Lanka bristles with expectations of change

Can Ranil surf the post-Uva tide?

by Kumar David-October 4, 2014
Uva declared that the tide had turned, but the flood gates have not
ruptured; it may be imminent or months away. The point is not 2!
decline in U"#$ vote from 2% "& or '(! drop from 2' general
elections; rather it is the dynamics. The political stage is changed acutely;
the )a*apa+sa game has reached terminal decline. ,an+a-s egregious
misery cannot last, it has to snap. The worm, the pliant citi.en, has
turned, but when will chrysalis turn angry wasp/
$ related concern is the crown prince in waiting. Does )anil-s scalp fit the
soon to be vacated e0ecutive crown/ 1hat about the 2ingle 3ssue &ommon
&andidate 423-&&5 suggestion that 3 have pushed so hard for years/ 3 will
not attempt to answer all 6uestions today; that must emerge from a
broader discourse. Discussion is already passionately *oined, if not in the
print and electronic media, at least in small rooms and seminars. 7y
purpose here is to fertilise this debate in three steps. 7ust ,an+a *ettison
the )a*apa+sa regime/ 1hat about )anil and the 23-&&/ 1hat afterwards/
Throw out the )a*apa+sas pronto8
The 7ahinda-9ota-:asil outfit, its henchmen, hangers-on and familial
bloodsuc+ers must be driven out pronto, that is as soon as constitutionally
feasible. &onsider people of ,an+a, this litany of e0ecrable wrongs that
blight our nation under cover of )a*apa+sa dar+ness8
; 3ndignities, abuses and humiliations inflicted by henchmen.
; "olitical hooliganism terrorising wor+places and police forces.
; Drug peddling in city neighbourhoods with politically guaranteed
impunity.
; $ +ept and traduced superior *udiciary; the elevation of sycophants.
; 7inorities in thrall to a military *ac+boot, or to thuggish state-sponsored
mon+s.
; )obbers appointed as &orporate &hairmen and :oard 7embers.
; 3gnorant nincompoops as $mbassadors to here and there
; #orget not the rapists who run provincial and local councils.
3 have friends loyal to the )a*apa+sa outfit, pro-government fol+s of many
social classes and a bunch of lower and upper echelons in the Dead ,eft.
<ot one, no not one single person disputes this list of ini6uities. The
argument of non-leftists is= >?e 4they5 won the war, so they should be in
power @ but of course they can do better>. Dead ,eftists cower in shame
and change the sub*ect. Aven in pro government circles 3 now perceive a
shift. The 7ahinda worshipping middle-class now intones= >Bh they did a
good thing; we are grateful; but now it is time for them to go>. There was
an une0pected response from pro-government campaigners in Uva to my
remar+ that it was the economy that had turned away voters. <o, they
said, people are fed up with the whole rotten thing. 4><aa sahodaraya, me
*arava sampoornenma epaavela>5. )3" )a*apa+se, the masses have spo+en
in :adulla and 7oneragala. &ase closed8
)anil as 2ir 9alahad
The theory is that )anil is a born loser and can never match 7ahinda as a
vote getter. 3 have reservations; it-s not so simple. 3f there is a shift and
people imagine power is in the balance, +issing babies- bottoms and
7ahinda 7ama charm as a man of the people will not count. $nd if there
the shift is profound, it means disgust with the government on a bigger
canvas has crystallised. Then, superficial popularity breeds contempt and
+issing babies- bottoms is ridiculed. 3f there is an anti-regime swing, the
siblings too will no longer be strengths but encumbrances. Bne will be
pro*ected as a cryptic tyrant the other a venal tric+ster.
3 have repeated >if there is a swing>, that is to say if crucial ob*ective
circumstances have matured at their own pace. 7y antennae say
conditions have matured, but we need more evidence than *ust one Uva.
"resident )a*apa+sa faces an acute dilemma; can he ris+ "residential polls
now, or should he put it off for a year or more/ $n election now may mean
defeat; but waiting will allow anger to ferment and blend with international
regime-change strategies. Delay provides time to plot e0tra-parliamentary
options @ post-election violence in :adulla signals what-s to come. #aced
with electoral defeat and legal action for crimes in office, rulers are
tempted to incite unrest as a prelude to emergency rule and palace coups.
Trapped in a heads 3-m ruined, tails 3-m damned, &atch-22/
3t is amusing that the U<" lost, but is elated and rides victory marches;
the U"#$ won and is despondent. The former en*oys pleasant reveries, the
latter fears +ismet. There are two amusing supplementary hypotheses in
circulation as well. Bne says= The U<" achieved nothing of significance in
the last four years but performed well; the simpleton e0planation is= ?arin
the wonder boy, he transformed all8 1ithout depreciating ?arin @ he seems
to be a fine young man @ this overloo+s the obvious. Ces the U<" has done
nothing smart, but the government simply despoiled itself. The other
hilarious hypothesis is that the revival of the U<" in Uva is than+s to
2a*ith. The )anil-2a*ith patch-up wor+ed wonders; Aure+a the U<" sprang
to life8 This is false; dullard 2a*ith contributed nothing in Uva. ?e is best
left to croon pop lyrics and play his organ on stage.
1here does Uva leave my 23-&& strategy/ 1ill a reenergised U<" deem
that )anil can go it alone on a full A" bid/ Br is 23-&& now stronger/ 1ill
)anil demand the &ommon &andidacy as his rightful due/ 3 have reflected
and concluded that the first option, the U<" going entirely alone, will end
in defeat. 1e of 23-&& persuasion then need to thin+ over the second and
third 6uestions in case the U<" demands one of its people is anointed
&ommon &andidate in recognition of its enhanced new muscle. 3n the
2unday 3sland of 'D Euly 3 reflected on what the options would be if the
U<" polled (F! in Uva though this seemed unli+ely to me at the time. 3
continue to stand by it.
>)anil and the U<" should ta+e note of five points. 4a5 7ahinda )a*apa+sa
can be defeated because he will be hard pressed to secure GF! of the
2inhala-:uddhist vote, that is (F! of the national vote. :ut he can be
defeated only if the main opposition parties and groups field a *oint
candidate. 4b5 The way to get a *oint candidate is to focus solely on the
abolition of the e0ecutive presidency and e0clude all diverging social and
economic policies, including the U<"-s. 4c5 The road map must be
unambiguously endorsement by all to give the public iron-clad confidence
in the procedure. 4d5 3f )anil wishes to be prime minister in the future
parliamentary system, there is no point in craving for a si0-month
temporary presidency. 4e5 3f the U<" wishes to propose a name from its
ran+s for this >short-term *ob> it had better do it now>.
The U<" including )anil surely understands 4a5; 7angala has said so
e0plicitly. 3t follows that 4b5 and 4c5 are imperative. 1e can leave aside 4d5
and 4e5 for the U<" to decide for itself; but 4d5 is so obvious, it is stupid to
ignore it. 3f )anil see+s broad endorsement as &ommon &andidate, then
4b5 and 4c5 must be answered. 1ill he state loud, clear, repeatedly and
unambiguously= >3 pledge to abolish the e0ecutive presidency within si0
months>/ 3f yes the U<" can endorse 2obitha-s )oad 7ap or propose one
of its own.
The U<" needs allies and 2arath #ones+a is at the end of his go-it-alone
tether; they need each other and #onse+a may bring a scale-tipping H!
vote. $nother critical concern is security. The military has been blatantly
politicised by this regime, hence a new government must bear threats to
constitution and democracy in mind. #onse+a if given a +ey defence
appointment can blunt this threat. #urthermore, if )anil and U<" pledge to
abolish A" e0peditiously, it would bring in substantial pro-2obitha votes.
?owever )anil lusts for A"; so 3 have no clue what the eventual decision
will be.
$fter )a*apa+sa
#irst ma+e the pleasant assumption that we will be rid of A" and have in its
place a U<"-led or a 2,#"-led parliamentary government. The second
lamentable case is if )anil is elected e0ecutive president. The third
calamitous option is what to do if )a*apa+sa secures a third e0ecutive
presidential term. 3 will reserve this for a later piece for reasons of space
and as it now seems the least li+ely.
3n the first case, whichever the parliamentary government and which the
opposition, it is best to +eep both at arms length li+e putrefying fish.
Democracy and the public interest will be served by a strong, even if
minority, radical left opposition in parliament. 3t is not possible to wind
bac+ the cloc+ but there was a time in our history when irrespective of
which big party was in office it was the people-s tribunes of the left who
guarded public interests and democratic freedoms. Uva has shown that a
third force, the EI" in this case, will be s6uee.ed when the contest
between the big players becomes acute. ?owever in a parliamentary
option there will be constituencies to mimic Catiyantota, $+uressa,
&olombo &entral or "anadura of yore. $ phalan0 of bold opposition
members in a future parliament is where we should place our trust.
3f the U<" refuses to pledge abolition of the A" and )anil see+s glory,
which rascal wins ma+es little difference; repulsive A" will go on. Does it
matter whether it is )a*apa+sa-D or )anil-'/ Bur tas+ remains unchanged;
to pull down A" which is the root of our autocratic evils.
Posted by Thavam