EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-27489. April 30, 1970.]

LEONORA TANTOY VDA. DE MACABENTA, for herself and in behalf of her minor child, RAQUEL
MACABENTA, claimants-appellees, vs. DAVAO STEVEDORE TERMINAL COMPANY, respondent-appellant.
Peregrino M. Andres for claimants-appellees.
H. A. Cabarroguis & Associates for respondent-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT; DEPENDENTS OF INJURED
EMPLOYER. From the express language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a widow living with the
deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of
age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon
the deceased, are considered dependents.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANT CASE. Claimant here is clearly the widow of the deceased Conrado
Macabenta. It is true that the marriage took place after the fatal accident but there was no question
that at the time of his death she was marked to him.
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; WHERE LAW IS CLEAR; DUTY OF COURT TO APPLY THE LAW TO
FACTS AS FOUND. Where the law is clear, our duty is equally plain. We must apply it to the facts as
found. What is more, we have taken pains to defeat any evasion of its literal language by rejecting an
interpretation, even if not totally devoid of plausibility, but likely to attach to it a significance different
from that intended by the lawmakers. A paraphrases of an aphorism from Holmes is not inappropriate.
there can always occur to intelligence hostile to a piece of legislation a misinterpretation that may,
without due reflection, be considered not too far-fetched.
4. ID.; ID.; SETTLED RULE. The Court has constantly held from the early cases of Ty Sue v. Hord,
12 Phil. 485, a 1909 decision, in United States v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 and again in Riera v. Palmori, 40 Phil.
105 (1919) that , assuming a choice is necessary between conflicting theories, that which best conforms
to the language of the statute and its purpose should prevail and that no construction is to be adopted
that would "tend to defeat the purpose and object of the legislator."
5. ID.; ID.; WHERE POLICY OF LAW IS CLEAR; DUTY COURT TO GIVE EFFECT. Once the policy of
purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. Even if honest
doubts could be entertained, therefor, as to the meaning of the statutory provisions, still respect for
such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the plea of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company.
6. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT; INTERPRETATION AND
CONSTRUCTION, TO BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE. "To state the
constructions sought to be fastened on the clear and explicit language of the statute is to reject it. It
comes into collision with the constitutional command pursuant to the social justice principle that the
government extend protection to labor." How could such an intent then be imputed to the legislative
body. No such suspicious ought to be entertained that it was contemplated by our lawmakers that any
provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act could be so worded as to deny protection to the laboring
elements and their dependents and thus frustrate the constitutional objective of social justice.
7. ID.; ID.; WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION; FINDINGS OF FACT IT BASED ON
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL; INSTANT CASE. The alleged error that the
accident resulting in the death of Conrado Macabenta could not be considered as having arisen out of
and in the course of employment is not to be taken too seriously. The facts as set forth in the decision,
which must be accepted by us in view of their being based on substantial evidence argue against the
condensation of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company.
8. ID.; ID.; APPEAL FROM DECISION OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION TO
SUPREME COURT ASCERTAINMENT OF CREDIBILITY AND WEIGHT OF CONFLICTING EVIDENCE, BEYOND
AUTHORITY IN APPEALS BY CERTIORARI. The task of ascertaining the credibility and weight of
conflicting evidence is, however, beyond the province of our authority in appeals by certiorari. Even if
the possibility that the Commission's conclusions were erroneous could not be ruled out, still, to borrow
the language of justice Dizon in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, 'such errors would constitute mere errors of judgment but do not involve any grave abuse
of discretion on its part.'
D E C I S I O N
FERNANDO, J p:
The success of the employer Davao Stevedore Terminal Company in imparting plausibility to the novel
question raised as to whether or not the widow of a deceased employee whose marriage occurred after
the accident as well as the posthumous child could be considered dependents within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Act may be gauged by the fact that we gave due course to the petition for
the review of a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission answering the question in the
affirmative and sustaining the right to compensation of the claimant Leonora Tantoy Vda. de Macabenta
for herself and in behalf of her minor child, Raquel Macabenta. After hearing the parties and in the right
of the language of the law, its manifest purpose, and the constitutional provisions on social justice and
protection to labor, we answer the question similarly. We affirm the appealed decision of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission.
In the decision rendered by the then Chairman of the Commission, Nieves Baens del Rosario, dated
September 27, 1966, it is stated that there is no dispute "that at the time that the decedent met the
vehicular accident on September 13, 1961 which led to his death on September 29, 1961, the claimant-
widow was not yet married to the decedent although they had already been living together as husband
and wife for the past three months. However. on the day following the accident, they were lawfully
wedded in a marriage ceremony solemnized at San Pedro Hospital in Davao City where the deceased
was hospitalized up to his death. It is noteworthy that the marriage was facilitated through the
intercession of the general manager of the respondent company." 1 The decision likewise noted that
the claimant widow gave birth on April 8, 1962 to the posthumous daughter of the deceased who was
given the name Raquel Tantoy Macabenta.
As to how the deceased Conrado Macabenta met his accident, the decision, after stating that the
deceased was a laborer in the sawmill of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company at Manay, Panabo,
Davao, about 48 kilometers from his residence in Davao City, went on as follows: "Although some sort of
quarters were provided by the respondent to its employees at the sawmill, many of them apparently
preferred to commute, and the deceased in particular went home about three times a week. While the
respondent, through its lone witness and at the same time production manager, Sergio Dalisay,
disclaimed the claimant's declarations that the company provided a service pickup to transport its
employees to and from work, the synthesis of the very same testimonial evidence does not support this
denial, but on the contrary tends to bring out the fact that the respondent did furnish transportation." 2
As a result, it reversed the finding of the then acting referee of its regional office in Davao City and
awarded to the claimant widow for herself and in behalf of her minor child the amount of P2,708.00 as
compensation and the sum of P270.80 as attorney's fees.
Hence, this petition for review, which, as noted, was given due course primarily due to the question
raised being one of first impression. As announced at the opening of this opinion, we uphold the
Workmen's Compensation Commission.
1. From the express language of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a widow living with the
deceased or actually dependent upon him totally or partly as well as her daughter, if under 18 years of
age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and unmarried, whether or not actually dependent upon
the deceased are considered dependents. 3 Claimant here is clearly the widow of the deceased
Conrado Macabenta. It is true that the marriage took place after the fatal accident but there was no
question that at the time of his death she was married to him. She, therefore, comes entirely within the
letter of the law. Nor can there be any doubt that the child, Raquel Macabenta, also falls within the
words the Act employs. As set forth in the decision, while the marriage took place on Sept. 14, 1961, the
widow and the deceased had already been living together as husband and wife the preceding three
months. The child born of such relationship, later legalized, is, as made clear in the decision, the
posthumous daughter of the deceased. What the employer Davao Stevedore Terminal Company seems
bent in ignoring is that our Civil Code, in no uncertain terms, considers a conceived child born for all
purposes that are favorable to her provided the birth is attended with the conditions specified, namely,
that she is alive at the time she is completely delivered from the mother's womb. 4 Here, fortunately,
the child has survived the ordeal of the loss of the one called upon to support her, her father, who,
unfortunately however, met his death before her birth.
Time and time again, we have stressed that where the law is clear, our duty is equally plain. We must
apply it to the facts as found. 5 What is more, we have taken pains to defeat any evasion of its literal
language by rejecting an interpretation, even if not totally devoid of plausibility, but likely to attach to it
a significance different from that intended by the lawmakers. A paraphrase of an aphorism from Holmes
is not inappropriate. There can always occur to an intelligence hostile to a piece of legislation a
misinterpretation that may, without due reflection, be considered not too far-fetched. The employer in
this case, without impugning its motives, must have succumbed to such a temptation, quite
understandable but certainly far from justifiable. It is quite obvious then why we find its stand devoid of
merit.
2. Our conclusion likewise finds support in the fundamental principle that once the policy or
purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. 6 Even if honest
doubts could be entertained, therefore, as to the meaning of the statutory provisions, still respect for
such a basic doctrine calls for a rejection of the plea of the Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. We
have never deviated from our constant holding from Ty Sue v. Hord, 7 a 1909 decision, that, assuming a
choice is necessary between conflicting theories, that which best conforms to the language of the
statute and its purpose should prevail. Again, as far back as United States v. Toribio, 8 decided the next
year, we made unmistakable our view that no construction is to be adopted that would bend "to defeat
the purpose and object of the legislator." We made use of an expression almost identical in Riera v.
Palmaroli 9 with our warning against so narrowly interpreting a statute "as to defeat the manifest
purpose of the legislator." The employer in this case should have been well advised to take into
consideration the teachings of the above cases before it sought to press upon us the desirability of
imparting to the applicable statutory language a meaning that would render fruitless the purpose so
clearly evident on the face of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
3. There is still another avenue of approach that similarly calls for the affirmance of the decision of
the Workmen's Compensation Commission now on appeal. This is apparent from an excerpt from a
recent case of Automotive Parts & Equipment Company, Incorporated v. Lingad: 10 "To state the
construction sought to be fastened on the clear and explicit language of the statute is to reject it. It
comes into collision with the constitutional command pursuant to the social justice principle that the
government extend protection to labor." How could such an intent then be imputed to the legislative
body. No such suspicion ought to be entertained that it was contemplated by our lawmakers that any
provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act could be so worded as to deny protection to the laboring
elements and their dependents and thus frustrate the constitutional objective of social justice. To quote
from the Lingad case anew: "For it is undeniable that every statute, much more so one arising from a
legislative implementation of a constitutional mandate, must be so construed that no question as to its
conformity with what the fundamental law requires need arise.
4. The basic question in this petition for review thus disposed of, there is nothing to stand in the
way of the affirmance of the decision now on appeal. The alleged error that the accident resulting in the
death of Conrado Macabenta could not be considered as having arisen out of and in the course of
employment is not to be taken too seriously. The facts as set forth in the decision, which must be
accepted by us in view of their being based on substantial evidence argue against the contention of the
Davao Stevedore Terminal Company. As we had occasion to state only last month in B. F. Goodrich
Philippines, Inc. v. Acebedo: 11 "Nor can the conclusion reached by respondent Commission be
repudiated unless 'on a clear showing of failure to consider the evidence on record or failure to consider
fundamental and patent logical relationships in the evidence, amounting to a clear travesty of justice or
grave abuse of discretion.' What was said by us in Basaysay v. Workmen's Compensation Commission,
through the present Chief Justice, bears repeating: 'The task of ascertaining the credibility and weight of
conflicting evidence, is, however, beyond the province of our authority in appeals by certiorari.' Even if
the possibility that the Commission's conclusions were erroneous could not be ruled out, still, to borrow
the language of Justice Dizon in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission. 'such errors would constitute mere errors of judgment but do not involve any grave abuse
of discretion on its part.' "
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission of September 27, 1966 is
affirmed. With costs against respondent Davao Stevedore Terminal Company.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Castro, Zaldivar, Teehankee and Villamor, JJ. concur.
Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.
Footnotes
1. Petition, Decision, Annex A, p. 1.
2. Ibid, p. 3.
3. Section 9 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, Republic Act No. 3428 (1927) as amended, reads
as follows: "Dependents of the injured person. The following persons, and no others shall be considered
as dependents and entitled to compensation under the provisions of this Act; A son or daughter, if
under 18 years of age or incapable of supporting him or herself, and unmarried, whether actually
dependent upon the deceased or not; The widow, only if she was living with the deceased or was
actually dependent upon him, totally or partly."
4. According to the Civil Code: "[Art.] 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child
shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article. [Art.] 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if
it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an
intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours
after its complete delivery from the maternal womb."
5. Cf. People v. Mapa, L-22301, Aug. 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164; Pacific Oxygen & Acetylene Co. v.
Central Bank, L-21881, March 1, 1968, 22 SCRA 917; Dequito v. Lopez, L-27757, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA
1352; Padilla v. City of Pasay, L-24039, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1349; Garcia v. Vasquez, L-26808, March
28, 1969, 27 SCRA 505; La Perla Cigar & Cigarette Factory v. Capapas. L-27948 & 28001-11, July 31, 1969,
28 SCRA 1085; Mobil Oil Philippines v. Diocares, L-26371, Sept. 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 656; Luzon Surety Co.,
Inc. v. De Garcia, L-25659, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 111.
6. Cf. Sarcos v. Castillo, L-29755, Jan. 31, 1959, 26 SCRA 853.
7. 12 Phil. 485.
8. 15 Phil. 85.
9. 40 Phil. 105 (1919).
10. L-26406, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 248.
11. L-29551, March 25, 1970, citing Batangas Transportation Co. v. Rivera, L-14427, Aug. 29, 1960;
Basaysay v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-16438, Nov. 29, 1961, 3 SCRA 530 and Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-20614 and L-21517, May 25, 1964, 11
SCRA 60. Cf. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-25640, March 21,
1968, 22 SCRA 1215 and Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-25665,
May 22, 1969, 28 SCRA 285.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-30642. April 30, 1985.]
PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, in his own behalf and on behalf of the minors ROMULO and NESTOR S.
FLORESCA; and ERLINDA FLORESCA-GABUYO, PEDRO S. FLORESCA, JR., CELSO S. FLORESCA, MELBA S.
FLORESCA, JUDITH S. FLORESCA and CARMEN S. FLORESCA;
LYDIA CARAMAT VDA. DE MARTINEZ in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children LINDA,
ROMEO, ANTONIO, JEAN and ELY, all surnamed Martinez; and DANIEL MARTINEZ and TOMAS
MARTINEZ;
SALUSTIANA ASPIRAS VDA. DE OBRA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE,
ESTELA, JULITA, SALUD and DANILO, all surnamed OBRA;
LYDIA CULBENGAN VDA. DE VILLAR, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDNA,
GEORGE and LARRY III, all surnamed VILLAR;
DOLORES LOLITA ADER VDA. DE LANUZA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children EDITHA,
ELIZABETH, DIVINA, RAYMUNDO, NESTOR and AURELIO, JR., all surnamed LANUZA;
EMERENCIANA JOSE VDA. DE ISLA, in her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children JOSE,
LORENZO, JR., MARIA, VENUS and FELIX, all surnamed ISLA, petitioners, vs. PHILEX MINING
CORPORATION and HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First Instance of
Manila, respondents.
Rodolfo C. Pacampara for petitioners.
Tito M. Villaluna for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES; CAUSE OF ACTION ASCERTAINED FROM
AVERMENTS IN THE COMPLAINT; CASE AT BAR. It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint
is not for compensation based on the Workmen's Compensation Act but a complaint for damages
(actual, exemplary and moral) in the total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00)
pesos. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to
compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation appeared in the complaint that the employees died
from accident arising out of and in the course of their employments. The complaint instead alleges gross
and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a
consequence of which a cave-in occurred resulting in the death of the employees working underground.
Settled is the rule that in ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's
compensation claim or a claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the
averments or allegations in the complaint (Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100). In the
present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a contractual relationship. The
alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad faith on the part of
Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which it may be held liable for damages.
2. CIVIL LAW; AWARD OF COMPENSATION BENEFITS UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT;
RATIONALE DIFFERS FROM AWARD OF DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE. The rationale in awarding
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differs from that in giving damages under the
Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of compensation distinct from the existing
theories of damages, payments under the acts being made as compensation and not as damages (99
C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate the harshness and insecurity of industrial life for the
workman and his family. Hence, an employer is liable whether negligence exists or not since liability is
created by law. Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable wrong on the part of
the employer (99 C.J.S. 36). In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay
compensation benefits for loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or
work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of the employer (Murillo vs.
Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand, damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the
wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained injury
either in his person, property or relative rights, through the act or default of another (25 C.J.S. 452).
3. ID.; ID.; CLAIM FOR DAMAGES UNDER THE N.C.C.; BURDEN OF PROOF. The claimant for
damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causal relation between the defendant's
negligence and the resulting injury as well as the damages suffered. While under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, there is a presumption in favor of the deceased or injured employee that the death
or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated; and the employer has the burden to prove otherwise
(De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Cario vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 551; Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs.
WCC, 60 SCRA 228).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER UNDER THE WORKMEN'S ACT AND THE CIVIL CODE.
Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits should be paid to an
employee who suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of his
employer but caused by factors outside the industrial plant of his employer. Under the Civil Code, the
liability of the employer, depends on breach of contract or tort. The Workmen's Compensation Act was
specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees or workmen. It is a social legislation designed
to give relief to the workman who has been the victim of an accident causing his death or ailment or
injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs. WCC, 54 SCRA 379).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CLAIMANTS NOT PRECLUDED FROM BRINGING ACTION BEFORE THE REGULAR
COURTS; RATIONALE. We hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under
the Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the
regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual
obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners
been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they
would not have sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which awarded a
lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of
fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in
their bid before the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be
deducted from the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
6. ID.; NEGLIGENCE; RECOVERY OF DAMAGES UNDER THE NEW CIVIL CODE; SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS FORM PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND. Recovery under the New Civil Code for damages
arising from negligence, is not barred by Article 173 of the New Labor Code. And the damages
recoverable under the New Civil Code are not administered by the System provided for by the New
Labor Code, which defines the "System" as referring to the Government Service Insurance System or the
Social Security System (Art. 167 [c], [d] and [e] of the New Labor Code). Furthermore, under Article 8 of
the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the law of the land. WE ruled that
judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself (Caltex vs.
Palomer, 18 SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SOCIAL JUSTICE GUARANTEE; EMPLOYER NOT RELIEVED FROM LIABILITY
FOR DEATH OF HIS WORKERS. The right to life is guaranteed specifically by the due process clause of
the Constitution. To relieve the employer from liability for the death of his workers arising from his gross
or wanton fault or failure to provide safety devices for the protection of his employees or workers
against the dangers which are inherent in underground mining, is to deprive the deceased worker and
his heirs of the right to recover indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker and the consequent loss
to his family without due process of law. The dissent in effect condones and therefore encourages such
gross or wanton neglect on the part of the employer to comply with his legal obligation to provide safety
measures for the protection of the life, limb and health of his worker. Even from the moral viewpoint
alone, such attitude is un-Christian. It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice
guarantees of the Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an
exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental
law and the implementing legislation aforementioned.
8. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; LABOR LAW; NO-FAULT LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER UNDER SEC.
5 OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT AND ART. 173, NEW LABOR CODE. It should be stressed that
the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act or Article 173 of the
New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury caused by the nature of the work, without any
fault on the part of the employers. It is correctly termed no-fault liability. Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, as amended, or Article 173 of the New Labor Code, does not cover the tortious
liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or culpable negligence in failing to provide the safety
devices required by the law for the protection of the life, limb and health of the workers. Under either
Section 5 or Article 173, the employer remains liable to pay compensation benefits to the employee,
whose death, ailment or injury is work-connected, even if the employer has faithfully and diligently
furnished all the safety measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect the employee.
MELENCIO-HERERA, J., dissenting:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTION FOR DAMAGES; DEATH COMPENSATION OF WORKMEN; COMPLAINT
REGULATED BY THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW. This case involves a complaint for damages
for the death of five employees of PHILEX Mining Corporation under the general provisions of the Civil
Code. The Civil Code itself, however, provides for its non-applicability to the complaint. It is specifically
provided in Article 2196 of the Code, found in Title XVIII Damages, that: "Compensation for Workmen
and other employees in case of death, injury or illness is regulated by special laws." By the very
provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law", not the Code itself, which has to apply to the complaint
involved in the instant case. That "special law", in reference to the complaint, can be no other than the
Workmen's Compensation Law.
2. ID.; ID.; OPTION TO SUE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE, FORECLOSED; CASE AT BAR. There are two
considerations why it is believed petitioners should no longer be allowed to exercise the option to sue
under the Civil Code. In the first place, the proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act have
already become the law in regards to the "election of remedies", because those proceedings had
become a "finished transaction." In the second place, it should be plainly equitable that, if a person
entitled to an "election of remedies" makes a first election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should
no longer be allowed to avail himself of the second option. At the very least, if he wants to make a
second election, in disregard of the first election he has made, when he makes the second election he
should surrender the benefits he had obtained under the first election. This was not done in the case
before the court.
3. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT; REMEDY UNDER THE
ACT, EXCLUSIVE. In providing for exclusiveness of the remedy under our Workmen's Compensation
Act, the Philippine Legislature worded the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Act as follows: "Sec. 5.
Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by
reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies
accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the
employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury." (Paragraphing and underscoring
supplied) There should be no question but that the original first paragraph of Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, formulated in 1927, provided that an injured worker or employee, or his
heirs, if entitled to compensation under the Act, cannot have independent recourse neither to the Civil
Code nor to any other law relative to the liability of the employer. After 1927, there were occasions
when the legislator had the opportunity to amend the first paragraph of Section 5 such that the
remedies under the Act would not be exclusive; yet, the legislator refrained from doing so. That shows
the legislative's continuing intent to maintain the exclusory provision of the first paragraph of Section 5
unless otherwise provided in the Act itself.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATIONS; WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT; REMOVAL OF
EXCLUSORY PROVISION, A LEGISLATIVE CONCERN. To grant the petition and allow the victims of
industrial accidents to file damages suits based on torts would be a radical innovation not only contrary
to the express provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act but a departure from the principles
evolved in the long history of workmen's compensation. At the very least, it should be the legislature
and not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act, a
provision reiterated in the present Labor Code on employees' compensation. Workmen's compensation
evolved to remedy the evils associated with the situation in the early years of the industrial revolution
when injured workingmen had to rely on damage suits to get recompense.
2. ID.; ID.; LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER PREDETERMINED; RIGHT OF INJURED WORKER TO FILE TORT
SUIT, GIVEN UP. Workmen's compensation represents a compromise. In return for the near certainty
of receiving a sum of money fixed by law, the injured worker gives up the right to subject the employer
to a tort suit for huge amounts of damages. Thus, liability not only disregards the element of fault but it
is also a pre-determined amount based on the wages of the injured worker and in certain cases, the
actual cost of rehabilitation. The worker does not receive the total damages for his pain and suffering
which he could otherwise claim in a civil suit. The employer is required to act swiftly on compensation
claims. An administrative agency supervises the program. And because the overwhelming mass of
workingmen are benefited by the compensation system, individual workers who may want to sue for big
amounts of damages must yield to the interests of their entire working class.
D E C I S I O N
MAKASIAR, J p:
This is a petition to review the order of the former Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, dated
December 16, 1968 dismissing petitioners' complaint for damages on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation (hereinafter referred
to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June
28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Specifically, the
complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and
deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working
underground. Portion of the complaint reads: LexLib
"xxx xxx xxx
"9. That for sometime prior and up to June 28, 1967, the defendant PHILEX, with gross and reckless
negligence and imprudence and deliberate failure to take the required precautions for the due
protection of the lives of its men working underground at the time, and in utter violation of the laws and
the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the Government pursuant thereto, allowed great amount
of water and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above Block 43-S-1 which seeped
through and saturated the 600 ft. column of broken ore and rock below it, thereby exerting tremendous
pressure on the working spaces at its 4300 level, with the result that, on the said date, at about 4 o'clock
in the afternoon, with the collapse of all underground supports due to such enormous pressure,
approximately 500,000 cubic feet of broken ores, rocks, mud and water, accompanied by surface
boulders, blasted through the tunnels and flowed out and filled in, in a matter of approximately five (5)
minutes, the underground workings, ripped timber supports and carried off materials, machines and
equipment which blocked all avenues of exit, thereby trapping within its tunnels of all its men above
referred to, including those named in the next preceding paragraph, represented by the plaintiffs
herein;
"10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant PHlLEX's mine on the said
date, five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust; 22 were rescued within the next 7 days;
and the rest, 21 in number, including those referred to in paragraph 7 herein above, were left
mercilessly to their fate, notwithstanding the fact that up to then, a great many of them were still alive,
entombed in the tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued due to defendant PHlLEX's decision to
abandon rescue operations, in utter disregard of its bounded legal and moral duties in the premises;
"xxx xxx xxx;
"13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and the rules and regulations duly promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities as set out by the Special Committee above referred to, in their
Report of Investigation, pages 7-13, Annex `B' hereof, but also failed completely to provide its men
working underground the necessary security for the protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact
that it had vast financial resources, it having made, during the year 1966 alone, a total operating income
of P38,220,254.00, or net earnings, after taxes of P19,117,394.00, as per its 11th Annual Report for the
year ended December 31, 1966, and with aggregate assets totalling P45,794,103.00 as of December 31,
1966;
"xxx xxx xxx" ( pp. 42-44, rec.).
A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of action of
petitioners based on an industrial accident are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act (Act 3428, as amended by RA 772) and that the former Court of First Instance has no
jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an opposition dated May 27, 1968 to the said motion to
dismiss claiming that the causes of action are not based on the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code allowing the award of actual, moral and
exemplary damages, particularly: LibLex
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
"Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict.
"(b) Art. 1173 The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence
which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171
and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.
"Art. 2201. . . .
"In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages
which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
"Art. 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence."
After a reply and a rejoinder thereto were filed, respondent Judge issued an order dated June 27, 1968
dismissing the case on the ground that it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission. On petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said order, respondent
Judge, on September 23, 1968, reconsidered and set aside his order of June 27, 1968 and allowed Philex
to file an answer to the complaint. Philex moved to reconsider the aforesaid order which was opposed
by petitioners.
On December 16, 1968, respondent Judge dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that in
accordance with the established jurisprudence, the Workmen's Compensation Commission has exclusive
original jurisdiction over damage or compensation claims for work-connected deaths or injuries of
workmen or employees, irrespective of whether or not the employer was negligent, adding that if the
employer's negligence results in work-connected deaths or injuries, the employer shall, pursuant to
Section 4-A of the Workmen's Compensation Act, pay additional compensation equal to 50% of the
compensation fixed in the Act. Cdpr
Petitioners thus filed the present petition.
In their brief, petitioners raised the following assignment of errors:
I
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PLAINTIFFS-PETITIONERS' COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF
JURISDICTION.
II
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN CLAIMS FOR
DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION UNDER THE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT."
A
In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the lower court has jurisdiction over the cause of
action since the complaint is based on the provisions of the Civil Code on damages, particularly Articles
2176, 2178, 1173, 2201 and 2231, and not on the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. They
point out that the complaint alleges gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take
the necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees working underground. They also
assert that since Philex opted to file a motion to dismiss in the court a quo, the allegations in their
complaint including those contained in the annexes are deemed admitted.
In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that respondent Judge failed to see the
distinction between the claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the
claims for damages based on gross negligence of Philex under the Civil Code. They point out that
workmen's compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting from injury, disability or
death of the working man through industrial accident or disease, without regard to the fault or
negligence of the employer, while the claim for damages under the Civil Code which petitioners pursued
in the regular court, refers to the employer's liability for reckless and wanton negligence resulting in the
death of the employees and for which the regular court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.
On the other hand, Philex asserts that work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively under the
provisions of Sections 5 and 46 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which read:
"SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee
by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies
accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the
employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury . . .
"SEC. 46. Jurisdiction. The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, . . ."
Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. 855 [1956]) where it was held that "all claims
of workmen against their employer for damages due to accident suffered in the course of employment
shall be investigated and adjudicated by the Workmen's Compensation Commission," subject to appeal
to the Supreme Court. cdphil
Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent, does not remove the case from the
exclusive character of recoveries under the Workmen's Compensation Act; because Section 4-A of the
Act provides an additional compensation in case the employer fails to comply with the requirements of
safety as imposed by law to prevent accidents. In fact, it points out that Philex voluntarily paid the
compensation due the petitioners and all the payments have been accepted in behalf of the deceased
miners, except the heirs of Nazarito Floresca who insisted that they are entitled to a greater amount of
damages under the Civil Code.
In the hearing of this case, then Undersecretary of Labor Israel Bocobo, then Atty. Edgardo Angara, now
President of the University of the Philippines, Justice Manuel Lazaro, as corporate counsel and Assistant
General Manager of the GSIS Legal Affairs Department, and Commissioner on Elections, formerly UP Law
Center Director Froilan Bacungan, appeared as amici curiae and thereafter, submitted their respective
memoranda.
The issue to be resolved as WE stated in the resolution of November 26, 1976, is: cdrep
"Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his death under the
Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative, that is to say, whether his or his
heirs' action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the
Workmen's Compensation Act or whether they have a right of selection or choice of action between
availing of the worker's right under the Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts
under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue
of negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other employees or whether they may avail
cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's Compensation
Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts."
There are divergent opinions in this case. Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that an injured employee or
worker, or the heirs in case of his death, may initiate a complaint to recover damages (not
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act) with the regular court on the basis of
negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil Code provisions. Atty. Angara believes otherwise. He
submits that the remedy of an injured employee for work-connected injury or accident is exclusive in
accordance with Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, while Atty. Bacungan's position is that
the action is selective. He opines that the heirs of the employee in case of his death have a right of
choice to avail themselves of the benefits provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or to sue in
the regular court under the Civil Code for higher damages from the employer by virtue of negligence of
the latter. Atty. Bocobo's stand is the same as that of Atty. Bacungan and adds that once the heirs elect
the remedy provided for under the Act, they are no longer entitled to avail themselves of the remedy
provided for under the Civil Code by filing an action for higher damages in the regular court, and vice
versa.
On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that they have amicably settled their claim with respondent Philex. In the resolution of
September 7, 1978, WE dismissed the petition only insofar as the aforesaid petitioners are connected, it
appearing that there are other petitioners in this case.
WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try the case.
It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the Workmen's
Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral) in the total amount of
eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825,000.00) pesos. Petitioners did not invoke the provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation
appeared in the complaint that the employees died from accident arising out of and in the course of
their employments. The complaint instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure
on the part of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in occurred
resulting in the death of the employees working underground. Settled is the rule that in ascertaining
whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's compensation claim or a claim for
damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the averments or allegations in the
complaint (Belandres vs. Lopez Sugar Mill, Co., Inc., 97 Phil. 100). LibLex
In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a contractual relationship.
The alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad faith on the part of
Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which it may be held liable for damages. The provisions of the
Civil Code on cases of breach of contract when there is fraud or bad faith, read:
"Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
"Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good
faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the
obligation was constituted.
"In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages
which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation."
Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the payment of all kinds of damages, as assessed by
the court.
The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act differs from that in
giving damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of compensation
distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under the acts being made as compensation
and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate the harshness and insecurity of
industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is liable whether negligence exists or
not since liability is created by law. Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable
wrong on the part of the employer (99 C.J.S. 36).
In other words, under the compensation acts, the employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for
loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated, even if
the death or injury is not due to the fault of the employer (Murillo vs. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the
other hand, damages are awarded to one as a vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the
indemnity recoverable by a person who has sustained injury either in his person, property or relative
rights, through the act or default of another (25 C.J.S. 452). prLL
The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of proving the causal relation between
the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury as well as the damages suffered. While under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, there is a presumption in favor of the deceased or injured employee that
the death or injury is work-connected or work-aggravated; and the employer has the burden to prove
otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Cario vs. WCC, 93 SCRA 551; Maria Cristina Fertilizer
Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228).
The claim of petitioners that the case is not cognizable by the Workmen's Compensation Commission
then, now Employees Compensation Commission, is strengthened by the fact that unlike in the Civil
Code, the Workmen's Compensation Act did not contain any provision for an award of actual, moral and
exemplary damages. What the Act provided was merely the right of the heirs to claim limited
compensation for the death in the amount of six thousand (P6,000.00) pesos plus burial expenses of two
hundred (P200.00) pesos, and medical expenses when incurred (Sections 8, 12 and 13, Workmen's
Compensation Act), and an additional compensation of only 50% if the complaint alleges failure on the
part of the employer to "install and maintain safety appliances or to take other precautions for the
prevention of accident or occupational disease" (Section 4-A, Ibid.). In the case at bar, the amount
sought to be recovered is over and above that which was provided under the Workmen's Compensation
Act and which cannot be granted by the Commission.
Moreover, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, compensation benefits should be paid to an
employee who suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the industry of his
employer but caused by factors outside the industrial plant of his employer. Under the Civil Code, the
liability of the employer, depends on breach of contract or tort. The Workmen's Compensation Act was
specifically enacted to afford protection to the employees or workmen. It is a social legislation designed
to give relief to the workman who has been the victim of an accident causing his death or ailment or
injury in the pursuit of his employment (Abong vs. WCC, 54 SCRA 379).
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have
a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker's right under the
Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages
(actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers
or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular
courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442, ruled that
an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the
Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher
damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. cdphil
In Pacaa WE said:
"In the analogous case of Esguerra vs. Muoz Palma, involving the application of Section 6 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act on the injured workers' right to sue third-party tortfeasors in the regular
courts, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, again speaking for the Court, pointed out that the injured worker has the
choice of remedies but cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously and thus balanced the
relative advantage of recourse under the Workmen's Compensation Act as against an ordinary action.
"As applied to this case, petitioner Esguerra cannot maintain his action for damages against the
respondents (defendants below), because he has elected to seek compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Law, and his claim (case No. 44549 of the Compensation Commission) was being
processed at the time he filed this action in the Court of First Instance. It is argued for petitioner that as
the damages recoverable under the Civil Code are much more extensive than the amounts that may be
awarded under the Workmen's Compensation Act, they should not be deemed incompatible. As already
indicated, the injured laborer was initially free to choose either to recover from the employer the fixed
amounts set by the Compensation Law or else, to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the
tortfeasor for higher damages. While perhaps not as profitable, the smaller indemnity obtainable by the
first course is balanced by the claimant's being relieved of the burden of proving the causal connection
between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury, and of having to establish the extent of the
damage suffered; issues that are apt to be troublesome to establish satisfactorily. Having staked his
fortunes on a particular remedy, petitioner is precluded from pursuing the alternate course, at least
until the prior claim is rejected by the Compensation Commission. Anyway, under the proviso of Section
6 aforequoted, if the employer Franklin Baker Company recovers, by derivative action against the
alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater than the compensation he may have paid the herein petitioner, the
excess accrues to the latter."
Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Muoz Palma (104 Phil. 582), applies to third-party
tortfeasor, said rule should likewise apply to the employer-tortfeasor.
Insofar as the heirs of Nazarito Floresca are concerned, as already stated, the petition has been
dismissed in the resolution of September 7, 1978 in view of the amicable settlement reached by Philex
and the said heirs.
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968
before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr.,
Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino Martinez submitted notices and claims for compensation to
the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have been paid in full as of
August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that they be paid in installments (pp.
106-107, rec.). Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to
dismiss dated May 27, 1968 (pp. 121-122, rec.) in the lower court, but they set up the defense that the
claims were filed under the Workmen's Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of
the committee created to investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence and
violation of law by Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to the then
Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only (p. 76, rec.). LLpr
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court
because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with
the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of
said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have
sought redress under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for
compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which
nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before
the lower court, the payments made under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted from
the damages that may be decreed in their favor.
B
Contrary to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the Court does not legislate in the instant case. The
Court merely applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice then secured by
Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, and now by Sections 6, 7, and
9 of Article II of the DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES of the 1973 Constitution, as
amended, and as implemented by Articles 2176, 2177, 2178, 1173, 2201, 2216, 2231 and 2232 of the
New Civil Code of 1950.
To emphasize, the 1935 Constitution declares that:
"Sec. 5. The promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people
should be the concern of the State" (Art. II).
"Sec. 6. The State shall afford protection to labor, especially to working women, and minors, and shall
regulate the relations between landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and in
agriculture. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration" (Art. XIV).
The 1973 Constitution likewise commands the State to "promote social justice to insure the dignity,
welfare, and security of all the people;" ". . . regulate the use . . . and disposition of private property, and
equitably diffuse property ownership and profits"; "establish, maintain and ensure adequate social
services in the field of education, health, housing, employment, welfare and social security to guarantee
the enjoyment by the people of a decent standard of living" (Sections 6 and 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution);
". . . afford protection to labor, . . . and regulate the relations between workers and employers . . ., and
assure the rights of workers to . . . just and humane conditions of work" (Sec. 9, Art. II, 1973
Constitution, italics supplied).
The foregoing constitutional guarantees in favor of labor institutionalized in Section 9 of Article II of the
1973 Constitution and re-stated as a declaration of basic policy in Article 3 of the New Labor Code, thus:
"Art 3. Declaration of basic policy. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work" (italics
supplied).
The aforestated constitutional principles as implemented by the aforementioned articles of the New
Civil Code cannot be impliedly repealed by the restrictive provisions of Article 173 of the New Labor
Code. Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (before it was amended by R. A. No. 772 on June
20, 1952), predecessor of Article 173 of the New Labor Code, has been superseded by the aforestated
provisions of the New Civil Code, a subsequent law, which took effect on August 30, 1950, which obey
the constitutional mandates of social justice enhancing as they do the rights of the workers as against
their employers. Article 173 of the New Labor Code seems to diminish the rights of the workers and
therefore collides with the social justice guarantee of the Constitution and the liberal provisions of the
New Civil Code. cdrep
The guarantees of social justice embodied in Sections 6, 7 and 9 of Article II of the 1973 Constitution are
statements of legal principles to be applied and enforced by the courts. Mr. Justice Robert Jackson in the
case of West Virginia State Board of Education vs. Barnette, with characteristic eloquence, enunciated:
"The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote;
they depend on the outcome of no elections" (319 U.S. 625, 638, 87 L. ed. 1638, italics supplied).
In case of any doubt which may be engendered by Article 173 of the New Labor Code, both the New
Labor Code and the Civil Code direct that the doubts should be resolved in favor of the workers and
employees.
Thus, Article 4 of the New Labor Code, otherwise known as Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended,
promulgated on May 1, 1974, but which took effect six months thereafter, provides that "all doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules
and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Art. 2, Labor Code).
Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail."
More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs that. "In case of doubt, all labor
legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the
laborer."
Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act provided:
"Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee
by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies
accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the
employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury (italics supplied).
"Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same may stipulate with
such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply exclusively to injuries received outside
the Islands through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the
employment; and all service contracts made in the manner prescribed in this section shall be presumed
to include such agreement."
Only the second paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act No. 3428, was amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, thus:
"Sec. 5. Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee
by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies
accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the
employer under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury.
"Employers contracting laborers in the Philippine Islands for work outside the same shall stipulate with
such laborers that the remedies prescribed by this Act shall apply to injuries received outside the Island
through accidents happening in and during the performance of the duties of the employment. Such
stipulation shall not prejudice the right of the laborers to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation
Law of the place where the accident occurs, should such law be more favorable to them (As amended by
section 5 of Republic Act No. 772)."
Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor impliedly the applicable provisions of
the New Civil Code, because said Article 173 provides:
"Art, 173. Exclusiveness of liability. Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State
Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to
the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the
employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall bar the recovery of
benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered
Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred eighty-six, as
amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-
eight hundred Sixty-four, as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System,
during the period of such payment for the same disability or death, and conversely" (italics supplied).
As above-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor Code expressly repealed only Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code, R.A. No. 1161, as amended, C.A. No. 186, as amended, R.A. No. 610, as amended,
R.A. No. 4864, as amended, and all other laws whose benefits are administered by the System (referring
to the GSIS or SSS). cdll
Unlike Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act as afore-quoted, Article 173 of the New Labor
Code does not even remotely, much less expressly, repeal the New Civil Code provisions heretofore
quoted.
It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New Civil Code for damages arising from negligence, is
not barred by Article 173 of the New Labor Code. And the damages recoverable under the New Civil
Code are not administered by the System provided for by the New Labor Code, which defines the
"System" as referring to the Government Service Insurance System or the Social Security System (Art.
167 [c], [d] and [e] of the New Labor Code).
Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form part of the law
of the land.
Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides:
"Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines."
The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in People vs. Licera, ruled:
"Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in
themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation
placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since
the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that
the construed law purports to carry into effect" (65 SCRA 270, 272-273 [1975]).
WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the statute itself
(Caltex vs. Palomer, 18 SCRA 247; 124 Phil. 763).
The afore-quoted provisions of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, before and after it was
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952, limited the right of recovery in favor of the
deceased, ailing or injured employee to the compensation provided for therein. Said Section 5 was not
accorded controlling application by the Supreme Court in the 1970 case of Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus
Company (32 SCRA 442) when WE ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from
the employer the fixed amount set by the Workmen's Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary
civil action against the tortfeasor for greater damages; but he cannot pursue both courses of action
simultaneously. Said Pacaa case penned by Mr. Justice Teehankee, applied Article 1711 of the Civil
Code as against the Workmen's Compensation Act, reiterating the 1969 ruling in the case of Valencia vs.
Manila Yacht Club (28 SCRA 724, June 30, 1969) and the 1958 case of Esguerra vs. Muoz Palma (104
Phil. 582), both penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes. Said Pacaa case was concurred in by Justices J.B.L.
Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Villamor.
Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely a re-statement of the first
paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and does not even refer,
neither expressly nor impliedly, to the Civil Code as Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act did,
with greater reason said Article 173 must be subject to the same interpretation adopted in the cases of
Pacaa, Valencia and Esguerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the aforesaid three (3) cases is faithful
to and advances the social justice guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
It should be stressed likewise that there is no similar provision on social justice in the American Federal
Constitution, nor in the various state constitutions of the American Union. Consequently, the restrictive
nature of the American decisions on the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot limit the range and
compass of OUR interpretation of our own laws, especially Article 1711 of the New Civil Code, vis-a-vis
Article 173 of the New Labor Code, in relation to Section 5 of Article II and Section 6 of Article XIV of the
1935 Constitution then, and now Sections 6, 7 and 9 of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of
Article II of the 1973 Constitution. llcd
The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property rights of the employer. The right
to life is guaranteed specifically by the due process clause of the Constitution. To relieve the employer
from liability for the death of his workers arising from his gross or wanton fault or failure to provide
safety devices for the protection of his employees or workers against the dangers which are inherent in
underground mining, is to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs of the right to recover indemnity
for the loss of the life of the worker and the consequent loss to his family without due process of law.
The dissent in effect condones and therefore encourages such gross or wanton neglect on the part of
the employer to comply with his legal obligation to provide safety measures for the protection of the
life, limb and health of his worker. Even from the moral viewpoint alone, such attitude is un-Christian.
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the Constitution, as
implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not an exercise of the power of law-making, but
is rendering obedience to the mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation
aforementioned.
The Court, to repeat, is not legislating in the instant case.
It is axiomatic that no ordinary statute can override a constitutional provision.
The words of Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act and of Article 173 of the New Labor Code
subvert the rights of the petitioners as surviving heirs of the deceased mining employees. Section 5 of
the Workmen's Compensation Act and Article 173 of the New Labor Code are retrogressive; because
they are a throwback to the obsolete laissez-faire doctrine of Adam Smith enunciated in 1776 in his
treatise Wealth of Nations (Collier's Encyclopedia, Vol. 21, p. 93, 1964), which has been discarded soon
after the close of the 18th century due to the Industrial Revolution that generated the machines and
other mechanical devices (beginning with Eli Whitney's cotton gin of 1793 and Robert Fulton's
steamboat of 1807) for production and transportation which are dangerous to life, limb and health. The
old socio-political-economic philosophy of live-and-let-live is now superseded by the benign Christian
shibboleth of live-and-help others to live. Those who profess to be Christians should not adhere to Cain's
selfish affirmation that he is not his brother's keeper. In this our civilization, each one of us is our
brother's keeper. No man is an island. To assert otherwise is to be as atavistic and ante-deluvian as the
1837 case of Prisley vs. Fowler (3 MN 1,150 reprint 1030) invoked by the dissent. The Prisley case was
decided in 1837 during the era of economic royalists and robber barons of America. Only ruthless,
unfeeling capitalistics and egoistic reactionaries continue to pay obeisance to such un-Christian doctrine.
The Prisley rule humiliates man and debases him; because the decision derisively refers to the lowly
worker as "servant" and utilizes with aristocratic arrogance "master" for "employer." It robs man of his
inherent dignity and dehumanizes him. To stress this affront to human dignity, WE only have to restate
the quotation from Prisley, thus: "The mere relation of the master and the servant never can imply an
obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may reasonably be
expected to do himself." This is the very selfish doctrine that provoked the American Civil War which
generated so much hatred and drew so much precious blood on American plains and valleys from 1861
to 1864.
"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures
man's survival and ennobles him. In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit
giveth life."
C
It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the courts cannot legislate.
That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "No judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws."
Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil Code, recognizes that in certain
instances, the court, in the language of Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in the
law; because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and therefore cannot envisage all
possible cases to which the law may apply. Nor has the human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all
situations. prcd
But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code, the founding fathers of the American
Constitution foresaw and recognized the eventuality that the courts may have to legislate to supply the
omissions or to clarify the ambiguities in the American Constitution and the statutes.
Thus, Alexander Hamilton pragmatically admits that judicial legislation may be justified but denies that
the power of the Judiciary to nullify statutes may give rise to Judicial tyranny (The Federalist, Modern
Library, pp. 503-511, 1937 ed.). Thomas Jefferson went farther to concede that the court is even
independent of the Nation itself (A.F.L. vs. American Sash Company, 1949 335 US 538).
Many of the great expounders of the American Constitution likewise share the same view. Chief Justice
Marshall pronounced: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial department to say what
the law is" (Marbury vs. Madison 1 Cranch 127 1803), which was re-stated by Chief Justice Hughes when
he said that "the Constitution is what the judge says it is" (Address on May 3, 1907, quoted by President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt on March 9, 1937). This was reiterated by Justice Cardozo who pronounced
that "No doubt the limits for the judge are narrower. He legislates only between gaps. He fills the open
spaces in the law." (The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 113). In the language of Chief Justice Harlan F.
Stone, "The only limit to the judicial legislation is the restraint of the judge" (U.S. vs. Butler 297 U.S. 1
Dissenting Opinion, p. 79), which view is also entertained by Justice Frankfurter and Justice Robert
Jackson. In the rhetoric of Justice Frankfurter, "the courts breathe life, feeble or strong, into the inert
pages of the Constitution and all statute books."
It should be stressed that the liability of the employer under Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act or Article 173 of the New Labor Code is limited to death, ailment or injury caused by the nature of
the work, without any fault on the part of the employers. It is correctly termed no-fault liability. Section
5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, or Article 173 of the New Labor Code, does not
cover the tortious liability of the employer occasioned by his fault or culpable negligence in failing to
provide the safety devices required by the law for the protection of the life, limb and health of the
workers. Under either Section 5 or Article 173, the employer remains liable to pay compensation
benefits to the employee, whose death, ailment or injury is work-connected, even if the employer has
faithfully and diligently furnished all the safety measures and contrivances decreed by the law to protect
the employee.
The written word is no longer the "sovereign talisman." In the epigrammatic language of Mr. Justice
Cardozo, "the law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the
sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal" (Wood vs. Duff Gordon 222 NW 88; Cardozo, The Nature of
the Judicial Process 100). Justice Cardozo warned that: "Sometimes the conservatism of judges has
threatened for an interval to rob the legislation of its efficacy. . . . Precedents established in those items
exert an unhappy influence even now" (citing Pound, Common Law and Legislation 21 Harvard Law
Review 383, 387).
Finally, Justice Holmes delivered the coup de grace when he pragmatically admitted, although with a
cautionary undertone: "that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are
confined from molar to molecular motions" (Southern Pacific Company vs. Jensen, 244 US 204 1917).
And in the subsequent case of Springer vs. Government (277 US 188, 210-212, 72 L. ed. 845, 852-853),
Justice Holmes pronounced:
"The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the
more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the
other. . . . When we come to the fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be
received with a certain latitude or our government could not go on.
"To make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who but for such action would be free from it is to
legislate yet it is what the judges do whenever they determine which of two competing principles of
policy shall prevail.
"xxx xxx xxx
"It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do
not and cannot carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical
precision and divide the branches into waterlight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so,
which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires."
True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should not legislate, but grudgingly
concede that in certain cases judges do legislate. They criticize the assumption by the courts of such law-
making power as dangerous for it may degenerate into Judicial tyranny. They include Blackstone, Jeremy
Bentham, Justice Black, Justice Harlan, Justice Roberts, Justice David Brewer, Ronald Dworkin, Rolf
Sartorious, Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. But said Justices, jurists or legal commentators, who
either deny the power of the courts to legislate in-between gaps of the law, or decry the exercise of such
power, have not pointed to examples of the exercise by the courts of such law-making authority in the
interpretation and application of the laws in specific cases that gave rise to judicial tyranny or
oppression or that such judicial legislation has not protected public interest or individual welfare,
particularly the lowly workers or the under-privileged. LLjur
On the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and statutory
enactments expanding the scope of such provisions to protect human rights. Foremost among them is
the doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. Arizona (384 US 436 1964), Gideon vs. Wainright (372 US 335),
Escubedo vs. Illinois (378 US 478), which guaranteed the accused under custodial investigation his rights
to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights as even as it protects him against the
use of force or intimidation to extort confession from him. These rights are not found in the American
Bill of Rights. These rights are now institutionalized in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
Only the peace-and-order adherents were critical of the activism of the American Supreme Court led by
Chief Justice Earl Warren.
Even the definition of identical offenses for purposes of the double jeopardy provision was developed by
American judicial decisions, not by amendment to the Bill of Rights on double jeopardy (see Justice
Laurel in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260, 261-268). And these judicial decisions have been re-stated in
Section 7 of Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as well as in Section 9 of Rule 117 of the
1964 Revised Rules of Court. In both provisions, the second offense is the same as the first offense if the
second offense is an attempt to commit the first or frustration thereof or necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first offense.
The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of Rights. They were also developed by
judicial decisions in the United States and in the Philippines even before people vs. Ylagan (58 Phil. 851-
853).
Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy vs. Ferguson (163 US 537) as
securing to the Negroes equal but separate facilities, which doctrine was revoked in the case of Brown
vs. Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294), holding that the equal protection clause means that the
Negroes are entitled to attend the same schools attended by the whites equal facilities in the same
school which was extended to public parks and public buses. De-segregation, not segregation, is now
the governing principle.
Among other examples, the due process clause was interpreted in the case of People vs. Pomar (46 Phil.
440) by a conservative, capitalistic court to invalidate a law granting maternity leave to working women
according primacy to property rights over human rights. The case of People vs. Pomar is no longer the
rule.
As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 US 45, 76, 49 L. ed. 937, 949), Justice Holmes
had been railing against the conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee of due process to protect
property rights as against human rights or social justice for the working man. The law fixing maximum
hours of labor was invalidated. Justice Holmes was vindicated finally in 1936 in the case of West Coast
Hotel vs. Parish (300 US 377-79; 81 L. ed. 703) where the American Supreme Court upheld the rights of
workers to social justice in the form of guaranteed minimum wage for women and minors, working
hours not exceeding eight (8) daily, and maternity leave for women employees.
The power of judicial review and the principle of separation of powers as well as the rule on political
questions have been evolved and grafted into the American Constitution by judicial decisions (Marbury
vs. Madison, supra; Coleman vs. Miller, 307 US 433, 83 L. ed. 1385; Springer vs. Government, 277 US
210-212, 72 L. ed. 852, 853).
It is noteworthy that Justice Black, who seems to be against judicial legislation, penned a separate
concurring opinion in the case of Coleman vs. Miller, supra, affirming the doctrine of political question
as beyond the ambit of judicial review. There is nothing in both the American and Philippine
Constitutions expressly providing that the power of the courts is limited by the principle of separation of
powers and the doctrine on political questions. There are numerous cases in Philippine jurisprudence
applying the doctrines of separation of powers and political questions and invoking American
precedents.
Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine Constitutions expressly vest in the
Supreme Court the power to review the validity or constitutionality of any legislative enactment or
executive act.
WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND THE
CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD A GREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE
DECREED IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THE PAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM PURSUANT TO
THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J, Teehankee, Plana, Escolin, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
Abad Santos and Relova, JJ., took no part.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-8888. November 29, 1957.]
SONG KIAT CHOCOLATE FACTORY, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and
VICENTE GELLA, in his capacity as Treasurer of the Philippines, defendants-appellees.
Rodegelio M. Jalandoni for appellant.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellee, Vicente Gella.
Nat. M. Balbao and F.E. Evangelista for appellee, Central Bank of the Philippines.
SYLLABUS
1. TAXATION; FOREIGN EXCHANGE TAX; EXEMPTION OF CHOCOLATE FROM TAXATION,
CONSTRUED. The exemption from taxation provided in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 601 refers to
"chocolate" as a manufactured or finished product. It does not include "cocoa beans".
2. STATUTES; INTERPRETATION OF LAWS IS FOR THE COURTS. The interpretation of laws is for
the courts. The courts are not bound by one legislator's opinion, expressed in Congressional dewbates,
concerning the application of existing laws.
D E C I S I O N
BENGZON, J p:
The question in this appeal is whether cocoa beans may be considered as "chocolate" for the purposes
of exemption from the foreign exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601 as amended.
During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9, 1953, the plaintiff-appellant imported sun-dried
cocoa beans for which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17 per cent totalling P74,671.04. Claiming
exemption from said tax under section 2 of same Act, it sued the Central Bank that had exacted
payment; and in its amended complaint it included the Treasurer of the Philippines. The suit was filed in
the Manila Court of First Instance, wherein defendants submitted in due time a motion to dismiss on the
grounds: first, the complaint stated no cause of action because cocoa beans were not "chocolate"; and
second, it was a suit against the Government without the latter's consent.
The Hon. Gregorio S. Narvasa, Judge, sustained the motion, and dismissed the case by his order of
November 19, 1954. Hence this appeal.
The lower court, appellant contends, erred in dismissing the case and in holding that the term
"chocolate" does not include sun-dried cocoa beans.
SEC. 2 of the aforesaid Act provides that "the tax collected or foreign exchange used for the payment of
costs transportation and/or other charges incident to importation into the Philippines of rice, flour . . .
soya beans, butterfat, chocolate, malt syrup . . . shall be refunded to any importer making application
therefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation . . .."
In support of its contention appellant quotes from dictionaries and encyclopedias interchangeably using
the words "chocolate", "cacao" and "cocoa". Yet we notice that the quotations refer to "cocoa" as
chocolate nut" "chocolate bean" or "chocolate tree." And the legal exemption refers to "chocolate"
not the bean, nor the nut nor the tree. We agree with the Solicitor General and the other counsel of
respondents that in common parlance the law is presumed to refer to it 1 chocolate is a
manufactured or finished product made out of cocoa beans, or "cacao" beans as they are locally known.
We may take notice of the fact that grocery stores sell powdered cocoa beans as chocolate, labeled
"cocoa powder", or simply "cocoa". They are, however, really chocolate; they are not cocoa beans. The
manufacture of chocolate involves several processes, such as selecting and drying the cocoa beans, then
roasting, grinding, sieving and blending. 2 Cocoa beans do not become chocolate unless and until they
have undergone the manufacturing processes above described. The first is raw material, the other
finished product.
The courts regard "chocolate" as
"Chocolate" is a preparation of roasted cacao beans without the abstraction of the butter and always
contains sugar and added cacao butter. Rockwood & Co., vs. American President Lines, D.C.N.J., 68 F.
Supp. 224, 226.
Chocolate is a cocoa bean roasted, cracked, shelled, crushed, ground, and molded in cakes. It contains
no sugar, and is in general use in families. Sweetened chocolate is manufactured in the same way but
the paste is mixed with sugar, and is used by confectioners in making chocolate confections. In re
Schiling, 53 F. 81, 82, 3 C.C.A. 440.
In view of the foregoing, and having in mind the principle of strict construction of statutes exempting
from taxation, 3 we are of the opinion and so hold, that the exemption for "chocolate" in the above
section 2 does not include "cocoa beans". The one is raw material, the other manufactured consumer
product; the latter is ready for human consumption; the former is not.
However, we cannot stop here, because in August 1954 suit was brought in May 1954 Congress
approved Republic Act 1197 amending section 2 by substituting "cocoa beans" for "chocolate." This
shows, maintains the appellant the Legislature's intention to include cocoa beans in the word
"chocolate." In fact, it goes on, the Committee Chairman who reported House Bill No. 2576 which
became Republic Act 1197, declared before the House:
"Mr. ROCES: Mr. SPEAKER, on line 8 page 1, after the word 'canned', strike out the words, 'fresh, frozen
and' and also the words 'other beef', on line 9 and on the same line, line 9, after the word 'chocolate',
insert the words '(COCOA BEANS)' in parenthesis ( ). I am proposing to insert the words '(COCOA BEANS)'
in parenthesis ( ) after the word "chocolate", Mr. Speaker, in order to clarify any doubt and manifest the
intention of the past Congress that the word 'chocolate' should mean 'cocoa beans.'
In reply to this, appellees point out that said chairman could not have spoken of the Congressional
intention in approving Republic Act 601 because he was not a member of the Congress that passed said
Act. Naturally, all he could state was his own interpretation of such piece of legislation. Courts do not
usually give decisive weight to one legislator's opinion, expressed in Congressional debates concerning
the application of existing laws. 4 Yet even among the legislators taking part in the consideration of the
amendatory statute (Republic Act 1197) the impression prevailed that, as the law then stood 5
chocolate candy or chocolate bar was exempted, but cocoa beans were not. Here are Senator Peralta's
statements during the discussion of the same House Bill No. 2576:
"SENATOR PERALTA: I signed that conference report and I am really bound by it, but, Mr. President, a
few hours ago I received some information which maybe the chairman would like to know, to the effect
that we allow chocolate bar, chocolate candy to come into this country exempt from the 17 per cent tax
when we do not allow cocoa beans, out of which our local manufacturers can make chocolate candy,
exempted. So why do we not take off that exemption for chocolate and instead put 'cocoa beans' so as
to benefit our manufacturers of chocolate candy?
xxx xxx xxx
Senator PERALTA: Yes, I agree with the chairman, only I was just wondering if the chairman, might not
consider the fact that in view of the information, this seems to be inconsistent we allow chocolate to
come here exempt and not exempt cocoa beans which is used by our manufacturers in making
chocolate candy.
And Senator Puyat is quoted as saying in the same connection:
"Mr. PRESIDENT, on the same page (page 1), line 9, delete "cocoa beans". The text as it came to the
Senate was misleading. In the original law the exemption is for chocolate, and the version that we got
from the Lower House is "(cocoa beans)" giving the impression that chocolate and cocoa beans are
synonymous. Now I think this is a sort of a rider, so your committee recommends the deletion of those
words." (Journal of the Senate, July 30, 1954, re H.B. No. 2576, italics ours.)
Other parts of the Congressional record quoted in the briefs would seem to show that in approving
House Bill No. 2576, the Congress agreed to exempt "cocoa beans" instead of chocolate with a view to
favoring local manufacturers of chocolate products. 6 A change of legislative policy, as appellees
contend 7 not a declaration or clarification of previous Congressional purpose. In fact, as indicating
the Government's new policy of exempting for the first time importations of "cocoa beans," there is the
President's proclamation No. 62 of September 2, 1954 issued in accordance with Republic Act No. 1197
specifying that said exemption (of cocoa beans) shall operate from and after September 3, 1954 not
before. As a general rule, it may be added, statutes operate prospectively.
Observe that appellant's cocoa beans had been imported during January-October 1953, i.e. before the
exemption decree.
After the foregoing discussion, it is hardly necessary to express our approval of the lower court's opinion
about plaintiff's cause of action, or the lack of it. And it becomes unnecessary to consider the other
contention of defendants that this is a suit against the Government without its consent.
The order of dismissal is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. "As a general rule words used in a statute are to be given their usual and commonly understood
meaning . . .." C.J.S. p. 639.
2. CF. Encyclopedia Americana (1954) Vol. V, p. 129, 130; Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 5 (1948 ed.)
p. 948.
3. Exemptions are never presumed, the burden is on the claimant to establish clearly his right to
exemption and an alleged grant of exemption will be strictly construed and cannot be made out by
inference or implication but must be beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, since taxation is the rule
and exemption the exception, the intention to make an exemption ought to be expressed in clear and
unambiguous terms. (Cooley on Taxation, 4th ed. Vol. 2 p. 1303.)
4. Interpretation of laws is for the Courts (See 82 C. J. S. pp. 745, 746). Even statutes declaring
"what the law was before" are not binding on courts. Endencia vs. David, 93 Phil., 696, 49 Off. Gaz.,
4825.
5. Section 2 of Republic Act 601 was amended first by Republic Act 814 and later by Republic Act
871. In both amendments "chocolate" was retained.
6. Whereas the exemption of "chocolate" aimed to benefit consumers thereof.
7. See footnote 5.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000.]
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), JUNK VFA MOVEMENT, BISHOP TOMAS MILLAMENA (Iglesia
Filipina Independiente), BISHOP ELMER BOLOCAN (United Church of Christ of the Phil.), DR. REYNALDO
LEGASCA, MD, KILUSANG MAMBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, GABRIELA, PROLABOR,
and the PUBLIC INTEREST LAW CENTER, petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY DOMINGO SIAZON, DEFENSE SECRETARY ORLANDO MERCADO, BRIG.
GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, SENATE PRESIDENT MARCELO FERNAN, SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON,
SENATOR BLAS OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO BIAZON, and SENATOR FRANCISCO TATAD, respondents.
[G.R. No. 138572. October 10, 2000.]
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC.(PHILCONSA), EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA, AMADOGAT
INCIONG, CAMILO L. SABIO, AND RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioners, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, as
Executive Secretary, HON. ORLANDO MERCADO, as Secretary of National Defense, and HON. DOMINGO
L. SIAZON, JR., as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, respondents.
[G.R. No. 138587. October 10, 2000.]
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., RAUL S. ROCO, and SERGIO R. OSMEA III, petitioners, vs. JOSEPH E.
ESTRADA, RONALDO B. ZAMORA, DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., ORLANDO B. MERCADO, MARCELO B.
FERNAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, BLAS F. OPLE and RODOLFO G. BIAZON, respondents.
[G.R. No. 138680. October 10, 2000.]
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its National President, Jose Aguila Grapilon,
petitioners, vs. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, in his capacity as President, Republic of the Philippines, and
HON. DOMINGO SIAZON, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, respondents.
[G.R. No. 138698. October 10, 2000.]
JOVITO R. SALONGA, WIGBERTO TAADA, ZENAIDA QUEZON AVENCEA, ROLANDO SIMBULAN,
PABLITO V. SANIDAD, MA. SOCORRO I. DIOKNO, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, JOKER P. ARROYO, FRANCISCO C.
RIVERA JR., RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, KILOSBAYAN, MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, SENATE PRESIDENT
MARCELO B. FERNAN, SENATOR BLAS F. OPLE, SENATOR RODOLFO G. BLAZON, AND ALL OTHER
PERSONS ACTING THEIR CONTROL, SUPERVISION, DIRECTION, AND INSTRUCTION IN RELATION TO THE
VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT (VFA), respondents.
Romeo B. Igot and Victoria G. delos Reyes for petitioner in G.R. No. 138680.
Eulogia M. Cueva for petitioner IBP.
Ramon A. Gonzales for PHILCONSA.
Wigberto E. Taada and Lorenzo Taada III for petitioners Jovito R. Salonga, Wigberto E. Taada, Sr.,
Agapito A. Aquino, Joker P. Arroyo, and Rene A.V. Saguisag.
Theodore O. Te for petitioners Avancea, Simbulan, Sanidad, Diokno and Rivera, Jr.
SYNOPSIS
The instant petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailed the agreement forged between the RP and
the USA THE VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT, which formalized, among others, the use of installations
in the Philippine territory by the US military personnel to strengthen their defense and security
relationship. On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada ratified the VFA, and then transmitted to
the Senate his letter of ratification and the VFA for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Art. VII of the
1987 Constitution. The Senate subsequently approved the VFA by a 2/3 vote of its members.
From these consolidated petitions, petitioners as legislators, non-governmental organizations,
citizens and taxpayers assailed the constitutionality of the VFA and imputed to respondents grave
abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.
In dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court held: that at the outset, petitioners have no locus standi to
bring the suit because they have not shown any interest in the case nor have they substantiated that
they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the operation of the VFA; that as taxpayers,
they have not established that the VFA involves the illegal disbursement of public funds raised by
taxation; that whether the President referred the VFA to the Senate and the latter extended its
concurrence under Section 21 , Article VII, or Section 25, Article XVIII, is immaterial, for in either case,
the fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory; that with regard to
the ratification by the President of the VFA and the exercise by the Senate of its constitutional power to
concur with the VFA, the Court, absent clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondents, is without power to meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in character
and nature; and that with the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance and with
the exchange of notes between the Philippines and the USA, it now becomes obligatory, under the
principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; REQUIREMENTS TO ALLOW A SUIT CHALLENGING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LAW, ACT OR STATUTE; PETITIONERS HAVE NO LEGAL STANDING TO ASSAIL
THE LEGALITY OF THE VFA IN CASE AT BAR. A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of
a law, act, or statute must show "not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in
immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way." He must show that he has been, or is about to
be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to
some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. In the case before us, petitioners
failed to show, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining
any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not
established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On this
point, it bears stressing that a taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. . . Clearly, inasmuch as no public
funds raised by taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence of any allegation by petitioners that
public funds are being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standing
to assail the legality of the VFA. Similarly, Representatives Wigberto Taada, Agapito Aquino and Joker
Arroyo, as petitioners-legislators, do not possess the requisite locus standi to maintain the present suit. .
. [T]he allegations of impairment of legislative power, such as the delegation of the power of Congress to
grant tax exemptions, are more apparent than real. While it may be true that petitioners pointed to
provisions of the VFA which allegedly impair their legislative powers, petitioners failed however to
sufficiently show that they have in fact suffered direct injury. TcEAIH
2. POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW; PACTA SUNT SERVANDA; EFFECT OF RP'S RATIFICATION
OF THE VFA AND USA'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE VFA AS A TREATY; CASE AT BAR. The records
reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the
United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as the
United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself further to comply
with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the
Constitution. Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the
concurrence of the Senate should be taken as a clear an unequivocal expression of our nation's consent
to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities
embodied thereunder. With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with
the exchange of notes between the Philippines and the United States of America, it now becomes
obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the principles of international law, to be bound by the
terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, declares that the
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations. As
a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for
the conduct of its international relations. While the international obligation devolves upon the state and
not upon any particular branch, institution, or individual member of its government, the Philippines is
nonetheless responsible for violations committed by any branch or subdivision of its government or any
official thereof. As an integral part of the community of nations, we are responsible to assure that our
government, Constitution and laws will carry out our international obligation. . . Article 26 of the
convention provides that "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed
by them in good faith." This is known as the principle of pacta sunt servanda which preserves the
sanctity of treaties and have been one of the most fundamental principles of positive international law,
supported by the jurisprudence of international tribunals.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; POWER TO ENTER INTO TREATIES AND
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IS VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT; CASE AT BAR. As regards the power to
enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President, subject
only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In this light, the
negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which
pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers
granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot
intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. Consequently, the acts or judgment calls of the
President involving the VFA specifically the acts of ratification and entering into a treaty and those
necessary or incidental to the exercise of such principal acts squarely fall within the sphere of his
constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down, much less calibrated by this Court, in
the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; ACT OF THE PRESIDENT IN
SUBMITTING THE VFA TO THE SENATE FOR CONCURRENCE UNDER SECTION 21 OF ARTICLE VII, INSTEAD
OF SECTION 25 OF ARTICLE XVIII OF THE CONSTITUTION, NOT A CASE OF. It is the Court's considered
view that the President, in ratifying the VFA and in submitting the same to the Senate for concurrence,
acted within the confines and limits of the powers vested in him by the Constitution. It is of no moment
that the President, in the exercise of his wide latitude of discretion and in the honest belief that the VFA
falls within the ambit of Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution, referred the VFA to the Senate for
concurrence under the aforementioned provision. Certainly, no abuse of discretion, much less a grave,
patent and whimsical abuse of judgment, may be imputed to the President in his act of ratifying the VFA
and referring the same to the Senate for the purpose of complying with the concurrence requirement
embodied in the fundamental law. In doing so, the President merely performed a constitutional task and
exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the functions of his office. Even if he erred in submitting
the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the provisions of Section 21 of Article VII, instead of
Section 25 of Article XVIII of the Constitution, still, the President may not be faulted or scarred, much
less be adjudged guilty of committing an abuse of discretion in some patent, gross, and capricious
manner.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; TREATY-CONCURRING POWER OF THE
SENATE PERTAINS TO THE WISDOM OF AN ACT WHICH IS BEYOND THE PROVINCE OF THE COURTS TO
INQUIRE. As to the power to concur with treaties, the constitution lodges the same with the Senate
alone. Thus, once the Senate performs that power, or exercises its prerogative within the boundaries
prescribed by the Constitution, the concurrence manner, be viewed to constitute an abuse of power,
much less grave abuse thereof. Corollarily, the Senate, in the exercise of its discretion and acting within
the limits of such power, may not be similarly faulted for having simply performed a task conferred and
sanctioned by no less than the fundamental law. For the role of the Senate in relation to treaties is
essentially legislative in character; the Senate, as an independent body possessed of its own erudite
mind, has the prerogative to either accept or reject the proposed agreement, and whatever action it
takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of
the act. In this sense, the Senate partakes a principal, yet delicate, role in keeping the principles of
separation of powers and of checks and balances alive and vigilantly ensures that these cherished
rudiments remain true to their form in a democratic government such as ours. The Constitution thus
animates, through this treaty-concurring power of the Senate, a healthy system of checks and balances
indispensable toward our nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth. True enough, rudimentary is
the principle that matters pertaining to the wisdom of a legislative act are beyond the ambit and
province of the courts to inquire.
PUNO, J., dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEC. 25, ART. XVIII THEREOF; TREATY ALLOWING PRESENCE OF
MILITARY BASES, TROOPS AND FACILITIES SHOULD ALSO BE "RECOGNIZED AS A TREATY BY THE OTHER
CONTRACTING PARTY." . . . Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the Constitution requires that the treaty allowing the
presence of foreign military bases, troops, and facilities should also be "recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting party." In plain language, recognition of the United States as the other contracting
party of the VFA should be by the U.S. President with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TREATY AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT IN U.S. PRACTICE, DISTINGUISHED; THE VFA IS
MORE AKIN TO A SOLE OR PRESIDENTIAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT. . . . In U.S. practice, a "treaty" is
only one of four types of international agreements, namely: Article II treaties, executive agreements
pursuant to a treaty, congressional-executive agreements, and sole executive agreements. The term
"executive agreement" is used both colloquially and in scholarly and governmental writings as a
convenient catch-all to subsume all international agreements intended to bind the United States and
another government, other than those which receive consent of two-thirds of the U.S. Senate. The U.S.
Constitution does not expressly confer authority to make these executive agreements, hence the
authority to make them, their scope, and legal force have been the subject of a long-ongoing debate. . .
At best, the VFA would be more akin to a sole or presidential executive agreement which would be valid
if concluded on the basis of the US. President's exclusive power under the U.S. Constitution. . . While
treaties and sole executive agreements have the same legal effect on state law, sole executive
agreements pale in comparison to treaties when pitted against prior inconsistent acts of Congress.
[C]ommentators have been in general agreement that unlike treaties, sole executive agreements cannot
prevail over prior inconsistent federal legislation. CAIHTE
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; VFA, AS A SOLE EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT UNDER U.S. LAW, FALLS SHORT OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT SET THEREIN ALLOWING PRESENCE OF U.S. TROOPS IN PHILIPPINE
SOIL. In conclusion, after a macro view of the landscape of U.S. foreign relations vis-a-vis U.S.
constitutional law, with special attention on the legal status of sole executive agreements, I respectfully
submit that the Court will be standing on unstable ground if it places a sole executive agreement like the
VFA on the same constitutional plateau as a treaty. Questions remain and the debate continues on the
constitutional basis as well as the legal effects of sole executive agreements under U.S. law. The
observation of Louis Henkin, a noted international and U.S. constitutional law scholar, captures the
sentiments of the framers of the Philippine Constitution and of the Filipinos in crafting Sec. 25, Art. XVIII
of the 1987 Constitution "(o)ften the treaty process will be used at the insistence of other parties to
an agreement because they believe that a treaty has greater 'dignity' than an executive agreement,
because its constitutional effectiveness is beyond doubt, because a treaty will 'commit' the Senate and
the people of the United States and make its subsequent abrogation or violation less likely." With the
cloud of uncertainty still hanging on the exact legal force of sole executive agreements under U.S.
constitutional law, this Court must strike a blow for the sovereignty of our country by drawing a bright
line between the dignity and status of a treaty in contrast with a sole executive agreement. However we
may wish it, the VFA, as a sole executive agreement, cannot climb to the same lofty height that the
dignity of a treaty can reach. Consequently, it falls short of the requirement set by Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of
the 1987 Constitution that the agreement allowing the presence of foreign military troops on Philippine
soil must be "recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state."
D E C I S I O N
BUENA, J p:
Confronting the Court for resolution in the instant consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition
are issues relating to, and borne by, an agreement forged in the turn of the last century between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America the Visiting Forces Agreement.
The antecedents unfold.
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement
which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States
military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the
United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties
agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and
aircraft. 1
In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and
the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On September
16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. 2
With the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises conducted
between the two countries were held in abeyance. Notwithstanding, the defense and security
relationship between the Philippines and the United States of America continued pursuant to the
Mutual Defense Treaty. HIDCTA
On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia
Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo
Severino Jr., to exchange notes on "the complementing strategic interests of the United States and the
Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region." Both sides discussed, among other things, the possible elements
of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). Negotiations by both panels on the VFA led to a
consolidated draft text, which in turn resulted to a final series of conferences and negotiations 3 that
culminated in Manila on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved
the VFA, which was respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and United States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on February 10, 1998.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
ratified the VFA. 4
On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora,
officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, 5 the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the
President 6 and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
The Senate, in turn, referred the VFA to its Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by Senator Blas F.
Ople, and its Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo G. Biazon, for
their joint consideration and recommendation. Thereafter, joint public hearings were held by the two
Committees. 7
On May 3, 1999, the Committees submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 8 recommending the
concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and the creation of a Legislative Oversight Committee to oversee
its implementation. Debates then ensued.
On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved by the Senate, by a two-thirds
(2/3) vote 9 of its members. Senate Resolution No. 443 was then re-numbered as Senate Resolution No.
18. 10
On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between respondent
Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Hubbard.
The VFA, which consists of a Preamble and nine (9) Articles, provides for the mechanism for regulating
the circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present
in the Philippines, and is quoted in its full text, hereunder:
"Article I
Definitions
"As used in this Agreement, 'United States personnel' means United States military and civilian
personnel temporarily in the Philippines in connection with activities approved by the Philippine
Government.
"Within this definition:
"1. The term 'military personnel' refers to military members of the United States Army, Navy,
Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard.
"2. The term 'civilian personnel' refers to individuals who are neither nationals of, nor ordinary
residents in the Philippines and who are employed by the United States armed forces or who are
accompanying the United States armed forces, such as employees of the American Red Cross and the
United Services Organization.
"Article II
Respect for Law
"It is the duty of the United States personnel to respect the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and
to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this-agreement, and, in particular, from any
political activity in the Philippines. The Government of the United States shall take all measures within
its authority to ensure that this is done.
"Article III
Entry and Departure
"1. The Government of the Philippines shall facilitate the admission of United States personnel and
their departure from the Philippines in connection with activities covered by this agreement.
"2. United States military personnel shall be exempt from passport and visa regulations upon
entering and departing the Philippines.
"3. The following documents only, which shall be presented on demand, shall be required in respect
of United States military personnel who enter the Philippines:
"(a) personal identity card issued by the appropriate United States authority showing full name, date
of birth, rank or grade and service number (if any), branch of service and photograph;
"(b) individual or collective document issued by the appropriate United States authority, authorizing
the travel or visit and identifying the individual or group as United States military personnel; and
"(c) the commanding officer of a military aircraft or vessel shall present a declaration of health, and
when required by the cognizant representative of the Government of the Philippines, shall conduct a
quarantine inspection and will certify that the aircraft or vessel is free from quarantinable diseases. Any
quarantine inspection of United States aircraft or United States vessels or cargoes thereon shall be
conducted by the United States commanding officer in accordance with the international health
regulations as promulgated by the World Health Organization, and mutually agreed procedures.
"4. United States civilian personnel shall be exempt from visa requirements but shall present, upon
demand, valid passports upon entry and departure of the Philippines
"5. If the Government of the Philippines has requested the removal of any United States personnel
from its territory, the United States authorities shall be responsible for receiving the person concerned
within its own territory or otherwise disposing of said person outside of the Philippines.
"Article IV
Driving and Vehicle Registration
1. Philippine authorities shall accept as valid, without test or fee, a driving permit or license issued
by the appropriate United States authority to United States personnel for the operation of military or
official vehicles.
2. Vehicles owned by the Government of the United States need not be registered, but shall have
appropriate markings.
"Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction
1. Subject to the provisions of this article:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to
offenses committed within the Philippines and punishable under the law of the Philippines. ETIcHa
(b) United States military authorities shall have the right to exercise within the Philippines all
criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the military law of the United States over
United States personnel in the Philippines.
2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel with
respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the Philippines, punishable under the
laws of the Philippines, but not under the laws of the United States.
(b) United States authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction over United States personnel with
respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the United States, punishable under
the laws of the United States, but not under the laws of the Philippines.
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of this article, an offense relating to security
means:
(1) treason;
(2) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to national defense.
"3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over all offenses
committed by United States personnel, except in cases provided for in paragraphs 1(b), 2(b), and 3(b) of
this Article.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over United
States personnel subject to the military law of the United States in relation to.
(1) offenses solely against the property or security of the United States or offenses solely against
the property or person of United States personnel; and
(2) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in performance of official duty.
(c) The authorities of either government may request the authorities of the other government to
waive their primary right to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case.
(d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States military authorities to maintain good order
and discipline among their forces, Philippine authorities will, upon request by the United States, waive
their primary right to exercise jurisdiction except in cases of particular importance to the Philippines. If
the Government of the Philippines determines that the case is of particular importance, it shall
communicate such determination to the United States authorities within twenty (20) days after the
Philippine authorities receive the United States request.
(e) When the United States military commander determines that an offense charged by authorities
of the Philippines against United states personnel arises out of an act or omission done in the
performance of official duty, the commander will issue a certificate setting forth such determination.
This certificate will be transmitted to the appropriate authorities of the Philippines and will constitute
sufficient proof of performance of official duty for the purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2) of this Article. In
those cases where the Government of the Philippines believes the circumstances of the case require a
review of the duty certificate, United States military authorities and Philippine authorities shall consult
immediately. Philippine authorities at the highest levels may also present any information bearing on its
validity. United States military authorities shall take full account of the Philippine position. Where
appropriate, United States military authorities will take disciplinary or other action against offenders in
official duty cases, and notify the Government of the Philippines of the actions taken.
(f) If the government having the primary right does not exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the
authorities of the other government as soon as possible.
(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall notify each other of the disposition
of all cases in which both the authorities of the Philippines and the United States have the right to
exercise jurisdiction.
"4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the authorities of the Philippines and United States
shall assist each other in the arrest of United States personnel in the Philippines and in handling them
over to authorities who are to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this article.
"5. United States military authorities shall promptly notify Philippine authorities of the arrest or
detention of United States personnel who are subject of Philippine primary or exclusive jurisdiction.
Philippine authorities shall promptly notify United States military authorities of the arrest or detention
of any United States personnel.
"6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction
shall immediately reside with United States military authorities, if they so request, from the commission
of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings. United States military authorities shall, upon
formal notification by the Philippine authorities and without delay, make such personnel available to
those authorities in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings relating to the offense with which
the person has been charged in extraordinary cases, the Philippine Government shall present its position
to the United States Government regarding custody, which the United States Government shall take into
full account. In the event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed within one year, the United
States shall be relieved of any obligations under this paragraph. The one-year period will not include the
time necessary to appeal. Also, the one-year period will not include any time during which scheduled
trial procedures are delayed because United States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine
authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused, fail to do so.
"7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States and Philippine authorities shall assist
each other in the carrying out of all necessary investigation into offenses and shall cooperate in
providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the collection and production of evidence, including
seizure and, in proper cases, the delivery of objects connected with an offense.
"8. When United States personnel have been tried in accordance with the provisions of this Article
and have been acquitted or have been convicted and are serving, or have served their sentence, or have
had their sentence remitted or suspended, or have been pardoned, they may not be tried again for the
same offense in the Philippines. Nothing in this paragraph, however, shall prevent United States military
authorities from trying United States personnel for any violation of rules of discipline arising from the
act or omission which constituted an offense for which they were tried by Philippine authorities.
HIESTA
"9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into custody, or prosecuted by Philippine
authorities, they shall be accorded all procedural safeguards established by the law of the Philippines. At
the minimum, United States personnel shall be entitled:
(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) To be informed in advance of trial of the specific charge or charges made against them and to
have reasonable time to prepare a defense;
(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to cross examine such witnesses;
(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses;
(e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their own choice on the same basis as
nationals of the Philippines;
(f) To have the service of a competent interpreter; and
(g) To communicate promptly with and to be visited regularly by United States authorities, and to
have such authorities present at all judicial proceedings. These proceedings shall be public unless the
court, in accordance with Philippine laws, excludes persons who have no role in the proceedings.
"10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United States personnel shall be
carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippine and United States authorities. United States
Personnel serving sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to visits and material assistance.
"11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only in Philippine courts of ordinary jurisdiction,
and shall not be subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine military or religious courts.
"Article VI
Claims
"1. Except for contractual arrangements, including United States foreign military sales letters of
offer and acceptance and leases of military equipment, both governments waive any and all claims
against each other for damage, loss or destruction to property of each other's armed forces or for death
or injury to their military and civilian personnel arising from activities to which this agreement applies.
"2. For claims against the United States, other than contractual claims and those to which
paragraph 1 applies, the United States Government, in accordance with United States law regarding
foreign claims, will pay just and reasonable compensation in settlement of meritorious claims for
damage, loss, personal injury or death, caused by acts or omissions of United States personnel, or
otherwise incident to the non-combat activities of the United States forces.
"Article VII
Importation and Exportation
"1. United States Government equipment, materials, supplies, and other property imported into or
acquired in the Philippines by or on behalf of the United States armed forces in connection with
activities to which this agreement applies, shall be free of all Philippine duties, taxes and other similar
charges. Title to such property shall remain with the United States, which may remove such property
from the Philippines at any time, free from export duties, taxes, and other similar charges. The
exemptions provided in this paragraph shall also extend to any duty, tax, or other similar charges which
would otherwise be assessed upon such property after importation into, or acquisition within, the
Philippines. Such property may be removed from the Philippines, or disposed of therein, provided that
disposition of such property in the Philippines to persons or entities not entitled to exemption from
applicable taxes and duties shall be subject to payment of such taxes, and duties and prior approval of
the Philippine Government.
"2. Reasonable quantities of personal baggage, personal effects, and other property for the
personal use of United States personnel may be imported into and used in the Philippines free of all
duties, taxes and other similar charges during the period of their temporary stay in the Philippines.
Transfers to persons or entities in the Philippines not entitled to import privileges may only be made
upon prior approval of the appropriate Philippine authorities including payment by the recipient of
applicable duties and taxes imposed in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. The exportation of
such property and of property acquired in the Philippines by United States personnel shall be free of all
Philippine duties, taxes, and other similar charges.
"Article VIII
Movement of Vessels and Aircraft
"1. Aircraft operated by or for the United States armed forces may enter the Philippines upon
approval of the Government of the Philippines in accordance with procedures stipulated in
implementing arrangements.
"2. Vessels operated by or for the United States armed forces may enter the Philippines upon
approval of the Government of the Philippines. The movement of vessels shall be in accordance with
international custom and practice governing such vessels; and such agreed implementing arrangements
as necessary.
"3. Vehicles, vessels, and aircraft operated by or for the United States armed forces shall not be
subject to the payment of landing or port fees, navigation or over flight charges, or tolls or other use
charges, including light and harbor dues, while in the Philippines. Aircraft operated by or for the United
States armed forces shall observe local air traffic control regulations while in the Philippines. Vessels
owned or operated by the United States solely on United States Government non-commercial service
shall not be subject to compulsory pilotage at Philippine ports.
"Article IX
Duration and Termination
"This agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the parties have notified each other in
writing through the diplomatic channel that they have completed their constitutional requirements for
entry into force. This agreement shall remain in force until the expiration of 180 days from the date on
which either party gives the other party notice in writing that it desires to terminate the agreement."
Via these consolidated 11 petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners as legislators, non-
governmental organizations, citizens and taxpayers assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute
to herein respondents grave abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.
We have simplified the issues raised by the petitioners into the following:
I
Do petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the
constitutionality of the VFA?
II
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution? AaIDHS
III
Does the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty?
a. Are Philippine courts deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed by US
military personnel?
b. Is the Supreme Court deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
or higher?
IV
Does the VFA violate:
a. the equal protection clause under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution?
b. the prohibition against nuclear weapons under Article II, Section 8?
c. Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution granting the exemption from taxes and duties for
the equipment, materials, supplies and other properties imported into or acquired in the Philippines by,
or on behalf, of the US Armed Forces?
LOCUS STANDI
At the outset, respondents challenge petitioners' standing to sue, on the ground that the latter have not
shown any interest in the case, and that petitioners failed to substantiate that they have sustained, or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the operation of the VFA. 12 Petitioners, on the other hand,
counter that the validity or invalidity of the VFA is a matter of transcendental importance which justifies
their standing. 13
A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show "not only that
the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way." He must show that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason
of the statute complained of. 14
In the case before us, petitioners failed to show, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they have
sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. As
taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing
or spending powers. 15 On this point, it bears stressing that a taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the
act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. 16
Thus, in Bugnay Const. & Development Corp. vs. Laron, 17 we held:
". . . it is exigent that the taxpayer-plaintiff sufficiently show that he would be benefited or injured by
the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit as a real party in interest. Before he can invoke the
power of judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general
interest common to all members of the public."
Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence of
any allegation by petitioners that public funds are being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as
taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA.
Similarly, Representatives Wigberto Taada, Agapito Aquino and Joker Arroyo, as petitioners-legislators,
do not possess the requisite locus standi to maintain the present suit. While this Court, in Phil.
Constitution Association vs. Hon. Salvador Enriquez, 18 sustained the legal standing of a member of the
Senate and the House of Representatives to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition
imposed on an item in an appropriation bill, we cannot, at this instance, similarly uphold petitioners'
standing as members of Congress, in the absence of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person
or to the institution to which they belong.
Beyond this, the allegations of impairment of legislative power, such as the delegation of the power of
Congress to grant tax exemptions, are more apparent than real. While it may be true that petitioners
pointed to provisions of the VFA which allegedly impair their legislative powers, petitioners failed
however to sufficiently show that they have in fact suffered direct injury.
In the same vein, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is stripped of standing in these cases.
As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, the IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the
absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its National President to
commence the present action. 19
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of the issues
raised in the petitions, this Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes aside the procedural
barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions, as we have done in the early Emergency Powers Cases, 20
where we had occasion to rule:
". . . ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general interest
shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties
and ruled that 'transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure' We have since then
applied the exception in many other cases. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.
Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343)." (Italics Supplied)
This principle was reiterated in the subsequent cases of Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 21 Daza vs. Singson, 22
and Basco vs. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 23 where we emphatically held:
"Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's
duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the government
have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused
the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken
cognizance of this petition. . . ."
Again, in the more recent case of Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., 24 this Court ruled that in cases of
transcendental importance, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper
even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review.
Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the doctrine of
separation of powers, which enjoins upon the departments of the government a becoming respect for
each others' acts, 25 this Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant petitions.
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
One focal point of inquiry in this controversy is the determination of which provision of the Constitution
applies, with regard to the exercise by the Senate of its constitutional power to concur with the VFA.
Petitioners argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is applicable considering that the VFA has for its subject
the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines. Respondents, on the contrary, maintain that
Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch as the VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement
which involves merely the temporary visits of United States personnel engaged in joint military
exercises.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on
treaties or international agreements. Section 21, Article VII, which herein respondents invoke, reads:
AcICTS
"No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate."
Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:
"After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be
allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress
so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that
purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State."
Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which case, the
concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the subject
treaty, or international agreement, valid and binding on the part of the Philippines. This provision lays
down the general rule on treaties or international agreements and applies to any form of treaty with a
wide variety of subject matter, such as, but not limited to, extradition or tax treaties or those economic
in nature. All treaties or international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject
matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be
valid and effective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which involve the
presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the
concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the constitutional
requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines. Section 25, Article XVIII further
requires that "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities" may be allowed in the Philippines only by
virtue of a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other
contracting state.
It is our considered view that both constitutional provisions, far from contradicting each other, actually
share some common ground. These constitutional provisions both embody phrases in the negative and
thus, are deemed prohibitory in mandate and character. In particular, Section 21 opens with the clause
"No treaty . . .," and Section 25 contains the phrase "shall not be allowed." Additionally, in both
instances, the concurrence of the Senate is indispensable to render the treaty or international
agreement valid and effective.
To our mind, the fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and
that the Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision, is immaterial. For in either case,
whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is crystalline that
the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and
personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of military
personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine government in the
matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies.
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense,
however, the provisions of Section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for
the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the
Senate, as will be further discussed hereunder.
It is a finely-imbedded principle in statutory construction that a special provision or law prevails over a
general one. Lex specialis derogat generali. Thus, where there is in the same statute a particular
enactment and also a general one which, in its most comprehensive sense, would include what is
embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must
be taken to affect only such cases within its general language which are not within the provision of the
particular enactment. 26
In Leveriza vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 27 we enunciated:
". . . that another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give
way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases
in which the special provisions are not applicable (Sto. Domingo vs. de los Angeles, 96 SCRA 139), that a
specific statute prevails over a general statute (De Jesus vs. People, 120 SCRA 760) and that where two
statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially
should prevail (Wil Wilhensen Inc. vs. Baluyot, 83 SCRA 38)."
Moreover, it is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere transient
agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of structure for the establishment of a
military base. On this score, the Constitution makes no distinction between "transient" and
"permanent." Certainly, we find nothing in Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or
facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
It is a rudiment in legal hermeneutics that when no distinction is made by law the Court should not
distinguish Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos.
In like manner, we do not subscribe to the argument that Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since
no foreign military bases, but merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. Notably, a
perusal of said constitutional provision reveals that the proscription covers "foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities." Stated differently, this prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops and facilities
without any foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to "foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities" collectively but treats them as separate and independent subjects. The use of comma and
the disjunctive word "or" clearly signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from the others
included in the enumeration, 28 such that, the provision contemplates three different situations a
military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b) foreign troops, or (c) foreign
facilities any of the three standing alone places it under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.
aTHASC
To this end, the intention of the framers of the Charter, as manifested during the deliberations of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, is consistent with this interpretation:
"MR. MAAMBONG. I just want to address a question or two to Commissioner Bernas.
This formulation speaks of three things: foreign military bases, troops or facilities. My first question is: If
the country does enter into such kind of a treaty, must it cover the three-bases, troops or facilities or
could the treaty entered into cover only one or two?
FR. BERNAS. Definitely, it can cover only one. Whether it covers only one or it covers three, the
requirement will be the same.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the Philippine government can enter into a treaty covering not bases
but merely troops?
FR. BERNAS. Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG. I cannot find any reason why the, government can enter into a treaty covering only
troops.
FR. BERNAS. Why not? Probably if we stretch our imagination a little bit more, we will find some. We
just want to cover everything." 29 (Italics Supplied)
Moreover, military bases established within the territory of another state is no longer viable because of
the alternatives offered by new means and weapons of warfare such as nuclear weapons, guided
missiles as well as huge sea vessels that can stay afloat in the sea even for months and years without
returning to their home country. These military warships are actually used as substitutes for a land-
home base not only of military aircraft but also of military personnel and facilities. Besides, vessels are
mobile as compared to a land-based military headquarters.
At this juncture, we shall then resolve the issue of whether or not the requirements of Section 25 were
complied with when the Senate gave its concurrence to the VFA.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country, unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly
concurred in by the Senate and, when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by
the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case of the VFA. The concurrence
handed by the Senate through Resolution No. 18 is in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution, whether under the general requirement in Section 21, Article VII, or the specific mandate
mentioned in Section 25, Article XVIII, the provision in the latter article requiring ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required
it.
As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires that a treaty or international
agreement, to be valid and effective, must be concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of
the Senate. On the other hand, Section 25, Article XVIII simply provides that the treaty be "duly
concurred in by the Senate."
Applying the foregoing constitutional provisions, a two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate is
clearly required so that the concurrence contemplated by law may be validly obtained and deemed
present. While it is true that Section 25, Article XVIII requires, among other things, that the treaty the
VFA, in the instant case be a "duly concurred in by the Senate," it is very true however that said
provision must be related and viewed in light of the clear mandate embodied in Section 21, Article VII,
which in more specific terms, requires that the concurrence of a treaty, or international agreement, be
made by a two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. Indeed, Section 25, Article XVIII must not
be treated in isolation to Section 21, Article, VII.
As noted, the "concurrence requirement" under Section 25, Article XVIII must be construed in relation to
the provisions of Section 21, Article VII. In a more particular language, the concurrence of the Senate
contemplated under Section 25, Article XVIII means that at least two-thirds of all the members of the
Senate favorably vote to concur with the treaty the VFA in the instant case.
Under these circumstances, the charter provides that the Senate shall be composed of twenty-four (24)
Senators. 30 Without a tinge of doubt, two-thirds (2/3) of this figure, or not less than sixteen (16)
members, favorably acting on the proposal is an unquestionable compliance with the requisite number
of votes mentioned in Section 21 of Article VII. The fact that there were actually twenty-three (23)
incumbent Senators at the time the voting was made, 31 will not alter in any significant way the
circumstance that more than two-thirds of the members of the Senate concurred with the proposed
VFA, even if the two-thirds vote requirement is based on this figure of actual members (23). In this
regard, the fundamental law is clear that two-thirds of the 24 Senators, or at least 16 favorable votes,
suffice so as to render compliance with the strict constitutional mandate of giving concurrence to the
subject treaty.
Having resolved that the first two requisites prescribed in Section 25, Article XVIII are present, we shall
now pass upon and delve on the requirement that the VFA should be recognized as a treaty by the
United States of America.
Petitioners contend that the phrase "recognized as a treaty," embodied in Section 25, Article XVIII,
means that the VFA should have the advice and consent of the United States Senate pursuant to its own
constitutional process, and that it should not be considered merely an executive agreement by the
United States.
In opposition, respondents argue that the letter of United States Ambassador Hubbard stating that the
VFA is binding on the United States Government is conclusive, on the point that the VFA is recognized as
a treaty by the United States of America. According to respondents, the VFA, to be binding, must only be
accepted as a treaty by the United States.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase "recognized as a treaty" means that the other contracting
party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. 32 To require the other contracting state, the
United States of America in this case, to submit the VFA to the United States Senate for concurrence
pursuant to its Constitution, 33 is to accord strict meaning to the phrase. IacHAE
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in common use. 34
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. 35 To be
sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the said
agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
A treaty, as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is "an international instrument
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a
single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and whatever its particular designation." 36
There are many other terms used for a treaty or international agreement, some of which are: act,
protocol, agreement, compromis d' arbitrage, concordat, convention, declaration, exchange of notes,
pact, statute, charter and modus vivendi. All writers, from Hugo Grotius onward, have pointed out that
the names or titles of international agreements included under the general term treaty have little or no
legal significance. Certain terms are useful, but they furnish little more than mere description. 37
Article 2(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that "the provisions of paragraph 1 regarding the use of
terms in the present Convention are without prejudice to the use of those terms, or to the meanings
which may be given to them in the internal law of the State."
Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their
binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within
their powers. 38 International law continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive
agreements: they are equally binding obligations upon nations. 39
In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements even without the
concurrence of the Senate or Congress. In Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern Sea Trading, 40 we had
occasion to pronounce:
". . . the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we have
entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-
favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation
arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by
our courts.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized the validity and
constitutionality of executive agreements entered into without Senate approval." (39 Columbia Law
Review, pp. 753-754) (See, also, U.S. vs. Curtis Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 81 L. ed. 255;
U.S. vs. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 81 L. ed. 1134; U.S. vs. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 86 L. ed. 796; Ozanic vs. U.S.
188 F. 2d. 288; Yale Law Journal, Vol. 15 pp. 1905-1906; California Law Review, Vol. 25, pp. 670-675;
Hyde on International Law [Revised Edition], Vol. 2, pp. 1405, 1416-1418; Willoughby on the U.S.
Constitution Law, Vol. I [2d ed.], pp. 537-540; Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 210-218;
Hackworth, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 390-407). "(Italics supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission which drafted the 1987 Constitution is enlightening
and highly-instructive:
"MR. MAAMBONG. Of course it goes without saying that as far as ratification of the other state is
concerned, that is entirely their concern under their own laws.
FR. BERNAS. Yes, but we will accept whatever they say. If they say that we have done everything to
make it a treaty, then as far as we are concerned, we will accept it as a treaty." 41
The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has
stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. 42
For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and binds itself
further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with the
mandate of the Constitution.
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the concurrence of the
Senate should be taken as a clear and unequivocal expression of our nation's consent to be bound by
said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied
thereunder.
Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the
government, as the case may be, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is proclaimed. 43 A
State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of ratification of a treaty. The consent of the
State to be bound by a treaty is expressed by ratification when: (a) the treaty provides for such
ratification, (b) it is otherwise established that the negotiating States agreed that ratification should be
required, (c) the representative of the State has signed the treaty subject to ratification, or (d) the
intention of the State to sign the treaty subject to ratification appears from the full powers of its
representative, or was expressed during the negotiation. 44
In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not, as commonly believed, in the
legislature. The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to
the ratification. 45
With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the exchange of notes
between the Philippines and the United States of America, it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on
our part, under the principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no
less than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, 46 declares that the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.
As a member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for
the conduct of its international relations. While the international obligation devolves upon the state and
not upon any particular branch, institution, or individual member of its government, the Philippines is
nonetheless responsible for violations committed by any branch or subdivision of its government or any
official thereof. As an integral part of the community of nations, we are responsible to assure that our
government, Constitution and laws will carry out our international obligation. 47 Hence, we cannot
readily plead the Constitution as a convenient excuse for non-compliance with our obligations, duties
and responsibilities under international law. DHaECI
Beyond this, Article 13 of the Declaration of Rights and Duties of States adopted by the International
Law Commission in 1949 provides: "Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations
arising from treaties and other sources of international law, and it may not invoke provisions in its
constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this duty." 48
Equally important is Article 26 of the Convention which provides that "Every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." This is known as the principle of
pacta sunt servanda which preserves the sanctity of treaties and have been one of the most
fundamental principles of positive international law, supported by the jurisprudence of international
tribunals. 49
NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
In the instant controversy, the President, in effect, is heavily faulted for exercising a power and
performing a task conferred upon him by the Constitution the power to enter into and ratify treaties.
Through the expediency of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners in these consolidated cases impute
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Chief Executive in ratifying the VFA, and referring the same
to the Senate pursuant to the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
On this particular matter, grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 50
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State, is the sole
organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief
architect of the nation's foreign policy; his "dominance in the field of foreign relations is (then)
conceded." 51 Wielding vast powers and influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as
Jefferson describes, is "executive altogether." 52
As regards the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests the same
in the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all the members of the
Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are
exclusive acts which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and
diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation
the Senate cannot intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. 53 Consequently, the acts or
judgment calls of the President involving the VFA specifically the acts of ratification and entering into
a treaty and those necessary or incidental to the exercise of such principal acts squarely fall within
the sphere of his constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down, much less calibrated
by this Court, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion.
It is the Court's considered view that the President, in ratifying the VFA and in submitting the same to
the Senate for concurrence, acted within the confines and limits of the powers vested in him by the
Constitution. It is of no moment that the President, in the exercise of his wide latitude of discretion and
in the honest belief that the VFA falls within the ambit of Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution,
referred the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the aforementioned provision. Certainly, no abuse
of discretion, much less a grave, patent and whimsical abuse of judgment, may be imputed to the
President in his act of ratifying the VFA and referring the same to the Senate for the purpose of
complying with the concurrence requirement embodied in the fundamental law. In doing so, the
President merely performed a constitutional task and exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the
functions of his office. Even if he erred in submitting the VFA to the Senate for concurrence under the
provisions of Section 21 of Article VII, instead of Section 25 of Article XVIII of the Constitution, still, the
President may not be faulted or scarred, much less be adjudged guilty of committing an abuse of
discretion in some patent, gross, and capricious manner.
For while it is conceded that Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution has broadened the scope of
judicial inquiry into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to
national security, it has not altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in
the field of foreign relations. 54 The High Tribunal's function, as sanctioned by Article VIII, Section 1, "is
merely (to) check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a
showing . . . (of) grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective power . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. 55
As to the power to concur with treaties, the Constitution lodges the same with the Senate alone. Thus,
once the Senate 56 performs that power, or exercises its prerogative within the boundaries prescribed
by the Constitution, the concurrence cannot, in like manner, be viewed to constitute an abuse of power,
much less grave abuse thereof. Corollarily, the Senate, in the exercise of its discretion and acting within
the limits of such power, may not be similarly faulted for having simply performed a task conferred and
sanctioned by no less than the fundamental law.
For the role of the Senate in relation to treaties is essentially legislative in character; 57 the Senate, as
an independent body possessed of its own erudite mind, has the prerogative to either accept or reject
the proposed agreement, and whatever action it takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion,
pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. In this sense, the Senate partakes a principal,
yet delicate, role in keeping the principles of separation of powers and of checks and balances alive and
vigilantly ensures that these cherished rudiments remain true to their form in a democratic government
such as ours. The Constitution thus animates, through this treaty-concurring power of the Senate, a
healthy system of checks and balances indispensable toward our nation's pursuit of political maturity
and growth. True enough, rudimentary is the principle that matters pertaining to the wisdom of a
legislative act are beyond the ambit and province of the courts to inquire. IEAacS
In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents, this Court
as the final arbiter of legal controversies and staunch sentinel of the rights of the people is then
without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs purely executive and legislative in
character and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the
metes and bounds within which each of the three political branches of government may exercise the
powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and
De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melo and Vitug, JJ., join the dissent of J. Puno.
Puno, J., see dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., concurs in the result.
Panganiban, J., took no part due to close personal and former professional relations with a petitioner,
Sen. J.R. Salonga.

Lina Obaa y Zamora vs. Hon. Andres B. Soriano CA-
G.R. SP No. 60353 August 29, 2001
Facts of the Case:

Jaime Liron, private respondent, was earlier charged before the trial court with rape, the
Information alleging that he had committed the crime by inserting his finger in the
vagina of petitioner Jolyna Obana y Zamora against her will and without her
consent. Acting on a motion in favour of respondent Liron, the trial court referred the
case to the Office of the Prosecutor, this time charging the accused no longer with rape
but with acts of lasciviousness.

Petitioners argue that to exclude fingers under the context instrument or object,
absurdity will result.

Respondents, however, for their part, insist that what the law reads is all the courts can
apply. Instrument or object is a phrase, they submit, that does not include the fingers;
citing a piece of legislative history in the discussion in the Bicameral Conference
Committee of Congress that apparently records the decision to exclude the fingers.

Hence, this petition.


Issue: Whether or not the term instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of
another person include fingers under Article 266 A, Paragraph 2 of R.A. 8353.


Ruling:

The starting point of construction should not be journals of debates or committee
discussion, but the text of the law itself. Dickerson, in his well read treatise on statutory
interpretation applies that the court should not overthrow the principle by treating as
co-equal the enacted statues and the legislative hearings or committee reports.

It may be uncommon to refer to his finger as an object, but it would not do such violence
to the term object for even in common use, it is synonymous to a thing. Ballentines Law
Dictionary defines object as a material thing, any tangible thing, visible or capable of
discernment by the senses. Clearly, a finger falls within the ambit of this concept.

It is a rule in statutory construction that where such construction is consonant and not
in variance with the purpose of the statute, and does not thwart or defeat the same, or
where it is not obvious from the statute that the evil to be suppressed, or the remedy to
be advanced, requires that the construction be limited or enlarged.

The title of the statute itself expands the definition of the crime of rape. Excluding the
insertion of finger would be unintelligible, arbitrary and capricious delimitation of what
the law had set out to expand. It is also based on the rule that statutes should be
construed as a whole for the purpose of the law itself.

It falls under the consequential analysis or absurdity rule where the courts must work
with norms of reasonableness or fairness.


G.R. No. 170943 September 23, 2008
Santos, Jr. v. PNOC Exploration Corp.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 170943. September 23, 2008.]
PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR., petitioner, vs. PNOC EXPLORATION CORPORATION, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J p:
This is a petition for review 1 of the September 22, 2005 decision 2 and December 29, 2005 resolution 3
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82482. HDCTAc
On December 23, 2002, respondent PNOC Exploration Corporation filed a complaint for a sum of money
against petitioner Pedro T. Santos, Jr. in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167. The
complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 69262, sought to collect the amount of P698,502.10 representing
petitioner's unpaid balance of the car loan 4 advanced to him by respondent when he was still a
member of its board of directors.
Personal service of summons to petitioner failed because he could not be located in his last known
address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondent's motion, the trial court allowed
service of summons by publication.
Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines, on May 20, 2003. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication of the
advertising manager of Remate 5 and an affidavit of service of respondent's employee 6 to the effect
that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioner's last known address.
When petitioner failed to file his answer within the prescribed period, respondent moved that the case
be set for the reception of its evidence ex parte. The trial court granted the motion in an order dated
September 11, 2003.
Respondent proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer of its evidence. Thereafter, the
case was deemed submitted for decision on October 15, 2003.
On October 28, 2003, petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached
Answer". He sought reconsideration of the September 11, 2003 order, alleging that the affidavit of
service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was
not executed by the clerk of court. He also claimed that he was denied due process as he was not
notified of the September 11, 2003 order. He prayed that respondent's evidence ex parte be stricken off
the records and that his answer be admitted.
Respondent naturally opposed the motion. It insisted that it complied with the rules on service by
publication. Moreover, pursuant to the September 11, 2003 order, petitioner was already deemed in
default for failure to file an answer within the prescribed period.
In an order dated February 6, 2004, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
September 11, 2003 order. It held that the rules did not require the affidavit of complementary service
by registered mail to be executed by the clerk of court. It also ruled that due process was observed as a
copy of the September 11, 2003 order was actually mailed to petitioner at his last known address. It also
denied the motion to admit petitioner's answer because the same was filed way beyond the
reglementary period. SIDTCa
Aggrieved, petitioner assailed the September 11, 2003 and February 6, 2004 orders of the trial court in
the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. He contended that the orders were issued with grave
abuse of discretion. He imputed the following errors to the trial court: taking cognizance of the case
despite lack of jurisdiction due to improper service of summons; failing to furnish him with copies of its
orders and processes, particularly the September 11, 2003 order, and upholding technicality over equity
and justice.
During the pendency of the petition in the Court of Appeals, the trial court rendered its decision in Civil
Case No. 69262. It ordered petitioner to pay P698,502.10 plus legal interest and costs of suit. 7
Meanwhile, on September 22, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision 8 sustaining the
September 11, 2003 and February 6, 2004 orders of the trial court and dismissing the petition. It denied
reconsideration. 9 Thus, this petition.
Petitioner essentially reiterates the grounds he raised in the Court of Appeals, namely, lack of
jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons, failure of the trial court to furnish him
with copies of its orders and processes including the September 11, 2003 order and preference for
technicality rather than justice and equity. In particular, he claims that the rule on service by publication
under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to actions in rem, not actions in personam
like a complaint for a sum of money. He also contends that the affidavit of service of a copy of the
summons should have been prepared by the clerk of court, not respondent's messenger.
The petition lacks merit.
PROPRIETY OF
SERVICE BY PUBLICATION
Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. In any action where
the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon
him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the
court may order. (emphasis supplied) STcEIC
Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate his
whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect service of summons upon him
by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with
summons by publication.
Petitioner invokes the distinction between an action in rem and an action in personam and claims that
substituted service may be availed of only in an action in rem. Petitioner is wrong. The in rem/in
personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to
which the rule was applicable. 10 Because of this silence, the Court limited the application of the old
rule to in rem actions only. 11
This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies "[i]n any action where the
defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown
and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry." Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in personam,
in rem or quasi in rem. 12
Regarding the matter of the affidavit of service, the relevant portion of Section 19, 13 Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court simply speaks of the following:
. . . an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post
office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.
Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal
clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of the newspaper which published the summons.
The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by registered mail to
the defendant's last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by an affidavit "showing
the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid,
directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address."
The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk
of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty
to make the complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to service by
publication.
Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was defective, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner by his own voluntary appearance in the action against him. In
this connection, Section 20, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court states: TDcAIH
SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner voluntarily appeared in the action when he filed the "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
and to Admit Attached Answer". 14 This was equivalent to service of summons and vested the trial court
with jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.
ENTITLEMENT TO
NOTICE OF PROCEEDINGS
The trial court allowed respondent to present its evidence ex parte on account of petitioner's failure to
file his answer within the prescribed period. Petitioner assails this action on the part of the trial court as
well as the said court's failure to furnish him with copies of orders and processes issued in the course of
the proceedings.
The effects of a defendant's failure to file an answer within the time allowed therefor are governed by
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 9 (on Effect of Failure to Plead) of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Default; declaration of. If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed
therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and
proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to
render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its
discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to
the clerk of court.
SEC. 4. Effect of order of default. A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent
proceedings but not to take part in the trial. (emphasis supplied)
If the defendant fails to file his answer on time, he may be declared in default upon motion of the
plaintiff with notice to the said defendant. In case he is declared in default, the court shall proceed to
render judgment granting the plaintiff such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its
discretion requires the plaintiff to submit evidence. The defaulting defendant may not take part in the
trial but shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings.
In this case, even petitioner himself does not dispute that he failed to file his answer on time. That was
in fact why he had to file an "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer". But
respondent moved only for the ex parte presentation of evidence, not for the declaration of petitioner
in default. In its February 6, 2004 order, the trial court stated: ADSTCa
The disputed Order of September 11, 2003 allowing the presentation of evidence ex-parte precisely
ordered that "despite and notwithstanding service of summons by publication, no answer has been filed
with the Court within the required period and/or forthcoming.["] Effectively[,] that was a finding that
the defendant [that is, herein petitioner] was in default for failure to file an answer or any responsive
pleading within the period fixed in the publication as precisely the defendant [could not] be found and
for which reason, service of summons by publication was ordered. It is simply illogical to notify the
defendant of the Order of September 11, 2003 simply on account of the reality that he was no longer
residing and/or found on his last known address and his whereabouts unknown thus the publication
of the summons. In other words, it was reasonable to expect that the defendant will not receive any
notice or order in his last known address. Hence, [it was] impractical to send any notice or order to him.
Nonetheless, the record[s] will bear out that a copy of the order of September 11, 2003 was mailed to
the defendant at his last known address but it was not claimed. (emphasis supplied)
As is readily apparent, the September 11, 2003 order did not limit itself to permitting respondent to
present its evidence ex parte but in effect issued an order of default. But the trial court could not validly
do that as an order of default can be made only upon motion of the claiming party. 15 Since no motion
to declare petitioner in default was filed, no default order should have been issued.
To pursue the matter to its logical conclusion, if a party declared in default is entitled to notice of
subsequent proceedings, all the more should a party who has not been declared in default be entitled to
such notice. But what happens if the residence or whereabouts of the defending party is not known or
he cannot be located? In such a case, there is obviously no way notice can be sent to him and the notice
requirement cannot apply to him. The law does not require that the impossible be done. 16 Nemo
tenetur ad impossibile. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. 17 Laws and rules must be
interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicality. 18
Hence, even if petitioner was not validly declared in default, he could not reasonably demand that
copies of orders and processes be furnished him. Be that as it may, a copy of the September 11, 2003
order was nonetheless still mailed to petitioner at his last known address but it was unclaimed. ITScAE
CORRECTNESS OF
NON-ADMISSION OF ANSWER
Petitioner failed to file his answer within the required period. Indeed, he would not have moved for the
admission of his answer had he filed it on time. Considering that the answer was belatedly filed, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying its admission.
Petitioner's plea for equity must fail in the face of the clear and express language of the rules of
procedure and of the September 11, 2003 order regarding the period for filing the answer. Equity is
available only in the absence of law, not as its replacement. 19 Equity may be applied only in the
absence of rules of procedure, never in contravention thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Carpio, Azcuna and Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. aDATHC
2. Penned by Associate Justice Santiago Javier Ranada (retired) and concurred by Associate Justices
Roberto A. Barrios (deceased) and Mario L. Guaria III of the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals.
Rollo, pp. 20-25.
3. Id., p. 27.
4. The car loan was originally for P966,000 which was used to procure a Honda CRV for petitioner.
The said loan was evidenced by a promissory note and further secured by a chattel mortgage on the
vehicle. One of the conditions of the promissory note was that, in case of separation from the service,
any unpaid balance shall immediately be paid in full. (See May 19, 2004 Regional Trial Court decision,
rollo, pp. 82-83.)
5. Allan Paul A. Plaza.
6. Vincent Panganiban. ETaHCD
7. See May 19, 2004 Regional Trial Court decision, rollo, pp. 82-83. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the said decision remains pending.
8. Supra note 2.
9. Supra note 3.
10. The predecessor of this provision was Section 16, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Procedure which
provided:
SEC. 16. Service upon an unknown defendant. Whenever the defendant is designated as an
unknown owner, or the like, or whenever the address of a defendant is unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may order.
11. Consolidated Plywood Industries, Inc. v. Breva, G.R. No. L-82811, 18 October 1988, 166 SCRA
519; Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 536 (1998); Valmonte v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil.
96 (1996).
12. See Herrera, Oscar M., Remedial Law, vol. I, pp. 699 and 702.
13. The provision states: ISTHED
SEC. 19. Proof of service by publication. If the service has been made by publication, service
may be proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or
advertising manager, to which affidavit a copy of the publication shall be attached, and by an affidavit
showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage
prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.
14. Herrera, supra note 12 citing Europa v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72827, 18 July
1989, 175 SCRA 394.
15. Mediserv, Inc. v. China Banking Corporation, 408 Phil. 745 (2001).
16. Akbayan-Youth v. Commission on Elections, 407 Phil. 618 (2001).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Heirs of Spouses de la Cruz v. Heirs of Quintos, Sr., 434 Phil. 708 (2002) citing Tupas v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 89571, 06 February 1991, 193 SCRA 597. aCcSDT
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-5872. November 29, 1954.]
ENRIQUE BERNARDO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. CRISOSTOMO S. BERNARDO and the COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
Cornelio R. Magsarili for petitioners.
De los Santos & De los Santos for respondents.
Alfonso S. Borja, as amicus curiae.
SYLLABUS
1. EMINENT DOMAIN; "BONA FIDE" OCCUPANT HAS PREFERENTIAL RIGHT TO BUY LANDS; MERE
LICENSE OF LESSEE IS NOT "BONA FIDE" OCCUPANT. Any person who, at the time of the acquisition of
the estate by the Government, has been gratuitously occupying a lot therein by mere tolerance of its
lessee, and who does not own the house erected on such lot, is not a "bona fide occupant," entitled to
its acquisition, as the term is used in Commonwealth Act No. 539.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ESSENCE OF TERM "BONA FIDE." The essence of bona fide or good faith lies in
honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to
overreach another.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, J.B.L., J p:
Enrique Bernardo, his wife and children, petition this Court for a review of the decision of the Court of
Appeals (in its case No. 6677-R), declaring the respondent Crisostomo R. Bernardo entitled to preference
under Commonwealth Acts Nos. 20 and 539, in the acquisition of lot No. 462-A of the "Capellana de
Concepcin", also known as lot No. 4, block No. 26, of the Tambobong Estate plan, located in Malabon,
Rizal, and having an area of 208 square meters.
It is uncontested fact that on December 31, 1947, the Republic of the Philippines purchased from the
Roman Catholic Church the estate known as the "Capellania de Tambobong" in Malabon, Rizal, under
the provisions of section 1, of Commonwealth Act No. 539. Said Act authorizes the expropriation or
purchase of private lands and that lands acquired thereunder should be subdivided into lots, for resale
at reasonable prices to "their bona fide tenants or occupants." Crisostomo R. Bernardo, respondent
herein, applied to the Rural Progress Administration for the purchase of the lot in question. Petitioners
Enrique Bernardo, et al., contested the application and claimed preferential right to such purchase, and
on January 12, 1948, the Rural Progress Administration resolved to recognize the petitioners as entitled
to preference. The respondents then appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and the latter
upheld their claim, and the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The decision of the Court of Appeals expressly finds that:
". . . It has been incontestably proven that the disputed lot had been held under lease by appellee's
deceased parents and later by him (appellee) continuously from 1912 to 1947. The appellee's
predecessors paid the rentals due on the said lot from the commencement of their leasehold rights up
to 1936, when Teodora Santos died. The appellee continued paying the rents on the same lot from 1936
to December 31, 1947, when the Government acquired the entire Capellania de Concepcin estate.
Since 1912 the values of the leasehold right of appellee amounts to about P4,000.00.
The alleged preferential right of the appellants to the purchase of the disputed lot, which was also the
main basis of the decision of the Rural Progress Administration, is their claim of actual occupation of the
lot for many years before the acquisition of the Concepcin estate by the Government. The appellants'
occupation of the premises is not denied by the appellee. Appellee's witness Otilia Santos, however, said
that the late Romulo Bernardo had allowed his uncle, appellant Enrique Bernardo, to stay in the
premises since the year 1918. (Petitioner's Brief, pp. 72-73).
The Court of Appeals also found that the house standing on the lot had been since July 13, 1944, sold by
petitioner Enrique Bernardo to the respondent, who thereby became its owner; that because of family
relationship, the petitioners "were able to remain in the premises due to the tolerance of, and out of
charity from, the appellee (respondent Crisostomo Bernardo) and his deceased parents who were the
rightful lessees of the lot in question."
The Court of Appeals likewise found and declared in its decision that since February 1, 1945, the
respondent Crisostomo Bernardo required the petitioner to vacate the premises. Finally, we understand
that in Case No. 6734-R, the Court of Appeals declared valid the sale of the house on the lot in question
made in 1944 by petitioner Enrique Bernardo in favor of respondent Crisostomo R. Bernardo, and that
the aforesaid judgment is now final.
There are thus before us, disputing the right of preference to the acquisition of the lot, the respondent
who is the owner of the house standing on said lot since 1944, and has held the land in lawful tenancy
since 1912, paying rents and taxes thereon; and the petitioner, who was allowed by respondent, out of
deference and charity, to gratuitously occupy the lot and live therein since 1918. Upon the facts on
record, we are of the opinion that petitioner does not come under the description "bona fide tenant or
occupant" employed in the statute (C. A. 539).
The term "bona fide occupant" (admittedly petitioner is not a tenant) has been defined as "one who
supposes he has a good title and knows of no adverse claim" (Philips vs. Stroup, 17 Atl. 220, 221); "one
who not only honestly supposes himself to be vested with true title but is ignorant that the title is
contested by any other person claiming a superior right to it" (Gresham vs. Ware, 79 Ala. 192, 199);
definitions that correspond closely to that of a possessor in good faith in our Civil Law (Civil Code of
1889, art. 433; new Civil Code, art. 526). The essence of the bona fides or good faith, therefore, lies in
honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to
overreach another. The petitioner Enrique Bernardo falls short of this standard: for the precarious
nature of his occupancy, as mere licensee of respondents, duty bound to protect and restore that
possession to its real and legitimate holders upon demand, could never be hidden from him. Moreover,
at the time the Government acquired the Tambobong Estate, petitioner had already parted with the
house that was his remaining link with the occupancy of the lot; and since 1945, even before the
Government's purchase, he had been required to vacate. Thus bereft of all stable interest in the land,
petitioner nevertheless seeks to turn respondent's past deferential regard to his own advantage, and to
exploit his gratuitous stay at respondent's expense for the purpose of ousting his benefactors and
wiping out the investment that the latter, and their predecessors in interest, had established and
preserved by faithful payment for thirty years of the rental charged for the lot in question. That the law,
in preferring "bona fide occupants,' intended to protect or sanction such utter disregard of fair dealing
may well be doubted.
The petitioner seeks to justify his stand by claiming that the policy of the government, ever since the
start of the American sovereignty, had been to acquire the landed estates for the benefit of their "actual
occupants," as allegedly exemplified in Acts 1170 and 1933 (Friar Lands' Acts), and Commonwealth Acts
Nos. 20, 260, 378, and 539 (Homesite Acts); that the words "bona fide occupants" employed in the
Commonwealth Acts are equivalent to "actual" occupants. Two powerful reasons nullify this contention.
The first is that section 7 of Act 1170 of the old Philippine Legislature, employs the terms "actual bona
fide settlers and occupants", plainly indicating that "actual" and "bona fide" are not synonymous, while
the Commonwealth acts deleted the term "actual" and solely used the words "bona fide occupants",
thereby emphasizing the requirement that the prospective beneficiaries of the acts should be endowed
with legitimate tenure. The second reason is that in carrying out its social readjustment policies, the
government could not simply lay aside moral standards, and arm to favor usurpers, squatters, and
intruders, unmindful of the lawful or unlawful origin and character of their occupancy. Such a policy
would perpetuate conflicts instead of attaining their just solution. It is safe to say that the term "bona
fide occupants" was not designed to cloak and protect violence, strategy, double dealing, or breach of
trust.
That the underlying motive behind the Homesite Acts is the desire that "the heads of the families
concerned be given opportunity to become the owners of their homes and residential lots in which they
and their forbears have been raised and born" (Messages of the President, Vol. 4, pp. 288-290), favors
the respondents rather than the petitioner, for it is an inalterable fact on record that the rentals and
taxes on the lot in question were always paid by the parents of respondent Crisostomo Bernardo and
continued by the latter upon his parents' death, to the exclusion of herein respondent.
As pointed out by the decision under review, had not the respondents taken and maintained sincere and
affirmative steps to own their lands through a continuous and faithful payment of their obligations, the
chances are that the petitioner would have been long ago speedily ejected from the premises of the
former landowners. To which may be added that at present, not being the lessee of the lot, nor the
owner of the house standing thereon, the petitioner's interest in this particular lot appears to be a
purely speculative one.
We therefore rule that a person who, at the time of the acquisition of the Tambobong Estate by the
Government, has been gratuitously occupying a lot therein by mere tolerance of its lessee, and who
does not own the house erected on such lot, is not a "bona fide occupant" entitled to its acquisition, as
the term is used in Commonwealth Act No. 539. Whether or not the situation would be different if the
occupant were a sublessee of the lot, need not be decided in this case, the issue not being involved.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., and Jugo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring.
I concur with the majority solely because of the peculiar facts of this case; but I am of the opinion that,
between a bona fide occupant and a tenant or lessee, the spirit of the law is to prefer the former
especially if the latter has already a piece of land of his own.
PARAS, C. J., dissenting:
On December 12, 1947, the herein respondent Crisostomo S. Bernardo filed an application with the
Rural Progress Administration for the purchase of lot No. 462-A of the "Capellana de Concepcin", now
lot No. 4, block No. 26, of the Tambobong Estate plan, situated in Concepcion, Malabon, Rizal, and
containing an area of 208 square meters. The herein petitioners, Enrique Bernardo, his wife and
children, also applied for the purchase of the same lot. The basis of both applications is Commonwealth
Act No. 20, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 539. In its decision dated January 12, 1948, the Rural
Progress Administration awarded the lot to the petitioners, and on July 9, 1948 the corresponding deed
was executed in their favor.
On July 26, 1948, respondent Bernardo filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against the
petitioners and the Rural Progress Administration, praying that the decision of the Rural Progress
Administration, as well as the corresponding sale in favor of the petitioners, be declared null and void;
that respondent Bernardo be declared entitled to purchase the lot in question; that the petitioners be
ordered to vacate the lot and surrender the possession thereof; and that the petitioners be sentenced
to pay respondent Bernardo, by way of damages, the sum of P20.00 per month from February 1, 1945
until its surrender to said respondent. After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered on
February 15, 1950 a decision in favor of respondent Bernardo, the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:
"In view of the foregoing, the Court renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, declaring the decision of the Rural Progress Administration dated January 12, 1948, as well
as the sale of the lot in question by said Rural Progress Administration to defendants Bernardo null and
void and of no effect; ordering said defendant Rural Progress Administration to sell the lot in question to
the plaintiff who is the bona fide tenant of the lot in dispute and the owner of the house standing
thereon; ordering the defendants Bernardo to vacate the lot in question and to pay to the plaintiff
damages in the sum of P20.00 per month, representing the reasonable rental value for their illegal use
and occupation of said lot, from February 1, 1945 until the said lot is vacated by defendant Bernardo;
and sentencing all defendants to pay the costs of the suit."
From this decision the petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on April 17, 1952, affirmed
the decision of the court of origin in toto, with costs against the petitioners. The latter have elevated the
case before us on certiorari.
The facts relied upon by the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the Court of Appeals are to the effect
that the deceased parents of the respondent Bernardo and later said respondent himself had been the
lessee of the lot from 1912 to 1947; that respondent's predecessors paid its rental up to 1936 when his
mother Teodora Santos died; that from 1936 respondent Bernardo in turn paid the rentals up to
December 31, 1947, when the Government acquired the entire "Capellana de Concepcin" estate; that
he owns the house standing on the lot; that while the petitioners actually occupied said lot since 1918,
their occupancy was by mere tolerance of and out of charity from respondent Bernardo and his
deceased parents; that the petitioners were required by respondent Bernardo to vacate the premises on
February 1, 1945, or two years before the acquisition of the "Capellana de Concepcin" estate by the
Government.
Upon the other hand, the petitioners' preferential right to acquire the lot is premised on their actual
occupancy since 1918.
Commonwealth Act No. 20, enacted on July 11, 1936, in section 1, provided that "the President of the
Philippines is hereby authorized to order the institution of expropriation proceeding or to enter into
negotiations for the purpose of acquiring portions of large landed estates which are now used as home
sites and reselling them at costs to their bona fide occupants." It will be noted that, under this provision,
portions of large landed estates used as homesites would be expropriated or acquired by the
Government for resale to their bona fide occupants. Commonwealth Act No. 539, enacted on May 26,
1940, and amending Commonwealth Act No. 20, provides that "the President of the Philippines is
authorized to acquire private lands or any interest therein, through purchase or expropriation, and to
subdivide the same into home lots or small farms for resale at reasonable prices and under such
conditions as he may fix to their bona fide tenants or occupants or to private individuals who will work
the lands themselves and who are qualified to acquire and own lands in the Philippines." This latter
provision differs from Commonwealth Act No. 20 in the sense that private lands are to be acquired or
expropriated for subdivision into lots or small farms for resale to their bona fide tenants or occupants or
to private individuals who are qualified to acquire and own lands in the Philippines, the important
change being, for the purposes of this opinion, that resale now be made to "bona fide tenants or
occupants."
The theory of the trial court and the Court of Appeals is that, as respondent Bernardo was admittedly
the lessee of the lot in question, he should enjoy priority. It was reasoned out that said respondent
having paid, by his predecessors and himself, the rentals for the land from 1912 to 1917, and owning the
house now standing on the lot, is a "tenant" within the purview of Commonwealth Act No. 539; that the
petitioners could not have stayed in the premises since 1918, without being ejected by the original
owners of the "Capellana de Concepcin" estate, if respondent Bernardo and his predecessors had not
paid said rentals.
We are of the opinion that the law in this case has been misapplied. To determine the real purpose of
Commonwealth Act No. 20 and Commonwealth Act No. 539, we have only to recall that as early as April
26, 1904, Act No. 1120, otherwise known as the "Friar Lands Act," was approved, providing that the
actual settlers and occupants of lands acquired by the Government had preference over all others to
lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings. This was followed on July 11, 1936, by Commonwealth Act
No. 20, authorizing the resale of homesites to their bona fide occupants. This trend was adopted in
Commonwealth Act No. 260, approved on April 18, 1938, and Commonwealth Act No. 378, approved on
August 23, 1938, which also expressly referred to bona fide occupants. The purpose of Act No. 1120,
known as the "Friar Lands Act" had already been explained by this court in the case of Jocson vs.
Soriano, 45 Phil. 375; 378-379; as follows:
"Acts 1120 and 926 were patterned after the laws granting homestead rights and special privileges
under the laws of the United States and the various states of the Union. The statutes of the United
States as well as of the various states of the Union contain provisions for the granting and protection of
homesteads. Their object is to provide a home for each citizen of the Government, where his family may
shelter and live beyond the reach of financial misfortune, and to inculcate in individuals those feelings of
independence which are essential to the maintenance of free institutions. Furthermore, the state itself
is concerned that the citizens shall not be divested of a means of support, and reduced to pauperism.
(Cook and Burgwall vs. McChristian, 4 Cal., 24; Franklin vs. Coffee, 70 Am. Dec., 192; Richardson vs.
Woodward, 104 Fed. Rep., 873; 21 Cyc., 459.)
"The conservation of a family home is the purpose of homestead laws. The policy of the state is to foster
families as the factors of society, and thus promote general welfare. The sentiment of patriotism and
independence, the spirit of free citizenship, the feeling of interest in public affairs, are cultivated and
fostered more readily when the citizen lives permanently in his own home, with a sense of its protection
and durability. (Wapples on Homestead and Exceptions, p. 3.)"
This objective is readily embedded in Commonwealth Act No. 20 which speaks of bona fide occupants;
and we cannot suppose that, presumably aware of legislative antecedents, our lawmakers ever intended
to depart from such purpose in enacting Commonwealth Act No. 539. Indeed, the Rural Progress
Administration in its resolution No. 32, dated August 7, 1949, (according to the petitioners should be
1939) resolved "that it is the sense of this Board that the words "bona fide occupants, as used in
Commonwealth Act No. 20, as amended, applies to the person actually occupying any given lot,
irrespective, of any former lease contract with the previous owners of the homesite." It is significant
that this construction was given by the very agency called upon to implement the law. But the Court of
Appeals argued that said resolution should be construed in connection with paragraph 3 of resolution
No. 252, dated March 11, 1949, which reads in part as follows:
"Resolved, to adopt as tentative rules covering the disposition of lot in the Tambobong Estate, Malabon,
Rizal, the following:
"(1) To award to the lessees the lots under their possession if they have houses thereon and the area
thereof does not exceed 1,000 square meters. The RPA, however, reserves the right to take away from
said lessees any portion in excess of 1,000 square meters.
"(2) That lots with houses even though surrounded by fence be declared vacant.
"(3) That sublessees who have been occupying lots for at least five years be considered as bona fide
occupants and as such with preferential right to purchase said lots if they possess no other in the same
estate."
The Court of Appeals was of the opinion that paragraph 3 of resolution No. 252 requires bona fide actual
occupation on the part of the sublessees for at least five years prior to the acquisition by the
Government of the lot to be resold; and as the petitioners were required by respondent Bernardo to
vacate the premises on February 1, 1945, they could not be considered as having occupied the lot bona
fide for at least five years prior to December 31, 1947 when the "Capellana de Concepcin" estate was
purchased by the Government. This construction is untenable, since paragraph 3 of the resolution No.
252 does not say that the bona fide possession for five years should be counted in relation or prior to
the date of acquisition by the Government. Said resolution, it may fairly be supposed, contemplates
possession from the time the sublessee actually occupies. In the present case it is admitted that the
petitioners have held possession since 1918.
In this connection it may not be amiss to make reference to Republic Act No. 1162 which, in its section
5, provides, among other things, that "from the approval of this Act, and until the expropriation herein
provided, no ejectment proceedings shall be instituted or prosecuted against any tenant or occupant of
any landed estates or haciendas herein authorized to be appropriated if he pays his current rentals." Of
course, said Act was approved in 1954, or after the purchase by the Government of the "Capellana de
Concepcin" estate, but it is obvious therefrom that the policy of the Government is to protect the
actual occupants as much as possible, with the view to enabling them to acquire homesites. By analogy,
we may consider the efforts of respondent Bernardo to oust the petitioners in 1945 as being of no
decisive consideration.
We are also inclined to the view that the term "tenant" was added by Commonwealth Act No. 539, not
for the purpose of giving such tenant any preference over an occupant, but merely to expand the scope
of the law by allowing resale to persons other than a bona fide occupant; and this is clear from the use
of the alternative conjunction "or" between the words "tenant" and "occupants" in Commonwealth Act
No. 539. If the intention were otherwise, the law would have expressly provided that the tenant and the
occupant shall enjoy preference in the order in which they are enumerated. This was exactly done in
Republic Act No. 1162 which provides, in its section 3, that "the landed estates or haciendas
expropriated by virtue of this Act shall be subdivided into small lots, none of which shall exceed one
hundred and fifty square meters in area, to be sold at costs to the tenants, or occupants of said lots, and
to other individuals, in the order mentioned." In essence and effect, Commonwealth Act No. 539 may be
said to vest a certain degree of discretion in the agency authorized to carry out the law, to determine
who is better qualified and should be preferred to a given lot. In the case before us, the Rural Progress
Administration, after proper investigation, awarded the lot to the petitioners and, in our opinion, this
exercise of discretion and judgment should not be interfered with in the absence of gross abuse.
We are not ready to state that the Rural Progress Administration had abused its discretion, because the
petitioners have lived on the lot since 1918 and they are conceded more indigent than respondent
Bernardo, coupled with the fact that the latter allegedly owns another property as his homesite. It is
immaterial whether the petitioners have occupied the lot in question by mere tolerance and out of
charity of respondent Bernardo, since this would not detract from the bona fide character of petitioners'
possession which is all that is required by the law. In our opinion, the petitioners have occupied the land
with as much good faith as a sublessee actually paying rentals; so much so that the former owners of the
land never attempted to oust them; and they cannot be charged with either ingratitude or unfair dealing
and dishonesty towards respondent Bernardo, for they merely accepted the benefit intended to be
conferred in Commonwealth Act No. 539. The petitioners do not deny having been the subject of
respondent's benevolence; and as to whether the latter is entitled to demand an accounting and to be
paid for such benevolence is another question which he may ventilate.
The relation of the parties herein which naturally gave way to petitioners continued possession of the
lot in question, and the manner the petitioners acquired said possession, are contained in the following
passage from the brief for the defendant-appellant in CA-G. R. No. 6734-R, Crisostomo Bernardo vs.
Enrique Bernardo, in which the ownership of the house standing on the lot was litigated and decided in
favor of respondent Bernardo:
"The plaintiff-appellee Crisostomo S. Bernardo and the defendant- appellant Enrique Bernardo are blood
relatives. It appears that the grandmother of the plaintiff-appellee, one by the name of either Aniceta or
Severina Bernardo, is the sister of the defendant-appellant Enrique Bernardo. At one time, (the exact
time could no longer be remembered) the parents of Aniceta or Severina Bernardo and Enrique
Bernardo, occupied the lot subject of the land case. There was a time however, when their parents died,
the grandmother of the plaintiff- appellee, together with his parents (plaintiff-appellee's) left the
premises, while the defendant appellant Enrique Bernardo was left behind on the said lot. As the years
went on the defendant-appellant erected a new house on the lot the one now in question, and
continued to live therein up to the present time with his children, who are the other defendants-
appellants in the land case. (Please refer to defendants-appellants' brief in the land case and the
documents or exhibits therein mentioned, pages 3-5." Supra, pp. 4-5.)
At any rate, from a technical point of view, the term "tenant" as used in Commonwealth Act No. 539
may be considered as referring only to a lessee who is in actual possession, thereby preventing one with
wealth from acquiring lots for business purposes. Suppose a lessee of 25 lots in a big hacienda sublets
the same to 25 actual occupants. In case the Government should expropriate the hacienda for resale in
lots to "tenants or occupants," can it be seriously contended that the lessee is to be preferred to the
actual occupants? An affirmative answer will be revolting to our sense of proportion; and yet that is the
effect of the majority decision.
"SEC. 27. Necessity of Entry by Lessee. Upon the execution of a lease, naming a present term,
the lessee has a right of entry and of possession, but it seems well settled that he is not a tenant until he
enters. To create the relation of landlord and tenant, there must be an entry by the lessee under the
lease, or a holding of the possession of the premises by the lessee that will be referable to the lease as
his authority. There is also authority to the effect that a lessee does not have an estate until he enters,
and that under the common law, no estate for years could be created by a lease or other common- law
conveyance, without an actual entry made by the person to whom the land was granted. . . . (32 Am.
Jur., p. 50.)
The fact that respondent Bernardo had allowed the petitioners to occupy the lot since 1918 is positive
evidence that said respondent has no need thereof; and it cannot be gainsaid that Commonwealth Acts
Nos. 20 and 539 are obviously intended, as heretofore already noted, to provide the actual occupants
with a piece of land which they may call their own. Certainly the Government would have no reason to
worry about those who were or are already home and land owners, much less to encourage "absentee"
lessees. Commonwealth Act No. 539 was conceived to solve a social problem, not merely as a direct or
indirect means of allowing accumulation of land holdings. Indeed, in Republic Act No. 267, which
authorizes municipalities to expropriate lands for sale in lots, preference being given to Filipino bona
fide occupants and to Filipino veterans, their widows, and their children, the policy of the Government
was more or less announced that "no such lot shall be sold to any person who already owns a residential
lot, and any sale made to such person shall be void."
The petitioners have called attention to the fact that respondent Bernardo paid the rentals from July,
1940 to December 31, 1947, only on April 2, 1947, when steps were already being taken by the
Government to acquire the Tambobong Estate for resale to tenants or occupants. This fact may not of
course affect the status of respondent Bernardo as a lessee, but it in a way justifies further the finding of
the Rural Progress Administration that the petitioners should be preferred in the resale of the lot in
question.
Another circumstance that influenced the Court of Appeals in affirming the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal is that the house standing on the lot belongs to respondent Bernardo. Apart from the
fact that said house assessed at P640, Philippine currency, was sold by the petitioners to respondent
Bernardo in 1944 for P1,050 in Japanese military notes (or less than P100, Philippine currency) and the
petitioners remained in possession, we do not think that respondent's ownership can affect the status
of the petitioners as bona fide occupants for purposes of Commonwealth Act No. 539. The same
considerations mentioned with respect to the possession of the land are applicable.
Accordingly, we vote to reserve the appealed judgment and to affirm the decision of the Rural Progress
Administration dated January 21, 1948, and the sale of the land in question to the petitioners.
Pablo, J., concurs.

C o p y r i g h t 1 9 9 4 - 1 9 9 9 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 133904. October 5, 2000.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO DELA CUESTA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Dominguez, Delani, Dominguez, Orsos & Fortuno for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, in Criminal
Case No. 4962-96-C finding Rodolfo dela Cuesta guilty of rape and sentencing him to death. Dela Cuesta
interposed alibi and assailed the inconsistencies in the testimony made by Cristina Gonzales, the private
complainant.
As long as the witness was found to be credible by the trial court, especially after undergoing a rigid
cross-examination, any apparent inconsistency may be overlooked especially if the lapses concerned
trivial matters. Anent the accused's alibi, the court reiterated a well-settled doctrine, thus: in the
absence of strong and convincing evidence, alibi could not prevail over the positive testimony of the
victim, who had no improper motive to testify falsely against him. As to the death penalty imposed,
while the trial court correctly found accused-appellant to be the common-law spouse of the victim's
mother, the Information, however, did not allege accused-appellant as the common-law spouse of
Cristina's mother, but that he was the step-father and guardian of the victim. Hence, the trial court
cannot properly impose the death penalty considering that his being the common-law spouse was not
alleged in the Information.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; AS LONG AS THE WITNESS IS CREDIBLE,
INCONSISTENCIES IN HIS TESTIMONY MAY BE OVERLOOKED. Courts cannot just discredit a witness
because there are gaps in her narration of facts, or because her narration was presented not in a
chronological manner. Factors such as memory, length of time, intelligence, articulateness, and
emotional condition all affect a witness' narration of events. As long as the witness was found to be
credible by the trial court, especially after undergoing a rigid cross-examination, any apparent
inconsistency may be overlooked. This is especially true if the lapses concern trivial matters.
2. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER THE VICTIM'S POSITIVE TESTIMONY. As repeatedly held
by this Court: "The defense of alibi is always viewed with suspicion and received with caution, not only
because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it can easily be fabricated. . . . For this
defense to prosper, it must be convincing enough to preclude any doubt about the physical impossibility
of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident.
In other words, he must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed,
but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at or near the crime scene. . . . In the
absence of strong and convincing evidence, alibi could not prevail over the positive testimony of the
victim, who had no improper motive to testify falsely against him." IASEca
3. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFIED RAPE; RELATIONSHIP OF ACCUSED WITH RAPE VICTIM MUST BE
ALLEGED; REASON. While the trial court correctly found accused-appellant to be the common-law
spouse of the victim's mother, the Information, however, did not allege accused-appellant as the
common-law spouse of Divina, but that he was the step-father and guardian of the victim. Hence, the
trial court cannot properly impose the death penalty considering that his being the common-law spouse
of Divina Corsanis was not alleged in the Information. Unlike a generic aggravating circumstance which
may be proven even if not alleged, a qualifying aggravating circumstance cannot be proven as such
unless alleged in the information. It must be properly pleaded in order not to violate the constitutional
right of the accused to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
Rodolfo dela Cuesta was charged with the rape of 16-year-old Cristina Gonzales. The Information 1 filed
against the accused reads:
"That on or about August 10, 1996 and prior thereto, at Brgy. Maitim, Municipality of Bay, Province of
Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-named being then the
stepfather and guardian and while armed with a bolo, by means of force, violence and intimidation and
with lewd designs, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
(sic) one CRISTINA GONZALES, a sixteen (16) year old girl, against her will and consent, to her damage
and prejudice."
On arraignment, accused pleaded "not guilty." Trial on the merits ensued. EScHDA
The victim's birth certificate 2 indicates her name to be Cristy Corsanis, born on February 14, 1980. It
appears that Cristy was sired by a certain Crispin Gonzales but a year after her birth, her mother Divina
Corsanis became the common-law spouse of accused Rodolfo dela Cuesta.
The following facts were established:
At around 10:00 o'clock in the morning of August 10, 1996 while Cristy was looking after their house at
Brgy. Maitim, Bay, Laguna, together with her step-brothers and step-sisters, accused ordered her step-
brothers and step-sisters to go to the store. When accused and Cristy were left alone, the former
forcibly undressed her and kissed her breast. Cristy struggled but her efforts were in vain as accused got
his bolo and pointed it at her neck warning her, "Wag kang sisigaw at magsusumbong kundi ay
papatayin kita at ang iyong nanay." He then tied her hands behind her back and proceeded to sexually
assault Cristy. Accused was oblivious to Cristy's entreaty, "Tay maawa na kayo sa akin, huwag ninyong
gawin sa akin yan." Failing in her plea, Cristy tried to reason with the question, "Tay bakit mo ginagawa
ito wala naman akong kasalanan sa inyo?"
Cristy informed her mother about the incident but instead of coming to her succor, her mother refused
to report the incident to the Barangay Captain, saying, "Tanga ka ba, gusto mo bang mabilanggo ang
tatay mo? Walang magpapalamon sa mga kapatid mo." Failing to get comfort and support from the one
person whom she expects to come to her aid, Cristy herself reported the incident to the Barangay
Captain and eventually gave her statement in the Municipal Hall of Bay, Laguna. DCTHaS
In an effort to stop her from filing the complaint, Cristy's mother brought her to the house of accused's
sister in San Jose, Dasmarias, Cavite. However, she was traced by policemen who brought her back to
Sta. Cruz, Laguna, and eventually entrusted her to the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) at Alabang. Accused was thereafter arrested.
Dra. Evelyn Macapagal of the Laguna Provincial Hospital examined Cristy and found the following:
"Pelvic exam: normal external genitalia, nulliparous outlet, vagina admits two fingers with ease, cervix
close, firm, non tender body of uterus small, no adnexal mass, no tenderness with vaginal bleeding
(menstruation)" 3
In interpreting her findings, Dr. Macapagal testified that "[n]ormally, vagina admits one finger with
difficulty. But in the case at bar, her vagina admits two fingers with ease, that means, not normal for
her. Her hymen is not intact anymore." 4
Accused, on the other hand, tried to attribute motives for the filing of the complaint against him. He
claimed that a certain Susan de Guzman, an employee of PAG-ASA, an organization that arranges for
foster parents to give financial help to deserving beneficiaries, instigated Cristy to file the rape
complaint against him. According to accused, Susan de Guzman had a special interest in the prosecution
of the case against him because of a misunderstanding brought about by a $500.00 remittance from
Cristy's foster parent in which Cristy only got P2,000.00.
Accused also claimed that a certain Rosita Erasga of DSWD at Bay, Laguna instigated the filing of the
complaint against him allegedly because of a misunderstanding with regard to the construction of the
Pinatubo Housing Project at Bay, Laguna, of which he was the foreman.
Accused also cast aspersions on Cristy's character by suggesting that she had two boyfriends, named
Doroteo and Gary, as evidenced by a letter signed by Gary and a bus ticket.
Cristy's mother corroborated accused's testimony. She stated that on the day in question, she was at
home washing clothes while accused was working at Silang, Cavite. On that very same day, she claimed
that Cristy went to school for her Citizen Army Training (CAT) but when she verified from Cristy's school
adviser whether she really attended her CAT, she was told that Cristy was absent. She likewise averred
that a certain Doroteo and a lesbian named Teresa were courting Cristy. ScaAET
Jeffrey dela Cuesta, Cristy's half brother, testified that on the day Cristy was allegedly raped, she
attended her CAT while his father was in Dasmarias, Cavite, working. He testified that he, together with
his brothers and sisters, was at home during the date in question.
Noel Calle, accused's co-worker also claimed that on August 10, 1996, he and accused worked overtime
at Silang, Cavite.
Finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, the trial court sentenced him to death and to
pay the victim, Cristy Gonzales, P50,000.00 in damages. 5
In this automatic review accused-appellant posits that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING FULL CREDIT TO ITS OWN FINDING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF
DR. EVELYN MACAPAGAL HAD NO DIRECT AND MATERIAL PROBATIVE VALUE TO PROVE THAT THE
CRIME OF RAPE WAS COMMITTED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED IN NOT DISCREDITING THE ENTIRE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT
CRISTINA GONZALES CONSIDERING; THAT SAID TESTIMONY WAS DIFFERENT FROM AND CONTRARY TO
HER OWN SWORN STATEMENT GIVEN TO THE POLICE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE THEORY OF THE DEFENSE THAT THE
CHARGE WAS CLEARLY FABRICATED, PRINCIPALLY INSTIGATED BY THE DSWD AND PROJECT PAG-ASA
OFFICIALS WHO NURTURED ANGER AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED IN COMPLETELY DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONIES OF
COMPLAINANT'S OWN MOTHER, DIVINA CORSANES (sic), AND HALF-BROTHER, JEFFREY DELA CUESTA,
THAT NO RAPE WAS COMMITTED ON AUGUST 10, 1996 BECAUSE CRISTINA GONZALES WAS IN SCHOOL
AND THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS WORKING AS CARPENTER AT BIGA, SILANG, OR DASMARIAS,
CAVITE.
V
THE TRIAL COURT FINALLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
IN THE INFORMATION ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
The defense assails the credibility of Cristy by pointing out that the medical findings showed that she
had no external abrasion, contrary to her testimony that she struggled by pushing accused-appellant's
arms away and kicking him while she was being undressed. DHITcS
This contention is totally unmeritorious. First, the rape was committed on August 10, 1996, whereas the
victim underwent medical examination on August 27, 1996 or seventeen (17) days later. Second, Cristy's
testimony shows that she was the one who pushed away and kicked accused-appellant and not the
other way around. The absence of external signs of injury does not necessarily negate the commission of
rape, especially when the victim was intimidated by the offender into submission. In this case, accused-
appellant pointed a bolo at her neck.
The defense argues that since the trial court declared that ". . . the testimony of Dr. Evelyn Macapagal
had no direct and material probative value to prove that the crime of rape was committed," then rape
could not have been committed.
The above argument is too simplistic and takes the trial court's conclusion out of context. This Court
notes that, after the trial court concluded that Dr. Macapagal's testimony had no direct and material
probative value to prove that the crime of rape was committed, the trial court explained in the
succeeding paragraph that:
"In the case of People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo San Juan, (G.R. No. 105556, April 4, 1997) the
Honorable Supreme Court ruled that well-settled is the doctrine that lack of lacerated wound does not
negate sexual intercourse. Moreover, the fact that hymenal lacerations were found to be healed and
that no spermatozoa was found does not necessarily negate rape. A freshly broken hymen is not an
essential element of rape. For that matter, in crimes against chastity, the medical examination of the
victim is not an indispensable element for the successful prosecution of the crime, as her testimony
alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused."
The defense claims that Cristy must have had previous sexual experience long before the date of the
alleged rape, considering that Dr. Macapagal found that complainant's vagina admits two (2) fingers
with ease which should not be normally the case if indeed she was raped.
The defense's reasoning is flawed if not misleading. Dr. Macapagal only testified that, in her experience
as an examining physician, a vagina normally admits one examining finger with difficulty. She did not
make any conclusion that Cristy must have had previous voluntary sexual contacts prior to the
commission of the rape considering that her vagina admits two (2) fingers with ease. If at all, it indicates
that sexual congress had indeed transpired.
Next, the defense insists that the trial court should have discredited Cristy's testimony during the trial,
noting that said testimony was different from and contrary to her own sworn statement given to the
police. ECISAD
In particular, the defense invites the attention to the following inconsistencies: (a) on what the victim
was doing prior to the arrival of accused-appellant; (b) on the manner or conduct of her struggle to
resist the attempt on her virtue; and (c) on who were present when the rape was committed.
This Court does not find any inconsistency between Cristy's testimony 6 given before the trial court, on
the one hand, and her statement 7 before the police on the other hand. In her testimony, she narrated
that she was watching their house when accused-appellant ordered her step-brothers and step-sisters
out of the house before he started undressing her. In her sworn statement, she narrated that when
accused-appellant arrived, she was washing clothes. Thereafter, accused-appellant ordered her to get
some clothes. While doing as she was told, accused-appellant started to undress her.
Chronologically, there is no inconsistency or contradiction between Cristy's testimony before the trial
court and her sworn statement. Courts cannot just discredit a witness because there are gaps in her
narration of facts, or because her narration was presented not in a chronological manner.
In this case, the alleged inconsistency or discrepancy is more apparent than real. In fact, the testimony
fills the gaps in the victim's narration of facts. This Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General's
observation, thus:
"Relevantly, in the instant case, when Cristina was called upon to testify on direct examination, she was
immediately made to identify her affidavit after a few preliminary questions relating to her personal
circumstances and identification of the accused (pp. 3-4, TSN, May 22, 1997). Cristina understood that
her affidavit had substantially formed part of her testimony especially since her answers to questions
that followed delved on supplying omissions or correcting minor details. Accordingly, during cross-
examination, Cristina confirmed and clarified that:
Q. And you want to convey to this Honorable Court that the answers to questions No. l, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
& 7 were all personally given by you in answer to all these (8) questions?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you still confirm or affirm under oath that this is what really happened to you on August 10,
1996 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning in Barangay Maitim, Bay, Laguna?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, I want you to read this statement all over again and please tell this Honorable Court
whether you want to deduct or add anything from what you claimed happened to you on August 10,
1996?
A. None, sir.
Q. Are you sure of that?
A. I wish to add something but I will not take away anything from the statement. (pp. 10-11, TSN,
June 5, 1997)
Indeed, the alleged inconsistencies adverted to by appellant were mere minor details which were not
mentioned in her affidavit. There are no material inconsistencies. There is nothing in Cristina's affidavit
that would indicate that she was alone in their residence when appellant arrived before the sexual
abuse. Therefore, it cannot be held to be inconsistent with her declaration on the witness stand that she
was in the company of her step-brothers and step-sisters until she was left alone because appellant told
them to go to another store. As to the specific household chore she was attending to, it is submitted
that the same was sufficiently explained and clarified by Cristina during cross-examination, thus:
"ATTY. DOMINGUEZ:
Q. In your statement you said that when the accused arrived, you were washing clothes and not
watching?
WITNESS:
A. Yes, sir.
ATTY. DOMINGUEZ:
Q. So what you stated last time that you were watching the house together with your brothers and
sisters is not correct?
WITNESS:
A. I was at the time washing clothes and at the same time me and my brothers and sisters were
also watching the house.
Q. You never said anything about your brothers and sisters being in the house in your statement.
Do you remember having forgotten that important fact?
FISCAL:
On what aspect, your honor.
ATTY. DOMINGUEZ:
What happened. She is supposed to narrate everything. The question is what happened to you.
She narrated she was washing clothes when the accused arrived. In her statement, she was watching
the house together with her brothers and sisters when the accused arrived and ordered them to go out.
This is completely different from her written statement.
I am testing the credibility of the witness.
COURT:
The witness may answer.
WITNESS:
A. No, sir. (pp. 20-21, TSN, June 5, 1997)"
In reconstructing the events that led to the incident in question, courts should not expect the narration
or presentation to be strictly chronological. Factors such as memory, length of time, intelligence,
articulateness, and emotional condition all affect a witness' narration of events. As long as the witness
was found to be credible by the trial court, especially after undergoing a rigid cross-examination, any
apparent inconsistency may be overlooked. This is especially true if the lapses concern trivial matters.
ESTDIA
Corollarily, the defense alleges that the charge against accused-appellant was fabricated and instigated
by Susan de Guzman of PAG-ASA and Rosita Erasga of DSWD who allegedly had axes to grind against
accused-appellant.
The above theory by the defense is speculative. De Guzman and Erasga belong to organizations that
would, by their mission and mandate, normally come to the aid of the victim and facilitate the
prosecution of their case. EaCSHI
Also, the defense maintains that the trial court should not have disregarded the testimonies of
complainant's mother and half-brother that Cristy could not have been raped as she was then in school
attending her CAT training and that accused-appellant was then working in Biga, Silang or Dasmarias,
Cavite.
The above argument holds no water. As clearly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General:
" . . . Cristina's half brother's declaration that she was in school at the time the rape incident occurred on
August 10, 1996 is unreliable not only because he is incompetent to so testify on the matter, but also
because it was denied by Cristina's school adviser."
xxx xxx xxx
It is understandable that Cristina's mother would naturally concoct a story to save appellant. As may be
recalled, Cristina testified that her mother was the one who dissuaded her from reporting the sexual
abuse to the Barangay Captain, saying "TANGA KA BA, GUSTO MO BANG MAKULONG ANG TATAY MO
WALANG MAGPAPALAMON SA MGA KAPATID MO"; who hid Cristina in San Jose, Cavite obviously to
prevent the complaint from being filed in court; and who manifested to the police and DSWD personnel,
"SA INYO NA ANG ANAK KO, HUWAG LANG MAKUKULONG ANG ASAWA KO."
Anent the accused-appellant's alibi, the Office of the Solicitor General correctly concluded:
"Neither can we rely on the testimony of Noel Calle. He was obviously a friend trying to lend appellant a
helping hand. His testimony is incredible. While he had a clear recollection that he and appellant worked
overtime in Biga, Silang, Cavite from 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. on August 10, 1996, a Saturday, the date the
rape incident occurred, he did not have any recollection whether they worked overtime on other
Saturdays near said date, thus:
Q. On August 17, did you do any overtime work?
A. I cannot remember because it happened a long time ago.
Q. On August 24, did you do any overtime work?
A. That already escaped in my mind.
Q. How about on August 3, did you render any overtime work?
A. We reported for work but I cannot remember if we rendered overtime work, sir. (p. 7, TSN, Nov.
4, 1997)
Furthermore, Calle's testimony does not clearly indicate the physical impossibility of appellant being in
Bay, Laguna at 10:00 a.m. in the morning, and be present to work overtime in Biga, Silang, Cavite at 5:00
p.m. in the afternoon of the same day. What Calle only remembered is that they both worked overtime.
But there is nothing in his testimony that appellant was already in Biga from the hours of 10:00 a.m. to
4:00 p.m. that same day."
As repeatedly held by this Court:
"The defense of alibi is always viewed with suspicion and received with caution, not only because it is
inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it can easily be fabricated. . . . For this defense to
prosper, it must be convincing enough to preclude any doubt about the physical impossibility of the
presence of the accused at the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident. In
other words, he must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed, but
also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at or near the crime scene. . . . In the absence
of strong and convincing evidence, alibi could not prevail over the positive testimony of the victim, who
had no improper motive to testify falsely against him." 8
However, we cannot agree with the trial court's imposition of the death penalty. Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code provides, thus:
"Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of
a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation.
xxx xxx xxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim. . . ."
The trial court imposed the death penalty on accused-appellant based on its finding that Divina Corsanis,
the victim's mother, is the common-law spouse of accused-appellant. While the trial court correctly
found accused-appellant to be the common-law spouse of the victim's mother, the Information,
however, did not allege accused-appellant as the common-law spouse of Divina, but that he was the
step-father and guardian of the victim. Hence, the trial court cannot properly impose the death penalty
considering that his being the common-law spouse of Divina Corsanis was not alleged in the
Information. Unlike a generic aggravating circumstance which may be proved even if not alleged, a
qualifying aggravating circumstance cannot be proved as such unless alleged in the information. It must
be properly pleaded in order not to violate the constitutional right of the accused to be properly
informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him. 9 Specifically, in People v. Fraga, 10
this Court held that "(a)lthough the rape of a person under eighteen (18) years of age by the common-
law spouse of the victim's mother is punishable by death, this penalty cannot be imposed on accused-
appellant . . . because his relationship was not what was alleged in the informations. What was alleged
was that he is the step-father of the complainant."
Neither can he be declared as a step-father as the court never made such a finding. The word "step,"
when used as prefix in conjunction with a degree of kinship, is repugnant to blood relationship and is
indicative of a relationship by affinity. 11 Since accused-appellant and the victim's mother were never
married, no such relationship by affinity existed between accused-appellant and the victim. HTcADC
Accused-appellant cannot also be considered as guardian for Cristy as no single evidence was presented
to prove such fact.
Lastly, the victim, Cristina Gonzales a.k.a. Cristina Corsanis, should be awarded moral damages of
P50,000.00, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. 12
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 36 in Criminal Case
No. 4962-96-C finding accused-appellant Rodolfo dela Cuesta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant
is ordered to pay the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Dated October 11, 1996, p. 50, Records.
2. Exhibit "1", Records, p. 99.
3. Exhibit "B", Records, p. 3.
4. TSN, July 28, 1997, pp. 6-7.
5. Penned by Judge Norberto Y. Geraldez of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch
36.
6. TSN, May 22, 1997, p. 6.
7. Exhibit "A", Records, p. 4.
8. People v. Hofilea, G.R. No. 134772, June 22, 2000.
9. People v. Mamac, G.R. No. 130332, May 31, 2000.
10. G.R. No. 134130-33, April 12, 2000.
11. People v. Hofilea, supra.
12. People v. Amban, G.R. No. 134286, March 1, 2000; People v. Sapinoso, G.R. No. 122540, March
22, 2000; People v. Dreu, G.R. No. 126282, June 20, 2000; People v. de Guzman, G.R. No. 124368, June
8, 2000.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-28021. December 15, 1977.]
JULIAN SANTULAN, substituted by his children named PATROCINIO, ADORACION, ARTURO,
CONSTANCIA, and PEPITA, all surnamed SANTULAN, and minor grandchildren, JOCELYN, ROSAURO and
ROBERTO, all surnamed SANTULAN, assisted by their guardian ad litem, PATROCINIO SANTULAN,
petitioners-appellants, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, and ANTONIO LUSIN, substituted by his Heirs named TEODOSIA
BALANZA (widow) and Children LEOPOLDO, ARMANDO, ALFONSO, EMILIANO, MAGDALENA, ERLINDA
and ESTRELLA (ESTER), all surnamed LUSIN, and Heirs of CAROLINA LUSIN-LUCERO named MANOLITO
LUCERO and MARIO LUCERO, respondents-appellees.
Isidoro Crisostomo for appellants Heirs of Julian Santulan.
Romulo C. Felizmea for appellees Heirs of Antonio Lusin.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Conrado T.
Limcaoco for The Executive Secretary, etc.
D E C I S I O N
AQUINO, J p:
This case is about the lease of a parcel of foreshore land of the public domain with an area of about four
and one-half hectares located at Barrio Kaigin, Kawit, Cavite abutting on Bacoor Bay and the Ankaw
Creek.
It is a protracted controversy that has been pending for more than thirty years between the rival
claimants, Julian Santulan and Antonio Lusin, who have been succeeded by their heirs.
Santulan claimed that foreshore land was an extension of his land, Lot No. 986 of the Kawit cadastre,
with an area of 17,301 square meters, registered in his name in 1937 under Original Certificate of Title
No. 6 which was issued by virtue of a free patent. The northern boundary of Lot No. 986 is Bacoor
(Manila) Bay (Exh. A). The said foreshore land was allegedly formed by soil deposits accumulated by the
alluvial action of the sea.
On December 5, 1942 Santulan caused the said land to be surveyed. The survey plan was approved by
the Director of Lands in 1944 (Exh. B). On December 29, 1942 Santulan, pursuant to Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1, filed an application, F.L.A. No. V-562, to lease for five years for agricultural
purposes an area of 36,120 square meters of the said foreshore land (Exh. F).
On that same date, December 29, 1942, Santulan, pursuant to Act No. 3077 and Lands Administrative
Order No. 8-3, filed with the Bureau of Lands an application for a revocable permit to occupy the said
land. He indicated therein that he would use the land for "capiz beds and oyster beds, the planting of
bakawan and pagatpat and later to be developed into a fishpond" (Exh. G).
Seven years later, or on December 22, 1949, Santulan filed with the Bureau of Fisheries an application
for an ordinary fishpond permit or lease of the said foreshore land (Special Use Permit Fp. A. No. 5114,
Exh. H).
At the instance of the Director of Fisheries, the Director of Forestry investigated the condition of the
said foreshore land. The latter in his first indorsement dated June 19, 1950 found that it was swampy
"and not an improved fishpond as alleged by Antonio Lusin" and that it is within the disposable areas for
agricultural purposes under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands (Exh. L-1).
The chief of the division of commercial fisheries sent a letter to Lusin dated April 28, 1950 apprising him
that he was reported to have illegally entered the area covered by Santulan's fishpond permit
application and directing him to refrain from introducing improvements, with the warning that court
proceedings would be taken against him (Exh. J).
On January 12, 1951 an attorney, acting for the Director of Lands wrote the following letter to Lusin
advising him to vacate the disputed land and maintain the status quo:
"Mr. Antonio Lusin
Caigin, Kawit, Cavite
"Sir:
"We have been informed that the area which is presently controverted by and between you and Julian
Santulan, under the applications noted above, was recently entered by you and some companions and
that you are destroying the dikes and other improvements previously constructed thereon by said Julian
Santulan.
"If this information is true, and inasmuch as you are aware that the controversy is still pending final
adjudgment in this Office, it is desired that you take proper advice and leave the area and its existing
improvements in status quo in order to avoid possible confusion of rights which may delay the final
disposition of the area in question.
"You are advised further that the acts imputed to you may make you liable to prosecution and
punishment under the law; and that whatever improvements you may make for yourself in the premises
will not legally accrue to your benefit, nor will they serve as basis for a claim to preferential rights."
(Paragraphing supplied, Exh. J-1)
Santulan declared the said foreshore land in his name for tax purposes. Tax Declaration No. 2923, which
took effect in 1948 and which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 13816 also in Santulan's name, shows that
the land was assessed at P460. He paid the realty taxes due on the said land for the years 1945-46,
1948-55 and 1957-60 (Exh. C, D and E, et seq.)
On the other hand, Antonio Lusin in 1942 and 1945 (he died in 1962) filed with the Bureau of Lands
applications for a revocable permit and lease of a foreshore land, respectively, for the purpose of
producing salt on the said land. He claimed that he had been in the continuous and exclusive possession
of the land since 1920, when it was still under water, and that he had used it as a site of his fish corrals.
He allegedly converted two hectares of the said land into a fishpond. The entire area was enclosed with
mud dikes and provided with a concrete sluice gate and another sluice gate made of wood On the
northern part of the land bordering the bay were bamboo stakes placed at close intervals to serve as
water breakers to protect the mud dikes from being washed away by the action of the sea. Lusin
introduced the alleged improvements from 1951 to 1953.
The 1942 foreshore lease applications of Santulan and Lusin gave rise to Bureau of Lands Conflict No. 8
(N). The Director of Lands in his decision in that case dated February 1, 1951 found that the disputed
land is foreshore land covered and uncovered by the flow and ebb of the ordinary tides; that it is an
extension of Santulan's Lot No. 986 and it was formerly a part of the sea; that Santulan was the first to
enter the land and to make dikes thereon, and that Lusin entered the land later and made dikes also
(Exh. K made a part hereof for reference as Annex A).
The Director ruled that the disputed foreshore land was subject "to riparian rights which may be invoked
by Santulan as owner of the upland in accordance with section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-
1" (Exh. K). Hence, the Director rejected Lusin's application for a foreshore lease and for a revocable
permit and gave due course to Santulan's foreshore lease application.
Lusin filed a motion for reconsideration. The Director in his order of October 19, 1951 denied that
motion. He found that Lusin was a possessor in bad faith; that it is not true that Lusin had improved and
possessed the said foreshore land for twenty years; that the disputed area is covered by water, two to
three feet deep during ordinary tides and is exposed land after the ebb of the tides, and that Lusin's
alleged possession and improvements could not nullify Santulan's preferential right to lease the land by
reason of his riparian rights. The Director ordered Lusin to vacate the land within sixty days from notice
(Exh. L made a part hereof for reference as Annex B).
Lusin appealed to the Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who in his decision of
October 13, 1952 dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Director's 1951 decision (Exh. M made a part
hereof for reference as Annex C). Lusin's motion for reconsideration was denied in the Secretary's order
of February 28, 1953 (Exh. N made a part hereof for reference as Annex D).
Lusin asked for a reinvestigation of the Case. His request was granted. The Department ordered a
reinvestigation on May 12, 1953.
After receipt of the report of reinvestigation, the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
by authority of the Secretary, in his order of December 14, 1954, reaffirmed the rejection of Lusin's
revocable permit and foreshore lease applications but ordered Santulan to reimburse to Lusin the
appraised value of his improvements (Exh. O made a part hereof for reference as Annex E).
Lusin appealed to the President of the Philippines after his motion for reconsideration was denied in the
Undersecretary's order of May 19, 1955 (Exh. OO made a part hereof for reference as Annex F).
Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo, by authority of the President, held in his decision of April 10, 1958 that
section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 (promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources on April 30, 1936 pursuant to Acts Nos. 2874 and 3038) was "rendered obsolete" by
section 67 of the Public Land Law which took effect on December 1, 1936 (Exh. P made a part hereof for
reference as Annex G).
On the basis of the foregoing ruling and since the record is silent as to whether or not the land in
question has been declared by the President as not necessary for the public service and as open to
disposition (Sec. 61, Public Land Law), the Executive Secretary sustained Lusin's appeal and reversed the
orders of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in favor of
Santulan. Secretary Pajo decided the case in the alternative as follows:
"On the assumption that the land in question has been declared open for disposition and is not
necessary for the public service, this Office directs that an oral bidding for the leasing thereof to
interested parties pursuant to the provisions of Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 be conducted
and the contract of lease awarded to the highest bidder. Whoever shall be the highest bidder, if other
than the appellant, shall be required to pay to the appellant the appraised value of the improvements
introduced by him on the land to be determined by that Department.
"If the land in question has not been so declared, this Office directs that a revocable permit under
Section 68 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 be issued to the appellant requiring him to pay permit fees
since the year 1951.
"Accordingly, the orders and decisions of that Department and the Bureau of Lands are hereby
revoked."
Santulan's case was distinguished from that of Gonzalo Monzon whose Lot No. 987 adjoins Santulan's
Lot No. 986. Executive Secretary Fred Ruiz Castro (now Chief Justice) in his decision of May 10, 1954
upheld the preferential right of Monzon to lease the foreshore land north of his lot, which foreshore
land is adjacent to the foreshore land now in dispute in this case (Exh. Q made a part hereof for
reference as Annex H).
Santulan's motion for reconsideration was denied in the letter of the Acting Executive Secretary dated
August 20, 1959 (Exh. W).
On October 22, 1959 Santulan filed in the Court of First Instance of Cavite a petition for certiorari
wherein he alleged that the Executive Secretary committed a grave abuse of discretion in
misinterpreting certain provisions of Act No. 2874, Commonwealth Act No. 141, and Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1.
In the lower court the parties agreed that the case involves only a question of law. On August 18, 1961
the lower court dismissed the petition and affirmed the Executive Secretary's decision. Santulan
appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution of July 21, 1967 elevated the record to this
Court on the ground that Santulan in his brief raised only the legal questions of whether the Public Land
Law repealed section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 and whether the Executive Secretary's
decision is "legally sound and correct" (CA-G. R. No. 30708-R).
It should be emphasized that, as found by the investigators of the Bureau of Lands, Santulan was the
prior possessor of the foreshore land in question. He had it surveyed in 1942. The survey plan (Psu-
115357) was approved by the Director of Lands in 1944. Santulan paid the realty taxes on that land.
It should further be underscored that the regulations give him a preferential right to lease the land as a
riparian owner. Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30, 1936, which was issued by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources upon the recommendation of the Director of Lands for
the disposition of alienable lands of the public domain, provides:
"32. Preference of Riparian Owner. The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy
lands or lands covered with water bordering upon shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be
given preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public
service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies
therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands
advising him of his preferential right."
Paragraph 32 quoted above is a substantial copy of paragraph 4 of Lands Administrative Order No. 8-3
dated April 20, 1936, which was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
upon the recommendation of the Director of Lands for issuance of temporary permits of occupation and
use of agricultural lands of the public domain.
The word "riparian" in paragraphs 32 and 4 of the departmental regulations is used in a broad sense as
referring to any property having a water frontage (Shepard's Point Land Co. vs. Atlantic Hotel, 44 S. E.
39, 45, 132 N. C. 517, 65 C. J. S. 143, note 84). Strictly speaking, "riparian" refers to rivers. A riparian
owner is a person who owns land situated on the bank of a river.
But in paragraphs 32 and 4, the term "riparian owner" embraces not only the owners of lands on the
banks of rivers but also the littoral owners, meaning the owners of lands bordering the shore of the sea
or lake or other tidal waters. The littoral is the coastal region including both the land along the coast and
the water near the coast or the shore zone between the high and low watermarks.
Therefore, on the basis of paragraphs 32 and 4 of the said administrative regulations, Santulan or his
heirs should be allowed to leased or occupy the said foreshore land.
But the Executive Secretary ruled that paragraph 32 was rendered obsolete by Commonwealth Act No.
141 or, as held by the trial court, Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 was repealed by the Public Land
Law. Is that conclusion correct? We hold that it is wrong.
It is true that Lands Administrative Orders Nos. 7-1 and 8-3 were issued when the 1919 Public Land Act
was in force or before the present Public Land Law took effect on December 1, 1936. But that
circumstance would not necessarily mean that the said departmental regulations are not good under
the 1936 Public Land Law.
In rationalizing the alleged repeal of paragraph 32, the Executive Secretary cited the following provisions
of Act No. 2874, the 1919 Public Land Act (15 Public Land Laws 24):
"SEC. 64. The lease or sale shall be adjudicated to the highest bidder; and if there is no bidder
besides the applicant, it shall be adjudicated to him. The provisions of section twenty-seven of this Act
shall be applied wherever applicable. If all or part of the lots remain unleased or unsold, the Director of
Lands shall from time to time announce in the Official Gazette or otherwise the lease or sale of those
lots, if necessary." (Section 27 refers to sealed bidding)
The Executive Secretary held that the above-quoted section 64 was repealed by the following provisions
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which took effect on December 1, 1936:
"SEC. 67. The lease or sale shall be made through oral bidding; and adjudication shall be made to
the highest bidder. However, where an applicant has made improvements on the land by virtue of a
permit issued to him by competent authority, the sale or lease shall be made by sealed bidding as
prescribed in section twenty-six of this Act, the provisions of which shall be applied wherever applicable.
If all or part of the lots remain unleased or unsold. the Director of Lands shall from time to time
announce in the Official Gazette, or in any other newspapers of general circulation, the lease or sale of
those lots, if necessary." (Section 26, like section 27 of Act No. 2874, refers to sealed bidding)
The Executive Secretary noted that under section 64 of Act No. 2874 sealed bidding was the general rule
of procedure in determining an award of a lease of foreshore land and that the applicant is entitled to
equal the bid of the highest bidder. On the other hand, under section 67, oral bidding is the general rule.
Hence, the Executive Secretary assumed that, while under section 64 of the 1919 old Public Land Act,
the fact that the applicant has a preferential right to lease foreshore land was a crucial factor, it is
unimportant under section 67 of the 1936 Public Land Law because in oral bidding the applicant is not
entitled to equal the bid of the highest bidder.
The Executive Secretary concluded that, because the preferential right of the applicant to lease
foreshore land was immaterial under section 67 of the present Public Land Law, paragraph 32 of Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1, which gives such preference, had become "idle and useless".
That conclusion is wrong because it is based on the erroneous hypothesis that section 64 of the 1919
Public Land Act is different from section 67 of the 1936 Public Land Law. They are not different. The
truth is that section 64 was amended by Act No. 3517 which took effect on February 4, 1929 (24 Public
Laws 416). Section 64, as thus amended, is substantially the same as section 67 of the 1936 Public Land
Law.
That fact was overlooked by the Executive Secretary. Hence, his conclusion, that paragraph 32 of Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1 was repealed or rendered obsolete by section 67 of the present Public
Land Law, is wrong because its premise is wrong.
In other words, paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, issued on April 30, 1936, was
promulgated under section 64 of the old Public Land Law, as amended. And since the amended section
64 was substantially reproduced in section 67 of the present Public Land Law, it is glaringly incorrect to
say that section 67 rendered obsolete the said paragraph 32. Paragraph 32 is still in force and is good
under the existing Public Land Law.
The foregoing discussion reveals that the Executive Secretary's rationalization of the alleged repeal of
paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 (identical to paragraph 4 of Lands Administrative
Order No. 8-3) is not only deficient in clarity and cogency but is predicated on the false assumption that
section 64 of the 1919 Public Land Act is different from section 67 of the present Public Land Law.
Consequently, the aforementioned decision of Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo under review has to be
set aside.
This case is governed by the precedent established in the case of Gonzalo Monzon, which, as already
noted, is similar to this case since the foreshore land involved in the Monzon case is adjacent to the
foreshore land involved in this case.
In the Monzon case, the Office of the President, applying the oftcited paragraph 32 of Lands
Administrative Order No. 7-1 held that Monzon, the littoral owner of the registered land abutting upon
the foreshore land, has the preferential right to lease the foreshore land.
The location of the lots of Santulan and Monzon and the foreshore lands abutting thereon is shown in
the following sketch based on the plan, Psu-115357 (Exh. B):

Considering that the foreshore land abutting upon Santulan's lot is in the same situation as the
foreshore land abutting upon Monzon's lot, there is no reason why Santulan should not enjoy, with
respect to the disputed foreshore land, the rights given to Monzon over the foreshore land adjacent to
his lot.
Now, then, is there any justification for giving to the littoral owner the preferential right to lease the
foreshore land abutting on his land?
That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which
provides that, while lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action
of the sea forth part of the public domain, such lands, "when they are no longer washed by the waters
of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, or for the coast guard service", shall be declared by the Government "to be the property of
the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof ." (cited in Ignacio vs. Director of
Lands, 108 Phil. 335, 338).
In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner (riparian according to
paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the
sea (Ker & Co. vs. Cauden, 6 Phil. 732, 736, 223 U. S. 268, 56 L. Ed. 432, 435; Jover vs. Insular
Government, 10 Phil. 522, 40 Phil. 1094, 1100, 221 U. S. 623, 55 L. Ed. 884).
The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for giving accretions to the riparian
owner, which is that accretion compensates the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land
suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters (Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). So, in the
case of littoral lands, he who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession (Banks
vs. Ogden, 2 Wall. 57, 67, 17 L Ed. 818, 821).
That preferential right is recognized in American jurisprudence where the rule is that the owner of the
land adjacent to navigable waters has certain riparian or littoral rights of a proprietary nature not
possessed by the general public which rights are incident to the ownership of the banks or the uplands:
riparian as respects the waters of a river and littoral as to sea waters or the waters of a lake (65 C. J. S.
143-145).
It may be mentioned that the Director of Lands stated in his manifestation of October 26, 1977 that
Lands Administrative Orders Nos. 7-1 and 8-3 are still in force and have not been superseded by any
later regulations and that the directive of the President of the Philippines to the Director of Lands dated
May 24, 1966, stopping the grant of foreshore leases all along Manila Bay, towards Cavite and Bataan,
has not rendered the instant case moot and academic "because the foreshore lease application involved
is pending award."
In view of the foregoing considerations, the trial court's decision and the decision of the Executive
Secretary dated April 10, 1958 are reversed and set aside and the order of the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources dated December 14, 1954 and the orders of the Director of Lands
dated February 1 and October 19, 1951 are affirmed.
The lease application of Julian Santulan mentioned in the order of February 1, 1951 should be recorded
in the names of his heirs and the obligation to make reimbursement mentioned in the dispositive part of
the Undersecretary's order should now devolve upon the heirs of Santulan. The reimbursement should
be made to the heirs of the late Antonio Lusin. The obligation to vacate the disputed land, as required in
the Director's order of October 19, 1951 devolves upon the heirs of Lusin. Costs in both instances
against respondent heirs of Lusin. (As amended by Resolution of February 17, 1977.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion Jr. and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Guerrero, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
Fernando and Santos, JJ., are on leave.
Annexes to Opinion in L-28021, Julian Santulan
vs. Executive Secretary, et al.
F.L.A. No. V-562, R.P.A. (New). Julian Santulan, Applicant & Contestant vs. F.L.A. (New), R.P.A. (New), B.L.
Conflict No. 8 (N) Psu-115357, Kawit, Cavite.
Julian Santulan, Applicant-Appellee vs. Antonio Lusin, Applicant-Appellant, D.A.N.R. Case No. 625, Psu-
115357, Kawit, Cavite.
Annex A Order of Director of Lands dated February 1, 1951.
Annex B Order of Director of Lands dated October 19, 1951.
Annex C Decision of Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated October 13, 1952.
Annex D Order of Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated February 28, 1953.
Annex E Order of Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated December 14, 1954.
Annex F Order of Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated May 19, 1955.
Annex G Decision of Executive Secretary Juan C. Pajo dated April 10, 1958.
Annex H Decision of Executive Secretary Fred Ruiz Castro dated May 10, 1954 in Emiliano del Rosario
vs. Gonzalo Monzon.
ANNEX A
O R D E R
Julian Santolan, who owns Lot No. 986 of the Kawit Cadastre, under a free patent grant with Original
Certificate of Title No. 6 issued to him on June 9, 1937, claims preferential rights to all the areas
extending seaward from the said lot. He caused the said areas to be surveyed for him in 1942, and the
survey plan thereof was approved in 1944, as may be seen in the Survey Plan Psu-115357 of this Office
which is reproduced in the sketch drawn on the back of the last page hereof. Except the portion marked
"A" in the sketch, he made a foreshore lease application and a revocable permit application for these
areas in 1942 to devote the areas applied for to fishpond purposes. Presently, he now includes the
portion "A" in his applications herein mentioned to be devoted to the same purposes, in fact, he now
intends to utilize the entire area comprised in his Survey Psu-115357 for fishery purposes and has filed
therefor with the Bureau of Fisheries fishpond permit application No. 5114. Upon this claim he contests
the revocable permit (new) application and the foreshore lease (new) application for the portion of
these areas marked "X" in the sketch which were filed by Antonio Lusin in 1942 and 1945, respectively,
for salt-producing purposes.
Lot No. 986 of the Kawit Cadastre, mentioned above as owned by Julian Santolan, appears to be
bounded on the north by the Bacoor Bay. It is evident therefore that the areas now comprised in
Santolan's Survey Psu-115357 were formerly parts of the bay, and that presently they exist as a result of
the recession of the waters of the sea. Investigation disclosed that these areas are now foreshore lands,
covered and uncovered by the flow and ebb of the ordinary tides. Santolan was found to have
entered the areas first and made dikes. Lusin was found to have entered lately and made dikes also.
None of them, however, has obtained from this Office any permit of occupancy and use, and their
applications are not yet approved.
On the basis alone of actual occupancy or introduction of improvements neither of the parties here may
claim preferential rights, for under the law and regulations, it is only such occupancy and introduction of
improvements as are made upon the authority of an official permit issued by this Office which could
serve as a reason for holding a sealed bidding in a public auction of the right to lease at which the
permittee is given the preferred right to equal the highest bid that might be put by any other party. This
is the rule prescribed by Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (the Public Land Act). It appears,
however, that the areas, portions "A", "X" and the parts extending up to the Bacoor Bay now, as may
be seen in the sketch, which are comprised by Santolan's Survey Plan Psu-115357, are immediately
adjoining Lot No. 986, which is his private property, and are extensions of the said lot to the sea. The
areas, being foreshore lands, are therefore subject to riparian rights which may be invoked by Santolan
as owner of the upland in accordance with Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 which
provides the following:
"Sec. 32. The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands, or lands covered
with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to
apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public service, subject to the
laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefor within 60 days
from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential
right."
As Julian Santolan is interested in utilizing the entire areas covered by his Survey Psu-115357 over which
he is fully entitled to exercise his riparian rights, the above-noted foreshore lease (new) application and
revocable (new) application of Antonio Lusin, both covering the portion marked "X" in the sketch, are
hereby rejected. The base application of Santolan, shall be recorded as Foreshore Lease Application No.
562 and given due course for the whole area (including portion "A") shown in the said sketch.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, February 1, 1951.
JOSE P. DANS
Director of Lands
ANNEX B
O R D E R
Counsel for respondent Antonio Lusin has filed in due time a motion for the reconsideration of our
Order of February 1, 1951, which resolved this case in favor of contestant Julian Santolan, praying that
the said order be set aside and the case, reopened for purposes of a formal hearing for the submission
of evidence. Substantially stated, respondent Lusin claims that he is entitled to preference because he
has been in possession of the premises for a period of over twenty years, placing stakes and planting
aquatic trees for the raising and cultivation of shell fish and sea shells, besides constructing dikes for
ponding fish and making salt beds, all these works undertaken by him being the cause for the gradual
filling of the area and its conversion into a productive state. He contends that the areas under question
had been formed thru "artificial accretion" caused by his own labor and, consequently, he has the right
of pre-emption.
There is no question, however, that the areas under question are parts of the foreshore. Under Section
61 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), they are disposable to private parties by lease only
and not otherwise; and under Section 67 of the same Act, the lease shall be made thru oral bidding, the
adjudication to be made to the highest bidder.
There is no question also that the areas under question extend to the sea from Lot No. 986 of the Kawit
Cadastre, which is actually owned by respondent Santolan under Original Certificate of Title No. 6 of the
land records of Cavite. Undoubtedly, respondent has riparian rights to the foreshore in question which
he can invoke against contestant Lusin under the provisions of Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order
No. 7-1, quoted in toto in the order sought to be reconsidered.
Records show that the areas under question are also involved in the Fishpond Application No. 5114 of
Julian Santolan with the Bureau of Fisheries which is also contested by Antonio. It appears that upon
request of the Director of Fisheries to the Bureau of Forestry for certification as to the availability of the
areas for fishery purposes, the latter made investigation, inquiring at the same time into the claim of
Antonio Lusin, made formally in writing, that he has improved the areas into a fishpond and has been in
occupation thereof for more than 20 years. The Bureau of Forestry made the findings that those areas
are within the disposable areas for agricultural purposes under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands;
and that they are swampy lands, formerly under sea water of the Bacoor Bay, "and not an improved
fishpond as alleged by Antonio Lusin". These findings were transmitted to the Director of Fisheries
under first indorsement dated June 19, 1950.
Our own investigating officer, reporting on this case on January 25, 1951, stated the following: "On
December 15, 1950, when I conducted the first ocular inspection of the premises in the presence of
both parties, the only visible improvements found thereon are the newly constructed dikes made
thereon by Julian Santolan, a few bacauan and ape-ape trees of about two to three years old, bamboo
stakes placed thereon at intervals, and a small old hut located at almost the middle of the land in
question. All these improvements were claimed to have been introduced by Julian Santolan. Antonio
Lusin, however, claimed that those bamboo stakes found therein were his."
It is evident from the findings of both the inspecting officer of the Bureau of Forestry and our own
investigating officer that the areas under question are foreshore lands, and that they have not been
really improved and possessed by respondent Lusin for over twenty years as he alleged. The
improvements found therein have been recently made, and they are not of such nature and extent as
would have changed the character of the areas as foreshore. In fact, according to the investigating
officer, the areas have been seen by him on different occasions, and he found that the same, as well as
the neighboring areas in the same belt, were covered by tidal waters of from 2 to 3 feet deep during
ordinary rise of the tides, and uncovered by the tides at ebb.
There is, therefore, no reason for changing our disposition in our order of February 1, 1951. It is not
necessary to re-open the case to receive evidence on respondent's allegation that he has been in
possession of the premises for over 20 years and has gradually improved them because, aside from the
fact that the allegation is belied by the physical condition of the premises, whatever evidence may be
gathered on that allegation could not change the nature of the areas as foreshore, nor would it avoid
the rights of contestant as riparian owner. The presence of the respondent in the premises has not been
authorized by competent authorities, and his introduction of improvements thereon was not done with
proper permit of temporary occupancy and use such as is prescribed in our administrative practice. The
circumstances under which he made improvements cannot justify his claim for a preferred right under
Section 67 of the Public Land Act; on the contrary, he stands to forfeit the improvements to the
Government for, as reported by our investigating officer, he entered the premises and commenced
making the improvements after contestant Santolan himself has already made improvements, and after
he has been warned on December 15, 1950 by the investigating officer not to continue working, which
warning was confirmed by us in our letter to him of January 12, 1951. His bad faith is quite evident, and
he cannot avail of his presence in the premises now to demand the issuance to him of a provisional or
revocable permit of temporary occupancy and use under our rules and regulations in order to legalize
his entry and give validity to his improvements. The right to demand issuance of such a permit is
concomitant to the right of contestant Santolan to be a preferred applicant by virtue of his riparian right
recognized in Section 32 of Land Administrative Order No. 7-1 cited hereinabove.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the instant motion for reconsideration and reinvestigation of respondent Antonio
Lusin is hereby denied, and he shall vacate the premises within 60 days from receipt of notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, October 19, 1951.
JOSE P. DANS
Director of Lands
ANNEX C
D E C I S I O N
The order of the Director of Lands dated February 1, 1951, rejected Foreshore Lease Application (New)
and Revocable Permit Application (New) of Antonio Lusin and gave due course to the Foreshore Lease
Application No. 562 of Julian Santolan. Antonio Lusin claims that the order is against the fact and the
law. He presented three (3) motions for reconsideration: one on October 19, 1951; the other on
December 12, 1951; and the last on April 9, 1952. Said motions were all denied. Hence, the present
appeal.
The subject of contention is the strip of land having an area of 4 1/2 hectares from Lot No. 986 of the
Kawit Cadastre No. 203 to the waters of Bacoor Bay. Lot No. 986 is covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 6 issued to Julian Santolan on June 9, 1937. Santolan's titled property is bounded on the north
by Bacoor Bay.
On December 5, 1942, Santolan filed his foreclosure lease application for the entire tract intervening
between his property and Bacoor Bay. So he caused Psu-115357 to be executed and same was approved
in 1944 by the Director of Lands.
On November 26, 1945, Antonio Lusin applied for permit for an area of 4.5 hectares for salt bed
purposes. The area for which permit was asked, is covered by his F.L.A. (New) filed on November 17,
1945, the boundaries of which are as follows:
NE V. del Rosario and E. del Rosario
SE Julian Santolan
SW Ankaw River
NW Bacoor Bay.
The two applications of Santolan and Lusin cover the same area. Julian Santolan duly protested in 1946
against Lusin's application. The question to be decided in this appeal is: Which of the two applicants,
Julian Santolan or Antonio Lusin, has right of preference to the land in controversy?
By virtue of the fact that he is a riparian owner, Julian Santolan has the right of preference pursuant to
the provisions of Section 32 of Administrative Order No. 7-1, which reads as follows:
"Sec. 32. The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands, or lands covered
with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to
apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public service, subject to the
laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefor within sixty (60)
days from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his
preferential right."
It is true that applicant Lusin introduced improvements on the land in question, but that fact does not
give him preferential right thereto, not only because he had not acquired any permit from the Bureau of
Lands before doing so, but also because his entry on the premises was duly protested by Santolan.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, and finding that the order of the Director of Lands on February 1,
1951, is in accordance with the facts of record and the provisions of the law on the matter, the herein
appeal from said order should be, as hereby it is, dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, October 13, 1952.
JOSE S. CAMUS
Acting Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources
ANNEX D
O R D E R
This is a motion filed by Antonio Lusin, thru counsel, for the reconsideration of the decision of this Office
dated October 13, 1952, dismissing his appeal from the decision of the Director of Lands under date of
February 1, 1951.
In support of the said motion for reconsideration, Lusin substantially alleges that he has been improving
the land in question since 1920, spending for such improvements no less than P20,000.00, and for that
reason, he should be given the preferential right to acquire the said land. To reinforce his allegation,
movant cites the case of Rosalia Vida Vda. de Tirona vs. Magdaleno Tragico, TA-G.R. No. 9050, decided
by the Court of Appeals on June 30, 1943, wherein it was held that because Tragico has constructed
fishpond on a portion of the land in question by means of the improvements he has introduced thereon
and has possessed the land for sufficient time to acquire the land by right of prescription, he was
awarded the land in dispute.
We have found this allegation of movant to be far from the truth. It is the finding of the investigating
officer who made an investigation of this case that it is Julian Santolan and not movant Lusin who has
been actually occupying the land in question and introducing improvements thereon. The pertinent
portion of his report reads as follows:
"On December 16, 1950, when I conducted the first ocular inspection of the premises in the presence of
both parties, the only visible improvements found thereon were the newly constructed dikes made
thereon by Julian Santolan, a few bacauan and ape-ape trees of about two to three years old, bamboo
stakes placed thereon as intervals and a small old hut located at almost the middle of the land in
question. All these improvements were claimed to have been introduced thereon by Julian Santolan.
Antonio Lusin, however, claimed that the bamboo stakes found thereon were his."
Moreover, according to the further finding of the said investigating officer, the land in question falls
under the category of foreshore land. That portion of his report referring to this finding is hereby quoted
as follows:
"It may not be amiss to state in this connection that I have on different occasions, the opportunity to
inspect the land subject hereof on both high and low tides. During ordinary low tide, the whole areas
and further seaward, is entirely exposed to the surface while during ordinary high tide, it is wholly
covered with tidal water with an approximate depth of two to three feet. The land in question in its
entirety is marshy covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of tidal water."
As the land is a foreshore land, the same is susceptible to the riparian right of the owner of the adjoining
land. According to Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, the owner of the property adjoining
foreshore land, shall be given preference to apply for such land adjoining his property as may not be
needed for the public service. Inasmuch as the land in question adjoins Lot No. 980, Kawit Cadastre,
which is a private property of Julian Santolan, said Julian Santolan shall have the preference right to
apply therefor over and above any other applicant. It may be mentioned, in this connection, that the
said case of Rosalia Vida Vda. de Tirona vs. Magdaleno Tragico who had possessed and improved the
land claimed by him, it is Santolan and not movant Lusin who has been actually occupying and improving
the land subject of the present controversy.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion for reconsideration filed by Antonio Lusin, as well as his request for
reinvestigation of this case, should be, as hereby it is, denied.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, February 28, 1953.
FERNANDO LOPEZ
Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources
ANNEX E
O R D E R
On October 13, 1952, this Office rendered a decision in connection with the above entire case, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"In view of all the foregoing and finding that the order of the Director of Lands on February 1, 1951, is in
accordance with the facts of record and the provisions of law on the matter, the herein appeal from the
said order should be, as hereby it is dismissed."
From the said decision Antonio Lusin filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied as per order
of this Office dated February 28, 1953. Still not satisfied with the aforementioned order, Lusin again filed
a second motion for reconsideration predicating his motion on the following grounds:
1. That he (Lusin) is in actual possession of the land in question since 1920;
2. That said area is an agricultural land actually devoted to fishpond and, therefore, is not a
foreshore land;
3. That even granting without admitting that Santolan is a riparian owner, Santolan had lost his
riparian right thereto in view of the continuous possession by Lusin of the area since 1920; and
4. That in the investigation relied upon by the Director of Lands in his decision and confirmed by
this Office, the movant herein was not given opportunity to be heard because the said investigation was
never completed, and as a result, the conclusions of the investigator thereat were one sided.
Adhering to its policy of giving party litigants the utmost opportunity to present their respective sides of
the case, this Office ordered a reinvestigation of the case to determine whether is not the allegations of
Antonio Lusin are true.
From the said reinvestigation, the facts of this case may be stated as follows:
The disputed area is a strip of land containing an approximate area of 4-1/2 hectares located at the
Barrio of Kaingin, Municipality of Kawit, Province of Cavite. It is bounded on the North by Bacoor Bay, on
the East by the property occupied by Vicente del Rosario and E. del Rosario, on the South by Lot No. 896
of Kawit Cadastre No. 203; and on the West by Ankaw River. Lot 986, mentioned above as the boundary
of the area in question on the South, is owned and possessed by Julian Santolan, his ownership thereof
being evidenced by a free patent grant with Original Certificate of Title No. 6 issued on June 9, 1937. The
only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not Julian Santolan, as riparian owner, is entitled to
the preference provided for in Section 32, Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, which reads as follows:
"32. Preference of Riparian Order. The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy
lands, or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall
be given preference to apply or such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public
service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies
therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands
advising him of his preferential right."
During the reinvestigation of this case by a representative of this Office, it was disclosed that Antonio
Lusin is the actual occupant of the area in question his present possession thereof dating back as of
1951. During his occupation, Lusin has introduced considerable improvements in the area investing his
life savings therein. Today, a portion of approximately two hectares of the said area is a complete
fishpond surrounded with dikes. A concrete gate was constructed or the western side of the fishpond in
1951. Water breakers were constructed around the dikes to protect them from the action of the waves.
The remaining portion of the area in question is fenced with bamboo stakes. LibLex
On the other hand, it is apparent that the area in question is an extension of Lot 986 to the sea and that
its present existence is the result of the continuous rescission of the water of the sea. There is no doubt
that the area in question is a foreshore, it being situated along the shore lying between medium high
and low water marks and is covered and uncovered by the flow and ebb of ordinary tide.
Both parties claim prior possession of the disputed area, Santolan's claim dating way back in 1907, the
year he claims said area was donated to him by his father-in-law, while Lusin alleges that he was already
in possession of the same since 1920. The evidence presented by both parties during the reinvestigation
were so diametrically opposed with each other that they only create doubts as to the veracity of the
respective claims of said parties. From the testimonies of witnesses for both sides, there could be
gathered sufficient grounds to believe that prior to 1942, neither party possessed the area to the
exclusion of the other. Rather, there are good reasons to believe that both parties fished in the premises
jointly and/or simultaneously without claiming the property exclusively for themselves because then the
area was covered with water which at that time was still deep. It was only in 1942 that Julian Santolan
took positive step to claim the property by filing a foreshore lease and a revocable permit application for
said area with the intention of converting the same into a fishpond. Santolan caused said area to be
surveyed in 1942, the survey plan thereof was approved in 1944 as may be seen in survey Plan Psu-
115357 of the Bureau of Lands. Since 1942, Santolan exercised dominion over the property although
Lusin occasionally entered the premises with a similar intention of claiming the area for himself. In
January of 1951 Lusin entered the area in question and wrested the possession thereof from Santolan.
Since then up to the present, Lusin is in continuous possession of the same notwithstanding the vigorous
opposition of Santolan.
Lusin alleges that the area in question does not fall within the purview of the above quoted Section 32
of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 on the theory that the lands enumerated in said provision,
whether foreshore lands, marshy lands, or lands covered with water, must be bordering upon the shores
or banks of navigable lakes or rivers. And it is argued that since the area in question is bordering the
shores of Manila Bay, which is neither a lake nor a river, the owner of the adjoining property is not
entitled to the preferential right accorded by said Lands Administrative Order.
We cannot agree with this contention. This Office is of the opinion and so holds that the said provision
of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, Section 32 speaks of the following kinds of lands, distinct and
separate from one another:
(1) Foreshore lands
(2) Marshy lands, or
(3) Land covered with water bordering upon the shores of navigable lakes or rivers.
The phrase "bordering upon the shores of navigable lakes or river" in said provision modifies only the
third classification, that is, "lands covered with water", for if the law intends that said phrase should
modify the three types of land enumerated above, then the punctuation mark, comma, should not have
been placed before the alternative "or" but instead between the words "water" and "bordering",
making said provision to appear as follows:
"The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy lands or lands covered with water,
bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers . . ."
The use of the alternative "or" instead of the conjunction "and" shows the intention of the law in
segregating foreshore lands from marshy lands and those two from lands covered with water bordering
upon shores of navigable lakes or rivers.
It is also alleged that even granting that Santolan was entitled to the preferential rights accorded to a
riparian owner, said right has prescribed on the ground that Lusin has been in continuous possession of
the said area since 1920. This allegation was not duly proven during the reinvestigation. While Lusin
claims possession of the disputed area since 1920, on the other hand. Santolan claims that he possessed
the same since 1907 when it was donated to him by his father-in-law. As we have already stated, it is the
finding of this Office that prior to 1942, neither party possessed the premises exclusively. It was only in
1942 when Santolan took positive steps to claim the area for himself. There are even evidence on record
that Santolan paid the land taxes for the area in 1936. In 1951, Lusin effected his entry to the area up to
the present. It may be recalled, however, that these actuations of Lusin had been the subject of a
criminal complaint filed by Santolan before the Justice of the Peace Court of Kawit, Cavite, wherein Lusin
was acquitted on the ground that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Needless to say, proof beyond reasonable doubt is absolutely necessary before conviction in criminal
cases could be had. On the other hand, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove a matter of fact
in civil and/or administrative cases. The preponderance of evidence adduced at the reinvestigation of
this case conducted by a representative of this Office, shows that the present occupation of Lusin of the
area in question was effected by force, although there are good reasons to believe that such force was
employed by Lusin to assert what he believed was his right over the property in question.
From the foregoing facts and circumstances, it is therefore, apparent that the area in question is a
foreshore land, and Santolan, being the riparian owner, is entitled to the preferential rights accorded by
the provision of Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1. Considering, however, the fact that
during the reinvestigation of this case, it was disclosed that Antonio Lusin had introduced considerable
improvements in the premises and had invested his life savings therefor, and considering further that if
Santolan were the one who converted the area into a fishpond, as he intends to do, he would have
incurred the same expenses as was incurred by Lusin in the premises in question, it is the belief of this
Office that justice would be fully served if Santolan he required to reimburse Lusin of the value of the
improvements now existing in the area as may be appraised by the Committee on Appraisal of the
Bureau of Lands.
WHEREFORE, the above-noted foreshore lease (New) application and revocable permit (New)
application of Antonio Lusin should remain, as hereby it is, REJECTED; and Foreshore Lease Application
No. V-65 of Julian Santolan given due course, PROVIDED, he reimburses Antonio Lusin of the appraised
value of the improvements now existing in the area within sixty (60) days after notification of said
appraisal.
The Director of Lands is hereby directed to instruct the Committee on Appraisal concerned to make the
necessary appraisal of the value of the improvements now existing in the area in question within thirty
(30) days from receipt of this order and to notify Julian Santolan of the result of said appraisal.
In the event that Julian Santolan fails to reimburse Antonio Lusin of the appraisal value of the said
improvements within the period specified in this order, he shall lose his preferential rights over the area
and Antonio Lusin will be allowed to file an appropriate public land application therefor.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, December 14, 1954.
By Authority of the Secretary:
JAIME M. FERRER
Undersecretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources
ANNEX F
O R D E R
On December 14, 1954, this Office issued an order in connection with the above-entitled case wherein
the rejection of the foreshore lease application and revocable permit (both new) of Antonio Lusin was
upheld and Foreshore Lease Application No. V-62 of Julian Santolan given due course provided he
reimburses Antonio Lusin of the appraised value of the improvements now existing in the area within
sixty (60) days after notification of said appraisal.
From said order, both parties to this conflict filed separate motions seeking reconsideration of the same.
Santolan premised his motion on the theory that as far as that portion of the order which requires him
to reimburse Lusin of the appraised value of the improvements within sixty (60) days after notification
of said appraisal is concerned, same is contrary to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and of
the New Civil Code. LexLib
Santolan argues that the best procedure that should have been followed in the disposition of this case
was for the Government to forfeit all the improvements introduced by Lusin in the area in question in its
(Government's) favor and then let Santolan pay to the Government the appraised value of said
improvements within ten (10) years after notification of said appraisal. He further argues that the "law
does not authorize the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to dispose of the proceeds of the
sale of the improvement to any person whomsoever", and "certainly the Secretary does not claim the
prerogative of disbursing government funds without authority of law."
In the first place, the order sought to be reconsidered does not contemplate any sale from which
proceeds could be disposed of by the Secretary "to any person whomsoever". In the second place, in the
issuance of the order sought to be reconsidered, this Office has taken into consideration the provisions
of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and those of the Civil Code cited by movant Santolan with respect to the
forfeiture in favor of the government of the improvements found in the areas covered by rejected
applications. However, this Office is also fully aware of that cardinal principle that "no man shall enrich
himself at the expense of another."
During the reinvestigation of this case by a representative of this Office, it was found that Lusin was the
actual occupant of the disputed area since 1951. During his occupation, Lusin was introduced
considerable improvements in the area, investing his life savings therein. At the time of inspection,
approximately two (2) hectares of the said area was a veritable fishpond complete with dikes and water
breakers, and the remaining portion was surrounded with bamboo stakes. While this Office found
Lusin's occupation as having effected by force, this Office also believes that such force was employed by
Lusin only to enforce what he believed was his right over the property in question. This being the case,
justice and equity demands that Lusin should be compensated of the improvements introduced by him
in the area in question by whomsoever shall enjoy the fruits of his (Lusin's) toil. Julian Santolan, being
the person who shall benefit from said improvements, it is only his and just that he should reimburse
Lusin of the value of said improvements, especially considering that the said area adjudicated to
Santolan is already a producing fishpond.
Antonio Lusin, on the other hand, contends that the order sought to be reconsidered is contrary to the
facts of the case and to the law applicable thereto.
Lusin assigns the following errors as having been allegedly committed by this Office:
(1) In holding that the possession of Lusin dated only as of 1951;
(2) In holding that the possession of Lusin was effected through force;
(3) In holding that Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 is applicable in the instant case;
(4) In not holding that the preferential rights of Julian Santolan, granting that he has any, has
already prescribed; and
(5) In giving due course to the foreshore lease application of Santolan for the entire area in
question.
With respect to the first two assignments of errors, a review of the records of this case shows that the
findings of this Office are in accordance with the facts of the case as deduced from the reinvestigation of
this conflict, and as supported by previous records of this case. This Office, therefore, finds no sufficient
ground to disturb its findings of facts.
Anent the next two assignments of errors, which are mere reiteration of movant's allegation in his
previous memorandum, and which were thoroughly passed upon by this office, it is believed that
discussing them further is no longer necessary since after another close examination of the case, this
office finds its disposition in this particular respect well justified and in accordance with the law and
regulations applicable thereto.
Now coming to the last allegation, Lusin contends that the foreshore lease application of Julian
Santolan, if given the course, should not cover the entire area in question. Movant Lusin advances the
theory that since the reason behind the law in granting preferential rights to riparian owners is to
compensate for whatever loss said riparian owner may suffer from the actions of the water, said
riparian owner cannot stand to lose more than what he owns, and therefore, since Santolan's property,
which adjoins the area in question, is only two (2) hectares, Santolan can never lose more than two
hectares.
Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 71, the particular point of law involved, provides as
follows:
"32. Preference of Riparian Owner. The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands, marshy
lands, or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall
be given preference to apply for such lands, adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public
service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applied
therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands
advising him of his preferential right."
The above-quoted provision of the Lands Administrative Order does not impose any restriction or
limitation with respect to the extent of the area to which a riparian owner is preferred as long as said
area is not needed for public service. The said order, being clear on this point, this Office has no other
alternative but to interpret said regulation in the meaning it clearly conveys.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the instant motion for reconsideration filed
respectively by the conflicting parties herein. should be, as hereby they are, denied.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, May 19, 1955.
By authority of the Secretary:
JAIME N. FERRER
Undersecretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources
ANNEX G
4th Indorsement
Manila, April 10, 1958.
Respectfully returned to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Manila.
This is with reference to the appeal by Antonio Lusin from the order of that Department in DANR Case
No. 625 (Julian Santolan vs. Antonio Lusin) dated May 19, 1955, whereby his motion for reconsideration
of the order of that office of December 14, 1954, rejecting his foreshore lease application for the
disputed land but awarding to him the right of reimbursement for the improvements he had introduced
thereon and giving due course to appellee's application therefor, was denied.
The land in question is a foreshore land of about 4-1/2 hectares located along Bacoor Bay in barrio
Kaingin, Kawit, Cavite. A preferential right to lease it is claimed by the appellant on the ground that he
has been in the continuous and exclusive possession thereof since 1920, when said land was still under
water and used as a site of his fish corals. On the other hand, it is alleged by the appellee that the
disputed lot is an extension of his property into the sea, as he is the owner of Lot No. 986 which,
according to its technical description, borders Bacoor Bay on the North; that the present foreshore land
was formed by soil deposits brought by the action of the sea; and that he has the right of preference to
apply for the land in question in accordance with Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1.
Upon the foregoing facts, the Director of Lands in an order dated February 1, 1951, rejected the
appellant's foreshore lease application and forfeited the improvements he had introduced thereon in
favor of the appellee. From this order, Lusin appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources after his three motions for reconsideration had been denied. On October 13, 1952, the
Secretary dismissed his appeal. Thereafter, the appellant moved for a reconsideration of the Secretary's
decision but his motion was denied on February 28, 1953. He then filed another motion requesting a
formal reinvestigation of the case. The motion was granted and that Department ordered a
reinvestigation of the case on May 12, 1953.
In the reinvestigation of the case, the following facts were established: That Lusin had converted two (2)
hectares of the area in dispute into a veritable fishpond; and that the entire area in question was
enclosed with dikes and provided with two (2) sluice gates, one of which was made of concrete and the
other of lumber; that on the northern part of the disputed land bordering Bacoor Bay were bamboo
poles placed at close intervals serving as water breakers to protect the mud dikes from being washed
away by the action of the sea; that all of these improvements were introduced by Lusin in 1951 up to
the time of the reinvestigation; that the disputed land was, as it still is, bounded on the South by Lot No.
986 of Julian Santolan; that said land was formed by soil deposits brought by the action of the sea; that
in December 1942, Santulan caused the survey of the land, and the survey plan was approved by the
Director of Lands in 1944; that on December 29, 1942, Santulan filed a foreshore lease application
covering an area of 36,120 square meters of the land in dispute; that the filing of Santulan's foreshore
lease application resulted in the investigation of the case in March 1943, involving the parties herein;
and that said investigation was not finally terminated for unknown reasons.
After receiving and considering the report of the reinvestigation, that office on December 14, 1954,
issued an order modifying its previous stand by giving the appellant the right to reimbursement for the
improvements he had introduced on the disputed lot, the dispositive part of which reads:
"Wherefore, the above noted foreshore lease (New) application and revocable permit (New) application
of Antonio Lusin should remain, as hereby it is, REJECTED; and Foreshore Lease application No. V-62 of
Julian Santulan given due course, PROVIDED, he reimburse Antonio Lusin of the appraised value of the
improvements now existing in the area within sixty (60) days after notification of said appraisal.
"xxx xxx xxx
"In the event that Julian Santulan fails to reimburse Antonio Lusin of the appraised value of the said
improvements within the period specified in this order, he shall lose his preferential rights over the area
and Antonio Lusin will be allowed to file an appropriate public and application therefor".
The appellant moved for a reconsideration of the foregoing order but his motion was denied on May 19,
1955. Dissatisfied, he appealed to this Office, averring that the Department erred in finding the
following: That the possession of Antonio Lusin of the land in question began only in 1951; that since
1942, Julian Santulan had been exercising dominion over the property in question; that the area in
question is apparently an extension of lot No. 986 into the sea and that its present existence was the
result of the continuous recession of the sea; that the possession of Antonio Lusin over the property in
question was effected through force; that Section 32, Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, is applicable
to the instant case; and that the preferential rights of Julian Santulan, granting he has any, has not
prescribed. He contends further that the Department erred in rejecting his foreshore lease application
and in giving due course to that of the appellee. LLpr
The main issue presented by the parties to be resolved in this controversy is, which of them has a better
right to lease the foreshore land under consideration? For a clear resolution of the question, it is
necessary to look into the legal provisions governing the administration and disposition of foreshore
lands. As correctly held by that Department and the Bureau of Lands, the administration and disposition
of foreshore lands are governed by Chapter IX, Title III of Commonwealth Act No. 141, (Secs. 58 and 59),
otherwise known as the Public Land Act.
Section 61 of said law provides that foreshore lands shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only
and not otherwise, as soon as the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public service and are open to
disposition. The procedure for the award of a lease of foreshore land, is found in Section 67 of the same
law which provides, as a general rule, that the award of the right to lease a foreshore land shall be
determined by oral bidding, except where improvements were introduced thereon by reason of a
permit issued by competent authority, in which case the award thereof shall be determined by sealed
bidding pursuant to the provisions of section 26, whereby the permittee is granted the right to equal the
highest bidder.
Noteworthy is the fact that both parties herein claim to have been in prior possession of the land in
controversy than the other. Not one of them, however, was granted a permit by competent authority to
occupy and use the land and introduce improvements thereon. Since not one of them was granted such
a permit, the fact that one or the other had been in prior possession of the premises in question is
immaterial, as will be seen hereafter, in the determination of the instant controversy. Neither is the
alleged finding that one of the parties herein entered the premises and introduced improvements
thereon in bad faith material to the resolution of the case.
It is likewise significant to note that while the Bureau held that none of the parties herein was entitled
to a preferential right to lease the land in question "on the basis alone of actual occupancy or
introduction of improvements," it ruled that the appellee, Julian Santulan, by reason of the fact that he
was, as he still is, a riparian owner of the disputed area, had a preferential right to apply for a lease
therefor, citing Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, which reads:
"Sec. 32. The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands marshy lands, or lands covered
with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to
apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public service, subject to the
laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefor within 60 days
from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential
right."
In this appeal, the appellant reiterates his contention before that Department that the foregoing is not
applicable to the instant case "because the property in question borders upon the shores or banks of the
Manila Bay and not upon navigable lakes or rivers." The fallacy of the argument is too obvious to require
any discussion since the provision expressly speaks of foreshore lands. At any rate, this Office finds that
Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 has been rendered obsolete by Commonwealth Act
No. 141.
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, dated April 30, 1936, but made effective on January 1, 1936, was
promulgated before the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Its provisions which have not been
altered, modified or amended, particularly Section 32 thereof, were promulgated pursuant to the
existing public land law at the time of its promulgation, namely, Act No. 2874. A perusal of Section 32 of
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 will show that while it speaks of a preferential right to apply for a
foreshore land, it does not specify the mode of application, i.e., whether by sale, lease, homestead,
permit, etc., contemplated by it. Nevertheless, it is clear under Act No. 2874 that a foreshore land may
be the subject only of a lease (Sec. 58), or of a revocable permit to occupy and use it (Sec. 65). Seemingly
therefore Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 contemplates an application for a lease of
foreshore land or a revocable permit to use or occupy it. However, Section I of said order provides,
among other things, the following:
". . . Those rules and regulations shall not apply to applications for temporary occupation or provisional
use of said lands and property which shall be governed by the provisions of Section 1844 of the
Administrative Code, as amended, by Acts Nos. 3077 and 3852, Lands Administrative Order No. 8 and
other regulations promulgated thereunder."
Since Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 expressly exempts from its operation temporary permits for
the use and occupation of public lands, the conclusion is inescapable that Section 32 thereof
contemplates an application for a lease under Section 58 of Act No. 2874 only and does not include a
revocable permit application under Section 65 of said Act.
The procedure for the award of the right to lease a foreshore land under Act No. 2874 is found in
Section 64 thereof, which reads: Cdpr
"Sec. 64. The lease or sale shall be adjudicated to the highest bidder; and if there is no bidder
besides the applicant, it shall be adjudicated to him. The provisions of Section twenty-seven of this Act
shall be applied wherever applicable. . . ."
Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, repealing the foregoing provisions, provides:
"Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made through oral bidding; and adjudication shall be made to
the highest bidder. However, where an has made improvements on the land by virtue of a permit issued
to him by competent authority, the sale or lease shall be made by sealed bidding as prescribed in section
twenty-six of this Act, "the provisions of which shall be applied wherever applicable. . ." (Emphasis
supplied).
While Section 64 of Act No. 2874 makes a reference to Section 27 of the same Act, Section 67 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 also makes a reference to Section 26 of the latter law, Section 26 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 is practically a reproduction of Section 27 of Act No. 2874 and prescribes
the manner or procedure of determining an award through sealed bidding in the sale of a public land.
Under its provision, an applicant is given the option or right to equal the highest bidder.
Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 differs, however, from Section 64 of Act No. 2874 in that
while the latter provides that "section twenty-seven of this Act shall be applied wherever applicable,"
making sealed bidding the general rule of procedure in determining an award of a lease of foreshore
land, the former provides the contrary, as under its provisions sealed bidding is not the general rule of
procedure in the determination of lease awards of foreshore lands but may be resorted to only when
the conditions specified therein are present.
Since Section 64 of Act No. 2874 provides that Section 27 thereof should be applied wherever applicable
in determining an award of a lease of foreshore land, the mere fact that the land is covered by a lease
application therefor warrants the holding of a sealed bidding for its disposition, whereby the applicant
therefor should be granted the option or right to equal the highest bid. In such a legal setup, the
question of preference in the right to apply for a lease of foreshore land became a necessary
consequence, as one need only apply to be entitled to the right to equal the highest bid; hence, the
applicability of Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1.
On the other hand, under Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, a foreshore land may be leased, as
a general rule, by oral bidding only. In such a case, the award of the foreshore lease shall always be
made to the highest bidder, notwithstanding the fact that one among the bidders is an applicant, as no
one in an oral bidding is entitled to equal the highest bid, unlike in the case of a sealed bidding either
under Section 27 of Act No. 2874 or under Section 26 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Since the award of
a foreshore lease shall be given to the highest bidder in an oral bidding, the necessity of determining
who among several interested parties has a preferential right to apply for the land has been obviated
under the present law, because the mere fact that one is an applicant does not entitle him to equal the
highest bid, rendering the provisions of Section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 idle and
useless.
Parenthetically, it may be stated that the appellee brought to the attention of this Office its previous
decision in DANR Case No. 694 (Del Rosario vs. Monzon), where the facts involved therein are more or
less similar to those in the present controversy. While this Office in that case relied on Section 32 of
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1 in resolving the appeal therein, it did not touch on the question of
whether or not said provision is still enforceable, as the same was not squarely placed in issue. For this
reason, the ruling in that case can not be availed of as a precedent in the adjudication of the one under
consideration. Cdpr
In the instant case the parties are vying for the preferential right to apply for a lease of the disputed
land, as if by the mere fact of application the land should be disposed of by sealed bidding, whereby the
recognized applicant therefor should be given the right accorded to applicants under Section 26 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141. The only instance under Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 when a
foreshore land may be leased through sealed bidding is when the conditions specified therein
namely, (a) that improvements had been introduced on the land and (b) that said improvements were
introduced thereon by reason of a permit issued by competent authority are present, in which case
the permittee shall be granted the right to equal the highest bid. In the absence of these conditions, the
land should be leased through oral bidding only and, as stated earlier, the question of preference in the
right to apply therefor is immaterial.
As the conditions specified in Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 are not present in the instant
case, the land in question can be leased only through oral bidding, if it can be disposed of under the
provisions of Section 61 of said Act, which requires as a condition sine qua non in the lease of foreshore
lands that the same have been declared by the President not necessary for the public service and are
open for disposition. Without such a declaration, a foreshore land may only be occupied and used by
private persons for lawful purposes upon the issuance of a revocable permit therefor under Section 68
of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Since the record is silent as to whether or not the land under
consideration has been so declared, this Office is constrained to render two alternative resolutions of
the instant case.
On the assumption that the land in question has been declared open for disposition and is not necessary
for the public service, this Office directs that an oral bidding for the leasing thereof to interested parties
pursuant to the provisions of Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 be conducted and the contract
of lease awarded to the highest bidder. Whoever shall be the highest bidder, if other than the appellant,
shall be required to pay to the appellant the appraised value of the improvements introduced by him on
the land to be determined by that Department.
If the land in question has not been so declared, this Office directs that a revocable permit under Section
68 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 be issued to the appellant requiring him to pay permit fees since the
year 1951.
Accordingly, the orders and decisions of that Department and the Bureau of Lands are hereby revoked.
The record of the case is returned herewith.
By authority of the President:
(SGD) JUAN C. PAJO
Executive Secretary
ANNEX H
5th Indorsement
Manila, May 10, 1954
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Manila.
In his decision of February 4, 1952, the Director of Lands amended the miscellaneous sales application of
Emiliano del Rosario by excluding therefrom portion "B" and adjudicating the same to Gonzalo Monzon
under his foreshore lease application. On appeal by Del Rosario, the decision of the Director of Lands
was affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on February 6, 1953. Del Rosario
now appeals to this Office.
The question presented for determination is, which of the parties has a better right to the area in
question?.
It appears that the area in dispute, portion "B", is a foreshore land, an extension of portion "A", which
lies immediately adjacent to lot No. 987, private property of Monzon. The record shows that Monzon
and his predecessor in interest have been in possession of said area since before the war, using it as site
for their oyster and "kapis" beds and for their fish corral. It was only in 1951 that Del Rosario through
stealth occupied a portion of the area in question, building earthen dikes preparatory to converting the
land into a fishpond. His entry upon the area was duly protested by Monzon with the Bureau of Lands
and the Bureau of Fisheries, both of which advised Del Rosario to vacate the premises and to refrain,
from introducing further improvements thereon. cdphil
Upon the facts and circumstances narrated above, and pursuant to Section 32 of Lands Administrative
Order No. 7-1, which gives to the owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands the preferential right
to apply therefor under the provisions of the Public Land Act, it is evident that Monzon has a better right
than Del Rosario to the area in dispute which, as stated above, is a foreshore land.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed.
The record of the case is returned herewith.
By authority of the President:
(SGD.) FRED RUIZ CASTRO
Executive Secretary

C o p y r i g h t 1 9 9 4 - 1 9 9 9 C D T e c h n o l o g i e s A s i a, I n c.


FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. L-12860-61. December 29, 1960.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IGMEDIO SANTIAGO, EPITACIO SANTIAGO,
FLAVIANO SANTIAGO, DIOSDADO SANTIAGO, ELIAS SALMORIN, ADOLFO SALMORIN and SALUSTIANO
SANTIAGO, defendants-appellants.
Nicanor D. Sorogon for appellants.
Solicitor Meliton G. Solimn and Solicitor Antonio M. Consing for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. THE CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; FRUSTRATED MURDER; CONSPIRACY. The fact that the seven
appellants were seen gathered together before the commission of the crimes charged, and one of them
was heard to have remarked that soon there would be a wake for the dead, strongly evinces conspiracy
among them, specially when these same appellants, moments later, in unison executed acts of violence.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TREACHERY; SUPERIOR STRENGTH ABSORBED BY TREACHERY. While abuse of
superior strength was also shown to have attended the commission of the crimes charged, the same
cannot be considered a separate and distinct aggravating circumstances, because it is deemed absorbed
by the circumstance of treachery.
D E C I S I O N
PAREDES, J p:
Prosecuted for murder and frustrated murder, the appellants were sentenced for homicide and serious
physical injuries, as follows: In the case of homicide, taking into account the aggravating circumstance of
superior strength and the mitigation circumstance of voluntary surrender, each to suffer an
indeterminate penalty from 6 years and 1 day of prisin mayor 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of
reclusin temporal, with the accessories of the law and to indemnify jointly and severally, the heirs of
deceased Blas Bernal in the amount of P6,000.00 and to pay the costs; and in the serious physical
injuries case, considering the same modifying circumstances, each to suffer an indeterminate penalty
from 4 months of arresto mayor to 1 year and 1 day of prisin correccional and to pay the costs. The
weapons Exhibits D to M were confiscated. They appealed to the Court of Appeals. The latter certified
the cases to this tribunal, stating that the crimes committed are murder and frustrated murder and that
the penalties imposable thereon are beyond its power to apply.
Accused Igmedio, Epitacio, Flaviano and Diosdado, all surnamed Santiago, are brothers, sons of one
Anacleta Panaguiton by her second marriage, and Elias Salmorin, Adolfo Salmorin and Salustiano
Santiago, are close relatives of the Santiago brothers. The deceased Blas Bernal in G.R. No. L-12860 and
Ciriaco Bernal, offended party in G.R. L- 12861, are brothers, also sons of Anacleta Panaguiton by her
first marriage. Toms Santiago, now deceased, second husband of Anacleta Panaguiton, had been
previously married to one Margarita Bernal, an aunt of the Bernal brothers. She died intestate leaving
some real properties acquired during her marriage with the father of the Santiagos, but without any
issue. The Bernals, believing that they had a right to inherit from their aunt Margarita Bernal,
commenced Special Proceedings No. 1014 in the court of first instance of Iloilo, and had their elder
brother Teodorico Bernal appointed as co-administrator, together with their mother Anacleta
Panaguiton. The Santiagos, believing that they were the sole heirs of their deceased father Toms
Santiago, sought the revocation of Teodorico's appointment. Bad blood then existed between the two
sets of brothers and their enmity flared up into violence sometime in October, 1953, when Ciriaco
Bernal was waylaid by the Santiagos by reason of Bernal's gathering coconuts from the properties under
administration.
The prosecution has established that the Santiagos and the Bernals were living in their respective
houses in the barrio of Tarong, municipality of Carles, provinces of Iloilo. On July 3, 1954, Blas Bernal,
Ciriaco Bernal and their nephew Gerardo Bernal were engaged, with several others, by Victoriano
Paglinawan to plant rice in the latter's field in their barrio of Tarong. they began planting early in the
morning, and at about ten o'clock they were told by Victoriano Paglinawan to cease working and have
breakfast. Thereafter, the Bernal brothers went to the house of Severo Salvidico to have a haircut, while
their nephew Gerardo went to see his carabao pasturing in the field. In so doing, Gerardo passed near
the house of Epitacio Santiago and saw the seven appellants squatted and huddled in front of the house.
When Gerardo was within a hearing distance from the group, he heard Igmedio Santiago say, "very soon
there will be a 'velacion' (wake for the dead)". Sensing that the remark was meant for the Bernals,
Gerardo tried to look for his uncles to warn them. Meantimes, when the Bernals arrived at the house of
Severo Salvidico for the haircut, they found that the barber was not in, so they retraced their steps
towards the field of Victoriano. Ciriaco was then unarmed and Blas had a scythe girded on his waist,
which he usually used in cutting coconut buds to extract "tuba". On their way, however, the seven
appellants suddenly appeared, running towards them and brandishing their heels, but were overtaken
at a place where there were bamboo clumps and bushes, and there simultaneously attacked by
appellants from different directions, Epitacio delivering the first blow on Blas Bernal's left face with a
bolo, followed by an arrow shot by Diosdado, Ciriaco, on his part, was hit by Ignacio on the left arm and
by Flaviano on the right ear which downed him. Ciriaco played possum, feigning death; whereupon
appellants concentrated their attack on the wounded Blas, who died on the spot. At this juncture,
Ciriaco seeing an opportunity for escape, sprinted towards the field where he timely met Victoriano
Paglinawan about 30 yards away, and leaned on him. This deterred appellants from further pursuing
him. Victoriano then took Ciriaco to town for medical attendance and to report to the police authorities.
Dr. Telesforo de los Reyes, the town medical officer, accompanied by the Mayor, a police sergeant and a
sanitary inspector, on the same day, repaired to the spot where Blas died and found the body lying on
one side, with an arrow stuck on the back which he pulled with difficulty. He found nine serious wounds
on the body, two of which were mortal (Exhibit A). He likewise certified to the nine different injuries
sustained by Ciriaco, which took some 40 to 50 days to heal (Exhibit C).
Appellants, on the other hand, presented an entirely different picture of the incident. Their version, as
related by Flaviano and Diosdado, is an follows:
That morning, while Flaviano was resting in his house together with Igmedio and Elias after planting rice
in his own field, Salustiano came warning them that the Bernal brothers were coming, both heavily
armed. After pulling a mat to cover the door, Flaviano peeped and saw that Blas really had a bolo in his
left hand, another longer one in his right, and a scythe on his waist; while Ciriaco had a fighting bolo on
his waist, a "palma brava" club in his left hand, and a spear on his shoulder. Ciriaco then shouted at
Flaviano to come down and fight, but as Flaviano and his companions inside the house did not make any
move, the Bernals then slashed the mat and entered the house; whereupon Elias, Salustiano, Flaviano
and Igmedio jumped out and scampered away, Flaviano following Elias and Salustiano, while Igmedio
took a different direction. Flaviano, thinking that he might be overtaken without any body helping him,
changed his mind and ran, with the Bernals close to his heels, to the direction of the house of Epitacio
which was about 400 brazas away. He saw his other brother Diosdado planting rice some 50 meters
away, so he shouted at him for help, who in turn got a piece of wood and ran to the rescue of Flaviano.
While the four were thus running, Blas threw his short bolo at Flaviano, hitting the latter on the back.
Whereupon Flaviano picked it up and faced Blas. Blas then started to hack him with the longer bolo, but
he parried the blow, causing Blas to drop it. Then Blas drew his scythe and again tried to slash him, but
Flaviano parried it again, and Blas became weak. At this instance, Blas called out his brother Ciriaco, who
was then fighting with Diosdado, for help. So Flaviano shoved Blas who fell on his back. Ciriaco then
detached from his fight with Diosdado and went to succor Blas. Diosdado, in turn, followed Ciriaco and
at the same time alerting his brother Flaviano, saying, "Nene, be careful, Ciriaco is going to you." Ciriaco
then struck Flaviano which the latter parried, and then Flaviano countered with his bolo. At this time,
Diosdado clubbed Ciriaco hitting the latter on the left arm and right ear. After receiving these blows,
Ciriaco said, "I am giving up; I don't want to fight anymore."
Appellants presented Clementina Bernal, full-blood sister of the Bernals. She said that when she saw her
brothers Blas and Ciriaco chasing Flaviano, she followed them so as to dissuade her brothers from
fighting and she even saw Flaviano from afar wresting the scythe from Blas, but that when she overtook
them, Blas was already bathed in his own blood, kneeling, and about to die. Anacleto Panaguiton stated
that when she refused to give the Bernals their claim in the inheritance, Blas had intimidated to her that
they might obtain their share "through the flow of blood". Dr. De los Reyes testified that he found two
contused and three lacerated wounds on Flaviano that could have healed from 6 to 8 days (Exh. 13): and
one contused and two lacerated wounds on Diosdado that could have healed from 5 to 7 days (Exh. 14).
The doctor admitted, however, that these contused and lacerated wounds found on both brothers were
merely the result of physical struggle, such as wrestling and not caused by any weapon.
The case hinges on the question of credibility. We have examined the record with meticulous care, and
have come to the conclusion that the version of the defense, does not deserve any credence.
The four medical certificate on record are self revealing. Whereas the Bernals received wounds inflicted
by sharp instruments like bolo, as asserted by Dr. De los Reyes, the Santiagos, on the other hand, merely
showed contusions and lacerations which, according to the same doctor, were simply the result of
wrestling or caused by fist, and not by any weapon, blunt or otherwise. This being the case, the said
medical certificates confirm the version of the prosecution that the Bernals only fought with their bare
hands, as against the onslaught of appellants who were all armed with different weapons. Were the
Bernals really armed, as claimed by the Santiagos, at least Flaviano or Diosdado, or any of the
appellants, for that matter, would have received some scratches caused by either bolo, scythe, spear or
"palma brava" club with which the Bernals were allegedly armed. It is claimed by the defense that
Flaviano was the only one who fought with the deceased Blas, while Ciriaco and Diosdado were fighting
and that Flaviano merely parried one bolo blow and one scythe slash from Blas, an then shoved the
latter in order to face Ciriaco who was coming to aid the deceased. If this were true, then said deceased
could not have received nine wounds, considering that Flaviano did not hit the deceased even once and
that Diosdado was only armed with a piece of wood which he picked at random in the field, moments
before. This once more confirms the version of the prosecution that the other appellants participated
directly in the killing of the deceased and near-killing of Ciriaco. Moreover, Ciriaco's testimony dovetails
with that of Victoriano Paglinawan. The latter told that court that the met Ciriaco, wounded and weak,
running to him saying that he and his brother were intercepted by seven armed men. Paglinawan, only
neutral witness in this case, for not being related to either the Bernals or the Santiagos, asserted that
when the seven appellants, who were some 30 brazas away, saw that Ciriaco was already leaning on
him, they desisted from their pursuit. The defense was not able to offer any explanation regarding the
arrow which was found embedded on the back of the deceased. On the other hand, prosecution witness
Gerardo Bernal positively declared that such arrow was shot by Diosdado. Again, when Flaviano,
Diosdado, Epitacio, Igmedio and Salustiano (Saling) Santiago, surrendered to police Sgt. Crisanto
Carmen, they told him they fought with the Bernal brothers.
The testimony of Anacleta Panaguiton, that it was the Bernals who had a grudge against the Santiagos
on account of inheritance, does not help the cause of the appellants, as it is undisputed that there had
been a mutual pent-up hatred against each other which erupted in open violence when Ciriaco was
waylaid by the Santiagos, eight months prior to the slaying of Blas Bernal. The story of Clementina
Bernal who sided with the Santiagos, against her full-blood Bernal brothers, is hard to believe,
considering that her testimony is in direct contrast with her written statement (Exhibit O) made before
the chief of police on July 7, 1954, when the incident was still fresh in her mind. In said written
statement she said that while she was planting rice in the field, she heard shouts coming from behind
the bamboo clumps about 300 meters away; that when she approached the place and was at a distance
of ten meters, she saw her deceased brother Blas already bathed in blood, kneeling, with several
wounds on his body and an arrow sticking on his back; that she saw Igmedio, Epitacio, Flaviano and
Diosdado, walking fast heading to town, and likewise saw Adolfo Salmorin, Elias Salmorin and Salustiano
Santiago equally walking fast toward their houses; and that while she was returning home, she also saw
her brother Ciriaco, aided by Victoriano, walking in another road towards the town. Although she
attempted to repudiate this statement, by alleging that the mayor did not faithfully translate its
contents in the Visayan dialect, we have no ground for believing that said mayor would capriciously and
deliberately distort the translation.
The simple denial made by the other appellants regarding their participation in the crime at bar can not
overcome the direct, positive and straightforward testimony of the surviving victim Ciriaco Bernal and
eyewitness Gerardo Bernal, who narrated convincingly the bloody manner with which the weaponless
Bernals were surrounded and attacked by the armed appellants.
The fact that the seven appellants were seen gathered together in front of the house of Epitacio
Santiago and one of them was heard to have remarked that soon there would be a wake for the dead,
strongly evinces conspiracy among them, specially when these same appellants, moments later, in
unison executed acts of violence.
With the exception of Elias Salmorin and Adolfo Salmorin, all the appellants surnamed Santiago,
voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities right after the crime was committed. The slaying of Blas
Bernal was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia). Abuse of superior strength,
was also shown but it is absorbed by the circumstance of treachery.
The five appellants surnamed Santiago, in the murder case, are, therefore, sentenced to suffer each an
indeterminate penalty ranging from 6 years, 8 months and 1 day of prisin mayor to 14 years and 8
months of reclusin temporal; and appellants Adolfo Salmorin and Elias Salmorin, to suffer each
reclusin perpetua.
In the frustrated murder case, committed on the person of Ciriaco Bernal, the Santiagos are hereby
sentenced to suffer each an indeterminate penalty ranging from 2 years, and 4 months of prisin
correccional to 7 years, and 4 months of prision mayor; and the Salmorins, to suffer each an
indeterminate sentence ranging from 6 years, 8 months and 1 day of prisin mayor to 12 years, 10
months and 21 days of reclusin temporal.
With the modification above indicated, the decision appealed from hereby in affirmed in all other
respects.
Pars, C.J., Bengzon, Labrador, Concepcin , Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutirrez David and Dizon, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154491. November 14, 2008.]
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS, PHILS., INC. (CCBPI), Naga Plant, petitioner, vs. QUINTIN J. GOMEZ, a.k.a. "KIT"
GOMEZ and DANILO E. GALICIA, a.k.a. "DANNY GALICIA", respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BRION, J p:
Is the hoarding of a competitor's product containers punishable as unfair competition under the
Intellectual Property Code (IP Code, Republic Act No. 8293) that would entitle the aggrieved party to a
search warrant against the hoarder? This is the issue we grapple with in this petition for review on
certiorari involving two rival multinational softdrink giants; petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., Inc.
(Coca-Cola) accuses Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. (Pepsi), represented by the respondents, of hoarding
empty Coke bottles in bad faith to discredit its business and to sabotage its operation in Bicolandia.
IAaCST
BACKGROUND
The facts, as culled from the records, are summarized below.
On July 2, 2001, Coca-Cola applied for a search warrant against Pepsi for hoarding Coke empty bottles in
Pepsi's yard in Concepcion Grande, Naga City, an act allegedly penalized as unfair competition under the
IP Code. Coca-Cola claimed that the bottles must be confiscated to preclude their illegal use, destruction
or concealment by the respondents. 1 In support of the application, Coca-Cola submitted the sworn
statements of three witnesses: Naga plant representative Arnel John Ponce said he was informed that
one of their plant security guards had gained access into the Pepsi compound and had seen empty Coke
bottles; acting plant security officer Ylano A. Regaspi said he investigated reports that Pepsi was
hoarding large quantities of Coke bottles by requesting their security guard to enter the Pepsi plant and
he was informed by the security guard that Pepsi hoarded several Coke bottles; security guard Edwin
Lirio stated that he entered Pepsi's yard on July 2, 2001 at 4 p.m. and saw empty Coke bottles inside
Pepsi shells or cases. 2 DAHCaI
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Executive Judge Julian C. Ocampo of Naga City, after taking the joint
deposition of the witnesses, issued Search Warrant No. 2001-01 3 to seize 2,500 Litro and 3,000 eight
and 12 ounces empty Coke bottles at Pepsi's Naga yard for violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code. 4
The local police seized and brought to the MTC's custody 2,464 Litro and 4,036 eight and 12 ounces
empty Coke bottles, 205 Pepsi shells for Litro, and 168 Pepsi shells for smaller (eight and 12 ounces)
empty Coke bottles, and later filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Naga a complaint against
two Pepsi officers for violation of Section 168.3 (c) in relation to Section 170 of the IP Code. 5 The
named respondents, also the respondents in this petition, were Pepsi regional sales manager Danilo E.
Galicia (Galicia) and its Naga general manager Quintin J. Gomez, Jr. (Gomez). aEHTSc
In their counter-affidavits, Galicia and Gomez claimed that the bottles came from various Pepsi retailers
and wholesalers who included them in their return to make up for shortages of empty Pepsi bottles;
they had no way of ascertaining beforehand the return of empty Coke bottles as they simply received
what had been delivered; the presence of the bottles in their yard was not intentional nor deliberate;
Ponce and Regaspi's statements are hearsay as they had no personal knowledge of the alleged crime;
there is no mention in the IP Code of the crime of possession of empty bottles; and that the ambiguity of
the law, which has a penal nature, must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in their
favor. Pepsi security guards Eduardo E. Miral and Rene Acebuche executed a joint affidavit stating that
per their logbook, Lirio did not visit or enter the plant premises in the afternoon of July 2, 2001.
The respondents also filed motions for the return of their shells and to quash the search warrant. They
contended that no probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the search warrant; the facts
charged do not constitute an offense; and their Naga plant was in urgent need of the shells. CHDaAE
Coca-Cola opposed the motions as the shells were part of the evidence of the crime, arguing that Pepsi
used the shells in hoarding the bottles. It insisted that the issuance of warrant was based on probable
cause for unfair competition under the IP Code, and that the respondents violated R.A. 623, the law
regulating the use of stamped or marked bottles, boxes, and other similar containers.
THE MTC RULINGS
On September 19, 2001, the MTC issued the first assailed order 6 denying the twin motions. It explained
there was an exhaustive examination of the applicant and its witnesses through searching questions and
that the Pepsi shells are prima facie evidence that the bottles were placed there by the respondents.
In their motion for reconsideration, the respondents argued for the quashal of the warrant as the MTC
did not conduct a probing and exhaustive examination; the applicant and its witnesses had no personal
knowledge of facts surrounding the hoarding; the court failed to order the return of the "borrowed"
shells; there was no crime involved; the warrant was issued based on hearsay evidence; and the seizure
of the shells was illegal because they were not included in the warrant. ITScHa
On November 14, 2001, the MTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the second assailed order, 7
explaining that the issue of whether there was unfair competition can only be resolved during trial.
The respondents responded by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City on the ground that the subject search warrant was
issued without probable cause and that the empty shells were neither mentioned in the warrant nor the
objects of the perceived crime.
THE RTC RULINGS
On May 8, 2002, the RTC voided the warrant for lack of probable cause and the non-commission of the
crime of unfair competition, even as it implied that other laws may have been violated by the
respondents. The RTC, though, found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the issuing MTC judge.
8 Thus, SAHaTc
Accordingly, as prayed for, Search Warrant No. 2001-02 issued by the Honorable Judge Julian C. Ocampo
III on July 2, 2001 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Orders issued by the Pairing Judge of Br. 1, MTCC of
Naga City dated September 19, 2001 and November 14, 2001 are also declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The
City Prosecutor of Naga City and SPO1 Ernesto Paredes are directed to return to the Petitioner the
properties seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 2001-02. No costs.
SO ORDERED. 9
In a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied on July 12, 2002, the petitioner stressed that the
decision of the RTC was contradictory because it absolved Judge Ocampo of grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the search warrant, but at the same time nullified the issued warrant. The MTC should have
dismissed the petition when it found out that Judge Ocampo did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion.
Bypassing the Court of Appeals, the petitioner asks us through this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to reverse the decision of the RTC. Essentially, the petition raises
questions against the RTC's nullification of the warrant when it found no grave abuse of di scretion
committed by the issuing judge. IEAaST
THE PETITION and THE PARTIES' POSITIONS
In its petition, the petitioner insists the RTC should have dismissed the respondents' petition for
certiorari because it found no grave abuse of discretion by the MTC in issuing the search warrant. The
petitioner further argues that the IP Code was enacted into law to remedy various forms of unfair
competition accompanying globalization as well as to replace the inutile provision of unfair competition
under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code does not limit the scope of
protection on the particular acts enumerated as it expands the meaning of unfair competition to include
"other acts contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of
another". The inherent element of unfair competition is fraud or deceit, and that hoarding of large
quantities of a competitor's empty bottles is necessarily characterized by bad faith. It claims that its
Bicol bottling operation was prejudiced by the respondents' hoarding and destruction of its empty
bottles. CETIDH
The petitioner also argues that the quashal of the search warrant was improper because it complied
with all the essential requisites of a valid warrant. The empty bottles were concealed in Pepsi shells to
prevent discovery while they were systematically being destroyed to hamper the petitioner's bottling
operation and to undermine the capability of its bottling operations in Bicol.
The respondents counter-argue that although Judge Ocampo conducted his own examination, he
gravely erred and abused his discretion when he ignored the rule on the need of sufficient evidence to
establish probable cause; satisfactory and convincing evidence is essential to hold them guilty of unfair
competition; the hoarding of empty Coke bottles did not cause actual or probable deception and
confusion on the part of the general public; the alleged criminal acts do not show conduct aimed at
deceiving the public; there was no attempt to use the empty bottles or pass them off as the
respondents' goods.
The respondents also argue that the IP Code does not criminalize bottle hoarding, as the acts penalized
must always involve fraud and deceit. The hoarding does not make them liable for unfair competition as
there was no deception or fraud on the end-users. cITaCS
THE ISSUE
Based on the parties' positions, the basic issue submitted to us for resolution is whether the Naga MTC
was correct in issuing Search Warrant No. 2001-01 for the seizure of the empty Coke bottles from
Pepsi's yard for probable violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code. This basic issue involves two sub-
issues, namely, the substantive issue of whether the application for search warrant effectively charged
an offense, i.e., a violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code; and the procedural issue of whether the
MTC observed the procedures required by the Rules of Court in the issuance of search warrants.
OUR RULING
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
We clarify at the outset that while we agree with the RTC decision, our agreement is more in the result
than in the reasons that supported it. The decision is correct in nullifying the search warrant because it
was issued on an invalid substantive basis the acts imputed on the respondents do not violate Section
168.3 (c) of the IP Code. For this reason, we deny the present petition. CcAITa
The issuance of a search warrant 10 against a personal property 11 is governed by Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Court whose relevant sections state:
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.
Section 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements together with the affidavits submitted. HDATSI
Section 6. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is satisfied of the existence of facts
upon which the application is based or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall
issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules. [Emphasis
supplied]
To paraphrase this rule, a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection
with a specific offense alleged in an application based on the personal knowledge of the applicant and
his or her witnesses. This is the substantive requirement in the issuance of a search warrant.
Procedurally, the determination of probable cause is a personal task of the judge before whom the
application for search warrant is filed, as he has to examine under oath or affirmation the applicant and
his or her witnesses in the form of "searching questions and answers" in writing and under oath. The
warrant, if issued, must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
DHcSIT
We paraphrase these requirements to stress that they have substantive and procedural aspects.
Apparently, the RTC recognized this dual nature of the requirements and, hence, treated them
separately; it approved of the way the MTC handled the procedural aspects of the issuance of the search
warrant but found its action on the substantive aspect wanting. It therefore resolved to nullify the
warrant, without however expressly declaring that the MTC gravely abused its discretion when it issued
the warrant applied for. The RTC's error, however, is in the form rather than the substance of the
decision as the nullification of the issued warrant for the reason the RTC gave was equivalent to the
declaration that grave abuse of discretion was committed. In fact, we so rule as the discussions below
will show.
Jurisprudence teaches us that probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is
such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his
action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. Probable cause requires facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched. 12
Implicit in this statement is the recognition that an underlying offense must, in the first place, exist. In
other words, the acts alleged, taken together, must constitute an offense and that these acts are
imputable to an offender in relation with whom a search warrant is applied for. DcITHE
In the context of the present case, the question is whether the act charged alleged to be hoarding of
empty Coke bottles constitutes an offense under Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code. Section 168 in its
entirety states:
SEC. 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and Remedies.
168.1. A person who has identified in the mind of the public the goods he manufactures or deals in, his
business or services from those of others, whether or not a registered mark is employed, has a property
right in the goodwill of the said goods, business or services so identified, which will be protected in the
same manner as other property rights.
168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which he
shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those
of the one having established such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts calculated to produce said
result, shall be guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an action therefor. EcDSTI
168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition,
the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:
(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of goods of another
manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which
they are contained, or the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which
would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or
dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such
appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent
vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like purpose;
(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means calculated to induce
the false belief that such person is offering the services of another who has identified such services in
the mind of the public; or SAHIaD
(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall commit any
other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of
another.
168.4. The remedies provided by Sections 156, 157 and 161 shall apply mutatis mutandis. (Sec. 29, R.A.
No. 166a)
The petitioner theorizes that the above section does not limit the scope of protection on the particular
acts enumerated as it expands the meaning of unfair competition to include "other acts contrary to
good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of another". Allegedly, the
respondents' hoarding of Coca Cola empty bottles is one such act.
We do not agree with the petitioner's expansive interpretation of Section 168.3 (c).
"Unfair competition", previously defined in Philippine jurisprudence in relation with R.A. No. 166 and
Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code, is now covered by Section 168 of the IP Code as this
Code has expressly repealed R.A. No. 165 and R.A. No. 166, and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised
Penal Code. IHaECA
Articles 168.1 and 168.2, as quoted above, provide the concept and general rule on the definition of
unfair competition. The law does not thereby cover every unfair act committed in the course of
business; it covers only acts characterized by "deception or any other means contrary to good faith" in
the passing off of goods and services as those of another who has established goodwill in relation with
these goods or services, or any other act calculated to produce the same result.
What unfair competition is, is further particularized under Section 168.3 when it provides specifics of
what unfair competition is "without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair
competition". Part of these particulars is provided under Section 168.3 (c) which provides the general
"catch-all" phrase that the petitioner cites. Under this phrase, a person shall be guilty of unfair
competition "who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit
the goods, business or services of another". TDCAHE
From jurisprudence, unfair competition has been defined as the passing off (or palming off) or
attempting to pass off upon the public the goods or business of one person as the goods or business of
another with the end and probable effect of deceiving the public. It formulated the "true test" of unfair
competition: whether the acts of defendant are such as are calculated to deceive the ordinary buyer
making his purchases under the ordinary conditions which prevail in the particular trade to which the
controversy relates. 13 One of the essential requisites in an action to restrain unfair competition is proof
of fraud; the intent to deceive must be shown before the right to recover can exist. 14 The advent of the
IP Code has not significantly changed these rulings as they are fully in accord with what Section 168 of
the Code in its entirety provides. Deception, passing off and fraud upon the public are still the key
elements that must be present for unfair competition to exist.
The act alleged to violate the petitioner's rights under Section 168.3 (c) is hoarding which we gather to
be the collection of the petitioner's empty bottles so that they can be withdrawn from circulation and
thus impede the circulation of the petitioner's bottled products. This, according to the petitioner, is an
act contrary to good faith a conclusion that, if true, is indeed an unfair act on the part of the
respondents. The critical question, however, is not the intrinsic unfairness of the act of hoarding; what is
critical for purposes of Section 168.3 (c) is to determine if the hoarding, as charged, "is of a nature
calculated to discredit the goods, business or services" of the petitioner. DcSTaC
We hold that it is not. Hoarding as defined by the petitioner is not even an act within the contemplation
of the IP Code.
The petitioner's cited basis is a provision of the IP Code, a set of rules that refer to a very specific subject
intellectual property. Aside from the IP Code's actual substantive contents (which relate specifically to
patents, licensing, trademarks, trade names, service marks, copyrights, and the protection and
infringement of the intellectual properties that these protective measures embody), the coverage and
intent of the Code is expressly reflected in its "Declaration of State Policy" which states:
Section 2. Declaration of State Policy. The State recognizes that an effective intellectual and
industrial property system is vital to the development of domestic and creative activity, facilitates
transfer of technology, attracts foreign investments, and ensures market access for our products. It shall
protect and secure the exclusive rights of scientists, inventors, artists and other gifted citizens to their
intellectual property and creations, particularly when beneficial to the people, for such periods as
provided in this Act. aCTcDH
The use of intellectual property bears a social function. To this end, the State shall promote the diffusion
of knowledge and information for the promotion of national development and progress and the
common good.
It is also the policy of the State to streamline administrative procedures of registering patents,
trademarks and copyright, to liberalize the registration on the transfer of technology, and to enhance
the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the Philippines. (n)
"Intellectual property rights" have furthermore been defined under Section 4 of the Code to consist of:
a) Copyright and Related Rights; b) Trademarks and Service Marks; c) Geographic Indications; d)
Industrial Designs; e) Patents; f) Layout-Designs (Topographies) of Integrated Circuits; and g) Protection
of Undisclosed Information.
Given the IP Code's specific focus, a first test that should be made when a question arises on whether a
matter is covered by the Code is to ask if it refers to an intellectual property as defined in the Code. If it
does not, then coverage by the Code may be negated. THaAEC
A second test, if a disputed matter does not expressly refer to an intellectual property right as defined
above, is whether it falls under the general "unfair competition" concept and definition under Sections
168.1 and 168.2 of the Code. The question then is whether there is "deception" or any other similar act
in "passing off" of goods or services to be those of another who enjoys established goodwill.
Separately from these tests is the application of the principles of statutory construction giving particular
attention, not so much to the focus of the IP Code generally, but to the terms of Section 168 in
particular. Under the principle of "noscitur a sociis", when a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated. 15
aCTcDH
As basis for this interpretative analysis, we note that Section 168.1 speaks of a person who has earned
goodwill with respect to his goods and services and who is entitled to protection under the Code, with
or without a registered mark. Section 168.2, as previously discussed, refers to the general definition of
unfair competition. Section 168.3, on the other hand, refers to the specific instances of unfair
competition, with Section 168.1 referring to the sale of goods given the appearance of the goods of
another; Section 168.2, to the inducement of belief that his or her goods or services are that of another
who has earned goodwill; while the disputed Section 168.3 being a "catch all" clause whose coverage
the parties now dispute.
Under all the above approaches, we conclude that the "hoarding" as defined and charged by the
petitioner does not fall within the coverage of the IP Code and of Section 168 in particular. It does not
relate to any patent, trademark, trade name or service mark that the respondents have invaded,
intruded into or used without proper authority from the petitioner. Nor are the respondents alleged to
be fraudulently "passing off" their products or services as those of the petitioner. The respondents are
not also alleged to be undertaking any representation or misrepresentation that would confuse or tend
to confuse the goods of the petitioner with those of the respondents, or vice versa. What in fact the
petitioner alleges is an act foreign to the Code, to the concepts it embodies and to the acts it regulates;
as alleged, hoarding inflicts unfairness by seeking to limit the opposition's sales by depriving it of the
bottles it can use for these sales. cHDAIS
In this light, hoarding for purposes of destruction is closer to what another law R.A. No. 623 covers,
to wit:
SEC. 1. Persons engaged or licensed to engage in the manufacture, bottling or selling of soda water,
mineral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream, or other lawful beverages in bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, or
barrels, and other similar containers, with their names or the names of their principals or products, or
other marks of ownership stamped or marked thereon, may register with the Philippine Patent Office a
description of the names or are used by them, under the same conditions, rules, and regulations, made
applicable by law or regulation to the issuance of trademarks. ScCEIA
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written consent of the manufacturer, bottler or
seller who has successfully registered the marks of ownership in accordance with the provisions of the
next preceding section, to fill such bottles, boxes, kegs, barrels, or other similar containers so marked or
stamped, for the purpose of sale, or to sell, dispose of, buy, or traffic in, or wantonly destroy the same,
whether filled or not, or to use the same for drinking vessels or glasses or for any other purpose than
that registered by the manufacturer, bottler or seller. Any violation of this section shall be punished by a
fine or not more than one hundred pesos or imprisonment of not more than thirty days or both.
As its coverage is defined under Section 1, the Act appears to be a measure that may overlap or be
affected by the provisions of Part II of the IP Code on "The Law on Trademarks, Service Marks and Trade
Names". What is certain is that the IP Code has not expressly repealed this Act. The Act appears, too, to
have specific reference to a special type of registrants the manufacturers, bottlers or sellers of soda
water, mineral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream, or other lawful beverages in bottles, boxes, casks,
kegs, or barrels, and other similar containers who are given special protection with respect to the
containers they use. In this sense, it is in fact a law of specific coverage and application, compared with
the general terms and application of the IP Code. Thus, under its Section 2, it speaks specifically of
unlawful use of containers and even of the unlawfulness of their wanton destruction a matter that
escapes the IP Code's generalities unless linked with the concepts of "deception" and "passing off" as
discussed above. ACDTcE
Unfortunately, the Act is not the law in issue in the present case and one that the parties did not
consider at all in the search warrant application. The petitioner in fact could not have cited it in its
search warrant application since the "one specific offense" that the law allows and which the petitioner
used was Section 168.3 (c). If it serves any purpose at all in our discussions, it is to show that the
underlying factual situation of the present case is in fact covered by another law, not by the IP Code that
the petitioner cites. Viewed in this light, the lack of probable cause to support the disputed search
warrant at once becomes apparent.
Where, as in this case, the imputed acts do not violate the cited offense, the ruling of this Court penned
by Mr. Justice Bellosillo is particularly instructive: ScTCIE
In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a finding of probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. Hence, since there is no crime to speak of, the search warrant does not even
begin to fulfill these stringent requirements and is therefore defective on its face. The nullity of the
warrant renders moot and academic the other issues raised in petitioners' Motion to Quash and Motion
for Reconsideration. Since the assailed search warrant is null and void, all property seized by virtue
thereof should be returned to petitioners in accordance with established jurisprudence. 16
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the RTC correctly ruled that the petitioner's search warrant
should properly be quashed for the petitioner's failure to show that the acts imputed to the respondents
do not violate the cited offense. There could not have been any probable cause to support the issuance
of a search warrant because no crime in the first place was effectively charged. This conclusion renders
unnecessary any further discussion on whether the search warrant application properly alleged that the
imputed act of holding Coke empties was in fact a "hoarding" in bad faith aimed to prejudice the
petitioner's operations, or whether the MTC duly complied with the procedural requirements for the
issuance of a search warrant under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. DHEaTS
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Accordingly, we confirm that Search
Warrant No. 2001-01, issued by the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Naga City, is NULL and VOID. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Acting C.J., Carpio Morales, Tinga and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. See Paragraph 3 of the Application; records, p. 96. aECSHI
2. Id., pp. 98-101.
3. Id., pp. 108-109.
4. Sec. 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulations and Remedies.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 168.3: In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against
unfair competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition: TcADCI
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who
shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business
or service of another.
5. Sec. 170. Penalties. Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a
criminal penalty of imprisonment from two years to five years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000), shall be imposed on any person who is
found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in Section 155, Section 168 and Subsection 169.1.
HCaIDS
6. Penned by Pairing Judge Irma Isidora M. Boncodin, MTC, Branch 1, Naga; records, p. 23.
7. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Jose P. Nacional, MTC, Branch 1, Naga; id., p. 22.
8. Decision penned by Judge Ramon A. Cruz, RTC, Branch 21; id., pp. 202-211.
9. Id., p. 210. TECIaH
10. Rule 126, Section 1. Search warrant defined. A search warrant is an order in writing issued in
the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property described therein and bring it before the court.
11. Rule 126, Section 3. Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may be issued for the
search and seizure of personal property: HSDCTA
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
12. La Chemise Lacoste, S. A. v. Judge Fernandez, G.R. Nos. 63796-97, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 373.
cHSIDa
13. Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Co v. Mojica, 27 Phil. 266 (1914).
14. Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Co., 33
Phil. 485 (1916). DCTHaS
15. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 3rd (1995) Ed., at p. 159, citing Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh,
75 Phil 371, and Soriano v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 65952, July 1, 1984, among others.
16. Supra note 12, pp. 705-706. ICHcTD

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People v. Santiago
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-17663. May 30, 1962.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ISAURO SANTIAGO, defendant-appellee.
Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Roces, Alidio & Ceguera for defendant-appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; ORAL DEFAMATION; USE OF AMPLIFIER SYSTEM. The utterance of
defamatory statements thru the medium of an amplifier system constitutes the crime of oral
defamation and prescribes in six (6) months. This medium does not fall within the term "radio", which is
one of the media thru which libel may be committed under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code,
because that term should be considered in relation to the terms with which it is associated "writing,
printing, lithography, engraving . . . phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition" all of which, unlike an
amplifier system, have a common characteristic, namely, in their permanent nature as a means of
publication, and this explains the graver penalty for libel than that prescribed for oral defamation.
D E C I S I O N
CONCEPCION, J p:
The information herein alleges that defendant Isauro Santiago has committed the crime of "libel" as
follows:
"That on or about the 5th day of October, 1959, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, for
the evident purpose of injuring the name and reputation of Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson, and of impeaching
and besmirching the latter's virtue, honesty, honor and reputation, and with the malicious intent of
exposing him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously, maliciously and publicly call said Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson, in the course of a political speech
delivered at 392 Fraternal, Quiapo, in said city, thru the medium of an amplifier system and before a
crowd of around a hundred persons, the following, to wit: 'Arsenio Hayop Lacson, pinakawalang hiyang
Alkalde, Mayor Lacson raped a woman at the Aroma Cafe and another City Hall employee in the
Shellborne Hotel', which are false, malicious and highly defamatory statements against Mayor Arsenio
H. Lacson, delivered with no good intentions or justifiable motive, but solely for the purpose of injuring
the name and reputation of said Mayor Arsenio H. Lacson and to expose him to public hatred, contempt
and ridicule."
Defendant moved to quash this information upon the ground that the crime charged therein is, not libel,
but oral defamation, which has already prescribed, it having been allegedly committed on October 5,
1959, or more than six (6) months prior to the filing of the information on August 11, 1960. The Court of
First Instance of Manila granted this motion and, accordingly, quashed the information, with costs de
officio. Hence, this appeal by the prosecution.
The only issue in this case is whether the crime charged in the information is oral defamation, under
Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, or libel, under Article 355, in relation to Article 353, of the same
Code. Said provisions read:
"ART. 358 Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise, the
penalty shall be arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos." '
ART. 355. Libel by means of writing or similar means. A libel committed by means of writing,
printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic
exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its maximum and medium
periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be
brought by the offended party."
"ART. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice
or defect, real and imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead."
The prosecution maintains that "the medium of an amplifier system", thru which the defamatory
statements imputed to the accused were allegedly made, falls within the purview of the terms "writing,
printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic
exhibition, or any similar means", appearing in said Article 355, in the sense, at least, that an "amplifier
system" is a means "similar" to "radio".
This pretense is untenable. To begin with, as correctly stated in defendant's brief, "radio as a means of
publication is "the transmission and reception of electromagnetic waves without conducting wires
intervening between transmitter and receiver' (Library of Universal Knowledge)" (see, also, 18
Encyclopedia Britannica, p. 885), "while transmission of words by means of an amplifier system", such as
the one mentioned in the information, "is not thru 'electromagnetic waves' and is with the use of
'conducting wires' intervening between the transmitter . . . and the receiver . . .".
Secondly, even the word "radio" used in said Article 355, should be considered in relation to the terms
with which it is associated "writing, printing, lithography, engraving . . . phonograph, painting,
theatrical exhibition or cinematographical exhibition" all of which have a common characteristic,
namely, their permanent nature as a means of publication, and this explains the graver penalty for libel
than that prescribed for oral defamation. Thus, it has been held that slanderous statements forming part
of a manuscript read by a speaker over the radio constitute libel (Sorensen vs. Wood, 243 N. W. 82, 82
A.L.R. 1109; Nules vs. Wasmer, 20 P. [2d] 487, 104 A.L.R. 877), whereas the rules governing such offense
were declared inapplicable to extemporaneous remarks of scurrilous nature, made ad libitum in the
course of a radio broadcast by a person hired to read a prepared text, but not appearing thereon
(Summit hotel Co. vs. National Broadcasting Co., PA-124 A.L.R. 963)
IN SHORT, the facts alleged in the information constitute the crime of oral defamation punished in
Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribed six (6) months after its commission, or on April
5, 1960 (Articles 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code), over four (4) months before the filing of said
information, in view of which the order appealed from is affirmed, without special pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., is on leave.

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