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THE CRIMEAN WAR: THE FIRST MODERN WAR OF OUR TIME?

by Robert Rogozinski
Proessor !"#es !$ S"%k
History &'(
) De%e#ber '*((
With the advancement of technology in the mid-nineteenth century due in part to the
Industrial Revolution, new innovations and technology were given practical application.
When the Crimean War broke out in the early 1!"s, new innovations and technology that
were available at the time were put to use. #owever, most of these new innovations were
misused, with both sides making many mistakes. While e$amining the incompetence of the
administrations running the war from both sides of the conflict, one can see how new
innovations were introduced during this war. %ecause of them, the Crimean War could,
perhaps, be classified as the first modern war of our time.
&o understand why the Crimean War is the first modern war, one needs to be
familiar with the events leading up to it. &he precursor to the war happened when the
'apoleonic Wars came to an end, when the Russian army invaded and occupied the city of
(aris in 11). &his showed the might of the Russians, and it intimidated the %ritish. *s the
years went on, the %ritish kept constant and close watch so that the balance of power in
+urope would not tip towards the Russians. When Russia invaded the ,ttoman +mpire in
1!- under the prete$t of protecting the people of the ,rthodo$ Christian faith, one of the
ob.ectives of the /enshikov /ission,
1
it ultimately led to a naval skirmish between both
empires in the port city of 0inop at the end of the following 'ovember. &he city was
completely decimated, and this battle served as the basis for the %ritish and 1rench to
1
Gooch, Brison D. Problems In European Civilization: The Origins of the Crimean War.
Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath and, 1969 p.xiii. Occurring in March o 1!"#, the Menshi$o%
Mission &as a po'itica' dispute &hich de(anded that the Otto(ans gi%e the )ussians
access to the Ho'* +'aces in the cit* o ,erusa'e( and that a treat* -e rati.ed stating
that a'' Orthodox Churches in the Otto(an /(pire are to -e under )ussian protection.
0hi'e 'itt'e concessions &ere done or the (ost part, the treat* speci*ing the
protection o the Orthodox churches &as denied, as it under(ined the so%ereignt* o
the su'tan. 0ith this denied, the )ussians used the protection o the peop'e o the
Orthodox re'igion as the 1usti.cation or in%ading the Otto(an /(pire.
2
declare war on the Russians. &he %ritish declared war in order to maintain personal
interests within the ,ttoman +mpire,
2
but to also prevent the +mpire from being partitioned
by Russia.
-
&he underlying reason however, was that the %ritish felt threatened by Russian
occupation of ,ttoman territory, since it could interfere with India. *s (hillip Warner writes
in his view of the cause of the Crimean War, 3if any country threatened the line of 4%ritish5
communication through the /iddle +ast that country must be checked.6
)
While Warner has
a valid point about the %ritish protecting India, there was also another reason for the %ritish
action. If the Russians were to have continued on without the declaration of war, they
would most likely have passed through the %osporus and 7ardanelles to con8uer
Constantinople, and then have open access to the /editerranean 0ea, which in turn would
further upset the balance of power of the +mpires of +urope. 1rance .oined in the Crimean
War on the side of the %ritish
!
to not only maintain the balance of power in +urope, but to
protect their interests in the #oly (laces in 9erusalem.
:
In addition, this was a perfect
opportunity for 1rance to declare war. With the rise of the 0econd 1rench +mpire .ust the
year before, it gave +mperor 'apoleon III a chance to not only show the world that the
2
Ha'e, 0i''ia( M., and A. 3. Ba456. Four Centuries of Turco-British elations: !tu"ies in
#iplomatic$ Economic an" Cultural %&airs. 0a'$ington, Be%er'e*, 7orth Hu(-erside:
/othen, 19!8 p."9:6;. <ince 1!#!, the British &ere a''o&ed to ree'* trade &ith the
Otto(an /(pire and %ice %ersa %ia the Co((ercia' =reat* o 1!#! in order to (aintain
re'ations &ith one another. 0hi'e it (ost'* negati%e'* i(pacted the Otto(an /(pire
since its inco(e ro( the trade &asn>t as high as the* &anted it to -e -ecause o 'o&
tari?s descri-ed in the treat* and the rising prices o goods, it u'ti(ate'* ga%e Britain
another reason to go to .ght &ith the Otto(ans &hen the* dec'ared &ar in 1!"8.
#
C'arendon. @=he 0ar &ith )ussia.@ The 'on"on Times 8 Mar. 1!"8.
8
0arner, +hi'ip. The Crimean War: a eappraisal( London: Bar$er, 1992. p."
"
Both /(pires dec'ared &ar on March 2!th, 1!"8.
6
/(peror 7apo'eon AAA during the &ar to'd his citiBens that the Crench &ere .ghting to
deend Christianit* and Otto(an so%ereignt*. =hough that state(ent &as
contradictor*, he a'so ought or Dthe sanctit* o treaties,E &hich the )ussians &ere
%io'ating since Crance and the )o(an Catho'ics &ere e%entua''* a''o&ed the right to
o%ersee the Christian protection o the Ho'* +'aces in ,erusa'e(. Gooch p.%iii, 0arner
p.9.
#
1rench military was still a force to be reckoned with, but also a chance to strike back
against the Russians for what had happened forty years before. &he ,ttomans on the other
hand were obviously in the war
;
to prevent the Russians from partitioning their lands. In the
eyes of the ,ttoman +mpire, the invading force obviously needed to be stopped< otherwise
the conse8uences of doing nothing could even lead to its dissolution. +ven though it was
allied with Christian nations, the ,ttomans called this war a 3#oly War6 under the prete$t
that a Christian army is invading /uslim territory. 'evertheless, these three empires, the
%ritish, the 1rench, and the ,ttoman, .oined forces and were known as the allied force
throughout the war.
&he Crimean War, while largely known for the poor tactical decisions and countless
mistakes made by generals and officers on both sides, it was also known for the new ideas
and devices that came to be of use in future conflicts. Ranging from new weaponry, the new
use of telecommunications and transport, to new professions such as the nursing profession
and the use of war correspondents, the Crimean War was a conflict that populari=ed these
ideas for the first time in recent history.
&he first of these new 3devices6 that shall be discussed is the new weaponry. &he
first of which is used by the Russians at the beginning of the war in the %attle of 0inop.
&hough the Russian naval fleet consisted of wooden ships at this time, it used a new type of
naval artillery, known as the (ai$hans gun, which fired e$plosive shells. While these guns
had been around for about twenty years at this point, the Crimean War was the one of the
first instances where this weapon was used in combat. &he e$plosive shells which were
9
=he Otto(an /(pire dec'ared &ar on )ussia on Octo-er 8
th
, 1!"#.
8
fired from the Russian fleet greatly contributed to the destruction of both the wooden
,ttoman fleet and the town of 0inop itself.

*s mentioned previously, the decimation of the


town got the attention of the %ritish after seeing the destruction the Russians left in their
wake. In %ritain>s eyes, the Russian navy must no longer e$ist on the %lack 0ea, or as
mentioned earlier, its colonies, primarily India, would be threatened because of the new
weapons Russia possessed. &hus %ritain had a stake in the war.
&o prepare itself for war, %ritain invested its money in creating a new rifle for its
soldiers. ?uckily, its new ally, the 1rench, developed the /ini@ rifle, a more powerful and
accurate weapon which replaced the now defunct muskets which fired lead balls and were
largely inaccurate. Asing the 1rench weapon as its source of inspiration, the %ritish
modified it to fit their own needs. What came out of this was the +nfield rifle, a weapon
that came to be used throughout the war by %ritish soldiers.
B
It was the beginning of new
era where new, accurate, and deadlier weapons took the stage.
In addition to new weaponry, new ships and trains were introduced as a means of
transport in war. In 1!!, while the allies were still trying to capture 0evastopol, they
installed a railroad system from %alaklava to the frontline to support their supply chains.
1"

In doing so, they also brought railroads to Russia for the first time. While this was a
significant advancement in supply and troop management in war at the time, this would
have not occurred, as is mentioned below, if ?ord Raglan had not chosen to prepare a siege
!
Go'd, Mic$, dir. The Crimean War. FG=H Histor*. 1999. Cro( a three episode series, the
Batt'e o Bo(arsund &as discussed in the .rst episode.
9
=rou-etB$o*, A'exis <. % Brief )istor* of the Crimean War: the Causes an"
Conse+uences of a ,e"ieval Con-ict Fought in a ,o"ern %ge. 7e& Ior$: Carro'' J Gra,
2;;6. p.#9
1;
=rou-etB$o* p.#9
"
against 0evastopol. 'evertheless, it is one of the first times in war where trains were used.
In addition to trains, ironclad ships were introduced as new naval vessels in response to the
devastating power of the (ai$hans gun, thus beginning the end of the era of ships using
sails in war. While they were first utili=ed near the end of the war in the %attle of Cinburn
in 1!!, they were still put to good use, contributing to the allied victory in battle.
11
&hese
ironclad ships however were not mass-produced until after the war since they were only
made as an e$periment to see if they were useful in battle.
12
'eedless to say, the e$periment
was a success, replacing wooden ships with iron ones.
&he Crimean War also saw first use of the telegraph in warfare. &his allowed long
range communication from the home front to the frontline with ease, allowing politicians
Din this case, ?ord *berdeenE to have direct communication with their generals D?ord
Raglan for e$ampleE.
1-
&his was very useful, since it also allowed the generals to send
orders down to the Fueen>s officers and soldiers as well. #owever, the use of the telegraph
was still relatively new, which posed problems in the war due to the many mistakes that
occurred on the battlefield. &he use of the telegraph can therefore be said to have been both
a blessing and a curse.
&he rise of the telegraph also gave rise to new professions. &he Crimean War was
the first war in modern times to be covered e$tensively by war correspondents because of
how fast information between the home front and the front line was e$changed. #ence one
11
D=he 0ar: +articu'ars o the Capture o Gin-urn.@ .e/ 0or1 Times ! 7o%. 1!"".=he
iron:c'ad ships during this ti(e &ere $no&n as Koating -atteries. =here &ere three o
these ships that participated in the -att'e: 'a #evastation$ 'a 'ace$ and 'a Tonnante.
12
=rou-etB$o* p.8;
1#
=rou-etB$o* p.#9
6
could 8uickly write about the life of its soldiers on the front line along with the way the war
was progressing. 9ournalists such as William #oward Russell, &homas Chenery, and
1redrick #arman of The London Times took to the front lines and reported what the allied
soldiers were going through.
1)
While Russell>s name is the predominant one during this
time period, he was not the only one covering the war. &he reason why Russell>s name is so
well-known for his work on the Crimean War is because of the vivid detail in which he
wrote his pieces. *long with the invention of the photograph, photographer Roger 1enton>s
photos and Russell>s writings brought the reality of war to the %ritish people. Russell>s
contribution to The London Times was so trusted, that the newspaper sold as much as
!",""" copies a day in 1!- because of him.
1!
&his obviously meant that the people who
were literate were following the war 8uite closely. Russell>s detail of the war even reached
the eyes and ears of the Russians. ,ne Russian officer even went as far to say that Russell>s
accounts are so accurate, that 3we have no need for spies, we have The Times.6
1:
&he
dedication of these war correspondents such as Russell eventually brought change to how
the Crimean War was managed, as will be more discussed later on in greater detail.
War 9ournalism as a profession was not the only thing that came out of the Crimean
War. &he nursing profession also e$panded. While the nursing of the sick and wounded
during war was nothing new, the feats accomplished by nurses during the conflict, on the
other hand, especially when supplies were scarce due to mismanagement, are worthy of
18
C'e(ing, Ange'a Miche''i, and ,ohn Max&e''. Ha(i'ton. @Antroduction.@ The Crimean
War: as !een b* Those Who eporte" It. Baton )ouge: Louisiana <tate F+, 2;;9 p.xi
1"
)o*'e, =re%or. Crimea: The 2reat Crimean War 3456-3457, 7e& Ior$: <t. Martin>s
+ress, 2;;;. p.86
16
=rou-etB$o* p.#!
9
praise. &he efforts of 1lorence 'ightingale and the 0isters of /ercy, /ary 0eacole, and
countless others made that all possible. 0eacole, who came to the Crimea under her own
e$pense, often tended to the soldiers on the front line, providing them with food, water,
medical aid, and other provisions. #er feats eventually earned her the respect of the soldiers
she was caring for, and the Crimean /edal for her contributions in helping them after the
war.
1;
1lorence 'ightingale on the other hand, revamped the dirty, frivolous military
barracks of 0cutari into something hospitable. 0i$ months after 'ightingale and her nurses
arrived and began administering aid in late 1!)< they were taking care of over !,"""
soldiers in the barracks, and had managed to lower the death rate from ))G down to
2.2G.
1

1B
While this statistic seems almost remarkable, some may argue that the drop in
mortality rate was caused by other factors not related to the efforts of 'ightingale and
others. Christopher 9. Hill and Hillian C. Hill point out the following in responseI
Critics of 1lorence 'ightingale rightly point out that the profound decreases in the mortality rate during the latter
months of 1!! could not have resulted solely from improvements in nursing. %ut this merely underscores the fact that the
improved survival rate had less to do with the outstanding individual care she and her nurses provided and far more to do with
the structural changes in the procurement of supplies and the improved sanitation that occurred under her influence. In
hindsight, these interventions likely served to critically alter the conditions that favored the spread through the wards of
typhus, tuberculosis, dysentery, cholera, typhoid, and other infectious diseases that were decimating the soldier.
2"
%oth authors have a valid point, which e$plains the above statistic. 1rom the hard
work and dedication of the nurses with fresh supplies coming to the military hospitals, it
19
=rou-etB$o* p.#9
1!
=rou-etB$o* p.#!
19
Florence .ightingale: ,easuring )ospital Care Outcomes. ,oint Co((ission on
Accreditation o Hea'thcare OrganiBations, 1999 p.2#1
2;
Gi'', Christopher ,. and Gi''ian C. Gi''. D7ightinga'e in <cutari: Her Legac*
)eexa(ined.E Clinical Infectious #iseases Ho'. 8; 7o. 12. Oxord Fni%ersit* +ress. 2;;".
,<=O). p.1!;2
!
was proven that they were definitely a factor in low mortality rate towards the end of the
conflict. In addition, one can say that the contributions of 'ightingale, 0eacole, and the like
contributed to the creation of the International Red Cross in 1:-. While it wasn>t until
#enry 7unant>s work in Italy in 1!B that helped create the International Red Cross, he was
strongly influenced by 'ightingale>s work in the Crimea and used her efforts as a basis for
his own.
21
%ecause of the lack of supplies to the countless elements the average soldier had
to face at the time, not limited to disease and poor weather, the Crimean War e$posed to the
+uropean nations that there needed to be an organi=ed way of distributing supplies and care
for those affected by war.
22

7isease played a ma.or role in the casualties which were sustained in the war.
%efore the war in the Crimea even begun, diseases such as cholera struck the soldiers
greatly. In one account by a war correspondentI
&he troops of the *llies, about !",""" in all, which had been lying in a state of inactivity, near
Constantinople, during the summer, were concentrated at Jarna, a port of %ulgariaK in the latter part
of *ugust. &hey had greatly suffered from the disease, and the cholera was especially fatalK
*nything was preferable to remaining where they wereK
2-

*rticles such as this one highlighted how deadly diseases could be for
soldiers. &he issue of disease now became a phenomenon that was a widely
discussed topic in newspapers, since it allowed the readers back home to be aware
21
ML''er, )udo'. @Histor* o the Origin o the )ed Cross and the Gene%a Con%ention.@
The %"vocate of Peace 83496-39:;< Ho'."9 Assue 8. 0ashington D.C: 0or'd A?airs
Anstitute. 1!99. =!TO. p.92
22
=rou-etB$o* p.82
2#
C'e(ing p. 88
9
of such a thing. In fact, by the end of the war, in an in8uiry conducted by 0urgeon-
Heneral ?ongmore, out of the 1,"! %ritish soldiers who died in the war, 1:,2B;
died from disease.
2)
In addition to the deaths of 1rench, Russian, and ,ttoman
soldiers because of disease, it showed that disease took more lives than the war
itself.
With the use of these new innovations and ideas in the war, it can be argued that this
conflict was one of the first modern wars of our time. #owever, mainly because of the way
it was managed, it was too often a war that was no different from the struggles that came
before it. &he handling of this war was an ine$cusable blunder from both sides of the
conflict, whether it would be from poor tactical decisions taken or miscommunication.
While some may argue that this war is not one of the first modern wars of recent history
because of those tactical blunders, this is not the case. &he Crimean War came to be as one
of the first modern wars because of them. Without those blunders, it would not have lasted
as long as it did, which would have prevented the introduction of those new inventions and
innovations which would be later adapted in future conflicts. &he following are some of the
criticisms of the war which paved the way to the proper use of the ideas and innovations
listed beforehand.
,ne of the first skirmishes of the Crimean War did not actually take place in the
Crimea. ,ne of the first offenses of the war came from a %ritish and 1rench e$cursion in
the %altic 0ea. Cnown as the %omarsund 1ortress, this Russian placement was the site of
one of the first %ritish and 1rench engagements in the Crimean War. While the three day
28
0arner p. 212:21#
1;
bombing and the eventual victory over the fortress itself
2!
were nothing worthy of criticism,
what did not happen afterwards can be considered to be a tactical blunder. Instead of
pushing forward towards 0t. (etersburg and ending the war, the naval fleet e$cursion went
back to %ritain.
2:
+ven though the defenses to 0t. (etersburg seemed impenetrable, taking
out the Russian defenses was, in the eyes of the public, something that should have been
attempted. 'evertheless, the fleet went back, and the war in the Crimea was about to begin.
&he allied invasion of the Crimea seemed to be going smoothly. ?anding its troops
near Calamita %ay, the allied forces began marching southward towards 0evastopol, the
head8uarters of the Russian naval fleet on the %lack 0ea. ,n the way there, the first allied
offensive was about to take place in the CrimeaI the %attle of *lma, .ust north of
0evastopol. While the battle was nothing worthy of criticism and was actually a huge
morale boost for the allied troops,
2;
it>s the decisions made afterward where the 8uestion of
whether or not the war was being managed properly arises.
With a devastating Russian loss at the %attle of *lma, 0evastopol is all but
con8uered at this point. While it seemed logical for the allied force to storm the city right
then and there, it never happened. ?ord Raglan of the %ritish and Heneral Canrobert of the
1rench armies ultimately decided that a proper siege needed to take place in order to
con8uer 0evastopol.
2
Instead of attacking the fortress from the north, the *llies would
2"
D=he Capture o Bo(arsund.E The 'on"on Times 29 Aug. 1!"8.
26
Go'd, /pisode One.
29
@=he Batt'e o the A'(a: A Hie& ro( =he Maintop.@ The 'on"on Times 12 Oct. 1!"8.
2!
0arner p.8!
11
redirect themselves in order to attack it from the south using the cities of %alaclava and
Camiesh as bases in order to do so. &his move was ultimately a disastrous one. &he
decision by both generals to set up a traditional siege closed any opportunities of ending the
war before winter, and allowed the deaths of tens of thousands more soldiers on both sides
of the conflict. &he decision was also a bad one because it caused the allies to take a long
time to prepare themselves for the siege of 0evastopol. In the time that it took to mobili=e
troops to the southern end of the Crimea, to mount up supplies, and to formally start
operations, the Russians at 0evastopol were fortifying their defenses in hopes of
withstanding the enemy. %y the time the allies were ready to start the attack, almost three
weeks later, the Russians were more than ready to defend themselves from the allies, with
heavy earth fortifications and deadly artillery placements at their disposal. In addition, this
decision opens up to further criticism back home, which eventually has parliament opening
an investigation into the mismanagement of the war.
Raglan and Canrobert>s decision to march south towards Camiesh and %alaclava
was made soon after the %attle of *lma. While the allied forces, the %ritish in particular,
were preparing themselves at %alaclava, the Russians noticed an opportunity to further
delay the already delayed attack on 0evastopol while the %ritish were situating themselves.
&he Russians 8uickly went on the counter-offensive and used this opportunity to attack the
%ritish at %alaclava in hopes of causing chaos and disarray in the preparations for the siege
of 0evastopol. Heneral ?iprandi, the Russian Heneral in command of the charge at the
time, in the end got what he wanted, in addition to much more. While the battle itself ended
12
up as indecisive, the Russians had set the stage for what would be infamously known as the
most beautiful blunder of it allI &he Charge of the ?ight %rigade.
When the Russians began operations on ,ctober 2!
th
, 1!) to attack the allies at
%alaclava, they began by 8uickly overrunning some of the allied artillery gun positions
which were in place, managed by the ,ttomans.
2B
*s soon as ?ord Raglan heard that the
,ttoman position was lost, he sent a message via telegram to the +arl of ?ucan, ordering
him to take back the position and those guns.
-"
&he telegram itself was very broad, but
orders were orders in the %ritish *rmy. 0o the +arl of ?ucan had forwarded Raglan>s
message to the +arl of Cardigan, ordering him to take his cavalry of appro$imately si$
hundred men to take back the gun placement that was lost by the ,ttomans.
-1
#owever, as
the order itself was very vague, Cardigan interpreted the lost guns for another gun
placement nearby. &he other gun placement had appro$imately 2,""" Russian troops
already there.
-2
+ven though it could have been easily noticeable that the gun placement
was heavily defended and in turn a mistake in orders, Cardigan and his light brigade
nevertheless charged towards the wrong placement. While somehow at )I1 odds, the %ritish
cavalry at the cost of 1L:
th
of their men had reached the position, but were forced to retreat
after reali=ing that they were about to be overrun.
--
While this was in itself nothing short of
miraculous, this could have all been avoided had the telegram message between Raglan and
29
@=he Attac$ on Ba'a$'a%a.@ The 'on"on Times 1# 7o%. 1!"8.
#;
@=he Attac$ on Ba'a$'a%a.@ The 'on"on Times 1# 7o%. 1!"8.
#1
@=he Attac$ on Ba'a$'a%a.@ The 'on"on Times 1# 7o%. 1!"8.
#2
=rou-etB$o* p.26#
##
=rou-etB$o* p.26#
1#
the two officers involved been more specific. While the operation was already risky, all the
casualties sustained from this suicidal charge could have been avoided. &his charge showed
that despite the introduction of all these new innovations to war, mistakes can still happen
on the battlefield.
With the conclusion of the %attle of %alaclava and the %attle of Inkerman, where
the overwhelming Russian force suffered a loss at the hands of the allies, the winter season
was approaching in the Crimea. &he attacks on 0evastopol had begun, but they were mostly
nullified, since the Russian defenses and soldiers who perished were repaired and
replaced.
-)
*s supplies ran short, not limited to warm and water-proof clothing, soldiers
were comparing themselves to the beggars of ?ondon, where the beggars are treated like
princes compared to their situation.
-!
&he weather was steadily getting worse, and on top of
inade8uate supply management, disease began afflicting the soldiers even more. &he rate
of soldiers dying from cholera towards the end of 'ovember, when Russell wrote this
account, was at si$ty a day.
-:
&his number would only increase with the harsher winter
weather coming, and with supplies .ust now being shipped from +ngland. *s winter
approached, %ritish soldiers, while waiting for supplies to arrive, were slowly free=ing to
death, with many being diagnosed with frostbite as well. While this was going on, the
%ritish officers who were supposed to be supervising their soldiers were nowhere to be
#8
DOn /arth&or$s and the Deence o <e-astopo'.E The 'on"on Times 19 7o%.
1!"",C'e(ing p.1;8
#"
C'e(ing p.1;#
#6
C'e(ing p.1;#
18
seen, stating that they were on leave.
-;
While things do take time to arrive, the way the
%ritish supplies were managed was unforgivable, and the public began taking notice.
When the public read the reports regarding soldiers receiving inade8uate supplies,
the outcry calling for a change in the management of the Crimean War started growing. In
9anuary of 1!!, (arliament finally voted in favor of a probe into the way the conflict was
managed. &reating this notion as a vote of confidence, the +arl of *berdeen, the (rime
/inister since 1!2, resigned, along with the 0ecretary of War, the 7uke of 'ewcastle.
-

&heir replacements, ?ord (almerston and ?ord (anmure took this opportunity to send
supplies en masse to the Crimea. While the damage was already done since %ritish soldiers
had already died from receiving inade8uate care because of the lack of supplies, this move
showed the public that things were now going to be done more efficiently. &o some e$tent,
this did happen, however, the war still needed to be improved from the tactical standpoint.
?uckily, it did.
&hough the Crimean War was still primarily directed by ?ord Raglan, newer, more
efficient tactical decisions were made. In the spring of 1!!, an allied e$pedition to the 0ea
of *=ov finally went underway to sever Russia>s supply lines to 0evastopol. &he allied
e$pedition was a success, but for all the wrong reasons. &he *llies were able to do it so
easily because the Russians prematurely blew up their own batteries in the city of Cerch,
since they felt that the *llies were about to capture the position.
-B
&hose batteries were the
only placements protecting the entrance of the 0ea of *=ov from the allied forces. What
#9
Go'd, /pisode =&o.
#!
0arner p.16;
#9
Go'd, /pisode =hree
1"
made this e$pedition a blunder by the Russians was the fact that those batteries were blown
up when the enemy force was 8uickly approaching, before one shot was even fired. &o give
up this strategic position, 0evastopol>s only lifeline in the war, easily shows improper
management on Russia>s part as well. If the entrance to the 0ea of *=ov had been defended
more efficiently, it would have been very likely for the Russians to hold 0evastopol for a lot
longer than they did.
+ven though 0evastopol was still standing, it was only a matter of time before the
Russians would eventually lose the city since Russian supplies were no longer reaching the
city. In a desperate attempt to push the enemy away from 0evastopol, the Russians tried to
set up an ambush which would be known as the %attle of the Chernaya. ,nce again,
miscommunication played a vital role in the battle. Heneral Horchakov, the man who
orchestrated the battle, gave his officers poorly communicated plans for the attack the day
before. In addition to this, the orders themselves were very broad. &he main order was
simply moving the Russian soldiers into close pro$imity to the enemy, while Horchakov
would ultimately decide which position to attack based on how the initial bombardments
fared.
)"
With such attack plans, the battle was over before it even started. It was apparent
that the Russian Heneral had no clear idea as to which position he was going to attack
beforehand. +ven though the Russians had twice as many men as the opposing force and
had the advantage of striking first, which caught the allied force off guard, the Russians
were forced to retreat and sustained heavy losses. With ,""" casualties, the %attle of the
8;
<eaton, A'-ert. The Crimean War: % ussian Chronicle. 7e& Ior$: <t. MartinMs, 1999
p.2;1
16
Chernaya was one of the costliest battles of the war.
)1
%ased on this result, it showed that
the war was all but lost for the Russians.
*fter 0evastopol lost its supply line, it became very obvious that the city could not
sustain itself for much longer. &he enemy bombardments on 0evastopol were about to take
their toll. 1or the ne$t three weeks, starting on *ugust 1;
th
, 0evastopol>s defense weakened
further with non-stop mortaring and shelling by allied troops, causing at least 2,"""
casualties a day.
)2
&he attacks were so relentless and so fierce, the Russians were unable to
repair their fortifications at the rate they were being destroyed on the night of 0eptember
;th, the first time since the siege began.
)-
With this opportunity given to them, the %ritish
and 1rench agreed to finally storm 0evastopol the ne$t day, when the .oint assault began.
&hough a sensible strategic decision was taken, not all problems were solved. Compared to
the 1rench force of -",""" soldiers, the %ritish force consisted of less than half of that. In
addition, the %ritish army now mainly consisted of new recruits, many of them very scared,
which caused problems in advancing towards 0evastopol.
))
%ecause of this disadvantage,
the %ritish were forced to retreat, which caused the .oint attack to fall apart. While it took
another two days to con8uer it because of poor trench networks on the %ritish side, the
1rench forces picked up the slack, and contributed greatly to the eventual capture of the
city. &he 1rench did this by taking the /alakov, a tower greatly aiding in the defense of
0evastopol, which caused the Russians to evacuate the city.
)!
With 0evastopol finally
81
<eaton p.2;6
82
<eaton p.2;9
8#
<eaton p.21;
88
@=he British Attac$ on the )edan.@ The 'on"on Times 2 Oct. 1!"".
8"
=rou-etB$o* p.29;:291
19
con8uered, the %ritish soon began what they had wanted all alongI the dismantling of the
Russian naval station. Altimately done to secure naval supremacy, the allies destroyed all of
the naval dockyards and any Russian war ships still afloat on the %lack 0ea.
):

#owever, even with 0evastopol captured, C=ar *le$ander II wasn>t ready to
concede defeat. 1or all that he cared, 0t. (etersburg was still in his hands, and the war could
still be won. 9ust as the war looked like it was going to continue, +mperor 1rancis-9oseph
of *ustria intervened.
);
While he remained neutral in this conflict, he was ready to .oin the
fray against Russia if it meant peace in +urope would return once more. 0ince *ustria and
Russia shared a border at the time, the C=ar most likely reali=ed that if he were to continue
the Crimean War, he would have to do so by fighting two fronts at the same time. With over
2)",""" casualties,
)
the C=ar knew it was time to finally call it 8uits. *fter the peace terms
were accepted in (aris on /arch -", 1!:, which called for the demilitari=ation of the
Crimea and the %lack 0ea, the war was finally over.
)B
Asing railroads to support the supply chain, the shortened delay between
communications thanks to the telegraph, the concept of war correspondents and the
populari=ation of war hospitals are all elements that play a heavy role in modern warfare.
/aterially, the Crimean War could be said to have signaled a new era in the art of war,
despite the poor decisions made by both *llied and Russian leadership. ?ord RaglanMs
decision to conduct a proper siege, which in turn led to the use of rail as a means of supply,
86
DDestruction o the Doc$s in <e-astopo'.E The 'on"on Times 9 ,an. 1!"6.
89
=rou-etB$o* p.#;;
8!
=rou-etB$o* p.#;;
89
<eaton p.228
1!
demonstrates that new innovations arise from poor decision making. 'evertheless, it does
not e$cuse the fact that this war was managed by outdated tactics, not limited to blind
charges at the enemy and mounting sieges to take cities. When ?ord Raglan .ustified his
decision of attacking 0evastopol from the south, it was done 3in order to do things by the
book.6
!"
&his implied that war does not change, and that there is only one right way to fight
a war. *s the wars of today show, where there are no blind charges or 3proper6 sieges, war
never is constant, and there is more than one way to fight a war.
?ist of Works Cited
";
Go'd, /pisode One
19
Clarendon. N&he War with Russia.N The London Times ) /ar. 1!).
1leming, *ngela /ichelli, and 9ohn /a$well. #amilton. The Crimean War: as Seen by
Those Who Reported It. %aton RougeI ?ouisiana 0tate A(, 2""B pp.$i,)),1"-,1").
Florence Nightingale: Measuring ospital Care !utcomes. 9oint Commission on
*ccreditation of #ealthcare ,rgani=ations, 1BBB p.2-1.
Hill, Christopher 9. and Hillian C. Hill. 3'ightingale in 0cutariI #er ?egacy Ree$amined.6
Clinical In"ectious #iseases Jol. )" 'o. 12. ,$ford Aniversity (ress. 2""!. 90&,R. p.1"2
OhttpILLwww..stor.orgLstableL)))2BBP.
Hold, /ick, dir. The Crimean War. AC&J #istory. 1BB;.
Hooch, %rison 7. $roblems In %uropean Ci&ili'ation: The !rigins o" the Crimean War.
?e$ington, /*I 7. C. #eath and, 1B:B pp.$iii, viii.
#ale, William /., and *. Q. %aRST. Four Centuries o" Turco()ritish Relations: Studies in
#iplomatic* %conomic and Cultural +""airs. Walkington, %everley, 'orth #umbersideI
+othen, 1B) pp.!;-:".
/Uller, Rudolf. N#istory of the ,rigin of the Red Cross and the Heneva Convention.N The
+d&ocate o" $eace ,-./0(-/123 Jol.!B Issue ). Washington 7.CI World *ffairs Institute.
1B;. 4ST!R. p.B2 OhttpILLwww..stor.orgLstableLinfoL2!;!1"-"P.
3,n +arthworks and the 7efence of 0ebastopol.6 The London Times 1B 'ov. 1!!.
Royle, &revor. Crimea: The 5reat Crimean War -.60(-.67, 'ew VorkI 0t. /artin>s (ress,
2""". p.):.
0eaton, *lbert. The Crimean War: + Russian Chronicle. 'ew VorkI 0t. /artinMs, 1B;;
pp.2":, 2"B,21",22).
N&he *ttack on %alaklava.N The London Times 1- 'ov. 1!).
N&he %attle of the *lmaI * Jiew from &he /aintop.N The London Times 12 ,ct. 1!).
N&he %ritish *ttack on the Redan.N The London Times 2 ,ct. 1!!.
3&he Capture of %omarsund.6 The London Times 2B *ug. 1!).
3&he WarI (articulars of the Capture of Cinburn.N Ne8 9or: Times 'ov. 1!!.
2;
&roubet=koy, *le$is 0. + )rie" istory o" the Crimean War: the Causes and Conse;uences
o" a Medie&al Con"lict Fought in a Modern +ge. 'ew VorkI Carroll W Hraf, 2"":. pp.-;,
-, -B, )", )2, 2:-, 2;, 2B", 2B1, -"".
Warner, (hilip. The Crimean War: + Reappraisal. ?ondonI %arker, 1B;2. pp.!, ;, ), 1:".
21

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