1

IN THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

PEOPLES UNION FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS (APPELLANT)
V.
UNION OF INDIA (RESPONDENT)



CASE CONCERNING LABOUR LAWS VIOLATION


Memorandum on behalf of the Appellant

COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT
AYUSHI DWIVEDI
ROLL NO. 47
SEMESTER III
SECTION A


2


TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (I)
2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES (II)
3. STATEMENT OF FACTS 1
4. ISSUES RAISED 2
5. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 3
6. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 4-8
7. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 9















3

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS


& And
AIR All India Reporter
Anr. Another
Art. Article
Co. Company
Corpn. Corporation
Deptt. Department
Edn. Edition
HC High Court
Honble Honourable
Ltd Limited
Ors. Others
S. Section
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reports
U.O.I Union of India
U.S. United States
V. Versus.
Vol Volume










4

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Acts/Statutes
The Constitution of India, 1950.
The Criminal Procedure Act, 1973.

Books
Dicey, Law of Constitution (10
th
edn.)
Dowling, Cases on Constitutional Law, 4th edn. 1139
Singh Mahendra Pal, V.N. Shuklas Constitution of India, (11
th
edn, 2008), 47.
Seervai H.M., Constitutional Law of India, Vol 1. (4
th
edn, 2008), 435.
Jain M.P., Indian Constitutional Law, (7
th
edn, 2014), 876.
Dr. Basu D.D., Introduction to the Constituion of India, (20
th
edn, 2012).

Cases:
Indian Judgements:
Behram v. State of Bombay AIR 1955 SC 123.
Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1950] S.C.R. 759.
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India and Ors [1950] S.C.R. 869
E.P. Royappa v. T.N. (1974) 2 S.C.R. 348.
Rakesh Vij v. Raminder Pal Singh Sethi, (2005) 8 SCC 504.
Ramchand Jagdish Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 538
Romesh Thapar v. The State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 594.
The State of Bombay and Anr v. F. N. Balsara , [1951] S.C.R. 682.

Foreign Judgements
Rogers v. Alabama 192 U.S. 226 (1904).
Gulf Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. W.H. Ellis, 166 U.S. 150.
Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co. 249 U.S. 152



5




STATEMENT OF FACTS

The respondents and 49 other person were charged with various offences alleged to
have been committed by them in the course of their raid as an armed gang on a certain
factory known as the Jessop Factory at Dum Dum.

They were convicted and sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment by the special
court to which the case was sent for trial by Governor of West Bengal by a
notification in exercise of the power conferred by S. 5(1) of the Act.

There upon the respondent applied to the High Court under Art. 226 of the
Constitution of India for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the conviction and
the sentence on the ground that the Act under which the convection took place was
unconstitutional and void under Art. 13(2) as it denied to the respondent the equal
protection of law enjoined by Art. 14.

The High Court quashed the conviction and directed the trial of the respondent and
the other accused persons according to law. Hence, the appeal is made before Honble
Supreme Court of India.



















6





ISSUES RAISED


1. WHETHER S 5(1) OF WEST BENGAL SPECIAL COURTS ACT, 1950 IS VOID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER ARTICLE 13(2) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA?


































7


SUMMARY OF ARGUEMENTS



CONTENTION 1: S 5(1) OF WEST BENGAL SPECIAL COURTS ACT, 1950 IS VOID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER ARTICLE 13(2) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.


S. 5
1
of the mentioned Act in violation with the Art 13(2)
2
. It is in violation with Art.
14 of Part III of the Indian Constitution. In the present case it is no classification at all
in the real sense of the term as it is not based on any characteristics which are peculiar
to persons or to cases which are to be subject to the special procedure prescribed by
the Act. The Act gives arbitrary powers to the government.

















1
5 (1)- A Special Court shall try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases, as the State
Government may by general or special order in writing, direct.
2
The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law
made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of this contravention, be void.


8



ARGUMENTS ADVANCED


CONTENTION 1: S 5(1) OF WEST BENGAL SPECIAL COURTS ACT, 1950 IS VOID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER ARTICLE 13(2) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.


S. 5
3
of the mentioned Act in violation with the Art 13(2)
4
. It is in violation with Art. 14 of
Part III of the Indian Constitution. As held in the case of Behram v. State of Bombay, the
Supreme Court has observed on this point:
Where a statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional, it is as if it had never been. Rights cannot
be built up under it, contracts which depend upon it for their consideration are void, it
constitutes a protection to no one who has acted under it and no one can be punished for
having refused obedience to it before the decision was made.
5

Any law which is in contravention of Part III is dead from the very beginning and cannot at
all be taken notice of or read for any purpose whatsoever.
6



CONTENTION 1.1:
THE ACT INFRINGES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT AS GIVEN UNDER ART. 14.

Art. 14
7
guarantee to every person the right to equality before the law or equal protection of
laws. The first expression equality before law is said to have been taken from the English
Common Law, is a declaration of equality of all persons in the eyes of law, implying absence
of any special privileges in any individual. The second expression, the equal protection of
laws, which is rather a corollary of the first and is based on the last clause of the first section
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the American Constitution, directs that equal protection
shall be secured to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the Union of India in the

3
5 (1)- A Special Court shall try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases, as the State
Government may by general or special order in writing, direct.
4
The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law
made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of this contravention, be void.
5
AIR 1955 SC 123.
6
Rakesh Vij v. Raminder Pal Singh Sethi, (2005) 8 SCC 504.
7
The state shall not deny to any person equality before law or equal protection of law is within the territory of
India


9

enjoyment of their rights and privileges without favouritism or discrimination.
8
Explaining the
concept of legal equality as it operated in England, Dicey said, With us every official is
under same responsibility for every act done without legal justification as any other citizen.
9

The meaning and scope of article 14 have been elaborately explained in two earlier decisions
of this Court, One of these principles is that article 14 is designed to protect all persons
placed in similar circumstances against legislative discrimination, and if the legislature takes
care to reasonably classify persons for legislative purposes and if it deals equally with all
persons belonging to a well-defined class, it is not open to the charge of denial of equal
protection on the ground that the law does not apply to other person.
10

The person therefore who pleads that Art. 14 has been violated, must make out that not only
he has been treated differently from others, but he has also been treated differently from the
persons similarly circumstanced without any reasonable basis, and such differential treatment
has been unjustifiably made.
11

Section 5 of the West Bengal Special Courts Act is hit by article 14 of the Constitution
inasmuch as it mentions on basis for the differential treatment prescribed in the Act for trial
of criminals in certain cases and for certain offences.
The scope of Art. 14 is that it is designed to prevent any person or class of persons for being
singled out as a special subject for discriminatory and hostile legislation. Democracy implies
respect for the elementary rights of man, however suspect or unworthy. Equality of right is a
principle of republicanism and article 14 enunciates this equality principle in the
administration of justice. In its application to legal proceedings the article assures to everyone
the same rules of evidence and modes of procedure. In other words, the same rule must exist
for all in similar circumstances. This principle, however, does not mean that every law must
have universal application for all persons who are not by nature, attainment or circumstance,
in the same position.
In the present case, as discussed in sub-contention 1.2, the classification made by the Act in
on no strict and reasonable grounds and it also gives state arbitrary powers to decide this class

8
Mahendra Pal Singh, V.N. Shuklas Constitution of India, (11
th
edn, 2008), 47.
9
Dicey, Law of Constitution (10
th
edn.)
10
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India and Ors ,[1950] S.C.R. 869 and The State of Bombay and Anr
v. F. N. Balsara ,[1951] S.C.R. 682.
11
Ramchand Jagdish Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 538.


10

of offences and cases which have to be tried in special courts. Therefore, it clearly violates
Art. 14 of Constitution on India.

CONTENTION 1.1.1: DISCRIMINATION MADE CANNOT BE SEEN AS A BYE PRODUCT OF PUBLIC
PURPOSE SERVED BY THE ACT.

The object of this legislation does not have a public purpose of such great degree to
compensate for the discrimination made, in other words, there is no such reasonability in the
restriction made. If the public purpose of opinion is kept in view, then almost every piece of
legislation has got a public purpose in view and is generally intended, or said to be intended,
to promote the general progress of the country and the better administration of Government.
The intention behind the legislation may be unexceptionable and the object sought to be
achieved may be praiseworthy but the question which falls to be considered under article 14
is whether the legislation is discriminatory in its nature, and this has to be determined not so
much by its purpose or objects but by its effects.

Discrimination may not appear in the statute itself but may be evident in the administration of
the law. If an uncontrolled or unguided power is conferred without any reasonable and proper
standards or limits being laid down in the enactment, the statute itself may be challenged and
not merely the particular administrative act. "Discrimination may exist in the administration
of the laws and it is the purpose of the equal protection clause to secure all the inhabitants of
the state from intentional and arbitrary discrimination arising in their improper or prejudiced
execution, as well by the express terms of the law itself. The validity and invalidity of a
statute often depends on how it is construed and applied. It may be valid when given a
particular application and invalid when given another."
12









12
Rogers v. Alabama 192 U.S. 226 (1904)


11


CONTENTION 1.2:
THE CLASSIFICATION IN THE PRESENT ACT, IS NOT REASONABLE.


Equal laws would have to be applied to all in the same situation, and there should be no
discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject matter of the
legislation their position is substantially the same. This brings in the question of
classification. As there is no infringement of the equal protection rule, if the law deals alike
with all of a certain class, the legislature has the undoubted right of classifying persons and
placing those whose conditions are substantially similar under the same rule of law, while
applying different rules to persons differently situated. It is said that the entire problem under
the equal protection clause is one of classification or of drawing lines.
13
By the process of
classification the State has the power of determining who should be regarded as a class for
purposes of legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular subject. This power, no
doubt, in some degree is likely to produce some inequality; but if a law deals with the
liberties of a number of well- defined classes, it is not open to the charge of denial of equal
protection on the ground that it has no application to other person. The classification
permissible, however, must be based on some real and substantial distinction bearing a just
and reasonable relation to the objects sought to be attained and cannot be made arbitrarily and
without any substantial basis. Classification thus means segregation in classes which have a
systematic relation, usually found in common properties and characteristics. It postulates a
rational basis and does not mean herding together of certain persons and classes arbitrarily.
14

Speedy administration of justice, especially in the field of the law of crimes, is a necessary
characteristic of every civilised Government, there is not much point in stating that there is a
class of offences that require such speedy trial. Of course, there may be certain offences
whose trial requires priority over the rest and quick progress, owing to their frequent
occurrence, grave danger to public peace or tranquillity, and other special features that may
be prevalent at a particular time in a specified area. And when it is intended to provide that
they should be tried more speedily than other offences, requiring in certain respects a
departure from the procedure prescribed for the general class of offences, it is but reasonable
to expect the legislature to indicate the basis for any such classification. If the Act does not
state what exactly are the offences which in its opinion need a speedier trial and why it is so

13
Dowling, Cases on Constitutional Law, 4th edn. 1139
14
Gulf Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. W.H. Ellis, 166 U.S. 150.


12

considered, a mere statement in general words of the object sought to be achieved, as we find
in this case, is of no avail because the classification, if any, is illusive or evasive.
In the present case, it is no classification at all in the real sense of the term as it is not based
on any characteristics which are peculiar to persons or to cases which are to be subject to the
special procedure prescribed by the Act.


CONTENTION: 1.3
THE ACT GIVES ARBITRARY POWERS TO THE STATE.


It was said that the possibility of the Act being applied in an unauthorised and arbitrary
manner was sufficient to make it unconstitutional according to the decisions of this Court in
Romesh Thapar v. The State of Madras
15
and Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya
Pradesh
16
. Judged by the test of Gulf Colorado etc. Co. v. Ellis
17
, the answer in the present
case should be in the negative; for the difference in the treatment rests here solely on arbitrary
selection by the State Government. It is true that the presumption should always be that the
legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people and that its
discriminations are based on adequate grounds (Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co. 249
U.S. 152); but as was said by Mr. Justice brewer in Gulf Colorado etc. Company v. Ellis, "to
carry the presumption to the extent of holding that there must be some undisclosed and
unknown reason for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile and
discriminatory legislation is to make the protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment a
mere rope of sand."
Royappas Case
18
pointed out for the first time that Art 14 embodies a guarantee against
arbitrariness.... and (equality) cannot be cribbed, cabined and confined within traditional
and doctrinaire limits- an obvious reference to the doctrine of classification. Classification is
merely a judicial formula for determining whether the legislative or the executive action is
arbitrary and therefore constitutes a denial of equality.
Hence it is submitted before the Honble Court that the Act infringes Art. 14 of the
Constitution and therefore is also in violation with Art 13(2) of the same.


15
[1950] S.C.R. 594.
16
[1950] S.C.R. 759.
17
165 U.S. 150.
18
E.P. Royappa v. T.N. (1974) 2 S.C.R. 348.


13




PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore, in the light of facts of the case, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited, this Honble Supreme Court of may be pleased to adjudge and declare:
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. S. 5(1) of The West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 be unconstitutional.
3. The trial of appellant to take place through the normal procedure of law.

And/or pass any other order in favour of the Appellant that it may deem fit in the light of
justice, equity, and good conscience.


All of which is most humbly submitted.


PLACE: INDIA
DATE: SEPTEMBER,02, 2014.
COUNSELS FOR APPELLANT
AYUSHI DWIVEDI
ROLL NO. 47.