THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2012

cse digest of aristotle ong

1. CSC V. DACOYCOY (1999)


The law defines nepotism
[9]
as follows:
"Sec. 59. Nepotism. - (1) All appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal
governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or
controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority,
or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over
him, are hereby prohibited.

"As used in this Section, the word "relative" and members of the family referred to are those
related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.

(2) The following are exempted from the operations of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons
employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such
appointment shall be made to the Commission."

The Facts:
On November 29, 1995, George P. Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen Chapter,
Northern Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission, Quezon City, a complaint against Pedro O.
Dacoycoy, for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism.
[1]


Civil ServiceCommission found respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a
result of the appointment of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker,
respectively, and their assignment under his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School
Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from
the service.
[3]


Decision:

Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative
within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:
1. appointing authority;
2. recommending authority
3. chief of the bureau or office, and
4. person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. In
Debulgado, we stressed that "[T]the basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also
strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one."
[25]
"The Court was
unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and
comprehensive."
[26]
If not within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or
bated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case "what we need now is
not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the `outstanding' civil servants, but also to plug the hidden
gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing legal procedures in
order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law."
[27]


WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44711.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court REVIVES and AFFIRMS the resolutions of
the Civil Service Commissiondated January 28, 1998 and September 30, 1998, dismissing
respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy from the service.


2. MATHAY V. CSC (1999)

The power to appoint is vested in the local chief executive and not with thelocal legislative
unit or Sanggunian
The provisions of B.P. 337 are clear. As stated above, the power to appoint is vested in the
local chief executive.
[9]
The power of the city council or sanggunian, on the other hand, is
limited to creating,consolidating and reorganizing city officers and positions supported by
local funds. The city council has no power to appoint. This is clear from Section 177 of
B.P. 337 which lists the powers of thesanggunian. The power to appoint is not one of
them. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
[10]
Had Congress intended to grant the power
to appoint to both the city council and the local chief executive, it would have said so in no
uncertain terms.
The Facts:
During his term as Mayor of Quezon City, Mr. Brigido R. Simon appointed private
respondents
[2]
to positions in the Civil Service Unit ("CSU") of the local government of Quezon
City. Civil Service Units were created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 51 which was allegedly
signed into law on November 15 or 16, 1972.
On February 23, 1990, the Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion No. 33, stating that Presidential
Decree No. 51 was never published in the Official Gazette. Therefore, conformably with our ruling
in Tanada vs. Tuvera
[3]
the presidential decree is deemed never "in force or effect and therefore
cannot at present, be a basis for establishment of the CSUs . . . ."
[4]


On June 4, 1990, the Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, directing
all CivilService Regional or Field Offices to recall, revoke and disapprove within one year from
issuance of the said Memorandum, all appointments in CSUs created pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 51 on the ground that the same never became law. Among those affected by the
revocation of appointments are private respondents in these three petitions.
For Quezon City CSU employees, the effects of the circular were temporarily cushioned by the
enactment of City Ordinance No. NC-140, Series of 1990, which established the Department of
Public Order and Safety ("DPOS").
Mayor Brigido R. Simon remedied the situation by offering private respondents contractual
appointments for the period of June 5, 1991 to December 31, 1991. The appointments were
renewed by Mayor Simon for the period of January 1, 1992 to June 30, 1992.

On May 11, 1992, petitioner Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. was elected Mayor of Quezon City. On July 1,
1992, Mayor Mathay again renewed the contractual appointments of all private respondents
effective July 1 to July 31, 1992. Upon their expiry, these appointments, however, were no longer
renewed.
The non-renewal by Quezon City Mayor Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. of private respondents'
appointments became the seed of discontent from which these three consolidated petitions grew.

Decision:

By ordering petitioner to "reinstate" private respondents pursuant to Section 3 of the Ordinance,
theCivil Service Commission substituted its own judgment for that of the appointing power. This cannot be
done. In a long line of cases,
[11]
we have consistently ruled that the Civil Service Commission's power is
limited to approving or disapproving an appointment. It does not have the authority to direct that an
appointment of a specific individual be made. Once the Civil Service Commission attests whether the
person chosen to fill a vacant position is eligible, its role in the appointment process necessarily ends.
The Civil Service Commission cannot encroach upon the discretion vested in the appointing authority.


Therefore, we rule that the Civil Service Commission has no legal standing to prosecute G.R. No.
126354.
WHEREFORE, the petitions of Ismael A. Mathay in G.R. No.124374 and G.R. No. 126366
are GRANTED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals dated March 21, 1996 and January 15,
1996 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The petition of the Civil Service Commission in G.R. No. 126354 is DISMISSED for lack of legal standing
to sue. The assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated July 5, 1996 is AFFIRMED.


3. LAPINID V. CSC (1991)

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which
it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on
the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide.
The Facts:
Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to the position of
Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal on October 1, 1988. This
appointment was protested on December 15, 1988, by private respondent Juanito Junsay, who
reiterated his earlier representations with the Appeals Board of the PPA on May 9, 1988, for a
review of the decision of the Placement Committee dated May 3, 1988. He contended that he
should be designated terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view of his
preferential right thereto.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Commission finds the appeal meritorious. It
is thus obvious that Protestants Junsay (79.5) and Villegas (79) have an edge over that of
protestees Lapinid (75) and Dulfo (78).

Foregoing premises considered, it is directed that Appellants Juanito Junsay and Benjamin
Villegas be appointed as Terminal Supervisor (SG 18) vice protestees Renato Lapinid and
Antonio Dulfo respectively who may be considered for appointment to any position
commensurate and suitable to their qualifications, and that the Commission be notified within ten
(10) days of the implementation hereof.

Decision:

Only recently, in Gaspar v. Court of Appeals,
[2]
this Court said:
The only function of the Civil Service Commission in cases of this nature, according to Luego, is to
review the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil ServiceLaw, and when it finds the
appointee to be qualified and all other legal requirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has no choice
but to attest to the appointment. Luego finally points out that the recognition by the Commission that both
the appointee and the protestant are qualified for the position in controversy renders it functus officio in
the case and prevents it from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the former's
appointment; it has no authority to revoke the appointment simply because it considers another employee
to be better qualified for that would constitute an encroachment on the discretion vested in the appointing
authority.
The determination of who among several candidates for a vacant position has the best
qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of the Department Head or appointing authority and not
in the Civil Service Commission. Every particular job in an office calls for both formal and informal
qualifications. Formal qualifications such as age, number of academic units in a certain course,
seminars attended, etc., may be valuable but so are such intangibles as resourcefulness, team
spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition, prospects for the future, and best interests of the service.
Given the demands of a certain job, who can do it best should be left to the Head of the Office
concerned provided the legal requirements for the office are satisfied.
The Civil Service Commission cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Head of Office in this
regard
Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court cannot compel. While the act of
appointment may in proper cases be the subject of mandamus, the selection itself of the
appointee - taking into account the totality of his qualifications, including those abstract qualities
that define his personality - is the prerogative of the appointing authority. This is a matter
addressed only to the discretion of the appointing authority. It is a political question that
the Civil Service Commission has no power to review under the Constitution and the applicable
laws.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the
respondent Civil Service Commission dated February 14, 1990, May 25, 1990, August 17, 1990,
and October 19, 1990, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order dated
December 13, 1990, is made PERMANENT. No costs.

4. ABELLA V. CSC (2004)
Both the appointing authority and the appointee are the real parties in interest, and both have
legal standing, in a suit assailing a Civil Service Commission (CSC) order disapproving an appointment.
Despite having legal interest and standing, herein petitioner unsuccessfully challenges the
constitutionality of the CSC circular that classifies certain positions in the career service of the
government. In sum, petitioner was appointed to a Career Executive Service (CES) position, but did not
have the corresponding eligibility for it; hence, the CSC correctly disapproved his appointment.

The Facts:
Petitioner Francisco A. Abella, Jr., a lawyer, retired from the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA),
now the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), on July 1, 1996 as Department Manager of the
Legal Services Department. He held a civil service eligibility for the position of Department Manager,
having completed the training program for Executive Leadership and Management in 1982 under
the Civil Service Academy, pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 850 dated April 16, 1979, which was then the
required eligibility for said position.
Two years after his retirement, petitioner was hired by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) on a
contractual basis. On January 1, 1999, petitioner was issued by SBMA a permanent employment as
Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center. However, when said appointment was submitted
to respondent Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. III, it was disapproved on the ground that
petitioners eligibility was not appropriate. Petitioner was advised by SBMA of the disapproval of his
appointment. In view thereof, petitioner was issued a temporary appointment as Department Manager III,
Labor and Employment Center, SBMA on July 9, 1999.

Decision:


Approval Required for
Permanent Appointment
A permanent appointment in the career service is issued to a person who has met the requirements of the
position to which the appointment is made in accordance with the provisions of law, the rules and the
standards promulgated pursuant thereto.
[13]
It implies the civil service eligibility of the appointee.
[14]
Thus,
while the appointing authority has the discretion to choose whom to appoint, the choice is subject to the
caveat that the appointee possesses the required qualifications.
[15]

To make it fully effective, an appointment to a civil service position must comply with all legal
requirements.
[16]
Thus, the law requires the appointment to be submitted to the CSC which will ascertain,
in the main, whether the proposed appointee is qualified to hold the position and whether the rules
pertinent to the process of appointment were observed.
[17]
The applicable provision of
theCivil Service Law reads:
SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall administer
the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and functions:


x x x x x x x x x

(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service, except
those of presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen,
and jail guards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or
required qualifications. An appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing
authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved
by the Commission, if this should take place, without prejudice to the liability of the appointing authority
for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or rules: Provided, finally, That the Commission shall
keep a record of appointments of all officers and employees in the civil service. All appointments requiring
the approval of the Commission as herein provided, shall be submitted to it by the appointing authority
within thirty days from issuance, otherwise, the appointment becomes ineffective thirty days thereafter.
[18]



5. CSC V. TINAYA (2005)
In Lazo vs. Civil Service Commission,
[11]
we held that under the Constitution,the Civil Service
Commission is the central personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of
determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to
the civil service.

The Facts:

On November 16, 1993, Pastor B. Tinaya, respondent, was issued a permanent appointment as
municipal assessor of the Municipality of Tabontabon, Leyte by Municipal Mayor Priscilla R. Justimbaste.
On December 1, 1993, the CSC Regional Office No. VIII approved the appointment but only
as temporary, effective for one (1) year from December 1, 1993 to November 30, 1994.

On December 16, 1993 or fifteen (15) days after the approval of his appointment, respondent married
Caridad R. Justimbaste, daughter of Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste.


Meanwhile, Mayor Priscilla Justimbaste was on leave of absence from November 23, 1994 up to
December 29, 1994. Vice-Mayor Rosario C. Luban was then the Acting Mayor.
On December 1, 1994, after the expiration of respondents temporary appointment, Acting Mayor
Luban appointed him anew as municipal assessor effective that day. The appointment was
permanent.


the CSC Regional Office No. VIII issued an Order dated November 9, 1999
[7]
recalling
respondents appointment, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the approval of the appointment of Pastor Tinaya as
Municipal Assessor, LGU Tabontabon, Leyte, is hereby RECALLED for having been issued in
violation of the law on Nepotism.

The Civil Service Leyte Field Office is hereby directed to cause the necessary action on the
appointment and service card of Mr. Tinaya.

Decision:


The powers and functions of petitioner are defined in Section 9 (h) of the Civil Service Law, thus:
SECTION. 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall administer
the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and functions:

x x x

(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service,
except those of presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces,
firemen, and jail guards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the
appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. An appointment shall take effect immediately upon
issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall remain
effective until it is disapproved by the Commission, if this should take place, without prejudice to the
liability of the appointing authority for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or rules: Provided,
finally, That the Commission shall keep a record of appointments of all officers and employees in
the civil service. All appointments requiring the approval of the Commission as herein provided, shall be
submitted to it by the appointing authority within thirty days from issuance, otherwise, the appointment
becomes ineffective thirty days thereafter;

SEC. 59. Nepotism. (1) All appointments in the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or
in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, made in
favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of
the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.

As used in this Section, the word relative and members of the family referred to are those related within
the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.

x x x.

Petitioner has the power to recall an appointment in violation of civil service law, rules and regulations.
Section 20, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V (Civil Service) of the Administrative Code
of 1987, provides:
SEC. 20. Notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same may be recalled on
any of the following grounds:

x x x

(d) violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations.


6. CSC V. ALBAO (2005)


The Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency of the government, it is expressly
conferred the power and authority to initiate the proceedings against public officials and
employees. The authority is contained in Section 12 (11), (16) in relation to Section 16 (15 [c]), Title
1(A), Book V of Executive Order No. 292, thus:

Section 12. Powers and Functions -- The Commission shall have the following powers and
functions:
. . .

(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal,
including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the
agencies attached to it. . . .
[12]


The Facts:
On September 1, 1998, the Office of the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines issued an
original and permanent appointment
[2]
for the position of Executive Assistant IV to respondent Ranulfo P.
Albao. Respondent was then a contractual employee at said Office.
[3]



On October 5, 1998, petitioner issued an Order
[5]
holding that it has found, after a fact-finding
investigation, that a prima facie case exists against respondent Albao for Dishonesty and Falsification of
Official Documents, committed as follows:
1. That in support of his permanent appointment as Executive Assistant IV, in the Office of the
Vice-President, he stated in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS) accomplished on July 1, 1998 that he took
and passed the Assistant Electrical Engineer Examination held on October 15 and 16, 1988 with a rating
of 71.64%;

2. To support his claim, he submitted a Report of Rating showing he obtained a rating of
71.64% during the aforesaid Assistant Electrical Engineering Examination, all purportedly issued by the
Professional Regulation Commission(PRC); and

3. That the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) has informed CSC-NCR that the name
Ranulfo P. Albao does not appear in the Table of Results and Masterlists of examinees of the Board of
Electrical Engineering which contain the names of those who took the Assistant Electrical Engineer
Examination given in October, 1988; and

4. That the examinee number appearing in his Report of Rating is assigned to one Bienvenido
Anio, Jr.
[6]


The Issue:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT CSC-NCR
EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT INSTITUTED THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST HEREIN RESPONDENT.

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE POWER
CONFERRED UPON THE PETITIONER TO HEAR AND DECIDE ADMINISTRATIVE CASES DOES
NOT INCLUDE THE POWER TO ITSELF INITIATE AND PROSECUTE SAID CASES.
[11]


Decision:


Settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the law.
[14]
Republic v. Court of
Appeals
[15]
also enunciated that only a statute can confer jurisdiction on courts and administrative
agencies.
Article IX-B, Section 3 of the Constitution declares the Civil Service Commission as the central personnel
agency of the Government, thus:
Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the Government, shall
establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It shall strengthen the merit and rewards system,
integrate all human resources development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a
management climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress
an annual report on its personnel programs.

Section 12, Title 1 (A), Book V of EO No. 292 enumerates the powers and functions of
the CivilService Commission, one of which is its quasi-judicial function under paragraph 11, which states:
Section 12. Powers and Functions -- The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal,
including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies
attached to it. . . .
[16]


WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
64671 and its Resolution promulgated on September 26, 2002 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
petitioner is declared vested with the power to institute the administrative proceedings against respondent
for alleged falsification of eligibility.




7. CSC V. SOJOR (2008)
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall
have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and
employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and
efficiency of such officers and employees.

The Facts:

On August 1, 1991, respondent Sojor was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as president of
the Central Visayas Polytechnic College (CVPC) in Dumaguete City. In June 1997, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8292, or the "Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997," was enacted. This law mandated that a
Board of Trustees (BOT) be formed to act as the governing body in state colleges. The BOT of CVPC
appointed respondent as president, with a four-year term beginning September 1998 up to September
2002.
[3]
Upon the expiration of his first term of office in 2002, he was appointed president of the institution
for a second four-year term, expiring on September 24, 2006.
[4]

On June 25, 2004, CVPC was converted into the Negros Oriental State University (NORSU).
[5]
A Board of
Regents (BOR) succeeded the BOT as its governing body.
Meanwhile, three (3) separate administrative cases against respondent were filed by CVPC faculty
members before the CSC Regional Office (CSC-RO) No. VII in Cebu City

He claimed that the CSC had no jurisdiction over him as a presidential appointee. Being part of the non-
competitive or unclassified service of the government, he was exclusively under the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the Office of the President (OP).

Decision:
It is evident that CSC has been granted by the Constitution and the Administrative Code jurisdiction over
all civil service positions in the government service, whether career or non-career. From this grant of
general jurisdiction, the CSC promulgated the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
theCivil Service.
[35]
We find that the specific jurisdiction, as spelled out in the CSC rules, did not depart
from the general jurisdiction granted to it by law. The jurisdiction of the Regional Office of the CSC and
the Commission central office (Commission Proper) is specified in the CSC rules as:


Section 5. Jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission Proper. - The Civil Service
Commission Proper shall have jurisdiction over the following cases:
A. Disciplinary
1. Decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for review;
2. Decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other
instrumentalities, imposing penalties exceeding thirty days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding
thirty days salary brought before it on appeal;
3. Complaints brought against Civil Service Commission Proper personnel;
4. Complaints against third level officials who are not presidential appointees;
5. Complaints against Civil Service officials and employees which are not acted upon by
the agencies and such other complaints requiring direct or immediate action, in the interest of
justice;
6. Requests for transfer of venue of hearing on cases being heard by Civil S ervice Regional
Offices;
7. Appeals from the Order of Preventive Suspension; and
8. Such other actions or requests involving issues arising out of or in connection with the
foregoing enumerations.

B. Non-Disciplinary
1. Decisions of Civil Service Commission Regional Offices brought before it;
2. Requests for favorable recommendation on petition for executive clemency;
3. Protests against the appointment, or other personnel actions, involving third level officials;
and
4. Such other analogous actions or petitions arising out of or in relation with the foregoing
enumerations.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The assailed Resolutions of
the Civil Service Commission are REINSTATED.


8. RABOR V. CSC (1995)

"It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity
that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate
authority and promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its
policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to
anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the
law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the
standards that the law prescribes."
[18]
(Italics supplied)
The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an administrative
regulation, must be governed by the principle that administrative regulations adopted under legislative
authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for
the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions (People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166,
October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30,
1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660;
Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). x x x. The rule on limiting to one year the
extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65)
years, but has less than fifteen (15) years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, S.
1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no relationship or connection with any provision
of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of the law, not
merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil Service Commission has no power to supply perceived
omissions in P.D. 1146."
[16]


The Facts:
Sometime in May 1991,
[1]
Alma D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City,
advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he had already reached the age of
sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with thirteen (13) years and one (1) month of
government service. Rabor responded to this advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of Membership"
[2]
issued
by the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May 1988. At the bottom of this
"Certificate of Membership" is a typewritten statement of the following tenor: "Service extended to comply
15 years service reqts." This statement is followed by a non-legible initial with the following date
"2/28/91."


In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director Filemon B. Cawad of CSRO-XI advised Davao City.
Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte as follows:
"Please be informed that the extension of services of Mr. Rabor is contrary to M.C. No. 65 of
the Office of the President, the relevant portion of which is hereunder quoted:
'Officials and employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years
shall not be retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the
retention shall not exceed six (6) months.'

IN VIEW WHEREFORE, please be advised that the services of Mr. Dominador [M.] Rabor
as Utility Worker in that office, is already non- extend[i]ble."
[3]


Accordingly, on 8 August 1991, Mayor Duterte furnished a copy of the 26 July 1991 letter of
Director Cawad to Rabor and advised him "to stop reporting for work effective August 16,
1991."
[4]


Decision:

We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions of service after an
employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane to
the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law.

"Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that extending the service of
compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-comers in the
government service and in effect discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age;
(2) delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for
employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the various government
examinations but must wait for jobs to be vacated by 'extendees' who have long passed the mandatory
retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service to complete 15 years so they may
qualify for old-age pension."
[24]
(Italics supplied


Applying now the results of our reexamination of the instant case, we believe and so hold
thatCivil Service Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28 April 1992 dismissing the appeal of petitioner Rabor and
affirming the action of CSRO-XI Director Cawad dated 26 July 1991, must be upheld and affirmed.
ACCORDINGLY, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.


9. CSC V. PCSO (2010)

Positions in the Career Executive Service under the Administrative Code include those of the position of
Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director,
Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career
Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President. Simply put, third-level positions in
the Civil Service are only those belonging to the Career Executive Service, or those appointed by the
President of the Philippines.

The Facts:


On March 16, 2005, the Board of Directors of PCSO resolved to appoint Josefina A. Sarsonas as
Assistant Department Manager II of the Internal Audit Department (IAD) of PCSO under temporary status.
Thus, on the same day, PCSO General Manager Rosario Uriarte issued a temporary appointment to
Sarsonas as Assistant Department Manager II.
[3]

On April 26, 2005, the Civil Service Commission Field Office - Office of the President (CSCFO-
OP)disapproved the temporary appointment of Sarsonas as she failed to meet the eligibility requirement
for the position.
[4]
CSCFO-OP certified that there were qualified individuals who signified their interest to
be appointed to the position, namely, Mercedes Hinayon and Reynaldo Martin.
[5]


The Issue:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE CSC RESOLUTIONS
DISAPPROVING THE TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS OF SARSONAS AND ORTEGA AS ASSISTANT
DEPARTMENT MANAGER II FOR LACK OF THE REQUIRED THIRD LEVEL ELIGIBILITY.

Decision:



Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 provides for three (3) classes
or levels in the career service. Book V, Title I, Subsection A, Chapter 2, Section 8 thereof provides:
SEC. 8. Classes of Positions in the Career Service. - (1) Classes of positions in the
career service appointment to which requires examinations shall be grouped into three
major levels as follows:
(a) The first level shall include clerical, trades, crafts, and custodial service positions which
involve non-professional or sub professional work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity
requiring less than four years of collegiate studies;
(b) The second level shall include professional, technical, and scientific positions which involve
professional, technical or scientific work in a non-supervisory or supervisory capacity requiring at least
four years of college work up to Division Chief level; and
(c) The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service.
(2) Except as herein otherwise provided, entrance to the first two levels shall be through
competitive examinations, which shall be open to those inside and outside the servicewho shall
meet the minimum qualification requirements. Entrance to a higher level does not require previous
qualification in the lower level. Entrance to the third level shall be prescribed by the Career
Executive Service Board.
(3) Within the same level, no civil service examination shall be required for promotion to a
higher position in one or more related occupation groups. A candidate for promotion should,
however, have previously passed the examination for that level. (Emphasis provided.)


Section 7 of the same code specifically delineates the coverage of the Career
Executive Service, thus:
SEC. 7. Career Service. - The Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance based
on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination, or based on
highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3)
security of tenure.

The Career Service shall include:

(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate
examination is required;

(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include
the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in
scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;

(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary,
Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief
of Department Service and other officers of equal rank as may be identified by the Career
Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President;

(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the
President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;

(5) Commissioned officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a
separate merit system;

(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing
governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and

(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled. (Emphasis provided.)


In the case at bench, it is undisputed that the position of Assistant Department Manager II is not one of
those enumerated under the Administrative Code of 1987. There is also no question that the CESB has
not identified the position to be of equal rank to those enumerated. Lastly, without a doubt, the holder of
the position of Assistant Department Manager II is appointed by the PCSO General Manager, and not by
the President of the Philippines. Accordingly, the position of Assistant Department Manager II in the
PCSO is not covered by the third-level or CES, and does not require CSE eligibility.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED.


10. SANTIAGO V. CSC (1989)
The power to appoint is a matter of discretion. The appointing power has a wide latitude of choice
as to who is best qualified for the position (Ocampo vs. Subido, L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72
SCRA 443). To apply the next-in-rank rule peremptorily would impose a rigid formula on the
appointing power contrary to the policy of the law that among those qualified and eligible, the
appointing authority is granted discretion and prerogative of choice of the one he deems fit for
appointment (Pineda vs. Claudio, L-29661, May 13, 1969, 28 SCRA 34).

One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher
vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule
neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing
authority to promote such person to the next higher position. As provided for in Section 4, CSC
Resolution No. 83-343:

The Facts:

On 18 November 1986, then Customs Commissioner Wigberto E. Tanada extended a
permanent promotional appointment, as Customs Collector III, to petitioner SANTIAGO, Jr. That
appointment was approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC), National Capital Region
Office. Prior thereto, SANTIAGO held the position of Customs Collector I.
On 26 November 1986, respondent JOSE, a Customs Collector II, filed a protest with the
Merit Systems Promotion Board (the Board, for short) against SANTIAGO's promotional
appointment mainly on the ground that he was next-in-rank to the position of Collector of
Customs III.
Decision:
True, the Commission is empowered to approve all appointments, whether original or
promotional, to positions in the civil service and disapprove those where the appointees do not
possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualification (paragraph (h), Section 9, P.D. No.
807). However, consistent with our ruling in Luego vs. CSC (L-69137, 5 August 1986, 143 SCRA
327), "all the commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee possesses the
appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if
not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by
the Commission when it acts on, or as the decree says, "approves" or "disapproves" an appointment
made by the proper authorities. x x x To be sure, it has no authority to revoke the said appointment
simply because it believed that the private respondent was better qualified for that would have
constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely (in the appointing authority)."
All told, we fail to see any reason to disturb SANTIAGO's promotional appointment.

The minimum qualifications and the standard of merit and fitness have been adequately satisfied as
found by the appointing authority. The latter has not been convincingly shown to have committed any
grave abuse of discretion.
Having arrived at the foregoing conclusion, we find no necessity to delve into the other issues raised.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. 87-554 of the Civil Service Commission is SET ASIDE and petitioner's
promotional appointment as Customs Collector Ill is hereby UPHELD. The Temporary Restraining
Order heretofore issued, enjoining respondents from enforcing CSC Resolution No. 87-554, is
hereby made permanent.
AAOng Case Digest 1-10