G.R. No.

145391 August 26, 2002

AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners,
vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.
CARPIO, J .:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution
1
dated December 28, 1999
dismissing the petition for certiorari and the Resolution
2
dated August 24, 2000 denying the motion
for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special
Civil Action No. 17-C (99).
The Facts
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya ("Laroya" for brevity) and the other
owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo ("Capitulo" for brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino
Casupanan ("Casupanan" for brevity), figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court ("MCTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case
against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 002-99. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for
quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage.
Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-
shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in the Order
of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate
civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for
reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court ("Capas RTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch
66,
3
assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari for
lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order
which disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should have been an appeal. The
Capas RTC further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the
civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the same in
the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:
"In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of them may think and believe
that the accident was caused by the fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party, believing himself
to be the aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal case for reckless imprudence against the
second party. On the other hand, the second party, together with his operator, believing
themselves to be the real aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a civil case for quasi-delict
against the first party who is the very private complainant in the criminal case."
4

Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence
can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case.
The Courts Ruling
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC dismissed on the ground
of forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue
that if the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file
the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-
delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused in
a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident. They
maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently
of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the
independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle,
who was not a party in the criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the real
antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the
order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there
is no question of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition for
certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the legal question of whether
there is forum-shopping since they filed only one action - the independent civil action for quasi-
delict against Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping under
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of
dismissal
5
that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of
dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states
it is with prejudice.
6
Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is deemed
without prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without
prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41
7
provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable.
The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41
expressly states that "where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may
file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65." Clearly, the Capas RTCs order dismissing the
petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.
8
Forum-
shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of
action and reliefs sought.
9
However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law
and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of
the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the
Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they
have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the
Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant."
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of evidence,
that he has suffered damage because of the fault or negligence of another. Either the private
complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing in
the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("2000 Rules"
for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to
wit:
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the
criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action." (Emphasis supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate
civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("1985 Rules" for brevity), as amended
in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently of the criminal action provided the
offended party reserved the right to file such civil action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil
action before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions arising from the
same act or omission were deemed "impliedly instituted" in the criminal case. These civil actions
referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the
recovery of damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the
offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to bring such action. Otherwise, such
civil action was deemed "impliedly instituted" in the criminal action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules provided as follows:
"Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the
reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the accused.
x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1, 2000 and now provides as
follows:
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
x x x
(b) x x x
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it
may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter
case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with
section 2 of this rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions." (Emphasis
supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with the criminal action is only
the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The
failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil
actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the criminal
action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and
independent of the civil action "deemed instituted" in the criminal action.
10

Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a separate civil action
to recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution
presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a
separate civil action before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-
delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated
with the criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions
arising from the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.
11

Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action, if reserved in the
criminal action, could not be filed until after final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. If the
separate civil action was filed before the commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still
pending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until final judgment was rendered in
the criminal action. This rule applied only to the separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-
delicto. The rule did not apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code, which could proceed independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues this procedure, to wit:
"SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action has been
commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the
latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the
merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal
action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil action, the same
may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court
trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil
action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to
the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party
in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated
criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the
civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended
shall be tolled.
x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil action,
filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of
the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a
separate civil action to recover damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in
the criminal case, can file a separate civil action against the offended party in the criminal case.
Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:
"SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action."
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows
the "offended party" to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the "offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in
the criminal action."
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil action
for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the
"offended party" may bring such an action but the "offended party" may not recover damages twice
for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to
the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs. Cantos
12
where the Court held
that the accused therein could validly institute a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his
Answer with Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At that time the Court noted the "absence of
clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted civil actions and the necessary
consequences and implications thereof." Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court should confine
itself to the criminal aspect of the case and disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court
further ruled that the accused may file a separate civil case against the offended party "after the
criminal case is terminated and/or in accordance with the new Rules which may be promulgated."
The Court explained that a cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil aspect will
only unnecessarily complicate the proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely to
address the lacunamentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the accused is barred from filing a
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the same provision
states that "any cause of action which could have been the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim
or third-party complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil action." The present Rule 111 mandates
the accused to file his counterclaim in a separate civil actiosn which shall proceed independently of
the criminal action, even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not
suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The
suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime,
if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal
case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a
civil case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can
proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the
criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended
party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases,
the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent,
necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is
accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present
Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused "may be litigated in a separate civil
action." This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any
counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is
therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused
does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the
period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code,
in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal
action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to
recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the
courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper.
The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is
erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in the criminal case
may vary with the decision of the trial court in the independent civil action. This possibility has
always been recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an independent
civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the
Code, expressly provides that the independent civil action "may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter." In Azucena vs. Potenciano,
13
the
Court declared:
"x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil
action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it
be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil
action and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the concept of a civil action
separate and independent from the criminal action although arising from the same act or omission.
The Court, however, has yet to encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial
courts, one hearing the criminal case and the other the civil action for quasi-delict. The fear of
conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent than real. In any event, there are
sufficient remedies under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000 while
the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the amendment of the
rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect considering the
well-settled rule that -
"x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in
that sense and to that extent."
14

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and
Civil Case No. 2089 isREINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez
*
, JJ., concur.















G.R. No. 122150 March 17, 2003
GEORGE (CULHI) HAMBON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND VALENTINO U. CARANTES, respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:
Petitioner George (Culhi) Hambon filed herein petition for review on certiorari, raising the following
issues:
WHETHER OR NOT A CIVIL CASE FOR DAMAGES BASED ON AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL
ACTION FALLING UNDER ARTICLE 32, 33, 34 AND 2176 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE BE DULY
DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO MAKE RESERVATION TO FILE A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION IN A
CRIMINAL CASE FILED ARISING FROM THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION OF THE ACCUSED
PURSUANT TO RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT, THE FAILURE TO MAKE
RESERVATION BEING DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE CRIMINAL CASE WAS DISMISSED
BEFORE THE PROSECUTION STARTED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE FOR FAILURE OF THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO APPEAR DESPITE NOTICE
SHOULD A STRICT INTERPRETATION OF RULE 111, SECTION 1 OF THE RULES OF COURT
WHICH INFRINGES ON A RIGHT OF A PARTY BASED ON A SUBSTANTIVE LAW BE
PERMITTED WHEN TO DO SO WOULD DIMINISH, MODIFY AND/OR AMEND A SUBSTANTIVE
RIGHT CONTRARY TO LAW.
1

The factual background that led to the filing of the petition is as follows:
On June 6, 1989, the petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio (Branch 6), a
complaint for damages
2
for the injuries and expenses he sustained after the truck driven by the
respondent bumped him on the night of December 9, 1985.
3
In answer thereto, respondent
contended that the criminal case arising from the same incident, Criminal Case No. 2049 for Serious
Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence, earlier filed on January 8, 1986,
4
had already been
provisionally dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Tuba, Benguet on March 23, 1987, due to
petitioners lack of interest;
5
and that the dismissal was with respect to both criminal and civil
liabilities of respondent.
6

After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision, dated December 18, 1991, ruling that the
civil case was not barred by the dismissal of the criminal case, and that petitioner is entitled to
damages. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered, sentencing defendant Valentino Cerantes to
pay plaintiff George Hambon the sum of P60,000.00 for hospitalization and medical
expenses and P10,000.00 for native rituals, as Actual Damages; the sum of P10,000.00 as
Moral Damages, P5,000.00 as Exemplary Damages and P5,000.00 as Attorneys fees and
costs.
SO ORDERED.
7

On appeal,
8
the Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on March 8, 1995,
9
reversed and set
aside the decision of the trial court, and dismissed petitioners complaint for damages.
According to the appellate court, since the petitioner did not make any reservation to institute a
separate civil action for damages, it was impliedly instituted with the criminal case, and the dismissal
of the criminal case carried with it the dismissal of the suit for damages, notwithstanding the fact that
the dismissal was provisional as it amounted to an acquittal and had the effect of an adjudication on
the merits.
10

Hence, herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner argues that the ruling in the case of Abellana v. Marave
11
should be observed, i.e., a civil
action for damages may be filed and proceed independently of the criminal action even without
reservation to file the same has been made;
12
and that the requirement of reservation, as provided in
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, practically diminished/amended/modified his substantial right.
13

The petition must be denied.
Petitioner filed the complaint for damages on June 6, 1989. Hence, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988,
14
is the prevailing and governing law in this
case, viz.:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately,
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from
the same act or omission of the accused.
. . .
Under the foregoing rule, civil actions to recover liability arising from crime (ex delicto) and under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code (quasi-delict) are deemed impliedly instituted with the
criminal action unless waived, reserved or previously instituted.
Thus, in Maniago v. Court of Appeals,
15
the Court ruled that the right to bring an action for damages
under the Civil Code must be reserved, as required by Section 1, Rule 111, otherwise it should be
dismissed;
16
and that the reservation requirement does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive
rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure.
17

In the Maniago case, petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of the bus driven by Herminio
Andaya that figured in a vehicular accident with the jeepney owned by respondent Alfredo Boado.
The petitioner therein initially sought for the suspension of the civil case for damages filed against
him in view of the pendency of the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property and multiple physical injuries filed against his driver. The respondent, in the criminal case,
did not reserve the right to bring the separate civil action against the petitioner or his driver. The
criminal case was later dismissed for the failure of the prosecution to prosecute its case. On appeal,
the Court identified the issues as (1) whether the respondent can file a civil action for damages
despite the absence of reservation; (2) whether the dismissal of the criminal case brought with it the
dismissal of the civil action; and (3) whether the reservation requirement is substantive in character
and beyond the rule-making power of the Court.
18

The Court expounded:
. . . 1quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil
actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will de deemed to have been instituted
with the criminal case. In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for
the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi-delict
under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will de deemed instituted
with the criminal action.
. . .
Contrary to private respondents contention, the requirement that before a separate civil
action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive
rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of procedure. The requirement
is merely procedural in nature. For that matter the Revised Penal Code, by providing in Art.
100 that any person criminally liable is also civilly liable, gives the offended party the right to
bring a separate civil action, yet no one has ever questioned the rule that such action must
be reserved before it may be brought separately.
19

While the Abellana case ruled that a reservation is not necessary, the 1988 amendment of the rule
explicitly requires reservation of the civil action.
x x x Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil
actions can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or
simultaneous with the criminal action.
. . . Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow
the words of the Court in "Caos v. Peralta":
. . . to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent
delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the
attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants.
20

Thus, herein petitioner Hambon should have reserved his right to separately institute the civil action
for damages in Criminal Case No. 2049. Having failed to do so, Civil Case No. 1761-R for damages
subsequently filed by him without prior reservation should be dismissed. With the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 2049, whatever civil action for the recovery of civil liability that was impliedly
instituted therein was likewise dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and
the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 8, 1995, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.



G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J .:
The Case
Petitioner Dreamwork Construction, Inc. seeks the reversal of the August 26, 2008 Decision
1
in SCA
No. 08-0005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 253 in Las Pias City. The Decision affirmed
the Orders dated October 16, 2007
2
and March 12, 2008
3
in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 issued by
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 79 in Las Pias City.
The Facts
On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President
for Finance and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5,
2004
4
for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S.
Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City. The case was docketed as I.S. No.
04-2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against
private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint
against petitioner by filing a Complaint dated August 2006
5
for the rescission of an alleged
construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages. The case was filed with the
RTC, Branch 197 in Las Pias City and docketed as Civil Case No. LP-06-0197. Notably, the
checks, subject of the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the
construction agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July
24, 2007
6
in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts
and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words, private
respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated
Comment/Opposition to Accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on Prejudicial
Question
7
on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the
contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue
of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that "the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action";
thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.
Later, the MTC issued its Order dated October 16, 2007, granting the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings, and reasoned that:
Should the trial court declare the rescission of contract and the nullification of the checks issued as
the same are without consideration, then the instant criminal cases for alleged violation of BP 22
must be dismissed. The belated filing of the civil case by the herein accused did not detract from the
correctness of her cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action may be filed at any time
before the prosecution rests (Section 6, Rule 111, Revised Rules of Court).
8

In an Order dated March 12, 2008,
9
the MTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 29, 2007.
Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC with a Petition dated May 13, 2008. Thereafter, the RTC
issued the assailed decision dated August 26, 2008, denying the petition. On the issue of the
existence of a prejudicial question, the RTC ruled:
Additionally, it must be stressed that the requirement of a "previously" filed civil case is intended
merely to obviate delays in the conduct of the criminal proceedings. Incidentally, no clear evidence
of any intent to delay by private respondent was shown. The criminal proceedings are still in their
initial stages when the civil action was instituted. And, the fact that the civil action was filed after the
criminal action was instituted does not render the issues in the civil action any less prejudicial in
character.
10

Hence, we have this petition under Rule 45.
The Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER
RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE NOS. 55554-61 ON THE BASIS OF
"PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" IN CIVIL CASE NO. LP-06-0197.
11

The Courts Ruling
This petition must be granted.
The Civil Action Must Precede the Filing of the
Criminal Action for a Prejudicial Question to Exist
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated
June 17, 1988 and July 7, 1988, the elements of a prejudicial question are contained in Rule 111,
Sec. 5, which states:
SEC. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial question
are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
Thus, the Court has held in numerous cases
12
that the elements of a prejudicial question, as stated
in the above-quoted provision and in Beltran v. People,
13
are:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has
two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
On December 1, 2000, the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, however, became effective and the
above provision was amended by Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now provides:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a prejudicial question
and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be established that the civil case was filed previous
to the filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner argues, is specifically to guard against the situation
wherein a party would belatedly file a civil action that is related to a pending criminal action in order
to delay the proceedings in the latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall
promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Private respondent argues that the phrase "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may
proceed" must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists when the civil action is filed
either before the institution of the criminal action or during the pendency of the criminal action.
Private respondent concludes that there is an apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of
Court and the Civil Code in that the latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial
question even if the criminal case preceded the filing of the civil case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.
First off, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a "change in phraseology by amendment
of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it
originally had."
14
In the instant case, the phrase, "previously instituted," was inserted to qualify the
nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This
interpretation is further buttressed by the insertion of "subsequent" directly before the term criminal
action. There is no other logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of
the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action.
Thus, this Court ruled in Torres v. Garchitorena
15
that:
Even if we ignored petitioners procedural lapse and resolved their petition on the merits, we hold
that Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
denying their omnibus motion for the suspension of the proceedings pending final judgment in Civil
Case No. 7160. Section 6, Rule lll of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, reads:
Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. - A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of
the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has
been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any
time before the prosecution rests.
Sec. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the
criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal
action with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the
institution of the criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan
ahead of the complaint in Civil Case No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160.
Thus, no prejudicial question exists. (Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, it is a principle in statutory construction that "a statute should be construed not only to
be consistent with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form
a complete, coherent and intelligible system."
16
This principle is consistent with the maxim,
interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus or every statute must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence.
17
1 a vv p h i l
In other words, every effort must be made to harmonize seemingly conflicting laws. It is only when
harmonization is impossible that resort must be made to choosing which law to apply.
In the instant case, Art. 36 of the Civil Code and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are
susceptible of an interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase "previously
instituted civil action" in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and is not susceptible of alternative
interpretations. The clause "before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed" in
Art. 36 of the Civil Code may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the
criminal action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public prosecutor or court
conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the court hearing the case.
This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court but also with Sec. 6 of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the situations when the
motion to suspend the criminal action during the preliminary investigation or during the trial may be
filed. Sec. 6 provides:
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question.A petition for suspension of the criminal
action based upon the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of
the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has
been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any
time before the prosecution rests.
Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code
that should govern in order to give effect to all the relevant provisions of law.
It bears pointing out that the circumstances present in the instant case indicate that the filing of the
civil action and the subsequent move to suspend the criminal proceedings by reason of the presence
of a prejudicial question were a mere afterthought and instituted to delay the criminal proceedings.
In Sabandal v. Tongco,
18
we found no prejudicial question existed involving a civil action for specific
performance, overpayment, and damages, and a criminal complaint for BP 22, as the resolution of
the civil action would not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In
resolving the case, we said:
Furthermore, the peculiar circumstances of the case clearly indicate that the filing of the civil case
was a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal cases. Petitioner filed the civil case three years
after the institution of the criminal charges against him. Apparently, the civil action was instituted as
an afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal cases.
19

Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal complaint and from the
time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job site. Also, it is worth
noting that the civil case was instituted more than two and a half (2 ) years from the time that
private respondent allegedly stopped construction of the proposed building for no valid reason. More
importantly, the civil case praying for the rescission of the construction agreement for lack of
consideration was filed more than three (3) years from the execution of the construction agreement.
Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases involved here show
that the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought on the part of private respondent and
interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111
of the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private respondents positions cannot be left to stand.
The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not
Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no
prejudicial question to speak of that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case.
To reiterate, the elements of a prejudicial question under Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
are: (1) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
Petitioner argues that the second element of a prejudicial question, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule
111 of the Rules, is absent in this case. Thus, such rule cannot apply to the present controversy.
Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that if the construction agreement between the parties
is declared null and void for want of consideration, the checks issued in consideration of such
contract would become mere scraps of paper and cannot be the basis of a criminal prosecution.
We find for petitioner.
It must be remembered that the elements of the crime punishable under BP 22 are as follows:
(1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there are no
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon
its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered
the bank to stop payment.
20

Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support the issuance of the
check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration does not make up the elements of
the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of cases
21
that the agreement surrounding the
issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v.
People,
22
we ruled:
It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check. The
purpose for which the check was issued, the terms and conditions relating to its issuance, or any
agreement surrounding such issuance are irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of petitioner.
To determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance,
will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as
currency substitutes, and bring havoc in trade and in banking communities. The clear intention of the
framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.
Lee v. Court of Appeals
23
is even more poignant. In that case, we ruled that the issue of lack of
valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient
funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution for violation of BP 22, to wit:
Third issue. Whether or not the check was issued on account or for value.
Petitioners claim is not feasible. We have held that upon issuance of a check, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration.
Valuable consideration, in turn, may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to
the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to
act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other side. It is an obligation to do, or
not to do in favor of the party who makes the contract, such as the maker or indorser.
In this case, petitioner himself testified that he signed several checks in blank, the subject check
included, in exchange for 2.5% interest from the proceeds of loans that will be made from said
account. This is a valuable consideration for which the check was issued. That there was neither a
pre-existing obligation nor an obligation incurred on the part of petitioner when the subject check
was given by Bautista to private complainant on July 24, 1993 because petitioner was no longer
connected with Unlad or Bautista starting July 1989, cannot be given merit since, as earlier
discussed, petitioner failed to adequately prove that he has severed his relationship with Bautista or
Unlad.
At any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the mere act of issuing a bouncing check,
not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. This is
because the thrust of the law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into
circulation.
24
(Emphasis supplied.)
Verily, even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the
parties is void for lack of consideration, this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in
the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which were
subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP
22.lawphil. net
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, that
the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether the criminal action may
proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists and the rules on it are
inapplicable to the case before us.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT this petition. We hereby REVERSE and SET ASIDE the August 26,
2008 Decision in SCA No. 08-0005 of the RTC, Branch 253 in Las Pias City and the Orders dated
October 16, 2007 and March 12, 2008 in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61 of the MTC, Branch 79 in
Las Pias City. We order the MTC to continue with the proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. 55554-61
with dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

















G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007
MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
MODESTO CALAUNAN, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
Assailed before Us is the decision
1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 which affirmed
in toto the decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 42, in Civil Case No.
D-10086, finding petitioners Mauricio Manliclic and Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI)
solidarily liable to pay damages and attorneys fees to respondent Modesto Calaunan.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number CVD-
478, owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep
with plate number PER-290, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo
Mendoza.
At around 6:00 to 7:00 oclock in the morning of 12 July 1988, respondent Calaunan, together with
Marcelo Mendoza, was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-type jeep. The
Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately
Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two
vehicles collided. The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep
causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to
further extensive damage. The bus veered to the left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of
collision.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt. He was first brought for treatment to
the Manila Central University Hospital in Kalookan City by Oscar Buan, the conductor of the
Philippine Rabbit Bus, and was later transferred to the Veterans Memorial Medical Center.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, charging
petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical
Injuries, docketed as Crim. Case No. 684-M-89. Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent
filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI before the RTC of Dagupan
City, docketed as Civil Case No. D-10086. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case.
Among those who testified in the criminal case were respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
Fernando Ramos.
In the civil case (now before this Court), the parties admitted the following:
1. The parties agreed on the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued as well as the venue
and the identities of the vehicles involved;
2. The identity of the drivers and the fact that they are duly licensed;
3. The date and place of the vehicular collision;
4. The extent of the injuries suffered by plaintiff Modesto Calaunan and the existence of the
medical certificate;
5. That both vehicles were going towards the south; the private jeep being ahead of the bus;
6. That the
weather
was fair and the road was well paved and straight, although there was a ditch on the right
side where the jeep fell into.
3

When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of stenographic
notes (TSNs)
4
of the testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos
in the criminal case be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not
available to testify in the civil case.
Francisco Tuliao testified that his brother-in-law, respondent Calaunan, left for abroad sometime in
November, 1989 and has not returned since then. Rogelio Ramos took the stand and said that his
brother, Fernando Ramos, left for Amman, Jordan, to work. Rosalia Mendoza testified that her
husband, Marcelo Mendoza, left their residence to look for a job. She narrated that she thought her
husband went to his hometown in Panique, Tarlac, when he did not return after one month. She
went to her husbands hometown to look for him but she was informed that he did not go there.1awphil. net
The trial court subpoenaed the Clerk of Court of Branch 8, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, the court where
Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was tried, to bring the TSNs of the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan,
5
Marcelo Mendoza
6
and Fernando Ramos
7
in said case, together with other documentary
evidence marked therein. Instead of the Branch Clerk of Court, it was Enrique Santos Guevara,
Court Interpreter, who appeared before the court and identified the TSNs of the three afore-named
witnesses and other pertinent documents he had brought.
8
Counsel for respondent wanted to mark
other TSNs and documents from the said criminal case to be adopted in the instant case, but since
the same were not brought to the trial court, counsel for petitioners compromised that said TSNs and
documents could be offered by counsel for respondent as rebuttal evidence.
For the defendants, petitioner Manliclic and bus conductor Oscar Buan testified. The TSN
9
of the
testimony of Donato Ganiban, investigator of the PRBLI, in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89 was marked
and allowed to be adopted in the civil case on the ground that he was already dead.
Respondent further marked, among other documents, as rebuttal evidence, the TSNs
10
of the
testimonies of Donato Ganiban, Oscar Buan and petitioner Manliclic in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89.
The disagreement arises from the question: Who is to be held liable for the collision?
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is resolute in
saying it was the former who caused the smash up.
The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:
The parties differed only on the manner the collision between the two (2) vehicles took place.
According to the plaintiff and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per
hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in
the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side.
At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words,
the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. Fernando Ramos
corroborated the testimony of the plaintiff and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that he was on another
jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff when the incident took place. He
said, the jeep of the plaintiff overtook them and the said jeep of the plaintiff was followed by the
Philippine Rabbit Bus which was running very fast. The bus also overtook the jeep in which he was
riding. After that, he heard a loud sound. He saw the jeep of the plaintiff swerved to the right on a
grassy portion of the road. The Philippine Rabbit Bus stopped and they overtook the Philippine
Rabbit Bus so that it could not moved (sic), meaning they stopped in front of the Philippine Rabbit
Bus. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the right because it was bumped by the
Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.
Both Mauricio Manliclic and his driver, Oscar Buan admitted that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped
the jeep in question. However, they explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go
to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake
another jeep in front of it. Such was their testimony before the RTC in Malolos in the criminal case
and before this Court in the instant case. [Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the
collision took place was correct, would be determinative of who between the two drivers was
negligent in the operation of their respective vehicles.]
11

Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of its employee, specifically petitioner Manliclic.
On 22 July 1996, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent Calaunan and against
petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the
said defendants to pay plaintiff jointly and solidarily the amount of P40,838.00 as actual damages for
the towing as well as the repair and the materials used for the repair of the jeep in
question; P100,000.00 as moral damages and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages
and P15,000.00 as attorneys fees, including appearance fees of the lawyer. In addition, the
defendants are also to pay costs.
12

Petitioners appealed the decision via Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals.
13

In a decision dated 28 September 2001, the Court of Appeals, finding no reversible error in the
decision of the trial court, affirmed it in all respects.
14

Petitioners are now before us by way of petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals. They assign as errors the following:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS QUESTIONABLE ADMISSION IN EVIDENCE OF THE TSNs AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS PRESENTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS RELIANCE ON THE VERSION OF THE RESPONDENT ON HOW THE ACCIDENT
SUPPOSEDLY OCCURRED.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS UNFAIR DISREGARD OF HEREIN PETITIONER PRBLs DEFENSE OF EXERCISE OF
DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS EMPLOYEES.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS QUESTIONABLE AWARD OF DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEE.
With the passing away of respondent Calaunan during the pendency of this appeal with this Court,
we granted the Motion for the Substitution of Respondent filed by his wife, Mrs. Precila Zarate Vda.
De Calaunan, and children, Virgilio Calaunan, Carmelita Honeycomb, Evelyn Calaunan, Marko
Calaunan and Liwayway Calaunan.
15

In their Reply to respondents Comment, petitioners informed this Court of a Decision
16
of the Court
of Appeals acquitting petitioner Manliclic of the charge
17
of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Physical Injuries attaching thereto a photocopy thereof.
On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the testimonies of respondent
Calaunan,
18
Marcelo Mendoza
19
and Fernando Ramos
20
should not be admitted in evidence for failure
of respondent to comply with the requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
For Section 47, Rule 130
21
to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead
or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial
or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former
case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action;
(d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present
case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the former
case.
22

Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set forth by the Rules for
a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be admissible as an exception to the hearsay
rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to
cross-examine the three witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against
petitioner Manliclic, petitioner PRBLIs employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of
employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases
instituted against their employees.
23

Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case, the testimonies
of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their
admissibility.
It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document
is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is
merely a privilege which the party may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it
does not conform to the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia
argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account of failure to
object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient to prove the facts therein
asserted.
24
Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in a suit but, when no
objection is made thereto, it is, like any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it
deserves.
25

In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the testimonies of
respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case when the same
were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and
Mendoza were admitted by both petitioners.
26
Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence
the TSN containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI argues
that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiffs witnesses in the criminal case should not be admitted in
the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the
criminal case? It appears that petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue
that the TSNs of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case should not
be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the witness for the accused
be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence of the TSNs of the testimonies of
Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the
testimony of Ganiban would be unfair.
We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLIs argument that it will be denied due process when the
TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the criminal case
are to be admitted in the civil case. It is too late for petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of due process in
relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of
the TSNs. For failure to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object that the TSNs did not
comply with Section 47.
In Mangio v. Court of Appeals,
27
this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno,
28
admitted in
evidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case despite therein petitioners assertion
that he would be denied due process. In admitting the TSN, the Court ruled that the raising of denial
of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to
the admissibility of the TSN was belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner waived his right to
object based on said ground.
Petitioners contend that the documents in the criminal case should not have been admitted in the
instant civil case because Section 47 of Rule 130 refers only to "testimony or deposition." We find
such contention to be untenable. Though said section speaks only of testimony and deposition, it
does not mean that documents from a former case or proceeding cannot be admitted. Said
documents can be admitted they being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been admitted.
Accordingly, they shall be given the same weight as that to which the testimony may be entitled.
29

On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that the version of petitioner Manliclic as to how
the accident occurred is more credible than respondents version. They anchor their contention on
the fact that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted by the Court of Appeals of the charge of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
To be resolved by the Court is the effect of petitioner Manliclics acquittal in the civil case.
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one arising from, or
based on, quasi-delict.
30
Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his negligence or reckless imprudence in
causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a
good father in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. The
allegations read:
"4. That sometime on July 12, 1988 at around 6:20 A.M. plaintiff was on board the above-
described motor vehicle travelling at a moderate speed along the North Luzon Expressway
heading South towards Manila together with MARCELO MENDOZA, who was then driving
the same;
"5. That approximately at kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Express Way, the above-described
motor vehicle was suddenly bumped from behind by a Philippine Rabbit Bus with Body No.
353 and with plate No. CVD 478 then being driven by one Mauricio Manliclic of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac, who was then travelling recklessly at a very fast speed and had
apparently lost control of his vehicle;
"6. That as a result of the impact of the collision the above-described motor vehicle was
forced off the North Luzon Express Way towards the rightside where it fell on its drivers side
on a ditch, and that as a consequence, the above-described motor vehicle which maybe
valued at EIGHTY THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000) was rendered a total wreck as shown by
pictures to be presented during the pre-trial and trial of this case;
"7. That also as a result of said incident, plaintiff sustained bodily injuries which compounded
plaintiffs frail physical condition and required his hospitalization from July 12, 1988 up to and
until July 22, 1988, copy of the medical certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A" and made
an integral part hereof;
"8. That the vehicular collision resulting in the total wreckage of the above-described motor
vehicle as well as bodily (sic) sustained by plaintiff, was solely due to the reckless
imprudence of the defendant driver Mauricio Manliclic who drove his Philippine Rabbit Bus
No. 353 at a fast speed without due regard or observance of existing traffic rules and
regulations;
"9. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Line Corporation failed to exercise the diligence of
a good father of (sic) family in the selection and supervision of its drivers; x x x"
31

Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be found negligent notwithstanding the
declaration of the Court of Appeals that there was an absence of negligence on his part?
In exonerating petitioner Manliclic in the criminal case, the Court of Appeals said:
To the following findings of the court a quo, to wit: that accused-appellant was negligent "when the
bus he was driving bumped the jeep from behind"; that "the proximate cause of the accident was his
having driven the bus at a great speed while closely following the jeep"; x x x
We do not agree.
The swerving of Calaunans jeep when it tried to overtake the vehicle in front of it was beyond the
control of accused-appellant.
x x x x
Absent evidence of negligence, therefore, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries as defined in Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code.
32

From the foregoing declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner Manliclic was
acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on the ground that he is not the author of the act complained
of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted
section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action arising
from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,
Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
33

A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime
a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-
delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability
arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-
contractual under the Civil Code.
34
It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a
finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi
delict.
35

In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability
arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is
acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there
is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said
acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance,
there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In
this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by
an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the
act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in
a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the
Penal Code.
36
An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil
case
37
based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
Petitioners ask us to give credence to their version of how the collision occurred and to disregard
that of respondents. Petitioners insist that while the PRBLI bus was in the process of overtaking
respondents jeep, the latter, without warning, suddenly swerved to the left (fast) lane in order to
overtake another jeep ahead of it, thus causing the collision.
As a general rule, questions of fact may not be raised in a petition for review. The factual findings of
the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding and conclusive on the
Supreme Court.
38
Not being a trier of facts, this Court will not allow a review thereof unless:
(1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellees; (7) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
39

After going over the evidence on record, we do not find any of the exceptions that would warrant our
departure from the general rule. We fully agree in the finding of the trial court, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, that it was petitioner Manliclic who was negligent in driving the PRBLI bus which
was the cause of the collision. In giving credence to the version of the respondent, the trial court has
this say:
x x x Thus, which of the two versions of the manner how the collision took place was correct, would
be determinative of who between the two drivers was negligent in the operation of their respective
vehicle.
In this regard, it should be noted that in the statement of Mauricio Manliclic (Exh. 15) given to the
Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading no mention was made by him about the fact that the
driver of the jeep was overtaking another jeep when the collision took place. The allegation that
another jeep was being overtaken by the jeep of Calaunan was testified to by him only in Crim. Case
No. 684-M-89 before the Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan and before this Court. Evidently, it
was a product of an afterthought on the part of Mauricio Manliclic so that he could explain why he
should not be held responsible for the incident. His attempt to veer away from the truth was also
apparent when it would be considered that in his statement given to the Philippine Rabbit
Investigator CV Cabading (Exh. 15), he alleged that the Philippine Rabbit Bus bumped the jeep of
Calaunan while the Philippine Rabbit Bus was behind the said jeep. In his testimony before the
Regional Trial Court in Malolos, Bulacan as well as in this Court, he alleged that the Philippine
Rabbit Bus was already on the left side of the jeep when the collision took place. For this
inconsistency between his statement and testimony, his explanation regarding the manner of how
the collision between the jeep and the bus took place should be taken with caution. It might be true
that in the statement of Oscar Buan given to the Philippine Rabbit Investigator CV Cabading, it was
mentioned by the former that the jeep of plaintiff was in the act of overtaking another jeep when the
collision between the latter jeep and the Philippine Rabbit Bus took place. But the fact, however, that
his statement was given on July 15, 1988, one day after Mauricio Manliclic gave his statement
should not escape attention. The one-day difference between the giving of the two statements would
be significant enough to entertain the possibility of Oscar Buan having received legal advise before
giving his statement. Apart from that, as between his statement and the statement of Manliclic
himself, the statement of the latter should prevail. Besides, in his Affidavit of March 10, 1989, (Exh.
14), the unreliability of the statement of Oscar Buan (Exh. 13) given to CV Cabading rear its "ugly
head" when he did not mention in said affidavit that the jeep of Calaunan was trying to overtake
another jeep when the collision between the jeep in question and the Philippine Rabbit bus took
place.
x x x x
If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his conductor, Oscar
Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat parallel to the jeep when the collision
took place, the point of collision on the jeep should have been somewhat on the left side thereof
rather than on its rear. Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather than having
been forced off the road. Useless, likewise to emphasize that the Philippine Rabbit was running very
fast as testified to by Ramos which was not controverted by the defendants.
40

Having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclics negligence that caused the smash up, there arises the
juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of
the diligence of a good father of a family.
41
Under Article 2180
42
of the New Civil Code, when an
injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under
Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
the private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employee.
43

In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly petitioner Manliclic. In the
matter of selection, it showed the screening process that petitioner Manliclic underwent before he
became a regular driver. As to the exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its employees, it
argues that presence of ready investigators (Ganiban and Cabading) is sufficient proof that it
exercised the required due diligence in the supervision of its employees.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete
proof, including documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on
them.
44

In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
45
it was explained that:
Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation of suitable
rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended
for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its
employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of
breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of
and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of
consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting
through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions.
In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be
deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company
guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to
the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it
has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their
work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without
anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.
We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the formulation of various
company policies on safety without showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to
exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon
petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and
company policies on efficiency and safety were followed." x x x.
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection but not in the supervision of its employees. It expounded as follows:
From the evidence of the defendants, it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good
procedure of recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no evidence
though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel. There has been no iota of evidence
introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding the safe operation of
its vehicle and in the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them. There
is no showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to oversee how its driver
should behave while operating their vehicles without courting incidents similar to the herein case. In
regard to supervision, it is not difficult to observe that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. has been
negligent as an employer and it should be made responsible for the acts of its employees,
particularly the driver involved in this case.
We agree. The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not enough to
exempt petitioner PRBLI from liability arising from the negligence of petitioner Manliclic. Same does
not comply with the guidelines set forth in the cases above-mentioned. The presence of the
investigators after the accident is not enough supervision. Regular supervision of employees, that is,
prior to any accident, should have been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do. The lack
of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of manual containing the
rules and regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI.
46
How then can all the drivers of petitioner PRBLI
know and be continually informed of the rules and regulations when only one manual is being lent to
all the drivers?
For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages
caused by petitioner Manliclics negligence.
We now go to the award of damages. The trial court correctly awarded the amount of P40,838.00 as
actual damages representing the amount paid by respondent for the towing and repair of his
jeep.
47
As regards the awards for moral and exemplary damages, same, under the circumstances,
must be modified. The P100,000.00 awarded by the trial court as moral damages must be reduced
to P50,000.00.
48
Exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good.
49
The amount awarded by the trial court must, likewise, be lowered toP50,000.00.
50
The award
of P15,000.00 for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation is in order and authorized by law.
51

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55909 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the
award of moral damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary damages
shall be lowered to P50,000.00. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.


G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J .:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova
was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by
Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy
secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its
Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the
Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission
of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not
extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor
General, relying on the case ofPeople v. Sendaydiego
1
insists that the appeal should still be resolved
for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General
arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes
both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the
Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia
2
which held that the civil obligation in a criminal
case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die
before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same
issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal
responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain.
Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of
ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as
contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final
and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El
Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y
respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere
recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is
"sentencia firme" under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las
definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso
alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos
al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is
only when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed
"en condena determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused
becomes "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to
Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal
de ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies
before judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final
judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for
the simple reason that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal
Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view. Francisco,
Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised
Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term "final judgment"
in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule
116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes
final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in
writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one
positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code
means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become
executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony
charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in
this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to
be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects of the
case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See
also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed.,
Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is
based solely on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found
guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised
Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out.
His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if
we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be
faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil
liability in a case where the source thereof criminal liability does not exist. And,
as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in
a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal
proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case
3
was adopted by the Supreme Court in the
cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al.,
4
People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et
al.
5
and People of the Philippines v.Satorre
6
by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the accused
pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and
considering that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the
appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was
extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971
Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045);
consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino
Polinar
7
andLamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals
8
ruled differently. In the former, the
issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who died
before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore against his
estate. It was the contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to
final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that
became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the
Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on
account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages
was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action still, since both
proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the
offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the
criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal
act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not exist
independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso
facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final
judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability
springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of
purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was
charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property subject
matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the
accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the
laws of human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding
the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following
ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
9
requires the dismissal of all money
claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First
Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard on
appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such
case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the case as
plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be substituted
as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was
that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of
obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together
with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al.
10
departed from this long-established
principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower court of
malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency
of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the
extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such
claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal
import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire
appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal
action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution
of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived
Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes
of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the
total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec.
1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and
distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa
vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may
be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975;
67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly
disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230;
Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased
Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money
claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts
complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making
applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for
that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the
names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under
administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or
administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the
civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases
11
raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego;
in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability solely
anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due
to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision
in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action impliedly
instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal
offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil
case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act
complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere
in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's
civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an
alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the
criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of
evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the
survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of
whether civil liability ex delictosurvives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of
the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this
matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed
claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted
with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but
merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one which is
dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the
prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings.
12
One would be
hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in
recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted
as it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty
to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability.Mors Omnia
Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal
liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal
action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action
cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true,
would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and
is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which
is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil
action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8,
1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action
referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to
authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under
Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July
8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal
liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable.
13

In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a
determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's
conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although
Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a
reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil
liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil
action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as
it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for
the Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court
made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims,
the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction
by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the
manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been
rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may
be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this
course taken inSendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that where the civil
liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the
judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court
of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the
extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the deceased. This
pronouncement, which has been followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and
consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned as
being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is
neither authority nor justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil
actions instituted together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any
authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary
civil action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21,
Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5
of Rule 86,
14
are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may
include even the restitution of personal or real property."
15
Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive
enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for
the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear
that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could
be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to
in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before
the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal
action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex
delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to
Section 1, Rule 111
16
(1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this
time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of
obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall be
enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law,
result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator
17
of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to
recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce
a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property,
real or personal, may be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala
18
where we held that, in recovering damages for
injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be
filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against the estate
under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses
for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or
implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations other than
those which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil
action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of
the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.
19
Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155
21
of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
22

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e.,
rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.


















G.R. No. 143044. July 14, 2005
WILLIAM MADARANG and EVANS KHO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. OFELIA
ARELLANO-MARQUEZ, Presiding Judge of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY, BRANCH 32 and JANICE YOUNG-CHUA, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks the
reversal of the Decision,
1
dated April 18, 2000, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
58038 dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On February 11, 1994, private respondent Janice Young-Chua and her husband, Eduardo Chan-
Chua, filed a complaint for replevin and damages against petitioners William Madarang and Evans
Kho in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-19266 and raffled
to Branch 84 (RTC, Branch 84). The complaint alleged that private respondent is the owner of a
1990 dark gray Kia Pride car, evidenced by Certificate of Registration No. 08605800
2
dated May 31,
1991; and that on January 29, 1994, petitioners, through force and intimidation, took possession of
the subject car by virtue of a falsified Deed of Sale dated December 3, 1993 allegedly executed by
private respondent in favor of petitioner Madarang.
3

On May 12, 1994, upon complaint of private respondent, petitioner Madarang was charged with
Falsification of Public Document in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (MeTC) which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-24930 and raffled to Branch 32.
4
On the same date, petitioners
were charged with Grave Coercion in the same MeTC which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-
24931, also raffled to Branch 32.
5
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried.
On August 8, 1996, a Motion to Suspend Criminal Proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question
was filed by petitioner Madarang in the MeTC, claiming that the issues presented in the replevin
case pending in RTC, Branch 84 are intimately related to the issues pending before the MeTC, the
resolution of which would necessarily determine the guilt of the accused in the criminal case for
falsification.
6

On October 1, 1996, the MeTC denied petitioner Madarangs motion to suspend proceedings on the
ground that the decision in the civil case for replevin will not be determinative of the guilt of the
accused in the criminal charge for falsification.
7

On March 7, 1997, RTC, Branch 84 dismissed the complaint for replevin upon finding that the deed
of sale is genuine and that private respondent voluntarily surrendered possession of the car to the
petitioners.
8
Private respondent filed a timely appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
57597.
On June 13, 1997, petitioner Madarang filed a Motion to Dismiss the falsification case on the ground
that the decision dismissing the replevin suit in RTC, Branch 84 involving the same parties absolved
him of criminal liability in the falsification case.
9
On January 22, 1998, the MeTC granted the Motion
to Dismiss of petitioner Madarang.
10
On February 27, 1998, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by
the prosecution on the ground that the dismissal was unwarranted since the decision dismissing the
replevin suit in RTC, Branch 84 is not yet final and executory, as it is pending appeal before the CA
and the accused deliberately omitted to send the private prosecutor a copy of said Motion to
Dismiss.
11
On July 27, 1998, the MeTC recalled the dismissal of the case for falsification.
12

Petitioners filed a Second Omnibus Motion to Quash Criminal Case Nos. 94-24930 and 94-24931 on
the ground that the findings of RTC, Branch 84 that the signature of private respondent in the deed
of sale is not falsified and that private respondent voluntarily surrendered possession of the car to
the petitioners bar the prosecution for falsification and grave coercion. Petitioners alleged that the
findings of the RTC are binding and must be given due respect by the MeTC notwithstanding the
appeal taken by private respondent.
13

In its Opposition, the prosecution alleged that: the motion to quash is a mere scrap of paper as it is
contrary to Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court that a Motion to Quash must be filed before
arraignment of accused and such failure to move to quash before entering his plea, accused is
deemed to have waived his right to file the same; and, the replevin suit is an independent civil action,
separate and distinct from these cases for falsification of public document and grave coercion.
14

On March 26, 1999, the MeTC denied petitioners motion to quash, ruling that the decision rendered
by the RTC, Branch 84 in the replevin case cannot absolve petitioners of the charges in the criminal
cases as said decision has not attained finality since it is pending appeal before the CA; and that
petitioners waived any grounds of a Motion to Quash pursuant to Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court.
15

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC, Branch 77, Quezon City (RTC, Branch
77), docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-37324. They assailed the MeTCs denial of their motion to
quash the informations for falsification of public document and grave coercion and alleged that the
MeTC should have adopted the factual findings of RTC, Branch 84 in the Decision dated March 7,
1997 in the replevin case as res judicata.
16

On October 8, 1999, the RTC, Branch 77 dismissed petitioners petition for certiorari upon holding
that: res judicatacannot be invoked considering that the Decision dated March 7, 1997 of RTC,
Branch 84 in the replevin case is not yet a final and executory judgment, being on appeal; in any
event, a final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is not a
bar to criminal action; the issues of falsification and coercion were not made the subject of a full-
dressed hearing in the replevin case; and, the motion to quash was filed only after their arraignment
in violation of the well-settled doctrine that a motion to quash may be filed only before the accused
has entered his plea to the accusatory pleading.
17

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
18
but was denied in an Order dated February 29,
2000.
19

Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which, on April 18, 2000, was
dismissed. In dismissing the petition, the CA held that the writ of certiorari is not the proper remedy
where a motion to quash an information is denied. It further held that the People of the Philippines
was not impleaded as a respondent in the case nor was the Office of the Solicitor General furnished
a copy of the petition when the Informations were filed in the name of the People of the Philippines
and necessarily it is the party interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court.
20

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE ISSUES PRESENTED PROBABLY
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS OR SO FAR SANCTIONED SUCH DEPARTURE
BY THE LOWER COURT AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION.
21

Petitioners claim that the MeTC Judge committed grave abuse of discretion when she denied their
motion to quash the Informations and refused to dismiss the charges against them since the charges
against them pending before her court were "obliterated" by the positive factual findings of RTC,
Branch 84 in its Decision dated March 7, 1997 that the signature of private respondent in the Deed
of Sale dated December 3, 1993 is genuine and she voluntarily surrendered the car to petitioners.
They maintain that such factual findings of RTC, Branch 84 in its Decision dated March 7, 1997 bar
their prosecution in the criminal cases for falsification of public document and grave coercion. They
submit that once a court of competent jurisdiction puts to finish an issue of fact, it cannot be
disturbed by the lower court and, accordingly, the factual findings of RTC, Branch 84 cannot be
overturned by the MeTC.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, avers that the decision in the replevin suit cannot foreclose
or suspend the prosecution of the criminal cases for falsification and grave coercion as replevin is an
entirely separate and distinct remedy allowed by the rules. He states that res judicata cannot apply
for lack of the essential elements of identity of parties and finality of the decision in the replevin suit.
As for private respondent, she argues that the decision of RTC, Branch 84 can not be conclusive
upon the MeTC because it is not a final and executory judgment, being on appeal in the CA, and,
even if final, the rules provide that such final decision does not foreclose prosecution of the criminal
action. She insists that the MeTC Judge did not act beyond her jurisdiction as the denial of the
motion to quash was in accordance with law and jurisprudence and, thus, petitioners resort
to certiorari was improper and appropriately dismissed by the RTC and the CA.
At the outset, we observe that while the assigned errors appear to raise errors of judgment
committed by the CA, the arguments of the petitioners purely dwell on the alleged grave abuse of
discretion or error of jurisdiction committed by the MeTC in denying the Motion to Quash, the very
issue they raised in the petition for certioraribefore the RTC, when the issues that should have been
raised in the petition for review on certiorari before us are the errors of judgment that the CA may
have committed in dismissing their petition for certiorari. Petitioners utter failure to bring up the
matter concerning the CAs bases in dismissing their petition shows that they are evading the issues.
Nonetheless, we find that the CA is correct in dismissing petitioners petition for certiorari.
First. We note that the petitions for certiorari in the RTC and CA are defective since petitioners failed
to implead the People of the Philippines as respondent therein. As provided in Section 5,
22
Rule 110
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and
control of the public prosecutor. The prosecution of offenses is thus the concern of the government
prosecutors. It behooved the petitioners to implead the People of the Philippines as respondent in
the RTC and in the CA to enable the public prosecutor or Solicitor General, as the case may be, to
comment on the petitions. The failure to implead is fatal to petitioners cause.
Second. It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper remedy to
assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that when such an
adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari or
prohibition, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed
down to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.
23
Only when the court issued such order
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and when the assailed
interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief will certiorari be considered an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory
order.
24
No such special circumstances are present in the case at bar.
The declaration of RTC, Branch 84 in its Decision dated March 7, 1997 that the signature of private
respondent in the Deed of Sale dated December 3, 1993 is genuine and she voluntarily surrendered
the car to petitioners is notres judicata in the criminal cases for falsification and grave coercion
because there is no identity of parties as the People of the Philippines is not a party in the replevin
suit and cannot be bound by the factual findings therein. Besides, the decision of RTC, Branch 84 is
still pending appeal with the CA. Hence, at the time the MeTC, the RTC and the CA rendered their
assailed order, decision and resolution, respectively, there existed no special circumstance to
warrant a dismissal of the cases pending in the MeTC.
It is noted that during the pendency of the case before us, the CA has rendered a Decision dated
April 19, 2005 modifying the Decision dated March 7, 1997 of RTC, Branch 84, in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the application for a Writ of Replevin is hereby DENIED, the plaintiff Janice Chua
having executed a Deed of Sale in favor of defendant William Madarang.
The Deed of Sale is however, hereby declared as an equitable mortgage and, therefore, plaintiff
Janice Chua possesses the right of redemption pursuant to Article 1606 of the New Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.
However, records before us do not show that this decision had become final and executory. As a
natural or inherent and inevitable consequence of said declaration, a decision which has not become
final and executory has no conclusive effect.
Third. Section 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the governing law at the time of
the filing of the indictments, provides the grounds on which an accused can move to quash the
complaint or information. These are: (a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) the court
trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d) the officer who filed the information had no authority
to do so; (e) the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) more than one
offense is charged, except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for
various offenses; (g) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (h) the information
contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (i) the accused
has been previously convicted or is in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged.
25

Section 8 of the same Rule specifically provides:
SEC. 8. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. The failure of the accused to
assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either
because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be
deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense charged,
lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy, as
provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3 of this Rule. (10a)
Thus, a motion to quash may still be filed after pleading to the complaint or information where the
grounds are that no offense is charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the
offense or penalty and jeopardy. Nowhere in the enumerated excepted grounds is there any mention
of res judicata as a ground to quash an information.
Fourth. Section 4, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court explicitly recognizes that "a final judgment
rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is no bar to a criminal action."
26

Fifth. Article 33
27
of the Civil Code provides that in cases involving alleged fraudulent acts, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. It is clear, therefore, that the civil case for replevin may
proceed independently of the criminal cases for falsification and grave coercion, especially because
while both cases are based on the same facts, the quantum of proof required for holding the parties
liable therein differs.
28

All told, the petitioners failed to show why the actions of the MeTC, RTC and the CA which have
passed upon the same issue should be reversed. We are thus convinced that the CA committed no
reversible error in its challenged Decision.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
April 18, 2000, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.













G.R. No. 176795 June 30, 2008
SPS. CAROLINA and REYNALDO JOSE, petitioners,
vs.
SPS. LAUREANO and PURITA SUAREZ, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
TINGA, J .:
Petitioners filed this case assailing the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB SP No.
00397 dated 17 August 2006 which affirmed the Orders
2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu
City, Branch 19 restraining Branches 2 and 5 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Cebu
City from proceeding with the criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg.
22) filed against respondent Purita Suarez.
The facts of the case follow.
Respondents, spouses Laureano and Purita Suarez, had availed of petitioner Carolina Joses
(Carolina) offer to lend money at the daily interest rate of 1% to 2%. However, Carolina and her
husband, petitioner Reynaldo Jose, later on increased the interest to 5% per day, which respondents
were forced to accept because they allegedly had no other option left. It then became a practice that
petitioners would give the loaned money to Purita and the latter would deposit the same in her and
her husbands account to cover the maturing postdated checks they had previously issued in
payment of their other loans. Purita would then issue checks in favor of petitioners in payment of the
amount borrowed from them with the agreed 5% daily interest.
On 7 May 2004, respondents filed a Complaint
3
against petitioners seeking the declaration of "nullity
of interest of 5% per day, fixing of interest, recovery of interest payments"
4
and the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction, alleging that the interest rate of 5% a day is iniquitous, contrary to morals,
done under vitiated consent and imposed using undue influence by taking improper advantage of
their financial distress. They claimed that due to serious liquidity problems, they were forced to rely
on borrowings from banks and individual lenders, including petitioners, and that they had to
scramble for funds to cover the maturing postdated checks they issued to cover their other
borrowings. In their prayer, respondents stated:
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that upon the filing of the instant case and in accordance with the
1997 Rules on Civil Procedure[,] a writ of preliminary injunction or at least a temporary
restraining order be issued restraining defendant from enforcing the checks as listed in
Annex "E" including the filing of criminal cases for violation of B.P. [Blg.] 22 and restraining
defendants from entering plaintiffs store and premises to get cash sales and other items
against plaintiffs will [sic] under such terms and conditions as this Court may affix.
5

Thereafter, at the instance of Carolina, several cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
6
were filed against
respondent Purita before the MTCC of Cebu City, Branches 2 and 5. Purita, in turn filed motions to
suspend the criminal proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question, on the theory that the
checks subject of the B.P. Blg. 22 cases are void for being contra bonos mores or for having been
issued in payment of the iniquitous and unconscionable interest imposed by petitioners. The motions
were denied.
7

Respondents thereafter filed before the RTC a "Motion for Writ of Preliminary Injunction with
Temporary Restraining Order"
8
seeking to restrain the MTCCs from further proceeding with the B.P.
Blg. 22 cases on the ground of prejudicial question. Petitioners opposed the motion. Nevertheless,
the RTC through its 20 December 2004 Order
9
issued a writ of preliminary injunction, thereby
enjoining the MTCCs from proceeding with the cases against Purita. Petitioners sought
reconsideration of the order but their motion was denied due course in the RTCs 3 February 2005
Order.
10

Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
11
and questioned the propriety of the RTCs
issuance of a preliminary injunction based on a prejudicial question. The appellate court stated that
respondents had sought to annul the checks for being void pursuant to Article 1422 of the Civil Code
which provides that "a contract which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract, is also void
and inexistent." Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that if the checks subject of the criminal
cases were later on declared null and void, then said checks could not be made the bases of
criminal prosecutions under B.P. Blg. 22. In other words, the outcome of the determination of the
validity of the said checks is determinative of guilt or innocence of Purita in the criminal case.
12

The appellate court also observed that respondents resort to an application for preliminary injunction
could not be considered as forum shopping since it is the only remedy available to them considering
the express proscription of filing a petition for certiorari against interlocutory orders issued in cases
under B.P. Blg. 22 which are governed by the rules on summary procedure.
13

Before us, petitioners submit that because under Section 6, Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure a petition to suspend proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question should be filed in
the same criminal action, the RTC has no jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary injunction as it is
not the court where the B.P. Blg. 22 cases were filed. Moreover, they argue that respondents are
guilty of forum shopping because after the denial of their motion to suspend the proceedings before
Branches 2 and 5 of the MTCC, they resorted to the filing of a motion for preliminary injunction
before the RTC also on the ground of prejudicial question; therefore, they succeeded in getting the
relief in one forum (RTC) which they had failed to obtain in the first forum (MTCCs). Likewise,
petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the civil case poses a prejudicial
question to the B.P. Blg. 22 cases, thus resulting in the erroneous suspension of the proceedings the
latter cases. Finally, petitioners posit that the RTC erred in issuing the preliminary injunction because
respondents have no clear and unmistakable right to its issuance.
14

Respondents, for their part, state that the possibility of a ruling in the civil case to the effect that the
subject checks are contra bonos mores and hence null and void constitutes a prejudicial question in
the B.P. Blg. 22 cases. Thus, proceeding with the trial in the criminal cases without awaiting the
outcome of the civil case is fraught with mischievous consequences.
15
They cite the case of Medel v.
Court of Appeals,
16
wherein the Court nullified the interest rate of 5.5% per month for being contra
bonos mores under Article 1306 of the Civil Code, and recomputed the interest due at the rate of 1%
per month.
17
Thus, if their loans are computed at 1% per month, it would mean that the checks
subject of the B.P. Blg. 22 cases are not only fully paid but are also in fact overpaid. They also
invoke the case of Danao v. Court of Appeals
18
wherein the Court allegedly ruled that there is no
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 if the dishonored checks have been paid.
19
They claim that since the 5%
interest per day was not contained in any written agreement, per Article 1956
20
of the Civil Code,
petitioners are bound to return the total interest they collected from respondents. Respondents point
out that they incorporated in their complaint an application for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order to restrain Carolina from enforcing the interest and from filing criminal cases for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Quoting the RTC, respondents explain:
Since there was no proof at that time that plaintiff sustain or are about to sustain damages or
prejudice if the acts complained of are not enjoined, the application was not acted upon by
the Court. When the attention of the Court was invited by the plaintiffs of the refusal of the
MTC, Branches 2 and 5, to suspend the criminal proceedings despite being appraised of the
pendency of this case, the Court has to act accordingly.
21

Respondents maintain that they are not guilty of forum shopping because after the denial by the
MTCCs of their motion to suspend proceedings, their only available remedy was the filing of an
application for preliminary injunction in the existing civil case filed earlier than the B.P. Blg. 22 cases.
In any case, respondents argue that the rule on forum shopping is not intended to deprive a party to
a case of a legitimate remedy.
22
Finally, they claim that the case falls under the exceptions to the rule
that the prosecution of criminal cases may not be enjoined by a writ of injunction, considering that in
this case there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice, and that there is persecution rather than
prosecution.
23

The case hinges on the determination of whether there exists a prejudicial question which
necessitates the suspension of the proceedings in the MTCCs.
We find that there is none and thus we resolve to grant the petition.
A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved
before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has
two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
24

Now the prejudicial question posed by respondents is simply this: whether the daily interest rate of
5% is void, such that the checks issued by respondents to cover said interest are likewise void for
being contra bonos mores, and thus the cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer prosper.
The prejudicial question theory advanced by respondents must fail.
In the first place, the validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not determinative of the guilt of
respondents in the criminal cases. The Court has consistently declared that the cause or reason for
the issuance of a check is inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under B.P. Blg. 22.
25
In
several instances, we have held that what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and
not the purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance; and that
the mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum provided the other elements of the
offense are properly proved.
26

The nature and policy of B.P. Blg. 22 were aptly enunciated by the Court in Meriz v. People,
27
when
it stated:
x x x. [B.P. Blg.] 22 does not appear to concern itself with what might actually be envisioned
by the parties, its primordial intention being to instead ensure the stability and commercial
value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency. It is a policy that can easily be
eroded if one has yet to determine the reason for which checks are issued, or the terms and
conditions for their issuance, before an appropriate application of the legislative enactment
can be made. The gravamen of the offense under [B.P. Blg.] 22 is the act of making or
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for payment. The
act effectively declares the offense to be one of malum prohibitum. The only valid query then
is whether the law has been breached, i.e., by the mere act of issuing a bad check, without
so much regard as to the criminal intent of the issuer.
28

Thus, whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is eventually declared void for
being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the B.P. Blg. 22 cases because what will
ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In fact, the primordial question
posed before the court hearing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether the law has been breached, that is,
if a bouncing check has been issued.
The issue has in fact been correctly addressed by the MTCCs when respondents motion to suspend
the criminal proceedings was denied upon the finding that there exists no prejudicial question which
could be the basis for the suspension of the proceedings. The reason for the denial of the motion is
that the "cases can very well proceed for the prosecution of the accused in order to determine her
criminal propensity as a consequence of the issuance of several checks which subsequently
bounced" for "what the law punishes is the issuance and/or drawing of a check and upon
presentment for deposit or encashment, it was dishonored due to insufficient funds [or] account
closed."
29

There being no prejudicial question, the RTC and, consequently, the Court of Appeals gravely erred
when they allowed the suspension of the proceedings in the B.P. Blg. 22 cases.
Now, on to other matters.
We find that respondents are guilty of forum shopping. There is forum shopping when a party seeks
to obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had already been solicited, and in other courts
and other proceedings in other tribunals. Forum shopping is the act of one party against another,
when an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another and possibly
favorable opinion in another forum other than by appeal or by special civil action of certiorari; or the
institution of two or more acts or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that
one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.
30

Respondents filed their motions to suspend proceedings in the MTCCs hearing the B.P. Blg. 22
cases but unfortunately, the same were denied. Failing to get the relief they wanted, respondents
sought before the RTC, the suspension of the criminal proceedings which was granted.
Respondents tried to extricate themselves from the charge of forum shopping by explaining that after
the denial of their motions to suspend, their only remedy was the application for preliminary
injunction in the civil casea relief which they had already asked for in their complaint and which
was also initially not granted to them. Any which way the situation is viewed, respondents acts
constituted forum shopping since they sought a possibly favorable opinion from one court after
another had issued an order unfavorable to them.
The Court notes that three cases, namely, Ras v. Rasul,
31
Medel v. CA
32
and Danao v. Court of
Appeals
33
finding no application to the instant casewere mentioned by the RTC, the Court of
Appeals and by respondents themselves in support of their position.
Ras v. Rasul cropped up in the order of the RTC which was quoted with approval by the Court of
Appeals. According to the RTC, the ruling in the said case allegedly "can be squarely applied in this
case which nullified and set aside the conviction in a criminal case because of a prejudicial
question."
34
We do not agree. The Ras case involves a petition for nullification of a deed of sale on
the ground of forgery. While the civil case was pending, an information for estafa was filed against
the respondent in the civil case. The Court ruled that there were prejudicial questions considering
that the defense against the charge of forgery in the civil case is based on the very same facts which
would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the estafa case. The instant
case is different from Ras inasmuch as the determination of whether the 5% daily interest is contra
bonos mores and therefore void, or that the total amount loaned from petitioners has been
sufficiently paid, will not affect the guilt or innocence of Purita because the material question in the
B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether Purita had issued a bad check, regardless of the purpose or condition
of its issuance.
Medel v. CA is the case upon which respondents anchor their claim that the interest due on their
loans is only 1% per month and thus they have already overpaid their obligation to petitioners.
In Medel, the Court declared that the rate of 5.5% interest per month on a P500,000.00 loan is
iniquitous, unconscionable and hence contrary to morals, and must equitably be reduced to 12% per
annum. While the Medel case made a finding that the stipulated interest rate is excessive and thus
may be equitably reduced by the courts, we do not see how a reduction of the interest rate, should
there be any, or a subsequent declaration that the amount due has been fully paid, will have an
effect on the determination of whether or not Purita had in fact issued bouncing checks.
Meanwhile, respondents misunderstood our ruling in Danao v. Court of Appeals, which they claim to
have ruled that there could be no violation of B.P. Blg. 22 if the dishonored checks have been paid.
In Danao, the accused was convicted by the trial court for having issued two checks which
eventually bounced. The Court found that there was no proof of receipt by the accused of any notice
of nonpayment of the checks, and thus there was no way of determining when the five-day period
prescribed in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 would start and end. Thus, the presumption or prima
facie evidence of knowledge of the insufficiency of funds or credit at the time of the issuance of the
checks did not arise. While there was a finding that the accused had already paid her obligations
prior to receipt of the complainants demand letter,
35
there was no declaration from the Court that
such payment exonerated accused from liability for having issued bouncing checks. Instead,
accused was acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence, and not because she had paid the amount
covered by the dishonored checks
36
or that the obligation was deemed paid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The impugned Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17
August 2006 and its Resolution dated 27 February 2007, in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00397, are SET
ASIDE. The preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19 in its
Order dated 20 December 2004 in Civil Case No. CEB-30278 enjoining the proceedings in the
criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is LIFTED ANDSET ASIDE and the MTCC of Cebu City,
Branches 2 and 5 are ORDERED to proceed with dispatch with the arraignment and trial in the B.P.
Blg. 22 cases pending before them.
SO ORDERED.







G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner,
vs.
ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without
said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a
second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third
marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an
information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25, 1998, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime
thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first
marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a
motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case
for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted
the motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998.
1
Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent should have first
obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage,
inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a
legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code.
2

The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for
bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved therein.
3
It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but
so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
4
It must
appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also
that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the
criminal case.
5
Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the
same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter
action may proceed.
6
Its two essential elements are:
7

(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply
tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of
the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically
admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the information,
considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on the indictment or may
not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of
prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal
suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage,
requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The
clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the
validity or invalidity of the marriage.
8
Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license
is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second
marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted
provided all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage
which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first
marriage.
9

In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He
cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy
charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally
void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage
aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the
first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly
held in Landicho v. Relova:
10

(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the
first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a marriage
license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her marriage to respondent was exempt from the
requirement of a marriage license. More specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage,
they had already attained the age of majority and had been living together as husband and wife for
at least five years.
11
The issue in this case is limited to the existence of a prejudicial question, and
we are not called upon to resolve the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state
that the Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated, provides that "every intendment
of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds."
12
[]
Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the
same must be submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists.
13
No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of
an element is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the
Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled inLandicho
v. Relova,
14
he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case
may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a
recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of
marriage is not a prejudicial question.
15
This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes
presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully invoked as
an excuse.
16
The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been
complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the
Revised Penal Code.
17
The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to
know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the
second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to
delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If he
wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he
presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.
The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage was
contracted rests upon the defense,
18
but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy
case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may be
used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower court,
therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover, when respondent was
indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It
was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial declaration
of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the
civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal
prosecution. As has been discussed above, this cannot be done.1awphi 1
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second
marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such
fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void.
19
The reason
is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In
the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the
time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.
20
Against this legal backdrop, any decision in
the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage
during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above,
respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against
him.
21

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial court is ordered to
IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.
SO ORDERED.









G.R. No. L-5930 February 17, 1954
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABELO ARAGON, defendant-appellant.
Amadeo D. Seno for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Francisco Carreon and Solicitor Ramon L. Avancea for appellee.
LABRADOR, J .:
The defendant in the above-entitled case is charged in the Court of First Instance of Cebu with the
crime of bigamy, for having contracted a second marriage with one Efigenia C. Palomer on
September 21, 1947, while his previous valid marriage with Martina Godinez was still subsisting and
had not been dissolved. The information is dated May 22, 1951. On October 11, 1951, while the
case was pending trial, Efigenia C. Palomer filed a civil action in the same Court of First Instance of
Cebu against the defendant -appellant, alleging that the latter "by means of force, threats and
intimidation of bodily harm, forced plaintiff to marry him", and praying that their marriage on
September 21, 1947 be annulled (Annex A). Thereupon and on April 30, 1952, defendant-appellant
filed a motion in the criminal case for bigamy, praying that the criminal charge be provisionally
dismissed, on the ground that the civil action for annulment of the second marriage is a prejudicial
question. The court denied this motion on the ground that the validity of the second marriage may be
determined in the very criminal action for bigamy. Against this order this appeal has been presented
to this court.
It is contended that as the marriage between the defendant-appellant and Efigenia C. Palomer is
merely a voidable marriage, and not an absolutely valid marriage, it can not be attacked in the
criminal action and, therefore, it may not be considered therein; consequently, that the civil action to
annul the second marriage should first be decided and the criminal action, dismissed. It is not
necessary to pass upon this question because we believe that the order of denial must be sustained
on another ground.
Prejudicial question has been defined to be that which arises in a case, the resolution of which
(question) is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal (Cuestion prejudicial, es la que surge en un pleito o causa, cuya
resolucion sea antecedente logico de la cuestion objeto del pleito o causa y cuyo conocimiento
corresponda a los Tribunales de otro orden o jurisdiccion X Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p.
228). The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court; this is first
element. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal; this is the second
element. In an action for bigamy, for example, if the accused claims that the first marriage is null and
void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another tribunal, the civil action for nullity must
first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed; hence, the validity of the first marriage is a
prejudicial question.
There is no question that if the allegations of the complaint on time the marriage contracted by
defendant-appellant with Efigenia C. Palomer is illegal and void (Sec. 29, Act 3613 otherwise known
as the Marriage Law). Its nullity, however, is no defense to the criminal action for bigamy filed
against him. The supposed use of force and intimidation against the woman, Palomer, even if it were
true, is not a bar or defense to said action. Palomer, were she the one charged with bigamy, could
perhaps raise said force or intimidation as a defense, because she may not be considered as having
freely and voluntarily committed the act if she was forced to the marriage by intimidation. But not the
other party, who used the force or intimidation. The latter may not use his own malfeasance to
defeat the action based on his criminal act.
It follows that the pendency of the civil action for the annulment of the marriage filed by Efigenia C.
Palomer, is absolutely immaterial to the criminal action filed against defendant-appellant. This civil
action does not decide that defendant-appellant did not enter the marriage against his will and
consent, because the complaint does not allege that he was the victim of force and intimidation in
the second marriage; it does not determine the existence of any of the elements of the charge of
bigamy. A decision thereon is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is,
therefore, not a prejudicial question.
There is another reason for dismissing the appeal. The order appealed from is one denying a motion
to dismiss and is not a final judgment. It is, therefore, not appealable (Rule 118, secs. 1 and 2).
The order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against defendant-appellant. So ordered.