment of Lucio Adriano's will .In the complaint, plaintiffs-petitioners alleged that before
the marriage of Lucio and their mother, Vicenta, on November 22, 1968, the two lived together as
husband and wife and as such, acquired properties which became the subject of inventory and
administration in plaintiffs-petitioners alleged that before the marriage of Lucio and their mother,
Vicentaon. petitioners claimed that the properties bequeathed in Lucio's will are undivided "civil
partnership and/or conjugal properties of Lucio Adriano and Vicenta Villa", and thus, the will sought to
be probated should be declared void and ineffective insofar as it disposes of the rightful share or
properties of Vicenta.
The trial court favored the evidence of private respondents, which indicated that the purchase money
for the contested properties came from the earnings of Lucio in a business partnership that he entered
into in 1947, or during the subsistence of his marriage to Gliceria. The trial court further found that
Lucio's initial capital infusion of P15,000.00 in the business partnership was in fact obtained from the
conjugal fund of his first marriage. Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners' appeal for lack of merit, and
affirmed in toto the Joint Order of the RTC
ISSUE: WON the property in question is co-owned by Vicenta and Lucio thus must not be part of the
will. (NO)
HELD: The co-ownership in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and woman living
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage must not in any way be incapacitated to
marry. Considering that the property was acquired in 1964, or while Lucio's marriage with Gliceria
subsisted, such property is presumed to be conjugal unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife
Property acquired by a man while living with a common-law wife during the subsistence of his marriage
is conjugal property, even when the property was titled in the name of the common-law wife. In such
cases, a constructive trust is deemed to have been created by operation of Article 1456 of the Civil
Code over the property which lawfully pertains to the conjugal partnership of the subsisting marriage.

8. MARIA BICARME assisted by her husband JOSE BALUBAR
Facts: Sps. Juan Bicarme and Florencia Bidaya were the original co-owners of two parcels of land:
Cornland in Palao, Bangued, Abra, bounded on the North-Hill, on the East-Brono Barbers, on the
South-Casimiro Palos, and on the West-Clemente Baldozan 8,721k sqm.
Riceland in Palao, Bangued, Abra, bounded on the North-Macario Bolos, East- Roberto Bicarme,
South-Juliana Baldozan, and West-Telesporo, about 1,539 sq. m
The spouses died intestate and were survived by three children-Victorina Bicarme, Sebastian Bicarme
and Maria Bicarme. Later, Victorina Bicarme died intestate, survived by her only daughter, Cristina
Cristina claims that upon the death of her grandparents, Sps. Juan and Florencia, her mother Victorina
and her aunt, Maria, became co-owners or co-heirs of the litigated parcels of land. Upon the death of
her mother, Victorina, Cristina became co-heirs with Maria, having inherited the share and interest of
her mother corresponding to one-half of the two parcels of land.
Cristina instituted this action for partition, because her aunt, Maria, refused to share with her the yearly
fruits of the disputed parcels of land.
Maria, however, maintains that "she acquired these two parcels of land in 1925 (cornland) and 1926
(riceland) from the deceased spouses Placido Bidaya and Margarita Bose and since then until the
present, had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse possession and enjoyment and in the
concept of absolute owner thereof Maria further claims that Cristina, her niece, never shared or
contributed to the payment of taxes of said two parcels of land; and, finally, that Cristina Bicarme was
presumed already dead"
Trial court judged them to be co-heirs
ISSUE: 1. WON there was CO-Ownership (YES)
2. WON Acquisitive prescription may be applied (NO)
3. WON Maria has been in possession of the lands in question under the conditions required by
Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as to uphold acquisitive prescription in her favor.
HELD: 1. Three deeds of sale executed by Maria as follows:

That I am the sole and absolute owner over the above described cornland having acquired the same by
inheritance from my late father Juan Bicarme.
By admitting that the cornland is inherited property, Maria, in effect, recognized Cristina's lights thereto
as a co-heir/co-owner
2. (clarification of NO) It is not legally correct to say that by virtue of the imprescriptibility of an action for
partition, prescription as a mode of acquiring title, can never be invoked, or in the present case, that
Maria, as a co-owner can never acquire the property by prescription. The imprescriptibility of an action
for partition cannot be invoked when one of the co-owners has possessed the property as exclusive
owner, and for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription. From the moment one of the co-owners
claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share
therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition, but of ownership. In this sense, the trial court
erred in saying that there can be no prescription (as a mode of acquiring title) in favor of a co-
3. One of the conditions imposed by said section is that the possession must be adverse against the
whole world. In order that a possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust, or the other co-
owner the following must concur:
(1) That he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que
trust or other co-owner, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui
que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.
Payment of land taxes does not constitute sufficient repudiation of the co-ownership, as it is not an act
adverse to Cristina's rights. Moreover, Cristina, being a minor, until she claimed her rights, was not
even aware thereof. Neither did Maria make known her repudiation to Cristina, because all along, Maria
presumed her to be dead. Her refusal to share with Cristina the yearly profits stemmed from Cristina's
failure to share in the yearly taxes. Acquisitive prescription cannot therefore apply in this case.

9. Rivera v. Heirs of Villanueva 2006
FACTS: Petitioners are allegedly the half-brothers, the half-sister-in-law, and the children of a half-
brother of the deceased Pacita Gonzales. Respondents are heirs of Villanueva and are represented by
Melchor. The remaining respondents, Angelina Villanueva and husband Victoriano de Luna, are
allegedly the daughter and the son-in-law, respectively, of the late Villanueva. From 1927 until her
death in 1980, Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of marriage because the latter
was married to one Amanda Musngi who died on April 20, 1963. In the course of their cohabitation,
they acquired several:
Lot No. 266-B-1, with an area of 1,787 square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-21446 [in the names of Villanueva and
Gonzales], together with the residential house erected thereon and other improvements;
(b) Lot No. 266-B-3 [included in the coverage of transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-21446], with an area of 5,353 square meters, more or less,
situated at Poblacion, Talavera, Nueva Ecija;
(c) [Lot 801-A covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-12201 [in the names of Villanueva and Gonzales], with [an] area of 15.400
hectares, more or less, situated at Llanera, Nueva Ecija;
(d) [Lot 3-A covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-51899 [in the names of Villanueva and Gonzales], with an area of 4.0019 hectares,
more or less, situated at Calipahan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija;
(e) [Lot No. 838 covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-17193 [in the names of Villanueva, Gonzales and one Soledad Alarcon vda. de
Rivera], with an area of 3.8718 hectares, more or less, situated at Talavera, Nueva Ecija;
(f) [Lot 884-B covered by] Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-26670 [in the name of Gonzales], with an area of 3.5972 hectares, more or less,
situated at Talavera, Nueva Ecija;
(g) Subdivision lots situated at Talavera, Nueva Ecija, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 106813 to 106931, inclusive, although the
land covered by TCT No. NT-106827 was already sold to one Pastor Barlaan;
(h) Shares of stocks, tractor, jewelries and other chattels, with an approximate value of at least P100,000; and
(i) Savings deposit with the [Philippine] National Bank, in the amount of P118,722.61 .

Gonzales died on July 3, 1980 without leaving a will. On August 8, 1980, Villanueva and respondent
Angelina executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with sale, that is, an extrajudicial settlement of
Gonzales estate comprising a number of the aforementioned properties. In this document, Villanueva,
for the amount of P30,000, conveyed his interests in the estate to Angelina. Petitioners filed a case for
partition of Gonzales estate and annulment of titles and damages, with the RTC. In dismissing the
complaint, the RTC made two findings: (1) Gonzales was never married to Villanueva and (2)
respondent Angelina was her illegitimate child by Villanueva and therefore her sole heir, to the
exclusion of petitioners. The CA ruled that respondent Angelina was the illegitimate daughter of the
decedent, based solely on her birth certificate.
ISSUE: 1. WON Angelina is an illegitimate child of the deceased Villanueva. (NO)
2. WON the real properties acquired by Villanueva and Gonzales were equally owned by them. (NO)
RULING: 1. The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed
parents is not a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the
legal rights of such child, and even amounts to simulation of the childs birth or falsification of his or her
birth certificate, which is a public document. Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is
merely a prima face evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the
truthfulness of the statements made there by the interested parties.
Following the logic of Benitez case, respondent Angelina and her co-defendants in SD-857 should have
adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however,
are bereft of any such evidence. Under the circumstances, the Court ruled that it was not sufficiently
established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales biological daughter, nor even her adopted
daughter. Thus, she cannot inherit from Gonzales. Since she could not have validly participated in
Gonzales estate, the extrajudicial partition which she executed with Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was
2. Because the cohabitation of Villanueva and Gonzales from 1927 to 1963 was adulterous, their
property relations during those 36 years were not governed by Article 144 of the Civil Code which
applies only if the couple living together is not in any way incapacitated from getting married.
The only property acquired after Musngis death in 1963 and registered in the names of both Villanueva
and Gonzales was Lot 3-A covered by TCT No. NT-51899. The rest of the properties registered solely
in Gonzales name were also acquired after the death of Amanda Musngi in 1963. The records show
that the subdivision lots situated in Talavera, Nueva Ecija covered by TCTs Nos. 106813 to 106931
were acquired in 1971These properties were governed by co-ownership under Article 144 of the Civil
Code. Again, half should accrue to Gonzales heirs and the other half, to Villanueva. Villanueva was not
able to prove he alone had purchased the properties and that only he could have done so during the
period of cohabitationhe never actually challenged the validity of the registration in her name. Thus the
efficacy of the title in Gonzales name remained unrebutted.
Extra judicial partition annulled. Case remanded for proper partition.

10. Pardell vs Bartolome 1912
Facts: Petitioner Vicenta Ortiz y Felin de Pardell and respondent Matilde Ortiz y Felin Bartolome were
the existing heirs of the late Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin. On 1888, Matilde and co-defendant Gaspar
de Bartolome y Escribano took it upon themselves without an judicial authorization or even extra
judicial agreement the administration of the properties of the late Calixta and Miguel. These properties
included a house in Escolta Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; a house in Washington Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur;
a lot in Magallanes Street, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; parcels of rice land in San Julian and Sta. Lucia; and
parcels of land in Candon, Ilocos Sur.
Vicenta filed an action in court asking that the judgement be rendered in restoring and returning to them
one half of the total value of the fruits and rents, plus losses and damages from the aforementioned
properties. However, respondent Matilde asserted that she never refused to give the plaintiff her share
of the said properties. Vicenta also argued that Matilde and her husband, Gaspar are obliged to pay
rent to the former for their occupation of the upper story of the house in Escolta Street.
Issue: Whether or not Matilde and Gaspar are obliged to pay rent for their occupation of the said
property (NO)
Held: The Court ruled that the spouses are not liable to pay rent. Their occupation of the said property
was a mere exercise of their right to use the same as a co-owner. One of the limitations on a co-
owners right of use is that he must use it in such a way so as not to injure the interest of the other co-
owners. In the case at bar, the other party failed to provide proof that by the occupation of the spouses
Bartolome, they prevented Vicenta from utilizing the same.
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story calle escota house, designed for use as a
dwelling, in the house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said
Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interest of the community property, nor that she prevented her
sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores
of the lower floor were rented and accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.
Supreme court decision: (1) That the defendants are not obliged to pay one-half of the rents which
could have been obtained from the upper story of the said house; (2) that the plaintiffs can not be
compelled to pay the legal interest from December 7, 1904, on the sum expanded in the reconstruction
(earthquake) of the aforementioned house, but only the interest fixed by law, at the rate of 6 per cent
per annum, from the date of the judgment to be rendered in accordance with this decision; (3) that the
husband of the defendant Matilde Ortiz is not entitled to any remuneration for the administration of the
pro indiviso property belonging to both parties; (4) that, neither is he entitled to collect from the plaintiffs
the sum of P910.50, the difference between the assessed valuation and the price set by the expert
appraisal solicited by the plaintiffs in their amendment to the complaint; and, (5) that no participation
shall be made of jewelry aforementioned now in the possession of the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz. The said
judgment, as relates to the points appealed, is affirmed, in so far as its findings agree with those of this
decision, and is reversed, in so far as they do not. No special finding is made regarding the costs of
both instances. So ordered.

Facts: The land (situated in the town of Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and containing an area of 4,628.25
square meters) in question was originally owned by one Julian Melencio. He died prior to the year 1905
leaving his widow, Ruperta Garcia, and his five children, Juliana, Ramon, Ruperta, Pedro R., and
Emilio Melencio. Emilio Melencio also died before 1905, his son Jose P. Melencio, then a minor,
succeeding to his interest in the said parcel of land by representation. A question has been raised as to
whether the land was community property of the marriage of Julian Melencio and Ruperta Garcia, but
the evidence is practically undisputed that Ruperta Garcia in reality held nothing but a widow's usufruct
in the land.
On July 24,1905, Ruperta Garcia, Pedro R. Melencio, Juliana Melencio, and Ruperta Melencio
executed a contract of lease of the land in favor of one Yap Kui Chin, but neither Jose P. Melencio nor
Ramon Melencio were mentioned in the lease. The term of the lease was for twenty years, extendible
for a like period at the option of the lessee. The purpose of the lessee was to establish a rice mill on the
land. it was further stipulated that at the termination of the original period of the lease, or the extension
therof, the lessors might purchase all the buildings and improvements on the land at a price to be fixed
by experts appointed by the parties, but that if the lessors should fail to take advantage of that privilege,
the lease would continue for another and further period of twenty years. The document was duly
acknowledged but was never recorded with the register of deeds.
The right to the lease fell to DY after multiple change of hands originally ruperta leased it to Yap Qui
Chin then transferred to Ui eng jui and finally DY.
Ramon Melencio the one that the lessees were dealing with died in 1914, and his widow, Liberata
Macapagal, was appointed administratrix of his estate. In 1913 the land which includes the parcel in
question was registered under the Torrens system. The lease was not mentioned in the certificate of
title, but it was stated that one house and three warehouses on the land were the property of Yap Kui
In 1920 the heirs of Julian Melencio made an extrajudicial partition of parts of the inheritance, and
among other things, the land here in question fell to the share of the children of Ramon Melencio, who
are the original plaintiffs in the present case. Their mother, Liberata Macapagal, as administratrix of the
estate of her deceased husband, Ramon, collected the rent for the lease at the rate of P20.20 per
month until the month of May,1926, when she demanded of the lessee that the rent should be
increased to P300 per month, and she was then informed by the defendant that a written lease existed
and that according to the terms thereof, the defendant was entitled to an extension of the lease at the
original rental. The plaintiffs insisted that they never had any knowledge of the existence of such a
contract of lease and maintained that in such case the lease was executed without their consent and
was void. Trial court rendered
ISSUE: WON The Contract for Lease was Invalid because of lack of consent, concurrence, and
ratification by the owners thereof. (YES)
HELD: It has been suggested that by reason of prescription and by acceptance of benefits under the
lease, the plaintiffs are estopped to question the authority for making the lease. To this we may answer
that the burden of proof of prescription devolved upon the defendant and that as far as we can find,
there is no proof that Ramon Melencio and his successors ever had knowledge of the existence of the
lease in question prior to 1926. We cannot by mere suspicion conclude that they were informed of the
existence of the document and its terms; it must be remembered that under a strict interpretation of the
terms of the lease, the lessees could remain indefinitely in their tenancy unless the lessors could
purchase the mill and the buildings on the land. In such circumstances, better evidence than that
presented by the defendant in regard to the plaintiff's knowledge of the lease must be required.
The fact that Ramon during his lifetime received his share of the products of land owned in common
with his coheirs is not sufficient proof of knowledge of the existence of the contract of lease when it is
considered that the land in question was only a small portion of a large tract which Pedro R. Melencio
was administering in connection with other community property.

12. ANGELA I. TUASON, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ANTONIO TUASON, JR., and GREGORIO ARANETA,
INC., defendants-appellees.
FACTS: In 1941, sisters Angela I. Tuason and Nieves Tuason de Barreto and their brother Antonio
Tuason Jr., co-owned a parcel of land in Sampaloc, Manila 64928.6 sqm, each owning an undivided
1/3 portion.
Nieves wanted partition bet failed to do the same so she tried to sell her shares to her siblings and then
to her mother but all of them declined. She sold her share to Gregorio Araneta Inc.
They agreed to improve the property by filling it and constructing roads thereon and then subdividing it
into small lots for sale, and thereafter dividing the proceeds accordingly. This agreement was embodied
in a "Memorandum of Agreement." Important provisions of the contract:
(9) This contract shall remain in full force and effect during all the time that it may be necessary for the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART to fully sell the said
property in small and subdivided lots and to fully collect the purchase prices due thereon; it being understood and agreed that said lots may be rented while there
are no purchasers thereof;
(11) The PARTY OF THE SECOND PART (meaning Araneta Inc.) is hereby given full power and authority to sign for and in behalf of all the said co-owners of said
property all contracts of sale and deeds of sale of the lots into which this property might be subdivided; the powers herein vested to the PARTY OF THE SECOND
PART may, under its own responsibility and risk, delegate any of its powers under this contract to any of its officers, employees or to third persons;
(15) No co-owner of the property subject-matter of this contract shall sell, alienate or dispose of his ownership, interest or participation therein without first giving
preference to the other co-owners to purchase and acquire the same under the same terms and conditions as those offered by any other prospective purchaser.
Should none of the co-owners of the property subject-matter of this contract exercise the said preference to acquire or purchase the same, then such sale to a
third party shall be made subject to all the conditions, terms, and dispositions of this contract; provided, the PARTIES OF THE FIRST PART (meaning Angela and
Antonio) shall be bound by this contract as long as the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART, namely, the GREGORIO ARANETA, INC. is controlled by the members
of the Araneta family, who are stockholders of the said corporation at the time of the signing of this contract and/or their lawful heirs;
Angela brought this suit asking the court to order the partition of the property. Among other things, she
alleges that the contract entered into was in violation of Art. 400 of the Civil Code, and further
questioned the validity of the stipulation on the ground that it virtually compelled them to remain in the
co-ownership until after all the lots have been sold. Brother joined Araneta as co-defendant
ISSUE:1. Is the contract valid? (YES)
2. May Angela validly demand partition as provided for in art 400
ART. 400. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the community. Each may, at any time, demand the partition of the thing held in
common.Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a specified length of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This period may be a new
agreement. (NO)
RULING:1. The stipulation is valid, for the precise purpose of the agreement was to eventually put an
end to the co-ownership after the parcels had been sold. Their being forced to remain, until after the
sale, should be considered only as a means to an end-a partnership so to speak, in order to dispose
the lots.
2. SC found no valid ground for the partition insisted upon the appellant. We find from the evidence as
was done by the trial court that of the 64,928.6 sq. m. which is the total area of the parcel held in
common, only 1,600 sq. m. or 2.5 per cent of the entire area remained unsold at the time of the trial in
the year 1947, while the great bulk of 97.5 per cent had already been sold. As well observed by the
court below, the partnership is in the process of being dissolved and is about to be dissolved, and even
assuming that Art. 400 of the Civil Code were applicable, under which the parties by agreement may
agree to keep the thing undivided for a period not exceeding 10 years, there should be no fear that the
remaining 1,600 sq. m. could not be disposed of within the four years left of the ten-years period fixed
by Art. 400.
"The provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code are not applicable. The contract far from violating the legal
provision that forbids a co-owner being obliged to remain a party to the community, precisely has for its
purpose and object the dissolution of the co-ownership and of the community by selling the parcel held
in common and dividing the proceeds of the sale among the co-owners."
"The obligation imposed in the contract to preserve the co-ownership until all the lots shall have been
sold, is a mere incident to the main object of dissolving the co-owners. By virtue of the document, the
parties thereto practically and substantially entered into a contract of partnership as the best and most
expedient means of eventually dissolving the co-ownership, the life of said partnership to end when the
object of its creation shall have been attained."