1

G.R. No. L-5276 March 3, 1953

ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MUTUAL BENEFIT
ASSOCIATION, respondent.
Vicente Hilado, Pedro Lopez and Artemio A. Almendral for
petitioner.
Sanidad, Ayson and Casia for respondent.
LABRADOR, J .:
This is an appeal by certiorari against a decision of the Court of
Industrial Relations. On September 4, 1950, demand was
submitted to petitioner by respondent union through its officers for
various concession, among which were (a) an increase of P0.50
in wages, (b) commutation of sick and vacation leave if not
enjoyed during the year, (c) various privileges, such as free
medical care, medicine, and hospitalization, (d) right to a closed
shop, check off, etc., (e) no dismissal without prior just cause and
with a prior investigation, etc. Some of the demands, were
granted by the petitioner, and the other were rejected, and so
hearings were held and evidence submitted on the latter. After
the hearing the respondent court rendered a decision, the most
important provisions of which were those fixing the minimum
wage for the laborers at P3.20, declaring that additional
compensation representing efficiency bonus should not be
included as part of the wage, and making the award effective
from September 4, 1950. It is against these portion of the
decision that this appeal is taken.
On the issue of the wage, it is contended by petitioner that as the
respondent court found that the laborer and his family at least
need the amount of P2.58 for food, this should be the basis for
the determination of his wage, not what he actually spends; that it
is not justifiable to fix a wage higher than that provided by
Republic Act No. 602; and that respondent union made the
demand in accordance with a pernicious practice of claiming
more after an original demand is granted. The respondent court
found that P2.58 is the minimum amount actually needed by the
laborer and his family. That does not mean that it is his actual
expense. A person's needs increase as his means increase. This
is true not only as to food but as to everything else education,
clothing, entertainment, etc. The law guarantees the laborer a fair
and just wage.
The minimum must be fair and just. The "minimum wage" can by
no means imply only the actual minimum. Some margin or leeway
must be provided, over and above the minimum, to take care of
contingencies such as increase of prices of commodities and
desirable improvement in his mode of living. Certainly, the
amount of P0.22 a day (difference between P2.80 fixed and
P2.58 actual) is not excessive for this purpose. That the P3
minimum wage fixed in the law is still far below what is
considered a fair and just minimum is shown by the fact that this
amount is only for the year after the law takes effect, as thereafter
the law fixes it at P4. Neither may it be correctly contended that
the demand for increase is due to an alleged pernicious practice.
Frequent demands for increase are indicative of a healthy spirit of
wakefulness to the demands of a progressing and an increasingly
more expensive world. We, therefore, find no reason or ground
for disturbing the finding contained in the decision fixing the
amount of P3.20 as the minimum wage.
It is next contended that the efficiency bonus paid the laborer
should have been included in his (minimum) wage, in the same
manner as the value of living quarters. Whether or not bonus
forms part of wages depends upon the circumstances or
condition for its payment. If it is an additional compensation which
the employer promised and agreed to give without any conditions
imposed for its payment, such as success of business or greater
production or output, then it is part of the wage. But if it is paid
only if profits are realized or a certain amount of productivity
achieved, it cannot be considered part of the wages. In the case
2

at bar, it is not payable to all but to laborers only. It is also paid on
the basis of actual production or actual work accomplished. If the
desired goal of production is not obtained or the amount of actual
work accomplished, the bonus does not accrue. It is evidence
that under the circumstances it is paid only when the labor
becomes more efficient or more productive. It is only an
inducement for efficiency, a prize therefor, not a part of the wage.
The last question raised in the appeal is the grant of the increase
from September 4, 1950, the date of the presentation of the
original demand, instead of from April 5, 1951, the date of the
amended demand. The decision states:
Both parties agreed that any award should be retroactive
to the date of the presentation of the demand, which is
September 4, 1950. (Annex A, p. 5.)
The terms of the stipulation are clearly against petitioner's
contention. There being no question as to its (agreement)
existence, the same must be given force and effect.
The petition is hereby dismissed, with costs.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes,
Jugo, and Angelo, JJ., concur.
Montemayor, J., concur in the result.























3

G.R. No. 91231 February 4, 1991
NESTL PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES, respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for petitioner.
Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Associates for
private respondent.
GRIO-AQUINO, J .:p
Nestl Philippines, Inc., by this petition for certiorari, seeks to
annul, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, the decision
dated August 8, 1989 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), Second Division, in Cert. Case No. 0522
entitled, "In Re: Labor Dispute of Nestl Philippines, Inc." insofar
as it modified the petitioner's existing non-contributory Retirement
Plan.
Four (4) collective bargaining agreements separately covering the
petitioner's employees in its:
1. Alabang/Cabuyao factories;
2. Makati Administration Office. (Both Alabang/Cabuyao factories
and Makati office were represented by the respondent, Union of
Filipro Employees [UFE]);
3. Cagayan de Oro Factory represented by WATU; and
4. Cebu/Davao Sales Offices represented by the Trade Union of
the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS),all expired on June
30, 1987.
Thereafter, UFE was certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent for all regular rank-and-file employees at the
petitioner's Cagayan de Oro factory, as well as its Cebu/Davao
Sales Office.
In August, 1987, while the parties, were negotiating, the
employees at Cabuyao resorted to a "slowdown" and walk-outs
prompting the petitioner to shut down the factory. Marathon
collective bargaining negotiations between the parties ensued.
On September 2, 1987, the UFE declared a bargaining deadlock.
On September 8, 1987, the Secretary of Labor assumed
jurisdiction and issued a return to work order. In spite of that
order, the union struck, without notice, at the Alabang/Cabuyao
factory, the Makati office and Cagayan de Oro factory on
September 11, 1987 up to December 8, 1987. The company
retaliated by dismissing the union officers and members of the
negotiating panel who participated in the illegal strike. The NLRC
affirmed the dismissals on November 2, 1988.
On January 26, 1988, UFE filed a notice of strike on the same
ground of CBA deadlock and unfair labor practices. However, on
March 30, 1988, the company was able to conclude a CBA with
the union at the Cebu/Davao Sales Office, and on August 5,
1988, with the Cagayan de Oro factory workers. The union
assailed the validity of those agreements and filed a case of
unfair labor practice against the company on November 16, 1988.
After conciliation efforts of the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) yielded negative results, the dispute was certified
to the NLRC by the Secretary of Labor on October 28, 1988.


4

After the parties had filed their pleadings, the NLRC issued a
resolution on June 5, 1989, whose pertinent disposition regarding
the union's demand for liberalization of the company's retirement
plan for its workers, provides as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Retirement Plan
The company shall continue implementing its retirement plan
modified as follows:
a) for fifteen years of service or less an amount equal to 100%
of the employee's monthly salary for every year of service;
b) more than 15 but less than 20 years 125% of the
employee's monthly salary for every year of service;
c) 20 years or more 150% of the employee's monthly salary for
every year of service. (pp. 58-59,Rollo.)
Both parties separately moved for reconsideration of the decision.
On August 8, 1989, the NLRC issued a resolution denying the
motions for reconsideration. With regard to the Retirement Plan,
the NLRC held:
Anent management's objection to the modification of its
Retirement Plan, We find no cogent reason to alter our previous
decision on this matter.
While it is not disputed that the plan is non-contributory on the
part of the workers, tills does not automatically remove it from the
ambit of collective bargaining negotiations. On the contrary, the
plan is specifically mentioned in the previous bargaining
agreements (Exhibits "R-1" and "R-4"), thereby integrating or
incorporating the provisions thereof to the agreement. By reason
of its incorporation, the plan assumes a consensual character
which cannot be terminated or modified at will by either party.
Consequently, it becomes part and parcel of CBA negotiations.
However, We need to clarify Our resolution on this issue. When
we increased the emoluments in the plan, the conditions for the
availment of the benefits set forth therein remain the same. (p.
32, Rollo.)
On December 14, 1989, the petitioner filed this petition
for certiorari, alleging that since its retirement plan is non-
contributory, it (Nestl) has the sole and exclusive prerogative to
define the terms of the plan "because the workers have no vested
and demandable rights thereunder, the grant thereof being not a
contractual obligation but merely gratuitous. At most the company
can only be directed to maintain the same but not to change its
terms. It should be left to the discretion of the company on how to
improve or mollify the same" (p. 10, Rollo).
The Court agrees with the NLRC's finding that the Retirement
Plan was "a collective bargaining issue right from the start" (p.
109, Rollo) for the improvement of the existing Retirement Plan
was one of the original CBA proposals submitted by the UFE on
May 8, 1987 to Arthur Gilmour, president of Nestl Philippines.
The union's original proposal was to modify the existing plan by
including a provision for early retirement.
The company did not question the validity of that proposal as a
collective bargaining issue but merely offered to maintain the
existing non-contributory retirement plan which it believed to be
still adequate for the needs of its employees, and competitive with
those existing in the industry.
The union thereafter modified its proposal, but the company was
adamant. Consequently, the impass on the retirement plan
become one of the issues certified to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration.
5

The company's contention that its retirement plan is non-
negotiable, is not well-taken. The NLRC correctly observed that
the inclusion of the retirement plan in the collective bargaining
agreement as part of the package of economic benefits extended
by the company to its employees to provide them a measure of
financial security after they shall have ceased to be employed in
the company, reward their loyalty, boost their morale and
efficiency and promote industrial peace, gives "a consensual
character" to the plan so that it may not be terminated or modified
at will by either party (p. 32, Rollo).
The fact that the retirement plan is non-contributory, i.e., that the
employees contribute nothing to the operation of the plan, does
not make it a non-issue in the CBA negotiations. As a matter of
fact, almost all of the benefits that the petitioner has granted to its
employees under the CBA salary increases, rice allowances,
mid-year bonuses, 13th and 14th month pay, seniority pay,
medical and hospitalization plans, health and dental services,
vacation, sick & other leaves with pay are non-contributory
benefits. Since the retirement plan has been an integral part of
the CBA since 1972, the Union's demand to increase the benefits
due the employees under said plan, is a valid CBA issue. The
deadlock between the company and the union on this issue was
resolvable by the Secretary of Labor, or the NLRC, after the
Secretary had assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute (Art.
263, subparagraph [i] of the Labor Code).
The petitioner's contention, that employees have no vested or
demandable right to a non-contributory retirement plan, has no
merit for employees do have a vested and demandable right over
existing benefits voluntarily granted to them by their employer.
The latter may not unilaterally withdraw, eliminate or diminish
such benefits (Art. 100, Labor Code; Tiangco, et al. vs. Hon.
Leogardo, et al., 122 SCRA 267).

This Court ruled similarly in Republic Cement Corporation vs.
Honorable Panel of Arbitrators, G.R. No. 89766, Feb. 19, 1990:
Petitioner's claim that retirement benefits, being noncontributory
in nature, are not proper subjects for voluntary arbitration is
devoid of merit. The expired CBA previously entered into by the
parties included provisions for the implementation of a
"Retirement and Separation Plan." it is only to be expected that
the parties would seek a renewal or an improvement of said item
in the new CBA. In fact, the parties themselves expressly
included retirement benefits among the economic issues to be
resolved by voluntary arbitration. Petitioner is estopped from
now contesting the validity of the increased award granted by
the arbitrators. (p. 145, Rollo.)
The NLRC's resolution of the bargaining deadlock between
Nestl and its employees is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor
whimsical. The benefits and concessions given to the employees
were based on the NLRC's evaluation of the union's demands,
the evidence adduced by the parties, the financial capacity of the
Company to grant the demands, its longterm viability, the
economic conditions prevailing in the country as they affect the
purchasing power of the employees as well as its concommitant
effect on the other factors of production, and the recent trends in
the industry to which the Company belongs (p. 57, Rollo). Its
decision is not vitiated by abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed, with costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., took no part.

6

G.R. No. 181806 March 12, 2014
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY-PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY-PHILIPPINES FACULTY and STAFF
ASSOCIATION, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J .:
A Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is a contract entered
into by an employer and a legitimate labor organization
concerning the terms and conditions of employment.
1
Like any
other contract, it has the force of law between the parties and,
thus, should be complied with in good faith.
2
Unilateral changes or
suspensions in the implementation of the provisions of the CBA,
therefore, cannot be allowed without the consent of both parties.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari
3
under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assails the September 25, 2007 Decision
4
and the
February 5, 2008 Resolution
5
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 97053.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Wesleyan University-Philippines is a non-stock, non-
profit educational institution duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Philippines.
6
Respondent Wesleyan University-
Philippines Faculty and Staff Association, on the other hand, is a
duly registered labor organization
7
acting as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file faculty and staff
employees of petitioner.
8


In December 2003, the parties signed a 5-year CBA
9
effective
June 1, 2003 until May 31, 2008.
10

On August 16, 2005, petitioner, through its President, Atty.
Guillermo T. Maglaya (Atty. Maglaya), issued a
Memorandum
11
providing guidelines on the implementation of
vacation and sick leave credits as well as vacation leave
commutation. The pertinent portions of the Memorandum read:
1. VACATION AND SICK LEAVE CREDITS
Vacation and sick leave credits are not automatic. They have to
be earned. Monthly, a qualified employee earns an equivalent of
1.25 days credit each for VL and SL. Vacation Leave and Sick
Leave credits of 15 days become complete at the cut off date of
May 31 of each year. (Example, only a total of 5 days credit will
be given to an employee for each of sick leave [or] vacation
leave, as of month end September, that is, 4 months from June to
September multiplied by 1.25 days). An employee, therefore, who
takes VL or SL beyond his leave credits as of date will have to file
leave without pay for leaves beyond his credit.
2. VACATION LEAVE COMMUTATION
Only vacation leave is commuted or monetized to cash. Vacation
leave commutation is effected after the second year of continuous
service of an employee. Hence, an employee who started
working June 1, 2005 will get his commutation on May 31, 2007
or thereabout.
12

On August 25, 2005, respondents President, Cynthia L. De Lara
(De Lara) wrote a letter
13
to Atty. Maglaya informing him that
respondent is not amenable to the unilateral changes made by
petitioner.
14
De Lara questioned the guidelines for being violative
of existing practices and the CBA,
15
specifically Sections 1 and 2,
Article XII of the CBA, to wit:
7

ARTICLE-XII
VACATION LEAVE AND SICK LEAVE
SECTION 1. VACATION LEAVE - All regular and non-tenured
rank-and-file faculty and staff who are entitled to receive shall
enjoy fifteen (15) days vacation leave with pay annually.
1.1 All unused vacation leave after the second year of service
shall be converted into cash and be paid to the entitled employee
at the end of each school year to be given not later than August
30 of each year.
SECTION 2. SICK LEAVE - All regular and non-tenured rank-
and-file faculty and staff shall enjoy fifteen (15) days sick leave
with pay annually.
16

On February 8, 2006, a Labor Management Committee (LMC)
Meeting was held during which petitioner advised respondent to
file a grievance complaint on the implementation of the vacation
and sick leave policy.
17
In the same meeting, petitioner
announced its plan of implementing a one-retirement
policy,
18
which was unacceptable to respondent.
Ruling of the Voluntary Arbitrator
Unable to settle their differences at the grievance level, the
parties referred the matter to a Voluntary Arbitrator. During the
hearing, respondent submitted affidavits to prove that there is an
established practice of giving two retirement benefits, one from
the Private Education Retirement Annuity Association (PERAA)
Plan and another from the CBA Retirement Plan. Sections 1, 2, 3
and 4 of Article XVI of the CBA provide:


ARTICLE-XVI
SEPARATION, DISABILITY AND RETIREMENT PAY
SECTION 1. ELIGIBILITY FOR MEMBERSHIP - Membership in
the Plan shall be automatic for all full-time, regular staff and
tenured faculty of the University, except the University President.
Membership in the Plan shall commence on the first day of the
month coincident with or next following his statement of
Regular/Tenured Employment Status.
SECTION 2. COMPULSORY RETIREMENT DATE - The
compulsory retirement date of each Member shall be as follows:
a. Faculty The last day of the School Year, coincident with his
attainment of age sixty (60) with at least five (years) of unbroken,
credited service.
b. Staff Upon reaching the age of sixty (60) with at least five (5)
years of unbroken, credited service.
SECTION 3. OPTIONAL RETIREMENT DATE - A Member may
opt for an optional retirement prior to his compulsory retirement.
His number of years of service in the University shall be the basis
of computing x x x his retirement benefits regardless of his
chronological age.
SECTION 4. RETIREMENT BENEFIT - The retirement benefit
shall be a sum equivalent to 100% of the members final monthly
salary for compulsory retirement.




8

For optional retirement, the vesting schedule shall be:
x x x x
19

On November 2, 2006, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a
Decision
20
declaring the one-retirement policy and the
Memorandum dated August 16, 2005 contrary to law. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the following award is hereby made:
1. The assailed University guidelines on the availment of vacation
and sick leave credits and vacation leave commutation are
contrary to law. The University is consequently ordered to
reinstate the earlier scheme, practice or policy in effect before the
issuance of the said guidelines on August 16, 2005;
2. The "one retirement" policy is contrary to law and is hereby
revoked and rescinded. The University is ordered x x x to resume
and proceed with the established practice of extending to
qualified employees retirement benefits under both the CBA and
the PERAA Plan.
3. The other money claims are denied.
21

Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the case to the CA via a Petition
for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
On September 25, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision
22
finding the
rulings of the Voluntary Arbitrator supported by substantial
evidence. It also affirmed the nullification of the one-retirement
policy and the Memorandum dated August 16, 2005 on the
ground that these unilaterally amended the CBA without the
consent of respondent.
23
Thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
24

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by
the CA in its February 5, 2008 Resolution.
25

Issues
Hence, this recourse by petitioner raising the following issues:
a.
Whether x x x the [CA] committed grave and palpable error in
sustaining the Voluntary Arbitrators ruling that the Affidavits
submitted by Respondent WU-PFSA are substantial evidence as
defined by the rules and jurisprudence that would substantiate
that Petitioner WU-P has long been in the practice of granting its
employees two (2) sets of Retirement Benefits.
b.
Whether x x x the [CA] committed grave and palpable error in
sustaining the Voluntary Arbitrators ruling that a university
practice of granting its employees two (2) sets of Retirement
Benefits had already been established as defined by the law and
jurisprudence especially in light of the illegality and lack of
authority of such alleged grant.
c.
Whether x x x the [CA] committed grave and palpable error in
sustaining the Voluntary Arbitrators ruling that it is incumbent
upon Petitioner WU-P to show proof that no Board Resolution
was issued granting two (2) sets of Retirement Benefits.
d.
9

Whether x x x the [CA] committed grave and palpable error in
revoking the 16 August 2005 Memorandum of Petitioner WU-P
for being contrary to extant policy.
26

Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner argues that there is only one retirement plan as the
CBA Retirement Plan and the PERAA Plan are one and the
same.
27
It maintains that there is no established company practice
or policy of giving two retirement benefits to its
employees.
28
Assuming, without admitting, that two retirement
benefits were released,
29
petitioner insists that these were done
by mere oversight or mistake as there is no Board Resolution
authorizing their release.
30
And since these benefits are
unauthorized and irregular, these cannot ripen into a company
practice or policy.
31
As to the affidavits submitted by respondent,
petitioner claims that these are self-serving declarations,
32
and
thus, should not be given weight and credence.
33

In addition, petitioner claims that the Memorandum dated August
16, 2005, which provides for the guidelines on the implementation
of vacation and sick leave credits as well as vacation leave
commutation, is valid because it is in full accord with existing
policy.
34

Respondents Arguments
Respondent belies the claims of petitioner and asserts that there
are two retirement plans as the PERAA Retirement Plan, which
has been implemented for more than 30 years, is different from
the CBA Retirement Plan.
35
Respondent further avers that it has
always been a practice of petitioner to give two retirement
benefits
36
and that this practice was established by substantial
evidence as found by both the Voluntary Arbitrator and the CA.
37

As to the Memorandum dated August 16, 2005, respondent
asserts that it is arbitrary and contrary to the CBA and existing
practices as it added qualifications or limitations which were not
agreed upon by the parties.
38

Our Ruling
The Petition is bereft of merit.
The Non-Diminution Rule found in Article 100
39
of the Labor Code
explicitly prohibits employers from eliminating or reducing the
benefits received by their employees. This rule, however, applies
only if the benefit is based on an express policy, a written
contract, or has ripened into a practice.
40
To be considered a
practice, it must be consistently and deliberately made by the
employer over a long period of time.
41

An exception to the rule is when "the practice is due to error in
the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of
law."
42
The error, however, must be corrected immediately after its
discovery;
43
otherwise, the rule on Non-Diminution of Benefits
would still apply.
The practice of giving two retirement
benefits to petitioners employees is
supported by substantial evidence.
In this case, respondent was able to present substantial evidence
in the form of affidavits to support its claim that there are two
retirement plans. Based on the affidavits, petitioner has been
giving two retirement benefits as early as 1997.
44
Petitioner, on
the other hand, failed to present any evidence to refute the
veracity of these affidavits. Petitioners contention that these
affidavits are self-serving holds no water. The retired employees
of petitioner have nothing to lose or gain in this case as they have
already received their retirement benefits. Thus, they have no
reason to perjure themselves. Obviously, the only reason they
executed those affidavits is to bring out the truth. As we see it
then, their affidavits, corroborated by the affidavits of incumbent
10

employees, are more than sufficient to show that the granting of
two retirement benefits to retiring employees had already ripened
into a consistent and deliberate practice.
Moreover, petitioners assertion that there is only one retirement
plan as the CBA Retirement Plan and the PERAA Plan are one
and the same is not supported by any evidence. There is nothing
in Article XVI of the CBA to indicate or even suggest that the
"Plan" referred to in the CBA is the PERAA Plan. Besides, any
doubt in the interpretation of the provisions of the CBA should be
resolved in favor of respondent. In fact, petitioners assertion is
negated by the announcement it made during the LMC Meeting
on February 8, 2006 regarding its plan of implementing a "one-
retirement plan." For if it were true that petitioner was already
implementing a one-retirement policy, there would have been no
need for such announcement. Equally damaging is the letter-
memorandum
45
dated May 11, 2006, entitled "Suggestions on the
defenses we can introduce to justify the abolition of double
retirement policy," prepared by the petitioners legal counsel.
These circumstances, taken together, bolster the finding that the
two-retirement policy is a practice.1wphi 1 Thus, petitioner cannot,
without the consent of respondent, eliminate the two-retirement
policy and implement a one-retirement policy as this would violate
the rule on non-diminution of benefits.
As a last ditch effort to abolish the two-retirement policy,
petitioner contends that such practice is illegal or unauthorized
and that the benefits were erroneously given by the previous
administration. No evidence, however, was presented by
petitioner to substantiate its allegations.
Considering the foregoing disquisition, we agree with the findings
of the Voluntary Arbitrator, as affirmed by the CA, that there is
substantial evidence to prove that there is an existing practice of
giving two retirement benefits, one under the PERAA Plan and
another under the CBA Retirement Plan.
The Memorandum dated August 16,
2005 is contrary to the existing CBA.
Neither do we find any reason to disturb the findings of the CA
that the Memorandum dated August 16, 2005 is contrary to the
existing CBA.
Sections 1 and 2 of Article XII of the CBA provide that all covered
employees are entitled to 15 days sick leave and 15 days
vacation leave with pay every year and that after the second year
of service, all unused vacation leave shall be converted to cash
and paid to the employee at the end of each school year, not later
than August 30 of each year.
The Memorandum dated August 16, 2005, however, states that
vacation and sick leave credits are not automatic as leave credits
would be earned on a month-to-month basis. This, in effect, limits
the available leave credits of an employee at the start of the
school year. For example, for the first four months of the school
year or from June to September, an employee is only entitled to
five days vacation leave and five days sick leave.
46
Considering
that the Memorandum dated August 16, 2005 imposes a
limitation not agreed upon by the parties nor stated in the CBA,
we agree with the CA that it must be struck down.
In closing, it may not be amiss to mention that when the provision
of the CBA is clear, leaving no doubt on the intention of the
parties, the literal meaning of the stipulation shall govem.
47

However, if there is doubt in its interpretation, it should be
resolved in favor of labor,
48
as this is mandated by no less than
the Constitution.
49




11

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed
September 25, 2007 Decision and the February 5, 2008
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97053 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DELCASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson


C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
National Federation of Labor v. Court of Appeals, 483
Phil 626, 639 (2004).
2
HFS Philippines, Inc. v. Pilar, G.R. No. 168716, April 16,
2009, 585 SCRA 315, 324.
3
Rollo, pp. 14-46.
4
CA rollo, pp. 268-288; penned by Associate Justice
Vicente S.E. Veloso and concurred in by Associate
Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Marlene Gonzales-
Sison.
5
Id. at 315.
6
Id. at 269.
7
Rollo, p. 92.
8
CA rollo, p. 269.
9
Rollo, pp. 92-106.
12

10
CA rollo, p. 269.
11
Rollo, p. 107.
12
Id.
13
CA rollo, p.104.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Rollo, p. 100.
17
CA rollo, p. 107.
18
Id. at 108.
19
Rollo, pp. 101-102.
20
Id. at 131-145; penned by
Voluntary Arbitrator Francis V.
Sobrevias.
21
Id. at 144-145.
22
CA rollo, pp. 268-288.
23
Id. at 284 and 287.
24
Id. at 288.
25
Id. at 315.
26
Rollo, pp. 326-327.
27
Id. at 341-344.
28
Id. at 327-348.
29
Id. at 335.
30
Id. at 335-341.
31
Id. at 335.
32
Id. at 328.
33
Id. at 327-328.
34
Id. at 348-351.
35
Id. at 368-378.
36
Id. at 378.
37
Id. at 365.
38
Id. at 378-382.
39
ART. 100. PROHIBITION
AGAINST ELIMINATION OR
DIMINUTION OF BENEFITS.
Nothing in this Book shall be
construed to eliminate or in any
way diminish supplements, or
other employee benefits being
enjoyed at the time of
promulgation of this Code.
40
Central Azucarera De Tarlac v.
Central Azucarera De Tarlac
Labor Union-NLU, G.R. No.
188949, July 26, 2010, 625
SCRA 622, 630-631.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 631.
43
Id.
44
CA rollo, p. 284.
45
Id. at 207-208.
46
Rollo, p. 107.
47
Supreme Steel Corporation v.
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng
Supreme Independent Union
(NMS-IND-APL), G.R. No.
185556, March 28, 2011, 646
SCRA 501, 521.
48
Id.
49
Article II, Section 18 of the
CONSTITUTION provides:
Section 18. The State affirms
labor as a primary social
economic force. It shall protect
the rights of workers and
promote their welfare.
13