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CASE BRIEF
Reginav.Prince
II. CRIME DEFINITIONS.
A. General Principles.
1. Mens rea: mistake of fact, mistake of law, public welfare offenses.
NAME: Regina v. Prince, Court of Crown Cases Reserved (1875).
FACTS:
0 D was convicted of taking an unmarried girl under 16 years of age out of the possession and against
the will of her father. The girl in question, Annie Phillips was 14; she told D that she as 18, and the jury
found that D reasonably believed that.
PROCEDURE: P was convicted and he appealed his conviction to the Court for Crown Cases Reserved.
ISSUE: Does the mistaken belief that the female was over 16 constitute a defense to the charge of taking an
unmarried girl under 16 years of age out of the possession and against the will of her father?
HOLDING: No. A mistake as to age, no matter how reasonable, is not a defense.
REASONING: Rule: A mistake as to age does not constitute a defense because taking an unmarried girl out of he
possession of the father without his consent is a wrong act, whether one believes she is under 16
or not; because the act is wrongful even if the facts are as D believes, his ignorance should not afford
him a defense. In contrast, whether the father consents is material to determining whether Ds act is
wrongful; so if D makes a mistake about consent, he would have a defense.
The judge takes a statute that is silent as to the mental state element and makes some mistakes but
not others into defenses. The principle he uses is the materiality of the mistake to moral culpability.
Obviously, this mode of analysis requires the interpreting judge to make extrastatutory judgments about
the moral character of various forms of behavior; essentially, the court must interpret societys norms
in order to interpret the statutory text. This is very contentious; how do we know the judge is reading
societys morality correctly?
DISPOSITION: Conviction affrmed.
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CASE BRIEF
Morissettev.UnitedStates
II. CRIME DEFINITIONS.
A. General Principles.
1. Mens rea: mistake of fact, mistake of law, public welfare offenses.
NAME: Morissette v. United States, Supreme Court of the United States (1952).
FACTS:
0 D junk dealer entered an Air Force bombing range and took some spent bomb casings that had been
laying around for years. He then fattened them out and sold them for scrap.
0 D was charged with theft, or knowing conversion of government property under 18 U.S.C. 641. His
defense was that he thought the casings had been abandoned by the government, and that he therefore
lacked the requisite mens rea. The government maintained that the statutory offense did not require
proof that the D intended to steal.
0 The trial court refused to instruct the jury on the Ds defense.
PROCEDURE: P was convicted and he appealed his conviction eventually to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Does the mistaken belief that an item is abandoned property constitute a defense to the knowing[]
conver[sion] [of a] . . . thing of value of the United States under 641?
HOLDING: Yes. Section 641 requires proof that the D knew the thing converted was U.S. property, a mental state
that would be negated by the belief that the casings had been abandoned.
REASONING:
0 The Court relied primarily on history to support the conclusion that 641, which is textually ambiguous,
requires proof of knowledge that the item converted is of value to the U.S. (i.e., U.S. property). At
common law, the various forms of theft all required proof that the D knew what he was taking was the
property of another. Nor is theft analogous to the sorts of public welfare offenses that the Court had
previously determined to impose liability without a showing of fault. The Court also adverted to strong
moral principles connecting fault to knowledge of the facts that make ones conduct illegal. Against that
background, Congress would be presumed to have incorporated the common law background unless it
clearly stated otherwise.
0 There are a number of presumptions here for resolving statutory ambiguity. One is that a statutory crime
should be given its common law meaning. Thats fne, but what about all the new-fangled crimes that
have no common law analogue? Another presumption is that fault requires proof of knowledge; but is
that always true? There is also language suggesting that proof of knowledge will be presumed for all
offenses except public welfare offenses, but the precise scope of the presumption is unclear because
the concept of public welfare offense is nebulous.
DISPOSITION: Conviction reversed.
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IV. DEFENSES.
A. Overview.
1. Justifcation v. Excuse.
NAME: The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens, Queens Bench Div. (1884).
FACTS:
0 Ds (Dudley and Stephens) were stranded without hardly any food or water on a boat with V
(Parker) and another passenger named Brooks.
0 On the 18th and 19th day at sea, Ds consulted with Brooks about sacrifcing the V so they all could eat
and both times Brooks refused to consent to the plan.
0 On the 20th day V was sacrifced by Ds, without Vs consent, and the three remaining men consumed
his body -- allowing them to survive to be rescued 4 days later.
0 Evidence was presented that V was in a very weakened state, presented no threat to Ds, and would not
likely have survived to be rescued.
0 The jury also determined that Ds would probably have died of starvation before being rescued had they
not eaten Vs body.
PROCEDURE: Ds were charged with murder and jury returned a special verdict setting forth the facts above but
requested that the court determine whether Ds conduct was legally justifed under the circumstances.
ISSUE: Whether killing under the circumstances set forth in the jurys factual fndings is murder or whether it
was legally justifed homicide?
HOLDING: No. Ds conduct amounted to willful murder and that the facts stated in the jurys fnding of fact are no
justifcation of the homicide.
REASONING: Rule: No man has the right to declare temptation to be an excuse or justifcation, nor allow compassion
for the criminal, to change or weaken in any manner the legal defnition of the crime. It is not sound
public policy to adopt a broad proposition that a man may save his life by killing, if necessary, an
innocent and unoffending neighbor.
DISPOSITION: Ds are guilty of murder and were sentenced to death. [NOTE: Ds sentences were later commuted by the
Crown to six months imprisonment.]
DISSENT: None.
CLASS NOTES:
CASE BRIEF
TheQueenv.DudleyandStephens
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IV. DEFENSES.
A. Overview.
1. Justifcation vs. Excuse.
NAME: North Dakota v. Leidholm, Supreme Court of North Dakota (1983).
FACTS:
0 D (wife) was involved in an abusive, unhappy marriage with H (victim-husband).
0 On 8/6/81, while they returned from a gun club party where they both consumed a large amount of
alcohol, D and H began fghting.
0 The fghting continued and H physically prevented D from calling the police.
0 After H and D went to bed, H fell asleep and D went to the kitchen, got a knife, returned to the bedroom
and killed H.
PROCEDURE: D was charged with murder and instead was found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to fve
years imprisonment. D appealed the conviction alleging that the courts instruction to the jury was a
misstatement of the law of self-defense.
ISSUE: Whether the court properly instructed the jury on the law of self-defense.
HOLDING: No. The trial courts instruction to the jury was a misstatement of law because it asked the jury to
apply the objective test to determine if D honestly and reasonably believed that the use of force was
necessary to protect against imminent harm.
REASONING: Rule: When determining whether the Ds use of force would be justifed or excused, courts must use
a subjective test to determine whether the circumstances are suffcient to induce in the accused an
honest and reasonable belief that he must use force to defend himself against imminent harm.
Rule: A person who correctly believes that the force he used was necessary to prevent imminent
unlawful harm is justifed in using such force. On the other hand, a person who reasonably but
incorrectly believed that force was necessary to protect himself from imminent unlawful harm is
excused from using such force.
A correct statement of the law of self-defense is one in which the court directs the jury to adopt a subjective
standard or reasonableness and assume the physical and psychological properties peculiar to the accused.
In the interest of fairness the jury must view the circumstances surrounding the Ds use of force from
the standpoint of the accused in order to determine if the accused honestly and reasonably believed that
the use of force was necessary to protect against imminent harm.
The Ds physical characteristics and psychological makeup are necessary considerations when a ury
determines the reasonableness of a persons use of force for protection.
DISPOSITION: Judgment of conviction reversed and case was remanded for a new trial.
DISSENT: None.
CLASS NOTES:
CASE BRIEF
NorthDakotav.Leidholm
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II. CRIME DEFINITIONS.
A. General Principles.
1. Mens rea: mistake of fact, mistake of law, public welfare offenses.
NAME: Pratt v. Chicago Housing Authority, United States District Court, N.D. Illinois (1994).
FACTS:
0 Ps, public housing residents, brought a class action suit on behalf of all residents to enjoin building
sweeps whereby the CHA police engaged in warrantless mass searches of apartments after reports of
random gunfre. Ps maintained that the searches, which typically occurred several days after the gunfre
report, violated the residents Fourth Amendment rights. The elected representatives of 18 of the 19
CHA projects intervened in opposition to the P class and in support of the CHA.
PROCEDURE: Court granted Ps request for a TRO; Ps now request that the TRO be converted into a PI.
ISSUE: Do warrantless searches of public housing apartments in the aftermath of reports of gunfre violate the
Fourth Amendment?
HOLDING: Yes. Whether or not exigent circumstances exist, the warrantees CHA searches are unconstitutional
because the police lack probable cause with respect to any particular apartment searched.
REASONING: Rule: Warrantless police searches of homes are presumptively unconstitutional. To overcome the
presumption that a warrantless search of a home is unconstitutional, the government must show that it
had both probable cause for the search and exigent circumstances that excuse its failure to obtain the
warrant.
In the present case, the Search Policy does not satisfy the probable cause requirement, because the
Search Policy actually orders searches where there is no probable cause to believe that a search of any
particular apartment will prevent the commission of a crime, unveil evidence of a crime, or lead to
an arrest.
Pratt presents tensions not only between the interests of the majority in security but also within the
concept of individual rights. If the majority of residents support the sweep policy, and if they are the
ones whose units are subject to unannounced searches, why not view the sweeps (at least if conducted
under genuinely exigent circumstances) as reasonable? In theory, individual tenants can still consent
o have their apartments searched without a warrant, but realistically, a sweeps policy is unlikely to
work unless the police have authority to search all apartments, regardless of consent. Does authorizing
the minority to block the policy accord adequate respect for the remaining residents to decide whether
or not to exercise their right to privacy in this context?
DISPOSITION: Court grants motion for PI.
CLASS NOTES:
CASE BRIEF
Prattv.ChicagoHousingAuthority