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Jane's Intelligence Review
Cloud cover - Pakistan's shift towards tactical nuclear weapons
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As the sophistication of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal advances through increased plutonium
production, the need for a clear nuclear doctrine becomes imperative. Brian Cloughley and Robert
Kelley examine the drive towards tactical nuclear arms.
Fighting in late August and early September in Islamabad between police and protesters demanding
the resignation of Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif underlined how the country, a confirmed
nuclear power, continues to be afflicted by political instability. Nevertheless, Pakistan continues to
expand and develop its nuclear infrastructure to diversify its nuclear arsenal.
Although Pakistan is currently involved in major internal security operations in the western Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and tensions with India are at a relatively low level, the country's
defence focus continues to be India-centric. Successive governments in Islamabad and military high
commands have judged that India presents the sole credible threat to national security and have
therefore developed the armed forces in order to counter India's conventional military superiority.
In April 1999, six months before he was deposed from his second term in office by a military coup,
then-prime minister Sharif stated that "nuclear restraint, stabilisation and minimum credible
deterrence constitute the basic elements of Pakistan's nuclear policy".
In March 2014, after his return to power, Sharif reiterated that "Pakistan is a responsible nuclear
weapons state. We pursue a policy of nuclear restraint, as well as credible minimum deterrence". In
the interim, however, Pakistan greatly increased its plutonium production capacity and continues to
develop increasingly sophisticated means of delivery, including air-delivered bombs and three types
of surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) that could be classed as tactical nuclear weapons suitable for
battlefield use.
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Estimation of Pakistan's nuclear fuel cycle. (IHS)
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Command and control
Pakistan's attempted concealment of a nuclear development programme from 1972 ended on 28
May 1998 with five underground nuclear tests. During this period, little emphasis had been placed
on establishing command-and-control (C2) arrangements for Pakistani nuclear delivery systems,
which remained relatively rudimentary.
Pakistan's first test of a nuclear-capable rocket was the Hatf 1 short-range unguided rocket in early
1989. Although it was described by then chief of army staff General Mirza Aslam Beg as an
"extremely accurate system", it was a free-flight rocket developed from the French Dauphin that
resembled the capabilities and limitations of the early American MGR-1 Honest John unguided
tactical rocket, which had a range of 50 kilometres (km) and a relatively large 400-500-metre (m)
circular error probable (CEP) - a measure of accuracy that reflects the radius around a target within
which 50% of the weapons aimed at that target will land.
It is understood by IHS Jane's that Pakistan's early nuclear command arrangements were aligned
with those of the US, with weapon release authority being routed through the normal chain of
military command until, when ordered, the tactical commander would take whatever action deemed
appropriate for battlefield employment.
The similarity between Pakistani and US command chains extended to ultimate decision-taking, with
the presidents of both countries being the final authority for the employment of nuclear weapons,
although in the case of the US, as apparent from documents declassified in 1998, there was a period
in which "predelegation" applied, meaning that ground commanders were empowered in certain
circumstances to order nuclear release without reference to higher authority.
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The legal and constitutional authority for control of the nuclear arsenal was and continues to be
precise in the US, but was less so in Pakistan during the rule of army presidents such as General
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) and General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008), the latter of whom
also briefly served as a civilian president. Despite their assumption of national leadership, both Gen
Zia and Gen Musharraf expanded the role of the army in overall defence, especially in nuclear
matters.
The two generals placed an emphasis on expanding Pakistan's nuclear capabilities and developing
the army's tactical weapons - namely the Hatf 3 (Ghaznavi), a road-mobile ballistic missile with a
range of up to 300 km, and the Hatf 9 (Nasr), a ballistic missile with a range of up to 60 km - both of
which received much development impetus during Musharraf's years in power.
Warhead miniaturisation was concomitant with the programme, the essentiality of which, as
perceived by Pakistan, was highlighted during India-Pakistan tensions in 2002 when then-president
Gen Musharraf declared that "as a last resort, the atom bomb is also possible".
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Nuclear delivery
Pakistan's nuclear weapons for surface-to-surface delivery are controlled by Army Strategic Force
Command (ASFC) located in Rawalpindi and headed by a lieutenant general. The command was
formed by Gen Musharraf in 2000 and reports to the NCA, as do the Pakistan Air Force Strategic
Force Command and the embryonic Naval Strategic Force Command, both based in the Pakistani
capital Islamabad.
Information on the location and number of missiles, and other details of missile units is not publicly
available, but it appears that the Strategic Missile Group, directly subordinate to the ASFC, in turn
commands missile formations, which include the 21 and 22 artillery divisions based respectively at
Pano Akil in southern Sindh and Sargodha in central Punjab.
In terms of aerial delivery systems, PAF Mushaf airbase at Sargodha has extensive deep-storage sites
that IHS Jane's assesses probably contain nuclear weapons, and the airbase houses three squadrons
of Lockheed Martin F-16 multirole fighter aircraft, of which Pakistan has a total of 76 as of August
2014 (these include 18 F-16C/D Block 52 versions; the remaining 58 are all of the A/B variants).
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Threat assessments
Pakistan's judgement on the possible use of nuclear-capable weapons would entirely depend on its
threat assessment. The manoeuvre and disposition of SSMs would vary according to the type of
missile to be deployed, but in essence the sequence of events would be predicated on Indian
movement across the international border or the Line of Control in disputed Kashmir, which, if
assessed by Pakistan as intending deep penetration into its territory, would result in orders being
passed for the deployment of nuclear missiles and the readying of aerial systems.
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In this scenario, the Pakistani army would evaluate the nature and intention of the Indian advance
and assess whether Pakistan's forces could repel it by conventional rather than nuclear means.
Pakistan's development of tactical nuclear weapons is largely motivated by a desire to counter
India's 'cold start' military doctrine. In 2010, WikiLeaks revealed a cable sent from the US embassy in
the Indian capital, New Delhi, to officials in Washington on 16 February 2010 that described India's
'cold start' doctrine as involving "a rapid, time- and distance-limited penetration into Pakistani
territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan, possibly in response to a Pakistan-linked
terrorist attack in India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear
response."
Pakistan's frontier with India is marked by numerous natural and man-made obstacles, including
canals, rivers, minefields, ditches, and fences that would be covered by indirect fire in the case of
military confrontation between the two states. Although most Pakistani army exercises focus on
engagement in the eastern region, there is no consensus among Pakistani military planners of the
likely rate of Indian advance, or even whether, given current deficiencies in India's conventional
forces, New Delhi's forces could even achieve decisive penetration.
Opacity in Pakistan's nuclear doctrine with regards to battlefield response indicators for the
deployment of nuclear weapons is paralleled by ambiguity in its portrayal of the readiness of its
nuclear arsenal. A 2001 US Department of Defense report stated that Pakistan's nuclear weapons
were "probably stored in component form".
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Overview and detail of the likely plutonium facility at Pakistan's Dera Ghazi Khan complex, 11 May
2014. (DigitalGlobe)
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Weapons production complex
Evidence of Pakistan's ongoing investment in the expansion of its nuclear arsenal can be seen at its
key nuclear chemistry and manufacturing site at Dera Ghazi Khan.
Located in western Punjab province, Dera Ghazi Khan is one of the largest and most important
elements of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. Comprised of three sub-sites, the complex
performs numerous roles in support of the country's military nuclear fuel cycle, including uranium
milling, processing, conversion, and manufacturing.
As one of the few sites in Pakistan that processes raw uranium, Dera Ghazi Khan is well defended by
extensive anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile emplacements, reflecting the strategic
importance of the site.
A non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Pakistan's co-operation with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) generally only extends to its civilian nuclear power
programme. As such, the facilities at Dera Ghazi Khan - like all of Pakistan's military-related nuclear
sites - operate outside of IAEA safeguards and are not subject to international inspections or
monitoring.
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BC-1 uranium mill
The Baghalchur-1 (BC-1) uranium mill, located in the southern end of the Dera Ghazi Khan complex,
was designed to perform the first stage of uranium processing at the site by converting raw uranium
ore into intermediate compounds. Prior to the increased use of in-situ leaching - a mining process
that produces a uranium solution conducive to being milled on site - the BC-1 mill was used to
process locally mined ore into feed compounds for more advanced uranium processing.
Time-elapsed satellite imagery of the BC-1 mill indicates that piles of rock ore have remained
untouched at the site since at least 2004. Originally, the mill would have processed ore from the
piles through phases of crushing and grinding before being dissolved in sulphuric acid and further
processed to produce yellowcake. The presence of leach tanks and six large clarifiers (evident in
satellite imagery of the site) are indicative of these processes.
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Chemical Plants Complex
Also at Dera Ghazi Khan, lying approximately 1 km north of the BC-1 mill, is the Chemical Plants
Complex (CPC). As the largest and most important chemical support facility in Pakistan's military
nuclear fuel cycle, the CPC receives raw uranium (originally from the BC-1 mill but more recently
from the Qabul Khel mine) and converts it to uranium hexafluoride - the critical feed for centrifuges
enriching uranium at the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) at Kahuta.
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The uranium hexafluoride plant at the CPC has an estimated production capacity of about 200
tonnes per year. Satellite imagery obtained of the site in May 2014 reveals that 16 cylinders
(assessed to be Type 30B cylinders in transport overpacks), typically used for transporting uranium
hexafluoride, were neatly stacked near the plant.
Additional analysis of time-elapsed imagery of the site indicates that since 2010 the number and
position of these cylinders has regularly changed, confirming that the cylinders are portable and the
uranium hexafluoride plant continues to be active.
These cylinders probably contain natural uranium hexafluoride produced by the plant and ready for
shipment to the KRL for enrichment. This is because the cylinders are too large to contain highly
enriched uranium, which must be transported in much smaller cylinders for reasons related to
criticality safety. The type 30B cylinders are also unlikely to contain low-enriched uranium, for which
Pakistan has no use in its military or civil nuclear fuel cycle (China is supplying low-enriched uranium
fuel for the lifespan of the Chashma power reactors under an agreement with the Pakistan Atomic
Energy Commission).
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Plutonium laboratories
In the northwest corner of the Dera Ghazi Khan complex lies a stand-alone compound notable for its
high-security features, including an inner perimeter fence situated within the already well-secured
patrolled perimeter that surrounds the entire Dera Ghazi Khan complex. Alluding to a proliferation-
sensitive application, the compound perimeter features walls, as well as guard towers, perimeter
lighting and CCTV cameras.
Within the inner perimeter is a long-established building with a working space estimated to be 1,200
square metres. Having undergone extensive development and expansion between 2004 and 2009, a
new addition to the western side of the original building appears to have added about 2,500 square
metres of working space.
The original building is notable for its extensive ventilation signatures, with an expansive roof
ducting system connected to a medium-height large-diameter stack and air filtration building. The
new addition is connected to the original ventilation stack by a large cross-section duct. A few
auxiliary buildings - possibly an office building and fire station - were also added during the
expansion.
A complex with these features is likely to be a plutonium manufacturing and processing facility,
particularly when situated within such an extensive nuclear materials processing complex as Dera
Ghazi Khan. Its relative isolation, high security, and extensive ventilation and air handling system are
all consistent with the requirements for safe and secure handling of hazardous weapons-usable
plutonium.
Furthermore, an expansion in plutonium processing capability during the past decade would have
coincided with Pakistan's major scale-up in plutonium production. Since 2000, Pakistan has gone
from operating one military reactor at Khushab to four (with estimated start-up dates of 2009, 2013,
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and 2014) - an increased plutonium production capacity that has necessitated the redevelopment of
the KNC-2 reprocessing plant at Chashma.
Due to its toxicity, plutonium processing facilities typically require a large ventilation system with
frequent air changes in the work space (the air handling systems of Western plutonium facilities are
designed to perform 10 changes of fresh air per hour). As plutonium corrodes readily in air, all
plutonium operations require the use of glove boxes with a dry or inert atmospheric environment,
enabling workers to safely handle and machine the material.
When used for this purpose, glove boxes are generally maintained at a lower pressure than the
surrounding atmosphere and require their own air handling systems. In turn, plutonium handling
facilities are designed to operate with an internal pressure slightly less than atmospheric pressure,
so that any contamination in working spaces remains within the building's air system, which is
thoroughly filtered before discharge.
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Conclusion
Pakistan's increased focus on plutonium production underscores the migration of its nuclear
deterrent from relatively large and heavy uranium-based fission weapons to significantly smaller and
lighter plutonium weapons. This will enable greater flexibility in delivery systems, including the
deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, as well as the development of weapons with significantly
higher yields.
Yet Pakistan's plutonium production, consequent warhead miniaturisation, and concurrent
development of a battlefield quick response system have failed to further the "credible minimum
deterrence" spoken of by Sharif. Rather, these efforts have ultimately lowered the threshold for the
employment of nuclear weapons.
Pakistan's stress on battlefield nuclear SSMs suggests their employment would be Pakistan's most
likely response to even a non-nuclear Indian attack. The dangers of nuclear retaliation, however,
were emphasised in April 2014 when the former chairman of India's National Security Advisory
Board, Shayam Saran, stated that if India "is attacked with such [tactical nuclear] weapons, it would
engage in nuclear retaliation that will be huge and designed to inflict unacceptable damage on its
adversary," and that "the label on a nuclear weapon used for attacking India, strategic or tactical, is
irrelevant". There is as of yet no indication that the newly elected Indian government intends to alter
its retaliatory policy.
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Copyright IHS Global Limited, 2014

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