1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 105619 December 12, 1995
MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 121 and CONCHITA TALAG DE
SANTOS, respondents.

ROMERO, J .:
Can natural children by legal fiction be legitimized?
There being no explicit provision of law in point, the Court is called upon to cast illumination in a gray area even as it fills up unintentional interstices in
the fabric of Civil Law with overlays of philosophical, historical and sociological strands. For an understanding of how the issue arose, we now proceed to
unravel the pertinent factual background.
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos.
After some time, their relationship became strained to the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag, private
respondent herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada court in 1949.
Obviously aware that said decree was a worthless scrap of paper in our jurisdiction which then, as now, did not recognize divorces, Antonio proceeded
to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent, with whom he had been cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. This union produced
eleven children. On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23, 1967, Antonio and private respondent contracted a
marriage in Tagaytay City celebrated under Philippine laws. On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated value of
P15,000,000.00.
On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court
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asking for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of
her late husband's estate. She alleged, among other things, that the decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten
surviving children, and petitioner. There being no opposition, her petition was granted.
After six years of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner decided to intervene. Thus, in a motion she filed sometime in November 1987,
she argued inter alia that private respondent's children were illegitimate. This was challenged by private respondent although the latter admitted during
the hearing that all her children were born prior to Sofia's death in 1967.
On November 14, 1991, after approval of private respondent's account of her administration, the court a quopassed upon petitioner's motion. The court,
citing the case of Francisco H. Tongoy, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (23 SCRA 99 [1983]), declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and
thereupon instituted and declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of said order but this was denied in the court's order dated January 9, 1992.
Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that since only natural children can be legitimized, the trial court
mistakenly declared as legitimated her half brothers and sisters.
This argument is tenable.
Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly states:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
In other words, a child's parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception for him to qualify as a "natural child."
In the case at bench, there is no question that all the children born to private respondent and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived and born
when the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother was still subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent were married abroad after the latter
obtained in Nevada, U.S.A. a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife does not change this fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in
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this jurisdiction at the time. Evidently, the decedent was aware of this fact, which is why he had to have the marriage solemnized in Tokyo, outside of the
Philippines. It may be added here that he was likewise aware of the nullity of the Tokyo marriage for after his legitimate, though estranged wife died, he
hastily contracted another marriage with private respondent, this time here in Tagaytay.
It must be noted that while Article 269, which falls under the general heading of "Paternity and Filiation," specifically deals with "Legitimated Children,"
Article 89, a provision subsumed under the general title on "Marriage," deals principally with void and voidable marriages and secondarily, on the effects
of said marriages on their offspring. It creates another category of illegitimate children, those who are "conceived or born of marriages which are void
from the beginning," but because there has been a semblance of marriage, they are classified as "acknowledged natural children" and, accordingly,
enjoy the same status, rights and obligations as such kind of children. In the case at bench, the marriage under question is considered "void from the
beginning" because bigamous, contracted when a prior valid marriage was still subsisting. It follows that the children begotten of such union cannot be
considered natural children proper for at the time of their conception, their parents were disqualified from marrying each other due to the impediment of a
prior subsisting marriage.
What term should then be coined to distinguish them from natural children proper (those "born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other")? A legal fiction had to be resorted to, that device contrived by
law to simulate a fact or condition which, strictly and technically speaking, is not what it purports to be. In this case, the term "natural children by legal
fiction" was invented, thus giving rise to another category of illegitimate children, clearly not to be confused with "natural children" as defined under Art.
269 but by fiction of law to be equated with acknowledged natural children and, consequently, enjoying the status, rights and obligations of the latter.
Does this cluster of rights include the right to be legitimated?
Under the Civil Code, there exists a hierarchy of children classified on the basis of rights granted by law, which must be preserved by strictly construing
the substantive provisions of the law in force.
Under the prevailing Civil Code (which may be considered "old" in light of the new provisions of the Family Code on "Persons"), much emphasis is laid
on the classification of children vis-a-vis their parents, and the corresponding rights they are entitled to under the law. Thus, the title on "Paternity and
Filiation" devotes two whole chapters to legitimate children alone, and one chapter on those deemed by law to be possessed of the rights of the former,
such as legitimated children, because of their compliance with certain requisites laid down by law; two other chapters deal with illegitimate children
composed of recognized natural children, and those other than natural, or spurious, whether recognized or not. The well-ordered delineation of such
distinctions among these groups demonstrates a clear intent on the part of the framers of the Civil Code to compartmentalize and separate one from the
other, for legitimacy/illegitimacy determines the substantive rights accruing to the different categories of children.
It must be noted that before said Code was enacted, other classes of illegitimate children were recognized, such as, "manceres" or the offspring of
prostitutes and the "sacrilegious" or children of those who had received Holy Orders. Subsequently, the Civil Code, in an effort to keep in step with
modern times, limited illegitimate filiation to those which are incestuous, adulterous and illicit.
At the core of the institution of legitimacy held sacrosanct by Spanish tradition and culture, lies the "inviolable social institution" known as marriage. This
union, absent any formal or substantial defect or of any vice of consent, is virtually adamantine. On the whole, the status of a marriage determines in
large part the filiation of its resultant issue. Thus, a child born within a valid marriage is legitimate, while one born outside of wedlock is illegitimate. If,
however, the latter's parents were, at the time of the child's conception, not legally barred from marrying each other and subsequently do so, the child's
filiation improves as he becomes legitimized and the "legitimated" child eventually enjoys all the privileges and rights associated with legitimacy. Without
such marriage, the natural child's rights depend on whether he is acknowledged or recognized by his parents, but he does not rise to the level of a
legitimate child in the manner that the legitimated child does.
A child conceived or born of a marriage which is void ab initio or one which is declared a nullity is illegitimate since there is no marriage to speak of, but it
is the law which accords him the rights of an acknowledged natural child.
Finally, there are illegitimate children who are referred to as "spurious" or derisively denominated as "bastards" because of their doubtful origins. There
is no marriage valid or otherwise which would give any semblance of legality to the child's existence. Nothing links child to parent aside from the
information appearing in the birth certificate. When such child is recognized by one or both parents, he acquires certain rights nowhere approaching
those of his legitimate counterparts.
The Civil Code provides three rights which, in varying degrees, are enjoyed by children, depending on their filiation: use of surname, succession, and
support.
Legitimate children and legitimated children are entitled to all three.
2
Thus, they "shall principally use the surname of the father,"
3
and shall be entitled to
support from their legitimate ascendants and descendants,
4
as well as to a legitime consisting of one-half of the hereditary estate of both parents,
5
and
to other successional rights, such as the right of representation. "These rights as effects of legitimacy cannot be renounced."
6

Natural children recognized by both parents and natural children by legal fiction shall principally use the surname of the father.
7
If a natural child is
recognized by only one parent, the child shall follow the surname of such recognizing parent.
8
Both types of children are entitled to receive support from
the parent recognizing them.
9
They also cannot be deprived of their legitime equivalent to one-half of that pertaining to each of the legitimate children or
descendants of the recognizing parent, to be taken from the free disposable portion of the latter's estate.
10

Recognized illegitimate children other than natural, or spurious issues, are, in their minority, under the parental authority of their mothers and, naturally,
take the latter's surname.
11
The only support which they are entitled to is from the recognizing parent,
12
and their legitime, also to be taken from the free
portion, consists of four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child or two-fifths that of each legitimate child.
13

3

It must also be observed that while the legitime of a legitimate child is fairly secured by law,
14
the legitime of any recognized illegitimate child, taken as it
is from the free portion of the hereditary estate which the child shares with the surviving spouse, may be reduced if it should exceed said portion.
15

Unrecognized illegitimate children are not entitled to any of the rights above mentioned.
16

These distinctions gain more relevance if we were to consider that while a legitimated child may enjoy the same successional rights granted to legitimate
children, a natural child by legal fiction cannot rise beyond that to which an acknowledged natural child is entitled, insofar as his hereditary rights are
concerned.
It is thus incongruous to conclude, as private respondent maintains, that petitioner's half siblings can rise to her level by the fact of being legitimized, for
two reasons: First, they failed to meet the most important requisite of legitimation, that is, that they be natural children within the meaning of Article 269;
second, natural children by legal fiction cannot demand that they be legitimized simply because it is one of the rights enjoyed by acknowledged natural
children.
It may be argued that legitimation is a right vouchsafed to acknowledged natural children and, therefore, by the same token, to natural children by legal
fiction. This conclusion is arrived at through a syllogism as simple as it is deceptive, which runs as follows:
The respondent's children are natural children by legal fiction.
Therefore, they have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children.
Acknowledged natural children have the right to be legitimated.
Ergo, respondent's children have the right to be legitimated (as in fact they were "deemed legitimated" by the
subsequent valid marriage of their parents in the Philippines in 1967).
The above line of reasoning follows the Euclidian geometric proposition that things equal to the same thing are equal to each other. This may hold true in
the realm of instructional, as opposed to descriptive science, where the former calls for the application of absolute, mathematical rules with precision but
not to the latter, particularly those which deal with the social sciences where human relationships are central to a study whose main concern is not to
leave out anything of significance. The former deals with inanimate things, those which a scientist has described as the "dead aspect of nature,"
excluding all factors regarded as superfluous to obtaining absolute results and nothing more. It does not concern itself so much with the whole truth as
with those aspects or parts only through which the inexorable result can be obtained. To apply the strict rules of syllogism, where the basic premise is
defective, to the arena of paternity and filiation, especially in the determination of the status and rights of the different kinds of illegitimate children vis-a-
vis the legitimate ones, is bound to spawn mischief and results never intended by the framers of the provisions of the law under review.
Pursued to its logical, undeviating conclusion, it may eventually be postulated that "adulterous children shall enjoy the status, rights and obligations of
legitimate children," a doctrine which no moral philosophy under our social and cultural milieu can countenance.
This conclusion not only presumes that children other than those who are "natural" can be legitimized in the first place, but also grants acknowledged
natural children (and, consequently, natural children by legal fiction) a "right" to be legitimized when no such right exists. Legitimation is not a "right"
which is demandable by a child. It is a privilege, available only to natural children proper, as defined under Art. 269. Although natural children by legal
fiction have the same rights as acknowledged natural children, it is a quantum leap in the syllogism to conclude that, therefore, they likewise have the
right to be legitimated, which is not necessarily so, especially, as in this case, when the legally existing marriage between the children's father and his
estranged first wife effectively barred a "subsequent marriage" between their parents.
The question that must be confronted next is: How are the offspring of the second union affected by the first wife's death and the ensuing celebration of
a valid marriage between her widower and his ostensible second wife?
Natural children by legal fiction cannot be legitimized in this fashion. Our archaic law on family relations, patterned as it is after Spanish Civil Law, frowns
upon illegal relations such that the benefits of legitimation under Chapter 3 of Title VIII do not extend, nor were they intended to extend, to natural
children by legal fiction. Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation to natural children as defined thereunder. There was, therefore, from
the outset, an intent to exclude children conceived or born out of illicit relations from the purview of the law.
Another point to be considered is that although natural children can be legitimized, and natural children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged
natural children, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that natural children by legal fiction can likewise be legitimized. As has been pointed
out, much more is involved here than the mere privilege to be legitimized. The rights of other children, like the petitioner in the case at bench, may be
adversely affected as her testamentary share may well be reduced in the event that her ten surviving half siblings should be placed on par with her,
when each of them is rightfully entitled to only half of her share.
The provisions of law invoked by private respondent are couched in simple and unmistakable language, not at all subject to interpretation, and they all
point to the correctness of petitioner's claim. If it should be asserted that we now trench on a gray area of law that calls for interpretation, or a lacuna that
cries for filling up, then we have to pierce the shroud unintentionally created by the letter of the law and expose its spirit as evincing intent, in this case
one which decidedly favors legitimacy over illegitimacy. The hierarchy of children so painstakingly erected by law and the corresponding gradation of
their rights may conceivably be shattered by elevating natural children by legal fiction who are incontestably illegitimate children to the level of natural
children proper, whose filiation would otherwise be legitimate had their parents blessed their union with a valid marriage.
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Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now
recognizes only two classes of children: legitimate and illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure fiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders of the court a quo dated November 14, 1991 and January 9, 1992, are
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos is hereby declared the SOLE LEGITIMATE CHILD of the decedent Antonio de Santos
and, as such, entitled to all the rights accorded to her by law.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Melo, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., concur.



Separate Opinions
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J ., concurring:
Do children born out of adulterous relationships have the right to be legitimated under the New Civil Code? This I believe is the resultant issue in this
case.
In declaring what the law is on this matter, we could not be so unmindful of the highest regard that our society places on the institution of marriage and
the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, Without it there could be neither
civilization nor progress.
1
No less than the Constitution, of which we should be the staunchest vanguard as we are its ablest defender, marshals us to
protect marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family,
2
for it cannot be denied that the welfare of society is served and
nurtured by a court that exercises its judicial prerogatives not in a vacuum of cold logic but in the context of the loftiest and most enduring social values
which the citizens, albeit struggling and fumbling in their daily living, try to approximate in their own lives. The citizens, after all, are our
constituents;
3
and so their best interests, embodied in the scale of values which they extol, are an integral part of the great flux that is the law. As we are
concerned with its exposition, we must strive to continuously refurbish the image of the law vis-a-vis the welfare of society, to keep it bright, and to
subject it to constant re-analysis so as to keep it in touch with what has always been right, what is just and fair under present circumstances, and what is
most beneficial for the future generations.
4

It is in this light that we appreciate this case with the following antecedent facts:
Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona on February 7, 1941. Out of this union was born in 1942 petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. However,
Antonio and Sofia subsequently parted ways. While separated de facto from Sofia, Antonio, in 1949, secured a divorce decree against her in Nevada,
U.S.A. He then married private respondent Dr. Conchita Talag in Tokyo, Japan, in 1951. Antonio and Conchita had eleven children who were all born
between the years 1951 to 1967.
On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Thereafter, Antonio married private respondent, for the second time, in Tagaytay City. Antonio then died
on March 8, 1981 at the Capitol Medical Center.
Is special proceedings filed by private respondent on May 15, 1981, before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the court granted her petition for
letters of administration since such petition was unopposed. In the course of the proceedings, however, petitioner intervened alleging, among others,
that the ten surviving children of private respondent were illegitimate.
After the approval of the Income and Expenses Statement of the decedent's estate pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court on May 6,
1991, the trial court issued an order on November 14, 1991 declaring that the ten children of the deceased and private respondent must be deemed
legitimated and therefore entitled to inherit as legitimate heirs.
Consequently, the sole issue raised in the instant petition for certiorari is whether or not said children can be legitimated.
A logical cold deduction based on some pertinent laws would appear to answer this issue in the affirmative, in this wise:
Article 80 of the New Civil Code considers as marriages void from the beginning, bigamous marriages not falling under Art. 83 (2). Article 89 of the same
Code, in turn, bestows upon children conceived or born of marriages void from the beginning, referred to as natural children by legal fiction, the status,
rights and obligations of acknowledged natural children. Among the rights of acknowledged natural children is the right of legitimation granted to them
under Article 269 in relation to 271 of the same Code. Since private respondent's children were all born after her marriage to the deceased in Tokyo in
1951, which marriage is considered bigamous, hence, void from the beginning, because of its celebration while the marriage between the deceased and
his first wife, Sofia Bona, still subsisted, said children are natural children by legal fiction who have the rights of acknowledged natural children, including
the right to be legitimated, and they may now be considered legitimated since the deceased and private respondent validly married for the second time
after Sofia's demise.
5

It happens that the law may lose its character of being a law by an excess of caprice in its administration, but it could hardly cease to be law because of
its rigid logical application according to its tenor. When its rigid logical application, however, amounts to absurdity, the law not only becomes incapable of
just administration but may also become an instrument of legal injustice. Clearly for us to read the law in the aforegoing manner is to dangerously teeter
on the fulcrum of legal folly for there is no scaling down its unacceptable implications.
If children born out of an extramarital relationship, but whose parents contracted a bigamous marriage and still another marriage subsequent thereto
upon the death of the first spouse of the adulterous parent, may eventually be legitimated, then children of adulterous spouses, by the expedient
contrivance of a bigamous marriage, may later on be legitimated. The adulterous spouse may still prove himself virtuous and heroic by risking
prosecution for bigamy if only to give his child out of wedlock the chance, that slim chance, to be legitimated, that is, if he prays enough that his first
spouse dies ahead of him so he could eventually validly marry his paramour. As such, in the mildest terms, the law would seem to condone extramarital
relationships by providing the seemingly confessant adulterer a way to be a conscientious parent to his illegitimate children without having to give up his
illicit relations with their mother. At its worst, such a reading of the law amounts to a mockery of the institution of marriage, which is, under our
Constitution and family laws, an inviolable social institution imbued with public interest and traditionally and constantly held to be a priority in our culture's
scale of values, for nothing stops the public from concluding that marriage and a bigamous marriage at that (with its accompanying criminal
consequences), is actually a backdoor to legitimating adulterous children.
The letter of Article 89 of the New Civil Code must be transcended and the absurd and sheepishly grotesque consequences of its application in the
instant case, rejected. It is not enough that the law exists to be administered justly; in addition and more importantly, the law needs to possess a just
content. The law must by itself aim at and endeavor to conform to, some criteria of rightness which repose on values espoused by the very society it
seeks to serve. As it is our duty to declare the law as it is, there is no escaping the task of revealing the justness of the law in accordance with society's
avowed values. Consequently, it has been called a golden rule of statutory interpretation that unreasonableness of the result produced by one possible
interpretation of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result.
5

In resolving the issue at hand, I believe the emphasis should be on Article 269 which is, after all, the law squarely in point under the premises of this
case. Taking the letter of Article 269 as it is, it clearly prescribes the limits of its applicability upon only natural children. Surely there is no canon against
using both common sense and common weal in construing the law as saying what it obviously means:
Chapter 3
Art. 269. Only natural children can be ligitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 271. Only natural children who have been recognized by the parents before or after the celebration of the marriage, or have
been declared natural children by final judgment, may be considered legitimated by subsequent marriage. (Emphasis ours)
Legitimation is a right granted by law only to natural children who, because their parents could have legally married at the time they were
conceived, cannot be substantially differentiated from legitimate children once their parents do marry after their birth. This is because said
parents can marry any time, there being no legal impediment preventing them from validly contracting marriage. The situation obtaining
respecting legitimate children and legitimated natural children is certainly distinct from that respecting adulterous children because the parents
of adulterous children are admittedly incapacitated to marry each other at the time said children were conceived. It may easily be said, thus,
that to interpret the law as allowing adulterous children to be put on equal footing with the legitimate children, would be putting a premium on
adulterous relationships, which is frowned upon by the society itself. Even the law on succession under the New Civil Code distinguishes the
respective hereditary rights of the different kinds of children and significantly assigns a diminishing share in accordance with the degree of
illegitimacy of the child concerned. Thus, Article 895 provides that the legitime of each of the acknowledged natural children and each of the
natural children by legal fiction shall consist of one-half of the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants and that of illegitimate
children who is neither of the above, four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child. It is, therefore, evident that the treatment
accorded children under the New Civil Code is determined by the circumstances under which they have been conceived and born, particularly,
the capacity to marry of their parents at the time that they were conceived.
Private respondent's children were precisely born when their deceased father was still legally married to Sofia Bona. The marriage of the deceased and
private respondent in Tokyo, Japan, in 1951 could not have given a semblance of legitimacy to their subsequent cohabitation and their issues since such
marriage was contracted during the subsistence of the deceased's marriage with Sofia Bona. The relationship between the deceased and private
respondent, therefore, was no less adulterous notwithstanding an attempt to legitimize the same through a bigamous marriage. There is no other way to
put it but that the deceased and private respondent were having illicit relations; they were fully aware of the legal and moral consequences of their
actions, and they seemingly, in bad faith, attempted to circumvent the law in their favor by contracting a bigamous marriage to the prejudice of the
legitimate issue in the person of the petitioner. There is no quibbling that private respondent's children are adulterous children whose status, by the
simple expedient of a bigamous marriage contracted by parties fully aware of their incapacity to marry, could never have been intended by the law to be
equated to that of petitioner who is the legitimate child of the deceased in view of the public policy involved in preserving the sanctity of marriage and
preventing the proliferation of illegitimate issues. As the earlier interpretation has been shown to lead to unreasonable results with socially virulent
implications, and the same originates from two provisions, namely, Article 89 and Article 269 of the New Civil Code, we are wont to state that they are
irreconcilable provisions. And the applicable statutory rule is that where there is an irreconcilable conflict between the different provisions of a statute,
the provision last in order of position will prevail, since it is the latest expression of the legislative will.
6
More than that Article 269 is the latest expression
of the legislative will, however, Article 269 on its face specifically states the law on legitimation, limits its applicability to natural children, and is resonantly
silent on the right of adulterous children to be legitimated in the same way as children born to parents who, at the time of their conception, were legally
capable to marry each other.
6

All told, the law tenders to us in no unpretentious terms the basis to rule that private respondent's children, being adulterous children, have no right to be
legitimated under the New Civil Code. Such a ruling is not only in accord with the explicit, unequivocal language of Article 269 but more importantly
animates and upholds the public policy as regards the institution of marriage as the foundation of society.
Needless to say, such ruling sits well with the need to obviate any legal injustice and social absurdity that may result if we were to rule otherwise.
The final cause of law is the welfare of society. The rule that misses its aim cannot permanently justify its existence. "Ethical
considerations can no more be excluded from the administration of justice which is the end and purpose of all civil laws than one
can exclude the vital air from his room and live.
7

The final rendering of the meaning of a statute is an act of judgment.
8
This court has so judged this case at bench, and so we will perhaps be judged
thereby.
I, therefore, vote to grant the petition, set aside the assailed order of the Regional Trial Court, and remand thereto the case for further proceedings.
VITUG, J ., dissenting:
I vote to resolve the controversy in favor of the child. I take it to be the legislative intent that the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code on children in the
book on persons and family relations are meant to enhance the child's interest and welfare. This intent finds exemplification in Article 89 of the Civil
Code by explicitly providing that natural children by legal fiction (among them those conceived or born of void marriages because the parents suffer from
an impediment to marry) shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children. If then under Article 269, in relation to
Article 270, of the Civil Code, acknowledged natural children are given the right to be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the parents, the law
must, by virtue of Article 89 aforesaid, likewise extend unqualifiedly to natural children by legal fiction.
No matter how well legal calisthenics are played, there is, I must point out, not a single provision of the Code that limits or circumscribes the scope and
application of Article 89. The law, I respectfully submit, should be so construed as to attain congruity, rather than a division, among its several provisions.
The rule is expressed in the maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi upon the theory that the legislature is presumed not to
have enacted conflicting provisions of law but that, on the contrary, it must have meant to give them such parity and consequence as a uniform
jurisprudential system.
Most regrettably, I still perceive coolness, if not outright hostility, towards illegitimate children who have not been fortunate enough to be conceived or
born under a better family circumstance. It is not enough that they are unjustly ostracized by a segment in society; they are also called names
bastards, outcasts, adulterous, spurious that certainly they do not deserve. If at all, their situation needs sympathy, not hatred or condemnation.
Any conflict of view, however, would soon be a thing of the past, for as so keenly observed by Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, the Family Code,
which became effective on 03 August 1988, has deleted any reference to natural children by legal fiction. The Family Code presently categorizes
children of void marriages into two kinds the legitimates which include those conceived or born of void marriages under Article 36 and Article 52 of the
Family Code before the judicial declaration of nullity of such void marriages and the illegitimates or children conceived or born of all other void marriages
(but evidently maintaining, for legitimation purposes, the distinction between those whose parents, at the time of conception, were not disqualified to
marry and those whose parents were disqualified).
Narvasa, C.J. and Bellosillo, J., concurs.
KAPUNAN, J ., dissenting:
The principal issue in the case at bench may be capsulized as to whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack
or excess of jurisdiction in considering the private respondent's children legitimated under the facts established herein, and in declaring and instituting
said children as heirs of the decedent. As the law unequivocally gives them such a right, I respectfully dissent from the majority.
I begin by observing that, taking their cue from the lower court's inappropriate lifting of an editor's precis or statement from the syllabus of the case
of Tongoy vs. Court of Appeals,
1
both parties in the case at bench have placed too much emphasis and reliance on the case of Tongoy,
2
the facts and
circumstances of which are not exactly on all fours with those obtaining in the case at bench. The italicized portion of the syllabus of cases appearing in
official or unofficial reports of Supreme Court Decisions or Resolutions
3
generally reflect the editor's summary of a discussion of an issue or a specific
point in a case, and, taken out of context, could be misleading and inappropriate for citation. Judges should strive to read cases which might have a
bearing on cases before them in their entirety, and quote or obtain their citations from the body of the decision, not the syllabus.
The principal issue in Tongoy,
4
hinged "on the absence of an acknowledgment (by the father prior to his death of his illegitimate children) through any of
the modes recognized by the Old Civil Code."
5
It is not, however clear from the Court's discussion of the facts of the case, whether the illegitimate
children were sired during the subsistence of the first marriage or after the death of the first wife. On the sale issue of the father's acknowledgment, the
Court therein took a liberal view, recognizing the fact that the children "were in continuous possession of the status of natural, or even legitimated,
children"
6
and that they were "treated as legitimate children not only by their parents but also by the entire clan,"
7
in declaring, on equitable grounds, that
the children therein were legitimate heirs.
For better appreciation of our ruling in Tongoy, let me quote the following:
7

The remaining assignment of error dwells on the question of whether or not respondents Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano and
Norberto, all surnamed Tongoy, may be considered legitimated by virtue of the marriage of their parents, Francisco Tongoy and
Antonina Pabello, subsequent to their births and shortly before Francisco died on September 15, 1926. Petitioners maintain that
since the said respondents were never acknowledged by their father, they could not have been legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of their parents, much less could they inherit from the estate of their father, the predecessor-in-interest of Luis D. Tongoy,
who is admittedly the half brother of the said respondents.
Both the trial court and the respondent appellate court have found overwhelming evidence to sustain the following conclusions: that
Amado P. Tongoy, Ricardo P. Tongoy, Cresenciano P. Tongoy and Norberto P. Tongoy were born illegitimate to Antonina Pabello
on August 19, 1910 (Exh. A), August 12, 1922 (Exh. B), December 1, 1915 (Exhs. C and C-1) and August 4, 1922 (Exh. D),
respectively; that Francisco Tongoy was their father; that said Francisco Tongoy had before them and Antonina Pabello two
legitimate children by his first wife, namely, Luis D. Tongoy and Patricio D. Tongoy; that Francisco Tongoy and Antonina Pabello
were married sometime before his death on September 15, 1926 (Exh. H); that shortly thereafter, Luis D. Tongoy and Patricio D.
Tongoy executed an Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs, leaving out their half-brothers Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano, and Norberto,
who were then still minors; that respondents Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano and Norberto were known and accepted by the whole
clan as children of Francisco; that they had lived in Hacienda Pulo with their parents, but when they went to school, they stayed in
the old family home at Washington Street, Bacolod, together with their grandmother, Agatona Tongoy; that everybody in Bacolod
knew them to be part of the Tongoy-Sonora clan; and that Luis D. Tongoy as administrator of Hacienda Pulo, also spent for the
education of Ricardo Tongoy until he became a lawyer; and that even petitioners admit the fact that they were half-brothers of the
late Luis D. Tongoy.
The bone of contention, however, hinges on the absence of an acknowledgment through any of the modes recognized by the Old
Civil Code (please see Articles 131 and 135 of the Old Civil Code), such that legitimation could not have taken place in view of the
provisions of Art. 121 of the same Code which states that "children shall be considered legitimated by a subsequent marriage only
when they have been acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof."
Of course, the overwhelming evidence found by respondent Court of Appeals conclusively shows that respondents Amado, Ricardo,
Cresenciano and Norberto have been in continuous possession of the status of natural, or even legitimated children. Still, it
recognizes the fact that such continuous possession of status is not, per se, a sufficient acknowledgment but only a ground to
compel recognition (Alabat vs. Alabat, 21 SCRA 1379; Pua vs. Chan, 21 SCRA 753; Larena vs. Rubio, 43 Phil. 1017).
Be that as it may, WE cannot but agree with the liberal view taken by respondent Court of Appeals when it said:
. . . It does not seem equally manifest, however, that defendants-appellants stand on a purely technical point in the light of
overwhelming evidence that appellees were natural children of Francisco Tongoy and Antonina Pabello, and were treated as
legitimate children not only by their parents but only by the entire clan. Indeed, it does not make much sense that appellees should
be deprived of their hereditary rights as undoubted natural children of their father, when the only plausible reason that the latter
could have had in mind when he married his second wife Antonina Pabello just over a month before his death was to give legitimate
status to their children. It is not in keeping with the more liberal attitude taken by the New Civil Code towards illegitimate children
and the more compassionate trend of the New Society to insist on a very literal application of the law in requiring the formalities of
compulsory acknowledgment, when the only result is to unjustly deprive children who are otherwise entitled to hereditary rights.
From the very nature of things, it is hardly to be expected of appellees, having been reared as legitimate children by their parents
and treated as such by everybody, to bring an action to compel their parents to acknowledge them. In the hitherto cited case
of Ramos vs.Ramos, supra, the Supreme Court showed the way out of patent injustice and inequity that might result in some cases
simply because of the implacable insistence on the technical amenities for acknowledgment. Thus, it held
Unacknowledged natural children have no rights whatsoever (Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5 Phil. 1; Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil. 5,
11; Infante vs. Figueras, 4 Phil. 738; Crisolo vs. Macadaeg, 94 Phil. 862). The fact that the plaintiffs, as natural children of Martin
Ramos, received shares in his estate implied that they were acknowledged. Obviously, defendants Agustin Ramos and Granada
Ramos and the late Jose Ramos and members of his family had treated them as his children. Presumably, that fact was well-known
in the community. Under the circumstances, Agustin Ramos and Granada Ramos and the heirs of Jose Ramos, are estopped from
attacking plaintiffs' status as acknowledged natural children (See Arts. 283 [4] and 2666 [3], New Civil Code). [Ramos vs.
Ramos, supra].
With the same logic, estoppel should also operate in this case in favor of appellees, considering, as already explained in detail, that
they have always been treated as acknowledged and legitimated children of the second marriage of Francisco Tongoy, not only by
their presumed parents who raised them as their children, but also by the entire Tongoy-Sonora clan, including Luis D. Tongoy
himself who had furnished sustenance to the clan in his capacity as administrator of Hacienda Pulo and had in fact supported the
law studies of appellee Ricardo P. Tongoy in Manila, the same way he did with Jesus T. Sonora in his medical studies. As already
pointed out, even defendants-appellants have not questioned the fact that appellees are half-brothers of Luis D. Tongoy. As a
matter of fact, they are really children of Francisco Tongoy and Antonina Pabello, and only the technicality that their
acknowledgment as natural children has not been formalized in any of the modes prescribed by law appears to stand in the way of
granting them their hereditary rights. But estoppel, as already indicated, precludes defendants-appellants from attacking appellees'
status as acknowledged natural or legitimated children of Francisco Tongoy. In addition to estoppel, this is decidedly one instance
when technicality should give way to conscience, equity and justice (cf. Vda. de Sta. Ana vs. Rivera, L-22070, October 29, 1966, 18
SCRA 588) [pp. 196-198, Vol. 1, rec.].
It is time that WE, too, take a liberal view in favor of natural children who, because they enjoy the blessings and privileges of an
acknowledged natural child and even of a legitimated child, found if rather awkward, if not unnecessary, to institute an action for
recognition against their natural parents, who, without their asking, have been showering them with the same love, care and material
support as are accorded to legitimate children. The right to participate in their father's inheritance should necessarily follow.
8

8

However, acknowledgment is clearly not at issue here. Petitioner makes no pretense that private respondent's children are not entitled to hereditary
rights.
9
She herself admits that the decedent acknowledged his paternity of the private respondent's children and that they are indeed her brothers and
sisters.
10
What herein petitioner claims she opposes "is their being judicially declared legitimated (by the respondent court) so as to entitle them to enjoy
the same rights as a legitimate heir,"
11
to her prejudice. Citing Article 269 of the New Civil Code as "the law in point" in the case at bench, she contends
that the trial court erred in declaring her half brothers and sisters legitimated because under the New Civil Code only natural children could be
legitimated. I find this contention, to which the majority of this divided Court agrees, absolutely untenable.
The New Civil Code appears to limit the right to legitimation only to those children conceived by parents not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other, bestowing upon them, prior to such legitimation, the status of natural children. Article 269 which provides the cornerstone for the majority's
holding today states that:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
The rule is, however, not absolute because even children conceived or born out of marriages void from the very beginning under the Civil Code possess
the status of natural children by legal fiction and enjoy the same rights as acknowledged natural children. Article 89 provides:
Art. 89. Children conceived or born out of marriages which are void from the beginning shall have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are called natural children by legal fiction.
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived
thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children
by legal fiction.
Article 89, a creature of legislation (through the Code Commission) which has remained unmolested since 1950 I must stress, is not an accidental
provision. The Civil Code Commission clearly intended Article 89, notwithstanding its location in the Code, as a piece of reform, an exception to the rule
furnished by Article 269. More importantly, Article 89 (unlike Article 269 which came from the Spanish Civil Code of 1889) was a new provision
deliberately introduced by the Code Commission as one of its revolutionary reforms thirty five years ago. And doubt about the intention of this piece of
legislation should have been laid to rest by the following explanation from the Code Commission's Report:
This proposed reform is based on the fact that such children have been brought into this world through no fault of their own, but
through that of their parents. To visit punishment upon them is most unjust. Moreover, though the marriage is void, or voidable, at
least there was a semblance of legality to the relationship between the parents. This circumstance should cast a mantle of
protection over the children, who by legal fiction should be treated as acknowledged natural children.
12

Since the decedent's 1951 marriage in Tokyo with the private respondent was invalid,
13
being one of those marriages classified as void from the very
beginning under the Civil Code,
14
the status of her children clearly falls under Article 89 which puts them on par, at least in terms of rights and
obligations, with acknowledged natural children. Since the rights of acknowledged natural children include the right of legitimation under Article 270 of
the Civil
Code by the subsequent valid marriage of their parents,
15
it therefore plainly follows that by virtue of Article 89, in relation to Article 270, the private
respondent's children were deemed legitimated by the subsequent valid marriage of their parents in the Philippines in 1967.
This position is hardly an isolated one. Virtually all Civil and Family Code commentators are united in the belief that Article 89 furnishes an escape valve
for children found under the circumstances existing in the case at bench. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, in his commentary on the Civil Code, for example, writes:
Under Article 89, natural children by legal fiction "shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural
children." Theoretically therefore, natural children by legal fiction can be
legitimated. . . . .
The following children by legal fiction . . . can be legitimated: . . . (2) those born of a bigamous marriage, for the parents can marry
each other again upon the widowhood of the parent who married twice. . . . .
16

In the same token, Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda, a member of the Family Code Revision Committee acknowledges this exception the rule, stating that:
By way of exception, some natural children by legal fiction (Art. 89, NCC) can be legitimated such as (a) those born of couples
who married while below the allowable marrying age but who contracted a new marriage after reaching the proper age; (b) those
born of bigamous marriages but where the parents married each other upon the widowhood of the disqualified parent; (c) those born
of parents who got married before an unauthorized officer and the parents contracted a new marriage before an authorized one; (d)
those born of parents who got married without a marriage license (where license was required) and the parents contracted a
subsequent valid marriage; and (e) children conceived after (not before) the decree of annulment of a voidable marriage.
17

Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, writing on the New Family Code
18
underscores the difference in treatment of the subject of legitimation between the Family
Code and the Civil Code thus:
Under the Civil Code, children of bigamous marriages, who are natural children by legal fiction, can be legitimated, since the parents
can marry each other upon the death of the first husband or wife of the parent who married twice. Unfortunately for such children,
9

they can no longer be legitimated under the Family Code, which has limited the kind of children to legitimate and illegitimate and
abolished the category of natural children by legal fiction.
19

"Parenthetically," another commentator on the Family Code, Prof. Melencio Sta. Maria writes, "under the Civil Code provisions of legitimation which were
repealed by the Family Code," there can be an instances where such children could be legitimated.
20
Elaborating on these provisions in his 1995
commentary; he states:
This is so because according to the repealed Article 271 of the Civil Code only acknowledged natural children can be legitimated,
and also according to the repealed Article 89 of the Civil Code, a child born inside a void marriage was considered a natural child by
legal fiction with all the rights of an acknowledged natural child. Since a natural child by legal fiction has all the rights of an
acknowledged natural child and the statutory right to be legitimated was one of the rights of an acknowledged natural child, the
subject child therefore can be legitimated if the parents subsequently validly remarried.
21

Clearly, the weight of authority in this country recognizes that under the Civil Code, Article 89 unequivocally furnishes an exception to the rule that only
acknowledged natural children or those who by law have been declared natural children by final judgment can be legitimated. This exception was, in
fact, acknowledged by the Family Code Revision Committee in its Meeting of August 24, 1985, when it decided not to accord the same privilege
extended by Article 89 to similarly situated illegitimate children (under the family Code's simplified classification) in the provisions of the new code.
However, for children born under the Civil Code, the exception is a legal fact which could not be ignored. If under Article 269, in relation to Article 270 of
the Civil Code, acknowledged natural children are given the right to be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the parents, the law must, by virtue of
Article 89, also extend unqualifiedly to natural children by legal fiction. This not only harmonizes Article 89 with the Civil Code articles on the rights of
acknowledged natural children and the articles on legitimation but also leads to a result which enhances the welfare and interest of the child. As Justice
Vitug in his 1993 Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence writes:
The provisions of Art. 269 and 271 of the Civil Code, in a literal sense appear to limit legitimation in favor of acknowledged natural
children or those who by law have been declared natural children by final judgment. Considering, however, that natural children by
legal fiction (such as those born of void marriages because the parents suffer from an impediment to marry) are expressly given the
same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children (Art. 89 Civil Code), and because all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the child, it is submitted that the rules on legitimation should likewise extend to such children.
22

Indeed, it hardly makes sense that the children of private respondent should be deprived of their full hereditary rights as legitimated children when the
facts and circumstances of the case at bench clearly show the decedent's intention to remove, once and for all, all manner of legal and moral obstacles
to his second and apparently blissful union with the private respondent. For immediately after the death of his first wife in Guatemala in 1967, the
decedent wasted no time in obtaining a Philippine marriage in Tagaytay with his second wife. With a fairly considerable estate, it was not entirely remote
that the decedent had in mind not only the intention to legitimatize his union with the private respondent but also the intention to accord legitimate status
to his children with his second wife. Given the nature of their relationship and the clear intendment of the Civil Code under Article 89 to place natural
children by legal fiction on equal standing with acknowledged natural children, a patent injustice and inequity will result if we uphold herein petitioner's
implacable position. Given the clear intendment of the legislature in enacting the new provision (Article 89) over thirty years ago when many of the
members of this Court were still law students, the majority's holding in the case at bench amounts to a belated judicial veto of a valid piece of legislation.
I vote to DENY the instant petition.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bellosillo, and Francisco JJ., concur.
PANGANIBAN, J ., dissenting:
With all due respect, I dissent from the well-written ponencia of Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero.
The pertinent portions of Arts. 89, 269, 270 and 271 of the New Civil Code which are the codal provisions in point, read as follows:
Art. 89. Children conceived or born of marriages which are void from the beginning shall have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are called natural children by legal fiction.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
Art. 270. Legitimation shall take place by the subsequent marriage of the parents.
Art. 271. Only natural children who have been recognized by the parents before or after the celebration of the marriage, or have
been declared natural children by final judgment, may be considered legitimated by subsequent marriage. . . .
Art. 89 has been repealed by the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209) which took effect on August 3, 1988 (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, 178
SCRA 684 [1989]; Atienza vs. Brillantes, A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, March 29, 1995). It was one of the provisions under Title III, Book I of the New Civil
Code which have been omitted from the text of the present Family Code. But it was the law in force at the time the legitimation in the case at bench took
place and should, consequently, govern the present controversy.
10

Art. 89 was a new provision in the sense that, unlike Articles 269 to 271, aforequoted, which all came from the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, Art. 89 was
one of the reforms instituted by the Code Commission that drafted the New Civil Code. The Code Commission justified this new article in this wise:
This proposed reform is based on the fact that such children have been brought into the world through no fault of their own, but
through that of their parents. To visit punishment upon them is most unjust. Moreover, though the marriage was void, or voidable, at
least there was a semblance of legality of the relationship between the parents. This circumstance should cast the mantle of
protection over the children, who by legal fiction should be treated as acknowledged natural children. (Report of the Code
Commission, at p. 81.)
In conferring upon natural children by legal fiction the same status, rights and obligations of acknowledged natural children, the clear intention of the law
was to put them at par with the latter although in fact they are not. They are not in fact natural because they were conceived in the presence, not
absence, of an impediment between the parents. They are natural only by figment of law. Thus, the name natural children by legal fiction.
But this legal fiction precisely operates to exempt them from the requirement under Art. 269 that there be no impediment between the parents at the time
of the conception as well as from the requirement of recognition by both parents under Art. 271. Plainly, this is the conclusion that can rationally be given
to the express, unequivocal declaration in Art. 89 that natural children by legal fiction "shall have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children" neither imposing any condition nor subjecting the grant of status to any qualification or exception of any kind. Had the
intention been to deprive them of the right of legitimation, the law would have said so. Or it would have inserted a condition that they could be legitimated
only if they can show compliance with Arts. 269 and 271 of the Code. The fact that these insertions were not made can only mean that the law intended
to exempt this special class of natural children from the strict requirements normally imposed on ordinary natural children.
Under the provisions of the New Civil Code, legitimation takes place when three requisites are met: (a) that the child be a natural child; (b) that he be
recognized by both parents either before or after a valid marriage; and (c) that there be a subsequent valid marriage of the parents (cf. Paras, Civil Code
of the Philippines Annotated, 1984 Ed., Vol. I, p. 651). A natural child by legal fiction possesses the first two requisites from inception by virtue of Art. 89,
which places him on the same plane as an acknowledged natural child. In that sense, he has an advantage over a natural child as defined by Art. 269,
for the latter would still need to be recognized by both parents in order to have the status and rights of an acknowledged natural child. Thus, for the
purpose of legitimation, the natural child by legal fiction needs to fulfill only the third requisite: a valid subsequent marriage between his parents (cf.
Paras, op. cit., p. 651; Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1987 Reprinting, Vol. I, p. 570). Where the impediment is permanent or perpetual, such
as incest or the fact that one or both of the parties have been found guilty of killing the spouse of one of them, no legitimation can ever take place as no
valid marriage can ever be made between the parents (Tolentino, op. cit., p. 570). But the bigamous character of a marriage is terminable by, among
other causes, the death of the first spouse, making a subsequent marriage valid. And that simply was what happened in the case at bench.
Prior to the repeal of Art. 89 by the Family Code, it was suggested by some civil law scholars that a distinction should be made between natural children
by legal fiction who were conceived during the existence of an impediment, on the one hand, and those who were conceived after the disappearance of
such impediment, on the other. Their theory was that only the latter would qualify for legitimation. Such a stance would have been juridically sound were
it not for the fact that Art. 89 does not classify natural children by legal fiction into the two suggested categories based on the presence or absence of
impediment at the time of conception of the child. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus; where the law does not distinguish, we should not
(Gesolgon vs. Lacson, 2 SCRA 553, 556 [1961]; Libudan vs. Gil, 45 SCRA 17, 33 [1972]; Guevarra vs. Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379, 385 [1966]; Robles vs.
Chromite Mining Co., 104 Phil. 688, 690 [1958]). Besides, as already pointed out, the conferment on natural children by legal fiction of the same status,
rights and obligations as those of acknowledged natural children under Art. 89, New Civil Code, evidently exempted the former from the requirements
imposed upon ordinary natural children by Arts. 269 and 271 of said Code. And, finally, Art. 220 of said Code fortifies this conclusion, because said
provision declares that in case of doubt, every intendment of law or fact leans toward, among other things, "the legitimacy of children". The doubt if
there be such at all should therefore be resolved in favor of sustaining the right to legitimation of the eleven (11) offsprings of the decedent with
private respondent Conchita Talag, regardless of the presence or absence of an impediment to marry on the part of their parents at the time of the
conception of each of them.
Indeed, it is hardly fair to stigmatize and create social and successional prejudice against children who had no fault in nor control over the marital
impediments which bedeviled their parents. They are the victims, not the perpetrators, of these vagaries of life. Why then should they suffer their
consequences? In the final analysis, there are really no illegitimate children; there are only illegitimate parents. And this dissent finds its philosophy in
this: that children, unarguably born and reared innocent in this world, should benefit by every intendment of the law, particularly where as in this case
their parents, who originally suffered from a marital impediment, would now want to overcome the improvident social and successional consequences
of such condition. Therefore, it is most unfair that the these innocent children should be condemned to continue suffering the consequences of the
impediment they did not cause, when the very impediment itself has disappeared.
The mere fact that such legitimation would impact adversely upon the petitioner's successional rights as the lone legitimate child of the first marriage is
no reason to deny the children of the second marriage of their own legal right to be deemed legitimated. Precisely, legitimation produces such an effect
i.e., diminution of successional rights of the legitimate children. Art. 272 of the New Civil Code provides in fact that "(c)hildren who are legitimated by
subsequent marriage shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children." When the legislature decided to grant to children of void carriages the same
status, rights, and obligations as those of acknowledged natural children, it is presumed to have carefully weighed precisely these consequences upon
the rights of the other children in the family. The policy then was to cast a mantle of protection upon children of void marriages. That policy is evidently
enforced by enabling them to get legitimated in the same manner as acknowledged natural children namely, by the subsequent valid marriage of their
parents. If the Family Code, by repealing Art. 89 of the New Civil Code, is to be viewed as having reversed or denigrated that policy (although, by and
large, it appears to have maintained the policy in many other areas of family law), such reversal or denigration should not, and cannot, in any case
impair rights already acquired by and thus vested in the private respondents.
One last point. Both petitioner and private respondent admit that the eleven (1l) children of the decedent with private respondent Conchita Talag were
born after the celebration of the bigamous marriage on July 25, 1951. (See Petition, item 6, page 5; Rollo p. 6.) If any one of them was born prior thereto,
such child, not being a natural child by legal fiction but spurious, cannot claim the special benefit granted under Art. 89 of the New Civil Code. Unlike his
brothers and sisters who are natural children by legal fiction, he can only inherit by showing that he has been recognized by the decedent as the latter's
illegitimate child either voluntarily or by final judgment in a proper paternity suit (Paterno vs. Paterno, 20 SCRA 585; Noble vs. Noble, 18 SCRA 1104;
11

Clemena vs. Clemena, 24 SCRA 720; Divinagracia vs. Rovira, 72 SCRA 307; Tolentino, The Civil Code of the Philippines, 1987 Reprinting, Vol. I, pp.
616-617.)
Separate Opinions
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J ., concurring:
Do children born out of adulterous relationships have the right to be legitimated under the New Civil Code? This I believe is the resultant issue in this
case.
In declaring what the law is on this matter, we could not be so unmindful of the highest regard that our society places on the institution of marriage and
the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, Without it there could be neither
civilization nor progress.
1
No less than the Constitution, of which we should be the staunchest vanguard as we are its ablest defender, marshals us to
protect marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family,
2
for it cannot be denied that the welfare of society is served and
nurtured by a court that exercises its judicial prerogatives not in a vacuum of cold logic but in the context of the loftiest and most enduring social values
which the citizens, albeit struggling and fumbling in their daily living, try to approximate in their own lives. The citizens, after all, are our
constituents;
3
and so their best interests, embodied in the scale of values which they extol, are an integral part of the great flux that is the law. As we are
concerned with its exposition, we must strive to continuously refurbish the image of the law vis-a-vis the welfare of society, to keep it bright, and to
subject it to constant re-analysis so as to keep it in touch with what has always been right, what is just and fair under present circumstances, and what is
most beneficial for the future generations.
4

It is in this light that we appreciate this case with the following antecedent facts:
Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona on February 7, 1941. Out of this union was born in 1942 petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. However,
Antonio and Sofia subsequently parted ways. While separated de facto from Sofia, Antonio, in 1949, secured a divorce decree against her in Nevada,
U.S.A. He then married private respondent Dr. Conchita Talag in Tokyo, Japan, in 1951. Antonio and Conchita had eleven children who were all born
between the years 1951 to 1967.
On March 30, 1967, Sofia died in Guatemala. Thereafter, Antonio married private respondent, for the second time, in Tagaytay City. Antonio then died
on March 8, 1981 at the Capitol Medical Center.
Is special proceedings filed by private respondent on May 15, 1981, before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the court granted her petition for
letters of administration since such petition was unopposed. In the course of the proceedings, however, petitioner intervened alleging, among others,
that the ten surviving children of private respondent were illegitimate.
After the approval of the Income and Expenses Statement of the decedent's estate pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court on May 6,
1991, the trial court issued an order on November 14, 1991 declaring that the ten children of the deceased and private respondent must be deemed
legitimated and therefore entitled to inherit as legitimate heirs.
Consequently, the sole issue raised in the instant petition for certiorari is whether or not said children can be legitimated.
A logical cold deduction based on some pertinent laws would appear to answer this issue in the affirmative, in this wise:
Article 80 of the New Civil Code considers as marriages void from the beginning, bigamous marriages not falling under Art. 83 (2). Article 89 of the same
Code, in turn, bestows upon children conceived or born of marriages void from the beginning, referred to as natural children by legal fiction, the status,
rights and obligations of acknowledged natural children. Among the rights of acknowledged natural children is the right of legitimation granted to them
under Article 269 in relation to 271 of the same Code. Since private respondent's children were all born after her marriage to the deceased in Tokyo in
1951, which marriage is considered bigamous, hence, void from the beginning, because of its celebration while the marriage between the deceased and
his first wife, Sofia Bona, still subsisted, said children are natural children by legal fiction who have the rights of acknowledged natural children, including
the right to be legitimated, and they may now be considered legitimated since the deceased and private respondent validly married for the second time
after Sofia's demise.
It happens that the law may lose its character of being a law by an excess of caprice in its administration, but it could hardly cease to be law because of
its rigid logical application according to its tenor. When its rigid logical application, however, amounts to absurdity, the law not only becomes incapable of
just administration but may also become an instrument of legal injustice. Clearly for us to read the law in the aforegoing manner is to dangerously teeter
on the fulcrum of legal folly for there is no scaling down its unacceptable implications.
If children born out of an extramarital relationship, but whose parents contracted a bigamous marriage and still another marriage subsequent thereto
upon the death of the first spouse of the adulterous parent, may eventually be legitimated, then children of adulterous spouses, by the expedient
contrivance of a bigamous marriage, may later on be legitimated. The adulterous spouse may still prove himself virtuous and heroic by risking
prosecution for bigamy if only to give his child out of wedlock the chance, that slim chance, to be legitimated, that is, if he prays enough that his first
spouse dies ahead of him so he could eventually validly marry his paramour. As such, in the mildest terms, the law would seem to condone extramarital
relationships by providing the seemingly confessant adulterer a way to be a conscientious parent to his illegitimate children without having to give up his
illicit relations with their mother. At its worst, such a reading of the law amounts to a mockery of the institution of marriage, which is, under our
Constitution and family laws, an inviolable social institution imbued with public interest and traditionally and constantly held to be a priority in our culture's
scale of values, for nothing stops the public from concluding that marriage and a bigamous marriage at that (with its accompanying criminal
consequences), is actually a backdoor to legitimating adulterous children.
12

The letter of Article 89 of the New Civil Code must be transcended and the absurd and sheepishly grotesque consequences of its application in the
instant case, rejected. It is not enough that the law exists to be administered justly; in addition and more importantly, the law needs to possess a just
content. The law must by itself aim at and endeavor to conform to, some criteria of rightness which repose on values espoused by the very society it
seeks to serve. As it is our duty to declare the law as it is, there is no escaping the task of revealing the justness of the law in accordance with society's
avowed values. Consequently, it has been called a golden rule of statutory interpretation that unreasonableness of the result produced by one possible
interpretation of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result.
5

In resolving the issue at hand, I believe the emphasis should be on Article 269 which is, after all, the law squarely in point under the premises of this
case. Taking the letter of Article 269 as it is, it clearly prescribes the limits of its applicability upon only natural children. Surely there is no canon against
using both common sense and common weal in construing the law as saying what it obviously means:
Chapter 3
Art. 269. Only natural children can be ligitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 271. Only natural children who have been recognized by the parents before or after the celebration of the marriage, or have
been declared natural children by final judgment, may be considered legitimated by subsequent marriage. (Emphasis ours)
Legitimation is a right granted by law only to natural children who, because their parents could have legally married at the time they were
conceived, cannot be substantially differentiated from legitimate children once their parents do marry after their birth. This is because said
parents can marry any time, there being no legal impediment preventing them from validly contracting marriage. The situation obtaining
respecting legitimate children and legitimated natural children is certainly distinct from that respecting adulterous children because the parents
of adulterous children are admittedly incapacitated to marry each other at the time said children were conceived. It may easily be said, thus,
that to interpret the law as allowing adulterous children to be put on equal footing with the legitimate children, would be putting a premium on
adulterous relationships, which is frowned upon by the society itself. Even the law on succession under the New Civil Code distinguishes the
respective hereditary rights of the different kinds of children and significantly assigns a diminishing share in accordance with the degree of
illegitimacy of the child concerned. Thus, Article 895 provides that the legitime of each of the acknowledged natural children and each of the
natural children by legal fiction shall consist of one-half of the legitime of each of the legitimate children or descendants and that of illegitimate
children who is neither of the above, four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child. It is, therefore, evident that the treatment
accorded children under the New Civil Code is determined by the circumstances under which they have been conceived and born, particularly,
the capacity to marry of their parents at the time that they were conceived.
Private respondent's children were precisely born when their deceased father was still legally married to Sofia Bona. The marriage of the deceased and
private respondent in Tokyo, Japan, in 1951 could not have given a semblance of legitimacy to their subsequent cohabitation and their issues since such
marriage was contracted during the subsistence of the deceased's marriage with Sofia Bona. The relationship between the deceased and private
respondent, therefore, was no less adulterous notwithstanding an attempt to legitimize the same through a bigamous marriage. There is no other way to
put it but that the deceased and private respondent were having illicit relations; they were fully aware of the legal and moral consequences of their
actions, and they seemingly, in bad faith, attempted to circumvent the law in their favor by contracting a bigamous marriage to the prejudice of the
legitimate issue in the person of the petitioner. There is no quibbling that private respondent's children are adulterous children whose status, by the
simple expedient of a bigamous marriage contracted by parties fully aware of their incapacity to marry, could never have been intended by the law to be
equated to that of petitioner who is the legitimate child of the deceased in view of the public policy involved in preserving the sanctity of marriage and
preventing the proliferation of illegitimate issues. As the earlier interpretation has been shown to lead to unreasonable results with socially virulent
implications, and the same originates from two provisions, namely, Article 89 and Article 269 of the New Civil Code, we are wont to state that they are
irreconcilable provisions. And the applicable statutory rule is that where there is an irreconcilable conflict between the different provisions of a statute,
the provision last in order of position will prevail, since it is the latest expression of the legislative will.
6
More than that Article 269 is the latest expression
of the legislative will, however, Article 269 on its face specifically states the law on legitimation, limits its applicability to natural children, and is resonantly
silent on the right of adulterous children to be legitimated in the same way as children born to parents who, at the time of their conception, were legally
capable to marry each other.
All told, the law tenders to us in no unpretentious terms the basis to rule that private respondent's children, being adulterous children, have no right to be
legitimated under the New Civil Code. Such a ruling is not only in accord with the explicit, unequivocal language of Article 269 but more importantly
animates and upholds the public policy as regards the institution of marriage as the foundation of society.
Needless to say, such ruling sits well with the need to obviate any legal injustice and social absurdity that may result if we were to rule otherwise.
The final cause of law is the welfare of society. The rule that misses its aim cannot permanently justify its existence. "Ethical
considerations can no more be excluded from the administration of justice which is the end and purpose of all civil laws than one
can exclude the vital air from his room and live.
7

The final rendering of the meaning of a statute is an act of judgment.
8
This court has so judged this case at bench, and so we will perhaps be judged
thereby.
I, therefore, vote to grant the petition, set aside the assailed order of the Regional Trial Court, and remand thereto the case for further proceedings.
VITUG, J ., dissenting:
13

I vote to resolve the controversy in favor of the child. I take it to be the legislative intent that the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code on children in the
book on persons and family relations are meant to enhance the child's interest and welfare. This intent finds exemplification in Article 89 of the Civil
Code by explicitly providing that natural children by legal fiction (among them those conceived or born of void marriages because the parents suffer from
an impediment to marry) shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children. If then under Article 269, in relation to
Article 270, of the Civil Code, acknowledged natural children are given the right to be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the parents, the law
must, by virtue of Article 89 aforesaid, likewise extend unqualifiedly to natural children by legal fiction.
No matter how well legal calisthenics are played, there is, I must point out, not a single provision of the Code that limits or circumscribes the scope and
application of Article 89. The law, I respectfully submit, should be so construed as to attain congruity, rather than a division, among its several provisions.
The rule is expressed in the maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi upon the theory that the legislature is presumed not to
have enacted conflicting provisions of law but that, on the contrary, it must have meant to give them such parity and consequence as a uniform
jurisprudential system.
Most regrettably, I still perceive coolness, if not outright hostility, towards illegitimate children who have not been fortunate enough to be conceived or
born under a better family circumstance. It is not enough that they are unjustly ostracized by a segment in society; they are also called names
bastards, outcasts, adulterous, spurious that certainly they do not deserve. If at all, their situation needs sympathy, not hatred or condemnation.
Any conflict of view, however, would soon be a thing of the past, for as so keenly observed by Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero, the Family Code,
which became effective on 03 August 1988, has deleted any reference to natural children by legal fiction. The Family Code presently categorizes
children of void marriages into two kinds the legitimates which include those conceived or born of void marriages under Article 36 and Article 52 of the
Family Code before the judicial declaration of nullity of such void marriages and the illegitimates or children conceived or born of all other void marriages
(but evidently maintaining, for legitimation purposes, the distinction between those whose parents, at the time of conception, were not disqualified to
marry and those whose parents were disqualified).
Narvasa, C.J. and Bellosillo, J., concurs.
KAPUNAN, J ., dissenting:
The principal issue in the case at bench may be capsulized as to whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack
or excess of jurisdiction in considering the private respondent's children legitimated under the facts established herein, and in declaring and instituting
said children as heirs of the decedent. As the law unequivocally gives them such a right, I respectfully dissent from the majority.
I begin by observing that, taking their cue from the lower court's inappropriate lifting of an editor's precis or statement from the syllabus of the case
of Tongoy vs. Court of Appeals,
1
both parties in the case at bench have placed too much emphasis and reliance on the case of Tongoy,
2
the facts and
circumstances of which are not exactly on all fours with those obtaining in the case at bench. The italicized portion of the syllabus of cases appearing in
official or unofficial reports of Supreme Court Decisions or Resolutions
3
generally reflect the editor's summary of a discussion of an issue or a specific
point in a case, and, taken out of context, could be misleading and inappropriate for citation. Judges should strive to read cases which might have a
bearing on cases before them in their entirety, and quote or obtain their citations from the body of the decision, not the syllabus.
The principal issue in Tongoy,
4
hinged "on the absence of an acknowledgment (by the father prior to his death of his illegitimate children) through any of
the modes recognized by the Old Civil Code."
5
It is not, however clear from the Court's discussion of the facts of the case, whether the illegitimate
children were sired during the subsistence of the first marriage or after the death of the first wife. On the sale issue of the father's acknowledgment, the
Court therein took a liberal view, recognizing the fact that the children "were in continuous possession of the status of natural, or even legitimated,
children"
6
and that they were "treated as legitimate children not only by their parents but also by the entire clan,"
7
in declaring, on equitable grounds, that
the children therein were legitimate heirs.
For better appreciation of our ruling in Tongoy, let me quote the following:
The remaining assignment of error dwells on the question of whether or not respondents Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano and
Norberto, all surnamed Tongoy, may be considered legitimated by virtue of the marriage of their parents, Francisco Tongoy and
Antonina Pabello, subsequent to their births and shortly before Francisco died on September 15, 1926. Petitioners maintain that
since the said respondents were never acknowledged by their father, they could not have been legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of their parents, much less could they inherit from the estate of their father, the predecessor-in-interest of Luis D. Tongoy,
who is admittedly the half brother of the said respondents.
Both the trial court and the respondent appellate court have found overwhelming evidence to sustain the following conclusions: that
Amado P. Tongoy, Ricardo P. Tongoy, Cresenciano P. Tongoy and Norberto P. Tongoy were born illegitimate to Antonina Pabello
on August 19, 1910 (Exh. A), August 12, 1922 (Exh. B), December 1, 1915 (Exhs. C and C-1) and August 4, 1922 (Exh. D),
respectively; that Francisco Tongoy was their father; that said Francisco Tongoy had before them and Antonina Pabello two
legitimate children by his first wife, namely, Luis D. Tongoy and Patricio D. Tongoy; that Francisco Tongoy and Antonina Pabello
were married sometime before his death on September 15, 1926 (Exh. H); that shortly thereafter, Luis D. Tongoy and Patricio D.
Tongoy executed an Extra-Judicial Declaration of Heirs, leaving out their half-brothers Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano, and Norberto,
who were then still minors; that respondents Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano and Norberto were known and accepted by the whole
clan as children of Francisco; that they had lived in Hacienda Pulo with their parents, but when they went to school, they stayed in
the old family home at Washington Street, Bacolod, together with their grandmother, Agatona Tongoy; that everybody in Bacolod
knew them to be part of the Tongoy-Sonora clan; and that Luis D. Tongoy as administrator of Hacienda Pulo, also spent for the
education of Ricardo Tongoy until he became a lawyer; and that even petitioners admit the fact that they were half-brothers of the
late Luis D. Tongoy.
14

The bone of contention, however, hinges on the absence of an acknowledgment through any of the modes recognized by the Old
Civil Code (please see Articles 131 and 135 of the Old Civil Code), such that legitimation could not have taken place in view of the
provisions of Art. 121 of the same Code which states that "children shall be considered legitimated by a subsequent marriage only
when they have been acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof."
Of course, the overwhelming evidence found by respondent Court of Appeals conclusively shows that respondents Amado, Ricardo,
Cresenciano and Norberto have been in continuous possession of the status of natural, or even legitimated children. Still, it
recognizes the fact that such continuous possession of status is not, per se, a sufficient acknowledgment but only a ground to
compel recognition (Alabat vs. Alabat, 21 SCRA 1379; Pua vs. Chan, 21 SCRA 753; Larena vs. Rubio, 43 Phil. 1017).
Be that as it may, WE cannot but agree with the liberal view taken by respondent Court of Appeals when it said:
. . . It does not seem equally manifest, however, that defendants-appellants stand on a purely technical point in the light of
overwhelming evidence that appellees were natural children of Francisco Tongoy and Antonina Pabello, and were treated as
legitimate children not only by their parents but only by the entire clan. Indeed, it does not make much sense that appellees should
be deprived of their hereditary rights as undoubted natural children of their father, when the only plausible reason that the latter
could have had in mind when he married his second wife Antonina Pabello just over a month before his death was to give legitimate
status to their children. It is not in keeping with the more liberal attitude taken by the New Civil Code towards illegitimate children
and the more compassionate trend of the New Society to insist on a very literal application of the law in requiring the formalities of
compulsory acknowledgment, when the only result is to unjustly deprive children who are otherwise entitled to hereditary rights.
From the very nature of things, it is hardly to be expected of appellees, having been reared as legitimate children by their parents
and treated as such by everybody, to bring an action to compel their parents to acknowledge them. In the hitherto cited case
of Ramos vs.Ramos, supra, the Supreme Court showed the way out of patent injustice and inequity that might result in some cases
simply because of the implacable insistence on the technical amenities for acknowledgment. Thus, it held
Unacknowledged natural children have no rights whatsoever (Buenaventura vs. Urbano, 5 Phil. 1; Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil. 5,
11; Infante vs. Figueras, 4 Phil. 738; Crisolo vs. Macadaeg, 94 Phil. 862). The fact that the plaintiffs, as natural children of Martin
Ramos, received shares in his estate implied that they were acknowledged. Obviously, defendants Agustin Ramos and Granada
Ramos and the late Jose Ramos and members of his family had treated them as his children. Presumably, that fact was well-known
in the community. Under the circumstances, Agustin Ramos and Granada Ramos and the heirs of Jose Ramos, are estopped from
attacking plaintiffs' status as acknowledged natural children (See Arts. 283 [4] and 2666 [3], New Civil Code). [Ramos vs.
Ramos, supra].
With the same logic, estoppel should also operate in this case in favor of appellees, considering, as already explained in detail, that
they have always been treated as acknowledged and legitimated children of the second marriage of Francisco Tongoy, not only by
their presumed parents who raised them as their children, but also by the entire Tongoy-Sonora clan, including Luis D. Tongoy
himself who had furnished sustenance to the clan in his capacity as administrator of Hacienda Pulo and had in fact supported the
law studies of appellee Ricardo P. Tongoy in Manila, the same way he did with Jesus T. Sonora in his medical studies. As already
pointed out, even defendants-appellants have not questioned the fact that appellees are half-brothers of Luis D. Tongoy. As a
matter of fact, they are really children of Francisco Tongoy and Antonina Pabello, and only the technicality that their
acknowledgment as natural children has not been formalized in any of the modes prescribed by law appears to stand in the way of
granting them their hereditary rights. But estoppel, as already indicated, precludes defendants-appellants from attacking appellees'
status as acknowledged natural or legitimated children of Francisco Tongoy. In addition to estoppel, this is decidedly one instance
when technicality should give way to conscience, equity and justice (cf. Vda. de Sta. Ana vs. Rivera, L-22070, October 29, 1966, 18
SCRA 588) [pp. 196-198, Vol. 1, rec.].
It is time that WE, too, take a liberal view in favor of natural children who, because they enjoy the blessings and privileges of an
acknowledged natural child and even of a legitimated child, found if rather awkward, if not unnecessary, to institute an action for
recognition against their natural parents, who, without their asking, have been showering them with the same love, care and material
support as are accorded to legitimate children. The right to participate in their father's inheritance should necessarily follow.
8

However, acknowledgment is clearly not at issue here. Petitioner makes no pretense that private respondent's children are not entitled to hereditary
rights.
9
She herself admits that the decedent acknowledged his paternity of the private respondent's children and that they are indeed her brothers and
sisters.
10
What herein petitioner claims she opposes "is their being judicially declared legitimated (by the respondent court) so as to entitle them to enjoy
the same rights as a legitimate heir,"
11
to her prejudice. Citing Article 269 of the New Civil Code as "the law in point" in the case at bench, she contends
that the trial court erred in declaring her half brothers and sisters legitimated because under the New Civil Code only natural children could be
legitimated. I find this contention, to which the majority of this divided Court agrees, absolutely untenable.
The New Civil Code appears to limit the right to legitimation only to those children conceived by parents not disqualified by any impediment to marry
each other, bestowing upon them, prior to such legitimation, the status of natural children. Article 269 which provides the cornerstone for the majority's
holding today states that:
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
The rule is, however, not absolute because even children conceived or born out of marriages void from the very beginning under the Civil Code possess
the status of natural children by legal fiction and enjoy the same rights as acknowledged natural children. Article 89 provides:
15

Art. 89. Children conceived or born out of marriages which are void from the beginning shall have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are called natural children by legal fiction.
Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived
thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children
by legal fiction.
Article 89, a creature of legislation (through the Code Commission) which has remained unmolested since 1950 I must stress, is not an accidental
provision. The Civil Code Commission clearly intended Article 89, notwithstanding its location in the Code, as a piece of reform, an exception to the rule
furnished by Article 269. More importantly, Article 89 (unlike Article 269 which came from the Spanish Civil Code of 1889) was a new provision
deliberately introduced by the Code Commission as one of its revolutionary reforms thirty five years ago. And doubt about the intention of this piece of
legislation should have been laid to rest by the following explanation from the Code Commission's Report:
This proposed reform is based on the fact that such children have been brought into this world through no fault of their own, but
through that of their parents. To visit punishment upon them is most unjust. Moreover, though the marriage is void, or voidable, at
least there was a semblance of legality to the relationship between the parents. This circumstance should cast a mantle of
protection over the children, who by legal fiction should be treated as acknowledged natural children.
12

Since the decedent's 1951 marriage in Tokyo with the private respondent was invalid,
13
being one of those marriages classified as void from the very
beginning under the Civil Code,
14
the status of her children clearly falls under Article 89 which puts them on par, at least in terms of rights and
obligations, with acknowledged natural children. Since the rights of acknowledged natural children include the right of legitimation under Article 270 of
the Civil
Code by the subsequent valid marriage of their parents,
15
it therefore plainly follows that by virtue of Article 89, in relation to Article 270, the private
respondent's children were deemed legitimated by the subsequent valid marriage of their parents in the Philippines in 1967.
This position is hardly an isolated one. Virtually all Civil and Family Code commentators are united in the belief that Article 89 furnishes an escape valve
for children found under the circumstances existing in the case at bench. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, in his commentary on the Civil Code, for example, writes:
Under Article 89, natural children by legal fiction "shall have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural
children." Theoretically therefore, natural children by legal fiction can be
legitimated. . . . .
The following children by legal fiction . . . can be legitimated: . . . (2) those born of a bigamous marriage, for the parents can marry
each other again upon the widowhood of the parent who married twice. . . . .
16

In the same token, Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda, a member of the Family Code Revision Committee acknowledges this exception the rule, stating that:
By way of exception, some natural children by legal fiction (Art. 89, NCC) can be legitimated such as (a) those born of couples
who married while below the allowable marrying age but who contracted a new marriage after reaching the proper age; (b) those
born of bigamous marriages but where the parents married each other upon the widowhood of the disqualified parent; (c) those born
of parents who got married before an unauthorized officer and the parents contracted a new marriage before an authorized one; (d)
those born of parents who got married without a marriage license (where license was required) and the parents contracted a
subsequent valid marriage; and (e) children conceived after (not before) the decree of annulment of a voidable marriage.
17

Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, writing on the New Family Code
18
underscores the difference in treatment of the subject of legitimation between the Family
Code and the Civil Code thus:
Under the Civil Code, children of bigamous marriages, who are natural children by legal fiction, can be legitimated, since the parents
can marry each other upon the death of the first husband or wife of the parent who married twice. Unfortunately for such children,
they can no longer be legitimated under the Family Code, which has limited the kind of children to legitimate and illegitimate and
abolished the category of natural children by legal fiction.
19

"Parenthetically," another commentator on the Family Code, Prof. Melencio Sta. Maria writes, "under the Civil Code provisions of legitimation which were
repealed by the Family Code," there can be an instances where such children could be legitimated.
20
Elaborating on these provisions in his 1995
commentary; he states:
This is so because according to the repealed Article 271 of the Civil Code only acknowledged natural children can be legitimated,
and also according to the repealed Article 89 of the Civil Code, a child born inside a void marriage was considered a natural child by
legal fiction with all the rights of an acknowledged natural child. Since a natural child by legal fiction has all the rights of an
acknowledged natural child and the statutory right to be legitimated was one of the rights of an acknowledged natural child, the
subject child therefore can be legitimated if the parents subsequently validly remarried.
21

Clearly, the weight of authority in this country recognizes that under the Civil Code, Article 89 unequivocally furnishes an exception to the rule that only
acknowledged natural children or those who by law have been declared natural children by final judgment can be legitimated. This exception was, in
fact, acknowledged by the Family Code Revision Committee in its Meeting of August 24, 1985, when it decided not to accord the same privilege
extended by Article 89 to similarly situated illegitimate children (under the family Code's simplified classification) in the provisions of the new code.
However, for children born under the Civil Code, the exception is a legal fact which could not be ignored. If under Article 269, in relation to Article 270 of
the Civil Code, acknowledged natural children are given the right to be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of the parents, the law must, by virtue of
16

Article 89, also extend unqualifiedly to natural children by legal fiction. This not only harmonizes Article 89 with the Civil Code articles on the rights of
acknowledged natural children and the articles on legitimation but also leads to a result which enhances the welfare and interest of the child. As Justice
Vitug in his 1993 Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence writes:
The provisions of Art. 269 and 271 of the Civil Code, in a literal sense appear to limit legitimation in favor of acknowledged natural
children or those who by law have been declared natural children by final judgment. Considering, however, that natural children by
legal fiction (such as those born of void marriages because the parents suffer from an impediment to marry) are expressly given the
same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children (Art. 89 Civil Code), and because all doubts should be
resolved in favor of the child, it is submitted that the rules on legitimation should likewise extend to such children.
22

Indeed, it hardly makes sense that the children of private respondent should be deprived of their full hereditary rights as legitimated children when the
facts and circumstances of the case at bench clearly show the decedent's intention to remove, once and for all, all manner of legal and moral obstacles
to his second and apparently blissful union with the private respondent. For immediately after the death of his first wife in Guatemala in 1967, the
decedent wasted no time in obtaining a Philippine marriage in Tagaytay with his second wife. With a fairly considerable estate, it was not entirely remote
that the decedent had in mind not only the intention to legitimatize his union with the private respondent but also the intention to accord legitimate status
to his children with his second wife. Given the nature of their relationship and the clear intendment of the Civil Code under Article 89 to place natural
children by legal fiction on equal standing with acknowledged natural children, a patent injustice and inequity will result if we uphold herein petitioner's
implacable position. Given the clear intendment of the legislature in enacting the new provision (Article 89) over thirty years ago when many of the
members of this Court were still law students, the majority's holding in the case at bench amounts to a belated judicial veto of a valid piece of legislation.
I vote to DENY the instant petition.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bellosillo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
PANGANIBAN, J ., dissenting:
With all due respect, I dissent from the well-written ponencia of Mme. Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero.
The pertinent portions of Arts. 89, 269, 270 and 271 of the New Civil Code which are the codal provisions in point, read as follows:
Art. 89. Children conceived or born of marriages which are void from the beginning shall have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are called natural children by legal fiction.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
Art. 270. Legitimation shall take place by the subsequent marriage of the parents.
Art. 271. Only natural children who have been recognized by the parents before or after the celebration of the marriage, or have
been declared natural children by final judgment, may be considered legitimated by subsequent marriage. . . .
Art. 89 has been repealed by the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209) which took effect on August 3, 1988 (Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, 178
SCRA 684 [1989]; Atienza vs. Brillantes, A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, March 29, 1995). It was one of the provisions under Title III, Book I of the New Civil
Code which have been omitted from the text of the present Family Code. But it was the law in force at the time the legitimation in the case at bench took
place and should, consequently, govern the present controversy.
Art. 89 was a new provision in the sense that, unlike Articles 269 to 271, aforequoted, which all came from the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, Art. 89 was
one of the reforms instituted by the Code Commission that drafted the New Civil Code. The Code Commission justified this new article in this wise:
This proposed reform is based on the fact that such children have been brought into the world through no fault of their own, but
through that of their parents. To visit punishment upon them is most unjust. Moreover, though the marriage was void, or voidable, at
least there was a semblance of legality of the relationship between the parents. This circumstance should cast the mantle of
protection over the children, who by legal fiction should be treated as acknowledged natural children. (Report of the Code
Commission, at p. 81.)
In conferring upon natural children by legal fiction the same status, rights and obligations of acknowledged natural children, the clear intention of the law
was to put them at par with the latter although in fact they are not. They are not in fact natural because they were conceived in the presence, not
absence, of an impediment between the parents. They are natural only by figment of law. Thus, the name natural children by legal fiction.
But this legal fiction precisely operates to exempt them from the requirement under Art. 269 that there be no impediment between the parents at the time
of the conception as well as from the requirement of recognition by both parents under Art. 271. Plainly, this is the conclusion that can rationally be given
to the express, unequivocal declaration in Art. 89 that natural children by legal fiction "shall have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children" neither imposing any condition nor subjecting the grant of status to any qualification or exception of any kind. Had the
intention been to deprive them of the right of legitimation, the law would have said so. Or it would have inserted a condition that they could be legitimated
17

only if they can show compliance with Arts. 269 and 271 of the Code. The fact that these insertions were not made can only mean that the law intended
to exempt this special class of natural children from the strict requirements normally imposed on ordinary natural children.
Under the provisions of the New Civil Code, legitimation takes place when three requisites are met: (a) that the child be a natural child; (b) that he be
recognized by both parents either before or after a valid marriage; and (c) that there be a subsequent valid marriage of the parents (cf. Paras, Civil Code
of the Philippines Annotated, 1984 Ed., Vol. I, p. 651). A natural child by legal fiction possesses the first two requisites from inception by virtue of Art. 89,
which places him on the same plane as an acknowledged natural child. In that sense, he has an advantage over a natural child as defined by Art. 269,
for the latter would still need to be recognized by both parents in order to have the status and rights of an acknowledged natural child. Thus, for the
purpose of legitimation, the natural child by legal fiction needs to fulfill only the third requisite: a valid subsequent marriage between his parents (cf.
Paras, op. cit., p. 651; Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1987 Reprinting, Vol. I, p. 570). Where the impediment is permanent or perpetual, such
as incest or the fact that one or both of the parties have been found guilty of killing the spouse of one of them, no legitimation can ever take place as no
valid marriage can ever be made between the parents (Tolentino, op. cit., p. 570). But the bigamous character of a marriage is terminable by, among
other causes, the death of the first spouse, making a subsequent marriage valid. And that simply was what happened in the case at bench.
Prior to the repeal of Art. 89 by the Family Code, it was suggested by some civil law scholars that a distinction should be made between natural children
by legal fiction who were conceived during the existence of an impediment, on the one hand, and those who were conceived after the disappearance of
such impediment, on the other. Their theory was that only the latter would qualify for legitimation. Such a stance would have been juridically sound were
it not for the fact that Art. 89 does not classify natural children by legal fiction into the two suggested categories based on the presence or absence of
impediment at the time of conception of the child. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus; where the law does not distinguish, we should not
(Gesolgon vs. Lacson, 2 SCRA 553, 556 [1961]; Libudan vs. Gil, 45 SCRA 17, 33 [1972]; Guevarra vs. Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379, 385 [1966]; Robles vs.
Chromite Mining Co., 104 Phil. 688, 690 [1958]). Besides, as already pointed out, the conferment on natural children by legal fiction of the same status,
rights and obligations as those of acknowledged natural children under Art. 89, New Civil Code, evidently exempted the former from the requirements
imposed upon ordinary natural children by Arts. 269 and 271 of said Code. And, finally, Art. 220 of said Code fortifies this conclusion, because said
provision declares that in case of doubt, every intendment of law or fact leans toward, among other things, "the legitimacy of children". The doubt if
there be such at all should therefore be resolved in favor of sustaining the right to legitimation of the eleven (11) offsprings of the decedent with
private respondent Conchita Talag, regardless of the presence or absence of an impediment to marry on the part of their parents at the time of the
conception of each of them.
Indeed, it is hardly fair to stigmatize and create social and successional prejudice against children who had no fault in nor control over the marital
impediments which bedeviled their parents. They are the victims, not the perpetrators, of these vagaries of life. Why then should they suffer their
consequences? In the final analysis, there are really no illegitimate children; there are only illegitimate parents. And this dissent finds its philosophy in
this: that children, unarguably born and reared innocent in this world, should benefit by every intendment of the law, particularly where as in this case
their parents, who originally suffered from a marital impediment, would now want to overcome the improvident social and successional consequences
of such condition. Therefore, it is most unfair that the these innocent children should be condemned to continue suffering the consequences of the
impediment they did not cause, when the very impediment itself has disappeared.
The mere fact that such legitimation would impact adversely upon the petitioner's successional rights as the lone legitimate child of the first marriage is
no reason to deny the children of the second marriage of their own legal right to be deemed legitimated. Precisely, legitimation produces such an effect
i.e., diminution of successional rights of the legitimate children. Art. 272 of the New Civil Code provides in fact that "(c)hildren who are legitimated by
subsequent marriage shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children." When the legislature decided to grant to children of void carriages the same
status, rights, and obligations as those of acknowledged natural children, it is presumed to have carefully weighed precisely these consequences upon
the rights of the other children in the family. The policy then was to cast a mantle of protection upon children of void marriages. That policy is evidently
enforced by enabling them to get legitimated in the same manner as acknowledged natural children namely, by the subsequent valid marriage of their
parents. If the Family Code, by repealing Art. 89 of the New Civil Code, is to be viewed as having reversed or denigrated that policy (although, by and
large, it appears to have maintained the policy in many other areas of family law), such reversal or denigration should not, and cannot, in any case
impair rights already acquired by and thus vested in the private respondents.
One last point. Both petitioner and private respondent admit that the eleven (1l) children of the decedent with private respondent Conchita Talag were
born after the celebration of the bigamous marriage on July 25, 1951. (See Petition, item 6, page 5; Rollo p. 6.) If any one of them was born prior thereto,
such child, not being a natural child by legal fiction but spurious, cannot claim the special benefit granted under Art. 89 of the New Civil Code. Unlike his
brothers and sisters who are natural children by legal fiction, he can only inherit by showing that he has been recognized by the decedent as the latter's
illegitimate child either voluntarily or by final judgment in a proper paternity suit (Paterno vs. Paterno, 20 SCRA 585; Noble vs. Noble, 18 SCRA 1104;
Clemena vs. Clemena, 24 SCRA 720; Divinagracia vs. Rovira, 72 SCRA 307; Tolentino, The Civil Code of the Philippines, 1987 Reprinting, Vol. I, pp.
616-617.)
Footnotes
1 Special Proceeding Case No. C-851 filed before Branch 121 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City.
2 Civil Code, Articles 264 and 272.
3 Ibid, Article 364.
4 Id., Article 291 (2).
5 Id., Article 888 (1st par.).
6 J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, An Outline of Philippine Civil Law, Vol. I, 1965, p. 248, citing Arts. 301, 905, and 1347.
7 Civil Code, Article 366-367.
8 Ibid, Article 366.
9 Id., Article 291(3) and (4), in relation to Article 89.
10 Id., Article 895, in relation to Article 282.
11 Id., Articles 288 and 368.
12 Id., Article 291 (5).
13 Id., Article 895 (2nd and 3rd pars.).
14 Id., Article 886.
15 Id., Article 895 (3rd par.).
18

16 Reyes v. Court of Appeals, No. L-39537, March 19, 1985, citing Alabat v. Alabat, 21 SCRA 1479 (1967); Mise v. Rodriguez, 95
Phil. 396 (1954); Magallanes v. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 797 (1954); Canales v. Ugarte, 91 Phil. 6 (1952); Malonda v. Malonda, 81
Phil 149 (1948); Buenaventura v. Urbano, 5 Phil. 1 (1905).
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J., concurring:
1 Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, 864.
2 Sec. 2, Art. XV, 1987 Constitution.
3 Davies, Jack, Legislative Law and Process, 1986 Edition, p. 324.
4 Lloyd, Dennis, The Idea of Law, 1981 Edition, p. 327.
5 Sands, C. Dallas, Sutherland Statutory Construction, 1972 Edition, p. 37.
6 Crawford, Earl T., The Construction of Statutes, 1940 Edition, p. 263.
7 Cardozo, Benjamin, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 1921 Edition, p. 66, citing Dillon.
8 Frankfurter, Felix, "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes," in Statutes and Statutory Construction by C. Dallas Sands, Vol.
3, 1973 Edition, p. 414.
KAPUNAN, J., dissenting:
1 123 SCRA 99 (1989). The lower court partly based its decision on the following statement, quoted from the syllabus of the
decision, which does not appear in the body of the decision itself: "The Supreme Court now takes a liberal attitude on the status of
children born out of wedlock such that if a person while married begets children with another woman whom he later marries after he
becomes a widower, and during his lifetime he showered such children with all paternal affections and favors, then they should be
deemed as legitimated, even in the absence of an action for recognition.
2 Id.
3 For e.g., Philippine Reports and the Supreme Court Reports Annotated.
4 Id.
5 Id., at 125.
6 Id., at 126.
7 Id.
8 Supra, note 3.
9 Rollo, p. 79.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 REPORT OF THE CODE COMMISSION, 81.
13 The third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 15 (on personal status and capacity) of the Civil Code provides:
"Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or properly, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and
good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated or by determinations or conventions agreed upon
in a foreign country."
14 Civil Code, art. 80(4).
15 Civil Code, art. 270, provides: "Legitimation shall take place by the subsequent marriage of the parents."
16 TOLENTINO, I COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 570 (1987).
17 ERNESTO L. PINEDA, THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED, 271 (1992).
18 ALICIA V. SEMPIO DIY, HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 251 (1991 ED.).
19 Id.
20 MELENCIO S. STA. MARIA, JR., PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS LAW 485 (1995).
21 Id., at 485-486.
22 JOSE C. VITUG, COMPENDIUM OF CIVIL LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, 86 (1993).












19

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Mariano B. Miranda for private respondent.

REGALADO, J .:
Dissatisfied with the decision of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on February 20, 1990
1
which affirmed in toto the decision of Branch 2 of the
Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City
2
granting the petition of herein private respondent to adopt the minor Jason Condat, petitioner seeks the reversal
thereof in the present petition for review on certiorari.
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living with her family
since he was four (4) months old, before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 1386.
3

The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued an order dated February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing on
March 28, 1988.
4
The order was duly published, with copies thereof seasonably served on the Solicitor General; Assistant Provincial Fiscal Mediavillo,
Jr. of Albay; Salvador Condat, father of the child; and the social worker assigned to the court. A copy of said order was posted on the bulletin board of
the court and in the other places it had required for that purpose. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition.
5

Compliance with the jurisdictional requirements having been proved at the hearing, the testimonies of herein private respondent, together with that of her
husband, Dioscoro Bobiles, and one Ma. Luz Salameno of the Department of Social Welfare and Development were taken and admitted in the
proceedings.
On March 20, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment disposing as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, it is declared that henceforth, the minor child, JASON CONDAT, be freed from all legal obligations of obedience
and maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and be, to all intents and purposes, the child of the spouses Dioscoro and
Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of the child be changed to "Bobiles" which is the surname of the petitioner.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, Regional Office, Region V,
Legaspi City, and the Local Civil Registrar of Tiwi, Albay, with copies of this decision.
6

Herein petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, as earlier stated, affirmed the aforesaid decision of the court below. Hence, this present
petition with the following assignment of errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Family Code cannot be applied retroactively to the petition for adoption
filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles; and
2 The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision which granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in
favor of spouses Dioscoro Bobiles and Zenaida C. Bobiles.
7

The petition for adoption was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No.
603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. However, after
the trial court rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took
effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.
On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for adoption should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private respondent
without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that the Family Code
20

must be applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of
her petition for adoption. We are not persuaded.
Preliminarily, we observe that petitioner's theory implies that the non-inclusion of Dioscoro Bobiles as a co-petitioner is a jurisdictional defect, hence its
prayer for an outright dismissal on that score. It could not be taking exception only on the ground of non-joinder since petitioner must be aware that non-
joinder is not a ground for the dismissal of an action or a special proceeding. 8 We further apprehend that this objection has been raised for the first time
on appeal in respondent court. Nonetheless, we shall clarify petitioner's misgivings as postulated in its aforestated assignment of errors.
Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that such retrospective
application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder.
9
The term expresses the
concept of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and
imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
10
Vested rights include not only legal
or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.
11

Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein.
When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such
petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be
prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
When private respondent filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the
governing law. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force
at the time of the commencement of the action.
12
We do not find in the present case such facts as would constitute it as an exception to the rule.
The first error assigned by petitioner warrants a review of applicable local and foreign jurisprudence. For that purpose, we start with the premise that
Article 185 of the Family Code is remedial in nature. Procedural statutes are ordinarily accorded a retrospective construction in the sense that they may
be applied to pending actions and proceedings, as well as to future actions. However, they will not be so applied as to defeat procedural steps
completed before their enactment.
13

Procedural matters are governed by the law in force when they arise, and procedural statutes are generally retroactive in that they apply to pending
proceedings and are not confined to those begun after their enactment although, with respect to such pending proceedings, they affect only procedural
steps taken after their enactment.
14

The rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure will affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act excludes them from
its operation, is not so extensive that it may be used to validate or invalidate proceedings taken before it goes into effect, since procedure must be
governed by the law regulating it at the time the question of procedure arises.
15

The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purely procedural, aspect of a case is substantive in nature and is subject to a more stringent rule. A petition
cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for adoption was
sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully
disposes of the case.
16
To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such
jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character
which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.
17

On the second issue, petitioner argues that, even assuming that the Family Code should not apply retroactively, the Court of Appeals should have
modified the trial court's decision by granting the adoption in favor of private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husband not being a petitioner. We
do not consider this as a tenable position and, accordingly, reject the same.
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the
petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. The pertinent parts
of his written consent read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That my wife, ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and I mutually desire to adopt as our child, a boy named JASON CONDAT, still
a minor being six (6) years old, likewise residing at 18 C. Imperial Street, Legaspi City, Albay, also in the Philippines;
3. That we are filing the corresponding Petition for Adoption of said minor child, JASON CONDAT, before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations court, now the Regional Trial Court in Legaspi City, Albay in the Philippines;
4. That I, Dioscoro C. Bobiles as the husband and father, am giving my lawful consent to this adoption of said minor child, JASON
CONDAT;
5. That further, my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES, and I have continuously reared and cared for this minor child, JASON
CONDAT since birth;
21

6. That as a result thereof, my wife and I have developed a kind of maternal and paternal love for the boy as our very own,
exercising therein the care, concern and diligence of a good father toward him;
7. That I am executing this document, an AFFIDAVIT OF CONSENT for whatever it is worth in the premises as to the matter of
adoption of this minor child, JASON CONDAT, by my wife ZENAIDA O. CORTEZA BOBILES and by me, DIOSCORO C. BOBILES,
in any court of justice; (Emphasis supplied.)
18

xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing declarations, and his subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the
circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal advice that an affidavit of consent on his part
sufficed to make him a party to the petition. This is evident from the text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in language and pedantry in the formal
requirements should yield to and be eschewed in the higher considerations of substantial justice. The future of an innocent child must not be
compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the form of pleadings.
We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not apply to this case and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule
therein that adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes
of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption.
19
The modern tendency of
the courts is to hold that there need not be more than a substantial compliance with statutory requirements to sustain the validity of the proceeding; to
refuse would be to indulge in such a narrow and technical construction of the statute as to defeat its intention and beneficial results or to invalidate
proceedings where every material requirement of the statute was complied with.
In support of this rule it is said that it is not the duty of the courts to bring the judicial microscope to bear upon the case in order that every slight defect
may be enlarged and magnified so that a reason may be found for declaring invalid an act consummated years before, but rather to approach the case
with the inclination to uphold such acts if it is found that there was a substantial compliance with the statute.
20
The technical rules of pleading should not
be stringently applied to adoption proceedings, and it is deemed more important that the petition should contain facts relating to the child and its parents,
which may give information to those interested, than that it should be formally correct as a pleading. Accordingly, it is generally held that a petition will
confer jurisdiction if it substantially complies with the adoption statute, alleging all facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction.
21

In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the interests and welfare of the child are of primary and paramount
consideration.
22
The welfare of a child is of paramount consideration in proceedings involving its custody and the propriety of its adoption by another,
and the courts to which the application for adoption is made is charged with the duty of protecting the child and its interests and, to bring those interests
fully before it, it has authority to make rules to accomplish that end.
23
Ordinarily, the approval of the adoption rests in the sound discretion of the court.
This discretion should be exercised in accordance with the best interests of the child, as long as the natural rights of the parents over the child are not
disregarded. In the absence of a showing of grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the approving official will not be disturbed.
24

In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the
consent of his natural parents.
25
The representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development unqualifiedly recommended the approval of
the petition for adoption
26
and the trial court dispensed with the trial custody for several commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been
living with the adopting parents since infancy.
27
Further, the said petition was with the sworn written consent of the children of the adopters.
The trial court and respondent court acted correctly in granting the petition for adoption and we find no reason to disturb the same. As found and aptly
stated by respondent court: "Given the facts and circumstances of the case and considered in the light of the foregoing doctrine,
28
We are of the opinion
and so hold that the decree of adoption issued by the court a quo would go a long way towards promoting the welfare of the child and the enhancement
of his opportunities for a useful and happy life."
29

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide
homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the
adopted, as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted
for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.
30

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Penned by Justice Oscar M. Herrera, with Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Asaali S. Isnani concurring, in CA-G.R. CV No.
17911.
2 Per Judge Angel M. Alegre in Sp. Proc. No. 1386.
22

3 Rollo, 15.
4 Original Record, 8.
5 Rollo, 18.
6 Ibid., 25-26.
7 Ibid., 6.
8 Sec. 11, Rule 3, in relation to Sec. 2, Rule 72, Rules of Court.
9 J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law, 15 (1964).
10 Ayog, et al., vs. Cusi, etc., et al., 118 SCRA 492, 499 (1982).
11 16A Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, 651.
12 People vs. Paderna, 22 SCRA 273 (1968); People vs. Mariano, et al., 71 SCRA 600 (1976); Lee, et al. vs. Presiding Judge, etc.,
et al., 145 SCRA 408 (1986); Atlas Fertilizer Corp. vs. Navarro, etc., et al., 149 SCRA 432 (1987).
13 82 C.J.S., Statutes, 998.
14 Cohen vs. Reckseit, 53 N.Y.S. 2d 365, 184 Misc. 107.
15 People ex rel. Central New England Ry. Co. vs. State Tax Commission, 26 N.Y.S. 2d 425, 261 App. Div. 416; Mich.-Clugston vs.
Rogers, 169 N.W. 9, 10, 203 Mich. 339.
16 Republic vs. Pielago, G.R. No. 72218, Resolution, July 21, 1986.
17 Ramos, et al., vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 565 (1971), and cases therein cited.
18 Original Record, 4. This was executed on October 17, 1987 in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A. where he was then residing due to his
employment in the Saint Francis Hospital there, and was duly authenticated in the Philippine Consulate General in that city.
19 2 Am Jur 2d, Adoption, 865.
20 Ibid., id., 900.
21 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Children, 418.
22 2 Am Jur 2d, Adoption, 910.
23 Ibid., id., 907.
24 2 C.J.S., Adoption of Children, 412.
25 Original Record, 3.
26 TSN, March 28, 1988, 7.
27 Rollo, 21-22.
28 Citing Daoang vs. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, 159 SCRA 369 (1988).
29 Rollo, 29.
30 Bobanovic, et al. vs. Montes, etc., et al., 142 SCRA 485 (1986).

23

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46345 January 30, 1990
RESTITUTO CENIZA and JESUS CENIZA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MAGNO DABON, VICENTA DABON, TERESITA DABON, EUGENIA DABON, and TOMAS
DABON, respondents.
Vicente P. Valera and Pedro Rosito & Jesus F. Balicanta for petitioners.
Victorino U. Montecillo for respondents.

GRINO-AQUINO, J .:
This is a petition for review of the order dated October 29, 1976, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 48546 entitled, "Restituto Ceniza, et al. vs.
Magno Dabon, et al.," dismissing the petitioners' complaint for reconveyance of their shares in co-ownership property and reversing the decision of the
trial court in their favor.
On June 14, 1967, the petitioners filed against private respondents, an action in the Court of First Instance of Cebu for recovery of their title to Lots Nos.
627-B and 627-C (being portions of Lot No. 627 with an area of approximately 5,306 square meters) situated in Casuntingan, Mandaue, Cebu (now
Mandaue City), which originally formed part of "Hacienda de Mandaue" of the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu. The Property is covered by
reconstituted Original Certificate of Title No. RO-10996 issued on February 8, 1939 (formerly Decree No. 694438 issued on February 27, 1934) in the
name of "Vicente Dabon married to Marcela [or Marcelina] Ceniza." (pp. 7 and 19, Record on Appeal).
Petitioners are the descendants of Manuel Ceniza while the private respondents are the descendants of his sister, Sofia Ceniza. Sofia Ceniza was
childless but she had an adopted daughter named Flaviana Ceniza, who begot a daughter named Marced Ceniza and who in turn had a daughter
named Marcelina (or Marcela) Ceniza who married Vicente Dabon. Private respondents are the children of this marriage and they are the great-great-
grandchildren of Sofia Ceniza.
On the other hand, Manuel Ceniza had an only son, Pablo, who had two sons, Santiago and Jose Ceniza. Petitioners Restituto and Jesus Ceniza and a
certain Nemesia Ceniza-Albina are their children and the great-grandchildren of Manuel Ceniza.
The records disclose that when Hacienda de Mandaue was subdivided for resale to the occupants in 1929, Jose Ceniza and Vicente Dabon, who were
residing in the hacienda, jointly purchased Lot 627 on installment basis and they agreed, for convenience, to have the land registered in the name of
Dabon. Since then, Jose Ceniza, Vicente Dabon, and their heirs have possessed their respective portions of the land, declared the same for taxation,
paid real estate taxes on their respective shares, and made their respective installment payments to the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu.
After Dabon died in 1954, his seven (7) children, named Magno, Jacinta, Tomas, Flaviana, Soledad, Teresita and Eugenia, succeeded to his possession
of a portion of the land.
On November 4, 1961, a private land surveyor, Espiritu Bunagan, on the request of Jacinta Dabon and Restituto Ceniza who jointly defrayed the cost,
divided Lot 627 into three parts, namely:
(1) Lot No. 627-A with 3,538 square meters for Marcela Ceniza;
(2) Lot No. 627-B with 884 square meters for Restituto Ceniza; and
(3) Lot No. 627-C with 834 square meters for Nemesia Ceniza-Albina, who later bequeathed her share to her brother, Jesus Ceniza.
(p. 19, Record on Appeal).
The present controversy arose because the private respondents refused to convey Lots Nos. 627-B and 627-C to the petitioners. They claimed that their
predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Dabon, was the sole and exclusive owner of Lot 627, by purchase from the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu. In their
answer to the petitioners' complaint for reconveyance in June 1967, they alleged that the petitioners' right of action had already prescribed.
Petitioners replied that Vicente Dabon held the land in trust for them, as co-owners, hence, their action for reconveyance was imprescriptible.
24

On August 31, 1970, the trial court rendered judgment for the petitioners. Finding that there existed a co-ownership among the parties, it ordered the
private respondents to execute deeds of conveyance of Lots Nos. 627-B and 627-C in favor of the plaintiffs, Restituto and Jesus Ceniza, respectively (p.
35, Record on Appeal).
On appeal by the defendants (now private respondents) the Court of Appeals on October 29, 1976, reversed that decision of the trial court. It ruled that
the petitioners' right of action had prescribed after the lapse of 20 years from the date of registration of the land on February 8, 1939 in Vicente Dabon's
name (p. 32, Rollo).
The petitioners have appealed to this Court by a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The legal issue presented by the petition is whether the registration of the title of the land in the name of one of the co-owner, constituted a repudiation
of the co-ownership for purposes of acquisitive prescription.
We find merit in the petition for review.
The trial court correctly ruled that since a trust relation and co-ownership were proven to exist between the predecessors- in-interest of both petitioners
and private respondents, prescription did not run in favor of Dabon's heirs except from the time that they repudiated the co-ownership and made the
repudiation known to the other co-owners, Restituto and Jesus Ceniza (Cortes vs. Oliva, 33 Phil. 480).
Paragraph 5 of Article 494 of the Civil Code provides-
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership.
The registration of Lot No. 627 in the name of Vicente Dabon created a trust in favor of his co-owner Jose Ceniza, and the latter's heirs. Article 1452 of
the Civil Code states:
If two or more persons agree to purchase property and common consent the legal title is taken in the name of one of them for the
benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the others in proportion to the interest of each.
This Court has ruled in numerous cases involving fiduciary relations that, as a general rule, the trustee's possession is not adverse and therefore cannot
ripen into a title by prescription. Adverse possession requires the concurrence of the following circumstances:
a) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to the ouster of thecestui que trust;
b) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust; and
c) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive.
The above elements are not present here for the petitioners/ co-owners have not been ousted from the land. They continue to possess their respective
shares of Lot 627 and they have been paying the realty taxes thereon. Restituto's house stands on his portion of the Land. Assuming that the private
respondents' rejection of the subdivision plan for the partition of the land was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set in
when the petitioners instituted the present action for reconveyance. These circumstances were overlooked by the Court of Appeals.
In Custodio v. Casiano 9 SCRA 841, we ruled that:
Where title to land was issued in the name of a co-heir merely with the understanding that he would act as a trustee of his sisters,
and there is no evidence that this trust relation had ever been repudiated by said trustee, it is held that a reaction of co-ownership
existed between such trustee and his sisters and the right of the successors-in-interest of said sisters to bring the present action for
recovery of their shares therein against the successors-in-interest of said trustee cannot barred by prescription, despite the, lapse of
25 years from the date of registration of the land in the trustee's name. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Escobar v. Locsin, 74 Phil. 86, we affirmed the duty of the courts to shield fiduciary relations "against every manner of chicanery or detestable design
cloaked by legal technicalities" and to guard against misuse of the Torrens system "to foment betrayal in the performance of a trust."
In this case, since the statutory period of limitation within which to file an action for reconveyance, after the defendants had repudiated the co-ownership
in 1961, had not yet run its course when the petitioners filed said action in 1967, the action was not barred by prescription.
WHEREFORE. the decision of the Court of appeals is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and the decision dated August 31, 1970 of the then Court
of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, in Civil Case No. R-10030 is reinstated. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
25

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-29727 December 14, 1988
PEDRO OLIVERAS, TEODORA GASPAR, MELECIO OLIVERAS and ANICETA MINOR, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
CANDIDO LOPEZ, SEVERO LOPEZ, HIPOLITO LOPEZ, EUGENIA LOPEZ, PRIMITIVO GASPAR, CORAZON LOPEZ, ALEJANDRO CACAYURIN,
FAUSTINA BOTUYAN, MODESTO SALAZAR, ADORACION BOTUYAN, CLAUDIO GANOTICE and ENONG BOTUYAN, defendants-appellants.
Venancio B. Fernando for defendants-appellants.

FERNAN, C.J .:
This case exemplifies the Filipino custom of keeping inherited property in a prolonged juridical condition of co-owner ship.
Lorenzo Lopez owned Lot 4685 of the Cadastral survey of Villasis, Pangasinan with an area of 69,687 square meters as evidenced by Original
Certificate of Title No. 15262.
1
In December, 1931, Lorenzo Lopez died,
2
leaving said property to his wife, Tomasa Ramos and six (6) children. From
that time on, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez did not initiate any moves to legally partition the property.
More than twenty-one years later, or on February 11, 1953, Tomasa Ramos and her eldest son, Candido Lopez, executed a deed of absolute sale of the
"eastern undivided four thousand two hundred and fifty seven-square meters (4,257) more or less, of the undivided portion of (their) interests, rights and
participation" over Lot 4685, in favor of the spouses Melecio Oliveras and Aniceta Minor, in consideration of the amount of one thousand pesos
(P1,000).
3

On the same day, Tomasa and Candido executed another deed of absolute sale of the "undivided" four thousand two hundred and fifty-seven (4,257)
square meters of the "eastern part" of Lot 4685 in favor of the spouses Pedro Oliveras and Teodora Gaspar, also in consideration of P1,000.
4
Each of
the said documents bear the thumbmark of Tomasa and the signature of Candido.
In his affidavit also executed on February 11, 1953, Candido stated that a month prior to the execution of the deed of sale in favor of Melecio Oliveras,
he offered his: "undivided portion" of Lot 4685 to his "adjacent owners" but none of them was "in a position to purchase" said property.
5

Since the execution of the two deeds of absolute sale, the vendees, brothers Melecio and Pedro, had been paying the real property taxes for their
respectively purchased properties.
6
They also had been in possession of their purchased properties which, being planted to palay and peanuts, were
segregated from the rest of Lot 4685 by dikes.
7

More than thirteen years later or on November 21, 1966, the counsel of the Oliveras brothers wrote the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez reminding them of the
Oliverases' demands to partition the property so that they could acquire their respective titles thereto without resorting to court action, and that, should
they fail to respond, he would be forced to file a case in court.
8
Apparently, the Lopezes did not answer said letter since on December 15, 1966, the
Oliveras brothers and their wives filed a complaint for partition and damages
9
in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
10

The Oliverases stated in their complaint that possession of the disputed properties was delivered to them with the knowledge and consent of the
defendants; that they had been paying the real estate taxes thereon; that prior to the sale, said properties were offered to the other co-owners for sale
but they refused to buy them; that on February 18, 1953, the transactions were duly annotated and entered in the Memorandum of encumbrances of
OCT No. 15262 as adverse claims; and that their desire to segregate the portions of Lot 4685 sold to them was frustrated by defendants' adamant
refusal to lend them the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 15262 and to execute a deed of partition of the whole lot.
In claiming moral damages in the amount of P2,000.00 plaintiffs alleged that defendants also refused to allow them to survey and segregate the portions
bought by them. Plaintiffs prayed that the court order the defendants to partition Lot 4685 and to allow them to survey and segregate the portions they
had purchased. They also demanded payment of P800.00 as attorney's fees and cost of the suit.
In their answer, the defendants alleged that no sale ever transpired as the alleged vendors could not have sold specific portions of the property; that
plaintiffs' possession and occupation of specific portions of the properties being illegal, they could not ripen into ownership; and that they were not under
any obligation to lend their copy of the certificate of title or to accede to plaintiffs' request for the partition or settlement of the property. As special and
affirmative defenses, the defendants contended that the deeds of sale were null and void and hence, unenforceable against them; that the complaint did
not state a cause of action and that the cause or causes of action if any, had prescribed.
Defendants averred in their counterclaim that despite repeated demands, plaintiffs refused and failed to vacate the premises; that the properties
occupied by the plaintiffs yielded an average net produce in palay and peanuts in the amount of P1,600.00 annually, and that the complaint was filed to
harass them. They prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and the payment of P1,600.00 per year from 1953 until plaintiffs shall have vacated the
premises and P1,000.00 for attorney's fees.
26

Plaintiffs filed an answer to defendants' counterclaim, denying all the allegations therein and stating that defendants never demanded that plaintiffs
vacate the portions of Lot 4685 they had bought.
The lower court explored the possibility of an amicable settlement between the parties without success. Hence, it set the case for trial and thereafter, it
rendered a
decision
11
declaring valid the deeds of absolute sale
12
and ordering the defendants to allow the segregation of the sold portions of Lot 4685 by a
licensed surveyor in order that the plaintiffs could obtain their respective certificates of title over their portions of said lot.
In resolving the case, the lower court passed upon the issue of whether the two deeds of absolute sale were what they purported to be or merely
mortgage documents. It considered as indicia of plaintiffs' absolute dominion over the portions sold to them their actual possession thereof without any
opposition from the defendants until the filing of the complaint, their payment of taxes thereon and their having benefited from the produce of the land.
The court ruled that the defendants' testimonial evidence that the deeds in question were merely mortgage documents cannot overcome the evidentiary
value of the public instruments presented by the plaintiffs.
On the issue of whether the two deeds of absolute sale were null and void considering that the land subject thereof had not yet been partitioned, the
court observed that the total area of 8,514 square meters sold to plaintiffs by Candido was less than his share should Lot 4685 with an area of 69,687
square meters be divided among the six children of Lorenzo Lopez and their mother. In this connection, the lower court also found that during his
lifetime, and before Candido got married, Lorenzo Lopez had divided Lot 4685 among his children who then took possession of their respective shares. *
The defendants appealed said decision to this Court contending that the lower court erred in declaring the two deeds of absolute sale as valid, in
ordering the segregation of the sold portions of Lot 4685 to enable the plaintiffs to obtain their respective certificates of title, and in not considering their
defense of prescription.
The extrinsic validity of the two deeds of absolute sale is not in issue in this case in view of the finding of the trial court that the defendants admittedly do
not question their due execution.
13
What should pre-occupy the Court is the intrinsic validity of said deeds insofar as they pertain to sales of designated
portions of an undivided, co-owned property.
In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual co-owner can claim title to any
definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.
14

However, the duration of the juridical condition of co-ownership is not limitless. Under Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code, co-ownership of an estate
should not exceed the period of twenty (20) years. And, under the former article, any agreement to keep a thing or property undivided should be for a
ten-year period only. Where the parties stipulate a definite period of in division which exceeds the maximum allowed by law, said stipulation shall be void
only as to the period beyond such maximum.
15

Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the in division of a property for more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to
sanction co-ownership beyond the period set by the law. Otherwise, the 20-year limitation expressly mandated by the Civil Code would be rendered
meaningless.
In the instant case, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez maintained the co-ownership for more than twenty years. We hold that when Candido and his mother
(who died before the filing of the complaint for partition) sold definite portions of Lot 4685, they validly exercised dominion over them because, by
operation of law, the co-ownership had ceased. The filing of the complaint for partition by the Oliverases who, as vendees, are legally considered as
subrogated to the rights of Candido over portions of Lot 4685 in their possession,
16
merely served to put a stamp of formality on Candido's otherwise
accomplished act of terminating the co-ownership.
The action for partition has not prescribed. Although the complaint was filed thirteen years from the execution of the deeds of sale and hence, as
contended by the defendants-appellants, prescription might have barred its filing under the general provision of Article 1144 (a) of the Civil Code, Article
494 specifically mandates that each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Hence, considering the validity of the
conveyances of portions of Lot 4685 in their favor and as subrogees of Candido Lopez, the Oliverases' action for partition was timely and properly
filed.
17

We cannot write finis to this decision without commenting on the compliance with the resolution of September 1, 1986 of counsel for defendants-
appellants. In said resolution, the court required the parties to move in the premises "considering the length of time that this case has remained pending
in this Court and to determine whether or not there might be supervening events which may render the case moot and academic.
18
In his manifestation
and motion dated August 12, 1987, said counsel informed the Court that he had contacted the defendants-appellants whom he advised "to move in the
premises which is the land in question and to maintain the status quo with respect to their actual possession thereon" and that he had left a copy of said
resolution with the defendants-appellants" for their guidance in the compliance of their obligations (sic) as specified in said
resolution."
19

Obviously, said counsel interpreted literally the Court's directive "to move in the premises." For the enlightenment of said counsel and all others of similar
perception, a "move in the premises" resolution is not a license to occupy or enter the premises subject of litigation especially in cases involving real
property. A "move in the premises" resolution simply means what is stated therein: the parties are obliged to inform the Court of developments pertinent
to the case which may be of help to the Court in its immediate disposition.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court insofar as it declares the validity of the two deeds of sale and directs the partition of Lot 4685, is
AFFIRMED. The lower court is hereby ordered to facilitate with dispatch the preparation of a project of partition which it should thereafter approve. This
decision is immediately executory. No costs.
27

SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., concur in the result.

Footnotes
1 Exh. A.
2 TSN, October 9, 1967, p. 2.
3 Exh. B.
4 Exh. F.
5 Exh. G.
6 Exhs. C to C-1 4; Exhs. 1 to I-1 3.
7 TSN, July 17, 1967, p. 10.
8 Exh. E.
9 Named defendants therein were Candido, Severo, Hipolito, Eugenia and Corazon Lopez Eugenia's husband Primitive Gaspar,
Corazon's husband Alejandro Cacayurin and the heirs of Catalina Lopez, namely, Faustina Botuyan and her husband Modesto
Salazar, Adoracion Botuyan and her husband Claudio Ganotice and Enong Botuyan.
10 Civil Case No. U-973,
11 Penned by Judge Amado S. Santiago.
12 Lazatin vs. House Electoral Tribunal.
* The lower court underplayed the significance of this finding in the absence of documentary evidence attesting to a formal partition
of the property, and the fact that in his testimony, Pedro Oliveras himself surmised that when Lorenzo Lopez died, his children were
still minors and could not have taken possession of their respective designated portions in the real property (TSN, October 9, 1967,
p. 5).
13 Record on Appeal, p. 28.
14 Diversified Credit Corporation vs. Rosado, L-27983, December 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 470.
15 II Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1972, ed., p. 494 citing 7 Llerena 505.
16 See Dancel vs.Dancel, 29 Phil. 25.
17 De Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 24.
18 Rollo, p. 32.
19 Rollo, pp. 39-40.



28

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 76351 October 29, 1993
VIRGILIO B. AGUILAR, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SENEN B. AGUILAR, respondents.
Jose F. Manacop for petitioner.
Siruello, Muyco & Associates Law Office for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 03933 declaring null
and void the orders of 23 and 26 April, 1979, the judgment by default of 26 July 1979, and the order of 22 October 1979 of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasay City, Branch 30, and directing the trial court to set the case for pre-trial conference.
Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers; Virgilio is the youngest of seven (7) children of the late Maximiano Aguilar, while Senen is the fifth.
On 28 October 1969, the two brothers purchased a house and lot in Paraaque where their father could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a
peaceful neighborhood. Initially, the brothers agreed that Virgilio's share in the co-ownership was two-thirds while that of Senen was one-third. By virtue
of a written memorandum dated 23 February 1970, Virgilio and Senen agreed that henceforth their interests in the house and lot should be equal, with
Senen assuming the remaining mortgage obligation of the original owners with the Social Security System (SSS) in exchange for his possession and
enjoyment of the house together with their father.
Since Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining a loan from SSS, the brothers agreed that the deed of sale would be executed and the title registered
in the meantime in the name of Senen. It was further agreed that Senen would take care of their father and his needs since Virgilio and his family were
staying in Cebu.
After Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974, petitioner demanded from private respondent that the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and
proceeds thereof divided among them.
Because of the refusal of respondent to give in to petitioner's demands, the latter filed on 12 January 1979 an action to compel the sale of the house and
lot so that the they could divide the proceeds between them.
In his complaint, petitioner prayed that the proceeds of the sale, be divided on the basis of two-thirds (2/3) in his favor and one-third (1/3) to respondent.
Petitioner also prayed for monthly rentals for the use of the house by respondent after their father died.
In his answer with counterclaim, respondent alleged that he had no objection to the sale as long as the best selling price could be obtained; that if the
sale would be effected, the proceeds thereof should be divided equally; and, that being a co-owner, he was entitled to the use and enjoyment of the
property.
Upon issues being joined, the case was set for pre-trial on 26 April 1979 with the lawyers of both parties notified of the pre-trial, and served with the pre-
trial order, with private respondent executing a special power of attorney to his lawyer to appear at the pre-trial and enter into any amicable settlement in
his behalf.
1

On 20 April 1979, Atty. Manuel S. Tonogbanua, counsel for respondent, filed a motion to cancel pre-trial on the ground that he would be accompanying
his wife to Dumaguete City where she would be a principal sponsor in a wedding.
On 23 April 1979, finding the reasons of counsel to be without merit, the trial court denied the motion and directed that the pre-trial should continue as
scheduled.
When the case was called for pre-trial as scheduled on 26 April 1979, plaintiff and his counsel appeared. Defendant did not appear; neither his counsel
in whose favor he executed a special power of attorney to represent him at the pre-trial. Consequently, the trial court, on motion of plaintiff, declared
defendant as in default and ordered reception of plaintiff's evidence ex parte.
29

On 7 May 1979, defendant through counsel filed an omnibus motion to reconsider the order of default and to defer reception of evidence. The trial court
denied the motion and plaintiff presented his evidence.
On 26 July 1979, rendering judgment by default against defendant, the trial court found him and plaintiff to be co-owners of the house and lot, in equal
shares on the basis of their written agreement. However, it ruled that plaintiff has been deprived of his participation in the property by defendant's
continued enjoyment of the house and lot, free of rent, despite demands for rentals and continued maneuvers of defendants, to delay partition. The trial
court also upheld the right of plaintiff as co-owner to demand partition. Since plaintiff could not agree to the amount offered by defendant for the former's
share, the trial court held that this property should be sold to a third person and the proceeds divided equally between the parties.
The trial court likewise ordered defendant to vacate the property and pay plaintiff P1,200.00 as rentals
2
from January 1975 up to the date of decision
plus interest from the time the action was filed.
On 17 September 1979, defendant filed an omnibus motion for new trial but on 22 October 1979 the trial court denied the motion.
Defendant sought relief from the Court of Appeals praying that the following orders and decision of the trial court be set aside: (a) the order of 23 April
1970 denying defendants motion for postponement of the pre-trial set on 26 April 1979; (b) the order of 26 April 1979 declaring him in default and
authorizing plaintiff to present his evidenceex-parte; (e) the default judgment of 26 July 1979; and, (d) the order dated 22 October 1979 denying his
omnibus motion for new trial.
On 16 October 1986, the Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court of 26 April 1979 as well as the assailed judgment rendered by default.,
The appellate court found the explanation of counsel for defendant in his motion to cancel pre-trial as satisfactory and devoid of a manifest intention to
delay the disposition of the case. It also ruled that the trial court should have granted the motion for postponement filed by counsel for defendant who
should not have been declared as in default for the absence of his counsel.
Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in not holding that the motion of defendant through counsel to cancel the pre-trial
was dilatory in character and (2) in remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial.
The issues to be resolved are whether the trial court correctly declared respondent as in default for his failure to appear at the pre-trial and in allowing
petitioner to present his evidence ex-parte, and whether the trial court correctly rendered the default judgment against respondent.
We find merit in the petition.
As regards the first issue, the law is clear that the appearance of parties at the pre-trial is mandatory.
3
A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial
conference may be non-suited or considered as in default.
4
In the case at bar, where private respondent and counsel failed to appear at the scheduled
pre-trial, the trial, court has authority to declare respondent in default.
5

Although respondent's counsel filed a motion to postpone pre-trial hearing, the grant or denial thereof is within the sound discretion of the trial court,
which should take into account two factors in the grant or denial of motions for postponement, namely: (a) the reason for the postponement and (b) the
merits of the case of movant.
6

In the instant case, the trial court found the reason stated in the motion of counsel for respondent to cancel the pre-trial to be without merit. Counsel's
explanation that he had to go to by boat as early as 25 March 1979 to fetch his wife and accompany her to a wedding in Dumaguete City on 27 April
1979 where she was one of the principal sponsors, cannot be accepted. We find it insufficient to justify postponement of the pre-trial, and the Court of
Appeals did not act wisely in overruling the denial. We sustain the trial court and rule that it did not abuse its discretion in denying the postponement for
lack of merit. Certainly, to warrant a postponement of a mandatory process as pre-trial would require much more than mere attendance in a social
function. It is time indeed we emphasize that there should be much more than mere perfunctory treatment of the pre-trial procedure. Its observance must
be taken seriously if it is to attain its objective, i.e., the speedy and inexpensive disposition of cases.
Moreover, the trial court denied the motion for postponement three (3) days before the scheduled pre-trial. If indeed, counsel for respondent could not
attend the pre-trial on the scheduled date, respondent at least should have personally appeared in order not to be declared as in default. But, since
nobody appeared for him, the order of the trial court declaring him as in default and directing the presentation of petitioner's evidence ex parte was
proper.
7

With regard to the merits of the judgment of the trial court by default, which respondent appellate court did not touch upon in resolving the appeal, the
Court holds that on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence presented ex parte, petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject
house and lot in equal shares; either one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand;
thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests.
Private respondent and his family refuse to pay monthly rentals to petitioner from the time their father died in 1975 and to vacate the house so that it can
be sold to third persons. Petitioner alleges that respondent's continued stay in the property hinders its disposal to the prejudice of petitioner. On the part
of petitioner, he claims that he should be paid two-thirds (2/3) of a monthly rental of P2,400.00 or the sum of P1,600.00.
In resolving the dispute, the trial court ordered respondent to vacate the property so that it could be sold to third persons and the proceeds divided
between them equally, and for respondent to pay petitioner one-half (1/2) of P2,400.00 or the sum of P1,200.00 as monthly rental, conformably with their
stipulated sharing reflected in their written agreement.
30

We uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, except as to the effectivity of the payment of monthly rentals by respondent as co-owner which
we here declare to commence only after the trial court ordered respondent to vacate in accordance with its order of 26 July 1979.
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time
partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is
essentially, indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds
accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the
property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who
among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. In one case,
8
this Court upheld the order of
the trial court directing the holding of a public sale of the properties owned in common pursuant to Art. 498 of the Civil Code.
However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property
owned in common long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-
owners.
9
Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other
limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot
be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants joint ownership over the pro indivisoproperty, in addition to his use and
enjoyment of the
same.
10

Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the house and lot and respondent has not refuted the allegation that
he has been preventing the sale of the property by his continued occupancy of the premises, justice and equity demand that respondent and his family
vacate the property so that the sale can be effected immediately. In fairness to petitioner, respondent should pay a rental of P1,200.00 per month, with
legal interest; from the time the trial court ordered him to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the property appertaining to petitioner.
When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-
ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and his family
in the house prejudiced the interest of petitioner as the property should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally between them. To this extent
and from then on, respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and his family vacate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 16 October 1986 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 69.12-P dated 16 July 1979 is REINSTATED, with the modification that respondent Senen B. Aguilar is
ordered to vacate the premises in question within ninety (90) days from receipt of this and to pay petitioner Virgilio B. Aguilar a monthly rental of
P1,200.00 with interest at the legal rate from the time he received the decision of the trial court directing him to vacate until he effectively leaves the
premises.
The trial court is further directed to take immediate steps to implement this decision conformably with Art. 498 of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court.
This decision is final and executory.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason, JJ., concur.
# Footnotes
1 Page 97, Rollo.
2 Presumable per month although the decision does not so specify.
3 Jungco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78051, 8 November 1989, 179 SCRA 213.
4 Sec. 2, Rule 20, Rules of Court; Insular Veneer v. Plan, G.R. L-40155, 10 September 1976, 73 SCRA 1.
5 Pacweld Steel Corp. v. Asia Steel Corp. No. L-26325, 15 November 1982, 118 SCRA 229.
6 Guzman v. Elbinias; G.R. No. 57395, 17 April 1989, 172 SCRA 240.
7 Ravelo v. Court of Appeals, No. L-40111, 27 October 1983, 125 SCRA 366.
8 Reyes v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 56550, 1 October 1990, 190 SCRA 171.
9 Article 486, Civil Code.
10 Pardell v. Bartolome, 23 Phil. 450 (1912).
31

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-47822 December 22, 1988
PEDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO CENDANA, respondents.
Vicente D. Millora for petitioner.
Jacinto Callanta for private respondent.

FELICIANO, J .:
Respondent Ernesto Cendana, a junk dealer, was engaged in buying up used bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan. Upon gathering sufficient
quantities of such scrap material, respondent would bring such material to Manila for resale. He utilized two (2) six-wheeler trucks which he owned for
hauling the material to Manila. On the return trip to Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicles with cargo which various merchants wanted
delivered to differing establishments in Pangasinan. For that service, respondent charged freight rates which were commonly lower than regular
commercial rates.
Sometime in November 1970, petitioner Pedro de Guzman a merchant and authorized dealer of General Milk Company (Philippines), Inc. in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, contracted with respondent for the hauling of 750 cartons of Liberty filled milk from a warehouse of General Milk in Makati, Rizal, to
petitioner's establishment in Urdaneta on or before 4 December 1970. Accordingly, on 1 December 1970, respondent loaded in Makati the merchandise
on to his trucks: 150 cartons were loaded on a truck driven by respondent himself, while 600 cartons were placed on board the other truck which was
driven by Manuel Estrada, respondent's driver and employee.
Only 150 boxes of Liberty filled milk were delivered to petitioner. The other 600 boxes never reached petitioner, since the truck which carried these
boxes was hijacked somewhere along the MacArthur Highway in Paniqui, Tarlac, by armed men who took with them the truck, its driver, his helper and
the cargo.
On 6 January 1971, petitioner commenced action against private respondent in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, demanding payment of P
22,150.00, the claimed value of the lost merchandise, plus damages and attorney's fees. Petitioner argued that private respondent, being a common
carrier, and having failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of him by the law, should be held liable for the value of the undelivered goods.
In his Answer, private respondent denied that he was a common carrier and argued that he could not be held responsible for the value of the lost goods,
such loss having been due to force majeure.
On 10 December 1975, the trial court rendered a Decision
1
finding private respondent to be a common carrier and holding him liable for the value of the
undelivered goods (P 22,150.00) as well as for P 4,000.00 as damages and P 2,000.00 as attorney's fees.
On appeal before the Court of Appeals, respondent urged that the trial court had erred in considering him a common carrier; in finding that he had
habitually offered trucking services to the public; in not exempting him from liability on the ground of force majeure; and in ordering him to pay damages
and attorney's fees.
The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that respondent had been engaged in transporting return loads of freight "as a
casual
occupation a sideline to his scrap iron business" and not as a common carrier. Petitioner came to this Court by way of a Petition for Review assigning
as errors the following conclusions of the Court of Appeals:
1. that private respondent was not a common carrier;
2. that the hijacking of respondent's truck was force majeure; and
3. that respondent was not liable for the value of the undelivered cargo. (Rollo, p. 111)
We consider first the issue of whether or not private respondent Ernesto Cendana may, under the facts earlier set forth, be properly characterized as a
common carrier.
32

The Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the following terms:
Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.
The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does
such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local Idiom as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.
Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or population, and one
who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1733 deliberaom making such
distinctions.
So understood, the concept of "common carrier" under Article 1732 may be seen to coincide neatly with the notion of "public service," under the Public
Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) which at least partially supplements the law on common carriers set forth in the Civil Code.
Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of the Public Service Act, "public service" includes:
... every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with
general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common
carrier, railroad, street railway, traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both, with or without fixed
route and whatever may be its classification, freight or carrier service of any class, express service, steamboat, or steamship line,
pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf
or dock, ice plant,
ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water supply and power petroleum, sewerage
system, wire or wireless communications systems, wire or wireless broadcasting stations and other similar public services. ...
(Emphasis supplied)
It appears to the Court that private respondent is properly characterized as a common carrier even though he merely "back-hauled" goods for other
merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although such back-hauling was done on a periodic or occasional rather than regular or scheduled manner, and
even though private respondent'sprincipal occupation was not the carriage of goods for others. There is no dispute that private respondent charged his
customers a fee for hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell below commercial freight rates is not relevant here.
The Court of Appeals referred to the fact that private respondent held no certificate of public convenience, and concluded he was not a common carrier.
This is palpable error. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability under the Civil Code provisions governing common
carriers. That liability arises the moment a person or firm acts as a common carrier, without regard to whether or not such carrier has also complied with
the requirements of the applicable regulatory statute and implementing regulations and has been granted a certificate of public convenience or other
franchise. To exempt private respondent from the liabilities of a common carrier because he has not secured the necessary certificate of public
convenience, would be offensive to sound public policy; that would be to reward private respondent precisely for failing to comply with applicable
statutory requirements. The business of a common carrier impinges directly and intimately upon the safety and well being and property of those
members of the general community who happen to deal with such carrier. The law imposes duties and liabilities upon common carriers for the safety and
protection of those who utilize their services and the law cannot allow a common carrier to render such duties and liabilities merely facultative by simply
failing to obtain the necessary permits and authorizations.
We turn then to the liability of private respondent as a common carrier.
Common carriers, "by the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy"
2
are held to a very high degree of care and diligence ("extraordinary
diligence") in the carriage of goods as well as of passengers. The specific import of extraordinary diligence in the care of goods transported by a
common carrier is, according to Article 1733, "further expressed in Articles 1734,1735 and 1745, numbers 5, 6 and 7" of the Civil Code.
Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods which they carry,
"unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character-of the goods or defects in the packing or-in the containers; and
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
It is important to point out that the above list of causes of loss, destruction or deterioration which exempt the common carrier for responsibility therefor, is
a closed list. Causes falling outside the foregoing list, even if they appear to constitute a species of force majeure fall within the scope of Article 1735,
which provides as follows:
In all cases other than those mentioned in numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or
deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733. (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the above-quoted Articles 1734 and 1735, we note firstly that the specific cause alleged in the instant case the hijacking of the carrier's truck
does not fall within any of the five (5) categories of exempting causes listed in Article 1734. It would follow, therefore, that the hijacking of the carrier's
33

vehicle must be dealt with under the provisions of Article 1735, in other words, that the private respondent as common carrier is presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary diligence on the part of private respondent.
Petitioner insists that private respondent had not observed extraordinary diligence in the care of petitioner's goods. Petitioner argues that in the
circumstances of this case, private respondent should have hired a security guard presumably to ride with the truck carrying the 600 cartons of Liberty
filled milk. We do not believe, however, that in the instant case, the standard of extraordinary diligence required private respondent to retain a security
guard to ride with the truck and to engage brigands in a firelight at the risk of his own life and the lives of the driver and his helper.
The precise issue that we address here relates to the specific requirements of the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried
in the specific context of hijacking or armed robbery.
As noted earlier, the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over goods is, under Article 1733, given additional specification not only by Articles
1734 and 1735 but also by Article 1745, numbers 4, 5 and 6, Article 1745 provides in relevant part:
Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable, unjust and contrary to public policy:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) that the common carrier shall not be responsible for the acts or omissions of his or its employees;
(6) that the common carrier's liability for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers who donot act with grave or
irresistible threat, violence or force, is dispensed with or diminished; and
(7) that the common carrier shall not responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of goods on account of
the defective condition of the car vehicle, ship, airplane or other equipment used in the contract of carriage.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 1745 (6) above, a common carrier is held responsible and will not be allowed to divest or to diminish such responsibility even for acts
of strangers like thieves or robbers, except where such thieves or robbers in fact acted "with grave or irresistible threat, violence or force." We believe
and so hold that the limits of the duty of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are reached where the goods are lost as a result
of a robbery which is attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force."
In the instant case, armed men held up the second truck owned by private respondent which carried petitioner's cargo. The record shows that an
information for robbery in band was filed in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 198 entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Felipe Boncorno, Napoleon Presno, Armando Mesina, Oscar Oria and one John Doe." There, the accused were charged with willfully and unlawfully
taking and carrying away with them the second truck, driven by Manuel Estrada and loaded with the 600 cartons of Liberty filled milk destined for
delivery at petitioner's store in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The decision of the trial court shows that the accused acted with grave, if not irresistible, threat,
violence or force.
3
Three (3) of the five (5) hold-uppers were armed with firearms. The robbers not only took away the truck and its cargo but also
kidnapped the driver and his helper, detaining them for several days and later releasing them in another province (in Zambales). The hijacked truck was
subsequently found by the police in Quezon City. The Court of First Instance convicted all the accused of robbery, though not of robbery in band.
4

In these circumstances, we hold that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the common carrier and
properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall that even common carriers are not made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and
of transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with
the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence.
We, therefore, agree with the result reached by the Court of Appeals that private respondent Cendana is not liable for the value of the undelivered
merchandise which was lost because of an event entirely beyond private respondent's control.
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 3 August 1977 is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 14.
2 Article 1733, Civil Code.
3 Rollo, p. 22.
4 The evidence of the prosecution did not show that more than three (3) of the five (5) hold-uppers were armed. Thus, the existence
of a "band" within the technical meaning of Article 306 of the Revised Penal Code, was not affirmatively proved by the prosecution.

34

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 149038 April 9, 2003
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
PKS SHIPPING COMPANY, respondent.
VITUG, J .:
The petition before the Court seeks a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 56470, promulgated on 25 June 2001, which
has affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, of Makati, dismissing the complaint for damages filed by petitioner
insurance corporation against respondent shipping company.
Davao Union Marketing Corporation (DUMC) contracted the services of respondent PKS Shipping Company (PKS Shipping) for the shipment to
Tacloban City of seventy-five thousand (75,000) bags of cement worth Three Million Three Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P3,375,000.00).
DUMC insured the goods for its full value with petitioner Philippine American General Insurance Company (Philamgen). The goods were loaded aboard
the dumb barge Limar I belonging to PKS Shipping. On the evening of 22 December 1988, about nine oclock, whileLimar I was being towed by
respondents tugboat, MT Iron Eagle, the barge sank a couple of miles off the coast of Dumagasa Point, in Zamboanga del Sur, bringing down with it the
entire cargo of 75,000 bags of cement.
DUMC filed a formal claim with Philamgen for the full amount of the insurance. Philamgen promptly made payment; it then sought reimbursement from
PKS Shipping of the sum paid to DUMC but the shipping company refused to pay, prompting Philamgen to file suit against PKS Shipping with the Makati
RTC.
The RTC dismissed the complaint after finding that the total loss of the cargo could have been caused either by a fortuitous event, in which case the ship
owner was not liable, or through the negligence of the captain and crew of the vessel and that, under Article 587 of the Code of Commerce adopting the
"Limited Liability Rule," the ship owner could free itself of liability by abandoning, as it apparently so did, the vessel with all her equipment and earned
freightage.
Philamgen interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. The appellate court ruled that evidence to
establish that PKS Shipping was a common carrier at the time it undertook to transport the bags of cement was wanting because the peculiar method of
the shipping companys carrying goods for others was not generally held out as a business but as a casual occupation. It then concluded that PKS
Shipping, not being a common carrier, was not expected to observe the stringent extraordinary diligence required of common carriers in the care of
goods. The appellate court, moreover, found that the loss of the goods was sufficiently established as having been due to fortuitous event, negating any
liability on the part of PKS Shipping to the shipper.
In the instant appeal, Philamgen contends that the appellate court has committed a patent error in ruling that PKS Shipping is not a common carrier and
that it is not liable for the loss of the subject cargo. The fact that respondent has a limited clientele, petitioner argues, does not militate against
respondents being a common carrier and that the only way by which such carrier can be held exempt for the loss of the cargo would be if the loss were
caused by natural disaster or calamity. Petitioner avers that typhoon "APIANG" has not entered the Philippine area of responsibility and that, even if it
did, respondent would not be exempt from liability because its employees, particularly the tugmaster, have failed to exercise due diligence to prevent or
minimize the loss.
PKS Shipping, in its comment, urges that the petition should be denied because what Philamgen seeks is not a review on points or errors of law but a
review of the undisputed factual findings of the RTC and the appellate court. In any event, PKS Shipping points out, the findings and conclusions of both
courts find support from the evidence and applicable jurisprudence.
The determination of possible liability on the part of PKS Shipping boils down to the question of whether it is a private carrier or a common carrier and, in
either case, to the other question of whether or not it has observed the proper diligence (ordinary, if a private carrier, or extraordinary, if a common
carrier) required of it given the circumstances.
The findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, particularly when such findings are consistent with those of the trial court, may not at liberty be
reviewed by this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
1
The conclusions derived from those factual findings, however, are
not necessarily just matters of fact as when they are so linked to, or inextricably intertwined with, a requisite appreciation of the applicable law. In such
instances, the conclusions made could well be raised as being appropriate issues in a petition for review before this Court. Thus, an issue whether a
carrier is private or common on the basis of the facts found by a trial court or the appellate court can be a valid and reviewable question of law.
The Civil Code defines "common carriers" in the following terms:
"Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public."
35

Complementary to the codal definition is Section 13, paragraph (b), of the Public Service Act; it defines "public service" to be
"x x x every person that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or
limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street
railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both, with or without fixed route and whatever may be its classification, freight
or carrier service of any class, express service, steamboat, or steamship, or steamship line, pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in the
transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice plant, ice refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation
system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water supply and power petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wireless communication systems,
wire or wireless broadcasting stations and other similar public services. x x x. (Underscoring supplied)."
The prevailing doctrine on the question is that enunciated in the leading case of De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals.
2
Applying Article 1732 of the Code, in
conjunction with Section 13(b) of the Public Service Act, this Court has held:
"The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one
who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as `a sideline). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction
between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional,
episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the `general public, i.e., the
general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general population. We
think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.
"So understood, the concept of `common carrier under Article 1732 may be seen to coincide neatly with the notion of `public service, under
the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as amended) which at least partially supplements the law on common carriers set forth
in the Civil Code."
Much of the distinction between a "common or public carrier" and a "private or special carrier" lies in the character of the business, such that if the
undertaking is an isolated transaction, not a part of the business or occupation, and the carrier does not hold itself out to carry the goods for the general
public or to a limited clientele, although involving the carriage of goods for a fee,
3
the person or corporation providing such service could very well be just
a private carrier. A typical case is that of a charter party which includes both the vessel and its crew, such as in a bareboat or demise, where the
charterer obtains the use and service of all or some part of a ship for a period of time or a voyage or voyages
4
and gets the control of the vessel and its
crew.
5
Contrary to the conclusion made by the appellate court, its factual findings indicate that PKS Shipping has engaged itself in the business of
carrying goods for others, although for a limited clientele, undertaking to carry such goods for a fee. The regularity of its activities in this area indicates
more than just a casual activity on its part.
6
Neither can the concept of a common carrier change merely because individual contracts are executed or
entered into with patrons of the carrier. Such restrictive interpretation would make it easy for a common carrier to escape liability by the simple expedient
of entering into those distinct agreements with clients.
Addressing now the issue of whether or not PKS Shipping has exercised the proper diligence demanded of common carriers, Article 1733 of the Civil
Code requires common carriers to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods they carry. In case of loss, destruction or deterioration
of goods, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, and the burden of proving otherwise rests on them.
7
The
provisions of Article 1733, notwithstanding, common carriers are exempt from liability for loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods due to any of the
following causes:
(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; and
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
8

The appellate court ruled, gathered from the testimonies and sworn marine protests of the respective vessel masters of Limar I and MT Iron Eagle, that
there was no way by which the barges or the tugboats crew could have prevented the sinking of Limar I. The vessel was suddenly tossed by waves of
extraordinary height of six (6) to eight (8) feet and buffeted by strong winds of 1.5 knots resulting in the entry of water into the barges hatches. The
official Certificate of Inspection of the barge issued by the Philippine Coastguard and the Coastwise Load Line Certificate would attest to the
seaworthiness of Limar I and should strengthen the factual findings of the appellate court.
Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals generally conclude this Court; none of the recognized exceptions from the rule - (1) when the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory; (2) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(3) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (4) when there is a grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (5) when the appellate court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and such findings
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts;
(7) when the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the
findings of fact are themselves conflicting; (9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based;
and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence
on record would appear to be clearly extant in this instance.
All given then, the appellate court did not err in its judgment absolving PKS Shipping from liability for the loss of the DUMC cargo.
36

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.


Footnotes
1
National Steel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 45.
2
168 SCRA 612.
3
Planters Products, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101503, 15 September 1993, 226 SCRA 476.
4
National Steel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112287, 12 December 1997, 283 SCRA 45.
5
National Steel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112287, 12 December 1997, 283 SCRA 45.
6
The testimony of respondents own witness, Capt. Andres Elbena, is quite revealing. He testified that he had been working for respondent as
tugmaster for the past twenty-five (25) years and that the company owns several vessels.
7
Article 1735, Civil Code of the Philippines.
8
Article 1734, Civil Code of the Philippines.
















37

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 83598 March 7, 1997
LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RAMONITO BALOGBOG and GENEROSO BALOGBOG, respondents.

MENDOZA, J .:
This is a petition for review of the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu City (Branch IX),
declaring private respondents heirs of the deceased Basilio and Genoveva Balogbog entitled to inherit from them.
The facts are as follows. Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arzibal who died intestate in
1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he died in 1935, predeceasing their parents.
In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting against petitioners, claiming that they
were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such, they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their
grandparents.
In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino died single and without issue in their parents'
residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu. In the beginning they claimed that the properties of the estate had been sold to them by their mother when
she was still alive, but they later withdrew this allegation.
Private respondents presented Priscilo Y. Trazo,
2
then 81 years old, mayor of the municipality of Asturias from 1928 to 1934, who testified that he knew
Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and Ramonito to be their first child. On crossexamination, Trazo explained that he knew Gavino and
Catalina because they performed at his campaign rallies, Catalina as "balitaw" dancer and Gavino Balogbog as her guitarist. Trazo said he attended the
wedding of Gavino and Catalina sometime in 1929, in which Rev. Father Emiliano Jomao-as officiated and Egmidio Manuel, then a municipal councilor,
acted as one of the witnesses.
The second witness presented was Matias Pogoy,
3
a family friend of private respondents, who testified that private respondents are the children of
Gavino and Catalina. According to him, the wedding of Gavino and Catalina was solemnized in the Catholic Church of Asturias, Cebu and that he knew
this because he attended their wedding and was in fact asked by Gavino to accompany Catalina and carry her wedding dress from her residence in
Camanaol to the poblacion of Asturias before the wedding day. He testified that Gavino died in 1935 in his residence at Obogon, Balamban, Cebu, in the
presence of his wife. (This contradicts petitioners' claim made in their answer that Gavino died in the ancestral house at Tag-amakan, Asturias.) Pogoy
said he was a carpenter and he was the one who had made the coffin of Gavino. He also made the coffin of the couple's son, Petronilo, who died when
he was six.
Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino.
4
She testified that after the wedding, she was handed a "receipt," presumably the marriage
certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned during the war. She said that she and Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot three children, namely,
Ramonito, Petronilo, and Generoso. Petronilo died after an illness at the age of six. On crossexamination, she stated that after the death of Gavino, she
lived in common law relation with a man for a year and then they separated.
Private respondents produced a certificate from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (Exh. P) that the Register of Marriages did not have a record of the
marriage of Gavino and Catalina, another certificate from the Office of the Treasurer (Exh. L) that there was no record of the birth of Ramonito in that
office and, for this reason, the record must be presumed to have been lost or destroyed during the war, and a certificate by the Parish Priest of Asturias
that there was likewise no record of birth of Ramonito in the church, the records of which were either lost or destroyed during the war. (Exh. M)
On the other hand, as defendant below, petitioner Leoncia Balogbog testified
5
that Gavino died single at the family residence in Asturias. She denied
that her brother had any legitimate children and stated that she did not know private respondents before this case was filed. She obtained a certificate
(Exh. 10) from the Local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that that office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina. The certificate
was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga, who testified that there was no record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in the Book
of Marriages between 1925 to 1935.
6

Witness Jose Narvasa testified
7
that Gavino died single in 1935 and that Catalina lived with a certain Eleuterio Keriado after the war, although he did not
know whether they were legally married. He added, however, that Catalina had children by a man she had married before the war, although he did not
know the names of the children. On crossexamination, Narvasa stated that Leoncia Balogbog, who requested him to testify, was also his bondsman in a
criminal case filed by a certain Mr. Cuyos.
38

Ramonito Balogbog was presented
8
to rebut Leoncia Balogbog's testimony.
On June 15, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private respondents (plaintiffs below), ordering petitioners to render an
accounting from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition the estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and
Genoveva, and to pay attorney's fees and costs.
Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, contending that the trial court erred in not giving weight to the certification of the Office of
the Municipal Treasurer of Asturias (Exh. 10) to the effect that no marriage of Gavino and Catalina was recorded in the Book of Marriages for the years
1925-1935. Their motion was denied by the trial court, as was their second motion for new trial and/or reconsideration based on the church records of
the parish of Asturias which did not contain the record of the alleged marriage in that church.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that private respondents failed to overcome the legal presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife are in fact married, that a child is presumed to be legitimate, and that things happen according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life.
9
Hence, this petition.
We find no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.
First. Petitioners contend that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of
1889 because this was the law in force at the time the alleged marriage was celebrated. Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code
of 1889 should be proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been
lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous possession by parents of the status of
husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.
This Court noted long ago, however, that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor
General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code to this
country.
10
Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage
must be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested
rights,
11
and the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife
are legally married.
12
This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary.
13
In this case, petitioners' claim that the certification
presented by private respondents (to the effect that the record of the marriage had been lost or destroyed during the war) was belied by the production
of the Book of Marriages by the assistant municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the
alleged marriage of private respondents' parents.
This contention has no merit. In Pugeda v. Trias,
14
the defendants, who questioned the marriage of the plaintiffs, produced a photostatic copy of the
record of marriages of the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month of January, 1916, to show that there was no record of the alleged marriage.
Nonetheless, evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is
considered primary evidence of marriage,
15
the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove
marriage.
16
Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence, that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three
children, one of whom died in infancy; that their marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents herein,
were recognized by Gavino's family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed because there was no evidence showing in particular that
Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of two witnesses, declared that they were taking each other as husband and wife.
17
An exchange of vows can be
presumed to have been made from the testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is
to exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows and quite unnatural for people not
to notice its absence.
The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of
constitutional concern. As stated in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee:
18

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract,
but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of
the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society,
and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency
and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio
Always presume marriage. (U.S. vs. Villafuerte and Rabano [1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son Cui vs. Guepangco, supra; U.S. vs.
Memoracion and Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633; Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)
Second. Petitioners contend that private respondents' reliance solely on testimonial evidence to support their claim that private respondents had been in
the continuous possession of the status of legitimate children is contrary to Art. 265 of the Civil Code which provides that such status shall be proven by
the record of birth in the Civil Register, by an authentic document or by final judgment. But in accordance with Arts. 266 and 267, in the absence of titles
indicated in Art. 265, the filiation of children may be proven by continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child and by any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court or special laws. Thus the Civil Code provides:
Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of
status of a legitimate child.
39

Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be
proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Petitioners contend that there is no justification for presenting testimonies as to the possession by private respondents of the status of legitimate children
because the Book of Marriages for the years 1928-1929 is available.
What is in issue, however, is not the marriage of Gavino and Catalina but the filiation of private respondents as their children. The marriage of Gavino
and Catalina has already been shown in the preceding discussion. The treasurer of Asturias, Cebu certified that the records of birth of that municipality
for the year 1930 could not be found, presumably because they were lost or destroyed during the war (Exh. L). But Matias Pogoy testified that Gavino
and Catalina begot three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six. Catalina testified that private respondents Ramonito and Generoso are
her children by Gavino Balogbog. That private respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina Balogbog cannot therefore be doubted.
Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that petitioner Gaudioso Balogbog admitted to the police of Balamban, Cebu that Ramonito is his nephew.
As the Court of Appeals found:
Ironically, it is appellant Gaudioso himself who supplies the clincher that tips the balance in favor of the appellees. In an
investigation before the Police Investigating Committee of Balamban, Cebu, held on March 8, 1968, conducted for the purpose of
inquiring into a complaint filed by Ramonito against a patrolman of the Balamban police force, Gaudioso testified that the
complainant in that administrative case is his nephew. Excerpts from the transcript of the proceedings conducted on that date (Exhs.
"N", "N-1", "N-2", "N-3" and "N-4") read:
Atty. Kiamco May it please this investigative body.
Q. Do you know the complainant in this Administrative Case No. 1?
A. Yes I know.
Q. Why do you know him?
A. I know because he is my nephew.
Q. Are you in good terms with your nephew, the complainant?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you mean to say that you are close to him?
A. Yes. We are close.
Q. Why do you say you are close?
A. We are close because aside from the fact that he is my nephew we were also leaving (sic) in the same
house in Butuan City, and I even barrow (sic) from him money in the amount of P300.00, when I return to
Balamban, Cebu.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Why is Ramonito Balogbog your nephew?
A. Because he is the son of my elder brother.
This admission of relationship is admissible against Gaudioso although made in another case. It is considered as a reliable
declaration against interest (Rule 130, Section 22). Significantly, Gaudioso did not try to offer any explanation to blunt the effects of
that declaration. He did not even testify during the trial. Such silence can only mean that Ramonito is indeed the nephew of
Gaudioso, the former being the son of Gavino.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
40

1 Per Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, J., concurred in by Justices Ricardo J. Francisco and Jose C. Campos, Jr.
2 TSN, December 3, 1969, pp. 2-6.
3 TSN, July 9, 1970, pp. 3-28.
4 TSN, July 25, 1980, pp. 3-28.
5 TSN, Aug. 12, 1972, pp. 5-18.
6 TSN, Aug. 28, 1972, p. 13.
7 TSN, Sept. 16, 1972, pp. 4-20.
8 TSN, July 7, 1983, pp. 3-5.
9 1964 RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, 5 (z), (bb), and (cc).
10 Benedicto v. De la Rama, 3 Phil. 34 (1903).
11 CIVIL CODE, Art. 2270.
12 1964 RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, 5(bb).
13 Alavado v. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230, 235 (1985); Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, 102-103 (1975).
14 SCRA 849 (1962). See Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1 (1930); Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 (1937); People v. Borromeo,
133 SCRA 106 (1984).
15 Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425 (1975).
16 Tolentino v. Paras, 122 SCRA 525 (1983); United States v. Memoracion, 34 Phil. 633 (1916); People v. Borromeo, 133 SCRA
106 (1984).
17 CIVIL CODE, Art. 55.
18 43 Phil. 13, 56 (1922). Accord, Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).











41

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118904. April 20, 1998]
ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J .:
In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may marriage and filiation be proven?
The Case
This is the main question raised in this petition for review on certiorari challenging the Court of Appeals
[1]
Decision promulgated on December 1,
1994
[2]
and Resolution promulgated on February 8, 1995
[3]
in CA-GR CV No. 23275, which reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed
petitioners action for partition and damages.
On August 10, 1978, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint
[4]
for partition and damages against Private Respondents Felix and Lourdes, both
surnamed Trinidad, before the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Branch I.
[5]
On October 28, 1982, Felix died without issue, so he was not substituted as a
party.
[6]

On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page decision
[7]
in favor of the petitioner, in which it ruled:
[8]

Considering therefore that this court is of the opinion that plaintiff is the legitimate son of Inocentes Trinidad, plaintiff is entitled to inherit the
property left by his deceased father which is 1/3 of the 4 parcels of land subject matter of this case. Although the plaintiff had testified that he
had been receiving [his] share from said land before and the same was stopped, there was no evidence introduced as to what year he
stopped receiving his share and for how much. This court therefore cannot rule on that.
In its four-page Decision, Respondent Court reversed the trial court on the ground that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that
his parents were legally married to each other and that acquisitive prescription against him had set in. The assailed Decision disposed:
[9]

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision.
In lieu thereof, the Court hereby DISMISSES the [petitioners] complaint and the counterclaim thereto.
Without costs.
Respondent Court denied reconsideration in its impugned Resolution which reads:
[10]

The Court DENIES defendants-appellants motion for reconsideration, dated December 15, 1994, for lack of merit. There are no new or substantial
matters raised in the motion that merit the modification of the decision.
Hence, this petition.
[11]

The Facts
The assailed Decision recites the factual background of this case, as follows:
[12]

On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein petitioner] filed with the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an action for partition of four (4)
parcels of land, described therein, claiming that he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad,
who was the original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his three (3) children,
Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal shares and to give
him the one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused.
In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978, defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants
contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before plaintiffs birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them,
and claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that
they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in
1940, survived by the above named children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
42

Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.
Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of twenty three (23). Sometime after the marriage, Arturio demanded from the
defendants that the above-mentioned parcels of land be partitioned into three (3) equal shares and that he be given the one-third (1/3)
individual shares of his late father, but defendants refused.
In order to appreciate more clearly the evidence adduced by both parties, this Court hereby reproduces pertinent portions of the trial courts
decision:
[13]

EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Plaintiff presented as his first witness, Jovita Gerardo, 77 years old, (at the time she testified in 1981) who is the barangay captain of barrio Tigayon,
Kalibo, Aklan, since 1972. She testified that before being elected as barrio captain she held the position of barrio council-woman for 4 years. Also she
was [a member of the] board of director[s] of the Parent-Teachers Association of Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That she knows the plaintiff because they are
neighbors and she knows him from the time of his birth. She knows the father of the plaintiff as Inocentes Trinidad and his mother Felicidad Molato; both
were already dead, Inocentes having died in 1944 and his wife died very much later. Witness recalls plaintiff was born in 1943 in Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo,
Aklan, on July 21, 1943. At the time of the birth of the plaintiff, the house of the witness was about 30 meters away from plaintiffs parents[] house and
she used to go there 2 or 3 times a week. That she knows both the defendants as they are also neighbors. That both Felix and Lourdes Trinidad are
the uncle and aunt of Arturio because Inocentes Trinidad who is the father of the plaintiff is the brother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes
Trinidad. She testified she also knows that the father of Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes[,] all surnamed Trinidad[,] was Patricio Trinidad who is already
dead but left several parcels of land which are the 4 parcels subject of this litigation. That she knows all these [parcels of] land because they are located
in Barrio Tigayon.
When asked about the adjoining owners or boundaries of the 4 parcels of land, witness answered and mentioned the respective adjoining owners. That
she knew these 4 parcels belonged to Patricio Trinidad because said Patricio Trinidad was a native also of Barrio Tigayon. Said Patricio died before the
[war] and after his death the land went to his 3 children, namely: Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes. Since then the land was never partitioned or divided
among the 3 children of Patricio.
A picture, Exhibit A, was shown to the witness for identification and she identified a woman in the picture as the defendant, Lourdes Trinidad. A man
with a hat holding a baby was identified by her as Felix Trinidad, the defendant. The other woman in the picture was pointed by the witness as the wife
of the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if Arturio Trinidad and Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad pointed to by her in the picture are the same
Arturio, Felix and Lourdes, who are the plaintiff and the defendants in this case, witness answered yes.
Another picture marked as Exhibit B was presented to the witness for identification. She testified the woman in this picture as Lourdes Trinidad. In said
picture, Lourdes Trinidad was holding a child which witness identified as the child Arturio Trinidad. When asked by the court when xxx the picture [was]
taken, counsel for the plaintiff answered, in 1966. When asked if Arturio Trinidad was baptized, witness answered yes, as she had gone to the house of
his parents. Witness then identified the certificate of baptism marked as Exhibit C. The name Arturio Trinidad was marked as Exhibit C-1 and the name
of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as father and mother respectively, were marked as Exhibit C-2. The date of birth being July 21, 1943 was
also marked. The signature of Monsignor Iturralde was also identified.
On cross-examination, witness testified that she [knew] the land in question very well as she used to pass by it always. It was located just near her
house but she cannot exactly tell the area as she merely passes by it. When asked if she [knew] the photographer who took the pictures presented as
Exhibit A and B, witness answered she does not know as she was not present during the picture taking. However, she can identify everybody in the
picture as she knows all of them.
At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and he was survived by his only sister, Lourdes Trinidad, who is his co-defendant in this case.
Next witness for the plaintiff was ISABEL MEREN who was 72 years old and a widow. She testified having known Inocentes Trinidad as the father of
Arturio Trinidad and that Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes are brothers and sister and that their father was Patricio Trinidad who left them 4 parcels of
land. That she knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato who are the parents of Arturio, the plaintiff, were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a
protestant pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. That she knows Felicidad Molato and Lourdes Trinidad very well because as a farmer she also
owns a parcel of land [and] she used to invite Felicidad and Lourdes to help her during planting and harvesting season. That she knows that during the
lifetime of Inocentes the three of them, Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes possessed and usufructed the 4 parcels they inherited from their father,
Patricio. That upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes Trinidad was in possession of the property without giving the widow of Inocentes any share of the
produce. As Lourdes outlived her two brothers, namely: Felix and Inocentes, she was the one possessing and usufructing the 4 parcels of land up to the
present. The witness testified that upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him when he was still small, about 3 years old, until
Arturio grew up and got married. That while Arturio was growing up, he had also enjoyed the produce of the land while he was being taken care of by
Lourdes Trinidad. That a misunderstanding later on arose when Arturio Trinidad wanted to get his fathers share but Lourdes Trinidad will not give it to
him.
Plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as witness. He testified that defendants, Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are his aunt and uncle, they
being the brother and sister of his father. That the parents of his father and the defendants were Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. That both his
father, Inocentes Trinidad, and mother, Felicidad Molato, were already dead having died in Tigayon, his father having died in 1944 and his mother about
25 years ago.
As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a certificate of baptism which had been previously marked as Exhibit
C. That his birth certificate was burned during World War 2 but he has a certificate of loss issued by the Civil Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan.
When he was 14 years old, the defendants invited him to live with them being their nephew as his mother was already dead. Plaintiffs mother died
when he was 13 years old. They treated him well and provided for all his needs. He lived with defendants for 5 years. At the age of 19, he left the
43

house of the defendants and lived on his own. He got married at 23 to Candelaria Gaspar and then they were invited by the defendants to live with
them. So he and his wife and children lived with the defendants. As proof that he and his family lived with the defendants when the latter invited him to
live with them, he presented a picture previously marked as Exhibit B where there appears his aunt, Lourdes Trinidad, carrying plaintiffs daughter, his
uncle and his wife. In short, it is a family picture according to him. Another family picture previously marked Exhibit A shows his uncle, defendant Felix
Trinidad, carrying plaintiffs son. According to him, these 2 pictures were taken when he and his wife and children were living with the defendants. That
a few years after having lived with them, the defendants made them vacate the house for he requested for partition of the land to get his share. He
moved out and looked for [a] lawyer to handle his case. He testified there are 4 parcels of land in controversy of which parcel 1 is an upland.
Parcel 1 is 1,000 square meters, [has] 10 coconut trees and fruit bearing. The harvest is 100 coconuts every 4 months and the cost of coconuts is P2.00
each. The boundaries are : East-Federico Inocencio; West-Teodulo Dionesio; North-Teodulo Dionesio; and South-Bulalio Briones; located at Tigayon.
Parcel 2 is an upland with an area of 500 square meters; it has only 1 coconut tree and 1 bamboo groove; also located in Tigayon, Kalibo,
Aklan. Adjoining owners are : East-Ambrosio Trinidad; North-Federico Inocencio; West-Patricio Trinidad and South-Gregorio Briones.
Parcel 3 is about 12,000 square meters and 1/4 of that belongs to Patricio Trinidad, the deceased father of the defendants and Inocentes, the father of
the plaintiff.
Parcel 4 is a riceland with an area of 5,000 square meters. The harvest is 40 cavans two times a years [sic]. Adjoining owners are: East-Gregorio
Briones; West-Bulalio Briones; South-Federico Inocencio and North-Digna Carpio.
Parcel 1 is Lot No. 903.
Parcel 2 is Lot No. 864 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo and only Lot 864-A with an area of 540 square meters is the subject of litigation.
Parcel 3 is Lot No. 979 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo covered by Tax Decl. No. 703310 with reference to one of the owners of the land, Patricio
Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones, one-half share.
Parcel 4 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22502 RO-174 covering Lot No. 863 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo. The title is in the name of
Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones.
Parcel 1 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 11609 in the name of Patricio Trinidad while parcel 2 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 10626 in the name of Anastacia
Briones and another Tax Declaration No. 11637 for Parcel 3 in the name of Ambrosio Trinidad while Parcel 4 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 16378 in the
name of Patricio Trinidad.
On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that during the lifetime of his mother they were getting the share in the produce of the land like coconuts, palay
and corn. Plaintiff further testified that his father is Inocentes Trinidad and his mother was Felicidad Molato. They were married in New Washington,
Aklan, by a certain Atty. Lajaylajay. When asked if this Atty. Lajaylajay is a municipal judge of New Washington, Aklan, plaintiff answered he does not
know because he was not yet born at that time. That he does not have the death certificate of his father who died in 1944 because it was wartime. That
after the death of his father, he lived with his mother and when his mother died[,] he lived with his aunt and uncle, the defendants in this case. That
during the lifetime of his mother, it was his mother receiving the share of the produce of the land. That both defendants, namely Lourdes and Felix
Trinidad, are single and they have no other nephews and nieces. That [petitioners] highest educational attainment is Grade 3.
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
First witness for the defendants was PEDRO BRIONES, 68 years old, unemployed and a resident of Nalook, Kalibo, Aklan. He testified
having known the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad. They being his first cousins because the mother of Lourdes and Felix by the
name of Anastacia Briones and his father are sister and brother. That he also knew Inocentes Trinidad being the brother of Felix and
Lourdes and he is already dead. According to the witness, Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1940 and at the time of his death Inocentes Trinidad
was not married. That he knew this fact because at the time of the death of Inocentes Trinidad he was then residing with his aunt, Nanay
Taya, referring to Anastacia Briones who is mother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad, as well as Inocentes Trinidad. That at the
time of the death of Inocentes Trinidad, according to this witness he stayed with his aunt, Anastacia Trinidad, and with his children before
1940 for only 3 months. When asked if he knew Inocentes Trinidad cohabited with anybody before his death, he answered, That I do not
know, neither does he kn[o]w a person by the name of Felicidad Molato. Furthermore, when asked if he can recall if during the lifetime of
Inocentes Trinidad witness knew of anybody with whom said Inocentes Trinidad had lived as husband and wife, witness, Pedro Briones,
answered that he could not recall because he was then in Manila working. That after the war, he had gone back to the house of his aunt,
Anastacia, at Tigayon, Kalibo, as he always visit[s] her every Sunday, however, he does not know the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked
if after the death of Inocentes Trinidad, he knew anybody who has stayed with the defendants who claimed to be a son of Inocentes Trinidad,
witness, Pedro Briones, answered: I do not know about that..
On cross examination, witness testified that although he was born in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, he started to reside in Nalook, Kalibo, as the
hereditary property of their father was located there. When asked if he was aware of the 4 parcels of land which is the subject matter of this
case before the court, witness answered that he does not know. What he knew is that among the 3 children of Patricio Trinidad, Inocentes is
the eldest. And that at the time of the death of Inocentes in 1940, according to the witness when cross examined, Inocentes Trinidad was
around 65 years old. That according to him, his aunt, Anastacia Briones, was already dead before the war. When asked on cross
examination if he knew where Inocentes Trinidad was buried when he died in 1940, witness answered that he was buried in their own land
because the Japanese forces were roaming around the place. When confronted with Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture of the
plaintiff and the defendants, witness was able to identify the lady in the picture, which had been marked as Exhibit A-1, as Lourdes Trinidad,
and the man wearing a hat on the said picture marked as Exhibit 2-A is Felix Trinidad. However, when asked if he knew the plaintiff, Arturio
Trinidad, he said he does not know him.
44

Next witness for the defendants was the defendant herself, LOURDES TRINIDAD. She stated that she is 75 years old, single and
jobless. She testified that Inocentes Trinidad was her brother and he is already dead and he died in 1941 in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That
before the death of her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, he had gone to Manila where he stayed for a long time and returned to Tigayon in
1941. According to her, upon arrival from Manila in 1941 his brother, Inocentes Trinidad, lived only for 15 days before he died. While his
brother was in Manila, witness testified she was not aware that he had married anybody. Likewise, when he arrived in Tigayon in 1941, he
also did [not] get married. When asked if she knew one by the name of Felicidad Molato, witness answered she knew her because Felicidad
Molato was staying in Tigayon. However, according to her[,] she does not kn[o]w if her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, had lived with Felicidad
Molato as husband and wife. When asked if she knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, she said, Yes, but she denied that Arturio Trinidad had
lived with them. According to the witness, Arturio Trinidad did not live with the defendants but he stayed with his grandmother by the name of
Maria Concepcion, his mother, Felicidad Molato, having died already. When asked by the court if there had been an instance when the
plaintiff had lived with her even for days, witness answered, he did not. When further asked if Arturio Trinidad went to visit her in her house,
witness also said, He did not.
Upon cross examination by counsel for the plaintiff, Lourdes Trinidad testified that her parents, Anastacia Briones and Patricio Trinidad, had
3 children, namely: Inocentes Trinidad, Felix Trinidad and herself. But inasmuch as Felix and Inocentes are already dead, she is the only
remaining daughter of the spouses Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. Defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, testified that her brother, Felix
Trinidad, died without a wife and children, in the same manner that her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, died without a wife and children. She
herself testified that she does not have any family of her own for she has [no] husband or children. According to her[,] when Inocentes
Trinidad [died] in 1941, they buried him in their private lot in Tigayon because nobody will carry his coffin as it was wartime and the
municipality of Kalibo was occupied by the Japanese forces. When further cross-examined that I[t] could not be true that Inocentes Trinidad
died in March 1941 because the war broke out in December 1941 and March 1941 was still peace time, the witness could not answer the
question. When she was presented with Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture wherein she was holding was [sic] the child of Arturio
Trinidad, she answered; Yes. and the child that she is holding is Clarita Trinidad, child of Arturio Trinidad. According to her, she was only
requested to hold this child to be brought to the church because she will be baptized and that the baptism took place in the parish church of
Kalibo. When asked if there was a party, she answered; Maybe there was. When confronted with Exhibit A-1 which is herself in the picture
carrying the child, witness identified herself and explained that she was requested to bring the child to the church and that the picture taken
together with her brother and Arturio Trinidad and the latters child was taken during the time when she and Arturio Trinidad did not have a
case in court yet. She likewise identified the man with a hat holding a child marked as Exhibit A-2 as her brother, Felix. When asked if the
child being carried by her brother, Felix Trinidad, is another child of the plaintiff, witness answered she does not know because her eyes are
already blurred. Furthermore, when asked to identify the woman in the picture who was at the right of the child held by her brother, Felix, and
who was previously identified by plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, as his wife, witness answered that she cannot identify because she had a poor
eyesight neither can she identify plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, holding another child in the picture for the same reason. When asked by counsel
for the plaintiff if she knows that the one who took this picture was the son of Ambrosio Trinidad by the name of Julito Trinidad who was also
their cousin, witness testified that she does not know.
Third witness for the defendants was BEATRIZ TRINIDAD SAYON who testified that she knew Arturio Trinidad because he was her neighbor
in Tigayon. In the same manner that she also knew the defendants, Felix and Lourdes, and Inocentes all surnamed Trinidad because they
were her cousins. She testified that a few months after the war broke out Inocentes Trinidad died in their lolas house whose names was
Eugenia Rufo Trinidad. She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad had lived almost in his lifetime in Manila and he went home only when
his father fetched him in Manila because he was already sick. That according to her, about 1 months after his arrival from Manila,
Inocentes Trinidad died. She also testified that she knew Felicidad Molato and that Felicidad Molato had never been married to Inocentes
Trinidad. According to her, it was in 1941 when Inocentes Trinidad died. According to her she was born in 1928, therefore, she was 13 or 14
years old when the war broke out. When asked if she can remember that it was only in the early months of the year 1943 when the
Japanese occupied Kalibo, she said she [was] not sure. She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad was buried in their private lot because
Kalibo was then occupied by the Japanese forces and nobody would carry his body to be buried in the Poblacion.
For rebuttal evidence, [petitioner] presented ISABEL MEREN, who was 76 years old and a resident of Tigayon. Rebuttal witness testified
that xxx she knew both the [petitioner] and the [private respondents] in this case very well as her house is only around 200 meters from
them. When asked if it is true that according to Lourdes Trinidad, [Inocentes Trinidad] arrived from Manila in 1941 and he lived only for 15
days and died, witness testified that he did not die in that year because he died in the year 1944, and that Inocentes Trinidad lived with his
sister, Lourdes Trinidad, in a house which is only across the street from her house. According to the said rebuttal witness, it is not true that
Inocentes Trinidad died single because he had a wife by the name of Felicidad Molato whom he married on May 5, 1942 in New Washington,
Aklan. That she knew this fact because she was personally present when couple was married by Lauriano Lajaylajay, a protestant pastor.
On cross examination, rebuttal witness testified that when Inocentes Trinidad arrived from Manila he was in good physical condition. That
she knew both Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato to be Catholics but that according to her, their marriage was solemnized by a
Protestant minister and she was one of the sponsors. That during the marriage of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, Lourdes Trinidad
and Felix Trinidad were also present.
When plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, was presented as rebuttal witness, he was not able to present a marriage contract of his parents but
instead a certification dated September 5, 1978 issued by one Remedios Eleserio of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of New
Washington, Aklan, attesting to the fact that records of births, deaths, and marriages in the municipality of New Washington were destroyed
during the Japanese time.
Respondent Courts Ruling
In finding that petitioner was not a child, legitimate or otherwise, of the late Inocentes Trinidad, Respondent Court ruled:
[14]

We sustain the appeal on the ground that plaintiff has not adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad. But the action to claim legitimacy has not prescribed.
45

Plaintiff has not established that he was recognized, as a legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, in the record of birth or a final
judgment, in a public document or a private handwritten instrument, or that he was in continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child.
Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz Trinidad Sayon, testified for the defendants that Inocentes Trinidad never married. He died single
in 1941. One witness, Isabel Maren, testified in rebuttal for the plaintiff, that Inocentes Trinidad married Felicidad Molato in New Washington,
Aklan, on May 5, 1942, solemnized by a pastor of the protestant church and that she attended the wedding ceremony (t.s.n. Sept. 6, 1988, p.
4). Hence, there was no preponderant evidence of the marriage, nor of Inocentes acknowledgment of plaintiff as his son, who was born on
July 21, 1943.
The right to demand partition does not prescribe (de Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23). Where one of the interested parties openly and
adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership (Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1958) acquisitive
prescription may set in (Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Fifth Revised Edition, 1988, p. 497). Admittedly, the
defendants have been in possession of the parcels of land involved in the concept of owners since their father died in 1940. Even if
possession be counted from 1964, when plaintiff attained the age of majority, still, defendants possessed the land for more than ten (10)
years, thus acquiring ownership of the same by acquisitive prescription (Article 1134, Civil Code of the Philippines).
The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:
[15]

1. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has proven by preponderant evidence the marriage of his parents.
2. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad,
brother of private respondents (defendants-appellants) Felix and Lourdes Trinidad.
3. Whether or not the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar[,] the decision of the Regional Trial Court having been promulgated on
July 4, 1989, after the Family Code became effective on August 3, 1988.
4. Whether or not petitioners status as a legitimate child can be attacked collaterally by the private respondents.
5. Whether or not private respondent (defendants-appellants) have acquired ownership of the properties in question by acquisitive
prescription.
Simply stated, the main issues raised in this petition are:
1. Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents marriage and of his filiation?
2. Was petitioners status as a legitimate child subject to collateral attack in the action for partition?
3. Was his claim time-barred under the rules on acquisitive prescription?
The Courts Ruling
The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of the late Patricios real properties requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or
co-heir of the decedents estate.
[16]
His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born during the existence of a valid and subsisting
marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes). This Court holds that such burden was successfully discharged by
petitioner and, thus, the reversal of the assailed Decision and Resolution is inevitable.
First and Second Issues: Evidence of and Collateral
Attack on Filiation
At the outset, we stress that an appellate courts assessment of the evidence presented by the parties will not, as a rule, be disturbed because the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. But in the face of the contradictory conclusions of the appellate and the trial courts, such rule does not apply
here. So, we had to meticulously pore over the records and the evidence adduced in this case.
[17]

Petitioners first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother (Felicidad) were validly married, and that he was born during the subsistence of
their marriage. This, according to Respondent Court, he failed to accomplish.
This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias
[18]
ruled that when the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in
litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the
testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couples public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the
baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.
[19]

In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification
[20]
from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages
were either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioners case. Although
46

the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioners failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as
other forms of relevant evidence may take its place.
[21]

In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren, who testified that she was present during the nuptial
of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple deported themselves as
husband and wife after the marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay captain of Tigayon and former board member of the local parent-teachers
association, used to visit Inocentes and Felicidads house twice or thrice a week, as she lived only thirty meters away.
[22]
On July 21, 1943, Gerardo
dropped by Inocentes house when Felicidad gave birth to petitioner. She also attended petitioners baptismal party held at the same house.
[23]
Her
testimony constitutes evidence of common reputation respecting marriage.
[24]
It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
[25]
Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate (Exhibit
C) in which Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the childs father and mother.
[26]

On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following:
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document
or a final judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status
of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be
proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
[27]

Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification
[28]
that records relative to his birth were either destroyed during the last world war or burned when
the old town hall was razed to the ground on June 17, 1956. To prove his filiation, he presented in evidence two family pictures, his baptismal certificate
and Gerardos testimony.
The first family picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit A-5) carrying his second daughter and his wife (Exhibit A-4) together with the late Felix
Trinidad (Exhibit A-2) carrying petitioners first daughter, and Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit A-1). Exhibit B is another picture showing Lourdes Trinidad
(Exhibit B-1) carrying petitioners first child (Exhibit B-2). These pictures were taken before the case was instituted. Although they do not directly prove
petitioners filiation to Inocentes, they show that petitioner was accepted by the private respondents as Inocentes legitimate son ante litem motam.
Lourdes denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive. While she admitted that Exhibit B shows her holding Clarita Trinidad, the petitioners
daughter, she demurred that she did so only because she was requested to carry the child before she was baptized.
[29]
When shown Exhibit A, she
recognized her late brother -- but not petitioner, his wife and the couples children -- slyly explaining that she could not clearly see because of an alleged
eye defect.
[30]

Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of the other means allowed under the Rules of Court and
special laws to show pedigree, as this Court ruled in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals:
[31]

What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed
filiation by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, according to the Civil Code, or by evidence of proof in his favor
that the defendant is her father, according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. [Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family
Code of the Phil. 1988 ed., p. 246]
Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of the Trinidad family by either consanguinity or affinity,
[32]
her testimony does not
constitute family reputation regarding pedigree. Hence, it cannot, by itself, be used to establish petitioners legitimacy.
Be that as it may, the totality of petitioners positive evidence clearly preponderates over private respondents self-serving negations. In sum,
private respondents thesis is that Inocentes died unwed and without issue in March 1941. Private respondents witness, Pedro Briones, testified that
Inocentes died in 1940 and was buried in the estate of the Trinidads, because nobody was willing to carry the coffin to the cemetery in Kalibo, which was
then occupied by the Japanese forces. His testimony, however, is far from credible because he stayed with the Trinidads for only three months, and his
answers on direct examination were noncommittal and evasive:
[33]

Q: At the time of his death, can you tell the Court if this Inocentes Trinidad was married or not?
A: Not married.
Q: In 1940 at the time of death of Inocentes Trinidad, where were you residing?
A: I was staying with them.
Q: When you said them, to whom are you referring to [sic]?
A: My aunt Nanay Taya, Anastacia.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Will you please tell the Court for how long did you stay with your aunt Anastacia Trinidad and his children before 1940?
A: For only three months.
Q: Now, you said at the time of his death, Inocentes Trinidad was single. Do you know if he had cohabited with anybody before his death?
A: [T]hat I do not know.
Q: You know a person by the name of Felicidad Molato?
A: No, sir.
Q: Can you recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad if you have known of anybody with whom he has lived as husband and wife?
A: I could not recall because I was then in Manila working.
47

Q: After the war, do you remember having gone back to the house of your aunt Anastacia at Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan?
A: Yes, sir,
Q: How often did you go to the house of your aunt?
A: Every Sunday.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: You know the plaintiff Arturio Trinidad?
A: I do not know him.
Q: After the death of Inocentes Trinidad, do you know if there was anybody who has stayed with the defendants who claimed to be a son of
Inocentes Trinidad?
A: I do not know about that.
Beatriz Sayon, the other witness of private respondent, testified that, when the Japanese occupied Kalibo in 1941, her father brought Inocentes
from Manila to Tigayon because he was sick. Inocentes stayed with their grandmother, Eugenia Roco Trinidad, and died single and without issue in
March 1941, one and a half months after his return to Tigayon. She knew Felicidad Molato, who was also a resident of Tigayon, but denied that
Felicidad was ever married to Inocentes.
[34]

Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start until December 7, 1941 with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the trial court was not
convinced that Inocentes died in March 1941.
[35]
The Japanese forces occupied Manila only on January 2, 1942;
[36]
thus, it stands to reason that Aklan
was not occupied until then. It was only then that local residents were unwilling to bury their dead in the cemetery in Kalibo, because of the Japanese
soldiers who were roaming around the area.
[37]

Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes surname (Trinidad) without objection from private respondents -- a presumptive proof of his
status as Inocentes legitimate child.
[38]

Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse party.
[39]
Compared to the
detailed (even if awkwardly written) ruling of the trial court, Respondent Courts holding that petitioner failed to prove his legitimate filiation to Inocentes is
unconvincing. In determining where the preponderance of evidence lies, a trial court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, including
the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the
facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want thereof, and their personal credibility.
[40]
Applying this rule, the trial court
significantly and convincingly held that the weight of evidence was in petitioners favor. It declared:
xxx [O]ne thing sure is the fact that plaintiff had lived with defendants enjoying the status of being their nephew xxx before plaintiff [had]
gotten married and had a family of his own where later on he started demanding for the partition of the share of his father, Inocentes. The
fact that plaintiff had so lived with the defendants xxx is shown by the alleged family pictures, Exhibits A & B. These family pictures were
taken at a time when plaintiff had not broached the idea of getting his fathers share. xxxx His demand for the partition of the share of his
father provoked the ire of the defendants, thus, they disowned him as their nephew. xxxx In this case, the plaintiff enjoyed the continuous
possession of a status of the child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the defendants themselves, which status was only broken when
plaintiff demanded for the partition xxx as he was already having a family of his own. xxxx.
However, the disowning by the defendant [private respondent herein], Lourdes Trinidad, of the plaintiff [petitioner herein] being her nephew is
offset by the preponderance of evidence, among them the testimony of witness, Jovita Gerardo, who is the barrio captain. This witness was
already 77 years old at the time she testified. Said witness had no reason to favor the plaintiff. She had been a PTA officer and the court
sized her up as a civic minded person. She has nothing to gain in this case as compared to the witness for the defendants who are either
cousin or nephew of Lourdes Trinidad who stands to gain in the case for defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, being already 75 years old, has no
husband nor children.
[41]

Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted.
[42]
Rather than rely on this axiom, petitioner chose to present evidence of his filiation and
of his parents marriage. Hence, there is no more need to rule on the application of this doctrine to petitioners cause.
Third Issue: No Acquisitive Prescription
Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive prescription sets in when one of the interested parties openly and adversely occupies the
property without recognizing the co-ownership, and because private respondents had been in possession -- in the concept of owners -- of the parcels of
land in issue since Patricio died in 1940, they acquired ownership of these parcels.
The Court disagrees. Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the property in question by acquisitive prescription. In a co-ownership,
the act of one benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the co-ownership.
[43]
Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-
heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action for partition, petitioner, in the concept of a co-owner, was receiving from private
respondents his share of the produce of the land in dispute. Until such time, recognition of the co-ownership by private respondents was beyond
question. There is no evidence, either, of their repudiation, if any, of the co-ownership of petitioners father Inocentes over the land. Further, the titles of
these pieces of land were still in their fathers name. Although private respondents had possessed these parcels openly since 1940 and had not shared
with petitioner the produce of the land during the pendency of this case, still, they manifested no repudiation of the co-ownership. In Mariategui vs. Court
of Appeals,the Court held:
[44]

x x x Corollarily, prescription does not run again private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs
for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In the other words, prescription of an
action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
48

Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership
duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is
imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 (1987). On the other hand, an action for partition may be
seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property
involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that petitioners claim over the land in dispute was time-barred.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial courts decision
dated July 4, 1989 is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.



[1]
Fifteenth Division composed of J. Bernardo P. Pardo, ponente; and JJ. Justo P. Torres, Jr., (now a retired associate justice of this Court) and Antonio
P. Solano, concurring;
[2]
Rollo, pp 114-117.
[3]
Rollo, p 141.
[4]
Records, p. 1.
[5]
The case was later transferred to Branch VI, presided by Judge Jaime D. Discaya, and then to Branch VIII, presided by Judge Emma C. Labayen.
[6]
Records, p. 68; TSN, July 17, 1984, p. 2.
[7]
Penned by Judge Labayen.
[8]
Rollo, p 90; Regional Trial Courts decision, p 20.
[9]
Rollo, p. 90.
[10]
Rollo, p. 141.
[11]
The case was deemed submitted for resolution upon receipt by this Court of the private respondents two-page Memorandum on August 15, 1997.
[12]
Rollo, pp 114-115.
[13]
Rollo, pp. 74-85.
[14]
Rollo, pp. 115-116; Decision, pp 2-3.
[15]
The 51-page petition was signed by Attys. Al A. Castro, Florecita V. Bilbes and Teresita S. de Guzman of the Public Attorneys Office; Rollo, pp 21-
22.
[16]
De Mesa vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 773, 779-780, April 25, 1994, per Regalado, J.
[17]
Quebral vs. . Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353, 364, January 25, 1996; Edra vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 344, 350, November 13,
1989; and Pacmac, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 555, 560, May 29, 1987.
[18]
4 SCRA 849, 855, March 31, 1962, per Labrador, J.
[19]
IbId.
[20]
Exh. I, Folder of Exhibits.
[21]
Balogbog vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 259, 266-267, March 7, 1997; Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425, 469, August 29, 1975.
[22]
TSN, July 30, 1981, p. 6.
[23]
IbId., pp 1-17; TSN, October 30, 1981, pp 18-26; TSN, March 5, 1982, pp 27-36.
[24]
Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence.
[25]
Section 3(aa), Rule 131, Rules; and Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, revised ed., 1993, p. 131, citing Rivera vs. Intermediate
Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 322; De Labuca vs. Workmens Compensation Commission, 77 SCRA 31; and Alvado vs. City Government of Tacloban,
139 SCRA 230.
[26]
Exhs. C-1 and C-2, Folder of Exhibits.
[27]
Now Arts. 170 & 171 of the Family Code; and Vitug, supra., pp.223-224.
[28]
Exh. D, Folder of Exhibits.
[29]
TSN, February 3, 1988, p. 6.
[30]
IbId., p. 8.
[31]
201 SCRA 675, 684, September 24, 1991, per Cruz, J.; and Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 684, 689, October 26, 1989.
[32]
Sec. 40, Rule 130, Rules on Evidence.
[33]
TSN, August 29, 1986, pp. 4-6.
[34]
TSN, March 17, 1988, pp. 2-5.
[35]
RTC Decision, p. 16; Rollo, p. 86.
[36]
Zaide, Philippine Political and Cultural History, Vol. II, revised ed., 1957, p. 341.
[37]
Rollo, p. 86.
[38]
Mendoza vs. CA, supra, pp. 683-684.
[39]
Summa Insurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 175, 185, February 5, 1996; New Testament Church of God vs. Court of Appeals, 246
SCRA 266, 269, July 14, 1995; Sapu-an vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 701, 706, October 19, 1992; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, ibid.
[40]
IbId.; and Francisco, Basic Evidence, 1991 ed., p. 491.
[41]
Rollo, pp. 89-90.
[42]
Sayson vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 321, January 23, 1992; Rosales vs. Castillo Rosales, 132 SCRA 132, 141-142, September 28, 1984; and
Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1990 ed., pp. 535-536.
[43]
Art. 494, Civil Code.
[44]
205 SCRA 337, 345-346, January 24, 1992, per Bidin, J.



49

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118230. October 16, 1997]
ABUNDIA BINGCOY, ISIDRO S. BINGCOY, MAMERTO S. BINGCOY, CORAZON S. DAGOY, DOMINGO DAGOMAS, SEGUNDINO LUMHOD,
QUIRICO LUMHOD, OTELIA LUMHOD, VICTOR LUMHOD, JOSE BINGCOY, PELAGIA BINGCOY, FELISA BINGCOY, CESAR
BINGCOY, DELFIN SAYRE, JESUS SAYRE, MARIA SAYRE, ANASTACIO SAYRE, FLORENTINO BEATE, and ISABELO
LUMHOD, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIANO BINGCOY, and AGUSTIN BINGCOY, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J .:
On May 31, 1952, private respondents Victoriano and Agustin Bingcoy filed a Complaint for Recovery of Property in the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Negros Oriental. Docketed as Civil Case No. 2728 and raffled to Branch 37, the complaint alleged that petitioners, some
time in July, 1948, attacked private respondents at their residence in Barrio Bongbong, Municipality of Valencia, Province of Negros Oriental, shot at
their hogs and chickens and seriously threatened to shoot private respondents if they did not leave their house and their lands. Fearing for their lives,
private respondents instinctively jumped out of their house and ran away. Thereupon, petitioners usurped private respondents house and lands,
occupied the same to the deprivation of private respondents and refused, after repeated requests and demands, to vacate the same and restore private
respondents in the possession of their properties.
In their complaint before the court a quo, private respondents detailed their claims in this manner:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
x x x
II. That Juan Cumayao died intestate many years ago, without any payable obligation, leaving three legitimate children, namely, Victoriano,
Agustin, and Prudencio, all surnamed Bingcoy, as his heirs. He also left three parcels of land in the municipality of Valencia, province of Negros
Oriental, more particularly described as follows:
1. Bounded on the North by Potenciana Tavandera - 32.00 m; on the East by Narciso Lumhod - 30.00 m; on the
South by Pangas - 28.00 m; and on the West by Valentin Igsi - 40.00 m; declared in the name of Juan Cumayao under Tax
Declaration No. 2621, assessed at P20.00 for taxation.
2. Bounded on the North by Juan Cumayao (now Victoriano Bingcoy) - 59.00; on the East by Agapito Morano - 33.00 m; on
the South by Gaspar Lumhod - 59.00 m; on the West by Bartolome Dagooc - 33.00 m; declared in the name of Agustin Bingcoy
under Tax 3840, assessed at P60.00 for taxation.
3. Bounded on the North by Vicente N. Antes Damiano Linguis - 48.00 m; on the East by Lucio Dagoy, Vicente N. and
Aniceta Lingcong - 72.00 m; on the South by Marcelina Cumayao antes Magdalino Sayre - 48 m; and on the West by Joaquin
Cumayao, Victoriano y Eustaquio Jaro y Gabriel Abequibil - 110.00 m. Declared in the name of Juan Cumayao under Tax Decl.
No. 8635, assessed at P30.00 for taxation.
III. That Prudencio Bingcoy, brother of the [private respondents], also died single, without issue, nor adopted child, intestate and without
any payable obligation, leaving the [private respondents] as his only heirs and a parcel of land located at Bongbong, Valencia, Negros
Oriental, more particularly described as follows:
Bounded on the North by Agapito Morano Antes Valentino Lumhod - 106.00 m.; on the East by Donato Lumhod - 32.00 m; on the
South by Maria Asuncion antes Paulino Lumhod - 106.00 m; and on the West by Moises Cumayao 0 32.00 m; Declared under
Tax Decl. No. 10043, assessed at P30.00 for taxation.
IV. That upon the death of Juan Cumayao and Prudencio Bingcoy, by right of inheritance the [private respondents] automatically became
the absolute owners of the property they left described in paragraphs II and III hereof, respectively and have since then been in the actual,
open, public, peaceful and continuous possession thereof under claim of title, exclusive of any other rights, adverse to the whole world.
V. That on or about the middle of July 1948, the [petitioners], taking advantage of the weakness and ignorance of the plaintiffs who are
illiterates, confederating together and helping one another, armed with a rifle and bolos, went to the house of the [private respondents] at
Bongbong, Valencia, and demanded from them the surrender of the above-described parcels of land, claiming that the plaintiffs are without
any right to inherit from Juan Cumayao and Prudencio Bingcoy and that they, the [petitioners] are the true heirs of said deceased; and in
order to scare the [private respondents] the [petitioners] shot the hogs and chickens under the house of the former and threatened to shoot
them if they refused to vacate the said land.
VI. That being ignorant, harmless and incapable of protecting themselves, the [private respondents] ran away and thus the [petitioners] got
into the possession and control of the above-described land, and since then have retained possession thereof to the exclusion of the [private
respondents], and refused to surrender the same despite repeated amicable request made upon them by the [private respondents] in order
to avoid judicial litigation.
50

x x x
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
x x x
II. That [private respondent] Victoriano Bingcoy is the absolute owner of three parcels of land located at barrio Bongbong, Valencia, Negros
Oriental, more particularly described as follows:
1. Bounded on the North by Magdalina Sayre - 52.00m; on the East by Pedro Sayre - 91.00 m; on the South by Placida
Dagooc 27.00 m; and on the West by Francisco Morales and Sotero Dagooc - 87.00 m; Declared under Tax No. 10623, assessed
at P120.00 for taxation.
2. Bounded on the North by Mauro Tinagan - 20.00 m; on the East by Felipe Nuay - 23.00 m; on the South by Narciso
Lumhod - 21.00 m; and on the West by Gaspar Lumhod - 21.00 m; declared under Tax Decl. No. 4024, assessed at P50.00 for
taxation.
3. Bounded on the North by Rufino Buling - 5.00 m; on the East by Agapito Morano 20.00 m; on the South by Gaspar
Lumhod - 5.00 m; and on the West by the Provincial Road 20.00 m; declared under Tax 3762, assessed at P10.00 for taxation.
III. That Victoriano Bingcoy acquired the first parcel of land by donation from Francisca Morilis, the second and third by purchase from
Nicolas Abong and Pascuala Bingcoy, respectively, many years ago as evidenced by documents x x x and [Victoriano Bingcoys]
predecessors-in-interest have been in the actual, open, public, peaceful and continuous possession of said land which [private respondent]
Victoriano Bingcoy continued up to recent years under claim of title, exclusive of any other right, adverse to the whole world.
IV. That on or about the middle of July 1948, the [petitioners], taking advantage of the weakness and ignorance of the [private
respondents] at Bongbong, Valencia, and first demanded the surrender of the properties left by the deceased Juan Cumayao and Prudencio
Bingcoy described in paragraphs II and III of the First Cause of Action, and having succeeded in dispossessing the [private respondents]
thereof in the manner specified in paragraphs V and VI of the First Cause of Action and encouraged by the inability of [Victoriano Bingcoy] to
protect himself, the [petitioners] usurped and occupied the private property of the [private respondent] Victoriano Bingcoy described in
Paragraph II, subparagraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the Second Cause of Action, retained possession thereof up to the present time and refused to
surrender the same despite the repeated amicable requests made upon them by the [private respondent] Victoriano Bingcoy in order to avoid
judicial litigation.
x x x
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
x x x
II. That the [private respondent] Agustin Bingcoy is the absolute owner of a parcel of land located in Barrio Bongbong, municipality of
Valencia, province of Negros Oriental described as follows:
Bounded on the North by Agustin Bingcoy - 48.00 m; on the East by Agapito Morano - 74.00 m; on the South by Leon Sayre -
62.00 m; and on the West by Victoriano Bingcoy - 44.00 m; declared under Tax Decl. No. 6350, assessed at P90.00 for taxation.
III. That the [private respondent] Agustin Bingcoy acquired the said parcel of land by purchase from Simplicia Lumhod many years ago
and since then the said [private respondent] has been in the actual, open, public, peaceful and continuous possession thereof under claim of
title, exclusive of any other right adverse to the whole world.
IV. That on or about the middle of July, 1948, the [petitioners], taking advantage of the weakness and ignorance of the plaintiffs who are
illeterates [sic], confederating together and helping one another, armed with a rifle and bolos, went to the house of the plaintiffs at Bongbong,
Valencia, and first demanded the surrender of the properties left by the deceased Juan Cumayao and Prudencio Bingcoy described in
Paragraphs II and III of the First Cause of Action, and having succeeding in despossessing [sic] the [private respondents] thereof in the
manner specififed [sic] in paragraphs V and VI of the First Cause of Action and encouraged by the inability of the [private respondent] to
protect himself, the [petitioners] usurped and occupied the private property of the [private respondent] Agustin Bingcoy described in
paragraph II of the Third Cause of Action, retained possession thereof up to the present time and refused to surrender the same despite
repeated amicable requests made upon them by the [private respondent] Agustin Bingcoy in order to avoid judicial litigation.
x x x
[1]

Petitioners countered private respondents allegations by presenting a true copy of the Death Certificate of Juan Cumayao whi ch indicated
that the latter had died single on July 17, 1926 at the age of fifty (50) years. They thus established the defense that, since Juan Cumayao died single
and without any known children, he could not have passed on, by inheritance, the subject properties to private respondents. To establish their claim of
ownership on the subject properties, petitioners claim that the same originally belonged to spouses Marcos Cumayao and Francisca Morales, parents of
Juan Cumayao and grandparents of petitioners. They aver, thus, in their Answer dated August 30, 1952 that:
x x x upon the death of their grandparents and their aforesaid uncle, the [petitioners], together with their other cousins, nephews and nieces, succeeded
to all the properties in question as the only heirs of the deceased and to the exclusion of [private respondents] herein, since Juan Cumayao died single,
and have, since 1927, been in the actual, open, public, peaceful and continuous possession and enjoyment of same properties, under a claim of
ownership exclusive of any other right and adverse to the whole world.
[2]

51

On September 1, 1964, trial commenced. Private respondent Victoriano Bingcoy took the stand. He testified on the contents of the following
documents:
1. A certificate issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Zamboanguita marked by the court a quo as Exhibit A.
[3]

The first paragraph thereof which reads that this is to certify that Juan Cumayao and Claudia Bingcoy, both residents of the municipality of
Valencia, Negros Oriental, which [sic] was [sic] married in this municipality according to the informant, was marked as Exhibit 1-a for the
defendants.
[4]

The second paragraph thereof which states that, this Office could not issue the necessary certificate in view of the fact that all records of
Births, Deaths and marriages were burned during the Japanese Occupation or have been eaten by the white ants, was marked by the trial
court as Exhibit A-1.
[5]

2. The marriage certificate of Agustin Bingcoy and Luisa Dacoyan secured from the priest of the town of Luzuriaga marked as Exhibit B.
[6]

The paragraph thereof which reads that x x x Que en el libro de Casamientos de esta Parroquia pagina cientocuarenta y tres x x x en el dia
vientieseis del mes de Noveiembre de mil novencientos cuarenta; Yo, el Presbitero Fr. Amado Lope Cora Parroco de esta Parrocquia de
Luzuriaga, Provincia de Negros Oriental, precedidas las amonestaciones y demas diligencias que proviene el Sta. Concilio de Trento y las
leyes civiles y no habiendo resultado imedimento alguno que a mi noticia haya ilegado, case por palabra de presente y vele en esta Iglesia
de mi cargo, segun rito de Ntra. Santa Madre la Iglesia Catolica a Agustin Bingcoy de vienteseis anos de edad soltero natural de Luzuriaga y
residente en este pueblo hijo de Juan Cumayao y de Claudia Vincoy, con Luisa Dacoyan y de diesinueve anos de edad soltera, natural de
Luzuriaga y residente en este pueblo, hija de Marcelo Daoyan y de Hilaria Abong was marked as Exhibit B-1.
[7]

3. A Deed of Sale executed on December, 1915 in favor of Juan Cumayao marked as Exhibit C.
[8]
Said deed of sale was in a private
instrument and covered the parcel of land described in subparagraph no. 1, paragraph II, under the First Cause of Action. It was signed by
Calixto Tavandera, Dionisio Tavandera, Teodora Tavandera, Filomena Tavandera and witnesses Herillas Civil and Antonio Enoy in favor of
Juan Cumayao who purchased the said parcel of land from the Tavandera siblings for P20.00. The said deed of sale was about 49 years old
at the time Victoriano Bingcoy testified thereon.
[9]

4. Tax Declaration No. 2621 in the name of Juan Cumayao marked as Exhibit C-2.
[10]

On July 25, 1966, the direct examination of private respondent Victoriano Bingcoy was resumed. He continued testifying on several other
documents that established private respondents claim of ownership over the subject properties. The documents presented to the court and duly
testified on by Victoriano Bingcoy, on this particular trial day were the following:
1. A document of sale in favor of Juan Cumayao marked as Exhibit D.
[11]
Said document was signed by Felicia Longhod and Bonifacio
Quitoy and covered the parcel of land subject of subparagraph 2, paragraph II, under the First Cause of Action. Indicating the purchase
price to be P25.00, said document of sale was signed before and prepared and ratified by, Justice of the Peace-Notary Public Pablo Teves
who had once been the Municipal Judge of Valencia; it was dated January 10, 1920 and bore a worn out documentary stamp.
[12]

2. Tax Declaration No. 14141 in the name of Juan Cumayao marked as Exhibit D-1.
[13]

3. Tax Declaration No. 3840 in the name of Juan Cumayao marked as Exhibit D-2.
[14]

The statement, Transferido segun documento retificado por Notario Publico Pablo Teves el dia 19 de Enero, 1920, appearing thereon,
was marked as Exhibit D-3.
[15]

4. An official tax receipt with no. 892811 covering taxes paid for the period from 1946 to 1951 marked as Exhibit D-4.
[16]

5. An official tax receipt with no. 1847878 covering taxes paid for the period from 1952 to 1957 marked as Exhibit D-5.
[17]

6. Tax Declaration No. 8635 in the name of Juan Cumayao marked as Exhibit E.
[18]
Said Tax Declaration covers the parcel of land subject
of subparagraph 3, paragraph II, First Cause of Action. Juan Cumayao acquired this parcel of land by clearing the same.
[19]

7. A document of sale in favor of Prudencio Bingcoy marked as Exhibit F.
[20]
The document was executed by Gaspar Lumhod and covered
the parcel of land subject of paragraph III, First Cause of Action. It was ratified by Judge Pablo Teves and visibly affixed thereon was a
partly destroyed documentary stamp.
[21]
Said document was executed on October 16, 1932.
[22]

The last part thereof from the words in Spanish, por la presenta down to the end of the description ending in the spanish words 32
metros, was marked as Exhibit F-2.
[23]

8. Tax Declaration No. 10043 in the name of Gaspar Lumhod marked as Exhibit F-1.
[24]

9. A deed of donation in favor of Victoriano Bingcoy Bingcoy marked as Exhibit G
[25]
. The document was executed by Francisca Meriles
and covered the parcel of land subject of subparagraph 1, paragraph II, Second Cause of Action. It was executed and signed before Judge
Pablo Teves.
The thumbmarks of Francisca Meriles and Victoriano Bingcoy were marked as Exhibit G-1.
[26]

The second paragraph in the said deed of donation which states that the property was given in consideration of the past services of
Victoriano Bingcoy, was bracketed and marked as Exhibit G-2.
[27]

The third paragraph which contained the acceptance by Victoriano Bingcoy of the property subject of the deed of donation, was bracketed and
marked as Exhibit G-3.
[28]

10. The official receipt for payment of ratification fees marked as Exhibit G-4.
[29]
The same was issued by Judge Pablo Teves in favor of
Francisca Meriles in the amount of P3.00 which she paid for the ratification fees.
11. Tax Declaration No. 10623 in the name of Victoriano Bingcoy marked as Exhibit G-5.
[30]
This tax declaration covers the
aforementioned land donated by Francisca Meriles to Victoriano Bingcoy.
52

12. Official Tax Receipt No. 474402 marked as Exhibit G-6.
[31]
The same showed that Victoriano Bingcoy paid real property taxes on the
property donated to him by Francisca Meriles.
13. Official Tax Receipt No. 1847883 marked as Exhibit G-7.
[32]
The same showed that Victoriano Bingcoy paid real property taxes on the
property donated to him by Francisca Meriles.
14. Document of sale in favor of Victoriano Bingcoy marked as Exhibit H.
[33]
Said document was executed by Nicolas Abong as vendor
and in favor of Victoriano Bingcoy as vendee, covering the parcel of land subject of subparagraph 2, paragraph II, Second Cause of
Action. The document bears the thumbmarks of witnesses Segundo Ubag, Roberto Tinoy and Filomeno Noway.
[34]

15. Tax Declaration No. 4024 in the name of Victoriano Bingcoy marked as Exhibit H-2.
[35]
This tax declaration covered the parcel of land
purchased by Victoriano Bingcoy from Nicolas Abong.
16. Official Tax Receipt No. 872707 marked as Exhibit H-3.
[36]
The same showed that Victoriano Bingcoy paid real property taxes on the
property that he purchased from Nicolas Abong. The said receipt covered the years from 1946 to 1951.
17. Official Tax Receipt No. 892810 marked as Exhibit H-4.
[37]
The same showed that Victoriano Bingcoy paid real property taxes on the
property that he purchased from Nicolas Abong. The said receipt also covered the years from 1946 to 1951.
18. Official Tax Receipt No. 1847884 marked as Exhibit H-5.
[38]
The same showed that Victoriano Bingcoy paid real property taxes on the
property that he purchased from Nicolas Abong. The said receipt covered the years from 1952 to 1961.
19. Tax Declaration No. 3762 in the name of Victoriano Bingcoy marked as Exhibit I.
[39]
Said tax declaration covered the parcel of land
subject of subparagraph 3, paragraph II, Second Cause of Action. Said parcel of land was purchased by
Victoriano Bingcoy from Pascuala Bingcoy, and the transaction was covered by a document of sale which had, however, been destroyed
during the war.
The statement appearing on said tax declaration to the effect that Victoriano Bingcoy paid real property tax in the amount of P10.00, was
marked as Exhibit I-1.
[40]

On May 11, 1967, counsel for petitioners cross-examined Victoriano Bingcoy who was expectedly queried on the various documents that he had
testified to during the direct examination.
On December 6, 1983, private respondents counsel submitted a Memorandum of Exhibits and Formal Offer of Evidence for the Plaintiffs.
[41]
The
same included all the aforementioned documents testified to by Victoriano Bingcoy during his direct and cross examinations.
On May 16, 1987, the entire records of this case, including all the above-enumerated documents marked and testified to by Victoriano Bingcoy
during his direct and cross examination, were lost when a fire destroyed the Perdices Coliseum which then housed the court a quo.
[42]
Accordingly, the
trial court ordered the reconstruction of the records based on the pleadings to be furnished by the contending parties or their respective lawyers.
On April 19, 1989, trial resumed. Subsequent hearings were also held on June 5, and 19, 1989 and on July 14, 1989.
On July 25, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment
[43]
in favor of private respondents. Finding sufficient evidence on record proving that
ownership over the subject parcels of land was vested in private respondents as prior possessors in good faith in the concept of owner and as
illegitimate heirs of Juan Cumayao, the trial court ordered the following in the dispositive portion of its decision:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants:
(a) Declaring plaintiffs Victoriano Bingcoy and Agustin Bingcoy the real and absolute owners of the parcels of land described under the First
Cause of Action in the complaint as follows:
1. Bounded on the North by Potenciana Tavandera - 32.00 m; on the East by Narciso Lumhod - 30.00 m; on the South by Pangas -
28.00 m; and on the West by Valentin Igsi - 40.00 m; declared in the name of Juan Cumayao under Tax Declaration No. 2621,
assessed at P20.00 for taxation.
2. Bounded on the North by Juan Cumayao (now Victoriano Bingcoy) - 59.00; on the East by Agapito Morano - 33.00 m; on the South
by Gaspar Lumhod - 59.00 m; on the West by Bartolome Dagooc - 33.00 m; declared in the name of Agustin Bingcoy under Tax 3840,
assessed at P60.00 for taxation.
3. Bounded on the North by Vicente N. Antes Damiano Linguis - 48.00 m; on the East by Lucio Dagoy, Vicente N. and
Aniceta Lingcong - 72.00 m; on the South by Marcelina Cumayao antes Magdalino Sayre - 48 m; and on the West by Joaquin
Cumayao, Victoriano y Eustaquio Jaro y Gabriel Abequibil - 110.00 m. Declared in the name of Juan Cumayao under Tax Decl. No.
8635, assessed at P30.00 for taxation.
4. Bounded on the North by Agapito Morano Antes Valentino Lumhod - 106.00 m.; on the East by Donato Lumhod - 32.00 m; on the
South by Maria Asuncion antes Paulino Lumhod - 106.00 m; and on the West by Moises Cumayao 0 32.00 m; Declared under Tax
Decl. No. 10043, assessed at P30.00 for taxation.
(b) Declaring Victoriano Bingcoy the true and absolute owner of the following three parcels of land as described in the Complaint under the
Second Cause of Action; as
53

1. Bounded on the North by Magdalina Sayre - 52.00m; on the East by Pedro Sayre - 91.00 m; on the South by Placida Dagooc
27.00 m; and on the West by Francisco Morales and Sotero Dagooc - 87.00 m; Declared under Tax No. 10623, assessed at P120.00
for taxation.
2. Bounded on the North by Mauro Tinagan - 20.00 m; on the East by Felipe Nuay - 23.00 m; on the South by Narciso Lumhod -
21.00 m; and on the West by Gaspar Lumhod - 21.00 m; declared under Tax Decl. No. 4024, assessed at P50.00 for taxation.
3. Bounded on the North by Rufino Buling - 5.00 m; on the East by Agapito Morano 20.00 m; on the South by Gaspar Lumhod - 5.00
m; and on the West by the Provincial Road 20.00 m; declared under Tax 3762, assessed at P10.00 for taxation.
(c) Declaring Agustin Bingcoy the true and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in the Third Cause of Action of the Complaint as
follows:
Bounded on the North by Agustin Bingcoy - 48.00 m; on the East by Agapito Morano - 74.00 m; on the South by Leon Sayre - 62.00
m; and on the West by Victoriano Bingcoy - 44.00 m; declared under Tax Decl. No. 6350, assessed at P90.00 for taxation.
(d) Ordering the defendants to deliver and restore possession of all the parcels of land described in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the
dispositive part of this Decision to the plaintiffs;
(e) Condemning the defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount P410.00 (under the First Cause of Action), the amount
of P44.00 (Second Cause of Action) and the amount of P180.00 (under the Third Cause of Action) a year starting from 1952 under
possession of all the aforesaid parcels of land have been delivered and restored to the plaintiffs.
Costs against the defendants.
[44]

Unable to agree with the decision of the trial court, petitioners appealed therefrom to the Court of Appeals. They raised the following issues:
1. What is the status of plaintiffs-appellees? Are they legitimate, or illegitimate, children of Juan Cumayao and Claudia Bingcoy?
2. If illegitimate, to what class do they belong? Are they natural children proper, or spurious children of Juan Cumayao and Claudia
Bingcoy?
3. If plaintiffs-appellees are the natural children of Juan Cumayao, are they as such acknowledged natural children?
4. Are unrecognized natural children entitled to successional rights both under the Old, and in the New, Civil Code?
5. Is it correct for the trial court to consider documentary exhibits which are not formally offered in evidence?
[45]

and insisted that the trial court erred:
1. In declaring that plaintiffs-appellees are the illegitimate children of Juan Cumayao and Claudia Bingcoy;
2. Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs-appellees are illegitimate children of Juan Cumayao and Claudia Bingcoy, in granting successional
rights to plaintiffs-appellees;
3. In considering documentary exhibits which are not formally offered in evidence as evidence;
4. In concluding that appellants failed to rebut appellees allegation of use of force and intimidation in July, 1948 to oust appellees from the
lands in question; and,
5. In not dismissing the complaint and adjudicating the properties in question to appellants.
[46]

On June 10, 1994, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming the ownership of private respondents over the parcels of
land subject of the first and second causes of action in their Complaint before the trial court, while basing such affirmance not on private respondents
right as heirs of Juan Cumayao but on their right as prior possessors in good faith under the law on acquisitive prescription.
The respondent appellate court, however, reversed the court a quo respecting the parcel of land subject of the third cause of action. The same
was adjudged the property of petitioners as surviving heirs of Juan Cumayao.
The disquisition of respondent Court of Appeals on its own findings in answer to the issues raised on appeal by the petitioners and in refutation of
the assigned errors in petitioners Brief on appeal, is as follows:
x x x [A]fter a painstaking examination of the evidence presented by the parties, We find:
As to the 1st and 2nd assigned errors - The first question is: Did the trial court commit a reversible error in ruling that appellees are illegitimate children
of Juan Cumayao?
The presumption that a child was born is legitimate as provided for in Article 220 of the New Civil Code is overcome by the death certificate issued by
the OIC Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Valencia, Province of Negros Oriental where it appears that Juan Cumayao died single on July 17,
1926 x x x. It is a well-settled rule that a death certificate, if duly registered with the Civil Registrar, is considered a public document and the entries
found therein are presumed correct (Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, May 29, 1989; 173 SCRA 620). Said presumption is merely
disputable and will have to yield to more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy x x x.
54

Appellees evidence on this matter is neither positive nor convincing. Aside from the testimony of appellee Victoriano Bingcoy, they presented a witness
by the name of Pedro Milan who was 76 years old at the time he testified. He averred on the witness stand that he knew Juan Cumayao and Claudia
Bingcoy to be the parents of herein appellees x x x; that he knew appellees since they were born as he was their neighbor at Bongbong, Valencia x x
. While it has been established that Juan Cumayao begot herein appellees, the fact that he died single proves that he had children without having been
married. In the absence of clear evidence to show that appellees parents were married, the conclusion is inevitable that appellees were born out of
wedlock.
Appellees explanation x x x that it was their grandmother who opted for them to use the surname Bingcoy x x x is totally incongruent with public customs
and morals and human experience. No natural mother and for matter, a grandmother, under Filipino tradition, would allow a child not to use the
surname of his father if he were really legitimate, considering the stigma that would necessarily attach to a child who is not allowed to use the surname
of his own father. x x x
There are no other evidence to sustain appellants claim that their parents were in fact married to controvert the statement in the death certificate that
Juan Cumayao died single. Appellees have not established by sufficient evidence the fact of marriage between their parents. Neither is there any
evidence showing that both parents of appellees have no legal impediment to marry.
Thus x x x [w]e agree with the ruling of the trial court that appellees are illegitimate children of Juan Cumayao.
Such being the case, the next question to be resolved is: Not being legitimate, are appellees entitled to inherit from their father, Juan Cumayao?
The Supreme Court sheds light on this matter in Castro vs. Court of Appeals (173 SCRA 656, 662 to 663):
Under the Civil Code, whether new or old, illegitimate children x x x were generally classified into two groups: (1) Natural, whether actual or by fiction,
were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other x x x and (2) Spurious, whether incestuous, adulterous or illicit, were those born of parents who, at the time of conception, were disqualified to
marry each other on account of certain legal impediments.
x x x
Under the Civil Code, for an illegitimate child other than natural to inherit, she must first be recognized voluntarily or by court action. x x x This arises
from the legal principle that an unrecognized spurious child like a natural child has no rights from her parents or to their estate because her
rights spring not from the filiation or blood relationship but from the childs acknowledgment by the parent x x x. In other words, the rights of
an illegitimate child arose not because she was the true and real child of her parents but because under the law, she has been recognized or
acknowledged as such a child.
x x x
Under the Civil Code, there are two kinds of acknowledgment - voluntary or compulsory. The provisions on acknowledgment are applied to natural
as well as spurious children x x x. Article 131 of the old Civil Code provides for voluntary acknowledgment by the father or mother, while Article 135
and Article 136 of the same Code provide for the compulsory acknowledgment by the father and mother respectively.
Article 131 of the old Civil Code states that the acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of birth, in a will or in some other public
document.
Naturally, and understandably so, plaintiffs-appellees did not present any evidence that they have been acknowledged by Juan Cumayao by reason of
their original stand that they are legitimate children of Juan Cumayao. There being no proof that appellees were acknowledged by Juan Cumayao as his
illegitimate children, appellees could not therefore legally inherit from the estate of the deceased Juan Cumayao.
If appellees are not entitled to inherit from Juan Cumayao, have they acquired ownership over the parcels of land in question? As to the four
(4) parcels of land under the First Cause of Action, Pedro Milan (TSN, September 1, 1964) and Victoriano Bingcoy (TSN, Hearings of September 1,
1964 and July 25, 1966) testified that appellees took possession of the parcels of land left by Juan Cumayao after his death on July 26, 1926, peacefully,
continuously, adversely, openly and in the concept of owners up to 1948, or for a period of twenty two years, by introducing improvements thereon like
abaca plants and coconut tress, harvesting fruits thereof, declaring the same for taxation purposes x x x and paying the corresponding realty taxes
therefor. We find no evidence on the part of defendants-appellants controverting the same.
Under Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, to wit:
SEC. 41. Title to land by prescription. - Ten years actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land
or interest in land, uninterruptedly continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy
may have commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title x x x.
It is not disputed that appellants have been in possession, as stated above, for 22 years in the concept of owners. Consequently, appellants claim over
the parcels of land in question have already prescribed. The trial court did not commit any error in awarding said parcels of land (under the First Cause
of Action) to herein appellees.
55

As to the third assigned error x x x [c]onsidering that appellants counsel had cross-examined appellees witnesses despite the failure of counsel for
appellees to offer their testimonies when they were called to testify, appellants are deemed to have waived their right to object to the admissibility of the
testimonies. x x x
There is merit to appellants claim that only Exhibits E, F-1, G-4, and I should be considered by the court in rendering the decision, as the rest of the
exhibits for appellees were withdrawn by their counsel (Order dated April 9, 1989).
However, in the interest of substantial justice and for equitable reasons considering that it is not disputed that the Perdicas Coliseum housing the court
was burned last May 14, 1987 and the entire records of the case were lost including the documents marked as Exhibits G, G-1 to G-7, H, H-1 to H-
5 and I, described in the reconstituted Memorandum of Exhibits and Formal Offer of Evidence for the Plaintiffs x x x said descriptions of the burned
documents may be considered and taken together as part of the positive and convincing testimony of appellee Victoriano Bingcoy (TSN, Hearing of July
25, 1977) which testimony sustains the findings of the trial court in favor of appellees. It cannot be over-emphasized that appellants did not present any
evidence to controvert the testimony of appellee Victoriano on this matter.
The possession of the three (3) parcels of land by appellee Victoriano under the Second Cause of Action was acquired not through inheritance from
Juan Cumayao but by donation in case of the first parcel of land covered by a document duly executed and thumbmarked by both donor Francisca
Meriles and Donee Victoriano x x x that had been lost in the fire; by purchase from Nicolas Abong in the case of the second parcel of land and covered
by a document x x x and by purchase from Pascuala Bingcoy in case of the third parcel of land, the document evidencing the same having been
destroyed during the war but with tax declaration in the name of appellee Victoriano x x x and payment of taxes therefor x x x together with the tax
declaration x x x and payments of realty taxes x x x which were gutted by fire except Exh. G-4 which is an official receipt for ratification fee. As already
stated, there is no evidence presented by appellants controverting the above testimony of appellee Victoriano Bingcoy. Appellants failed to establish
that they have better rights to the parcels of land subject matter of the Second Cause of Action.
With respect to the parcel of land under the Third Cause of Action x x x We find no evidence to sustain the finding of the trial court that said
land was given to appellee Juan Cumayao. No document was ever presented in court to prove the donation; and the realty taxes paid by
appellee Agustin on said land started only in 1951, three years after appellees were ousted from the land in 1948. Considering that said
parcel of land undisputedly belonged to Juan Cumayao, its ownership passed by inheritance to his heirs upon his death. And appellees not
being entitled to inheritance as earlier discussed, the parcel of land properly pertains to herein appellants who are the surviving heirs of said
decedent. We find no evidence that entitles appellee Agustin to acquisitive prescription under the Old Civil Code or Code of Civil
Procedure.
As to the fourth assigned error: The testimonies of Milan and Victoriano Bingcoy establish the fact that appellees forcibly entered the
parcels of land in question and ousted appellees therefrom by threatening Victorianos life with a gun x x x. They were not controverted by
the evidence of appellants. Neither Ricardo Genel nor Felisa Lumhod, witnesses for appellants, denied the aforesaid testimonies x x
x. The trial court did not commit any error in finding that appellees were forcibly dispossessed by appellants in 1948. We have
meticulously read the testimonies of appellants witnesses x x x and not one of them disclaimed the acts of dispossession committed by
appellant against appellees ousting the latter from the parcels of land in question.
x x x
As to the fifth assigned error, the Fourth Amended Complaint of appellees should be dismissed with respect only to the Third Cause of Action, for
reasons already discussed above.
[47]

Pursuant to the above postulations, the respondent appellate court modified the decretal portion of the court a quos decision insofar as the parcel
of land subject of the Third Cause of Action is concerned. The modification runs in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby MODIFIED to the effect that the dispositive portion should read as follows:
x x x
(c) Declaring Pedro Bingcoy, et al. the true and absolute owners of the parcel of land described in the Third Cause of Action of the
Complaint as follows:
Bounded on the North by Agustin Bingcoy - 48.00 m; on the East by Agapito Morano - 74.00 m; on the South by Leon Sayre -
62.00 m; and on the West by Victoriano Bincoy - 44.00 m; declared under Tax Decl. No. 6350, assessed at P90.00 for taxation.
(d) Ordering plaintiff Agustin Bingcoy to deliver and restore possession of the parcel of land described in paragraph (c) of herein dispositive
part of the Decision to defendants;
(e) Ordering defendants to deliver and restore possession of all the parcels of land described in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the dispositive part
of this Decision to the plaintiffs;
(f) Condemning the defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally the amount of P410.00 (under the First Cause of Action); and the
amount of P44.00 (under the Second Cause of Action) a year starting from 1952 until possession of all the aforesaid parcels of land have
been delivered and restored to the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
[48]

Still not contented with the ruling of the respondent Court of Appeals which partly found their claims of ownership as heirs of Juan Cumayao, to be
meritorious, although only insofar as the parcel of land under the Third Cause of Action is concerned, petitioners submit that the respondent appellate
56

court committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the trial courts award to private respondents of the parcels of l and covered under the First
and Second Causes of Action. They have assigned the following errors:
(1) On its own, the Honorable Court of Appeals shifted, or changed, the theory of the case and the issues litigated by the parties in Civil
Case No. 2728;
(2) Assuming arguendo that only the emphasis in the aspect of the case is changed, or altered, private respondents claim over
the parcels of land (described in their First Cause of Action) is based on TITULO PUTATIVO and, as such, said claim ought to have been
rejected;
(3) The Honorable Court of Appeals considered documentary evidence which were not formally re-offered in evidence below, or were
withdraw, by private respondents; and,
(4) There is no harmony in the findings of fact in the Decision of the Court of Appeals such that it committed grave misapprehension of facts.
[49]

There is no merit to the instant petition.
There are two primary issues that need to be definitively resolved in this case:
(1) May private respondents obtain ownership by acquisitive prescription over the parcels of land described under the first and second causes of action
although they, as unrecognized illegitimate children, have no inheritance rights thereto?
(2) May the trial court and the respondent Court of Appeals consider as basis for their decisions, documents that had been formally offered but were lost
by fire and are thus no longer available for physical scrutiny but are adequately described in the direct testimony of the premiere witness in the case
who was also cross-examined by the opposing party as regards the same documents?
Petitioners furiously take the negative side of both these issues, but they utterly fail to persuade us, as we instead believe that the trial court and
the respondent Court of Appeals were correct in their findings and conclusions.
First. Petitioners insist that in order for private respondents to be qualified to become owners of the parcels of land under the fi rst and second
causes of action in accordance with our laws on acquisitive prescription, they should first have been entitled to the same parcels of land through
succession because absent successional rights from their deceased parents, private respondents have NO MODE of acquiring ownership over said
properties and their possession, if any, over said properties x x x could not ripen into ownership by prescription
[50]
(underscoring and emphasis theirs).
Petitioners theory is absolutely erroneous. It only takes a cursory glance at Book III of the Civil Code of the Philippines to expose the
ridiculousness of this contention. Book III is entitled, Different Modes of Acquiring Ownership and notably, Title V thereunder is denominated,
Prescription. Needless to say, acquisitive prescription is in itself a mode of acquiring ownership over a parcel of land and does not require, as
petitioners asseverate, successional or inheritance rights, in order to ripen into ownership.
Significantly, there is nothing on the record that discloses even an attempt by petitioners to rebut the evidence of private respondents as to their
peaceful, continuous, adverse, and open possession in the concept of owner over the parcels of land in question from July 26, 1926 until 1948 or for
twenty two (22) years. Under the applicable law at that time, which was Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, ten years of actual
adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly continued for ten years by x x x
whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete
title. Clearly, therefore, private respondents have become owners, by acquisitive prescription, of the parcels of land described in the first and second
causes of action.
Petitioners resort to a baseless legal argument, however, is understandable. They had never been armed with the evidence needed to prove their
ownership of the subject parcels of land, and they even enhanced and confirmed private respondents prior possession of the subject properties when
their witnesses, namely, Ricardo Genel, Feliciano Cumayao, and Corazon Dagoy, failed to deny the acts of dispossession committed by petitioners
against private respondents in that fateful year of 1948.
Second. It must have been starkingly obvious that the narration of the documents testified upon by private respondent Victoriano Bingcoy during
the trial in September, 1964 and its continuation in July, 1966, in the first part of this ponencia, but which documents were lost to a courthouse fire in
1987, was not without a pre-determined purpose. That earlier narration deliberately enumerated and meticulously described each document in order to
show that although said documents have no physical existence now, they were exhaustively testified upon, in the course of both direct and cross-
examinations, and were properly offered in evidence by private respondents in open court, such that the trial court and the respondent appellate court
could not, without committing procedural error and grave injustice, ignore their contents and their over-all import in rendering judgment.
Petitioners especially attack the inclusion of said documents by the trial court and the respondent Court of Appeals in their appreciation of the
evidence in the instant controversy, because said documents have allegedly been withdrawn by private respondents at the behest of the petitioners. We
can only surmise, however, that petitioners, by so contending with apparent desperation, are simply running out of tenable arguments.
We have carefully reviewed the records of the case and are convinced that the technical withdrawal of the documents in question, upon the
insistent clamor of petitioners, does not operate to render nugatory the testimonial evidence attesting to the tenor and contents of the said
documents. Neither does such a technicality work to justify the erosion, denial or annihilation of the truths undisputedly established by the questioned
documents. The trial court and respondent Court of Appeals are courts of law and justice. It would be a gross subversion of their nature as such were
they, in full awareness of the questioned documentary evidence proffered and marked during the hearings, affirmatively identi fied and unhamperedly
testified to by the main witness in the case and undoubtedly formally offered by private respondents before the trial court, to consciously choose to
sacrifice legalism for substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is HEREBY DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
57

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.



[1]
Fourth Amended Complaint dated March 14, 1989, pp. 1-7, Original Records, pp. 101-107.
[2]
Answer dated August 30, 1952, pp. 2-3, Original Records, pp. 11-12.
[3]
TSN dated September 1, 1964, p. 60.
[4]
Id., pp. 64-65.
[5]
Id., pp. 63-64.
[6]
Id., p. 67.
[7]
TSN dated September 1, 1964, pp. 69-70.
[8]
Id., pp. 81-83.
[9]
TSN dated September 1, 1964, p. 85.
[10]
Id., p. 87.
[11]
TSN dated July 25, 1966, pp. 5-6.
[12]
Id., pp. 7-8.
[13]
TSN dated July 25, 1966, p. 11.
[14]
Ibid.
[15]
Id., p. 12.
[16]
Id., p. 13.
[17]
Ibid.
[18]
Id., p. 14.
[19]
Ibid.
[20]
Id., p. 18.
[21]
TSN dated July 25, 1966, p. 21.
[22]
Id., p. 22.
[23]
Id., p. 24.
[24]
Ibid.
[25]
Id., p. 36.
[26]
Id., p. 39.
[27]
TSN dated July 25, 1966, p. 39.
[28]
Ibid.
[29]
Id., p. 40.
[30]
Ibid.
[31]
Id., p. 41.
[32]
Ibid.
[33]
TSN dated July 25, 1966, p. 42
[34]
Id., pp. 43-44.
[35]
Ibid.
[36]
Id., p. 45.
[37]
Ibid.
[38]
TSN dated July 25, 1966,p. 45.
[39]
Id., p. 46.
[40]
Id., p. 47.
[41]
Original Records, pp. 69-71.
[42]
Order dated June 1, 1987, Original Records, p. 27.
[43]
Decision penned by Judge Temistocles B. Diez, Original Records, pp. 153-164.
[44]
Decision of the RTC, pp. 10-12, Original Records, pp. 162-164.
[45]
Appellants Brief dated July 15, 1992, pp. 8-9; CA Rollo, pp. 40-41.
[46]
Id., pp. 9-10; CA Rollo, pp. 41-42.
[47]
Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 10-20; Rollo, pp. 37-47.
[48]
Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 20, 22-23; Rollo, pp. 47, 49-50.
[49]
Petition dated December 1, 1994, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 15-16.
[50]
Petition, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 18-19.

















58

























NOT SURE IF THIS IS CORRECT . . . . . ???

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34568 March 28, 1988
RODERICK DAOANG, and ROMMEL DAOANG, assisted by their father, ROMEO DAOANG, petitioners,
vs.
THE MUNICIPAL JUDGE, SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE, ANTERO AGONOY and AMANDA RAMOS-AGONOY, respondents.

PADILLA, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated 30 June 1971, rendered by the respondent judge *in Spec. Proc. No. 37 of Municipal
Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos; Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy,
petitioners", the dispositive part of which reads, as follows:
Wherefore, Court renders judgment declaring that henceforth Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos be, to all legitimate intents and
purposes, the children by adoption of the joint petitioners Antero Agonoy and Amanda R. Agonoy and that the former be freed from
legal obedience and maintenance by their respective parents, Miguel Bonilla and Laureana Agonoy for Quirino Bonilla and Modesto
Marcos and Benjamina Gonzales for Wilson Marcos and their family names 'Bonilla' and 'Marcos' be changed with "Agonoy", which
is the family name of the petitioners.
Successional rights of the children and that of their adopting parents shall be governed by the pertinent provisions of the New Civil
Code.
Let copy of this decision be furnished and entered into the records of the Local Civil Registry of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, for its
legal effects at the expense of the petitioners.
1

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
59

On 23 March 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking
the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The case, entitled: "In re Adoption of the Minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos,
Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, petitioners", was docketed therein as Spec. Proc. No. 37.
2

The petition was set for hearing on 24 April 1971 and notices thereof were caused to be served upon the office of the Solicitor General and ordered
published in the ILOCOS TIMES, a weekly newspaper of general circulation in the province of Ilocos Norte, with editorial offices in Laoag City.
3

On 22 April 1971, the minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein, filed an opposition to
the aforementioned petition for adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy,
oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
4

After the required publication of notice had been accomplished, evidence was presented. Thereafter, the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
rendred its decision, granting the petition for adoption.
5

Hence, the present recourse by the petitioners (oppositors in the lower court).
The sole issue for consideration is one of law and it is whether or not the respondent spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos-Agonoy are
disqualified to adopt under paragraph (1), Art. 335 of the Civil Code.
The pertinent provision of law reads, as follows:
Art. 335. The following cannot adopt:
(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal fiction;
xxx xxx xxx
In overruling the opposition of the herein petitioners, the respondents judge held that "to add grandchildren in this article where no grandchil is included
would violate to (sic) the legal maxim that what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included".
But, it is contended by the petitioners, citing the case of In re Adoption of Millendez,
6
that the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos would not
only introduce a foreign element into the family unit, but would result in the reduction of their legititimes. It would also produce an indirect, permanent and
irrevocable disinheritance which is contrary to the policy of the law that a subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended person
deprives the latter of the right to disinherit and renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made.
We find, however, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and
unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include
grandchildren.
Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise,
the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction.
7

Besides, it appears that the legislator, in enacting the Civil Code of the Philippines, obviously intended that only those persons who have certain classes
of children, are disqualified to adopt. The Civil Code of Spain, which was once in force in the Philippines, and which served as the pattern for the Civil
Code of the Philippines, in its Article 174, disqualified persons who have legitimate or legitimated descendants from adopting. Under this article, the
spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy would have been disqualified to adopt as they have legitimate grandchildren, the petitioners herein. But, when the
Civil Code of the Philippines was adopted, the word "descendants" was changed to "children", in paragraph (1) of Article 335.
Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons who have no child of their own the consolation of having one, by
creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none exists by blood relationship.
8
The present tendency, however, is geared
more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is
sustained to promote that objective.
9
Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or children by legal
fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt.
10

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The judgment of the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte in Spec. Proc. No. 37 is AFFIRMED. Without
pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
60

* Judge Pascual C. Barab.
1 Rollo, pp. 19-20.
2 Id., p. 8.
3 Id., p. 12.
4 Id., p. 13.
5 Id., p. 14.
6 G.R. No. L-28195, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 499.
7 2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd. ed., Section 4502, p. 316.
8 In re Adoption of Resaba, 95 Phil. 244.
9 Santos vs. Aranzanso, 123 Phil. 160.
10 Child and Welfare Code, Art. 28.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
March 26, 1965
G.R. No. L-18753
VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellant.
J.C. Zulueta, G. D. David and N. J. Quisumbing for oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J .:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in
Spanish which she executed at her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left
margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures
below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was
acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her witnesses.
61

In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from
illegal pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously
executed said will and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of any kind such that she could freely dispose of all her estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina
Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts to
her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the
remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the Court of First Instance of Manila which was set for hearing on
September 3, 1955 after the requisite publication and service to all parties concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of
Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following
grounds: (1) said will was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its
execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due
hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition by
alleging, the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care of the
testatrix during her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on November 10, 1960, admitting the will to probate but declaring
the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's
heirs by way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the
portion of the estate to be vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as passing to the legal heirs, while the oppositor filed also a
motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which decrees the probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to
intervene and to file a motion for reconsideration with regard to that portion of the decision which nullified the legacy made in his favor.
The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both petitioner and oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from that
portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacated portion as subject of succession in favor of the legal heirs, and
the latter from that portion which admits the will to probate. And in this instance both petitioner and oppositor assign several errors which, stripped of
non-essentials, may be boiled down to the following: (1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will in
question been duly admitted to probate?; (3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and in
determining who should inherit the portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?
These issues will be discussed separately.
1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the
will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091, September
30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the
estate like a creditor (Idem). On the other hand, in Saguinsin v. Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said:
62

According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of administration must be filed by an "interested person." An interested party
has been defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a
creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the
interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent (Trillana vs. Crisostomo,
G.R. No. L-3370, August 22, 1951;Rapinosa vs. Barrion, 70 Phil. 311).
The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of the will, and, in the negative, would she acquire any right to the
estate in the event that the will is denied probate?
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor
does she have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or
devisee of any portion of the estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim against any
portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had
already disposed of it long before the execution of the will.
In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any interest in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She would
acquire such right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is true that oppositor claims to be an
acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the deceased, and also an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a deceased
sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for, even if it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the
deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding
to the legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; ... ." And the philosophy behind this provision is well expressed inGrey v. Fabie, 68 Phil. 128,
as follows:
Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother who acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot
be called relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the law does not recognize it. On this, article 943 is based upon
the reality of the facts and upon the presumption will of the interested parties; the natural child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family;
the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the natural child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former and the resources of which it is
thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family. Every
relation is ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further grounds of resentment. (7 Manresa, 3d., p. 110.)
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship
established by adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted
child except only as expressly provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting parents. As
a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.
The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting parent, and does not extend to his other relatives, except as expressly
provided by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the
legitimate children which they may have after the adoption, except that the law imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither
are the children of the adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The relationship created is exclusively between the adopter and the adopted,
and does not extend to the relatives of either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652).
63

Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not extend to other members of the family of either; but the adopted is prohibited to
marry the children of the adopter to avoid scandal. (An Outline of Philippine Civil Law by Justice Jose B. L. Reyes and Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313;
See also Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law 1955, Vol 1, pp. 312-313; Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the
court a quo.
2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted to probate. Oppositor claims that the same should not have been
admitted not only because it was not properly attested to but also because it was procured thru pressure and influence and the testatrix affixed her
signature by mistake believing that it contained her true intent.
The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence of record. In this respect it is fit that we state briefly the declarations of
the instrumental witnesses.
Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the time she executed the will for she carried her conversation with her intelligently;
that the testatrix signed immediately above the attestation clause and on each and every page thereof at the left-hand margin in the presence of the
three instrumental witnesses and the notary public; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her and the other witnesses to act as such; and that the
testatrix was the first one to sign and later she gave the will to the witnesses who read and signed it.
Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her to be a witness to the will; that the
testatrix was the first one to sign and she gave the will later to the witnesses to sign and afterwards she gave it to the notary public; that on the day of the
execution of the will the testatrix was in the best of health.
Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of the witnesses to the will; that he read and understood the attestation
clause before he signed the document, and all the witnesses spoke either in Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally said that the instrumental witnesses and
the testatrix signed the will at the same time and place and identified their signatures.
This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively that the will was duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and her
instrumental witnesses and the notary public in the manner provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied by the evidence. On this point the court a quo made the following
observation:
The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof with Dr. Rene Teotico is no proof adequate in law to sustain the conclusion that
there was improper pressure and undue influence. Nor is the alleged fact of isolation of the testatrix from the oppositor and her witnesses, for their
supposed failure to see personally the testatrix, attributable to the vehemence of Dr. Rene Teotico, to exclude visitors, took place years after the
execution of the will on May 17, 1951. Although those fact may have some weight to support the theory of the oppositor, yet they must perforce yield to
the weightier fact that nothing could have prevented the testatrix, had she really wanted to from subsequently revoking her 1951 will if it did not in fact
reflect and express her own testamentary dispositions. For, as testified to by the oppositor and her witnesses, the testatrix was often seen at the Escolta,
in Quiapo and Sta. Cruz, Manila, walking and accompanied by no one. In fact, on different occasions, each of them was able to talk with her.
We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord with the foregoing observation. Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina Mortera
and her husband Rene Teotico had the opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived in their house several years prior to the
execution of the will and that she was old and suffering from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her friends for several years prior to her
death is insufficient to disprove what the instrumental witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and with full consciousness of the
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solemnity of the occasion executed the will under consideration. The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by
substantial evidence and must be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make her
express the will of another rather than her own (Coso v. Deza, 42 O. G. 596). The burden is on the person challenging the will that such influence was
exerted at the time of its execution, a matter which here was not done, for the evidence presented not only is insufficient but was disproved by the
testimony of the instrumental witnesses.
3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line
of decisions among which the following may be cited:
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely
to determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law." (Palacios v. Palacios, 58 O. G. 220)
... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites
or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the
provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely
unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. .
From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions therein contained, it does not follow that such provision lack the efficiency, or
fail to produce the effects which the law recognizes when they are not impugned by anyone. In the matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine that the will
of the testator is the law governing the interested parties, and must be punctually complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to public
morals. (Montaano v. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679-680)
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the
testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment
in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the
will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one is valid. (Castaeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426, 428)
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a quodeclaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will
Exhibit A must be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the
legatee was not given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other
pronouncements touching on the disposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same
to probate, the rest of the decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. No pronouncement as
to costs.