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G.R. No. 148225 March 3, 2010


CARMEN DEL PRADO, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES ANTONIO L. CABALLERO and LEONARDA
CABALLERO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
NACHURA, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated September 26, 2000 and its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
thereof.
The facts are as follows:
In a judgment rendered on February 1, 1985 in Cadastral Case No. N-6 (LRC Rec.
No. N-611), Judge Juan Y. Reyes of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City,
Branch 14, adjudicated in favor of Spouses Antonio L. Caballero and Leonarda B.
Caballero several parcels of land situated in Guba, Cebu City, one of which was
Cadastral Lot No. 11909, the subject of this controversy.
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On May 21, 1987, Antonio
Caballero moved for the issuance of the final decree of registration for their
lots.
3
Consequently, on May 25, 1987, the same court, through then Presiding Judge
Renato C. Dacudao, ordered the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration to issue the decree of registration and the corresponding titles of the
lots in favor of the Caballeros.
4

On June 11, 1990, respondents sold to petitioner, Carmen del Prado, Lot No. 11909
on the basis of the tax declaration covering the property. The pertinent portion of the
deed of sale reads as follows:
That we, Spouses ANTONIO L. CABALLERO and LEONARDA B. CABALLERO,
Filipinos, both of legal age and residents of Talamban, Cebu City, Philippines, for and
in consideration of the sum of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40,000.00), Philippine
Currency, paid by CARMEN DEL PRADO, Filipino, of legal age, single and a resident
of Sikatuna St., Cebu City, Philippines, the receipt of which is full is hereby
acknowledged, do by these presents SELL, CEDE, TRANSFER, ASSIGN &
CONVEY unto the said CARMEN DEL PRADO, her heirs, assigns and/or
successors-in-interest, one (1) unregistered parcel of land, situated at Guba, Cebu
City, Philippines, and more particularly described and bounded, as follows:
"A parcel of land known as Cad. Lot No. 11909, bounded as follows:
North : Lot 11903
East : Lot 11908
West : Lot 11910
South : Lot 11858 & 11912
containing an area of 4,000 square meters, more or less, covered by Tax Dec. No.
00787 of the Cebu City Assessors Office, Cebu City." of which parcel of land we are
the absolute and lawful owners.
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 1305, covering Lot No. 11909, was issued only
on November 15, 1990, and entered in the "Registration Book" of the City of Cebu on
December 19, 1990.
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Therein, the technical description of Lot No. 11909 states that
said lot measures about 14,457 square meters, more or less.
6

On March 20, 1991, petitioner filed in the same cadastral proceedings a "Petition for
Registration of Document Under Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1529"
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in order that a
certificate of title be issued in her name, covering the whole Lot No. 11909. In the
petition, petitioner alleged that the tenor of the instrument of sale indicated that the
sale was for a lump sum or cuerpo cierto, in which case, the vendor was bound to
deliver all that was included within said boundaries even when it exceeded the area
specified in the contract. Respondents opposed, on the main ground that only 4,000
sq m of Lot No. 11909 was sold to petitioner. They claimed that the sale was not for a
cuerpo cierto. They moved for the outright dismissal of the petition on grounds of
prescription and lack of jurisdiction.
After trial on the merits, the court found that petitioner had established a clear and
positive right to Lot No. 11909. The intended sale between the parties was for a lump
sum, since there was no evidence presented that the property was sold for a price per
unit. It was apparent that the subject matter of the sale was the parcel of land, known
as Cadastral Lot No. 11909, and not only a portion thereof.
8

Thus, on August 2, 1993, the court a quo rendered its decision with the following
dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted and judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of herein petitioner. The Register of Deeds of the City of
Cebu is hereby ordered and directed to effect the registration in his office of the Deed
of Absolute Sale between Spouses Antonio Caballero and Leonarda Caballero and
Petitioner, Carmen del Prado dated June 11, 1990 covering Lot No. 11909 after
payment of all fees prescribed by law. Additionally, the Register of Deeds of the City
of Cebu is hereby ordered to cancel Original Certificate No. 1305 in the name of
Antonio Caballero and Leonarda Caballero and the Transfer Certificate of Title be
issued in the name of Petitioner Carmen del Prado covering the entire parcel of land
known as Cadastral Lot No. 11909.
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An appeal was duly filed. On September 26, 2000, the CA promulgated the assailed
decision, reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC.
The CA no longer touched on the character of the sale, because it found that
petitioner availed herself of an improper remedy. The "petition for registration of
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document" is not one of the remedies provided under P.D. No. 1529, after the original
registration has been effected. Thus, the CA ruled that the lower court committed an
error when it assumed jurisdiction over the petition, which prayed for a remedy not
sanctioned under the Property Registration Decree. Accordingly, the CA disposed, as
follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one entered dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction. No
pronouncement as to costs.
10

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition, raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN
MAKING FINDINGS OF FACT CONTRARY TO THAT OF THE TRIAL COURT[;]
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR
IN FAILING TO RULE THAT THE SALE OF THE LOT IS FOR A LUMP SUM OR
CUERPO CIERTO[;]
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
PETITION FOR REGISTRATION OF THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED 11
JUNE 1990 EXECUTED BETWEEN HEREIN PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENTS[.]
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The core issue in this case is whether or not the sale of the land was for a lump sum
or not.
Petitioner asserts that the plain language of the Deed of Sale shows that it is a sale of
a real estate for a lump sum, governed under Article 1542 of the Civil Code.
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In the
contract, it was stated that the land contains an area of 4,000 sq m more or less,
bounded on the North by Lot No. 11903, on the East by Lot No. 11908, on the South
by Lot Nos. 11858 & 11912, and on the West by Lot No. 11910. When the OCT was
issued, the area of Lot No. 11909 was declared to be 14,475 sq m, with an excess of
10,475 sq m. In accordance with Article 1542, respondents are, therefore, duty-bound
to deliver the whole area within the boundaries stated, without any corresponding
increase in the price. Thus, petitioner concludes that she is entitled to have the
certificate of title, covering the whole Lot No. 11909, which was originally issued in the
names of respondents, transferred to her name.
We do not agree.
In Esguerra v. Trinidad,
13
the Court had occasion to discuss the matter of sales
involving real estates. The Courts pronouncement is quite instructive:
In sales involving real estate, the parties may choose between two types of pricing
agreement: a unit price contract wherein the purchase price is determined by way of
reference to a stated rate per unit area (e.g., P1,000 per square meter), or a lump
sum contract which states a full purchase price for an immovable the area of which
may be declared based on the estimate or where both the area and boundaries are
stated (e.g., P1 million for 1,000 square meters, etc.). In Rudolf Lietz, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals (478 SCRA 451), the Court discussed the distinction:
"In a unit price contract, the statement of area of immovable is not conclusive and
the price may be reduced or increased depending on the area actually delivered. If
the vendor delivers less than the area agreed upon, the vendee may oblige the
vendor to deliver all that may be stated in the contract or demand for the
proportionate reduction of the purchase price if delivery is not possible. If the vendor
delivers more than the area stated in the contract, the vendee has the option to
accept only the amount agreed upon or to accept the whole area, provided he pays
for the additional area at the contract rate.
x x x x
In the case where the area of an immovable is stated in the contract based on an
estimate, the actual area delivered may not measure up exactly with the area stated
in the contract. According to Article 1542 of the Civil Code, in the sale of real estate,
made for a lump sum and not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure or
number, there shall be no increase or decrease of the price, although there be a
greater or less areas or number than that stated in the contract. . . .
x x x x
Where both the area and the boundaries of the immovable are declared, the area
covered within the boundaries of the immovable prevails over the stated area. In
cases of conflict between areas and boundaries, it is the latter which should prevail.
What really defines a piece of ground is not the area, calculated with more or less
certainty, mentioned in its description, but the boundaries therein laid down, as
enclosing the land and indicating its limits. In a contract of sale of land in a mass, it is
well established that the specific boundaries stated in the contract must control over
any statement with respect to the area contained within its boundaries. It is not of vital
consequence that a deed or contract of sale of land should disclose the area with
mathematical accuracy. It is sufficient if its extent is objectively indicated with
sufficient precision to enable one to identify it. An error as to the superficial area is
immaterial. Thus, the obligation of the vendor is to deliver everything within the
boundaries, inasmuch as it is the entirety thereof that distinguishes the determinate
object.
14

The Court, however, clarified that the rule laid down in Article 1542 is not hard and
fast and admits of an exception. It held:
A caveat is in order, however. The use of "more or less" or similar words in
designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency. A vendee of land
sold in gross or with the description "more or less" with reference to its area does not
thereby ipso facto take all risk of quantity in the land..
Numerical data are not of course the sole gauge of unreasonableness of the excess
or deficiency in area. Courts must consider a host of other factors. In one case (see
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Roble v. Arbasa, 414 Phil. 343 [2001]), the Court found substantial discrepancy in
area due to contemporaneous circumstances. Citing change in the physical nature of
the property, it was therein established that the excess area at the southern portion
was a product of reclamation, which explained why the lands technical description in
the deed of sale indicated the seashore as its southern boundary, hence, the
inclusion of the reclaimed area was declared unreasonable.
15

In the instant case, the deed of sale is not one of a unit price contract. The parties
agreed on the purchase price of P40,000.00 for a predetermined area of 4,000 sq m,
more or less, bounded on the North by Lot No. 11903, on the East by Lot No. 11908,
on the South by Lot Nos. 11858 & 11912, and on the West by Lot No. 11910. In a
contract of sale of land in a mass, the specific boundaries stated in the contract must
control over any other statement, with respect to the area contained within its
boundaries.
16
1avvphi1
Blacks Law Dictionary
17
defines the phrase "more or less" to mean:
About; substantially; or approximately; implying that both parties assume the risk of
any ordinary discrepancy. The words are intended to cover slight or unimportant
inaccuracies in quantity, Carter v. Finch, 186 Ark. 954, 57 S.W.2d 408; and are
ordinarily to be interpreted as taking care of unsubstantial differences or differences
of small importance compared to the whole number of items transferred.
Clearly, the discrepancy of 10,475 sq m cannot be considered a slight difference in
quantity. The difference in the area is obviously sizeable and too substantial to be
overlooked. It is not a reasonable excess or deficiency that should be deemed
included in the deed of sale.
We take exception to the avowed rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. After an
assiduous scrutiny of the records, we lend credence to respondents claim that they
intended to sell only 4,000 sq m of the whole Lot No. 11909, contrary to the findings
of the lower court. The records reveal that when the parties made an ocular
inspection, petitioner specifically pointed to that portion of the lot, which she preferred
to purchase, since there were mango trees planted and a deep well thereon. After the
sale, respondents delivered and segregated the area of 4,000 sq m in favor of
petitioner by fencing off the area of 10,475 sq m belonging to them.
18

Contracts are the law between the contracting parties. Sale, by its very nature, is a
consensual contract, because it is perfected by mere consent. The essential elements
of a contract of sale are the following: (a) consent or meeting of the minds, that is,
consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; (b) determinate subject
matter; and (c) price certain in money or its equivalent. All these elements are present
in the instant case.
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More importantly, we find no reversible error in the decision of the CA. Petitioners
recourse, by filing the petition for registration in the same cadastral case, was
improper. It is a fundamental principle in land registration that a certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor
of the person whose name appears therein. Such indefeasibility commences after
one year from the date of entry of the decree of registration.
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Inasmuch as the
petition for registration of document did not interrupt the running of the period to file
the appropriate petition for review and considering that the prescribed one-year
period had long since expired, the decree of registration, as well as the certificate of
title issued in favor of respondents, had become incontrovertible.
21

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. L-21703-04 August 31, 1966
MATEO H. REYES and JUAN H. REYES, petitioners and appellants,
vs.
MATEO RAVAL REYES, respondent and appellee.
Harold M. Hernando for petitioners and appellants.
Rafael Ruiz for respondent and appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J .:
Direct appeal on pure question of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte, in its Cadastral Cases Nos. 31, L. R. C. Rec. No. 1188, and 42, L. R. C.
Rec. No. 1994, denying petitioners' motion to compel respondent to surrender their
owners' duplicates of Original Certificates of Title Nos. 22161 and 8066, as well as
from a subsequent order of the same court, refusing, upon petitioners' motion, to
reconsider the first order of denial.
The undisputed facts are: three brothers, Mateo H., Juan H., and Francisco H., all
surnamed Reyes, are the registered owners of several parcels of land, to wit; Lots
Nos. 15891, 15896, 15902 and 15912, of the Laoag (Ilocos Norte) Cadastre,
embraced in and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22161, and also Lots
Nos. 20481 and 20484, of the same cadastral survey, embraced in and covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 8066, both of the Registry of Deeds of Ilocos Norte.
These titles were issued pursuant to a decree of registration, dated 31 May 1940.
On 17 July 1962, petitioners Mateo H. Reyes and Juan H. Reyes filed, in the above
stated cadastral cases, a motion for issuance of writs of possession over all the lots
covered by both Certificates of Title above referred to.
Respondent Mateo Raval Reyes opposed the motion, admitting that he is only in
possession of the lots covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22161, but denying
that he possesses the lots covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 8066; however,
he claimed that he has been in, and is entitled to, the possession thereof (i.e., Lots
Nos. 20481 and 20484), having acquired by way of absolute sale (not recorded) from
petitioners' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, the latter's undivided one-third (1/3) share,
interest and participation to these disputed lots.
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After due hearing of this appellant, the court a quo issued, on 20 December 1962, the
writ of possession with respect to Lot Nos. 15891 and 15896, which writ was, upon
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, amended, on 7 January 1963, to include all the
other lots covered by both titles.
Respondent did not appeal from this order amending the writ of possession.
Subsequently, petitioners in the above cadastral cases, as plaintiffs, commenced, on
15 January 1963, before the same court of first instance, an ordinary civil action
seeking to recover the products of the disputed lots, or their value, and moral
damages against respondent Mateo Raval Reyes, as defendant. This case was
docketed as its Civil Case No. 3659.
Defendant therein (now respondent M. Raval Reyes) answered the complaint and
pleaded a counterclaim for partition of all the disputed lots, alleging the same ground
he had heretofore raised in his answer and/or opposition to the motion for issuance of
writ of possession, i.e., he is their (plaintiffs') co-owner, he having bought from
plaintiffs' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, the latter's undivided one-third (1/3) share,
interest and participation to these disputed lots.
Pending trial on this ordinary civil case (No. 3659), petitioners presented, on 25
February 1963, in the cadastral cases aforementioned, a motion to compel
respondent Mateo Raval Reyes to surrender and deliver to them the owners'
duplicates of Original Certificates of Title Nos. 22161 and 8066. Respondent opposed
this motion.
The court a quo denied petitioners' motion, on the ground that the parcels of land
covered by both titles are subjects of litigation in Civil Case No. 3659 and the same
has not yet been decided on the merits by it. Petitioners subjected the foregoing order
to a motion for reconsideration, but without success; hence, the present appeal.
Petitioners-appellants dispute the above ruling of the trial court contending that, since
the subject matter of Civil Case No. 3659 are not the lots covered by the titles in
question but their products or value, and moral damages, these lots are not in
litigation in this ordinary civil case; and that since respondent had already raised the
issue of ownership and possession of these lots in his opposition to the (petitioners')
motion for issuance of writ of possession and, despite this opposition, the court a
quo granted the writ, without any appeal being taken, respondent is barred and
estopped from raising the same issue in the ordinary civil case, under the principle
ofres judicata.1wph1.t
On the other hand, respondent-appellee maintains that, having pleaded a
counterclaim for partition of the lots in question in said Civil Case No. 3659, the trial
court correctly held that these lots are subjects of litigation in this ordinary civil case.
He also maintains that petitioners not having impleaded their brother, Francisco H.
Reyes, or his heirs, as parties in their motion for issuance of writ of execution, and
because these heirs have not intervened in this particular incident, the writ of
possession issued by the trial court is, at most, valid only with respect to their
(petitioners) undivided two-thirds (2/3) share and participation in these disputed lots;
hence, he concludes that he is not barred and estopped from raising the issue of
ownership and possession of the undivided one-third (1/3) share and participation of
petitioners' brother, Francisco H. Reyes, which share respondent allegedly bought
from the latter.
In their reply brief, petitioners-appellants refute the latter argument of respondent-
appellee by showing that they had previously obtained special authority from the heirs
of their deceased brother to represent them in the proceedings had in the court
below.
The sole issue to be resolved in the instant appeal is: who between petitioners-
appellants or respondent-appellee has a better right to the possession or custody of
the disputed owners' duplicates of certificates of title.
While we agree with the court a quo that the disputed lots are subjects of litigation in
Civil Case No. 3659, it appearing that respondent, as defendant therein, had
presented a counterclaim for partition of the lots covered by the titles, we see no valid
and plausible reason to justify, on this ground, the withholding from the registered
owners, such as the petitioners-appellants herein, the custody and possession of the
owners' duplicates of certificates of title. In a decided case, this Court has already
held that the owner of the land in whose favor and in whose name said land is
registered and inscribed in the certificate of title has a more preferential right to the
possession of the owners' duplicate than one whose name does not appear in the
certificate and has yet to establish his right to the possession thereto. Thus, this Court
said:
Como acertadamente dijo el Juzgado, lo unico que se suscita es si Ana Umbao de
Carpio tiene derecho a la possession del duplicado para el dueno del Certificado de
Titulo Original No. 698, con preferencia a la opositora-apelante. A nuestro juicio, la
solucion es clara e ineludible. Hallandose admitido que el decreto final que se dicto en
el expediente catastral en 28 de mayo de 1936, en relacion con el lote No. 778, fue a
favor de Ana Umbao y que el duplicado para el dueo del Certificado de Titulo
Original No. 698 se expidio por el Registrador de Titulos a favor de la misma es
obvious que quien tiene derecho a poseer el certificado de titulo es ella y no la
apelante (art. 41 de la Ley No. 496, tal como ha sido reformado).
Alega la apelante que ella tiene tanto derecho como la apelada a poseer el titulo
porque el terreno a que se refiere es de la propiedad de las tres hermanas. La
pretension no es meritoria Segun el articulo 41 de la Ley No. 496, conforme ha sido
enmendado, el duplicado para el dueno debe expedirse por el Registrador a nombre
de la persona a cuyo favor se ha decretado el terreno y dispone, ademas, que dicho
duplicado debe entregarsele al dueo inscrito. Si la apelante cree que tiene derecho a
participar en el lote No. 778, como coheredera, debe ejercitar una accion
independiente, encaminada a obtener su participacion. (El Director de
Terrenos contra Abacahin 72 Phil. 326).
It being undisputed that respondent had already availed of an independent civil action
to recover his alleged co-owner's share in the disputed lots by filing a counterclaim for
partition in said Civil Case No. 3659, his rights appear to be amply protected; and
considering that he may also avail of, to better protect his rights thereto, the provision
on notice of lis pendens under Section 24, Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court, for
the purpose of recording the fact that the lots covered by the titles in question are
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litigated in said Civil Case No. 3659, we again see no justifiable reason for
respondent to retain the custody of the owners' duplicates of certificates of titles.
In view of the above considerations, we deem it unnecessary to pass on the merits of
the second contention of petitioners-appellants.
Wherefore, the orders appealed from should be, as they are hereby, reversed; and, in
accordance with this opinion, respondent Mateo Raval Reyes is hereby ordered to
deliver to petitioners the owners' duplicates of Original Certificates of Title No. 22161
and 8066. With costs against respondent-appellee, Mateo Raval Reyes.
[G.R. No. L-7644. November 27, 1956.]
HENRY LITAM, ETC., ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. REMEDIOS R. ESPIRITU,
as guardian of the incompetent MARCOSA RIVERA, and ARMINIO
RIVERA, Defendants-Appellees.
[G.R. No. L-7645. November 27, 1956]
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE OF THE DECEASED RAFAEL LITAM.
GREGORIO DY TAM,Petitioner-Appellant, vs. REMEDIOS R. ESPIRITU, in her
capacity as judicial guardian of the incompetent MARCOSA RIVERA, counter-
Petitioner, ARMINIO RIVERA, administrator-Appellee.

D E C I S I O N
CONCEPCION, J .:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in the above
entitled case, which were jointly tried.
On May 21, 1952, Gregorio Dy Tam instituted Special Proceeding No. 1537 of said
court, entitled In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Rafael Litam.
The petition therein filed, dated April 24, 1952, states that Petitioner is the son of
Rafael Litam, who died in Manila on January 10, 1951; chan roblesvirtualawlibr ar ythat the deceased was
survived by:chanr obl esvirt uall awlibrar y
Li Hong Hap 40 years
Li Ho 37 years
Gregorio Dy Tam 33 years
Henry Litam alias Dy Bun Pho 29 years
Beatriz Lee Tam alias Lee Giak Ian 27 years
Elisa Lee Tam alias Lee Giok Bee 25 years
William Litam alias Li Bun Hua 23 years
Luis Litam alias Li Bun Lin 22 years
that the foregoing children of the decedent by a marriage celebrated in China in 1911
with Sia Khin, now deceased; chan robl esvirtual awlibrar ythat after the death of Rafael Litam, Petitioner and
his co-heirs came to know that the decedent had, during the subsistence of said
marriage with Sia Khin, contracted in 1922 in the Philippines cralaw another marriage with
Marcosa Rivera, Filipino citizen;chan roblesvirtualawli brar ythat the decedent left as his property among
others, his one-half (1/2) share valued at P65,000 in the purported conjugal properties
between him and Marcosa Rivera, which cralawpartnership consisted of the following real
property acquired during the marriage between him and Marcosa Rivera, to wit:chanr obl esvirt uall awlibrar y
(1) Three (3) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1228 of the
Registry of Deeds of the province of Pampanga:chanroblesvirtuallawli brar y
(2) One (1) parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26011 of the
Registry of Deeds of the province of Bulacan.
and that the decedent had left neither a will nor debt. Petitioner prayed, therefore,
that, after appropriate proceedings, letters of administration be issued to Marcosa
Rivera, the surviving spouse of the decedent. Soon thereafter, Marcosa Rivera filed
a counter- petition:chanrobl esvirtuallawli brar y (1) substantially denying the alleged marriage of the decedent
to Sia Khin, as well as the alleged filiation of the persons named in the petition; chan r obl esvirt ual awlibr ary(2)
asserting that the properties described herein are her paraphernal properties, and
that the decedent had left unpaid debts, and certain properties in Bulan and
Casiguran, Sorsogon, and in Virac, Catanduanes, apart from shares of stock in a
private corporation known by the name of Litam Co., Inc.; chan r obl esvirt ual awlibrar yand (3) praying that her
nephew, Arminio Rivera, be appointed administrator of the intestate estate of the
deceased.
In due course, the court granted this petition and letters of administration were issued
to Arminio Rivera, who assumed his duties as such, and, later, submitted an inventory
of the alleged estate of Rafael Litam. Inasmuch as said inventory did not include the
properties mentioned in the petition, dated April 24, 1952, of Gregorio Dy Tam, the
latter filed, on November 29, 1952, a motion for the removal of Rivera as
administrator of the aforementioned estate. This led to a number of incidents hinging
on the question whether said properties belong in common to the decedent and
Marcosa Rivera or to the latter exclusively.
Meanwhile, Remedios R. Espiritu was appointed, in Special Proceeding No. 1709 of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, guardian of Marcosa Rivera, who had been
declared incompetent. Thereafter, or on April 20, 1953, Gregorio Dy Tam and his
alleged brothers and sisters aforementioned, filed the complaint in Civil Case No.
2071 of the same court, against Remedios R. Espiritu, as guardian of Marcosa
Rivera, and Arminio Rivera. In said complaint,Plaintiffs therein reproduced
substantially the allegations made in the aforementioned petition of Gregorio Dy Tam
dated April 24. 1952, except that the properties acquired during the existence of
marriage between Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera and/or with their joint efforts
during the time that they lived as husband and wife were said to be more than those
specified in said petition, namely:chanroblesvirtuallawli brar y
(1) 3 parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Macabebe, Province of
Pampanga, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1228 of the Registry of Deeds
for the Province of Pampanga, issued on July 29, 1947;
(2) 2 Parcels of land, together with all buildings and improvements thereon except
those expressly noted in the title as belonging to other persons, situated in the
Municipality of Navotas, Province of Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
35836 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, issued on October 4, 1938;
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(3) 1 parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23248 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal, issued on June 12, 1933;
(4) 1 parcel of land situated in Barrio of Kay-Badia, Municipality of Obando, Province
of Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21809 of the Registry of
Deeds for the Province of Bulacan, issued on May 25, 1939;
(5) 1 parcel of land (plan psu-93067, swo-16049) situated in Barrio of Quibadia,
Municipality of Obando, Province of Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 26011 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan, issued on April 9,
1943;
Other properties are located in Bataan province.
All properties total an assessed value of approximately P150,000.00.
In said complaint, Plaintiffs prayed that the judgment be rendered:chanrobl esvirtuallawli brar y
(1) declaring the aforesaid properties as belonging to the conjugal partnership or
tenancy in common which existed between the deceased Rafael Litam and the
incompetent Marcosa Rivera;
(2) ordering the Defendants to deliver the aforesaid properties to the administration
of the estate of the deceased Rafael Litam (Rule 75, section 2, Rules of Court);
(3) ordering the said Defendants further to render an accounting of the fruits they
collected from the aforesaid properties and to deliver the same to the administration
of the estate of the deceased Rafael Litam;
(4) ordering the said Defendants to pay the administration of the estate of the
deceased Rafael Litam damages in double the value of the fruits mentioned in the
preceding paragraph which they embezzled; chan roblesvirtualawli brar yand
(5) ordering the Defendants to pay the costs. The Plaintiffs further pray for such
other remedy as the Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.
In her answer to the complaint, Marcosa Rivera reiterated, in effect, the allegations in
her counter-petition, dated July 12, 1952, in Special Proceeding No. 1537, and set up
some affirmative and special defenses, as well as a counter-claim for attorneys fees
and damages in the aggregate sum of P110,000.00.
Owning to the identity of the issue raised in said Civil Case No. 2071 and in the
aforementioned incidents in Special Proceeding No. 1537, both were jointly heard.
Later on, the court rendered a decision.
(1) Dismissing Civil Case No. 2071, with costs against the Plaintiffs;
(2) Sentencing the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2071, under the Defendants
counterclaim, to pay jointly and severally each of the Defendants the sum of
P5,000.00 as actual damages and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) Declaring that the properties in question, namely:chanroblesvirt uallawlibr ar y the fishponds, consisting of
three parcels, situated in Macabebe, Pampanga, with Transfer certificate of Title No.
1228 of the land records of Pampanga, one-half undivided portion of the fishponds,
consisting of two parcels, situated in Navotas, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 35836, the parcel of land with the improvements thereon situated in
Malabon, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23248, both of the land
records of Rizal, and the fishponds, consisting of two parcels, situated in Obando,
Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 21809 and 26011, both of the
land records of Bulacan, are the exclusive, separate and paraphernal properties of
Marcosa Rivera; chan r obl esvirt ual awlibr ar yand
(4) Declaring that the Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 (who are the same persons
alleged to be children of Rafael Litam in the petition, dated April 24, 1952, filed by
the Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537) are not the children of the deceased Rafael
Litam, and that his only heir is his surviving wife, Marcosa Rivera.
The two (2) Cases are now before us on appeal taken by the Petitioner in Special
Proceeding No. 1537 and the Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071. The issues for
determination are:chanroblesvirtuallawli brar y (1) AreAppellants the legitimate children of Rafael Litam? (2) Is
Marcosa Rivera the exclusive owner of the properties in question, or do the same
constitute a common property of her and the decedent?
The first issue hinges on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in 1911,
and whether Rafael Litam is the father of Appellants herein. In this connection, the
lower court had the following to say:chanr obl esvirt uall awlibrar y
cralaw the evidence weikhs very heavily in favor of the theory of the Defendants in Civil
Case No. 2071 to the effect that the said deceased Rafael Litam was not married to
Sia Khin and thatPlaintiffs, are not the children of the said decedent. The Plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 2071 and thePetitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 have utterly failed to
prove their alleged status as children of Rafael Litam by a marriage with Sia Khin.
It appears from the evidence presented by the Defendants in civil Case No. 2071
and the administrator and the counter-Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 that there was
no such marriage between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and that
the Plaintiffs named in Civil Case No. 2071 are not children of said deceased. The
various official and public documents executed by Rafael Litam himself convincingly
show that he had not contracted any marriage with any person other than Marcosa
Rivera, and that he had no child. In the marriage certificate, (Exhibit 55) it was clearly
stated that he was single when he married Marcosa Rivera on June 10, 1922. In the
sworn application for alien certificate of registration dated July 7, 1950 (Exhibit 1),
Rafael Litam unequivocably declared under oath that he had no child. In the several
other documents executed by him and presented in evidence, (Exhibits 19, 21, 22,
23, 46 and 46-A) Rafael Litam had consistently referred to Marcosa Rivera alone as
his wife; chan r obl esvirt ual awlibr aryhe had never mentioned of Sia Khin as his wife, or of his alleged children.
The witnesses presented by the Defendants in Civil Case No. 2071 and the
administrator and counter Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 positively testified to the
effect that they know that Rafael Litam did not have any child, nor was he married
with Sia Khin. An impartial and disinterested witness, Felipe Cruz, likewise testified
that he has known Rafael Litam even before his marriage with Marcosa Rivera and
that said Rafael Litam did not have any child.
On the other hand, the Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 and the Petitioner in Sp.
Proc. No. 1537 presented in support of their theory the testimony of their lone
witness, Luis Litam, and certain documentary evidence. It is noteworthy that the
said Plaintiffs and said Petitioner did not present in evidence the marriage certificate
of Rafael Litam and Sia Khin, which in the opinion of the Court, is the competent and
best evidence of the alleged marriage between them. No explanation has been given
for the non-presentation of said marriage certificate, nor has there been any showing
7
of its loss. Neither have said Plaintiffs and said Petitionerpresented any competent
secondary evidence of the supposed marriage.
The testimony of the lone witness, Luis Litam, cannot be given any credence and
value at all. His testimony is mostly hearsay, as according to him, he was merely
informed by Rafael Litam of the latters supposed marriage with Sia Khin. His
testimony is uncorroborated. The court noticed that the said witness was only 22
years old when he testified, and it appears in the petition filed by the Petitioner in Sp.
Proc. No. 1537 that said witness is the youngest of all the alleged eight children of
Rafael Litam. The Court is at a loss to understand why one or some of the older
alleged children of Rafael Litam were not presented as witnesses in view of the
unreliable testimony of Luis Litam, and considering that older persons are better
qualified to testify on the matters sought to be proved which allegedly happened a
long time ago.
The birth certificate presented by the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2071 and Petitioner in
Sp. Proc. No. 1537 cannot be given even little consideration, because the name of
the father of the children appearing therein is not Rafael Litam, but different persons.
It is very significant to note that the names of the father of the persons appearing in
said birth certificates are Dy Tham, Li Tam, Lee Tham, Rafael Dy Tam, and that said
persons were born in different places, some in Amoy, China, another Fukien, China,
and the other in Limtao, China. It also appears in said birth certificates that the
childrens mothers named therein are different, some being Sia Khim, others Sia
Quien, the other Sia Khun, and still another Sia Kian. These documents do not
establish the identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as
father. Besides, it does not appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam
had in any manner intervened in the preparation and filing thereof.
The other documentary evidence presented by the said Plaintiffs and Petitioner are
entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage between the
deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and the alleged statue of the Plaintiffs as
children of said decedent.
It is, therefore, the finding of this Court that the Plaintiffs named in Civil Case No.
2071 are not heirs of the said decedent, his only heir being his surviving wife,
Marcosa Rivera. (Emphasis ours.)
The findings of fact thus made in the decision appealed from are borne out by the
records and the conclusion drawn from said facts is, to our mind, substantially correct.
Appellants evidence on this point consists of the testimony of Appellant Li Bun Lin,
who said that he is, also known as Luis Litam; chan robl esvirtual awlibrar ythat his co-Appellants are his
brothers and sisters; chan roblesvirtualawli brar ythat their parents are the decedent and Sia Khin, who were
married in China in 1911; chan r obl esvirt ual awlibr ar yand that Sia Khin died in Manila during the Japanese
occupation. He likewise, identified several pictures, marked Exhibits I to S, which
were claimed to be family portraits, but the lower court rejected their admission in
evidence. Although we agree with herein Appellants that this was an error, it is clear
to us that said pictures and the testimony of Luis Litam, as well as the other evidence
adverted to in the above-quoted portion of the decision appealed from, are far from
sufficient to outweigh, or even offset, the evidence in favor of the Appellees.
It should be noted that the decedent had admittedly married Marcosa Rivera in 1922.
In the very petition of Appellant Gregorio Dy Tam, in Special Proceeding No. 1537,
dated April 24, 1952, he alleged that Marcosa Rivera is the surviving spouse of the
decedent. In their complaint in Civil Case No. 2071, Appellants specifically admitted
and averred the existence of the marriage between said Rafael Litam and Marcosa
Rivera which would have been void ab initio, and, hence, inexistent legally,
if Appellants pretense were true or they believed it to be so and that they had
lived as husband and wife. Again, although Gregorio Dy Tam, asserted, in his
aforementioned petition, that he and his co-heirs came to know about the marriage
of the decedent and Marcosa Rivera after the death of Rafael Litam, the very
testimony of Li Bun Lin, as witness for the Appellants, show, beyond doubt, that said
Appellants knew, during the lifetime of Rafael Litam that he and Marcosa Rivera were
living in Malabon, Rizal, openly and publicly, as husband and wife, and regarded her
as his lawful wife. Indeed, in the course of his testimony, said Li Bun Lin alluded to
her as his mother. In other words, aside from the circumstance that the wedding and
marital life of Marcosa Rivera and Rafael Litam is undisputed, it is, also, an
established fact that they had the general reputation of being legally married and
were so regarded by the community and by Appellants herein, during the lifetime of
Rafael Litam.
Upon the other hand, Appellants maintain, in effect, that Rafael Litam was guilty of
the crime of bigamy; chan r obl esvirt ual awlibr arythat he had, likewise, willfully and maliciously falsified public
and official documents; chan roblesvirtualawli brar yand that, although Appellants and Sia Khin were living in
Manila and Marcosa Rivera whom Appellants knew resided only a few
kilometers away, in Malabon, Rizal where Rafael Litam returned daily, after attending
to his business in Manila, the decedent had succeeded, for about thirty (30) years, in
keeping each party in complete ignorance of the nature of his alleged relations with
the other. Apart from the highly improbable nature of the last part of Appellants
pretense, it is obvious that the same cannot be sustained unless the evidence in
support thereof is of the strongest possible kind, not only because it entails the
commission by Rafael Litam of grave criminal offenses which are derogatory to his
honor, but, also, because death has sealed his lips, thus depriving him of the most
effective means of defense. The proof for Appellants herein does not satisfy such
requirement.
As regards the title to the properties in dispute, the evidence thereon was analyzed by
the lower court in the following language:chanr obl esvirt uall awlibr ar y
It has been established by the evidence that the properties in question were bought
by Marcosa Rivera with her separate and exclusive money. The fishponds situated in
Obando, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 21809 and 26011, the
one-half (1/2) undivided portion of the fishponds situated in Navotas, Rizal with
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 35836, and the property situated in Hulong-Duhat,
Malabon, Rizal, with Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23248 were all purchased by
Marcosa Rivera with the money she earned and accumulated while she was still
single; chan roblesvirt ualawlibr ar ywhile the fishponds situated in Macabebe, Pampanga with Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1228 were purchased by her with the money she inherited from
her late sister, Rafaela Rivera and with the money she received from the proceeds of
the sale of the pieces of jewelry she inherited from her father Eduardo Rivera and her
sister Rafaela Rivera. The properties in question, having been bought by Marcosa
Rivera, although during her marriage with Rafael Litam, with her exclusive and
separate money, said properties are undeniably her paraphernal properties. (Art.
1396, Spanish Civil Code, which is the same as Art. 148 of the Civil Code of the Phil.)
Great importance should be given to the documentary evidence, vis:chanr obl esvirt uall awlibr ary Exhibits 21,
22, 23, 19, 46 and 46-A, presented by the Defendants, in Civil Case No. 2071 and the
administrator and counter- Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537, which prove beyond
8
peradventure of any doubt that the properties in question are the paraphernal
properties of Marcosa Rivera. In Exhibit 21, Rafael Litam unequivocably declared
under his oath that the money paid by Marcosa Rivera for the fishponds in Obando,
Bulacan was her exclusive and separate money which was earned by her while she
was still single. In Exhibits 22 and 23, both dated June 16, 1947, same Rafael Litam,
also under oath, acknowledge the fact that the sums of P13,000.00 and P10,000.00
loaned by Marcosa Rivera to the spouses Catalino Pascual and Juliana Pascual, and
to Juliana Pascual, respectively, are the separate and exclusive money of Marcosa
Rivera, in which money Rafael Litam had no interest whatsoever. In Exhibit 19, same
Rafael Litam acknowledged the fact that he had obtained, before the outbreak of the
second world war, from Marcosa Rivera the sum of P135,000.00 which belongs
exclusively to the latter, and that after the liberation, or more specifically, on January
4, 1946, he stole from Marcosa Rivera the further sum of P62,000.00, also belonging
exclusively to the latter, which amounts, totalling P197,000.00, exclusive of interests,
have not, according to the evidence, been paid to her up to the present. In Exhibits 46
and 46-A, it was acknowledged by Rafael Litam that he had not given any money to
his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that they have actually adopted a system of separation
of property, each of them not having any interest or participation whatsoever in the
property of the other. These declarations and admission of fact made by Rafael Litam
against his interest are binding upon him, his heirs and successors in interests and
third persons as well. (Secs. 7 & 29, Rule 123, Rules of Court).
The finding of this Court that the properties in question are paraphernal properties of
Marcosa Rivera, having been bought by her with her separate and exclusive money,
is further strengthened by the fact that, as it is clearly disclosed by the evidence when
Marcosa Rivera married Rafael Litam in 1922, she was already rich, she having
already earned and saved money as consignataria while she was still single. It also
appears that she was born of a rich family, her father, Eduardo Rivera, being the
owner of fishponds, commercial and residential lands and buildings, (Exhibits 5 to 18,
inclusive), with an assessed value of around P150,000.00 (Exhibits 25 and 42,
inclusive), now worth approximately a million pesos, and most of which properties as
may be seen from the certificates of title were acquired by him way back in the years
1916 and 1919. When Eduardo Rivera died on February 5, 1942, his cash and
jewelry were inherited by his eldest daughter, Rafaela Rivera, and when the latter
died single on July 2, 1943, Marcosa Rivera inherited her cash amounting to
P150,000.00, Philippine currency, and and her pieces of jewelry. It is with this amount
and with the proceeds of the sale of some of said pieces of jewelry that Marcosa
Rivera purchased the fishponds in question, situated in Macabebe, Pampanga.
On the other hand, it appears from the evidence that when Rafael Litam was on June
10, 1922, married to Marcosa Rivera, he was poor. He had to borrow from Marcosa
Rivera, the sum of P135,000.00 belonging exclusively to her before the outbreak of
the war, and to steal from her further sum of P62,000.00 after the liberation (Exhibit
10). The said amounts totalling P197,000.00, exclusive of the stipulated interests,
according to the evidence, have not been paid to Marcosa Rivera up to the present.
Rafael Litam did not contribute any amount of money or labor to the properties in
question, as he and Marcosa Rivera maintained an absolute separation of property
(Exhibits 46 and 46-A). Besides, during his lifetime he used to go his office in Manila
everyday.
Another circumstance which clearly proves that the properties in question belong
exclusively to Marcosa Rivera is the established fact that before she became
incompetent sometime in the early part of the year, 1953, she had been administering
said properties, to the exclusion of Rafael Litam. In fact, as may be seen from the
very documentary evidence (Exhibit EE, same as Nxh. 50) presented by
the Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 themselves and Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537,
she alone leased the properties in question, situated in Macabebe, Pampanga, and
the corresponding lease contract, dated July 13, 1948 was signed by her as lessor
and by Rafael Suarez, Jr. as lessees. Furthermore, the properties in question have
been declared in the name of Marcosa Rivera alone, and she alone pays the real
estate taxes due thereon. (Exhibits 43, 44 & 45.)
Further strong proofs that the properties in question are the paraphernal properties of
Marcosa Rivera, are the very Torrens Titles covering said properties. All the said
properties are registered in the name of Marcosa Rivera, married to Rafael Litam.
This circumstance indicates that the properties in question belong to the registered
owner, Marcosa Rivera, as her paraphernal properties, for if they were conjugal, the
titles covering the same should have been issued in the names of Rafael Litam and
Marcosa Rivera. The words married to Rafael Litam written after the name of
Marcosa Rivera, in each of the above mentioned titles are merely descriptive of the
civil status of Marcosa Rivera, the registered owner of the properties covered by said
titles.
On the other hand, the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071
andPetitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537 in support of their contention that the properties in
question are conjugal is, in the mind of the Court, very weak, unreliable, and mostly
incompetent, and cannot overcome the clear, convincing and almost conclusive
proofs presented by the opposite party. Scant or no consideration at all could be
given by the Court to the immaterial, incompetent and unbelievable testimonies of the
witnesses presented by the said Plaintiffsand Petitioners. The disputable presumption
of law that the properties acquired during the marriage are conjugal properties, upon
which legal presumption said Plaintiffs and Petitionermainly rely has been decisively
overcome by the overwhelming preponderance of evidence adduced in these cases
that the properties in question are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera.
(Emphasis ours.)
Appellants counsel assail the decision appealed from upon the ground that the lower
court had been partial to the Appellees and had not accorded to the Appellants a fair
and just hearing.
As above pointed out, His Honor the trial Judge could have been, and should have
been, more liberal in the reception of evidence. Appellants witnesses (Li Bun Lin,
Dominador Gadi, Benigno Musni and Rafael B. Suarez) should have been allowed to
testify on the alleged title of Rafael Litam to certain properties and on his alleged
reasons for the language used in the public and official documents relied upon by
the Appellees. However, it is apparent to us that said evidence cannot affect the
decision in these cases.
The evidenciary value of the testimony of said witnesses would have depended
mainly upon their individual appraisal of certain facts, upon their respective inferences
therefrom and their biases or view points, and upon a number of other factors
affecting their credibility. At best, said testimony could not possibly prevail over the
repeated admissions made by the decedent against his own interest in Exhibits 19,
21, 22, 23, 46 and 46-A (adverted to in the abovequoted portion of the decision
appealed from), which admissions are corroborated by the fact that the deceased
father of Marcosa Rivera was well to do; chan robl esvirtual awlibrar ythat aside from her share in his estate,
she had, likewise, inherited from a sister who died single and without issue; chan roblesvirtualawli brar ythat
9
the lands in dispute were registered, and some were, also, leased, in her name,
instead of hers and that of the decedent; chan roblesvir tualawli brar yand that the latter lived in her house in
Malabon, Rizal.
Appellants contend that the transactions covered by said Exhibits 19, 21 to 23 and 46
and 46-A, as well as by the other deeds referred to in the decision appealed from,
were caused to be made in the name of Marcosa Rivera, to the exclusion of her
husband, in order to evade the constitutional provision disqualifying foreigners from
the acquisition of private agricultural lands, except by succession. Apart from being
based, solely, upon a surmise, without any evidentiary support, this pretense is
refuted by the fact that said residential property in Hulong-Duhat, Malabon, Rizal, was
acquired on April 12, 1933, or prior to the adoption of our Constitution (see Exhibits Z
and AA). Her transactions subsequently thereto, merely followed, therefore, the
pattern of her activities before the drafting of said fundamental law.
This notwithstanding, we do not believe that Appellants should be sentenced to pay
damages. The petition of Gregorio Dy Tam in Special Proceeding No. 1537 and the
complaint in Civil Case No. 2071 contain nothing derogatory to the good name or
reputation of the herein Appellees. On the contrary, it may be surmised from said
pleadings that Marcosa Rivera had no knowledge of the alleged previous marriage of
the decedent to Sia Khin. Moreover, the records do not show that Appellants have
acted in bad faith.
Likewise, we are of the opinion that the lower court should not have declared, in the
decision appealed from, that Marcosa Rivera is the only heir of the decedent, for such
declaration is improper in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive
competence of the court in Special Proceeding No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in
issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of
partition.
Wherefore, with the elimination of the award for damages in favor of the
herein Appellees, and of said declaration of heirship, the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs against the Appellants. It is SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-57757 August 31, 1987
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PRAGMACIO VITUG AND MAXIMO
VITUG, respondents.
GANCAYCO, J .:
Does the presumption of conjugality of properties acquired by the spouses during
coverture provided for in Article 160 of the Civil Code apply to property covered by a
Torrens certificate of title in the name of the widow? This is the issue posed in this
petition to review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
60903 which is an action for reconveyance and damages. *
On November 28, 1952, Donata Montemayor, through her son, Salvador M. Vitug,
mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) several parcels of land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2289 Pampanga to guarantee the loan
granted by the PNB to Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani in the amount of
P40,900.00 which was duly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Pampanga. 1
On December 1, 1963, Donata Montemayor also mortgaged in favor of PNB certain
properties covered by TCT Nos. 2887 and 2888-Pampanga to guarantee the payment
of the loan account of her son Salvador Vitug in the amount of P35,200.00, which
mortgage was duly registered in the Register of Deeds of Pampanga.
2

The above-mentioned Transfer Certificates of Titles covering said properties were all
in the name of Donata Montemayor, of legal age, Filipino, widow and a resident of
Lubao, Pampanga at the time they were mortgaged to PNB
3
and were free from all hens
and encumbrances.
4

Salvador Vitug failed to pay his account so the bank foreclosed the mortgaged
properties covered by TCT Nos. 2887 and 2888. They were sold at public auction on
May 20, 1968 in which the PNB was the highest bidder. The titles thereto were
thereafter consolidated in the name of PNB.
Likewise, Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani failed to settle their accounts with the
PNB so the latter foreclosed the properties covered by TCT No. 2889 which were sold
at public auction and likewise PNB was the buyer thereof. On August 30, 1968, a
certificate of sale was issued by the Register of Deeds covering said properties in
favor of the PNB. When the title of the PNB was consolidated a new title was issued
in its name.
5

On September 2, 1969, the PNB sold the properties covered by TCT Nos. 2887 and
2888 Pampanga to Jesus M. Vitug, Anunciacion V. de Guzman, Prudencia V.
Fajardo, Salvador Vitug and Aurora V. Gutierrez in those names the corresponding
titles were issued.
6

During the lifetime of Clodualdo Vitug he married two times. His first wife was
Gervacia Flores with whom he had 3 children, namely, Victor, Lucina and Julio all
surnamed Vitug. Victor now dead is survived by his 5 children: Leonardo, Juan,
Candida Francisco and Donaciano, an surnamed Vitug. Juan Vitug is also dead and
is survived by his only daughter Florencia Vitug.
The second wife of Clodualdo Vitug was Donata Montemayor with whom he had 8
children, namely, Pragmacio, Maximo, Jesus, Salvador, Prudencio and Anunciacion,
all surnamed Vitug, the late Enrique Vitug represented by his wife Natalia Laquian,
and the late Francisco Vitug who is survived by 11 children, namely, Antonio,
Francisco, Aurora, Pedro, Honorio, Corazon, Anselmo, Benigno, Eligio Jesus and
Luz.
10
Clodualdo Vitug died intestate on May 20, 1929 so his estate was settled and
distributed in Special Proceeding No. 422 in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
wherein Donata Montemayor was the Administratrix.
7

Meanwhile, on May 12,1958, Donata Montemayor executed a contract of lease of Lot
No. 24, which is covered by TCT No. 2887-R in favor of her children Pragmacio and
Maximo both surnamed Vitug. This lease was extended on August 31, 1963. By virtue
of a general power of attorney executed by Donata Montemayor on Sept. 19, 1966 in
favor of Pragmacio Vitug, the latter executed a contract of lease on Sept. 19, 1967 of
the said lot in favor of Maximo Vitug.
8

On March 21, 1970 Pragmacio Vitug and Maximo Vitug filed an action for partition
and reconveyance with damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against
Marcelo Mendiola, special administrator of the intestate estate of Donata Montemayor
who died earlier, Jesus Vitug, Sr., Salvador, Natalia, Prudencia, Anunciacion, all
surnamed Vitug, Antonio, Francisco, Aurora, Pedro, Honorio, Corazon, Anselmo,
Benigno, Eligio Jesus and Luz, all surnamed Fajardo and the PNB.
The subject of the action is 30 parcels of land which they claim to be the conjugal
property of the spouses Donata Montemayor and Clodualdo Vitug of which they claim
a share of 2/11 of 1/2 thereof. They assailed the mortgage to the PNB and the public
auction of the properties as null and void. They invoked the case of Vitug vs.
Montemayor, L-5297 decided by this Court on Oct. 20, 1953 which is an action for
partition and liquidation of the said 30 parcels of land wherein the properties were
found to be conjugal in nature.
In a decision of Sept. 15, 1975, the lower court dismissed the complaint with costs
against the plaintiffs and ordered them to pay attorney's fees of P5,000.00 to the
defendant's counsel. Plaintiffs then interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
wherein in due course a decision was rendered on May 20, 1981, the dispositive part
of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the decision appealed
from is hereby reversed and set aside, and another one entered in
accordance with the tenor of the prayer of appellant's complaint
with the modification that the sale at public auction of the 22 parcels
be considered valid with respect to the 1/2 thereof. No costs.
Hence the herein petition for certiorari filed by the PNB raising the following
assignments of error:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING
TO THE CASE AT BAR THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT IN FLORENCIA VITUG VS. DONATA
MONTEMAYOR, ET AL., 91 PHIL. 286 (1953) BECAUSE:
A. BETWEEN A PROVISION OF A SPECIAL
LAW AND THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
AND/OR APPLICATION OF A PROVISION OF A
GENERAL LAW, THE FORMER PREVAILS.
B. THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS IS NOT
A MECHANICAL FORMULA OF ADHERENCE.
C. PNB WAS NOT A PARTY, AND HAD NO
KNOWLEDGE OF THE ABOVECITED CASE.
D. SIMILARLY, PRAGMACIO VITUG AND
MAXIMO VITUG WERE NOT PARTIES IN SAID
CASE.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
RECOGNIZING THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF THE CERTIFICATE,
OF TITLE, AS PROVIDED IN ACT 496, AS AMENDED (THE
LAND REGISTRATION).
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IGNORING
THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF OWNERSHIP OF DONATA
MONTEMAYOR OVER THE PROPERTIES WHICH WERE
REGISTERED EXCLUSIVELY IN HER NAME WHEN PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS (PRAGMACIO VITUG AND MAXIMO VITUG), AS
LESSEES, ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT OF LEASE WITH
DONATA MONTEMAYOR AS THE OWNER-LESSOR.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT PNB WAS A MORTGAGEE IN BAD FAITH.
The petition is impressed with merit.
When the subject properties were mortgaged to the PNB they were registered in the
name of Donata Montemayor, widow. Relying on the torrens certificate of title
covering said properties the mortgage loan applications of Donata were granted by
the PNB and the mortgages were duly constituted and registered in the office of the
Register of Deeds.
In processing the loan applications of Donata Montemayor, the PNB had the right to
rely on what appears in the certificates of title and no more. On its face the properties
11
are owned by Donata Montemayor, a widow. The PNB had no reason to doubt nor
question the status of said registered owner and her ownership thereof. Indeed, there
are no liens and encumbrances covering the same.
The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a registered land
has a right to rely upon the face of the torrens certificate of title and to dispense with
the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge
of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man make such
inquiry.
9

A torrens title concludes all controversy over ownership of the land covered by a final
degree of registration. 10Once the title is registered the owner may rest assured without the
necessity of stepping into the portals of the court or sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid the
possibility of losing his land. 11
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife.
The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and
wife. In this case, it appears on the face of the title that the properties were acquired
by Donata Montemayor when she was already a widow. When the property is
registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the
property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs
exclusively to said spouse. 12 And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot
prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are
involved. 13
The PNB had a reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of title of the
properties mortgaged. For all legal purposes, the PNB is a mortgagee in goodfaith for
at the time the mortgages covering said properties were constituted the PNB was not
aware to any flaw of the title of the mortgagor. 14
True it is that in the earlier cases decided by this Court, namely Vitug VS.
Montemayor decided on May 15, 1952, which is an action for recovery of possession
of a share in said parcels of land, 15 and in the subsequent action for partition between the
same parties decided on Oct. 20, 1953, 16 this court found the 30 parcels of land in question to be
conjugal in nature and awarded the corresponding share to the property of Florencia Vitug, an heir of
the late Clodualdo Vitug from the first marriage. In said cases this Court affirmed the decision of the
lower court. In the dispositive part of the decision of the trial court it made the observation that "but
from the conduct of Clodualdo Vitug and Donata Montemayor during the existence of their marital life,
the inference is clear that Clodualdo had the unequivocal intention of transmitting the full ownership of
the 30 parcels of land to his wife Donata Montemayor, thus considering the 1/2 of the funds of the
conjugal property so advanced for the purchase of said parcels of land as reimbursible to the estate of
Clodualdo Vitug on his death. 17 That must be the reason why the property was registered in the name
of Donata Montemayor as widow after the death of Clodualdo Vitug. 18
At any rate, although actions for recovery of real property and for partition are real
actions, however, they are actions in personam that bind only the particular
individuals who are parties thereto. 19 The PNB not being a party in said cases is not bound by
the said decisions. Nor does it appear that the PNB was aware of the said decisions when it extended
the above describe mortgage loans. Indeed, if the PNB knew of the conjugal nature of said properties it
would not have approved the mortgage applications covering said properties of Donata Montemayor
without requiring the consent of all the other heirs or co-owners thereof. Moreover, when said
properties were sold at public auction, the PNB was a purchaser for value in good faith. So its right
thereto is beyond question.
20

Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug are now estopped from questioning the title of Donata
Montemayor to the said properties. They never raised the conjugal nature of the
property nor took issue as to the ownership of their mother, Donata Montemayor, over
the same. Indeed private respondents were among the defendants in said two cases
wherein in their answers to the complaint they asserted that the properties in question
are paraphernal properties belonging exclusively to Donata Montemayor and are not
conjugal in nature.
21
Thus they leased the properties from their mother Donata Montemayor
for many years knowing her to be the owner. They were in possession of the property for a long
time and they knew that the same were mortgaged by their mother to the PNB and thereafter
were sold at public auction, but they did not do anything.
22
It is only after 17 years that they
remembered to assert their rights. Certainly, they are guilty of laches.
23

Moreover, as correctly held by the lower court. Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug as
occupants and lessees of the property in question cannot now dispute the ownership
of their mother over the same who was their lessor.
24

WHEREFORE, the subject decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and set aside and another decision is hereby rendered DISMISSING the
complaint and ordering private respondents to pay attomey's fees and expenses of
litigation to petitioner PNB in the amount of P20,000.00 and the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 185091
REPRESENTED BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
DIVISION OF LIPA CITY (FOR
PANINSINGIN PRIMARY SCHOOL),
Petitioner, Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
*

PEREZ,
**
and
MENDOZA, JJ.
PRIMO MENDOZA and
MARIA LUCERO, Promulgated:
Respondents.
August 8, 2010

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

12
DECISION

ABAD, J .:

This case is about the propriety of filing an ejectment suit against the
Government for its failure to acquire ownership of a privately owned property that it
had long used as a school site and to pay just compensation for it.



The Facts and the Case


Paninsingin Primary School (PPS) is a public school operated
by petitioner Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) through the Department of
Education. PPS has been using 1,149 square meters of land in Lipa City, Batangas
since 1957 for its school. But the property, a portion of Lots 1923 and 1925, were
registered in the name of respondents Primo and Maria Mendoza (the Mendozas)
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) T-11410.
[1]


On March 27, 1962 the Mendozas caused Lots 1923 and 1925 to be
consolidated and subdivided into four lots, as follows:

Lot 1 292 square meters in favor of Claudia Dimayuga
Lot 2 292 square meters in favor of the Mendozas
Lot 3 543 square meters in favor of Gervacio Ronquillo; and
Lot 4 1,149 square meters in favor of the City Government of Lipa
[2]


As a result of subdivision, the Register of Deeds partially cancelled TCT T-
11410 and issued new titles for Lots 1 and 3 in favor of Dimayuga and Ronquillo,
respectively. Lot 2 remained in the name of the Mendozas but no new title was issued
in the name of the City Government of Lipa for Lot 4.
[3]
Meantime, PPS remained in
possession of the property.

The Republic claimed that, while no title was issued in the name of the City
Government of Lipa, the Mendozas had relinquished to it their right over the school lot
as evidenced by the consolidation and subdivision plan. Further, the property had
long been tax-declared in the name of the City Government and PPS built significant,
permanent improvements on the same. These improvements had also been tax-
declared.
[4]


The Mendozas claim, on the other hand, that although PPS sought permission
from them to use the property as a school site, they never relinquished their right to
it. They allowed PPS to occupy the property since they had no need for it at that
time. Thus, it has remained registered in their name under the original title, TCT T-
11410, which had only been partially cancelled.

On November 6, 1998 the Mendozas wrote PPS, demanding that it vacate
the disputed property.
[5]
When PPS declined to do so, on January 12, 1999 the
Mendozas filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Lipa
City in Civil Case 0002-99 against PPS for unlawful detainer with application for
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.
[6]


On July 13, 1999 the MTCC rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint
on ground of the Republics immunity from suit.
[7]
The Mendozas appealed to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lipa City which ruled that the Republics consent was
not necessary since the action before the MTCC was not against it.
[8]


In light of the RTCs decision, the Mendozas filed with the MTCC a motion to
render judgment in the case before it.
[9]
The MTCC denied the motion, however,
saying that jurisdiction over the case had passed to the RTC upon appeal.
[10]
Later,
the RTC remanded the case back to the MTCC,
[11]
which then dismissed the case for
insufficiency of evidence.
[12]
Consequently, the Mendozas once again appealed to
the RTC in Civil Case 2001-0236.

On June 27, 2006 the RTC found in favor of the Mendozas and ordered PPS
to vacate the property. It held that the Mendozas had the better right of possession
since they were its registered owners. PPS, on the other hand, could not produce
any document to prove the transfer of ownership of the land in its favor.
[13]
PPS
moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied it.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed
the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 96604 on the grounds
that: (1) the Mendozas were barred by laches from recovering possession of the
school lot; (2) sufficient evidence showed that the Mendozas relinquished ownership
of the subject lot to the City Government of Lipa City for use as school; and (3) Lot 4,
Pcs-5019 has long been declared in the name of the City Government since 1957 for
taxation purposes.
[14]


In a decision dated February 26, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision.
[15]
Upholding the Torrens system, it emphasized the indefeasibility of
theMendozas registered title and the imprescriptible nature of their right to eject any
person occupying the property. The CA held that, this being the case, the Republics
possession of the property through PPS should be deemed merely a tolerated one
that could not ripen into ownership.

The CA also rejected the Republics claim of ownership since it presented no
documentary evidence to prove the transfer of the property in favor of the
government. Moreover, even assuming that the Mendozas relinquished their right to
the property in 1957 in the governments favor, the latter never took steps to have the
title to the property issued in its name or have its right as owner annotated on
the Mendozas title. The CA held that, by its omissions, the Republic may be held in
estoppel to claim that the Mendozas were barred by laches from bringing its action.

With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, the Republic has taken
recourse to this Court via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

The Issue Presented

The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding that
the Mendozas were entitled to evict the Republic from the subject property that it had
used for a public school.
13

The Courts Ruling

A decree of registration is conclusive upon all persons, including the
Government of the Republic and all its branches, whether or not mentioned by name
in the application for registration or its notice.
[16]
Indeed, title to the land, once
registered, is imprescriptible.
[17]
No one may acquire it from the registered owner by
adverse, open, and notorious possession.
[18]
Thus, to a registered owner under
the Torrens system, the right to recover possession of the registered property is
equally imprescriptible since possession is a mere consequence of ownership.

Here, the existence and genuineness of the Mendozas title over the
property has not been disputed. While the consolidation and subdivision plan of Lots
1923 and 1925 shows that a 1,149 square meter lot had been designated to the City
Government, the Republic itself admits that no new title was issued to it or to any of
its subdivisions for the portion that PPS had been occupying since 1957.
[19]


That the City Government of Lipa tax-declared the property and its
improvements in its name cannot defeat the Mendozas title. This Court has allowed
tax declarations to stand as proof of ownership only in the absence of a certificate of
title.
[20]
Otherwise, they have little evidentiary weight as proof of ownership.
[21]


The CA erred, however, in ordering the eviction of PPS from the property
that it had held as government school site for more than 50 years. The evidence on
record shows that the Mendozas intended to cede the property to the City
Government of Lipa permanently. In fact, they allowed the city to declare the property
in its name for tax purposes. And when they sought in 1962 to have the bigger lot
subdivided into four, the Mendozas earmarked Lot 4, containing 1,149 square meters,
for the City Government of Lipa. Under the circumstances, it may be assumed that
the Mendozas agreed to transfer ownership of the land to the government, whether to
the City Government of Lipa or to the Republic, way back but never got around to do
so and the Republic itself altogether forgot about it. Consequently, the Republic
should be deemed entitled to possession pending the Mendozas formal transfer of
ownership to it upon payment of just compensation.

The Court holds that, where the owner agrees voluntarily to the taking of his
property by the government for public use, he thereby waives his right to the
institution of a formal expropriation proceeding covering such property. Further, as
the Court also held in Eusebio v. Luis,
[22]
the failure for a long time of the owner to
question the lack of expropriation proceedings covering a property that the
government had taken constitutes a waiver of his right to gain back
possession. TheMendozas remedy is an action for the payment of just
compensation, not ejectment.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
[23]
the Court affirmed the
RTCs power to award just compensation even in the absence of a proper
expropriation proceeding. It held that the RTC can determine just compensation
based on the evidence presented before it in an ordinary civil action for recovery of
possession of property or its value and damages. As to the time when just
compensation should be fixed, it is settled that where property was taken without the
benefit of expropriation proceedings and its owner filed an action for recovery of
possession before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of
the property at the time of taking that is controlling.
[24]


Since the MTCC did not have jurisdiction either to evict the Republic from
the land it had taken for public use or to hear and adjudicate the Mendozas right to
just compensation for it, the CA should have ordered the complaint for unlawful
detainer dismissed without prejudice to their filing a proper action for recovery of such
compensation.

WHEREFORE, the Court partially GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the
February 26, 2008 decision and the October 20, 2008 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. 96604, and ORDERS the dismissal of respondents Primo and
Maria Mendozas action for eviction before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Lipa
City in Civil Case 0002-99 without prejudice to their filing an action for payment of just
compensation against the Republic of the Philippines or, when appropriate, against
the City of Lipa.

SO ORDERED.
D.B.T. MAR-BAY CONSTRUCTION,
INCORPORATED,
Petitioner,


- versus -



RICAREDO PANES, ANGELITO
PANES, SALVADOR CEA, ABOGADO MAUTIN,
DONARDO PACLIBAR, ZOSIMO PERALTA and
HILARION MANONGDO,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 167232

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.


Promulgated:

July 31, 2009
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x


DECISION

NACHURA, J .:


Before this Court is a Petition
[1]
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision
[2]
dated
October 25, 2004 which reversed and set aside the Order
[3]
of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 216,

dated November 8, 2001.

The Facts

Subject of this controversy is a parcel of land identified as Lot Plan Psu-
123169,
[4]
containing an area of Two Hundred Forty Thousand, One Hundred Forty-
Six (240,146) square meters, and situated at Barangay (Brgy.) Pasong Putik,
Novaliches, Quezon City (subject property). The property is included in Transfer
14
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 200519,
[5]
entered on July 19, 1974 and issued in favor
of B.C. Regalado & Co. (B.C. Regalado). It was conveyed by B.C. Regalado to
petitioner D.B.T. Mar-Bay Construction, Inc. (DBT) through a dacion en pago
[6]
for
services rendered by the latter to the former.

On June 24, 1992, respondents Ricaredo P. Panes (Ricaredo), his son Angelito
P. Panes (Angelito), Salvador Cea, Abogado Mautin, Donardo Paclibar, Zosimo P.
Peralta, and Hilarion Manongdo (herein collectively referred to as respondents) filed a
Complaint
[7]
for Quieting of Title with Cancellation of TCT No. 200519 and all Titles
derived thereat (sic), Damages, with Petition for the Issuance of Injunction with Prayer
for the Issuance of Restraining Order Ex-Parte, Etc. against B.C. Regalado, Mar-Bay
Realty, Inc., Spouses Gereno Brioso and Criselda M. Brioso, Spouses Ciriaco and
Nellie Mariano, Avelino C. Perdido and Florentina Allado, Eufrocina A. Maborang and
Fe Maborang, Spouses Jaime and Rosario Tabangcura, Spouses Oscar Ikalina and
the Register of Deeds (RD) of Quezon City. Subsequently, respondents filed an
Amended Complaint
[8]
and a Second Amended Complaint
[9]
particularly impleading
DBT as one of the defendants.

In the Complaints, Ricaredo alleged that he is the lawful owner and claimant of
the subject property which he had declared for taxation purposes in his name, and
assessed in the amount of P2,602,190.00 by the City Assessor of Quezon City as of
the year 1985. Respondents alleged that per Certification
[10]
of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) National Capital Region (NCR) dated
May 7, 1992, Lot Plan Psu-123169 was verified to be correct and on file in said office,
and approved on July 23, 1948.

Respondents also claimed that Ricaredo, his immediate family members, and
the other respondents had been, and still are, in actual possession of the portions of
the subject property, and their possession preceded the Second World War. To
perfect his title in accordance with Act No. 496 (The Land Registration Act) as
amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 (The Property Registration Decree),
Ricaredo filed with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 82 a case docketed as LRC Case
No. Q-91-011, with LRC Rec. No. N-62563.
[11]


Respondents averred that in the process of complying with the publication
requirements for the Notice of Initial Hearing with the Land Registration Authority
(LRA), it was discovered by the Mapping Services of the LRA that there existed an
overlapping of portions of the land subject of Ricaredos application, with the
subdivision plan of B.C. Regalado. The said portion had, by then, already been
conveyed by B.C. Regalado to DBT.

Ricaredo asseverated that upon verification with the LRA, he found that the
subdivision plan of B.C. Regalado was deliberately drawn to cover portions of the
subject property. Respondents claimed that the title used by B.C. Regalado in the
preparation of the subdivision plan did not actually cover the subject property. They
asserted that from the records of B.C. Regalado, they gathered that TCT Nos.
211081,
[12]
211095
[13]
and 211132,
[14]
which allegedly included portions of the subject
property, were derived from TCT No. 200519. However, TCT No. 200519 only
covered Lot 503 of the Tala Estate with an area of Twenty-Two Thousand Six
Hundred Fifteen (22,615) square meters, and was different from those mentioned in
TCT Nos. 211081, 211095 and 211132. According to respondents, an examination of
TCT No. 200519 would show that it was derived from TCT Nos.
14814,
[15]
14827,
[16]
14815
[17]
and T-28.

In essence, respondents alleged that B.C. Regalado and DBT used the
derivative titles which covered properties located far from Pasong Putik,
Novaliches,Quezon City where the subject property is located, and B.C. Regalado
and DBT then offered the same for sale to the public. Respondents thus submitted
that B.C Regalado and DBT through their deliberate scheme, in collusion with others,
used (LRC) Pcs-18345 as shown in the consolidation-subdivision plan to include the
subject property covered by Lot Plan Psu-123169.

In his Answer
[18]
dated July 24, 1992, the RD of Quezon City interposed the
defense that at the time of registration, he found all documents to be in
order. Subsequently, on December 5, 1994, in his Motion
[19]
for Leave to Admit
Amended Answer, with the Amended Answer attached, he admitted that he
committed a grave mistake when he earlier said that TCT No. 200519 covered only
one lot, i.e. Lot 503. He averred that upon careful examination, he discovered that
TCT No. 200519 is composed of 17 pages, and actually covered 54 lots, namely: Lots
503, 506, 507, 508, 509, 582, 586, 655, 659, 686, 434, 495, 497, 299, 498, 499, 500,
501, 502, 493, 692, 776, 496, 785, 777, 786, 780, 783, 505, 654, 660, 661, 663, 664,
665, 668, 693, 694, 713, 716, 781, 779, 784, 782, 787, 893, 1115, 1114, 778, 669
and 788, all of the Tala Estate. Other lots included therein are Lot 890-B of Psd
36854, Lot 2 of (LRC) Pcs 12892 and Lot 3 of (LRC) Pcs 12892. Thus, respondents'
allegation that Lots 661, 664, 665, 693 and 694 of the Tala Estate were not included
in TCT No. 200519 was not true.

On December 28, 1993, then defendants Spouses Jaime and Rosario
Tabangcura (Spouses Tabangcura) filed their Answer
[20]
with Counterclaim, claiming
that they were buyers in good faith and for value when they bought a house and lot
covered by TCT No. 211095 from B.C. Regalado, the latter being a subdivision
developer and registered owner thereof, on June 30, 1986. When respondent
Abogado Mautin entered and occupied the property, Spouses Tabangcura filed a
case for Recovery of Property before the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 97 which
rendered a decision
[21]
in their favor.

On its part, DBT, traversing the complaint, alleged that it is the legitimate owner
and occupant of the subject property pursuant to a dacion en pago executed by B.C.
Regalado in the formers favor; that respondents were not real parties-in-interests
because Ricaredo was a mere claimant whose rights over the property had yet to be
determined by the RTC where he filed his application for registration; that the other
respondents did not
allege matters or invoke rights which would entitle them to the relief

prayed for in their complaint; that the complaint was premature; and that the action
inflicted a chilling effect on the lot buyers of DBT.
[22]


The RTC's Rulings

On June 15, 2000, the RTC through Judge Marciano I. Bacalla (Judge Bacalla),
rendered a Decision
[23]
in favor of the respondents. The RTC held that the testimony
of Ricaredo that he occupied the subject property since 1936 when he was only 16
years old had not been rebutted; that Ricaredo's occupation and cultivation of the
15
subject property for more than thirty (30) years in the concept of an owner vested in
him equitable ownership over the same by virtue of an approved plan, Psu 123169;
that the subject property was declared under the name of Ricaredo for taxation
purposes;
[24]
and that the subject property per survey should not have been included
in TCT No. 200519, registered in the name of B.C. Regalado and ceded to DBT. The
RTC further held that Spouses Tabangcura failed to present satisfactory evidence to
prove their claim. Thus, the RTC disposed of the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered declaring Certificate of Title No.
200519 and all titles derived thereat as null and void insofar as the
same embrace the land covered by Plan PSU-123169 with an area
of 240,146 square meters in the name of Ricaredo Panes; ordering
defendant DBT Marbay Realty, Inc. to pay plaintiff Ricaredo Panes
the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000) pesos as attorneys
fees plus costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.


On September 12, 2000, DBT filed a Motion
[25]
for Reconsideration, based on
the grounds of prescription and laches. DBT also disputed Ricaredos claim of open,
adverse, and continuous possession of the subject property for more than thirty (30)
years, and asserted that the subject property could not be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession because it is covered by TCT No. 200519.

While the said Motion for Reconsideration was pending, Judge Bacalla passed
away.

Meanwhile, on January 2, 2001, a Motion
[26]
for Intervention and a Complaint in
Intervention were filed by Atty. Andres B. Pulumbarit (Atty. Pulumbarit), representing
the Don Pedro/Don Jose de Ocampo Estate. The intervenor alleged that the subject
property formed part of the vast tract of land with an area of 117,000 hectares,
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 779 issued by the Honorable
Norberto Romualdez on March 14, 1913 under Decree No. 10139, which belongs to
the Estate of Don Pedro/Don Jose de Ocampo. Thus, the Complaint
[27]
in
Intervention prayed that the RTCs Decision be reconsidered; that the legitimacy and
superiority of OCT 779 be upheld; and that the subject property be declared as
belonging to the Estate of Don Pedro/Don Jose de Ocampo.

In its Order
[28]
dated March 13, 2001, the RTC, through Acting Judge Modesto
C. Juanson (Judge Juanson), denied Atty. Pulumbarits Motion for Intervention
because a judgment had already been rendered pursuant to Section 2,
[29]
Rule 19 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

On April 10, 2001, the RTC issued an Order
[30]
stating that there appeared to
be a need for a clarificatory hearing before it could act on DBT's Motion for
Reconsideration. Thus, a hearing was held on May 17, 2001. Thereafter,
supplemental memoranda were required of the parties.
[31]
Both parties
complied.
[32]
However, having found that the original copy of TCT No. 200519 was not
submitted to it for comparison with the photocopy thereof on file, the RTC directed
DBT to present the original or certified true copy of the TCT on August 21,
2001.
[33]
Respondents moved to reconsider the said directive
[34]
but the same was
denied.
[35]
DBT, on the other hand, manifested that a copy of TCT No. 200519,
consisting of 17 pages, had already been admitted in evidence; and that because of
the fire in the Office of the RD in Quezon City sometime in 1988, DBT, despite
diligent effort, could not secure an original or certified true copy of said TCT. Instead,
DBT submitted a certified true copy of Consolidated Subdivision Plan Pcs 18345.
[36]


On November 8, 2001, the RTC, through Judge Juanson, issued an
Order
[37]
reversing the earlier RTC Decision and dismissing the Complaint for lack of
merit. The RTC held that prescription does not run against registered land; hence, a
title once registered cannot be defeated even by adverse, open or notorious
possession. Moreover, the RTC opined that even if the subject property could be
acquired by prescription, respondents' action was already barred by prescription
and/or laches because they never asserted their rights when B.C. Regalado
registered the subject property in 1974; and later developed, subdivided and sold the
same to individual lot buyers.

On December 18, 2001, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration
[38]
which
the RTC denied in its Order
[39]
dated June 17, 2002. Aggrieved, respondents
appealed to the CA.
[40]


The CA's Ruling

On October 25, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC Orders dated
November 8, 2001 and June 17, 2002 and reinstated the RTC Decision dated June
15, 2000. The CA held that the properties described and included in TCT No. 200519
are located in San Francisco del Monte, San Juan del Monte, Rizal and
Cubao,Quezon City while the subject property is located in Brgy. Pasong Putik,
Novaliches, Quezon City. Furthermore, the CA held that Engr. Vertudazo's testimony
that there is a gap of around 1,250 meters between Lot 503 and Psu 123169 was not
disproved or refuted. The CA found that Judge Juanson committed a procedural
infraction when he entertained issues and admitted evidence presented by DBT in its
Motion for Reconsideration which were never raised in the pleadings and proceedings
prior to the rendition of the RTC Decision. The CA opined that DBT's claims of laches
and prescription clearly appeared to be an afterthought. Lastly, the CA held that
DBT's Motion for Reconsideration was not based on grounds enumerated in the
Rules of Procedure.
[41]


Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
[42]
which was, however, denied by
the CA in its Resolution
[43]
dated February 22, 2005.

Hence, this Petition.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following as grounds for this Petition:
I.

PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO ALLEGE PRESCRIPTION IN ITS
ANSWER IS NOT A WAIVER OF SUCH DEFENSE.

II.
16

IT IS NOT ERRONEOUS TO REQUIRE THE PRODUCTION OF A
CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF TCT NO. 200519 AFTER THE
DECISION ON THE MERITS HAS BEEN RENDERED BUT
BEFORE IT BECAME FINAL.

III.

A REGISTERED LAND CAN NOT BE ACQUIRED BY
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.

IV.

THE TESTIMONY OF ENGR. VERTUDAZO ON THE BASIS OF
THE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF LOT 503 IN AN
INCOMPLETE DOCUMENT IS UNRELIABLE.

V.

MR. PANES HAS NEVER BEEN IN OPEN, ADVERSE AND
CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.
[44]



Distilled from the petition and the responsive pleadings, and culled from the
arguments of the parties, the issues may be reduced to two questions, namely:

1) Did the RTC err in upholding DBT's defenses of prescription and laches as
raised in the latter's Motion for Reconsideration?
2) Which between DBT and the respondents have a better right over the
subject property?

Our Ruling

We answer the first question in the affirmative.

It is true that in Dino v. Court of Appeals
[45]
we ruled:

(T)rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an
action on the ground of prescription when the parties' pleadings or
other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred; (Francisco
v. Robles, Feb. 15, 1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao
v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961; Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14,
1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32 SCRA 529; Sinaon
v. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may do so on the basis of a
motion to dismiss (Sec. 1, [f] Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an
answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec.
5, Rule 16), or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on
the merits, as in a motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta,
84 SCRA 705); or even if the defense has not been asserted at
all, as where no statement thereof is found in the
pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific
Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al.,
97 Phil. 821); or where a defendant has been declared in default
(PNB v. Perez; 16 SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat,
is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive
period be otherwise sufficiently and satisfactorily apparent on
the record; either in the averments of the plaintiff's complaint,
or otherwise established by the evidence. (Emphasis supplied)


Indeed, one of the inherent powers of courts is to amend and control its
processes so as to make them conformable to law and justice. This includes the right
to reverse itself, especially when in its opinion it has committed an error or mistake in
judgment, and adherence to its decision would cause injustice.
[46]
Thus, the RTC
in its Order dated November 8, 2001 could validly entertain the defenses of
prescription and laches in DBT's motion for reconsideration.

However, the conclusion reached by the RTC in its assailed Order was
erroneous. The RTC failed to consider that the action filed before it was not simply for
reconveyance but an action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible.

Verily, an action for reconveyance can be barred by prescription. When an
action for reconveyance is based on fraud, it must be filed within four (4) years from
discovery of the fraud, and such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the
issuance of the original certificate of title. On the other hand, an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years
from the date of the issuance of the original certificate of title or transfer certificate of
title. The rule is that the registration of an instrument in the Office of the RD
constitutes constructive notice to the whole world and therefore the discovery of the
fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of registration.
[47]


However, the prescriptive period applies only if there is an actual need to
reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. If the
plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in possession of the property,
the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run
against him. In such a case, an action for reconveyance, if nonetheless filed, would
be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.
[48]
Thus,
in Vda. de Gualberto v. Go,
[49]
this Court held:

[A]n action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied
or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference
being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the
issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule
applies only when the plaintiff or the person enforcing the
trust is not in possession of the property, since if a person
claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the
property, as the defendants are in the instant case, the right to
seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the
property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who
is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner
thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for
the rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a
17
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its
effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who
is in possession.

Insofar as Ricaredo and his son, Angelito, are concerned, they established in
their testimonies that, for some time, they possessed the subject property and that
Angelito bought a house within the subject property in 1987.
[50]
Thus, the respondents
are proper parties to bring an action for quieting of title because persons having legal,
as well as equitable, title to or interest in a real property may bring such action, and
title here does not necessarily denote a certificate of title issued in favor of the
person filing the suit.
[51]


Although prescription and laches are distinct concepts, we have held,
nonetheless, that in some instances, the doctrine of laches is inapplicable where the
action was filed within the prescriptive period provided by law. Therefore, laches will
not apply to this case, because respondents' possession of the subject property has
rendered their right to bring an action for quieting of title imprescriptible and, hence,
not barred by laches. Moreover, since laches is a creation of equity, acts or conduct
alleged to constitute the same must be intentional and unequivocal so as to avoid
injustice. Laches will operate not really to penalize neglect or sleeping on one's
rights, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a clearly
inequitable situation.
[52]


Albeit the conclusion of the RTC in its Order dated November 8, 2001, which
dismissed respondents' complaint on grounds of prescription and laches, may have
been erroneous, we, nevertheless, resolve the second question in favor of DBT.

It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that no title to registered land in
derogation of the rights of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.
[53]


Article 1126
[54]
of the Civil Code in connection with Section 46
[55]
of Act No. 496
(The Land Registration Act), as amended by Section 47
[56]
of P.D. No. 1529 (The
Property Registration Decree), clearly supports this rule. Prescription is unavailing not
only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors.
Possession is a mere consequence of ownership where land has been registered
under the Torrens system, the efficacy and integrity of which must be protected.
Prescription is rightly regarded as a statute of repose whose objective is to suppress
fraudulent and stale claims from springing up at great distances of time and surprising
the parties or their representatives when the facts have become obscure from the
lapse of time or the defective memory or death or removal of witnesses.
[57]



Thus, respondents' claim of acquisitive prescription over the subject property is
baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, acquisitive prescription of ownership
of lands registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special
laws. Correlatively, Act No. 496, as amended by PD No. 1529, provides that no title to
registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
adverse possession. Consequently, in the instant case, proof of possession by the
respondents is immaterial and inconsequential.
[58]


Moreover, it may be stressed that there was no ample proof that DBT
participated in the alleged fraud. While factual issues are admittedly not within the
province of this Court, as it is not a trier of facts and is not required to re-examine or
contrast the oral and documentary evidence anew, we have the authority to review
and, in proper cases, reverse the factual findings of lower courts when the findings of
fact of the trial court are in conflict with those of the appellate court.
[59]
In this regard,
we reviewed the records of this case and found no clear evidence that DBT
participated in the fraudulent scheme. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,
[60]
this Court
gave due importance to the fact that the private respondent therein did not participate
in the fraud averred. We accord the same benefit to DBT in this case. To add, DBT is
an innocent purchaser for value and good faith which, through a dacion en
pago duly entered into with B.C. Regalado, acquired
ownership over the subject property, and whose rights must be protected under
Section 32
[61]
of P.D. No. 1529.
Dacion en pago is the delivery and transmission of ownership of a thing by the
debtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance of the obligation.
It is a special mode of payment where the debtor offers another thing to the creditor,
who accepts it as an equivalent of the payment of an outstanding debt. In its modern
concept, what actually takes place in dacion en pago is an objective novation of the
obligation where the thing offered as an accepted equivalent of the performance of an
obligation is considered as the object of the contract of sale, while the debt is
considered as the purchase price.
[62]


It must also be noted that portions of the subject property had already been sold
to third persons who, like DBT, are innocent purchasers in good faith and for value,
relying on the certificates of title shown to them, and who had no knowledge of any
defect in the title of the vendor, or of facts sufficient to induce a reasonably prudent
man to inquire into the status of the subject property.
[63]
To disregard these
circumstances simply on the basis of alleged continuous and adverse possession of
respondents would not only be inimical to the rights of the aforementioned
titleholders, but would ultimately wreak havoc on the stability of the Torrens system of
registration.

A final note.

While the Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring title, but merely a system
of registration of titles to lands, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should
not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of the State's
agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to
third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a
stop forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were
noted in the certificate at the time of the registration or that may arise subsequent
thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system would forever be sullied by the
ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to
have regularly performed their duties.
[64]
Thus, where innocent third persons, relying
on the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the
property, the court cannot disregard those rights and order the cancellation of the
certificate. The effect of such outright cancellation will be to impair public confidence
in the certificate of title. The sanctity of the Torrens system must be preserved;
otherwise, everyone dealing with the property registered under the system will have
to inquire in every instance on whether the title had been regularly or irregularly
issued, contrary to the evident purpose of the law. Every person dealing with the
18
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued
therefor, and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine
the condition of the property.
[65]


WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Court of
Appeals Decision dated October 25, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A
new judgment is hereby entered DISMISSING the Complaint filed by the respondents
for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
DIONISIO CARAAN, represented by HEIDI
CARAAN and ERLINDA CARAAN,
G.R. No. 140752
Petitioners, Present:

PUNO, Chairman,
*

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,
**
J J .

COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES
SALCEDO R. COSME and NORA LINDA S.
COSME,

Promulgated:
Respondents. November 11, 2005

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:

This resolves the petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 29, 1999 affirming with
modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104
(RTC), thereby ordering herein petitioners to vacate the property located at No. 65
Commodore St., Veterans Subdivision, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City and
surrender possession thereof to herein private respondents.

The antecedent facts are as follows.

On September 16, 1992, private respondents-spouses Salcedo R. Cosme
and Nora Linda S. Cosme filed a complaint (accion reivindicatoria) with damages
against Dionisio Caraan in the RTC. Therein, it was alleged that: herein private
respondents are the registered owners of the real property located at No. 65
Commodore St., Veterans Subdivision, Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 214949; they had been paying realty taxes on
the property from 1969 to 1993; sometime in March 1991, they discovered that the
land was being occupied by petitioner who had built his residential house thereon;
such occupancy by petitioner was effected through fraud, strategy and stealth without
private respondents knowledge and consent; demands to vacate, both oral and
written, were made upon petitioner, the last written demand having been received by
petitioner on August 7, 1992, but said demands went unheeded; thus, private
respondents prayed that judgment be rendered ordering petitioner and all persons
holding title under him to vacate the subject premises and deliver possession thereof
to private respondents; pay private respondents the amount of P54,000.00 by way of
reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P50,000.00 as attorneys fees.

In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner alleged that he had acquired the
land in question through extra-ordinary prescription of thirty years of continuous,
public, open and uninterrupted possession; private respondents title was one of the
numerous titles derived from TCT No. 3548 in the name of Eustacio Morales and
Vicente Villar doing business under the style of Vilma Malolos Subdivision, which was
in turn derived from TCT No. 33531 which came from TCT No. 26285 and derived
from (OCT) No. 614; and OCT No. 614 had been declared null and void by the RTC,
Quezon City (Branch 83).
[2]


After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated August 9,
1995, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
in favor of the plaintiffs [herein private respondents], whereby defendant
[herein petitioner] is ordered to:

(a) Vacate the premises concerned and to deliver and surrender the
possession of the same to the plaintiff;

(b) To pay plaintiffs the sum of P54,000.00 as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of the premises subject
matter of the above-entitled case;

(c) Pay the plaintiffs the sum P30,000.00 as moral damages;

(d) Pay the plaintiffs the sum of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and to
pay the cost of the suit.
[3]


Herein petitioner Dionisio Caraan then appealed the RTC judgment to the
CA. On October 29, 1999, the CA promulgated its Decision ruling thus:

Absent any countervailing factum probandum adduced
by the defendant-appellant [herein petitioner], the indefeasibility of
the Torrens title under their [herein private respondents] names
buttresses the presumption ad homini that they have a better right
of ownership over the land.

The defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] cannot seek
refuge on his contention that he is a holder of a residential permit
allegedly issued by the Bureau of Forest Development. Within the
aegis of Section 3 (ff) of Presidential Decree No. 705, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code, a [p]ermit is a short-term
privilege or authority granted by the State to a person to utilize any
limited forest resources or undertake a limited activity within any
forest land without any right to occupation and possession therein.

19


Neither is the defendant-appellant a possessor in the
concept of an owner, which fact is a conditio sine qua non in order
to be entitled to ownership through acquisitive prescription.

mere possession with a juridical title, e.g., as a
usufructuary, a trustee, a lessee, an agent or a pledgee, not being
in the concept of owner, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive
prescription, unless the juridical relation is first expressly repudiated
and such repudiation has been communicated to the other party.
[4]



The appellate court then affirmed the RTC judgment ordering petitioner
Dionisio Caraan to vacate subject premises and to deliver and surrender possession
thereof to herein private respondents. The CA, however, deleted the sums for
compensatory and moral damages and attorneys fees awarded by the RTC in favor
of private respondents. No motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was filed.

In the meantime, petitioner Dionisio Caraan died and his surviving heirs filed
with this Court a petition for review on certiorari with motion that said heirs be
substituted as petitioners in this case.

Petitioners insist that private respondents TCT No. 214949 is a derivative of
OCT No. 614 and TCT No. 3548 which had been declared spurious and null and void;
Dionisio Caraan has a better right of possession because he had been in open,
public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession in the concept of owner of
subject land for more than thirty years; and the subject land is part of a large tract of
public land not yet classified for alienation to private ownership.

On the other hand, private respondents argue that a certificate of title cannot
be collaterally attacked, thus, TCT No. 214949 is valid and existing and conclusive
evidence of ownership unless it becomes subject of a direct attack through a
proceeding for cancellation of title.

The Court finds the present petition bereft of merit.

In Eduarte vs. Court of Appeals,
[5]
the Court reiterated the hornbook principle
that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in
favor of the person whose name appears therein.
[6]
Private respondents having
presented TCT No. RT-71061, which is the reconstituted title of TCT No. 214949,
they have thus proven their allegation of ownership over the subject property. The
burden of proof then shifted to petitioners who must establish by preponderance of
evidence their allegation that they have a better right over the subject property.

Petitioners attack the validity of private respondents certificate of title,
alleging that TCT No. 214949 is spurious as it was derived from OCT No. 614 which
had allegedly been declared null and void pursuant to the
Partial Decision on Defaulted Private Respondents dated March 21, 1988 issued in
Civil Case No. Q-35672, entitled Teofilo M. Gariando, et al. vs. Gregorio Dizon, et al.
Petitioners further point out that the subject land could not have been titled in favor of
private respondents as said land is within the unclassified public forest land of
Quezon City and not subject to disposition under the Public Land Law, per
Certification dated April 16, 1985 issued by the Bureau of Forest Development.
Petitioners further argue that they have a better right to subject property, as they had
been in possession thereof in open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted
possession in the concept of owner of subject land for more than thirty years.

It should be borne in mind, however, that Section 48, Presidential Decree
No. 1529 (P.D. No. 1529), provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law.
Petitioners defense takes the form of a collateral attack on private respondents
certificate of title. In Mallilin, Jr. vs. Castillo,
[7]
the Court defined a collateral attack on
the title in this wise:

When is an action an attack on a title? It is when the object of
the action or proceeding is to nullify the title, and thus challenge the
judgment pursuant to which the title was decreed. The attack is direct when
the object of an action or proceeding is to annul or set aside such judgment,
or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or
collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the
judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
[8]


In the present case, the attack on the title is definitely merely collateral as the relief
being sought by private respondents in their action was recovery of possession. The
attack on the validity of private respondents certificate of title was merely raised as a
defense in petitioners Answer filed with the trial court. In Ybaez vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court,
[9]
the Court categorically ruled that:

It was erroneous for petitioners to question the Torrens Original
Certificate of Title issued to private respondent over Lot No. 986 in Civil
Case No. 671, an ordinary civil action for recovery of possession filed by the
registered owner of the said lot, by invoking as affirmative defense in their
answer the Order of the Bureau of Lands, dated July 19, 1978, issued
pursuant to the investigatory power of the Director of Lands under Section
91 of Public Land Law (C.A. 141 as amended). Such a defense partakes
of the nature of a collateral attack against a certificate of title brought
under the operation of the Torrens system of registration pursuant to
Section 122 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 103 of P.D.
1259. The case law on the matter does not allow collateral attack on the
Torrens certificate of title on the ground of actual fraud. The rule now finds
expression in section 48 of P.D. 1529 otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree.
[10]
(Emphasis supplied)

The Court cannot, therefore, resolve the issue of the alleged invalidity of private
respondents certificate of title in the present action for recovery of possession. Even
petitioners claim that subject property could not have been titled in favor of private
respondents because the same has not yet been classified for alienation for private
ownership, cannot be given consideration because, as clearly stated in Apostol vs.
Court of Appeals, [t]he issue of the validity of the title of respondents can only be
assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.
[11]


Petitioners asseveration that TCT No. RT-71061 (214949) should not have
been admitted into evidence because private respondents merely presented the
photocopy thereof is also unmeritorious. Private respondents presented the original
20
of TCT No. RT-71061 (214949) in open court during the hearing held on April 13,
1994. The pertinent portions of the transcript of stenographic notes of said hearing
are reproduced hereunder:

Atty. Mazo:

Your Honor, we are presenting in evidence this Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-71061 (214949) as Exhibit A. The
purpose of which, Your Honor, is to show that the property
subject matter of this case is registered in the name of the
herein plaintiff spouses Salcedo R. Cosme and Nora Linda S.
Cosme. And in that regard, Your Honor, may we invite
Counsel to stipulate that this is a Xerox copy and that we
request to be marked as Exhibit A is a faithful
reproduction of the original.

If Counsel will stipulate, this will be the one to be submitted in
evidence.

Atty. Moya:

This is a faithful reproduction, Your Honor. (Emphasis
supplied)

Furthermore, no objection was raised by counsel for petitioners in their written
opposition/comment to private respondents offer of evidence
[12]
regarding the fact
that what was marked and submitted to the court was the photocopy. In Blas vs.
Angeles-Hutalla,
[13]
the Court held thus:

The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a
timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such
objection shall be considered as waived. In Tison v. Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court set out the applicable principle in the following terms:
[F]or while the documentary evidence submitted by
petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their
admissibility, we are, however, of the considered opinion that the
same may be admitted by reason of private respondents failure
to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were
being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall
be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is
offered in evidence, otherwise, the objection shall be treated as
waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the
party may waive.
As explained in Abrenica vs. Gonda, et al., it has been
repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or
objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at
the proper time, otherwise, it will be deemed to have been
waived. The proper time is when from the question addressed to
the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation
of the proof, the inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may be
inferred.
Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it
does not conform with the statute is a waiver of the provisions of
the law.
[14]



Hence, considering the fact that counsel for petitioners admitted that the photocopy of
TCT No. RT-71061 (214949) is a faithful reproduction of the original thereof,
stipulated with private respondents counsel that what will be marked and submitted
to the trial court as Exhibit A is the photocopy, and the lack of objection on such
ground which is then deemed a waiver thereof, the admission into evidence of the
photocopy of TCT No. RT-71061 was absolutely correct.

Moreover, although the reconstituted title of TCT No. 214949 does show on
its face that it was derived from OCT No. 614,
[15]
both the trial and appellate courts
are correct in saying that petitioners assertion that OCT No. 614 had been declared
null and void is misleading. The RTC of Quezon City, Branch 83 issued a Partial
Decision on Defaulted Private Respondents
[16]
dated March 21, 1988 in Civil Case
No. Q-35672 which declared OCT No. 614 and subsequent TCTs issued therefrom,
with the exception of those titles belonging to the non-defaulted respondents,
[17]
null
and void. However, the defaulted private respondents in Civil Case No. Q-35672 filed
a case for annulment of said partial judgment. The CA granted the petition for
annulment of partial judgment in Civil Case No. Q-35672. The case was elevated via
a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision and on January 19, 2001,
this Court promulgated a Decision in Pinlac vs. Court of Appeals,
[18]
docketed as G.R.
No. 91486, affirming the CA Decision setting aside and annulling said partial decision
on the ground of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the persons of respondents in
said case. Petitioners have not been able to present any proof that, indeed, OCT
No. 614 had been declared null and void by final judgment. Hence, petitioners claim
that private respondents certificate of title is spurious deserves no consideration
whatsoever. Private respondents certificate of title must be deemed valid and
existing, as it cannot be assailed through a collateral attack in the present action.

Consequently, petitioners defense that they have a better right over the
subject land because they had been in open, public, adverse, continuous, and
uninterrupted possession in the concept of owner for more than 30 years must be
struck down. Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529 provides that [n]o title to registered land in
derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. The ruling in Ragudo vs. Fabella Estate Tenants Association,
Inc.,
[19]
is exactly in point, to wit:

In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands
covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. So it is that in Natalia Realty Corporation vs. Vallez, et al., we
held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land
involved is a registered land because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code in
relation to Act 496 (now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529):

Appellants claim of acquisitive prescription is likewise
baseless. Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, prescription
of ownership of lands registered under the Land Registration
Act shall be governed by special laws. Correlatively, Act No.
496 provides that no title to registered land in derogation of
that of the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse
possession. Consequently, proof of possession by the
21
defendants is both immaterial and inconsequential. (Emphasis
supplied)

Therefore, as emphasized in the above quoted ruling, petitioners allegations
of uninterrupted possession for 30 years cannot prevail over private respondents
certificate of title, which is the best proof of ownership. As the Court stated in Apostol
vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,
[20]
the registered owners are entitled to the possession of
the property covered by the said title from the time such title was issued in their
favor. Preponderance of evidence being in favor of private respondents, there can be
no other conclusion but that private respondents, being the registered owners of
subject property, should be placed in possession thereof.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated October 29, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 156357. February 18, 2005]
ENGR. GABRIEL V. LEYSON, DR. JOSEFINA L. POBLETE, FE LEYSON QUA,
CARIDAD V. LEYSON and ESPERANZA V. LEYSON, petitioners, vs.
NACIANSINO BONTUYAN and MAURECIA B.
BONTUYAN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision
[1]
of the Court of Appeals
(CA), as well as its Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64471 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the said decision.

The Antecedents
Calixto Gabud was the owner of a parcel of land located in Barangay Adlawon,
Mabolo, Cebu City, which was declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration
(T.D.) No. 03276-R in 1945
[2]
with the following boundaries:
North Calixto Gabud East Marcelo Cosido
South Pedro Bontuyan West Asuncion Adulfo.
[3]

Because of the construction of a provincial road, the property was divided into
two parcels of land covered by T.D. No. 03276-R and T.D. No. 01979-R. On
February 14, 1948, Gabud executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
[4]
over the property
covered by T.D. No. 03276-R, as well as the other lot covered by T.D. No. 01979-R,
in favor of Protacio Tabal, married to Leodegaria Bontuyan. On the basis of the said
deed, T.D. No. 03276-R was cancelled by T.D. No. 13615-R in the name of Protacio
Tabal effective 1949.
[5]
On January 5, 1959, Tabal executed a Deed of Sale
[6]
over the
property covered by T.D. No. 13615-R in favor of Simeon Noval, married to Vivencia
Bontuyan, daughter of Gregorio Bontuyan, forP800.00. T.D. No. 13615-R was
cancelled by T.D. No. 100356 in the names of the spouses Noval.
[7]
Gregorio
Bontuyan received a copy of the said tax declaration in behalf of the spouses
Noval.
[8]
The latter tax declaration was then cancelled by T.D. No. 008876 under the
same names effective 1967.
[9]

Subsequently, the property was surveyed by Cadastral Land Surveyor Mauro U.
Gabriel on January 22, 1964. The plan survey was approved on September 30,
1966.
[10]
The property covered by T.D. No. 008876 was identified as Lot No. 17150 of
Cebu Cadastre No. 12, while the property covered by T.D. No. 01979-R was
identified as Lot No. 13272. On May 22, 1968, the spouses Noval executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale
[11]
over the two lots covered by T.D. No. 008876 in favor of Lourdes
V. Leyson for P4,000.00. Lourdes Leyson took possession of the property and had it
fenced. Despite the said sale, T.D. No. 008876 was cancelled by T.D. No. 21267
effective 1974.
[12]
Thereafter, T.D. No. 21267 was cancelled by T.D. No.
23821
[13]
which, in turn, was cancelled by T.D. No. 01-17455 effective 1980.
[14]
In
1989, the latter was cancelled by a new tax declaration, T.D. No. 01-001-00646. All
these tax declarations were in the names of the spouses Noval.
[15]

Meanwhile, Lourdes Leyson paid for the realty taxes over the property.
However, the tax declaration issued thereon continued to be under the names of the
spouses Noval.
[16]

Despite his knowledge that the property had been purchased by his son-in-law
and daughter, the spouses Noval, Gregorio Bontuyan, who was then 91 years old,
filed an application with the Bureau of Lands for a free patent over Lot No. 17150 on
December 4, 1968. He alleged therein that the property was public land and was
neither claimed nor occupied by any person,
[17]
and that he first entered upon and
began cultivating the same in 1918. Thus, on November 19, 1971, Free Patent No.
510463 was issued over Lot No. 17150 in his favor, on the basis of which Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-1619 was issued to and under his name on March 21,
1974.
[18]
Another parcel of land, Lot No. 13272, was also registered under the name of
Gregorio Bontuyan under OCT No. 0-1618. He then declared Lot No. 17150 for
taxation purposes under T.D. No. 13596 effective 1974.
[19]
On February 20, 1976,
Gregorio Bontuyan executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
[20]
over Lot No. 17150 in favor
of his son, Naciansino Bontuyan.
On April 28, 1980, Gregorio Bontuyan, then 103 years old, executed another
Deed of Absolute Sale
[21]
over Lot Nos. 13272 and 17150, covered by OCT No. 0-
1618 and OCT No. 0-1619, respectively, in favor of Naciansino Bontuyan
for P3,000.00. On the basis of the said deed, OCT No. 0-1619 was cancelled by TCT
No. 1392 in the name of Naciansino Bontuyan on December 2, 1980.
[22]
Gregorio
Bontuyan died intestate on April 12, 1981.
[23]

On March 30, 1981, the spouses Bontuyan executed a Real Estate Mortgage
over Lot No. 17150 covered by OCT No. 0-1619 in favor of the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP) as security for a loan of P11,200.00.
[24]
Naciansino Bontuyan
had earlier executed an affidavit that the property was not tenanted. Shortly
thereafter, the spouses Bontuyan left the Philippines and resided in the United
States. Meanwhile, Lourdes Leyson died intestate.
The spouses Bontuyan returned to the Philippines in 1988 to redeem the
property from DBP only to discover that there were tenants living on the property
installed by Engineer Gabriel Leyson, one of the late Lourdes Leysons children.
Despite being informed that the said spouses owned the property, the tenants refused
to vacate the same. The tenants also refused to deliver to the spouses the produce
22
from the property. The spouses Bontuyan redeemed the property from DBP on
September 22, 1989.
On February 12, 1993, Jose Bontuyan, Nieves Atilano, Pacifico Bontuyan,
Vivencia Noval and Naciansino Bontuyan, the surviving heirs of Gregorio Bontuyan,
executed an Extrajudicial Settlement
[25]
of the latters estate and adjudicated Lot No.
13272 in favor of Naciansino. Based on the said deed, T.D. No. 01-001-00877 was
issued to and under the name of Naciansino over the said property starting 1994.
On June 24, 1993, Naciansino Bontuyan, through counsel, wrote Engr. Gabriel
Leyson, demanding that he be furnished with all the documents evidencing his
ownership over the two lots, Lots Nos. 17150 and 13272.
[26]
Engr. Leyson ignored the
letter.
The spouses Bontuyan, thereafter, filed a complaint against Engr. Leyson in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City for quieting of title and damages. They
alleged that they were the lawful owners of the two lots and when they discovered,
upon their return from the United States, that the property was occupied and
cultivated by the tenants of Engr. Leyson, they demanded the production of
documents evidencing the latters ownership of the property, which was ignored.
The spouses Bontuyan prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be
rendered in their favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to
render judgment against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiffs, to wit:
(a) Confirming the ownership of the plaintiffs on the lots in question;
(b) Ordering defendant to pay the plaintiffs the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) as the share of the plaintiffs of the produce of the lots in question;
(c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as reimbursement of
attorneys fees and the further sum of P500.00 as appearance fee every time the case is called
for trial;
(d) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and
exemplary damages may be fixed by the court;
(e) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as actual expenses for the
preparation and filing of the complaint;
(f) Ordering defendant to pay the costs; and
(g) Granting to plaintiffs such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable in the
premises.
[27]

In his answer to the complaint, Engr. Leyson averred, by way of affirmative
defenses, that the two lots were but portions of a parcel of land owned by Calixto
Gabud, covered by T.D. No. 03276-R, and was subdivided into two parcels of land
because of the construction of a provincial road on the property; Gabud later sold the
two lots to Protacio Tabal, who sold the same to Simeon Noval, married to Vivencia
Bontuyan, one of the children of Gregorio Bontuyan; Simeon Noval later sold the
property to Lourdes Leyson on May 22, 1968 who, forthwith, took possession thereof
as owner; and Gregorio Bontuyan was issued a free patent over the property through
fraud. Engr. Leyson concluded that the said patent, as well as OCT No. 0-1619 and
TCT No. 1392, were null and void and that the plaintiffs acquired no title over the
property.
Engr. Leyson interposed a counterclaim against the spouses Bontuyan and
repleaded as an integral part thereof all the material allegations in his affirmative
defense. He prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in his favor,
thus:
a) Dismissing Plaintiffs complaint for failure to include indispensable parties;
b) Declaring the Defendant and his four (4) sisters, namely, Dr. Josefina L. Poblete, Mrs.
Fe L. Qua, Esperanza Leyson and Caridad Leyson as the true and legal owners and possessors
of the parcels of land in issue;
c) Declaring OCT No. 0-1619 in the name of Gregorio Bontuyan and TCT No. 1392 in the
name of Naciansino Bontuyan null and void and to order the Register of Deeds to cancel the
same and issue new ones in favor of the Defendant Gabriel V. Leyson and his four (4) sisters,
namely: Dr. Josefina L. Poblete, Mrs. Fe L. Qua, Esperanza V. Leyson and Caridad V.
Leyson;
d) And on the Counterclaim, to order Plaintiffs to pay the Defendant the following sums:
d-1) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and appearance fee of P1,000.00 per hearing;
d-2) P500,000.00 as moral damages;
d-3) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
d-4) P10,000.00 as expenses of litigation.
Defendant further prays for such other reliefs just and equitable in the premises.
[28]

In due course, the other children of Lourdes Leyson, namely, Dr. Josefina L.
Poblete, Fe Leyson Qua, Caridad V. Leyson and Esperanza V. Leyson, were allowed
to intervene as defendants. They filed their answer-in-intervention wherein they
adopted, in their counterclaim, paragraphs 7 to 26 of the answer of their brother,
Engr. Leyson, the original defendant. They prayed that, after due hearing, judgment
be rendered in their favor as follows:
Wherefore, this Honorable Court is prayed to render judgment in favor of the Defendant and
the Defendants-in-Intervention and against the Plaintiffs as follows:
a) Promissory Plaintiffs complaint for failure to include indispensable parties and for lack
of cause of action;
23
b) Declaring the Defendant and his four (4) sisters, namely: Dr. Josefina L. Poblete; Mrs.
Fe L. Qua, Esperanza Leyson and Caridad Leyson as the true and legal owners and possessors
of the parcels of land in issue;
c) Declaring OCT No. 0-1619 in the name of Gregorio Bontuyan and TCT No. 1392 in the
name of Naciansino Bontuyan null and void and to order the Register of Deeds to cancel the
same and issue new ones in favor of the Defendant Gabriel V. Leyson and his four (4) sisters,
namely: Dr. Josefina L. Poblete, Mrs. Fe L. Qua, Esperanza V. Leyson and Caridad V.
Leyson;
d) On the Counterclaim, Plaintiffs should pay the Defendants the following sums:
d-1) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees and appearance fee of P1,000.00 per hearing;
d-2) P500,000.00 as moral damages to each Intervenor;
d-3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
d-4) P15,000.00 as expenses of litigation.
Defendant further prays for such other reliefs just and equitable in the premises.
[29]

In their reply, the spouses Bontuyan averred that the counterclaim of the
defendants for the nullity of TCT No. 1392 and the reconveyance of the property was
barred by laches and prescription.
On January 21, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the Leyson
heirs and against the spouses Bontuyan. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiffs
complaint for dearth of evidence declaring the defendant and the intervenors as the true and
legal owners and possessors of the subject parcels of land; declaring OCT No. 0-1619 in the
name of Gregorio Bontuyan and TCT No. 1392 in the name of Naciansino Bontuyan null and
void; ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel OCT No. 0-1619 and TCT No. 1392 and issue
new ones in favor of defendant Gabriel Leyson and intervenors Josefina Poblete, Fe Qua,
Esperanza Leyson and Caridad Leyson; ordering plaintiff to pay defendant and intervenors the
following:
a) P50,000.00 attorneys fees;
b) 1,000.00 per appearance;
c) 100,000.00 moral damages for defendant and
intervenors;
d) 10,000.00 exemplary damages; and
e) 10,000.00 litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.
[30]

The trial court held that Simeon Noval had sold the lots to Lourdes Leyson on
May 22, 1968, who thus acquired title over the property.
The spouses Bontuyan appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed, with
modification, the decision of the RTC. The appellate court held that the Leyson heirs
were the owners of Lot No. 13273, while the spouses Bontuyan were the owners of
Lot No. 17150. The CA ruled that the answer of the Leyson heirs to the complaint
constituted a collateral attack of OCT No. 0-1619 which was proscribed by law. The
Leyson heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision insofar as Lot No.
17150 was concerned, contending that their counterclaim for the nullification of OCT
No. 0-1619 contained in their answer constituted a direct attack on the said title. The
CA denied the motion.
The Leyson heirs then filed a petition for review with this Court and made the
following assignments of error:
First Assignment of Error
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT RULED
THAT THE NULLITY OR THE VALIDITY OF OCT NO. 0-1619 CANNOT BE RULED
UPON IN THESE PROCEEDINGS BROUGHT BY THE RESPONDENTS FOR THE
QUIETING OF THEIR TITLE.
Second Assignment of Error
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONERS ANSWER WITH COUNTERCLAIM, PRAYING FOR THE
CANCELLATION OF PLAINTIFFS TORRENS CERTIFICATE IS A MERE
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE TITLE.
[31]

Third Assignment of Error
THE APPELLATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT MODIFIED THE DECISION
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DATED JANUARY 21, 1999 BY RULING THAT
PETITIONERS ARE DECLARED THE OWNERS OF LOT 13273 BUT RESPONDENTS
ARE DECLARED THE OWNERS OF LOT 17150 UNDER OCT NO. 0-1619 AND
PRESENTLY COVERED BY TCT NO. 1392 IN THE NAME OF NACIANSINO
BONTUYAN, DESPITE THE APPELLATE COURTS AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF
THE TRIAL COURT THAT FRAUD WAS COMMITTED BY GREGORIO BONTUYAN
(RESPONDENTS PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST) IN ACQUIRING TITLE OVER THE
SUBJECT PROPERTIES.
[32]

Fourth Assignment of Error
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT
RECONVEYANCE OF TITLE OF LOT 17150 COVERED BY OCT NO. 0-1619 AND
PRESENTLY COVERED BY TCT NO. 1392, IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS HAD
PRESCRIBED.
[33]

Fifth Assignment of Error
THE APPELLATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GRANTING ATTORNEYS
FEES AND APPEARANCE FEES DESPITE RESPONDENTS FRAUD IN ACQUIRING
TITLE OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.
[34]

24
On the first two assignments of errors, the petitioners aver that the counterclaim
in their answer to the complaint constituted a direct attack of the validity of OCT No.
0-1619. They maintain that the appellate courts reliance on the ruling of this Court
in Cimafrancia v. Intermediate Appellate Court
[35]
was misplaced. They assert that
what is controlling is the ruling in Pro Line Sports Center, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals
[36]
wherein this Court held that the counterclaim of the petitioners therein
constituted a direct attack on a certificate of title. The petitioners, likewise, cited
Section 55 of Act No. 496, as amended, to buttress their stance. They plead that
their answer to the complaint should be liberally construed so as to afford them
substantial justice.
On the other hand, the respondents assert that the decision of the CA is
correct. They claim that Lot No. 17150 was still public land when Lourdes Leyson
purchased the same from Simeon Noval, and that the property became private land
only when Free Patent No. 510463 was issued to and under the name of Gregorio
Bontuyan.
We agree with the contention of the petitioners that the CA erred in not nullifying
OCT No. 0-1619 and TCT No. 1392 and ordering the respondents to reconvey the
property covered by the said title to the petitioners.
The respondents, as plaintiffs in the court a quo, were burdened to prove their
claim in their complaint that Gregorio Bontuyan was the owner of Lot No. 17150 and
that they acquired the property in good faith and for valuable consideration from
him.
[37]
However, the respondents failed to discharge this burden. The evidence on
record shows that Calixto Gabud sold the property to Protacio Tabal on February 14,
1948,
[38]
and that the latter sold the property to Simeon Noval on January 5,
1959.
[39]
Simeon Noval then sold the property to Lourdes Leyson on May 22,
1968.
[40]
The respondents failed to adduce any evidence to prove that Lourdes
Leyson, or even Simeon Noval, sold the property to Gregorio Bontuyan, or to any of
the respondents for that matter. Since Gregorio Bontuyan was not the owner of the
property, he could not have sold the same to his son Naciansino Bontuyan and the
latters wife, the respondents herein. As the Latin adage goes: NEMO DAT QUOD
NON HABET. Gregorio Bontuyan could not feign ignorance of Simeon Novals
ownership of the property, considering that the latter was his son-in-law, and that he
(Gregorio Bontuyan) was the one who received the owners copy of T.D. No. 100356
covering the property under the name of Simeon Noval.
[41]
At the dorsal portion of the
said tax declaration, there was even an annotation that the property was transferred
to Simeon Noval as shown by the deed of sale executed before Notary Public
Gregorio A. Uriarte who notarized the deed of sale over the property executed by
Protacio Tabal in favor of Simeon Noval on January 5, 1959.
[42]
We note that the
respondents failed to adduce in evidence any receipts of real property tax payments
made on the property under their names, which would have fortified their claim that
they were the owners of the property. We agree with the findings of the CA, thus:
This case involves two parcels of land Lot 17150 and Lot 13273. Lot 17150 is registered
under the Torrens System under the names of plaintiffs-appellants, while Lot 13273 remained
to be unregistered.
In this case, records show that defendant-appellee and intervenors-appellees are the true
owners of the subject lots. They have in their favor tax receipts covering the subject lots
issued since 1945.
While, indeed, tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership,
such, however, if accompanied with open, adverse, continuous possession in the concept of an
owner, as in this case, constitute evidence of great weight that person under whose name the
real taxes were declared has a claim of right over the land.
Further, defendant-appellee and intervenors-appellees presented before the trial court the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated February 14, 1948, executed by Calixto Gabud, conveying the subject
lots in favor of Protacio Tabal. The deed is a notarial document.
Likewise presented is the Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject lots dated January 5, 1959,
executed by Protacio Tabal in favor of spouses Simeon Noval and Vivencia Bontuyan. The
document is, likewise, a notarial document.
Defendant-appellee and intervenors-appellees also presented the Deed of Absolute Sale of the
subject lots dated May 22, 1968, executed by spouses Simeon Noval and Vivencia Bontuyan
in favor of Lourdes Leyson. The deed is a notarial document.
A notarial document is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed.
It has in its favor the presumption of regularity. It is admissible in evidence without necessity
of preliminary proof as to its authenticity and due execution.
There exist (sic) no trace of irregularity in the transfers of ownership from the original owner,
Calixto Gabud, to defendant-appellee and intervenors-appellees.
Plaintiffs-appellants, on the other hand, offered no convincing evidence as to how their
predecessor-in-interest, Gregorio Bontuyan, acquired the subject lots. Plaintiffs-appellants
presented only the Free Patent and OCT No. 0-1619, covering Lot No. 17150, issued in the
name of Gregorio Bontuyan.
As to Lot No. 13273, We find no sufficient reason why defendant-appellee and intervenors-
appellees should be disturbed in their ownership and possession of the same.
[43]

As copiously shown by the record, Gregorio Bontuyan filed his application for a
free patent with the Bureau of Lands on December 4, 1968 in gross bad faith, thereby
defrauding Lourdes Leyson of the said property through deceit. Gregorio Bontuyan
falsely declared in the said application: (a) that he entered upon and cultivated the
property since 1918 and that the property was not claimed or occupied by any
person; and (b) that Lot No. 17150 was located in Sirao, Cebu City, when, in fact, the
property was located in Adlawon, Cebu City. Lourdes Leyson was not notified of the
said application and failed to file any opposition thereto. Gregorio Bontuyan was then
able to secure Free Patent No. 510463 on November 19, 1971 and OCT No. 0-1619
on March 21, 1974. It appears in the said title that the propertys location was
indicated as Sirao, Cebu City.
[44]
Indeed, the CA declared that Gregorio Bontuyan
had acquired title to the property through fraud:
However, as to Lot No. 17150, We find that despite the fraud committed by Gregorio
Bontuyan (plaintiffs-appellants predecessor-in-interest) in acquiring his title over the said lot,
ownership over the said lot should be adjudged in favor of plaintiffs-appellants.
25
Records, indeed, show that, at the time when Gregorio Bontuyan applied for Free Patent,
Gregorio Bontuyan was living with his daughter, Vivencia Bontuyan (defendant-appellees
predecessor-in-interest). Thus, Gregorio Bontuyan must have known that at the time when he
applied for free patent on December 1968, the subject lots were already sold on May 1968 by
his daughter Vivencia Bontuyan in favor of Lourdes Leyson, predecessor-in-interest of
defendants-appellees.
Moreover, records further show that Gregorio Bontuyan sold twice Lot [No.] 17150 to
plaintiffs-appellants. The first was in 1976 and the other was in 1980. Plaintiffs-appellants
offered no reasonable explanation why Gregorio Bontuyan have (sic) to sell twice Lot No.
17150 in favor of plaintiffs-appellants.
As found by the trial court, these are badges of bad faith which affect the validity of the title of
Gregorio Bontuyan over the subject lots.
We are aware that the torrens system does not create or vest title. It only confirms and records
title already existing and vested. It does not protect a usurper from the true owner. It cannot
be a shield for the commission of fraud. It does not permit one to enrich himself at the
expense of another. Where one does not have any rightful claim over a real property, the
torrens system of registration can confirm or record nothing.
[45]

The findings of the CA affirmed the findings of the trial court in its decision, thus:
After having thoroughly analyzed the records and the evidences adduced during the trial of
this case, this Court is convinced and sincerely believes that the lots in question were
originally owned by Calixto Gabud as evidenced by T.D. [No.] 03276R marked as Exh. 1.
In 1945, this consisted of only one lot in Adlawon, Cebu City, as there was no provincial road
yet. However in 1948, the said parcel of land was divided into two because a provincial road
was constructed passing through it. Hence, T.D. [No.] 03276R and T.D. [No.] 01979-R were
issued to Calixto Gabud. On February 16, 1948, Calixto Gabud sold the said parcels of land to
spouses Protacio Tabal and Ludegaria (sic) Bontuyan as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of
Sale, Exh. 2. On January 5, 1959, spouses Protacio Tabal and Ludegaria (sic) Bontuyan, in
turn, sold the same parcels of land to spouses Simeon Noval and Vivencia Bontuyan as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale, Exh. 4. It is noteworthy to mention at this point in time that
Vivencia Bontuyan is one of the daughters of Gregorio Bontuyan, the father of herein plaintiff
Naciansino Bontuyan. In May 1968, spouses Simeon Noval and Vivencia Bontuyan sold the
subject parcels of land to Lourdes vs. (sic) Leyson, the mother of herein defendant as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale marked as Exh. 6. It is quite perplexing for the court to imagine
that Gregorio Bontuyan, father of herein plaintiff, who was then residing with spouses Simeon
Noval and Vivencia Bontuyan at 179 C San Jose dela Montaa, Mabolo, Cebu City, as
reflected in his application for Free Patent (Exhs. 8 & 26) dated December 4, 1968 was
unaware of the sale of the subject parcels of land made by his daughter Vivencia Bontuyan
and spouse Simeon Noval to Lourdes Leyson. It is evident that, after the sale from spouses
Noval to Lourdes Leyson in May 1968, Gregorio Bontuyan applied for Free Patent for the
same parcels of land in December 1968 claiming to have cultivated the land since 1918,
stating therein the location as Sirao and not Adlawon which is the true and correct location.
Sirao and Adlawon are two different barangays which are not even adjacent to each other. In
fact, as borne out by Exh. 25, it is separated by Barangay Guba. In 1974, Free Patent No.
510463 and OCT# 0-1619 was issued to Gregorio Bontuyan covering subject property, the
location of which is in Barangay Sirao in consonance to his application. Gregorio Bontuyans
application for Free Patent over subject parcels of land had raised in the mind of this Court
reasonable badges of bad faith on his part as the subject parcels of land were already sold by
his daughter Vivencia Bontuyan and spouse Simeon Noval to Lourdes Leyson. Another badge
of bad faith is raised in the mind of this Court when he (Gregorio) sold the subject parcels of
land twice to his son Naciansino Bontuyan in 1976 and 1980, respectively, wherein both
Deeds of Sale were notarized by different Notary Publics, (Exhs. 10 & 16).
[46]

Considering that Lourdes Leyson was in actual possession of the property, the
respondents cannot, likewise, claim that they were in good faith when Gregorio
Bontuyan allegedly sold the property to them on April 28, 1980.
Anent the third and fourth assignments of error, we do not agree with the ruling
of the CA that the petitioners failed to directly attack the validity of OCT No. 0-1619.
The CA failed to consider the fact that, in their respective answers to the complaint,
the petitioners inserted therein a counterclaim wherein they repleaded all the material
allegations in their affirmative defenses, that Gregorio Bontuyan secured OCT No. 0-
1619 through fraud and deceit and prayed for the nullification thereof.
While Section 47 of Act No. 496 provides that a certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack, the rule is that an action is an attack on a title if its object
is to nullify the same, and thus challenge the proceeding pursuant to which the title
was decreed. The attack is considered direct when the object of an action is to annul
or set aside such proceeding, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, an attack
is indirect or collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the
proceeding is nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
[47]
Such action to attack a
certificate of title may be an original action or a counterclaim in which a certificate of
title is assailed as void. A counterclaim is considered a new suit in which the
defendant is the plaintiff and the plaintiff in the complaint becomes the defendant. It
stands on the same footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an
independent action.
[48]
Furthermore, since all the essential facts of the case for the
determination of the titles validity are now before the Court, to require the party to
institute cancellation proceedings would be pointlessly circuitous and against the best
interest of justice.
[49]

The CA, likewise, erred in holding that the action of the petitioners to assail OCT
No. 0-1619 and TCT No. 1392 and for the reconveyance of the property covered by
the said title had already prescribed when they filed their answer to the complaint.
Case law has it that an action for reconveyance prescribes in ten years, the
point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of
the certificate of title over the property. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of
registration is highly regarded as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the
transfer of the property or its title, which has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another persons name, to its rightful or legal owner, or to one who has a
better right.
[50]

However, in a series of cases, this Court declared that an action for
reconveyance based on fraud is imprescriptible where the plaintiff is in possession of
the property subject of the acts. In Vda. de Cabrera v. Court of Appeals,
[51]
the Court held:
... [A]n action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or the
26
date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property, but this rule applies only when
the plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property, since if a
person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, as the
defendants are in the instant case, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to
quiet title to the property, does not prescribe. The reason for this is that one who is in actual
possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the
rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a
court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and
its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
Similarly, in the case of David v. Malay,
[52]
the same pronouncement was
reiterated by the Court:
... There is settled jurisprudence that one who is in actual possession of a piece of land
claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacked
before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his undisturbed
possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of the court of equity to ascertain and
determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which
right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. No better situation can be conceived at
the moment for Us to apply this rule on equity than that of herein petitioners whose ...
possession of the litigated property for no less than 30 years and was suddenly confronted with
a claim that the land she had been occupying and cultivating all these years, was titled in the
name of a third person. We hold that in such a situation the right to quiet title to the property,
to seek its reconveyance and annul any certificate of title covering it, accrued only from the
time the one in possession was made aware of a claim adverse to his own, and it is only then
that the statutory period of prescription commences to run against such possessor.
The paramount reason for this exception is based on the theory that registration
proceedings could not be used as a shield for fraud.
[53]
Moreover, to hold otherwise
would be to put premium on land-grabbing and transgressing the broader principle in
human relations that no person shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another.
[54]

In the present case, Lourdes Leyson and, after her death, the petitioners, had
been in actual possession of the property. The petitioners were still in possession of
the property when they filed their answers to the complaint which contained their
counterclaims for the nullification of OCT No. 0-1619 and TCT No. 1392, and for the
consequent reconveyance of the property to them. The reconveyance is just and
proper in order to put a stop to the unendurable anomaly that the patentees should
have a Torrens title for the land which they and their predecessors never possessed
and which has been possessed by another in the concept of an owner.
[55]

On the fifth assignment of error, we rule for the petitioners. The award of
attorneys and appearance fees is better left to the sound discretion of the trial court,
and if such discretion is well exercised, as in this case, it will not be disturbed on
appeal.
[56]
With the trial and the appellate courts findings that the respondents were in
bad faith, there is sufficient basis to award attorneys and appearance fees to the
petitioners. Had it not been for the filing of a baseless suit by the respondents against
the petitioners, the latter would not have sought the services of counsel to defend
their interests and represent them in this case.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals declaring the respondents the owners of Lot No. 17150
covered by OCT No. 0-1619 and TCT No. 1392; and setting aside the award of
attorneys fees in favor of the petitioners by the Regional Trial Court are
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
The Court hereby AFFIRMS the ownership of the petitioners of Lot No. 17150.
OCT No. 0-1619 and TCT No. 1392 covering the said lot are hereby nullified. The
Register of Deeds is ORDERED to cancel TCT No. 1392 and to issue another title
over the property in favor of the petitioners as co-owners thereof. The trial courts
award of P50,000.00 for attorneys fees to the petitioners is AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
TEOFISTO OO, PRECY
O. NAMBATAC,VICTORIA O.
MANUGAS and POLOR O.
CONSOLACION,
Petitioners,



- versus -




VICENTE N. LIM,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 154270

Present:

PUNO, C.J ., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., J J .

Promulgated:
March 9, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
x
D E C I S I O N

BERSAMIN, J .:

The subject of controversy is Lot No. 943 of the Balamban Cadastre in Cebu
City, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-9969-(O-20449), over
which the contending parties in this action for quieting of title, initiated by respondent
Vicente N. Lim (Lim) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City, assert exclusive
ownership, to the exclusion of the other. In its decision dated July 30, 1996,
[1]
the
RTC favored Lim, and ordered the cancellation of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449) and
the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of Luisa Narvios-Lim (Luisa),
Lims deceased mother and predecessor-in-interest.
On appeal (CA-GR CV No. 57823), the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
RTC on January 28, 2002.
[2]
It later denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration through the resolution dated June 17, 2002.
[3]


Hence, this appeal via petition for review on certiorari.

Antecedents

27
On October 23, 1992, Lim filed in the RTC in Cebu City a petition for the
reconstitution of the owners duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), alleging
that said OCT had been lost during World War II by his mother, Luisa;
[4]
that Lot No.
943 of the Balamban Cadastre in Cebu City covered by said OCT had been sold in
1937 to Luisa by Spouses Diego Oo and Estefania Apas (Spouses Oo), the lots
registered owners; and that although the deed evidencing the sale had been lost
without being registered, Antonio Oo (Antonio), the only legitimate heir of Spouses
Oo, had executed on April 23, 1961 in favor of Luisa a notarized document
denominated as confirmation of sale,
[5]
which was duly filed in the Provincial
Assessors Office of Cebu.

Zosimo Oo and petitioner Teofisto Oo (Oos) opposed Lims petition,
contending that they had the certificate of title in their possession as the successors-
in-interest of Spouses Oo.

On account of the Oos opposition, and upon order of the RTC, Lim
converted the petition for reconstitution into a complaint for quieting of title,
[6]
averring
additionally that he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in actual possession of
the property since 1937, cultivating and developing it, enjoying its fruits, and paying
the taxes corresponding to it. He prayed, inter alia, that the Oos be ordered to
surrender the reconstituted owners duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449),
and that said OCT be cancelled and a new certificate of title be issued in the name of
Luisa in lieu of said OCT.

In their answer,
[7]
the Oos claimed that their predecessors-in-
interest, Spouses Oo, never sold Lot No. 943 to Luisa; and that the confirmation of
salepurportedly executed by Antonio was fabricated, his signature thereon not being
authentic.

RTC Ruling

On July 30, 1996, after trial, the RTC rendered its decision,
[8]
viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered quieting plaintiff's title to Lot No. 943 of the Balamban
(Cebu) Cadastre, and directing the Register of Deeds of Cebu

(1) To register the aforestated April 23, 1961 Confirmation of
Sale of Lot No. 943 of the Balamban, Cebu Cadastre by Antonio
Oo in favor of Luisa Narvios-Lim;

(2) To cancel the original certificate of title covering the said
Lot No. 943 of the Balamban, Cebu Cadastre; and,

(3) To issue in the name of Luisa Narvios-Lim, a new
duplicate certificate of title No. RO-9969 (O-20449) of the Register
of Deeds of Cebu, which shall contain a memorandum of the fact
that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate of title, and
shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original
certificate, and shall be regarded as such for all purposes of this
decree, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 109, Presidential
Decree No. 1529.

Without special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
[9]

The RTC found that the Lims had been in peaceful possession of the land
since 1937; that their possession had never been disturbed by the Oos, except on
two occasions in 1993 when the Oos seized the harvested copra from the Lims
caretaker; that the Lims had since declared the lot in their name for taxation
purposes, and had paid the taxes corresponding to the lot; that the signature of
Antonio on the confirmation of sale was genuine, thereby giving more weight to the
testimony of the notary public who had notarized the document and affirmatively
testified that Antonio and Luisa had both appeared before him to acknowledge the
instrument as true than to the testimony of the expert witness who attested that
Antonios signature was a forgery.

CA Ruling

On appeal, the Oos maintained that the confirmation of sale was spurious;
that the property, being a titled one, could not be acquired by the Lims through
prescription; that their (the Oos) action to claim the property could not be barred by
laches; and that the action instituted by the Lims constituted a collateral attack
against their registered title.

The CA affirmed the RTC, however, and found that Spouses Oo had sold Lot
No. 943 to Luisa; and that such sale had been confirmed by their son Antonio. The
CA ruled that the action for quieting of title was not a collateral, but a direct attack on
the title; and that the Lims undisturbed possession had given them a continuing right
to seek the aid of the courts to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third
party and its effect on their own title.

Nonetheless, the CA corrected the RTC, by ordering that the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Cebu City issue a new duplicate certificate of title in the name of
Luisa, considering that the owners duplicate was still intact in the possession of the
Oos.

The decree of the CA decision was as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. However, the dispositive portion of the decision appealed
from is CORRECTED as follows:

(1) Within five (5) days from finality of the decision,
defendants-appellants are directed to present the
owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-9969 (O-20449)
to the Register of Deeds who shall thereupon register
the Confirmation of Sale of Lot No. 943, Balamban
Cadastre, Cebu, executed on April 23, 1961 by Antonio
Oo in favor of Luisa Narvios-Lim, and issue a new
transfer certificate of title to and in the name of the latter
upon cancellation of the outstanding original and
owner's duplicate certificate of title.
28

(2) In the event defendants-appellants neglect or refuse to
present the owner's copy of the title to the Register of
Deeds as herein directed, the said title, by force of this
decision, shall be deemed annulled, and the Register of
Deeds shall make a memorandum of such fact in the
record and in the new transfer certificate of title to be
issued to Luisa Narvios-Lim.

(3) Defendants-appellants shall pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
[10]



The CA denied the Oos motion for reconsideration
[11]
on June 17, 2002.
[12]


Hence, this appeal.

Issues


The petitioners raise the following issues:

1. Whether or not the validity of the OCT could be collaterally
attacked through an ordinary civil action to quiet title;

2. Whether or not the ownership over registered land could be lost
by prescription, laches, or adverse possession;

3. Whether or not there was a deed of sale executed by Spouses
Oo in favor of Luisa and whether or not said deed was lost
during World War II;

4. Whether or not the confirmation of sale executed by Antonio in
favor of Luisa existed; and

5. Whether or not the signature purportedly of Antonio in
that confirmation of sale was genuine.

Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

A.
Action for cancellation of title
is not an attack on the title
The petitioners contend that this action for quieting of title should be
disallowed because it constituted a collateral attack on OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449),
citing Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, viz:

Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot
be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.

The petitioners contention is not well taken.
An action or proceeding is deemed an attack on a title when its objective is
to nullify the title, thereby challenging the judgment pursuant to which the title was
decreed.
[13]
The attack is direct when the objective is to annul or set aside such
judgment, or enjoin its enforcement. On the other hand, the attack is indirect or
collateral when, in an action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is
nevertheless made as an incident thereof.
[14]


Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud, doubt,
or uncertainty affecting title to real property.
[15]
Whenever there is a cloud on titleto
real property or any interest in real property by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth
and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to
said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
[16]
In
such action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the
complainant and the other claimants, not only to place things in their proper places,
and to make the claimant, who has no rights to said immovable, respect and not
disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both, so that whoever has the
right will see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter
fearlessly introduce the improvements he may desire, as well as use, and even
abuse the property as he deems fit.
[17]


Lims complaint pertinently alleged:

18. If indeed, the genuine original of the Owner's Duplicate of
the Reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO-9699 (O-
20449) for Lot 943, Balamban Cadastre xxx is in Defendant's
(Oos) possession, then VNL submits the following
PROPOSITIONS:
xxx
18.2. Therefore, the Original of Owners Duplicate
Certificate (which Respondents [Defendants Oos] claim in their
Opposition is in their possession) must be surrendered to VNL upon
order of this Court, after the Court shall have determined VNL's
mother's acquisition of the attributes of ownership over said Lot
943, in this action, in accordance with Section 107, P.D. 1529,
Property Registration Decree xxx
xxx
[t]hat OCT 20449 be cancelled and new title for Lot 943 be issued
directly in favor of LUISA NARVIOS, to complete her title to said
Lot;
[18]



The averments readily show that the action was neither a direct nor a
collateral attack on OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), for Lim was asserting only that the
existing title registered in the name of the petitioners predecessors had become
inoperative due to the conveyance in favor of Lims mother, and resultantly should be
29
cancelled. Lim did not thereby assail the validity of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), or
challenge the judgment by which the title of the lot involved had been decreed. In
other words, the action sought the removal of a cloud from Lims title, and the
confirmation of Lims ownership over the disputed property as the successor-in-
interest of Luisa.

B.
Prescription was not relevant

The petitioners assert that the lot, being titled in the name of their
predecessors-in-interest, could not be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.

The assertion is unwarranted.

Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring or losing ownership and other
real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions laid
down by law.
[19]
However, prescription was not relevant to the determination of the
dispute herein, considering that Lim did not base his right of ownership on an
adverse possession over a certain period. He insisted herein, instead, that title to the
land had been voluntarily transferred by the registered owners themselves to Luisa,
his predecessor-in-interest.

Lim showed that his mother had derived a just title to the property by virtue of
sale; that from the time Luisa had acquired the property in 1937, she had taken over
its possession in the concept of an owner, and had performed her obligation by
paying real property taxes on the property, as evidenced by tax declarations issued
in her name;
[20]
and that in view of the delivery of the property, coupled with Luisas
actual occupation of it, all that remained to be done was the issuance of a new
transfer certificate of title in her name.

C.
Forgery, being a question of fact,
could not be dealt with now

The petitioners submit that Lims evidence did not preponderantly show that the
ownership of the lot had been transferred to Luisa; and that both the trial and the
appellate courts disregarded their showing that Antonios signature on
the confirmation of sale was a forgery.

Clearly, the petitioners hereby seek a review of the evaluation and appreciation
of the evidence presented by the parties.

The Court cannot anymore review the evaluation and appreciation of the
evidence, because the Court is not a trier of facts.
[21]
Although this rule admits of
certain exceptions, viz: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjecture; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case, and the findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well in the petitioners main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and, (10) when the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
are contradicted by the evidence on record,
[22]
it does not appear now that any of the
exceptions is present herein. We thus apply the rule without hesitation, and reject the
appeal for that reason.

It is emphasized, too, that the CA upheld the conclusion arrived at by the
RTC that the signature of Antonio had not been simulated or forged. The CA ruled
that the testimony of the notary public who had notarized the confirmation of sale to
the effect that Antonio and Luisa had appeared before him prevailed over that of the
petitioners expert witness. The concurrence of their conclusion on the genuineness
of Antonios signature now binds the Court.
[23]


In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case
by a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit,
and value of the aggregate evidence on either side, and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of the
credible evidence. Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that means, in the last
analysis, probability of the truth.
[24]
It is evidence that is more convincing to the court
as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

Lim successfully discharged his burden of proof as the plaintiff. He
established by preponderant evidence that he had a superior right and title to the
property. In contrast, the petitioners did not present any proof of their better title other
than their copy of the reconstituted certificate of title. Such proof was not enough,
because the registration of a piece of land under the Torrens system did not create or
vest title, such registration not being a mode of acquiring ownership. The petitioners
need to be reminded that a certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or
title over the particular property described therein. Its issuance in favor of a particular
person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with
persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person
by the registered owner.
[25]


WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is denied, and the
decision dated January 28, 2002 is affirmed.

The petitioners are ordered to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

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