Deep Eco K

Deep Ecology GDI DD (sea)lab 2021
Notes

Instrumental vs. Intrinsic value of items this helps explain the thesis of the k
Lilley 10 (NAVIGATING A SEA OF VALUES: UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE OCEAN
AND OCEAN ENERGY RESOURCES by Jonathan Charles Lilley A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of
the University of Delaware in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in Marine Studies Summer 2010 Copyright 2010 Jonathan Charles Lilley All Rights Reserved
http://www.ceoe.udel.edu/windpower/resources/J_Lilley_8-03_FINAL.pdf -&)
3 1 While moral concern for the environment can be traced as far back as the ancient Greeks (Nash, 1989), as a standalone subject area,
environmental ethics only come into its own in the 1970s. Since its inception, however, the discipline has been characterized
by a number of longstanding debates about the merits of monism versus pluralism, instrumental value versus
intrinsic value, and anthropocentrism versus nonanthropocentrism (Minteer, 2004). The last of these three is the most germane to this
study and will be addressed in more detail below. First, however, it is worth outlining the differences between instrumental and intrinsic value,
as a basic understanding of value is necessary to fully appreciate the anthropocentrism versus nonanthropocentrism debate. It is generally
agreed that there are two different types of value that can be placed on nature instrumental value and intrinsic, or inherent, value.
Instrumental value is the value an object has as a means to obtain something else of value. Perhaps the
easiest example to give of instrumental value is money. A ten-dollar bill has little value in itself (it is, after all, just a small piece
of paper) but its value is determined by what the ten dollars can be exchanged for this is its
instrumental value. Instrumental value is often referred to as resource value and certain aspects of the
environment are often said to have resource value. Intrinsic value on the other hand refers to the value an object has in itself, without
consideration to what other objects of value the object in question might be used to attain. For this reason, intrinsic value is often referred to
as non-instrumental value (Stenmark, 2002). J. Baird Callicott states that something is intrinsically valuable if it is valuable in and for itself if
its value is not derived from its utility, but is independent of any use or function it may have in relation to something or someone else and
comments that *i+n classical philosophical 3 2 terminology, an intrinsically valuable entity is said to be an end-in-itself,
not just a means to anothers end (Callicott, 1989d, p. 131). In traditional ethical thought it is generally assumed that while
humans have intrinsic value, nonhuman life does not. Although the above categorization is commonly used for describing
the kind of value nature has, it should be noted that a further distinction can be drawn between intrinsic and inherent value. This distinction is
not due to the lexical definitions of the words but rather to how they have been employed by philosophers. Although important, the difference
is subtle and, as a result, frequently overlooked. Callicott is one author who differentiates between the two terms. He defines intrinsic value as
value that is objective and independent of all valuing consciousness and states that inherent value (while its value is not independent of all
valuing consciousness) it is valued for itself and not only and merely because it serves as a means to satisfy the desires, further the interests, or
occasion the preferred experiences of the valuers (Callicott, 1989c, p. 161). In other words, both intrinsic and inherent value should be seen as
having value in themselves and not solely as a means to an end. The difference lies in the suggestion that whereas intrinsic value is independent
of a valuer, inherent value is not it requires a valuing consciousness to exist. Although definitions vary, other authors also differentiate
between intrinsic and inherent value and the two terms should not be used interchangeably (O'Neill, 1997; Stenmark, 2002; Taylor, 1986). 2.3.1
Anthropocentric Environmental Ethics Anthropocentric environmental ethics, or anthropocentrism, focuses exclusively
on the instrumental value that nature possesses. It holds that as humans 3 3 are the only beings capable of valuing an
object, then value relates to the value that humans place on that object. As Bryan Norton puts it, [v]aluing always occurs from
the viewpoint of a conscious valuer and that *o+nly humans are valuing agents (Norton, 1991, p. 251). The value of a
plant, an animal or an ecosystem is therefore that which as been assigned by humans. The animal, plant or
ecosystem is not a valuer it neither gives itself, nor other objects, value. Given that above it was stated how instrumental value and resource
value are often taken as synonyms, it might be assumed that such an attitude would be antienvironmental that all of nature is simply seen as
a resource for humankind to use. Although it is true that societys recent exploitation of the environment has been
conducted with an anthropocentric mindset, this does not necessarily mean that holding an anthropocentric ethic results in
nature being valued only for short-term resource use. There are at least four reasons why this is not the case. First, regarding resource use,
there is the issue of posterity and the duties that current society has towards future generations (de-Shalit, 1995; Hardin, 1977). An
anthropocentric ethic should: take into account future human generations; and ensure that enough natural resources remain for their use and
that the environment is healthy enough for their survival. Second, there is the issue of the essential, life-giving services that the earth provides
over and above the resources humans directly extract from the environment. In 1997, a research group led by Robert Costanza estimated that
natural ecosystems provide at least US$33 trillion worth of services annually. They suggested that 63% (US$20.9 trillion yr-1) of this value stems
from marine ecosystems, slightly over half of which (US$10.6 trillion yr-1) comes from coastal ecosystems (Costanza, et al., 1997). Third, it can
be argued that, in addition to providing resources for human 3 4 consumption and services for our survival, nature also provides a different set
of resources which are necessary for human well-being. Alan Gewirth (2001) notes how the natural environment, entirely apart from its
supplying food and other practical necessities for human beings, fulfills the human need to appreciate and to marvel at the majestic structure
of the natural world (Gewirth, 2001, p. 211). All of these three attitudes are anthropocentric they all assume that to have value, nature
requires a human valuer yet they all hold that nature is more than simply a resource to be used in any way the present generation deems fit.

===NEG===
***1NCs***

Eco-Phenomenology 1NC

Ocean development is rooted in a paradigm metaphysical naturalism the 1acs
attempt to separate humanity from nature dismisses the ethical implications of our
interconnectedness with the earth
http://www.ceoe.udel.edu/windpower/resources/J_Lilley_8-03_FINAL.pdf )
Covering almost three-quarters of the planets surface, the ocean has for centuries been thought of as impervious to
harm. Indeed, for all but the most recent chapter in human history, it was simply not possible to affect the ocean in any meaningful way.
Humans fished, sailed, and utilized the cleansing properties of the ocean, but due to a comparatively
small global population and less advanced technologies, had a negligible impact on the marine
environment. Those days disappeared during the nineteenth century with the advent of commercial whaling
and never returned. Since then, ever increasing population numbers, coupled with new and more efficient
technologies, have led to a situation where humans have the capacity to significantly affect the ocean.
Today, the ocean has many uses fishing, recreation, transportation, energy development, to name just a few and
needs to be managed accordingly. The last of these, development of the oceans energy resources, has gained
significance in the last couple of years. Stymied for a quarter century by a moratorium on new offshore drilling, changing political
views and new technologies (such as offshore wind power) have opened up both non-renewable and
renewable resources for potential development. A number of issues e.g., overfishing, pollution,
development of the coastal zone result from the above uses and traditionally such issues have been tackled through
a combination of science and technology. This is partly because problems relating to the environment are frequently complex and require the
use of 2 advanced technologies and also because science is believed to be able to provide objective answers to the
questions we ask (Stenmark, 2002). However, although science and technology tell us what can be done to solve
a particular problem, they do not tell us what should be done; to believe otherwise is to confuse questions of fact with
questions of value. Thinking that because something is the case means it ought to be the case is one form of the naturalistic fallacy (Dennett,
1995; Singer, 1981), a tendency that is strongly cautioned against (Moore, 1903). Using the best available science and technology is important
when addressing environmental issues, but it should be remembered that other aspects of such issues also need consideration. Rather than
focusing solely on science and technology, Mikael Stenmark has suggested that environmental problems have three dimensions scientific,
social and normative (moral or ethical) all of which need to be considered to address environmental issues effectively (Stenmark, 2002).
Stenmark argues that, in addition to scientific and social studies of human/nature relationships, there is the need for a critical
and constructive analysis of peoples various ethical judgments, their views of nature, their world
views and of the consequences that all these different positions have (Stenmark, 2002, p. 13). While there have been
many in-depth scientific studies of ocean processes, as well as social and economic studies of how humans impact the marine environment,
there has been very little research into what people think of the ocean. As will be seen, the studies that have been conducted focus
almost exclusively on ocean knowledge, as opposed to the ethical or value judgments that people possess.
Despite this lack of information about ocean values, both the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy and the Pew Oceans Commission state the need
for an engaged citizenry in marine affairs, with the former noting that *t+o successfully address complex 3 ocean- and coastal-related issues,
balance the use and conservation of marine resources, and realize future benefits from the ocean, an interested, engaged public is essential
(U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, 2004, p. 123). 1.1 Purpose of the Research By looking at ocean values and beliefs, this study seeks to
investigate the third dimension that Stenmark describes the moral and ethical aspects of the relationships that exist between humans and the
marine environment. In short, this dissertation looks to discover what the American public thinks of the ocean. In addition, given renewed
interest in offshore energy, it will focus specifically on attitudes to ocean energy development. It will draw out mental and cultural models that
exist in society regarding the ocean and offshore energy development; understand why people think of the ocean as they do; and unearth what
(if any) philosophies underpin peoples attitudes toward the ocean. The data generated from the study will provide a better understanding of
how society currently perceives the marine environment. While research has previously been conducted into general environmental values
(Kempton, Boster, & Hartley, 1995) and ocean knowledge (Steel, Lovrich, Lach, & Fomenko, 2005), no study has focused specifically on ocean
values. As such, this work represents new research and will contribute to a general understanding of public
perceptions of the marine environment. It is hoped this research will aid policy makers. Policies are far more likely to succeed
when they have the weight of public support behind them (Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999; Theodoulou, 1995), and by
understanding how people view the oceans, 4 policy makers will have better idea of which policies are likely to receive public support and
which are not.

Absent a recognition of our being with nature environmental exploitation and
violence become an inevitability
Henning 09 (Brian; Associate Professor of Philosophy at Gonzaga University; Trusting in the 'Efficacy of
Beauty: A Kalocentric Approach to Moral Philosophy; Ethics & the Environment- Volume 14, Number 1
pp.)
In the opening decade of this new millennium, long-simmering conflicts have exploded into a rolling boil of fear,
hostility, and violence. Whether we are talking about the rise of religious fundamentalism, the so-called "war on terror" or the much
touted culture wars that define the [End Page 101] contemporary American political landscape, there is a move away from
tolerance and appreciation of diversity toward the ever more strident formulation of absolutist positions.
Dogmatism in its various forms seems to be on the rise as the rhetoric and reality of compromise and
consensus building is replaced with the vitriol of moral superiority and righteousness. As the psychologist and philosopher
William James noted more than a century ago, the problem is that we are in a world where "every one of hundreds of ideals has
its special champion already provided in the shape of some genius expressly born to feel it, and to fight to death in its behalf"
(James 1956 [1891], 20708). The force of this point was made brutally clear by the events of and following September 11, 2001. Given a world
fraught with such conflict and tension, what is needed is not a moral philosophy that dogmatically advances
absolute moral codes. More than ever, what is needed is an ethic that is dynamic, fallible, and situated, yet not
grossly relativistic. This project takes on added urgency when we consider the environmental and
social crises that threaten not only human civilization, but all forms of life on this planet. Unhealthy air and water,
species extinction, overpopulation, soaring food prices, fresh water shortages, stronger storms, prolonged droughts, the spread of deserts,
deforestation, melting ice caps and glaciers, the submersion of low-lying landsthere are no shortage of challenges facing us
in this young century. Complex and multifaceted, these issues are at once technological, scientific, economic, social, and political. Yet
we will have no hope of successfully addressing the root cause of these crises until we also squarely
confront fundamental issues concerning epistemology, axiology, aesthetics, and metaphysics. Although
debates over carbon taxes and trading schemes, over carbon offsets and compact fluorescents are important, our efforts will
ultimately fail unless and until we also set about the difficult work of reconceiving who we are and
how we are related to our processive cosmos. What is needed, I believe, are new ways of thinking and
acting grounded in new ways of understanding ourselves and our relationship to the world, ways of
understanding that recognize our fundamental interdependence and interconnection with everyone and
everything in the cosmos, ways of understanding that recognize the intrinsic beauty and value of every form
of existence. What is needed, I suggest, is a moral philosophy grounded in Alfred North Whitehead's
philosophy of organism. Recognizing this [End Page 102] need, it is the primary aim of this essay to present the key elements and
defend the value of a moral philosophy inspired by, though not dogmatically committed to, Whitehead's organic, beauty-centered conception
of reality.

A Rejection of Metaphysical Naturalism is the First Step Toward a Phenomenological
Ontology and a Set of Environmental Ethics
Brown3 [Charles, Professor of Philosophy at Emporia State University, "The Real and The Good:
Phenomenology and The Possibility of an Axiological Rationality," Eco-Phenomenology Back to The Earth
Itself 2003, pp. 5-6]
Phenomenologys specific contribution to ecological philosophy begins in the attitude of respect for
experience that it shares with ecological philosophy and many environmentalists. Just as Thoreau, Muir, and Leopold describe the world in such a
way that the experiencing of the world is an integral part of it, and in doing so show us broader possibilities of experience, phenomenology as a
philosophical method begins with a respect for experience and ultimately grounds all meaning in experience.
Phenomenology is a method of philosophical research that describes the forms and structures of experience as well as a critique of those ways of doing philosophy
that operate from a nave standpoint. The description of experience is an attempt to return to the things-themselves rather than simply taking for granted higher-
level, culturally sedimented idealizations and abstractions that often pass for ahistorical metaphysical discoveries. Phenomenology seeks to
describe the meaning within experience and to uncover the experiential phenomena on which
categories of higher-level philosophical discourse are founded and in which those experiential phenomena are embedded. A
phenomenological approach to moral philosophy 6 begins with descriptions of moral experience,
while a 5 phenomenological natural philosophy begins with descriptions of encounters with life-worldly
nature, that is, the nature we experience prior to theoretical abstraction. The nave standpoint, which is simply our natural taken-for-
granted involvement with the world, is initially undermined by the uniquely phenomenological
method of epoche, which requires a philosophical abstention from everyday metaphysical and normative commitments. From this perspective, theories,
ideologies, traditions, and discourses are revealed as historically and intentionally constituted. From the phenomenological
perspective, there is no one correct tradition, theory, or discourse, although from this perspective we do see that
there are many worlds, traditions, and theories that claim to be privileged. 7 nomenological reduction helps to free
thinking from its natural ideological naivet by adopting such a position of ontological neutrality. By a bracketing of the realistic assumptions of everyday
consciousness, we are in a position to see that the world and the things in it are only given to us through the interpretative and meaning-bestowing function of our
intentional acts. Husserls steady development of this method eventually led to the discovery of the everyday world
of pretheoretical experience, viz., the lifeworld, which serves as the sense foundation for the idealized and historically constituted typifications of the
human and social sciences. It is within this lifeworld of direct and immediate experience that we may begin to
find an experiential grounding of an ecological ethics. 8 The phe- Phenomenology exemplifies an attitude of respect for lived
experience. Unlike naturalism, phenomenology does not seek to dismiss experience as subjective, nor does it
wish to replace or reduce experience with or to a more fundamental or more basic mode of being. A
phenomenological philosophy is one that remains close to our original experience, respects that experience,
and seeks to find within experience a measure of rationality and truth. To this extent all phenomenology
begins with a critique and rejection of metaphysical naturalism, which disrespects and seeks to
eliminate, reduce, or replace experience.

Thus the alternative rejects the 1ac in favor of phenomenological reflection of our
relationship to nature
Marietta 3 [Don Jr. Professor Emeritus at Florida Atlantic University, author of For People and the
Planet: Holism and Humanism in Environmental Ethics. Back to the Earth with Reflection and Ecology
Eco-Phenomenology Back to The Earth Itself Page 133-134]
How is our ontological commitment related to our environmental ethics? Without going into the detail with which I treat
this matter in For People and the Planet and elsewhere, I will give a sketch of my approach. The first thing to note is that I do not try to derive an ethic from
ecological 18 knowledge through deductive argument. The is/ought dichotomy holds within its own domain, which is that of logical entailment. Our ontological
commitment does not entail an ethic. What is the relationship? The best way to see the connection, I believe, is to begin with
phenomenological reflection. This is not the abstract and analytical sort of reflection, which sorts through things and places them in previously
acquired, and usually unquestioned, categories. It is a reflection that seeks to describe our awareness of the world with as
little presupposition as possible. As we have seen, Merleau-Ponty described this approach as finding the
world there for us, not only in its physical qualities but also with its values. We perceive matters in the world as good,
ugly, beautiful, or frightening as soon as, or in some cases before, we take note of sizes, shapes, and colors. 19 The importance of this for ethics
is that there is no is/ought impasse in this reflection on the world. The relationship between the way the
world is seen and our recognition that some things have value, on the one hand, and our sense that some
things ought to be and some not, on the other, is not a matter of entailment. It is not derived by logical argument. There
is a sort of directness and immediacy in matters as reflected on.

Deep Ecology 1NC
Western ethics presuppose ontology where only humans are viewed as selves capable
of controlling the environment while not being a part of it - This instrumentalizes
nature and ensures that environmental destruction becomes inevitable
Keller 97 *Keller, David R. 1997, professor of philosophy at Utah Valley University, Gleaning Lessons
from Deep Ecology. Ethics and the Environment 2(2): 145-146, Retrieved from:
http://davidkeller.us/publications/Keller-Ethics-Environment_1997.pdf]
Any ethic-including an environmental one-presupposes an ontology of selfhood. Adjudication of moral
interests depends upon metaphysical and axiological assumptions about which things are selves and
how much value different types of selves have. Accordingly, the mechanistic worldview which has
dominated the Modern period of Western culture is founded on the presupposition that only human
beings are selves, and hence only human beings have moral value. All nonhumans are insensate
automata albeit extremely complex automata. On a larger scale, Nature is one superlative mega-machine.
Johannes Kepler exemplified this attitude at the beginning of the seventeenth century when he wrote: "I
am much occupied with the investigation of physical causes. My aim is to show that the celestial
machine is to be likened not to a divine organism but rather to a clockwork " (quoted in Oelschlaeger 1991, 77). As
Kepler, Bacon, Galileo, Harvey, Hobbes, Descartes, Newton, and others believed, all corporeal bodies operate predictably according to strict
casual laws; all natural phenomena can be described in terms of inert matter in motion. Nature itself is devoid of any intrinsic value or purpose.
Deep ecologists are right to excoriate the Modern view of nature, since the practical outcome of
Mechanism has been the instrumentalization of nature. Organism are biomachines, and qua machines, the only value
fauna, flora, fungi, protista, prokaryotae, and inanimate matter have is use-value for humankind. In other words, the nonhuman world has only
instrumental value. The more natural resources are used by humans, the more value nature has a Lockean
notion which has not surprisingly become the favorite mantra of the Wise Use Movements The
importance of Deep Ecology, in my estimation, is the repudiation of the mechanical View of nature and
the realization that nonhumans have value above and beyond use-value for humans.

Human Attempts to Dominate the Worlds Resources With Technology and
Exploitation Have Brought the Ecosphere to the BrinkOnly a Gargantuan
Sociopolitical Transition Can Solve for the Impending Annihilation of All the Life on
Earth
Jensen 11, (Robert. Professor at the School of Journalism at the University of Texas, Austin. Occupy
demands: Let's radicalise our analysis
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/11/201111191022862285.html )
In addition to inequality within the human family, we face even greater threats in the human assault on the living
world that come with industrial society. High-energy/high-technology societies pose a serious threat to
the ability of the ecosphere to sustain human life as we know it. Grasping that reality is a challenge, and coping with the
implications is an even greater challenge. We likely have a chance to stave off the most catastrophic
consequences if we act dramatically and quickly. If we continue to drag our feet, it's "game over". While public
awareness of the depth of the ecological crisis is growing, our knowledge of the basics of the problem is
hardly new. World Scientists Warning to Humanity Issued By 1,700 Of the Planets Leading Scientists:
"Human beings and the natural world are on a collision course. Human activities inflict harsh and often irreversible damage on
the environment and on critical resources. If not checked, many of our current practices put at serious risk the
future that we wish for human society and the plant and animal kingdoms, and may so alter the living
world that it will be unable to sustain life in the manner that we know. Fundamental changes are
urgent if we are to avoid the collision our present course will bring about." That statement was issued in 1992, and
since then we have fallen further behind in the struggle for sustainability. Look at any crucial measure of the health of the ecosphere in which we live -
groundwater depletion, topsoil loss, chemical contamination, increased toxicity in our own bodies, the number and size of "dead zones" in
the oceans, accelerating extinction of species and reduction of bio-diversity - and the news is bad.
Remember also that we live in an oil-based world that is fast running out of easily accessible oil, which means we face a
huge reconfiguration of the infrastructure that undergirds our lives. And, of course, there is the undeniable
trajectory of climate disruption. Add all that up, and ask a simple question: Where we are heading? Pick a metaphor. Are we a car running out of
gas? A train about to derail? A raft going over the waterfall? Whatever the choice, it's not a pretty picture. It's crucial we realise that
there are no technological fixes that will rescue us. We have to acknowledge that human attempts to
dominate the non-human world have failed. We are destroying the planet and in the process
destroying ourselves.

The alternative is to reject the holy crusade that frames human utility only as an end
in itself. Only through acceptance and integration of nature can we discover the true
meaning of living.
Calicott 1980 (University Distinguished Research Professor of Philosophy and formerly Regents
Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Texas, Animal Liberation, A Triangular Affair, P333)
More seriously still, the value commitments of the humane movement seem at bottom to betray a world-
denying or rather a life-Ioathing philosophy. The natural world as actually constituted is one in which
one being lives at the expense of others.45 Each organism, in Darwin's metaphor, struggles to maintain its
own organic integrity. The more complex animals seem to experience (judging from our own case, and reasoning from analogy)
appropriate and adaptive psychological accompaniments to organic existence. There is a palpable passion for self-preservation. There are
desire, pleasure in the satisfaction of desires, acute agony attending injury, frustration, and chronic
dread of death. But these experiences are the psychological substance of living. To live is to be anxious about
life, to feel pain and pleasure in a fitting mixture, and sooner or later to die. That is the way the system works. If
nature as a whole is good, then pain and death are also good. Environmental ethics in general require
people to play fair in the natural system. The neo-Benthamites have in a sense taken the uncourageous approach. People
have attempted to exempt themselves from the life/death reciprocities of natural processes and from
ecological limitations in the name of a prophylactic ethic of maximizing rewards (pleasure) and
minimizing unwelcome information (pain). To be fair, the humane moralists seem to suggest that we should attempt to project
the same values into the nonhuman animal world and to widen the charmed circle-no matter that it would be biologically unrealistic to do so or
biologically ruinous if, per impossible, such an environmental ethic were implemented. There is another approach. Rather than
imposing our alienation from nature and natural processes and cycles of life on other animals, we
human beings could reaffirm our participation in nature by accepting life as it is given without a sugar coating.
Instead of imposing artificial legalities, rights, and so on on nature, we might take the opposite course
and accept and affirm natural biological laws, principles, and limitations in the human personal and
social spheres. Such appears to have been the posture toward life of tribaI peoples in the past. The chase was relished with its dangers,
rigors, and hardships as well as its rewards: animal flesh was respectfully consumed; a tolerance for pain was cultivated; virtue and
magnanimity were prized; lithic, floral, and faunal spirits were worshipped; population was routinely optimized by sexual continency, abortion,
infanticide, and stylized warfare; and other life forms, although certainly appropriated, were respected as fellow players in a magnificent and
awesome, if not altogether idyllic, drama of life. It is impossible today to return to the symbiotic relationship of
Stone Age man to the natural environment, but the ethos of this by far the longest era of human
existence could be abstracted and integrated with a future human culture seeking a viable and
mutually beneficial relationship with nature. Personal, social, and environmental health would, accordingly, receive a
premium value rather than comfort, self-indulgent pleasure, and anaesthetic insulation from pain. Sickness would be regarded as a worse evil
than death. The pursuit of health or wellness at the personal, social, and environmental levels would require selfdiscipline in the form of simple
diet, vigorous exercise, conservation, and social responsibility.

***2NC Round Winners***
2NC O/V Eco-Phenominology

Write your overview here
(quick tips)
a. remember to turn the affs advantages and prevent external offense from outweighing the kritik in the
1ar
b. explain the thesis of the argument without using too many buzzwords read some literature or
secondary sources to find the best way to communicate it to the judge in your round
c. it could be useful to make some even-if framing arguments to hedge against permutations and impact
calcs the aff might do later

2NC O/V Deep Ecology

Write your overview here

Eco-Security Framing

Framing environmental issues as problems of Security militarizes environmental
issues this turns solvency and
Waever 95 (Ole, Senior Researcher at the Center for Peace & Conflict Research, On Security, p. 63-64)
KSM
Central to the arguments for the conceptual innovation of environmental or ecological security
41
is its mobilization
potential. As Buzan points out, the concept of national security "has an enormous power as an instrument of social and political mobilization" and,
therefore, "the obvious reason for putting environmental issues into the security agenda is the possible magnitude of the threats posed, and the need
to mobilize urgent and unprecedented responses to them. The security label is a useful way both of signalling danger and setting priority, and for
this reason alone it is likely to persist in the environmental debates."
42
Several analysts have, however, warned against securitization of
the environmental issue for some of these very reasons, and some of the arguments I present here fit into the principled issue of
securitization/desecuritization as discussed earlier in this chapter. A first argument against the environment as a security issue, mentioned, for example,
by Buzan, is that environmental threats are generally unintentional.
43
This, by itself, does not make the threats any less
serious, although it does take them out of the realm of will. As I pointed out earlier, the field of security is constituted around
relationships between wills: It has been, conventionally, about the efforts of one will to (allegedly) override the
sovereignty of another, forcing or tempting the latter not to assert its will in defense of its sovereignty. The contest of
concern, in other words, is among strategic actors imbued with intentionality, and this has been the logic around which the whole issue of security
has been framed. In light of my earlier discussion, in which I stressed that "security" is not a reflection of our everyday sense of the word but, rather, a
specific field with traditions, the jump to environmental security becomes much larger than might appear at first to be the
case. I do not present this as an argument against the concept but, rather, as a way of illuminating or even explaining the debate over it. Second in
his critique of the notion of environmental security, Richard Moss points out that the concept of "security" tends to imply that
defense from the problem is to be provided by the state: The most serious consequence of thinking of
global change and other environmental problems as threats to security is that the sorts of centralized gov-
ernmental responses by powerful and autonomous state organizations that are appropriate for
security threats are inappropriate for addressing most environmental problems. When one is reacting
to the threat of organized external violence, military and intelligence institutions are empowered
to take the measures required to repel the threat. By this same logic, when responding to
environmental threats, response by centralized regulatory agencies would seem to be logical.
Unfortunately, in most cases this sort of response is not the most efficient or effective way of
addressing environmental problems, particularly those that have a global character.
4
4
Moss goes on to
warn that "the instinct for centralized state responses to security threats is highly inappropriate for responding
effectively to global environmental problems."
45
It might, he points out, even lead to militarization of environmental
problems .
46
A third warning, not unrelated to the previous two, is the tendency for the concept of security to produce thinking in
terms of us-them, which could then be captured by the logic of nationalism. Dan Deudney writes that "the 'nation' is not
an empty vessel or blank slate waiting to be filled or scripted, but is instead profoundly linked to war and 'us vs. them'
thinking ( . . . ) Of course, taking the war and 'us vs. them' thinking out of nationalism is a noble goal. But this may be like taking sex out of 'rock
and roll,' a project whose feasibility declines when one remembers that 'rock and roll' was originally coined as a euphemism for sex."
47
The
tendency toward "us vs. them" thinking, and the general tradition of viewing threats as coming from outside a state's
own borders, are, in this instance, also likely to direct attention away from one's own contributions to environmental
problems." Finally, there is the more political warning that the concept of security is basically defensive in nature, a status quo
concept defending that which is, even though it does not necessarily deserve to be protected. In a paradoxical way, this
politically conservative bias has also led to warnings by some that the concept of environmental security could become a dangerous tool of the "totalitarian
left," which might attempt to relaunch itself on the basis of environmental collectivism." Certainly, there is some risk that the logic of ecology,
with its religious potentials and references to holistic categories, survival and the linked significance of everything, might easily lend itself to
totalitarian projects, where also the science of ecology has focused largely on how to constrain, limit, and control activities in
the name of the environment.
50

Biotic Suffering Framing

Concious suffering should be the basis for moral decision-making we have a
responsibility as moral agents to minimize all forms of suffering
Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Texas, Animal Liberation, A Triangular Affair, P317-
318)
The humane moralists, for their part, insist upon sentience (sensibility would have been a more precise word choice) as the
only relevant capacity a being need possess to enjoy full moral standing. If animals, they argue, are
conscious entities who, though deprived of reason, speech, forethought or even selfawareness (however that may be judged), are
capable of suffering, then their suffering should be as much a matter of ethical concern as that of our fellow
human beings, or strictly speaking, as our very own. What, after all, has rationality or any of the other allegedly uniquely human capacities
to do with ethical standing? Why, in other words, should beings who reason or use speech (etc.) qualify for moral status,
and those who do not fail to qualify?18 Isn't this just like saying that only persons with white skin
should be free, or that only persons who beget and not those who bear should own property? The criterion seems utterly
unrelated to the benefit for which it selects. On the other hand, the capacity to suffer is, it seems, a more relevant criterion
for moral standing because-as Bentham and Mill, notable among modern philosophers, and Epicurus, among the ancients, aver-pain is evil, and
its opposite, pleasure and freedom from pain, good. As moral agents (and this seems axiomatic), we have a duty to behave in
such a way that the effect of our actions is to promote and procure good, so far as possible, and to reduce and
minimize evil. That would amount to an obligation to produce pleasure and reduce pain. Now pain is pain wherever and by
whomever it is suffered. As a moral agent, I should not consider my pleasure and pain to be of greater consequence in determining a
course of action than that of other persons. Thus, by the same token, if animals suffer pain-and among philosophers only strict
Cartesians would deny that they do--then we are morally obliged to consider their suffering as much an evil to
be minimized by conscientious moral agents as human suffering. Certainly actions of ours which contribute to the
suffering of animals, such as hunting them, butchering and eating them, experimenting on them, etc.,
are on these assumptions morally reprehensible. Hence, a person who regards hin1self or herself as not aiming in life to live
most selfishly, conveniently, or profitably, but rightly and in accord with practical principle, if convinced by these arguments, should, among
other things, cease to eat the flesh of animals, to hunt then1, to wear fur and leather clothing and bone ornaments and other articles made
from the bodies of anials, to eat eggs and drink milk, if the animal producers of these commodities are retained under inhumane circumstances,
and to patronize zoos (as sources of psychological if not physica torment of animals). On the other hand, since certain very
simple animals are almost certainly insensible to pleasure and pain, they may and indeed should be
treated as morally inconsequential. Nor is there any moral reason why trees should be respected or
rivers or mountains or anything which is, though living or tributary to life processes, unconscious. The
humane moralists, like the moral humanists, draw a firm distinction between those beings worthy of
moral consideration and those not. They simply insist upon a different but quite definite cut-off point
on the spectrum of natural entities, and accompany their criterion with arguments to show that it is more ethically defensible (granting certain
assumptions) and more consistently applicable than that of the moral humanists

***Links***

Arctic Development

Development of the (Ant)Arctic posits the environment as a resource to be abused
Naess 94 (Arne, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oslo, 1973, The Arctic Dimension Outside
and Inside Us, Deep Ecology in the High Arctic: Proceedings of the 1994 International Ecophilosophical
Symposium, Svalbard, Norway, 29 August2 September, edited by Elisabeth Stoltz Larsen and Robin
Buzza. Longyerbyen: Norwegian Polar Institute, pages 1316.)
The future of Arctic and Antarctic nature depends, to a certain degree, on the strengthening and spreading
of the feeling and the view that it is a self-contained world with meaning in itself: it has its kind of
perfection as it is; and that it should not be seen as a potential material resource for humankind; that
we are intruders; that our contamination of the Arctic and Antarctic atmosphere is shameful, and the
same applies to the interference with the composition of the stratosphere. The feeling of shame probably
originates with the feeling that we have nothing to do in those far away areas: there is no good reason of interference. The view that the
polar areas are inhospitable and hostile is likely to disappear because of the development of proper
equipment. There are wonderful possibilities of large scale tourism. Economic pressures may
consequently be expected to increase. Resistance must be significantly increased. This implies wider
recognition of the perils. How can we all contribute to that? The privilege simply to be here has a cost: we, who had
never been here before, should in the years to come be willing to help those who already are trying
to protect this part of the world. Since the time of the European Renaissance, about 500 years ago, academic philosophy has
shown waves of conformity or fashion. In my time we had an internationally felt wave of logical empiricism (also called logical positivism); the
wave caused by the early Wittgenstein and that of the late Wittgensteinone personally overwhelming; the so-called philosophical
world; hermeneutics; and now the less reputable and sometimes squarely silly (self-proclaimed) postmodernism. It is amusing to inspect this
last fashion a little because it is so convenient to make some conventional philosophical point in contrast to what is said, or seems to be meant,
in the literature called postmodern philosophical literature. In that literature, authors use earnest expressions like the social construction of
reality and the social construction of nature, so everything is social and interpretational. Texts are real, and especially texts about texts are
taken seriously, but the way seems infinitely long before we reach what you and I naively worship as grand, majestic nature! In short, we have
to do with a literary, and occasionally academic sophisticated absolutizing (Absolutierung) of social relations; every relation is a social
relation, and we never get to a relation between a human being or a society and nature. Ecology seems, in the postmodern texts, to have only
to do with human social systems and not ecosystems. In one word: sociologism. We have had in this century psychologism and ecologism
(every science is part of ecology). To meet here at Svalbard can, as already suggested, only be justified as an expression of resolve to contribute
to the dissemination of views favourable to the preservation of a largely intact Arctic and Antarctic. Concepts of wilderness play a prominent
role in industrial states where there are still great areas with limited impact by humans: the United States, Canada, and Australia. From the
point of view of conservation, four levels of abstention from intervention may be distinguished. At the first level, a limiting case, all sorts of
interference by humans are to be avoided. This includes flying over the area. In second level, areas of wilderness, scientific exploration is
permitted, as are attempts to counteract the influence of pollution and other phenomena due to non-human and human influence. Third level
wilderness permits tourism, but limited and only during parts of the year. Fourth level areas are managed roughly as the great natural parks of
the United States. At the moment, one of the most noteworthy undertakings is to try to let there be corridors between areas of wilderness of
such sort that inbreeding is avoided and there is free access for protected animals to move from one area to another. The Arctic and
Antarctic are by far the greatest wilderness areas left. Thanks to the enormity of the areas, and
relative scarcity of intrusions, little has been done to seriously restrict interference with the
ecosystems. The accelerated rate of interference, if continued, will result in a totally unacceptable
state of affairs in the next century. As a philosopher I am expected to talk from a point of view of principles. This means for me,
among other things, to contemplate a future much wider than in practical life, say, the development of life since Cambrian, 600 million years
ago. It is quite natural to move from thousands years ago to thousands years from now into the future. The relevance of such a frame of
reference along the time axis is evident when considering the growth of the human population. There is a discussion going on as to what extent
technological advance is a causal factor for the high rate of population growth, and to what extent the increasing population pressure in the last
500 years caused or motivated the technological advance. At any rate, the present technological knowledge is such that with one-tenth of the
global population, the Gaia Gift per capita would be very much greater. By yearly Gaia Gift per capita, I mean the amount of interference in
the ecosystems a person may cause without resulting in ecological unsustainability. Roughly, the Gaia Gift is inversely proportional to the world
population. Assuming, say, that one among ten thousand people feel a persistent urge to visit or stay in the high Arctic or Antarctic once in a
lifetime, with a population of a billion that means an urge among 100,000 to realize the dream, whereas with a population of 10 billion, it
means that such an urge makes itself felt among one million. Now, education plays a role, and with higher education one may expect that a
higher fraction of the population will feel an urge to stay for a while in the Arctic or Antarctic. In any case, it is clear that the problem of
protecting those regions increases with population and also with increases in the level of education. This makes it natural for us to support
ethically acceptable plans to contribute to a decrease of the human population. These plans are rejected when people make the sharp
distinction between plans to reduce the population of a non-human species and that of humans. The indignation when we talk about reduction
of the human population stems, in part, from the habit of not thinking in terms of long time periods

Cartesian Method

Modern thought Rejects alternative epistemological investigations in favor of a false
objectivity of nature
Kohak 3 [Erazim. Professor Emeritus in the philosophical faculty of Charles University, Prague, Czech
Republic. "An UnderstandingHeart: Reason, Value, and Transcendental Phenomenology" Eco-
Phenomenology Back to The Earth Itself pp 21-22 ]
That commitment to a life in truth is Europes great contribution to human self-realization. It has also
become a snare and a stumbling block when, at the dawn of modernity, European thought reduced its
conception of explanatory rationality to mathematical and causal relations only, writing off relations
of value and meaning as subjective and so intrinsically irrational. To understand would henceforth be taken to mean to
integrate in a network of quantifiable causal relations, rigorously excluding relations of meaning and value. 11 That shift, to be sure, was not an
arbitrary whim of Ren Descartes or some other malevolent genie. Mathematical and causal relations really do appear as
objectively there in a world independent of the subject. Like it or not, two bob, thruppence, tuppence, hapenny, and two
farthings do add up to a half-crown. 13 12 Once we accept that colorfully archaic notation, though a subject does the sum, the sum holds for any vendor or buyer.
Rather than risk contaminating the vaunted objectivity of its judgments with the alleged subjectivity
of value, Western thought accepted a reality reduced to the quantifiable while consigning judgments
of value and meaning to the outer darkness of the irrational, which respectable scholars could dismiss
as unscientific, leaving questions of good and evil to prophets, poets, and postmodernists.

Old Habits die hard modern civilization re-creates fascist attempts to control the
environment through modern methods of reasoning this posits the earth as
disposable
Phenomenology Back to The Earth Itself pp 21 -22]
Yet relations of meaning and value, though qualitative and subject elated, are utterly fundamental to
human decision making. Ignoring them would be difficultand dangerous. Some contemporary
thinkers have attempted just that, claiming value decisions to be a matter of indifference. Others, while considering them no less
irrational, have sought to treat the irrationalinstinct, intuition, or customas a legitimate counterpart of reason
for dealing with questions of value and meaning. Though they seldom stated it explicitly, they assumed that constructing a nuclear
bomb is legitimately a question of reason while dropping it is a matter of personal preference. 14 Having been on the receiving end of airborne ordnance, I find this
most troublesomeand not only because of my generations experience with the cult of Blut und Boden, blood and soil. More basically, the problem is
that instinct grows over millennia and custom over centuries, while culturally induced changes require an effective response in
a matter of years. Were we to wait for instinct and custom to catch up with such changes, we should be rather likely to destroy ourselves long before we developed
an instinctive or a traditional fear of firearms or automobiles, not to mention genetically modified crops. 15 A civilization basing itself on
instrumental reason while leaving value decisions to an intuitive reliance on the irrationalas in the
case of the Nazi attempt to entrust the direction of a technically rational civilization to an intuitive call of Blut und Boden is a highly unstable
compound. Technical reason is not enough and supplementing it with a dose of irrationality will not
make it so. Communing with Gaia, however salutary, does not render quantitative expansion any more benign. 16 17

Econ
The current view of protecting biodiversity is predicated off making sure the economy
is sustainable and the aff propagates that by []
Helen Kopnina 12 (Dr. Kopnina, Helen (Ph.D. Cambridge University, 2002) is currently employed at
The Hague University of Applied Science as a coordinator of Sustainable Business program and
researcher of environmental education. Kopnina is the author of nine books, among which East to West
Migration (2005), Environmental Anthropology: Future Directions (2013) and Sustainable Business: Key
Issues) (2012) The Lorax complex: deep ecology,ecocentrism and exclusion
(http://www.academia.edu/2121808/The_Lorax_Complex_Deep_ecology_Ecocentrism_and_Exclusion)-
M.H
Biodiversity preservation is often viewed in utilitarian terms that render non-human species as
ecosystem services or natural resources. The economic captureapproach may be inadequate in
addressing biodiversity loss because extinction of some species could conceivably come to pass
without jeopardizing the survival of the humans. People might be materially sustained by a technological biora madeto yield
services and products required for human life. The failure to addressbiodiversity loss calls for an exploration of
alternative paradigms. It is proposedthat the failure to address biodiversity loss stems from the fact that ecocentricvalue holders are
politically marginalized and underrepresented in the mostpowerful strata of society. While anthropocentric concerns with environment
andprivate expressions of biophilia are acceptable in the wider society, the morepronounced publicly expressed deep ecology position is
discouraged. Radicalenvironmentalists are among the least understood of all contemporaryopposition movements, not only in tactical terms,
but also ethically. The articleargues in favor of the inclusion of deep ecology perspective as an alternative tothe current anthropocentric
paradigm. For most people, the idea of harming humans to liberate animals or prevent timber sales is
unconscionable and misanthropic. The average person wonders how activists can justifythreatening
children in order to save guinea pigs. Arent the medical and health needs of
humans,forexample,moreimportantthanthesueringofarodent?Animal liberationists respond that most people are hopelessly blinded by
species is mand that animal suering to benet humans is morally wrong. Environmental monkeywrenchers adopt an equallyradical stance;
after all, what good are natural resource extraction, private property, andprot making if the Earth itself is destroyed by mankind? Based on a
large number of international opinion polls, it appears that concern forthe environment is on the rise and may be universal (Dunlap and York
2008). Exactly 40 years ago, the Club of Rome predicted in a study titled The Limits toGrowth that population growth, industrialization
and resource depletion wouldultimately inhibit the global economys ability to expand and in rapid
loss of biodiversity (Meadows et al. 1972).Despite the announcement by the United Nations Decade on Biodiversity 2011 2020, the
current loss of species is estimated by experts to be between 1000 and10,000 times higher than the natural extinction rate (WWF 2012).The
failure of the current framework to explicitly address the needs (and the very survival of) non-human species calls for an exploration of
alternative paradigms(Kopnina 2012b). This article aims to examine what alternative approach to representation of biodiversity is possible and
what type of advocacy may be needed in order to adequately address the loss of biodiversity. Who are the human advocates, who speak for
nature? (ONeill 2006). Those committed to the struggleof radical environmentalism or animal liberation are among the least understoodof
all contemporary opposition movements, not only in tactical terms, but alsoethically and philosophically (Best and Nocella 2004; Churchill
2004). This articlewill therefore reect upon the question of what are the present-day causes for thislack of understanding (in science and
society) as well as on possibility to reduce thislack of understanding. 2. Representations of biodiversity In the current paradigm, two approaches
can be distinguished in regard tobiodiversity and representation. One is an economic capture approach, whichadvocates
the extension of the existing economic methods to include ethical concerns(Spash 2009). The other one is a
moral expert approach which connes economicmethods to the analysis of welfare gains, and assumes committees of ethical expertswill
complement economic expertise (ONeil and Spash 2000). We shall examine eachof these approaches in turn. We shall discuss environmental
ethics and environ-mental psychology in order to address alternative approaches in regard tobiodiversity. 2.1. Economic value of biodiversity
Rather than addressing the limits to growth, the new rhetoric of sustainabledevelopment (Brundland
Report 1987) recast limits to growth debate as anopportunity to balance social, economic, and
environmental needs. The secretarygeneral of the United Nations (UN), Ban Ki-moon, said, We need to chart
anew, more sustainable course for the future, one that strengthens equality andeconomic growth
while protecting our planet (UN News Center 2012). Rio 20UN Conference on Sustainable Development held in June
2012, promotes(1) Human sustainability: maintaining human capital such as health.(2) Social sustainability (organizations and
networks) and maintaining socialcapital: cultural, language, shared rules, laws, etc.(3) Economic (nancial) sustainability: keeping
capital intact(4) Natural (environmental) sustainability: Protecting natural capitals (e.g.water, land, air, minerals, etc.) 2.
Representations of biodiversity The World Banks mission is to alleviate poverty and support sustainable
development.Biological resources provide the raw materials for livelihoods, sustenance,
medicines,trade, tourism, and industry. Genetic diversity provides the basis for new
breedingprograms, improved crops, enhanced agricultural production, and food security.Forests,
grasslands, freshwater, and marine and other natural ecosystems provide arange of services, often not recognized in national economic
accounts but vital tohuman welfare (The World Bank 2012) The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB), a major
internationalinitiative hosted by the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) withnancial support from the European
Commission draws attention to the globaleconomic benets of biodiversity, warns that our neglect of the
natural servicesprovided by biodiversity is an economic catastrophe of an order of magnitudegreater
than the global economic crisis

The political drive for control and resources posits the environment as a meaningless
subject to be abused
Manes 87 (Christopher, Writer for The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy, Deep Ecology as
Revolutionary Thought (Action), The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy Vol4 No 2 Spring 87 pp. 12-14)
Like it or not, Deep Ecology has become the last reservoir of revolutionary energy in industrial society.
Traditional opposition to technological centralization of power, whether from the Left or old-line conservatives or
minority communities, has more or less been suborned by the Technological Culture. I mean that the Culture
has absorbed the discourse of these groups, so that their opposition can only question the parts and not the whole. Their solutions
always assume the continuation of the same technological relations that are the source of the
problems. In One-Dimensional Hun Herbert Marcuse exposes this process with prophetic fury. Technological Culture permits
opposition groups to fight for pollution control, or factory safety, or a juster distribution of wealth,
because that is precisely their immersion in the specific operations of industrial society which
prevents them from articulating the irrationality of technological relations in general. Whatever
reforms they bring about, technocracy still distributes food, water, energy only by destroying the
wilderness which yields these things without technocracy: the economy of affluence still relies on the cohesive
power of the State; the forests are cut by workers who must support their children, who will thereby
inherit more impoverished world. Deep Ecology came into being at least in part due to the realization that this is exactly what
happened to the environmental movement. The Technological Culture captured an emerging critique of its assault on wilderness by giving
environmentalism a seat alongside government and industry in its pantheon. In this context, whatever specific policies environmental
groups rightfully oppose, they actually foster technocratic dominion over nature. Their very success is an acquiescence to
technology's claim of historic necessity which defines the issues in the first place. Its no coincidence that these successes have often
been disastrous for wildernessconceding bioregional integrity for legal concerns, accepting
compromises incompatible with wilderness, and legitimating contradictory and debased concepts like
good wilderness management.

The pursuit of economic preservation shuns the environment and enslaves the
individual
Manes 87 (Christopher, Writer for The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy, Deep Ecology as
Revolutionary Thought (Action), The Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy Vol4 No 2 Spring 87 pp. 12-14)
A most peculiar revolution. Deep Ecology has always asserted that wilderness must be defended for its own
sake, not for human aims. But this concern for wilderness naturally has implications for the struggle to
regain our humanity in the face of technological domination. There is no idea, no religion, no
philosophy the Technological Culture cannot absorb, market, and exploit. But wilderness is subversive. In its very
existence it negates the Cultures universe of discourse. A pristine forest shouts to the world that technology is not a historic necessity; the
Earth works without it, bearing fruit, yielding shelter, proffering freedom. How hard Technological Culture tries to establish its own historic
necessity! Ask people if electricity, public schools and police are among the necessities of life and they
will probably say yes, however absurd this is historically. The Culture propagates a view that life
without industrial economy is virtually impossible. Its historiography is an accumulation of fictions
about the misery of existence before the steam engine. Its myth of progress proclaim technology must be. We have to
go on because we cant go back, it says over and over again, like an ironic Virgil guiding Dante down to the Inferno. How hard the Culture tries
to establish its own liberality! Developed countries, even in the East, hold elections, offer career choices, paint cars different colours. None
of this changes the fact that our essential relation to labour is one of slavery. We are well-treated
slaves, craftily flattered and lavishly entertained, as Ed Abbey puts itbut slaves nonetheless, forced to exchange our
labour for the necessities of life from a central authority and its representatives. Forced to be
industrial producers and consumers. A nomadic hunter-gatherer would find very little tolerance
among the law officers and tax collectors of modern society. When Deep Ecology made wilderness its
theme, it produced a rupture in the Cultures universe of discourse, a crack in the asphalt thorugh
which the grass is growing. For the first time since the Luddite, it became possible to say (and be understood):
Industrial society is wrong; it has enslaved us. And further than the Luddites could go, to declare: Wilderness is the
only safeguard of freedom.

Ethics

Enlightenment Era Moral Insights Claim Absolute Superiority But Ultimately Fail to
Provide Insight about a Life of Compassion in Favor of Domination
Itself 2003, Page 10]
Relying on an extensional interpretation of objectivity, modern moral theory approaches issues of morality in a distinctly
nonmoral manner. For modern theory, morality becomes effectively decidable as some sort of calculus is
applied to so-called objective standards of right and wrong. When morality becomes governed by an external calculus, the
good has become secondary to the right. Each of the historically influential moral theories emerging from the
Enlightenment admirably makes the case for the moral relevancy of the feature it picks out as the essential
nature of moral phenomena. Kant does this for rational motive, the Utilitarians do this for consequences, and the Contractarians do this for shared
decisions. And each fails to make the case that their chosen single feature explains, articulates, or gives coherence
to all moral phenomena. Each moral theory does a better job than its rivals at explaining its carefully chosen set of core 10 examples, but each does a
poor job of making philosophical sense out of others. Each of these moral theories provides us with deep and rich insight
into the nature of a limited set of moral phenomena but fails to provide the single, universal criterion
of all moral phenomena as it claims. These theories are each instances of a Rule-Based Moral Monism that, by reducing all moral phenomena to a single criterion,
generates a procedure for positing a set of rules to guide and judge behavior. Such a schema fits the projects of power and control
better than the simple desire to gain insight and wisdom and to practice tolerance and compassion.

Generic

Deep ecology enables humans to become part of the environment and recognize the
intrinsic value of nonhuman members of the biosphere, while shallow ecology puts
humans first and degrades the value of the environment, justifying its exploitation.
Fox 84, Warwick (an Australian philosopher and ethicist. He is the author of Toward a Transpersonal
Ecology and A Theory of General Ethics: Human Relationships, Nature, and the Built Environment.)
Deep Ecology: A New Philosophy of our Time?
(http://wildsreprisal.com/PDF's/Cascadia%20Rising/Deep%20Ecology%20A%20New%20Philosophy%20o
f%20our%20Time.pdf)-M.H
First, shallow ecology views humans as separate from their environment. Figure/ground boundaries are sharply
drawn such that humans are perceived as the significant figures against a ground that only assumes significance in so far as it enhances
humans images of themselves qua important figures. Shallow ecology thus views humans as the source of all value
and ascribes only instrumental (or use) value to the nonhuman world. It is, in short, anthropocentric, representing that attitude to conservation
that says: We ought to preserve the environment (i.e., what lies outside the boundary) not for its own sake but
because its value to us (i.e, what lies inside the boundary). Deep ecology, on the other hand, rejects the
(human)-in-environment image in favor of the relational, total-field image. Organisms are then viewed rather
as knots in the bio spherical net or field of intrinsic relations. Figure/ground boundaries are replaced by a holistic or gestalt view where, in
Devalls words, the person is not above or outside of nature(but)is part of creation on-going. This total-field conception
dissolves not only the notion of humans as separate form their environment but the very notion of
the world as composed of discrete, compact, separate things. When we do talk about the world as if it were a
collection of discrete, isolable things we are, in Naesss view, talking at a superficial or preliminary level of communication. Deep
ecology thus strives to be non-anthropocentric by viewing humans as just one constituency among
others in the biotic community, just one particular strand in the web of life, just one kind of knot in the bio spherical net. The
intrinsic value of the nonhuman members of the biotic community is recognized and the right of these
members to pursue their own evolutionary destinies is taken as an intuitively clear and obvious value
axiom. In contrast, the idea that humans are the source or ground of all value (the measure of all things) is viewed as the arrogant conceit
of those who dwell in the moral equivalent of a Ptolemaic universe. Deep ecologists are concerned to move heaven and earth in this universe in
order to effect a paradigm shift of comparable significance to that association with Copernicus.

The aff re-engrains a subjective/objective understanding of the environment
Rothenberg 08-- professor of philosophy and music at the New Jersey Institute of Technology. David
Rothenberg (1996) No world but in things: The poetry of Naess's concrete contents, Inquiry: An
Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 39:2, 255-272
Most of the writing concerned with deep ecology tends to focus on the deep ecology movement, an international assemblage of theorists and
activists intent on using environmentalism as a basis for a fundamental change in the way we live and understand the human place in nature. In
this definition such a movement implicates people like Murray Bookchin, David Brower, and vice president Al Gore, whether they like it or not.
As a movement, deep ecology is an embracing, umbrella term to cover all those who believe ecological
problems stand for deeper social, political, and ethical problems. But the philosophy of deep ecology
is something altogether different. This is, I believe, something much more specific than the movement, something 1 less
recognized, less well-understood. Deep ecology as philosophy is the attempt to articulate a new relationship
between humanity and nature, one that does not accept familiar divisions between the subjective and
the objective, or between the natural and the human. It is a direction for ontology to make progress on, not a perspective
that has been fully or even tentatively outlined. Deep ecology as philosophy suggests that humanity is not only part
of nature, but intertwined with nature, as idea and fact, connected to our surroundings in a way that
our language is not prepared to let us speak of. Our language and categories of thought are questioned in order that we
may develop new ways to speak the world into existence (in Heidegger's words), changing logic, syntax, and conception. This is the
most radical kind of ecological thinking, and this is the hardest to engage in or to explain. Arne Naess's particular articulation
of the philosophy of deep ecology depends on a human ability to apprehend the qualities of nature directly. This borrows from phenomenology
but does not use its terminology. In this paper I intend to explore Naess's terminology of concrete contents, which builds on a rejection of Galileo's
distinction between primary, secondary, and tertiary qualities and posits instead a way of understanding where we apprehend the qualities of
things only through their relation with each other. Naess rejects the notion of 'quality' and comes up instead with the word 'contents' and calls
these contents 'concrete' because they are directly apprehended reality, not structures invoked to explain reality. Naess then sidesteps the
phenomenological tradition, with its subject experiencing the world, and hints instead at a world that as a whole experiences itself, with no
primary subjects or objects, but instead a web of relations. I say 'hints' because the philosophy of deep ecology has always, in
2 its radical break with tradition, seemed by nature to be preliminary. How to develop it further? I suggest that
Naess is trying to push philosophy in a direction toward poetry. To that end I use a series of resonating
examples from Italian writer Italo Calvino, the music of the Kahili people of New Guinea, a film by John
Sayles, and Swedish poet Tomas Transtromer. To redefine itself, philosophy sometimes needs to find
inspiration outside its borders. Naess rides the train to the mountains - he sees birches smiling, firs weeping. He wants us to
believe that these smiles and tears come before we see trees themselves, and are not a projection
from human moods or glances. These emotional parts of reality he calls the concrete contents of
reality. W e see the world first as relations between us and it. Smiles and cries are actually there, they
are the fabric of the world, the threads of nature and the foundations of the universe. He doesn't
want to call them human appearances but natural appearances. Not human experience but simply experience, the
world experiencing itself in surges of emotion, sparkles of light. We need to wake up and perceive the world as alive,
dancing upon itself, wondrous and self- aware. With this idea of the content of reality as concrete, Naess is reaching for a
name to mark out an area of existence, and giving it greater weight by saying it is real. In his drive to make up these phrases and hope they will
stick, I see him striving for a peculiar kind of logical poetry, trying out a metaphor to see if it will catch on, a gentle jab to consider the pieces of
experience and wonder what would happen if we were to put them back together another way. It is my intention here to
investigate what it would mean to see the world in this other way - how the primacy of all qualities
might make things recede and relations come into prominence, how it might be the birth of a less
arrogant way of placing human beings into an equally experiencing surrounding, also a subject, not
only an object. And the announcement that the emotions we sense there in nature are not mere projections, or whims of different
perspectives, but an actuality which can't be denied. Leave your left hand out in the cold winter air, keep the right one
cozy inside a mitten. Then stick both inside a pot of room-temperature water. The left one feels warm.
The right one feels cold. Is the water warm or cold? Galileo says neither warm nor cold. These are
secondary qualities, subjective, in the hand of the beholder. To be distinguished from primary, objective
qualities like volume and shape, what he would have called properties of the water and the pot itself,
wholly contained and clear in the object. Presocratic Protagoras has already disagreed, two thousand years earlier. According
to Sextus Empiricus, he would have said the water is both warm and cold. 'Water has all kinds of qualities, but a sensitive being is only able 3 to
experience a limited number of them.' We feel different aspects of the water in different relations to it, but the water still contains these
different aspects since as water it is defined in terms of its relations with the world. Naess goes on to find support for this view in the following
ancient Sanskrit formula: sarvam dharmam nihsvabhavam - Every element is without self- existence. Things exist only
linked to each other, caught in the web of the world. But subjects and objects are primary categories in most of Western
philosophy. When Naess tries to go beyond these divisions, he is led, like other philosophers of this century, to create his own language to
describe the way he sees things. And all is not equal in this view: feelings of water as well as the rootedness of sense of place are contents of
reality, because they are there in the sea we swim in or the place with which we identify. But there is a level of understanding that takes a step
back from the immediacy of relating with the world: deciding how much land is worth in monetary terms, or discovering the chemical formula
that constitutes soil or the cell pattern of wood. These are abstract structures, once removed from the concrete
relational contents of the nature that includes our ability to know it. The implications of this view for tactical,
pragmatic environmentalism are clear: if a defender of a mountain sees it as beneficent, glorious, sublime, then that value is beneath the
summit, ready to be excavated and converted into cash, even though it is harder to quantify. Beauty in nature is not subjective
(used by the 'rational' as a pejorative term) and therefore possible to dismiss as sentimentalism. The full
range of qualities latent in the Earth come from there, belong there, and we should ensure that they stay there.

Geo-Engineering/Climate

Calculative ordering of the world by means of geo-engineering and augmentation of
the environment in response to anthro-pogenic crisis such as global warming deny the
interconnectedness of humanity to the environment the impact to this is unfettered
calculative nihilism and inevitable planetary destruction
Joronen, 2011 (Mikko, PhDUniversity Teacher in Department of Geography @ University of Turku,
Antipode, Vol. 43, No. 4, Dwelling in the Sites of Finitude: Resisting the Violence of the Metaphysical
Globe, Pg. 1127-1154&)
In spite of the revolutionary sense of power-free letting-be, our role as the ones who let being make its
transformation poses a number of questions concerning our part in this radical turning from ontological violence
to the other beginning of abyssal being. What exactly is our relation to the finitude of being? Should we only wait for the end of the
prevailing mode of being and thus hope for a new sending of being? At least Heideggers comment in his posthumously published Der Spiegel
interview about only god (ie a new sending of being) being capable of saving us seems to imply this, apparently leaving little room for
human activism (Heidegger 1993b:107; see also Schatzki 2007:32). Hence, is our part just to question the prevailing unfolding and
so to wait for the new sending, the other beginning, the new arrival of being? First of all, it is crucial to recognise
that waiting for the world-historical turning is not inactivity but a revolution that turns power-free thinking into
praxis. It is a non-violent revolution, which can take many forms of activism, such as disobedience and protests. In fact, Dallmayr
(2001:267) even compares this praxis of non-violent resistance with the paths of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. Altogether, as Malpas
(2006:300) writes, there is no reason why the world-historical turning of being cannot be awaited through political activism, as long as it avoids
being taken up by a machinational mode of unfolding and thus remains non-violent and aware of its limitedness and finitude (see also Irwin
2008:170, 188189). Secondly, it is important that Heidegger relates our letting-be-like recognition of abyssal being to the earth aspect of the
site where things show themselves. The unconcealment of the abyssal ground, the unveiling of the abundant being
concealed by the limits of particular world-disclosures, is also an unconcealment of the earth, since the material
things that the earth provides are never emptied into present world-disclosure. Earth rather stands in strife
against every particular rationalisation made by particular world-disclosures. Accordingly, even though all particular
world-disclosures always denote an unfolding of things as what they are, none of them is an unfolding of things as
all that they are (Heidegger 2001a:5253; Malpas 2006:193; Schatzki 2007:5455). All secured realms of disclosure always
conceal other possible ways of unfolding, which means that by concealing the abyssal realm of abundance against
which every particular unfolding takes place, world-disclosures conceal the inexhaustibility of things on earth in a
very metaphysical sense. Unlike in the manipulative possession promoted by contemporary planetary
machination, earth does not belong to anyone since it can never be captured as a whole (de Beistegui 2007:17). It is
our non-violent rejection of the manipulative power of calculative ordering that puts aside the violent capturing of
the earth and hence lets what has already fled our rational apparatuses to become in power: the abyssal ground of
earth. Perhaps one of the most striking examples of the need for nonviolent resistance and power-free following of
the abyssal earth is the contemporary event of global warming. While this devastating change is affecting all parts
of the earth, even the atmosphere, some of the most vulgar solutions, especially the geo-engineering proposals,
aim at intentional, even global-scale, climate modification either by reducing the incoming radiation from the
sunfor instance, by using the refractive screens or sunshade of autonomous spacecraft installed in space (Angel
2006), or by spraying cooling sulphate particle concentrations in the stratosphere (Crutzen 2006)or by removing
carbon dioxide from the atmospherefor instance, by increasing carbon sequestration with iron fertilisation of
the oceans (Buesseler and Boyd 2003). These various potential geo-engineering implementations seem to do nothing
but follow the baseline of the gigantic machination, the subjugation of things into orderable reserve commanded
to stand by so that they may be manipulated by the operations of calculation. Even though such geo-engineering
may eventually mitigate the negative consequences of climate change, it offers a calculative moulding of the
even more complex systems of orderings as a solution to the problem of global warming, which is itself
subordinate to, as well as an outcome of, this manipulative and calculative subjugation of earth, the logic of
circular self-overcoming in the ever-greater modalities of exploitative power. As Malpas (2006:298) writes, although it is
evident that more complex systems of orderings also increase the possibilities of their failure, machination always
presents itself as a source for continuous improvements by simply viewing these failures as an indication of a
further need for technological perfection. In other words, machination does not implicate an achievement of total
ordering, but a drive towards total ordering where this drive itself is never under suspicion. Nevertheless, as
contemporary climate change indicates, earth never allows itself to become captured, completely controlled or
emptied into unfolding that frames it in terms of orderable and exploitable standing reserve. Earth rather resists all
attempts to capture it: it resists by pointing out the lack that leads to the failure of all systems of orderings. It is
precisely this lack, the line of failure that has always already started to flee the perfect rationalisation and total
capture of things, which presents the earth aspect of Heidegger. Instead of the calculative engineering of technical
solutions, non-violent resistance allows the earth to become a source of abyssal being, a source of self-emerging
things that always retains a hidden element since the earth never allows itself to become completely secured
though particular world-disclosures (see Harrison 2007:628; Peters and Irwin 2002:8). In other words, instead of mere
calculative manipulation, we can resist the manipulative machination of earth and thus let the living earth become
a source of abyssal being, an earth-site for our dwelling. Thirdly, it is the recognition of the finitude, the limit, that
allows a breakdown of our taken-for-granted ontological intelligibility of prevailing world-disclosure. Identification of
the finitude affords a view into the possible absence of prevailing world-disclosure, a situation of distress Polt (2006:30) calls the emergency of
being, where the world we are thrown into becomes unsettled, releases its hold and eventually allows us to remember its originary
happening as a mere historical appropriation of limits from the groundless abyss. Moreover, compared with Heideggers earlier notion about
the recognition of our own finitudeour deathforcing us to face what stands as completely contrary to the
meaning of beingthe nothingness with empty-of-all meaningthe notion about the finitude of being as such
refers rather to the positive realm, to the abyssal reservoir of plenitude (Young 2002:190192). Thus, the nothing is
not excluded as the opposite of being, as a mere negativity of empty nihilism; nothing rather belongs to the realm
of being through the sense of possible absence it implies, absence (the possibility of finitude) in this case keeping
the site opened for the play and other beginning of being. Planetary machination, however, and the calculative
thinking it affords, do not allow this appearance of finitude: as a total positioning they destroy the earth upon
which we dwell by changing it into an errant planet, into a globe in an astral universe without the earth-site for
making manifest the limits of the happening of being. As Radloff (2007:36) sums up, earth is not a planetearth is not a
planet, because the planet belongs to the representational thinking that hides the fundamental openness of the
abyssal earth-site through which the sphere of total gaze, the planetary globe, became possible in the first place.
Eventually this globe, ordered through the networks cast upon the planet, opens neither paths nor possibilities,
but a profound nihilism of calculative consumption and utilisation of the earth (see Joronen 2008:603604). As Critchley
(1997:12) writes, rather than simple transgression or restoration of the conditions that ground the contemporary situation, we need to
experience their limit, to delineate them. The crucial point is that the contemporary ontic homelessness, the late modern nihilism of planetary
machination, does not allow the fundamental sense of ontological finitude, the distress and emergency about the limitedness and finitude of the
prevailing mode of being, to arise (Heidegger 1996:7475; Radloff 2007:240). This ontological homelessness, the sense about finitude and play of
being, can only be confronted through the happening of being, through being that presences through sites, which means that one can become
opened to abyssal being to the extent that one first finds the finitude of the prevailing mode of being, its limits. Hence, Heideggers notion
about dwelling in the earth-sites, our being-at-home on earth, is properly understood as a homecoming that takes place through
ontological homelessness: out of the passage through what is foreign, we no more merely live through the given unfolding, but better, by
being unhomely in becoming homely we become to sense the potential for human beings to dwell on earth with understanding about the
finitude and givenness of the ruling unfolding (Heidegger 1996:120121; on Heideggers comparison between modern homelessness and
Marxs notion of alienation, see Heidegger 1993a:243244). Since the primary aim of this non-metaphysical and non-grounding
dwelling is the recognition of the abyssal earth-sites, it neither proposes the chauvinism of provincial locality nor
bounded homeland rooted in organic national family of blood and soil, as Thiele (1995:172175) for instance
misinterprets all of these definitions, the organic, the national and the blood, are metaphysical
determinations that presuppose a concept of collective subjectivity explicitly rejected by Heidegger (1993a:244245; see also
de Beistegui 2007:10; Radloff 2007:241242). Instead, the possibility of a non-metaphysical dwelling in the sites of
ontological finitude signifies a chance for an open and abyssal clearing on earth, an eco-poetic promiseecological
as opposed to violent exploitation of nature, poetic as opposed to the metaphysical violence of calculative
rationality. As de Beistegui (2007:18) suggests, instead of bounded territorialism or cosmopolitanism, such citizenship on earth could
perhaps be translated into something like geopolitanism (cf. Morin 2009; Turnbull 2006).4 As it has become evident, the contemporary
nihilism and planetary homelessness of (late) modernity does not correspond with the primordial ontological homelessness based on dwelling
in the finite earth-sites of abyssal being. The homelessness of technological calculation, which is now coming to be the
destiny of the world, is a symptom of the oblivion of beingan abandonment of abyssal being in favour of
metaphysical rationality of ideologically and universally grounded conceptual systemswhen the dwelling in the sites of
finitude is a homecoming that founds our taken-for-granted belongingness to particular world-disclosure by unsettling and dislocating us
from it (Heidegger 1993a:242, 243). At the end, we are left with a nonmetaphysical sense of dwelling, with a resistance
based on the finitude of being. Accordingly, resistance includes both power-free dwelling on earth, and non-
metaphysical sites based on finite and abyssal being. As I have tried to show, this sort of dwelling offers neither total
unity of intelligibility, an ontologically bounded and grounded dwelling, nor alienation based on planetary nihilism
of willfull calculations, but a sense of finitude and thus a sense about the limits of the planetary unfolding of
machination. It is a dwelling that remains open for abyssal being and hence for an Event, which as a play can never
be mastered since mastering does not provide possibilities but necessities. As exposed to abyss, we human beings
are exposed to the concealed ab-ground of beingto the abysmal reservoir of abundant being and so may turn into the
power-free grounders of abyssal earth (cf. Sallis 2001:188, 194195). One of the features of contemporary planetary homelessness of
machination is precisely the lack of distress and emergency, the lack of mood that affords access to the openness of being via finitude
(Heidegger 2000:266267; see Haar 2002:157; Heidegger 1973:99). It is the sense of ontological finitude that is crucial to dwelling without it
dwelling turns into moulding securing of being, into the metaphysical capturing of earth, when with the sense of finitude we are given both the
earth-sites of dwelling and the finite unfolding of abyssal being. It is precisely the distress about the finitude of being that is
able to block and cease the eternal machinery of will to will and hence the endless productisation and
organisation of all in the names of capital accumulation, winning-valuing and profit-making. Without a sense of
finitude, limitation and dependence, thinking is not just lack of genuine questions concerning our finite existence
and ontological situatedness in-the-world, but also in danger of encouraging the ontological violence of
boundless measurement and complete control. As Zimmerman writes, by affording realms of personal and collective
craving for immortality such violence generates a ground for the new oppressive social institutions and nature-
dominating projects of ecological aggressiveness (Zimmerman 1994:107; cf. Taylor 1991:68, 1992:267). The dark side of the
denial of finitude and impermanence is the structured aim for total control and measurement encouraging us to
build immortal, megalomaniac and turgid monuments from violent authoritarianism and hierarchic cultures to the
contemporary hegemony of capital accumulation and nature exploitation. It is the finitude then that works against what
Zizek calls the fantasmatic illusion maintained by the contemporary global techno-capitalism, the illusion that the world ruled by
machination and its capitalist forces is ontologically complete and perfectly measured by its instrumental-pragmatist problem-solving
calculations (Zizek 1999:204, 218; see also Brockelman 2008a:84, 2008b). It is precisely the functioning of everything and that this functioning
drives further to more functioning which implies lack of distress and emergency about the finitude and impermanence (of the calculative
ground) of being. If everything operates so that there is no problem in view, there is no need for emergency and
distress alike. Nihilist calculating and reckoning then do not just give us the nomadic homelessness of mankind
(uniformly subjecting the living earth into the useable and disposable globe for the will to power) but also violent
cults of power, control, violence, accumulation and oppression (with no other purposes aside from the
strengthening and unbounded expansion of their own world-image, their world-view). These are just two sides
of the same coin of the manipulative and omnipotent power of calculative machination, a power without any
distress about its lack of distress. In the end, machination raises a radical sense of making a love affair to power, as Taylor (1991:67)
puts it. This all-doable makeability grows to new heights when the value of all becomes decided upon the point of
calculative measuring, choosing and computingupon a coercive reckoning promoted by the will that wills more
power and control. In order to follow through Heideggers opening to the notion of finitude, it is our possibility of a
non-violent dwelling in the finite earth-sites of abyssal being that decides the question whether mankind is still,
after planetary capitalism, nomadic humanity and coercive enframing and domination of nature, capable of
calling the living earth a home.

Ocean Development
Ocean development is rooted in a paradigm of exploitation the 1acs attempt to
separate humanity from nature dismisses the ethical implications of our actions
http://www.ceoe.udel.edu/windpower/resources/J_Lilley_8-03_FINAL.pdf - &)
Covering almost three-quarters of the planets surface, the ocean has for centuries been thought of as impervious to
harm. Indeed, for all but the most recent chapter in human history, it was simply not possible to affect the ocean in any meaningful way.
Humans fished, sailed, and utilized the cleansing properties of the ocean, but due to a comparatively
small global population and less advanced technologies, had a negligible impact on the marine
environment. Those days disappeared during the nineteenth century with the advent of commercial whaling
and never returned. Since then, ever increasing population numbers, coupled with new and more efficient
technologies, have led to a situation where humans have the capacity to significantly affect the ocean.
Today, the ocean has many uses fishing, recreation, transportation, energy development, to name just a few and
needs to be managed accordingly. The last of these, development of the oceans energy resources, has gained
significance in the last couple of years. Stymied for a quarter century by a moratorium on new offshore drilling, changing political
views and new technologies (such as offshore wind power) have opened up both non-renewable and
renewable resources for potential development. A number of issues e.g., overfishing, pollution,
development of the coastal zone result from the above uses and traditionally such issues have been tackled through
a combination of science and technology. This is partly because problems relating to the environment are frequently complex and require the
use of 2 advanced technologies and also because science is believed to be able to provide objective answers to the
questions we ask (Stenmark, 2002). However, although science and technology tell us what can be done to solve
a particular problem, they do not tell us what should be done; to believe otherwise is to confuse questions of fact with
questions of value. Thinking that because something is the case means it ought to be the case is one form of the naturalistic fallacy (Dennett,
1995; Singer, 1981), a tendency that is strongly cautioned against (Moore, 1903). Using the best available science and technology is important
when addressing environmental issues, but it should be remembered that other aspects of such issues also need consideration. Rather than
focusing solely on science and technology, Mikael Stenmark has suggested that environmental problems have three dimensions scientific,
social and normative (moral or ethical) all of which need to be considered to address environmental issues effectively (Stenmark, 2002).
Stenmark argues that, in addition to scientific and social studies of human/nature relationships, there is the need for a critical
and constructive analysis of peoples various ethical judgments, their views of nature, their world
views and of the consequences that all these different positions have (Stenmark, 2002, p. 13). While there have been
many in-depth scientific studies of ocean processes, as well as social and economic studies of how humans impact the marine environment,
there has been very little research into what people think of the ocean. As will be seen, the studies that have been conducted focus
almost exclusively on ocean knowledge, as opposed to the ethical or value judgments that people possess.
Despite this lack of information about ocean values, both the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy and the Pew Oceans Commission state the need
for an engaged citizenry in marine affairs, with the former noting that *t+o successfully address complex 3 ocean- and coastal-related issues,
balance the use and conservation of marine resources, and realize future benefits from the ocean, an interested, engaged public is essential
(U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, 2004, p. 123). 1.1 Purpose of the Research By looking at ocean values and beliefs, this study seeks to
investigate the third dimension that Stenmark describes the moral and ethical aspects of the relationships that exist between humans and the
marine environment. In short, this dissertation looks to discover what the American public thinks of the ocean. In addition, given renewed
interest in offshore energy, it will focus specifically on attitudes to ocean energy development. It will draw out mental and cultural models that
exist in society regarding the ocean and offshore energy development; understand why people think of the ocean as they do; and unearth what
(if any) philosophies underpin peoples attitudes toward the ocean. The data generated from the study will provide a better understanding of
how society currently perceives the marine environment. While research has previously been conducted into general environmental values
(Kempton, Boster, & Hartley, 1995) and ocean knowledge (Steel, Lovrich, Lach, & Fomenko, 2005), no study has focused specifically on ocean
values. As such, this work represents new research and will contribute to a general understanding of public
perceptions of the marine environment. It is hoped this research will aid policy makers. Policies are far more likely to succeed
when they have the weight of public support behind them (Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999; Theodoulou, 1995), and by
understanding how people view the oceans, 4 policy makers will have better idea of which policies are likely to receive public support and
which are not.

The deep ecology movement requires informing the consumers of what products are
acquired through sustainable methods and what arent
Preston 96 (Christopher My research interests have been shaped by my job as botanist at the Biological
Records Centre since 1980, and my professional and personal involvement with the recording activities
of the Botanical Society of the British Isles and the British Bryological Society.) 1996 Deep Ecology and
Natural Resource Industries: Some Lessons From a Fishing Boat
(http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/index.php/trumpet/article/viewArticle/235/335)-M.H
Natural resource industries present a series of unique challenges to the deep ecology movement. Recognizing the importance of these
industries is a crucial first step. Extractive resource industries occupy the cutting edge of consumer society's
relationship with nature. They are the forgotten price of every trip to the mall or the grocery store. Anyone who has seen pictures of
an open cast gold mine or visited a clear cut in the Cascade Mountains of Oregon and Washington knows that these industries can do a lot of
damage. Many of the methods currently used for extracting resources are extremely problematic for
those in the deep ecology movement. Dissolving gold with cyanide, trawling the ocean floor, drift net fishing and clear cutting
old growth forests are all methods that can cause significant damage, or totally destroy, an ecosystem. For example, the local crab
fishery in King Cove, Alaska disappeared a mere three years after the area was opened up for bottom
trawling for cod and flounder. Alternative methods for extracting resources are, in many instances, both
necessary and overdue. Thinking about these methods should be a priority for anyone seriously
concerned with minimizing the daily damage to our wilder places. Establishing acceptable methods for extracting
natural resources would allow the consumer to take a more pro-active role in determining change. Platform principle #8 of the deep
ecology movement states that there is an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the
necessary changes.3 For every consumer, purchasing power has an important role to play in fulfilling
these obligations. This means not just consuming less, but also consuming products taken less
destructively from the earth. For this to happen, the consumer needs to know the environmental footprint of her purchase.
Certification procedures such as those currently used on organic fruits and vegetables can help consumers make purchases that reflect their
moral commitments. But decisions over certification can be complex and require lengthy discussion. For example, in fishing,
seining may prove to be an acceptable method for catching salmon, but unacceptable for catching
tuna because of the dolphin by-catch. Extractive industries also occupy an important part of the political territory. Many regions
of the country have historical attachments to certain industries that stir deep emotions. Supporters of the deep ecology platform often find
themselves a marginalized group in these regions. Loggers and ranchers lament the voices of the "extremists" that
oppose the way they make a living. Newsmaking initiatives such as the Wildlands Project can make it
appear to loggers and ranchers that their opponents would indeed rather kill people than snakes or
grizzly bears. This obscures the fact that a deep ecology approach calls for a society that is more, not
less, integrated with nature than the present one. Selective logging and subsistence hunting have an important role to play in any
ecological future. The political currency of the deep ecology movement would be enhanced enormously if activists could show that
they encourage long-term sustainable extraction of goods from nature and then demonstrate how it could be done.

Shallow Ecology

The affs focus on shallow ecology reduces life to economic terms justifying the
destruction of the environment for human benefit
Third, in terms of its social, political and economic project, shallow ecology tends to accept by default or positively
endorse the ideology of economic growth which characterizes industrial and developing societies of all political complexions.
It is thus often referred to as the Resource Management or resource Conservation and
Development approach. As such, it is content to operate in a reformist fashion within the dominant social paradigm and, often, to
accept the economic reduction (i.e., the reduction of all values to economic terms) for the purposes of decision making. Deep ecology on
the other hand, is concerned to address existing social, political and economic arrangements and to
replace the ideology of economic growth with the ideology of ecological sustainability. It is insisted
that economics (etymologically: management of the household) must be seen as subsidiary to ecology (Study of the
household), and the economic reduction of values is thus firmly resisted. Key ideas in deep ecologys social, political and
economic project include those of a just and sustainable society, carrying capacity, frugality (or voluntary
simplicity), dwelling in place, cultural and biological diversity, local autonomy and decentralization, soft
energy paths, appropriate technology, rein habitation, and bioregionalism. These last two perhaps require some
elaboration. Rein habitation refers to the process of relearning how to live in place, how to establish a
sense of place, how to dwell in and care for a place. Some people are attempting to cultivate consciously this sense,
under the most difficult of circumstances, by moving into areas that have been degraded by industrial development and participating in the
re-establishment of a rich and diverse ecosystem. Bio regions refer to areas possessing common characteristics of
soils, watersheds, plants and animals (e.g., the Amazon jungle). It is argued that bioregions should replace
nation-states as the fundamental geographical unit in terms of which humans think and live. The
human carrying capacity for each bioregion should be determined in terms of the number of humans
that can be supported living at a level of resource use that is adequate for their needs but minimally
intrusive on their environment. Here, of course, lie a multitude of difficult questions for the political agenda of deep ecology.
However, these questions have, in various forms, been addressed by numerous societies in the past (including a minority tradition in Western
society) and are now being taken up by increasing numbers of thinkers in highly industrialized societies.

The affs green policies are part of shallow ecology that robs consumers of any concept
of personal sacrifice as self interest this fuels destruction of earths natural habitats
Itself 2003, pp. 5-6]
Although a few voices can be heard calling for philosophical examination of our predicament, they are a small minority. For the most part, we
are living through a massive cultural propaganda exercise dedicated to the task of convincing ourselves that the
dominant cultural forces have identified the problem and are working steadily toward appropriate solutions. While we may not yet be
walking the green walk, we are well on our way to mastering the green talk. Apart from a few hardened
reactionary voices, the entire American mainstream from Disney to the White House now sings a green song.
Environmental slogans that were heard only among a dedicated core of treehuggers a generation
ago have become todays accepted clichs. Political spin doctors and corporate public relations departments,
having mastered the art of green speak, reassure us that our environmental concerns, as real as they are,
are being handled attentively. We may continue to drive our SUVs to fast-food franchises in support
of the global beef market without any need for alarm or personal sacrifice. Although the world rarely looks to
them for help in analyzing such practical matters, philosophers have nevertheless been busy reevaluating our
relation with nature and its underlying assumptions. Even in the ivory-tower discipline of academic
philosophy, environmental ethics has become a legitimate topic of study. Treated at best as a fringe interest only a
generation ago, the philosophical examination of the environment is gaining respect as a desirable area of academic teaching and research. But
while philosophers have begun to talk among themselves about the current state of nature,
difficulties persist in establishing serious dialogue with other academic disciplines, much less with the public
outside the academy. Philosophy has yet to find an effective voice in our struggle with the environmental
crisis or a clear role in our quest for a sustainable human presence on the earth.

Shallow Ecology advances Eurocentric and Anthropocentric norms, Deep Ecology can
break this mindset
from Deep Ecology. Ethics and the Environment 2(2): 140, Retrieved from:
To avoid the complications of trying to characterize Deep Ecology through a general survey of its advocates, it will be most efficacious to simply
focus on the philosophy of the original deep ecologist, Arne Naess, and two well-known partisans, Bill Devall and George Sessions. Naess is a
Norwegian philosopher and naturalist who coined the term in The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary (1973),
which has become a sort of manifesto for the Deep-Ecology movement. Though Naess conveys a humble, non-confrontational, Gandhi-
influenced demeanor, he lambastes Western civilization for arrogant human-centeredness and a related
instrumentalization and subjugation of nonhuman nature by contrasting his new "deep" environmental
ethic with "shallow" (or to put it less pejoratively, "reform") environmentalism. Shallow
environmentalism is simply an extension of the anthropocentric Western paradigm, because the reasons
for preserving wilderness or biodiversity are inevitably couched in terms of human welfare. Shallow
environmentalism falls short of valuing nonhumans apart from their use-value. Deep Ecology, in contrast, asserts that all
organisms have intrinsic value. In this way Deep Ecology is fundamentally non-anthropocentric. There
are two interrelated underpinnings of Deep Ecology' s non-anthropocentrism. The first is the principle
that all biota have equal intrinsic value. Naess, Devall, and Sessions use the phrases "biocentric equality," "biospherical
egalitarianism," and "ecological egalitarianism" to express this principle (Naess 1973, 95; Devall and Sessions 1975,_ 67-69). The second is
the principle that the biosphere does not consist of metaphysically discrete individuals, but
ontologically-interconnected individuals comprising one unbroken whole. This is a principle of
metaphysical holism, and is known through the process of "self-realization" (66- 67). Therefore, we can
characterize Deep Ecology as an egalitarian and holistic theory. To discover what lessons Deep Ecology has for environmental
philosophy in general, let us consider each of these principles in turn, and then in relation to each other.

State
Link- The use of the state guarantees malicious lies to continue their ever expansive
grip on exploiting nature for profit and power
Naess 89, Council for Environmental Studies University of Oslo 1989 (ARNE, Cambridge University,
Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, pg 165 , CD)
Pollution and resource problems make up a real part of the concerns of the ecological movement, but
the way these problems are taken up in the industrial countries has not been satisfactory for several
reasons, neither in short- nor in long-term perspectives. Firstly a priority has been given to them without attacking deeper links of the causal
chains: the systems of production and consumption, the technologies, thelack of global and local
solidarity, the lifestyle anomalies. One can perhaps go as far as to say that pollution and resource
discussions have pushed away all the deeper aspects. The shallow movement has dominated the
deep. Industrial countries can control outflow of garbage and pollutants in a way that is economically
impossible for developing countries to follow. Industrial countries can reduce the requirements in turn
for political benevolence from the side of the developing countries, for example press them to open
their countries for certain hard technologies and immense industrial undertakings which can ignore
the environmental laws of the rich industrial countries. It seems powerful multinational corporations
still lead the current development. Government's and people's opinions permit them to exploit the
poor lands' cheaper resources and raw materials and labour on the grounds of a long-lasting
relationship of exploitation where the developing countries are the losers. Their Capacities for fighting
environmental degradation are different from ours. We are not all in the same boat, but in several
different boats, all of them charting a course for catastrophe.

Sustainable Development

The use of sustainable development as justification for perpetuation of human survival furthers an
anthro-darwinian understanding of humanity that denies interconnectedness with nature though
their aff may appear beneficial for the environment, it is only beneficial through a lens of calculability
of nature that is the source of environmental exploitation
O Kane 11 (Katrina, Associate professor of ethnology, multimedia documentary artist and natural
scientist., RELS 235 Religion and the Environment DEEP SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT New Visions for an
Important Concept November 30, 2011 pg 122-124)
The term sustainable development itself appears an oxymoron. Our definitions of development increasing Western
notions of material wealth and technology can in themselves be environmentally and culturally unsustainable (Robinson 2002, 1). The
Bruntland report, which is the founding document for sustainable development, simultaneously calls for a five or tenfold increase in global
economic product in order for sustainable development to be achieved (Robinson 2002, 11). Again, this conflicts with
environmental sustainability, as increased production places strain on the environment. The focus on
economic development allows for hypocrisy, as sustainable economic practices that cause environmental and cultural damage are advanced
under the name of sustainable development (Robinson 2002, 14). Lastly, sustainable development is strongly
anthropocentric and fails to recognize the importance of nonhuman life to the long-term
sustainability of the Earth (Naess 2005(b), 566). To overcome the failings of current notions of sustainable
development, there is a need for a new, deeper vision. The next section will explore how deep ecology can help develop
that stronger vision, answering important questions about end goals, maintaining cultural diversity, and implementing sustainable action. III.
DEEP SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: ANEW VISION SELF-REALIZATION: THE END GOAL OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT To bring purpose
and vision to sustainable development, it is essential that there exists an ultimate ideal towards which to strive.
There is a need for meaning, something that one often attributes to religion or philosophical belief. Deep ecology can also
provide source of meaning and an end goal: self-realization. Similar to their understanding of interconnectedness, deep
ecologists view self-realization as broadening our sense of self beyond the narrow individualistic ego to an
identification with all living beings (Naess 2005(a), 415). In deep ecology, the Self is understood as
integrated with the whole of nature, a widened and deepened notion (Devall and Sessions 1984, 311). When we are able to fully
understand this notion of self, we are able to move towards self-realization. Here, deep ecology draws on Spinozas metaphysics. According to
Spinoza, self realization is the ability to be self-reliant and to understand, recognize, and take responsibility for our own opinions, beliefs,
feeling and actions (de Jonge 2004, 146). Actions come from within, we are not reliant on outside feelings of
pleasure or self-worth, and are aware of social conditioning (de Jonge 2004, 82-83). We act in ways to serve
our Self, yet since we view our Self as integrated with nature, we act to preserve nature. Through self-realization, we
experience an increased confidence in the meaning of life, and the joy we experience in living is increased (Naess 1995(a), 226), as we come to
understand that joy is our own responsibility. This motivates us on a personal level to strive towards a better goal. However, we can apply these
concepts to societies as well. If a society can achieve self-realization, it sees itself as integrated with the larger
reality, and acts in ways that preserve nature. Lastly, it is useful to make the connection between Maslows hierarchy of
needs and the concept of self-realization. Maslow presents a hierarchical system, moving from the most basic needs to the most complex:
physiological, safety, love/belonging, esteem, and self-actualization (Maslow 1943). Selfactualization is deemed the highest order and the
ultimate state of being towards which to strive. It too is recognized to be the desire for self-fulfillment, namely, to the tendency for [the
individual+ to become actualized in what he is potentially, to become everything that one is capable of becoming (Maslow 1943, 383). Self-
actualization and self-realization are similar concepts, simply approached from different perspectives. What is useful about this analogy is that
Maslow recognizes that this highest state can only be achieved after all other states have been passed. Thus, self-realization can only
be achieved once we are free from the bounds of the more primitive needs. This structure allows us to
envision ourselves or our societies within a certain level of need, and strive towards the next one, with the end ideal
remaining self-realization. For example, it is unlikely that a war torn country such as Somalia will dive into
philosophical thought about its deeper interconnectedness in the world. Instead, safety needs should be focused
on for the moment, as a means to the end of self-realization. However, this should not be misinterpreted to mean that only once we reach self-
realization should we be environmentally concerned. Throughout the process of development and achievement of self realization we should
find ourselves engaged ecologically. The state of self-realized existence provides us simply with an ideal towards which to strive. Self-
realization, as understood by deep ecology, thus provides sustainable development with an ultimate goal
towards which to strive: a state of existence where we as individuals and societies understand our
deeper interconnectedness with nature, and act in ways to preserve it. We exist happier, less bounded by outside pressures,
understanding the meaning of our actions. DEEP ECOLOGY AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY: RECOGNIZING DIFFERENT PATHS OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT While the previous section outlined a homogeneous ultimate ideal for sustainable development, this section will emphasize
that this ideal can be interpreted according to culture and must be achieved through different paths. It will also show that there are drastic
differences in the paths of sustainable development between industrial and non-industrial countries. Self-realization is a state of
being fully conscious and willing to take responsibility for our own beliefs and actions. It does not define what these
beliefs or actions should be, only that we must be the ones choosing them, free of external pressures.
Through experiencing this unbound state of consciousness, we are in a sense, achieving ultimate cultural freedom to understand and chose
what we believe in. In addition to being compatible with cultural diversity, deep ecology further provides an understanding of its importance.
Intrinsic to deep ecology is a respect for richness and diversity of life, which includes respect for cultural diversity. Thus, cultural diversity is
analogue on the human level to biological richness and diversity of life forms (Naess 1995(b), 73). Cultures are valuable to the flourishing of life,
independent of their usefulness to the current Western model. Thus, under deep ecology, the protection of non-industrial cultures from
invasion by industrial societies is a key focus (Naess 1995(b), 73), and the appreciation of cultural diversity is inherent. It should then be
recognized that different countries and cultures must follow different paths towards sustainable development. Underlying this discussion is the
understanding that all countries are developing. Industrial countries are not nearer to the ideal of self-realization then nonindustrial, and often
far further in their closeness to nature. All countries must implement sustainable development in a way that is unique to their conditions.
However, there are two opposing cases that are useful to discuss - rich, industrial and poor, non-industrial countries. Poor, non-industrial
countries should find the path of sustainable development more direct. They can altogether avoid the industrial phase infected with
consumerism, and enter a green postindustrial stage comprised of a lifestyle and economy based on sustainable principles (Naess 2005(b),
575). Nonindustrial countries often already practice ways of living that are more in line with ecological sustainability. For example, eating local
is not a cultural fad, but a means to survive, as the pathways and wealth needed to sell imported food do not exist. Thus, you find people in
Nepal growing maize and potatoes in their modest sized backyards within city limits. Development in these countries is still needed, so that
everyone may be able to meet their needs and achieve self-realization, however the basic practices are already in place to build upon.
Conversely, for rich, industrial countries, the struggle for sustainable development is more complex, due to the current lack of sustainable
practices and the ability to mass produce (Naess 2005(b), 575). Industrial countries have fallen out of balance with nature, and must regress to
more simplistic living. This requires a massive change in ideologies, in order to reconstruct large parts of our lives, including how we build our
cities, where we get our food, and our energy sources. By recognizing and valuing cultural diversity, deep ecology helps sustainable
development become a more widely embraced concept. It ensures the preservation of the many unique and colourful cultures the world
boasts, by understanding that different countries must follow different paths. DEEP ECOLOGY IN ACTION: MANDATE AND MANTRA OF
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Equipped with a well defined end goal and a clear understanding of cultural sensitivity and the differences in
paths, sustainable development still lacks applicable suggestions for implementation. Although this will vary
culturally, it is still useful to present broad ideas for areas of improvement. Such areas can be thought of under two headings as mandates and
mantras. A mantra is a sound repeated to aid concentration, words laden with spiritual meaning. It has come to represent a phrase that we
view as our guiding principle, that inspires us to act or expresses what we believe in. On this level, sustainable development must cultivate a
profound love for nature. This love must be completely genuine, coming from within; it must not be an order given. Only when we truly
appreciate the beauty of the mountain, the magic of the forest, or the freedom of the seas, will we
feel compelled to act to preserve them. Through deep ecology, this mantra can be recognized by
comprehending our wide identification with nature. By viewing ourselves as interconnected with nature, we nurture a
sincere internal love for nature. Actions to protect nature become actions to protect ourselves, and acts of kindness towards nature becomes
actions of kindness towards ourselves. A mandate, on the other hand, is defined as an order given to a person or organization to carry out a
certain task (Wildeman 2002, 93). It refers to the rules and regulations created by governments and other organizations in the pursuit of
sustainable development. These too can be made stronger with the help of deep ecology. The eight point Deep Ecology Platform lays out
principles through which we may act. A review of the relevant points follows (Naess 1995(b), 68): 1. The flourishing of human and non-human
life on Earth have value in themselves, independent of their usefulness for human purposes. This supports policies that act to protect any form
of life. Policies against deforestation, ocean acidification, and even climate change, which has lead to habitat alteration, are all supported by
this point. 2. Richness and diversity of life forms is valuable. Policies would act to preserve biodiversity, through preservation of unique
ecosystems, to reduce the human impact on the rate of extinction, and also to promote cultural diversity. 3. Humans have no right to reduce
this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs. This makes us consider what our vital needs consist of, and trade our material
accumulation for a more simple life style. It calls for rejection of consumerism and notions of material wealth, however allows for cultural and
environmental interpretations of the term vital. 4. The flourishing of life is compatible/requires a smaller human population. This point
specifically calls for population reduction policies, that acknowledge the earth has a carrying capacity over which we have passed. Even if our
current population is maintained, it will result in an irremediable loss of biodiversity and life. Thus, the process of population reduction may
take centuries, policies must be initiated immediately (Naess 1995(b), 69). 5. Present human interference with the non-human world is
excessive. This calls for a reduction of the nature and extent of our interference, and policies to preserve and extend areas of wilderness (Naess
1995(b), 69). 6. Policies affecting economic, technological, and ideological structures must be changed. This point enforces the need for policy
changes that cover areas other then environment. Economic growth is in itself unsustainable, and the call for sustainable development needs to
recognize this. Further, Ideologies such the prestige in vast consumption and waste must change, to better reflect a love of nature. 7. The
ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating life quality rather than adhering to an increasingly higher material standard of living. This
point recognizes the need to change our methods of valuing wellbeing. For example, our current ranking of wellbeing in nations on the basis of
GDP is flawed. Instead, focus on aspects that contribute to life quality (health, social connectedness, environmental conditions) should be
measured and used to evaluate. 8. Those who subscribe to the forgoing points have an obligation to implement changes. This addresses the
need for all members of society to adopt sustainable practices. Although sustainable policies and changes may be mandated from above, they
should spread throughout, and become mandatory for municipalities, businesses, charities, and individuals. Thus, through the eight points of
the Deep Ecology Platform, we are able to develop a more concrete understanding of policies to be adopted in striving for sustainable
development. Deep ecology also offers direct mandates to many common environmental problems. Pollution plagues every nation around the
world. While traditional approaches call for regulating pollution and finding new technologies, deep ecology calls for fighting the deep causes of
pollution, focusing also on economic conditions and technological responsibility (Naess 1995(b), 71). The problem of resource depletion
becomes a question of the balance between vital needs and right to live. Whereas traditional notions of sustainable
development promote reduced resource extraction on the basis of being able to provide for future
generations, deep ecology calls for an even more drastic reduction, so as to protect vital ecosystems
functions and promote long-range environmental vivacity (Naess 1995(b), 72). Lastly, when evaluating
policies for land and ocean management, current policies are quick to divide ecosystems into fragments, each of which is owned
by a human or group of humans. However, deep ecology allows us to understand the interconnected nature of systems, and thus focus on
more broad scale conservation efforts. It also emphasizes that the earth does not belong to humans, and thus calls for less invasive
interference, only to satisfy vital needs (Naess 1995(b), 74). Deep ecology provides sustainable development with several concepts that can
turn theory into action. It provides a mantra: cultivating a sincere internal love for nature, that has the power to inspire us to act. It also
provides mandates: addressing issues through the lens of the eight points of the Deep Ecology Platform, and by further offering solutions to
other common problems including pollution, resource depletion, and land and ocean management. IV. CONCLUSION Sustainable
development recognizes a more realistic need to consider Earths future. However, it has failed to bring about needed
change, as it lacks an end goal, remains culturally insensitive, and is dominated by contradictory messages and
anthropocentric views. Here, deep ecology can help sustainable development become a more robust concept. Self-realization of individuals and
societies provides a positive, hopeful future goal. Deep ecologys focus on preservation of cultural diversity as analogous to preservation of
diversity of life helps foster an understanding that different paths are needed. Lastly, deep ecology helps define a mantra and mandates that
can help put sustainable practices in place. It is with optimism that we move into the future; bright eyes set on Earths wonders, and with deep
understanding of our place, acting to protect, preserve, and love.

Technology
Even the conception of technology as something that can be part of nature while
maintaining an externalized and systematized control highlights the inherent
contradiction in the affs attempt to solve ecological crisis
Langer 3, Monika [Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Victoria in British Columbia,
Canada. Nietzsche, Heidigger, and Merleau Ponty: Some of their Contributions and Limitations for
Environmentalism Eco-Phenomenology Back to The Earth Itself Page 105-106]
For her part, Freya Mathews emphasizes that Nature itself has a dark side; and that decay, death, and destruction are aspects of Natures
earthiness that have been repressed in the traditional dualistic ontology favoring light, reason, and culture. She urges us to recognize and
accept this dark side and its exemplification in human destructiveness. According to Mathews, bulldozers, chainsaws, bombs, missiles, and all
our other technologies are part of the natural order, and contribute to the moral order as effectively
as any forest. We should honor these ecologically destructive technologiesfor we cannot honour
the world if we despise our technology. Mathews insists that *t]o be prepared to accept as natural and
hence to respectperhaps to sacralizeour cities and our technologies of destruction, is to respect and re-
enchant the Nature that we actually inhabit. 5 She criticizes deep ecologists idealization of untouched Nature as
wilderness. 6 It is not surprising that environmentalists disagree so profoundly about the very meaning of nature. As Evernden points out,
the concept of nature is inherently volatile and ambiguous and can be used to demand or justify
virtually all lifestyles and social goals. It is also a mode of concealment, a cloak of abstractions which obscures
that discomforting wildness that defies our paranoid urge to delineate the boundaries of Being.
Similarly, the notions of environment and problem solving spring from, and conceal, the dualistic ontology
which fuels that paranoid urge to delineate, delimit, and control Being. Thus the very terms environ-mentalism and
environmentalists actually encourage and reinforce the rupture with, and reification of, Being, by implying that there is a world
of objects surrounding us. The idea of environmental problems or solutions presupposes such an
androcentric reification of Being. Despite these inherent difficulties and drawbacks, environmentalism can contribute to
phenomenology, as I will show in due course. 8 7

Wildlife Preservation

The affs creation of (anything that tries to protect the environment by closing it off to
humans ) doesnt assume a changing ecosystem and reinforces the separation of
humans from nature
Sessions 06. (George retired philosophy teacher who still offers courses now and then at Sierra College
in Rocklin California.) 2006. Wildness, Cyborgs, and Our Ecological Future: Reassessing the Deep
Ecology Movement. The Trumpeter 20 (2): 121-82. (file:///C:/Users/murtaza/Downloads/906-3121-1-
PB.pdf)-M.H
A much more systematic and comprehensive critique of the wilderness concept was developed beginning in 1991 by J. Baird Callicott, one of
the leading expositors of Leopolds land ethic. Summarizing Callicotts position, he first of all claims that the original
rationale for protecting wilderness put forth by John Muir was for its aesthetic and spiritual The
Trumpeter 134 values. But, this is misleading. Muir also rejected the anthropocentrism of what he called Lord Man: for Muir, wild
nonhuman beings have a right to exist for their own sakes and this requires protecting large expanses
of wilderness as wild habitat. Thoreau was the first modern thinker to emphasize the crucial importance of protecting the Earths
wildness; Muir agreed with Thoreau and emphasized the role of anthropocentrism in destroying wildness.37 Second, according to
Callicott, wilderness preservation is a defensive and ultimately losing strategy. Third, echoing Guha, Callicott
argues that wilderness is a uniquely American concept and is not exportable. It results in evicting
indigenous people from their homes in the remaining wild areas of the Third World. Fourth, it is an ethnocentric
concept. No wilderness is pristine (untouched by human hands): native people managed and, in some cases, altered the landscape with fire
and other means. Fifth, recent ecological theory claims that ecosystems are constantly changing and
unstable, whereas Callicott claims that wilderness preservation assumes a stable ecosystem. And
sixth, by excluding permanent human habitation, the wilderness concept reinforces a philosophical
and literal separation of humans from nature.

***Alts***

Natural Unity Alt

The alts shift in view of nature gives us a better understanding of the world allowing for ease in
decisions regarding the sustainability of the environment.
Ecology and A Theory of General Ethics: Human Relationships, Nature, and the Built Environment.) 19
Deep ecologists are willing to trust their inner voices in the hope that the dominant social paradigm (within which the
moral community is situated) will disintegrate although in a creative rather than a destructive manner. Again, Arne Naess is
quite explicit on these points in a recent interview in The Ten Directions, a magazine published by the Zen Centre of Los Angeles: Ten
Directions: This brings us back to the question of information versus intuition. Your feeling is that we cant expect to have an ideal amount of
information but must somehow act on what we know? Naess: Yes, Its easier for deep ecologists than for others because
we have certain fundamental values, a fundamental view of whats meaningful in life, whats worth
maintaining, which makes it completely clear that we are opposed to further development for the
sake of increased domination and an increased standard of living. The material standard of living
should be drastically reduced and the quality of life, in the sense of basic satisfaction in the depths of
ones heart or soul, should be maintained or increased. This view is intuitive, as are all important views, in the sense that
it cant be proven. As Aristotle said, it shows a lack of education to try to price everything because you have to have a starting point. You can
prove the methodology of science, you cant even prove logic because logic presupposes fundamental premises. However, the central intuition
of deep ecology, the one from which Naesss views on practice flow, in the first point I made in my summary of the shallow/deep ecology
distinction. This is the idea that there is no firm ontological divide in the field of existence. In other words, the world simply is not
divided up into independently existing subjects and objects, nor is there any bifurcation in reality
between the human and non-human realms. Rather all entities are considered by their relationships To the extent that we
perceive boundaries, we fall short of a deep ecological consciousness. In Devalls words: Deep ecology begins with unity rather
than dualism which has been the dominant theme of western philosophy.

Digger/Ontology Alt

Alt solves - Acknowledgement of being as interconnectness with the natural world re-
orients dominant conceptions of human self interest
Howe 93 (Heidegger's Discussion of "The Thing": A Theme for Deep Ecology Lawrence W. Howe The
University of West Florida published in between the species
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1844&context=bts spring 1993 &)
Because we look upon things as separate from us we fabricate a dichotomy between self and world.
Once the dichotomy has been manufactured, the thing is regarded as a mere object; it has a "separate
location"6 from any other entity in the environment. Thus, a thing such as a tree, for example, is represented as an object
with the trait of "life" somehow added to it. By man's continual "forgetfulness" he tends to add characteristics
to a thing and treat it as an object to be subdued by human control. This attitude is suggestive of the
calculative thinking which artificially fabricates the thing with a view to quantifying it. Through conceptually
representing his field of experience, man objectifies the thing by reducing it to a set of concepts which artificially
reconstruct the thing? Formulas are devised so the thing can be regarded like any object that is translated into the formula's mode of
expression. The aim of calculative thinking is to reduce the thing to elements that are common with
elements of other objects. The thing is fragmented into parts, and though it is a unique entity, its uniqueness is
blurred as a resultofthefragmentation. This reduction has a utilitarian value because it enables us to
grasp the thing in terms of universal concepts. As a consequence, things are represented as common
objects. Because of the calculative mode, says Heidegger, "we separate subjects and objects, inside and outside, feelings and situations....
These many divisions are not separate issues, since each involves the same type of conceptual construct of things......8 In hisessay, "Building,
Dwelling,Thinking," Heidegger expresses the manner in which the essential nature of the thing has been lost. Throughout the history
of Western thought we see a constant attempt to uncover the substance of a thing. Yet Heidegger suggests
that a thing's underlying substance cannot be discerned from that which is gathered around a thing. The effort to delineate an
independent substance disfigures the nature of a thing because its nature is part and parcel of its
surrounding world. Heidegger's investigation reveals the inauthentic attitude that man has developed
toward the environment. "We ignore the intrinsic harmony of living beings, as well as whole biomes, for
ontologically everything has been reduced to the level of raw material for production and
consumption."10 Although Heidegger has laid out the inauthentic attitude toward the environment, he offers an alternative for
understanding the man/nature relationship. He illustrates this alternative by examining simple artifacts or natural entities
as an example of a thing. Take a jug, says Heidegger, when we allow the being of the jug to come forth we observe that it presents
itself as a process of "gathering in." It becomes the focus of a whole set of interconnections with its
environment. However, the process of "gathering in" is only one feature of the jug's essence. Within the jug's capacity to contain is also
the capacity to offer and pour drink. Granted that the jug has utility for men, but this artifact has a deeper significance. The essence of the thing
is that which gathers-up and comes-together, creating a presence of the fourfold unity ofearth, sky, gods and men. The thing manifests the
harmonious interplay of the fourfold in the world. The jug is a particular unity that exemplifies the integration of the earth, sky, men and gods.
The thing assembles the unity of the fourfold, making possible their interrelation to one another. The thing, wrote one commentator, "evokes
the 'quadrate,' gathers into unified presences the four moments, brings them into an abiding 'stand still,' to self-manifestation, to
unconcealedness."ll The earth, sky, men and gods are involved in one another so as to form a simple unitythe fourfold. Zimmerman explains
these moments by saying that the earth is "the life-giving aspect of things Spring 1993 that cannot and should
not be violated," the sky is "the luminous aspect of the world necessary to draw forth what the Earth conceals," men are the ones who
participate in the life process and the gods are an expression of the divine in a harmonious world.12 The harmonious interplay of the fourfold
constitutes the moments of the world through the presence of a thing. Being a container, the jug gathers by taking and holding, but it further
reveals the fourfold by pouring forth. Its out-pouring is a gift which regenerates the interplay of the fourfold. How is the fourfold gathered in
the jug? The earth gathers since the drink comes from the earth's waters. The sky gathers because it offers the warmth of sun which is needed
for the creation of the drink. The men gather since it is they who celebrate the joyofdrinking. The gods gather since they are the ones whose
honor is being drunk to. Thus, the jug reveals the mingling of the fourfold in the dimension of Being. The interplay of the fourfold suggests a
value to the world that contrasts sharply with the value attributed to it by the technological paradigm of anthropocentrism. For Heidegger
the world is manifested as an opening which allows things to emerge; the world is that which comes forth
and merges as a totality. Thus things are not lifeless atomic units detachable from their surroundings,
rather they always bear an intimate relation to their environment. This view is compatible with the deep ecologists'
emphasis on the interrelation of all things within a unifying matrix. For Heidegger, a thing is the center for the harmonious integration of the
four moments of Being. Moreover, the world is revealed through each thing that comes to presence. Thus a thing is ''more than a mere fact,
more than something 'at hand' (vorhanden). It represents in a unique way the full richness of all 'regions' of Being as a whole."13 The thing so
revealed is not an object of technological domination, nor is it dislocated from its environment. An understanding of the thing is intertwined
with an understanding of the world. . Unlike the anthropocentric view that sharply distinguishes between man
and nature, Heidegger sees man as an integral part of the fourfold. Humans are "portrayed as one of the four aspects
needed to constitute an authentic dwelling place. Like a deer or jug or tree or bridge, a mortal can be a 'thing' that
provides the nexus through which the other participating dimensions of the world can reveal
themselves."14 The unity and interplay of the four members are further characterized by Heidegger as a "round dance" (gering) where
each member of the fourfold assemble as participants of a unifying process. The round dance involves a double aspect. On the one hand, it
presents a unity of the fourfold; the four gather appearing as a simple unity. As the fourfold gives the appearance of being a simple prevailing
unity, it is characterized as a thing. On the other hand, the round dance also involves a dimension which consists of the fourfold in their
interplay. This aspect of the round dance is called the world. Through the moments of the round dance the world and thing are gathered
together, mutually configurated, not juxtaposed to one another. World and thing are two moments of one and the same process of the round
dance. It may be further pointed out that Heidegger's account avoids reductionism since both the thing
and world retain their respective integrity. The world is not reduced to a mere collection of objects;
the thing is not reduced to an atomic unit isolated from other entities. The fourfold, in the self-creating
process of the round dance, are like threads which weave together the weft of the thing and world. Heidegger has spoken of the fourfold as
being a "whole infinite relation." None of the fourfold "stays and goes one-sidedly by itself. In this sense, none are
finite. None are without others. In-finite, they hold themselves to each other, they are what they are
from this in-finite relation, they are this whole itself."15 The fourfold is an in-finite relation in that no one member has a
unified and determinate nature in isolation from the other members. As in deep ecology, Heidegger emphasizes interrelations throughout
nature. Tbings do not exist alone, they are what they are through their intrinsic relation to the environment. Wberedoes manstandin
thepresencing oftheworld? He emerges as one who lives with things----a participant member ofthe fourfold. Theintegrity ofmanisrecognized by
the fact thai he is a necessary feature of, and belongs together with, the fourfold interplay. Heidegger's discussion certainly breaks away from
the one-dimensional man nestled in the paradigm ofmechanistic materialism. The technological orientation ofcontemporary man veils the
presence of the thing by representing it as an everyday object cut off from the world and having nothing more than an instrumental value.
Heidegger's discussion of "thing" and "world" brings forth an ontological basis for interpreting the theme of interrelation that is an essential
feature for Between the Species 96 deep ecology. His reflections serve to challenge anthropocentric attitudes toward nature that have
emerged with the development of a mechanistic worldview. For deep ecology, he offers a way of regarding nature that is nonanthropocentric
while boldly contemplating the possibility to "let beings be." For Heidegger, as for deep ecology, this means allowing a place for revealing man's
interrelatedness and rootedness in Being as such.

Land Ethic Alt
We must replace Western ethics with the land ethic in order to recognize our moral
obligation to nonhuman beings
313)
The ethical foundations of the "animal liberation" movement are compared with those of Aldo Leopold's "land ethic." which is taken as the
paradigm for environmental ethics in general. Notwithstanding certain superficial similarities, more profound practical and theoretical
differences are exposed. While only sentient animals are morally considerable according to the humane
ethic, the land ethic includes within its purview plants as well as animals and even soils and waters.
Nor does the land ethic prohibit the hunting, killing and eating of certain animal species, in sharp
contrast to the humane ethic. The humane ethic rests upon Benthamic foundations: pain is taken to
be the ultimate evil and it' is reductive or atomistic in its moral focus. The land ethic on the other hand, is holistic in
the sense that the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community is its summum bonum. A classical
antecedent of some of the formal characteristics of the land ethic is found in Plato's moral philosophy. Special consideration is given to the
differing moral status of domestic and wild animals in the humane and land ethics and to the question of moral vegetarianism P It is Leopolds
opinion, and certainly an overall review of the prevailing traditions of western ethics, both popular and philosophical, generally confirms it, that
traditional Western systems of ethics have not accorded moral standing to nonhuman beings.' Animals
and plants, soils and waters, which Leopold includes in his community of ethical beneficiaries, have traditionally enjoyed
no moral standing, no rights, no respect, in sharp contrast to human persons whose rights and
interests ideally must be fairly and equally considered if our actions are to be considered "ethical" or
"moral." One fundamental and novel feature of the Leopold land ethic, therefore, is the extension of direct ethical
considerability from people to nonhuman natural entities. At first glance, the recent ethical movement usually labeled
"animal liberation" or "animal rights" seems to be squarely and centrally a kind of environmental ethics.' The more uncompromising among
the animal liberationists have demanded equal moral consideration on behalf of cows, pigs, chickens, and other annarentlv enslaved and
oppressed nonhuman animals. P At first glance, the recent ethical movement usually labeled animal liberation or animal rights seems to be
squarely and centrally a kind of environmental ethics. The more uncompromising among the animal liberationists have
demanded equal moral consideration on behalf of cows, pigs, chickens, and other apparently enslaved
and oppressed nonhuman animals. The theoreticians of this new hyper-egalitaiianism have coined such terms as speciesism ( on
analogy with racism and sexism) and human chauvinism (on analogy with male chauvinism , and have made animal liberation seem, perhaps
not improperly, the next and most daring development of political liberalism.' Aldo Leopold also draws upon metaphors of political liberalism
when he tells us that his land ethic "changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land
community to plain member and citizen of it."' For animal liberationists it is as if the ideological battles
for equal rights and equal consideration for women and for racial minorities have been all but won,
and the next and greatest challenge is to purchase equality, first theoretically and then practically. for
all (actually only some) animals, regardless of species. This more rhetorically implied than fully articulated historical
progression of moral rights from fewer to greater numbers of "persons" (allowing that animals to also be persons) as advocated by animal
liberationists, also parallels Leopold's scenario in "The Land Ethic" of the historical extension of "ethical criteria" to more and more "fields of
conduct" and to larger and larger groups of people during the past three thousand or so years." As Leopold develops it, ethic is a cultural
"evolutionary possibility," the next "step in a sequence."' For Leopold. however, the next step is much more sweeping, much more inclusive
than the animal liberationists imagine, since it enlarges the boundaries of the [moral] community to include soils, waters, [and] plants. . ." as
well as animals." Thus. the animal liberation movement could be construed as partitioning Leopold's perhaps
undigestable and totally inclusive environmental ethic into a series of more assimilable stages: today animal rights,
tomorrow equal rights for plants, and after that full moral standing for rocks, soil, and other earthy compounds, and
perhaps sometime in the still more remote future, liberty and equality for water and other elementary bodies

Alternative-Self Identification through Self-Realization rejects the codes of human
centered ethical system for a relational total-sphere image of the world
Katz, 2000(Eric, Against the Inevitability of Anthropocentrism, Beneath the Surface : Critical Essays in
the Philosophy of Deep Ecology, MIT Press, Beneath the Surface : Critical Essays in the Philosophy of
Deep Ecology Pg 27, Accessed: 7/1/14, CD)
For Naess, the full process of Self-realization eliminates the need for a system of moral obligation.
Naess advocates the notion, derived from Kant, of the beautiful action the harmonious fusion of self-
interest and right action, not commanded or directed by a sense of moral law.36 With a mature Self-
realization, we defend the planet in self-defense, we preserve natural processes and entities as an
expression of our shared interests with the rest of creation. By developing our capacity for Self-interest with an
emphasis on the capital "S" Selfwe transcend the need for an appropriate ethics for the human treatment of the natural world. It is thus
clear that the deep ecological expansion of the self, through the process of identification, toward the
goal of Self-realization is quite different from the moral extensionism that can be attributed (on some
interpretations) to the land ethic of Leopold and to similar positions (such as Rolston's) in environmental ethics.
Leopold's land ethic can be read as a simple extension of moral consideration to ever wider groups
and kinds of entities; thus we extend our moral consciousness outward from the self to the family to
society as a whole to animals, plants, and, eventually, to the natural system itself, what Leopold calls
the "land."37 In philosophical language, we extend the range of entities capable of possessing moral valueindeed, we might even call
thisintrinsic or inherent value. But in the deep ecological expansion of the self, it is not our consideration of
moral value that is extended, it is our identificationour empathy, our commonality of intereststhat is
extended. We extend ourselves; we see ourselves more and more connected to the rest of the natural world. We take seriously
the ecological idea that all entities within natural systemsincluding human beingsare interconnected.
The extensionism of environmental ethics is thus an expansion of moral value; but the expansion of
the deep ecological self is an expansion of ontological commitments. From two directions, then, we have arrived at
the third core idea of the philosophy of deep ecology: a holistic metaphysics or ontology. First, we have Naess's denial of ethics
being the primary focal point of deep ecology. The supremacy of ontology is demonstrated by the
identification of interests and the expansion of the self as the sources of beautiful actions regarding
the preservation of nature. Second, the expansion of self and the goal of Self-realization are seen to
be components of an ontological claim about the interconnection of humans and nature, and indeed
about all entities and systems in the world. As Fox explains: Transpersonal ecologists [i.e., advocates of deep ecology] claim
that ecology, and modern science in general, provides a compelling account of our interconnectedness with the world. . . . Their analysis of the
self is such that they consider that if one has a deep understanding of the way things are (i.e., if one emphatically incorporates the fact that we
and all other entities are aspects of a single unfolding reality) then one will . . . naturally be inclined to care for the unfolding of the world in all
its aspects. . . . This is why one finds transpersonal ecologists making statements to the effect that they are more concerned with ontology or
cosmology . . . than with ethics." 38 The advocates of deep ecology, in other words, are primarily concerned with
developing the proper deep understanding of the interconnection of all entities in the natural world.
Any ethical principles or programs of actionany environmental policywill be derivative of the
fundamental ontological position. As Naess writes, "What I am suggesting is the supremacy of environmental ontology and
realism over environmental ethics."39 What, then, is the ontological position of the philosophy of deep ecology? What is meant by a "holistic
metaphysics?" The interconnection of all entities is clearly the key idea. As Naess writes in the original shorthand 1972 formulation, the deep
ecology position is characterized by "rejection of the man-in-environment image in favor of the
relational, total-field image. Organisms as knots in the biospherical net or field of intrinsic relations."40
Deep ecology rejects an individualistic and atomistic metaphysics, in which all entities are separate
from each other. An individualistic and atomistic metaphysics would conceive of a human being as a
separate individual standing alone, free, and un-connected to all other entities within the
environmentthe image of man-in-environment. From the perspective of deep ecology, just the opposite is true: all entities
are related, and they are constituted by their relationships with other entities. The human individual exists and is defined by
the relationships it has to other entities and processes in the environment. The individual is
constituted and defined by its relationships to the wholethis is the essence of holism. The holistic
interconnection of all entities in the natural world is the basic ontological commitment of the
philosophy of deep ecology.

Life World Alt.
The Alternative Allows For a New Interpretation of Nature that Envelopes and Unites
All Facets of Nature Under the Scope of Life
Embree 3 *Lester. William F. Dietrich Eminent Scholar in Philosophy at Florida Atlantic University, The
Possibility of a Constitutive Phenomenology of the Environment Eco-Phenomenology Back to The Earth
Itself Page 39]
Both the naturalistic science and the naturalistic-scientific technology that relate to the environment have
been exploited in the naturalism in human thought that has been spreading since the Renaissance.
While good science, and technology based on it, are self-critical and modest enough to avoid
construing their cognitive approach as paradigmatic for epistemology and their findings as
metaphysical claims, naturalism whether in philosophy or common sensewillfully does so in both respects.
Phenomenologists ought to oppose scientism, but not science. The first contribution of a constitutive phenomenology
of the environment is therefore to provide the analysis in terms of which the nature correlative to
the naturalistic attitude is an abstract part of the cultural world. This is not a matter of the subtle and sophisticated
construction produced and constantly refined in the astonishing history of naturalistic-scientific thinking over recent centuries, which is one of
humankinds greatest achievements. Instead it is the nature that phenomenologists increasingly call lifeworldly
nature and that is encountered in sensuous perception and hence prior to all construction in
thinking. Once abstracted from the remainder of the concrete cultural world, this perceived nature is
premathematically spatial, temporal, and causal and includes physical things, vital or organic things, and among
the latter, things that also have mental livesthat is, humans as well as nonhuman animals. 4 3

Embracing Husserls Concept of the Life-World Attributes Value to the Vast-
Interconnectedness of Nature and Compensates for the Nihilistic Epistemologies of
Cartesian Modernity
Phenomenology Back to The Earth Itself pp 21-22 ]
For our purposes, quite literally, all the difference in the world. The problem of our usual conception of rationality, we said,
is that it does not include the dimension of value and meaning. Necessarily so: there are no meanings or
values in the world reconstructed in theoretical reflection as objective. If we start out from that reconstructed
world, meaning and value can enter in only as irrational intrusions, which [mathematical] reason must needs leave to instinct, custom, or whim.
29 By contrast, lifeworld, the world constituted as a meaningful whole by the presence of life, is neither
value free nor meaningless. As we have emphasized throughout, by its very constitution as the world of purposeful activity, it is ab
initio and per essentiam value laden and meaning structured. It is a world that not only is, but from the beginning also aids or hinders the
activity that constitutes it. Its rationality is one of values and reasons, not merely of quantifiable causal
relations. So loving and hating are no longer irrational but can be understood in terms of the web of
value relations that render my world meaningful. Not putative causes but reasons make them intelligible. 30 The
lifeworld on which phenomenology focuses is not some forgotten natural world to be discovered in
our antelapsarian past. Nor is it some putative deep reality uncovered by plumbing the depth of our
unconscious. Such metaphysical constructs become necessary when we ignore the world of our life
and treat our theoretical construct as reality. Then we understandably have to invent hidden forces and alternative realities
to account for their conduct. When, however, we set aside our theoretical world and see the world of our
experience, value laden and meaning structured, we can shave them off with Ockhams razor. That is the point.
Husserl is not inventing alternative realities but rather pointing to alternative ways of organizing or
constituting the one reality amid which we live, breathe, and have our being. Yes, we can consider that reality
from the perspective of a natural scientist, as abstracted from subject activities. It will be a highly useful model but in principle incomplete. We
can conjure up a supernatural reality to make up the lackor we can consider that very same reality from the perspective of a purposive
subject, including the relations of value and meaning that structure a subjects world. The rationality or intelligibility of the
world so considered or constituted will not be mathematical and causal but rather the rationality of
value and meaningfor that is in fact how we constitute our life-world. 31 32

Inherent value shaped by earth world distinction
Zimmerman 86 Michael E. Implications of Heideggers Thought for Deep Ecology. The Modern
Schoolman 64: 1943. (Year as Assistant Professor at Denison University, he was Professor of Philosophy
at Tulane University from 1975 to 2005, and Director of the Institute for Humanities and the Arts at
Tulane.)
Conceived as a tiny lump of matter in the universe, we are told, humanity is insignificant; but conceived as the
clearing through which the cosmos in all its beauty and worth can manifest itself, human existence
has immeasurable significance. Deep ecologists generally argue, however, that the worth of things holds independently of whether
they happen to be apprehended by humans. Moreover, the view that things can be only insofar as they manifest
themselves through human existence, would seem difficult to reconcile with the view of some deep
ecologists that humans are Leopoldian plain citizens of the land. Yet, Arne Naess has remarked that in
some ways he agrees with the view that human existence allows things to manifest themselves, at
least in a way not otherwise possible. He cites approvingly the following remarks made by T. L. S. Sprigge, who thinks in the
spirit of Heidegger. Sprigge encourages us : to think of the point of our consciousness as being that it supplies a home in which objects can
enter into actuality, so that we as consciousness are to be thought of as existing for the sake of the objects which need us in order to exist
rather than its being the objects which exist for our sake. This quotation should not be read as implying that either
Naess or Heidegger are subjective idealists. Early Heidegger did say that nature is only within a human
world, but he later tried to take into account the extra-historical dimension of nature by
distinguishing earth from world. The latter refers primarily to the historical clearing in which entities can show themselves,
while the former refers primarily to the transhistorical, self-concealing dimension of entities. World and earth contend with, but
also need each other; world wants to compel earth to become completely present within the
historical domain, but earth resists becoming totally disclosed and present for manipulation. Without
the earth, nature as overflowing fullness and richness of things, nothing would be disclosed in a
historical world. Regarding the intrinsic worth of things, one might argue in the following way: the
beauty and worth of entities obtain in potentia, as it were, independently of their being apprehended
within a world, but they become more fully actualized in the event of such apprehension.

Phenomenology Alt.
The Value Claims of a Phenomenological System of Morals Helps to Reveal the Vast
Interconnectedness of the Natural World
Unlike mere experiences of pleasure, value experiences have their own value horizon. When I
experience something as good, I know what to expect of it. I experience rain, sun, and soil as good not simply
because I enjoy them but because I appreciate their roles in sustaining the Earths biotic web. Water is
regularly experienced as a good not only for me and my fellow homosapiens but for many other organisms and species. Water is a
shared good. When we hear of a herd of elephants walking many days over parched landscapes and at last finding water, and then
stopping to drink, bathe, and play, we understand their satisfaction and their bodily appreciation of the goodness of water. When I quench my
own thirst with a cool drink of fresh and clean water, my sophisticated or simple appreciations of water are fulfilled in a moment of bodily
awareness of the goodness of water. We experience both sun and rain as good when we glimpse their roles in the
fabric of the planets biotic web. As we experience our own dependency on the planets biotic web,
we realize the massive and inescapable interdependency among other species and processes in a
mutually sustaining web of life, and with it a constellation of shared goods.

More Alt. ev.

The sensation of pain ties the human to the animal. We must free ourselves from the
shackles of anthropocentrism to achieve balance in the environment
323)
The neo-Benthamite humane moralists have, to be sure, digested one of the metaphysical implications of modern biology. They insist
that human beings must be understood continuously with the rest of organic nature. People are (and are
only) animals, and much of the rhetorical energy of the animal liberation movement is spent in fighting a rear guard action for this aspect of
Darwinism against those philosophers who still cling to the dream of a special metaphysical status for people in the order of "creation." To this
extent the animal liberation movement is biologically enlightened and argues from the taxonomical and evolutionary continuity of man and
beast to moral standing for some nonhuman animals. Indeed, pain, in their view the very substance of evil, is something
that is conspicuously common to people and other sensitive animals, something that we as people
experience not in virtue of our metasimian cerebral capabilities, but because of our participation in a more generally
animal, limbic-based consciousness. // it is pain and suffering that is the ultimate evil besetting human life, and this not
in virtue of our humanity but in virtue of our animality, then it seems only fair to promote freedom from pain
for those animals who share with us in this mode of experience and to grant them rights similar to
ours as a means to this end.

***Impacts***

Root Cause Eco-Destruction

Misinterpretation of Humans Relationship with Nature Has Posited the World As a
Theatre of War and Ecological Degradation
Itself 2003, pp. 4-5]
The Radical Ecologists see this damage as symptomatic of a deeper disorder embedded within the
humanity-nature relation. It is embedded within the way nature and humanity are experienced in daily life, in
myth, in literature, and in abstract thought. To the extent that the ecological devastation we witness today is the result
of anthropocentrism, androcentrism, or a dualistic value-hierarchical worldview (as many have
claimed), the ecological crisis is a crisis of meaning. It is ultimately the meaning of nature and humanity that
is at stake. As such it can be managed, solved, or perhaps overcome by new myths or improvements in thinking that would
reconceptualize the boundaries, as well as the content, of our understanding of humanity and nature. For the
existential philosopher, the roots of the ecological crisis may be much deeper than the Radical Ecologists realize. The
humanity-nature disorder is perhaps best conceived as a manifestation of the tendency toward
alienation inherent in the human condition, one that operates prior to any particular meaning system. This tendency
toward alienation, leading to war and oppression in the past, has now been coupled with the
technological power to sustain a massive homo centrus centrus population explosion, the by-products of
which are poisoning and dismantling the Earths bio-web. There is a certain irony here as the realization of massive
ecological destruction occurs just when we had thought that our science and technology would save
us from the ravages of the organic world. Instead we find ourselves hurtling toward or perhaps through an irrevocable tear in
the fabric of the planetary biotic web (and perhaps beyond). Dreams of technological Utopia have been replaced
overnight by nightmares of ecological holocaust. The existential philosophers remind us that the replacement of one
conceptual system for another is not enough unless there occurs with it a corresponding shift or lifestyle
change that actually ushers in a new mode of being for humanity. Such thinking reinforces the claim of radicality
within the projects of Radical Ecology.

Only a System of Ecological Ethics Can Solve the Impending Global Destruction
Triggered By Environmental Catastrophes Triggered by Growth
Henning 09 (Brian; Associate Professor of Philosophy at Gonzaga University; Trusting in the 'Efficacy of
Beauty: A Kalocentric Approach to Moral Philosophy; Ethics & the Environment- Volume 14, Number 1
pp.)
In the opening decade of this new millennium, long-simmering conflicts have exploded into a rolling boil of fear,
hostility, and violence. Whether we are talking about the rise of religious fundamentalism, the so-called "war on terror" or the much
touted culture wars that define the [End Page 101] contemporary American political landscape, there is a move away from
tolerance and appreciation of diversity toward the ever more strident formulation of absolutist positions.
Dogmatism in its various forms seems to be on the rise as the rhetoric and reality of compromise and
consensus building is replaced with the vitriol of moral superiority and righteousness. As the psychologist and philosopher
William James noted more than a century ago, the problem is that we are in a world where "every one of hundreds of ideals has
its special champion already provided in the shape of some genius expressly born to feel it, and to fight to death in its behalf"
(James 1956 [1891], 20708). The force of this point was made brutally clear by the events of and following September 11, 2001. Given a world
fraught with such conflict and tension, what is needed is not a moral philosophy that dogmatically advances
absolute moral codes. More than ever, what is needed is an ethic that is dynamic, fallible, and situated, yet not
grossly relativistic. This project takes on added urgency when we consider the environmental and
social crises that threaten not only human civilization, but all forms of life on this planet. Unhealthy air and water,
species extinction, overpopulation, soaring food prices, fresh water shortages, stronger storms, prolonged droughts, the spread of deserts,
deforestation, melting ice caps and glaciers, the submersion of low-lying landsthere are no shortage of challenges facing us
in this young century. Complex and multifaceted, these issues are at once technological, scientific, economic, social, and political. Yet
we will have no hope of successfully addressing the root cause of these crises until we also squarely
confront fundamental issues concerning epistemology, axiology, aesthetics, and metaphysics. Although
debates over carbon taxes and trading schemes, over carbon offsets and compact fluorescents are important, our efforts will
ultimately fail unless and until we also set about the difficult work of reconceiving who we are and
how we are related to our processive cosmos. What is needed, I believe, are new ways of thinking and
acting grounded in new ways of understanding ourselves and our relationship to the world, ways of
understanding that recognize our fundamental interdependence and interconnection with everyone and
everything in the cosmos, ways of understanding that recognize the intrinsic beauty and value of every form
of existence. What is needed, I suggest, is a moral philosophy grounded in Alfred North Whitehead's
philosophy of organism. Recognizing this [End Page 102] need, it is the primary aim of this essay to present the key elements and
defend the value of a moral philosophy inspired by, though not dogmatically committed to, Whitehead's organic, beauty-centered conception
of reality.

Human Attempts to Dominate the Worlds Resources With Technology and
Exploitation Have Brought the Ecosphere to the BrinkOnly a Gargantuan
Sociopolitical Transition Can Solve for the Impending Annihilation of All the Life on
Earth
Jensen 11, Robert. Professor at the School of Journalism at the University of Texas, Austin. Occupy
demands: Let's radicalise our analysis
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/11/201111191022862285.html
In addition to inequality within the human family, we face even greater threats in the human assault on the living
world that come with industrial society. High-energy/high-technology societies pose a serious threat to
the ability of the ecosphere to sustain human life as we know it. Grasping that reality is a challenge, and coping with the
implications is an even greater challenge. We likely have a chance to stave off the most catastrophic
consequences if we act dramatically and quickly. If we continue to drag our feet, it's "game over". While public
awareness of the depth of the ecological crisis is growing, our knowledge of the basics of the problem is
hardly new. World Scientists Warning to Humanity Issued By 1,700 Of the Planets Leading Scientists:
"Human beings and the natural world are on a collision course. Human activities inflict harsh and often irreversible damage on
the environment and on critical resources. If not checked, many of our current practices put at serious risk the
future that we wish for human society and the plant and animal kingdoms, and may so alter the living
world that it will be unable to sustain life in the manner that we know. Fundamental changes are
urgent if we are to avoid the collision our present course will bring about." That statement was issued in 1992, and
since then we have fallen further behind in the struggle for sustainability. Look at any crucial measure of the health of the ecosphere in which we live -
groundwater depletion, topsoil loss, chemical contamination, increased toxicity in our own bodies, the number and size of "dead zones" in
the oceans, accelerating extinction of species and reduction of bio-diversity - and the news is bad.
Remember also that we live in an oil-based world that is fast running out of easily accessible oil, which means we face a
huge reconfiguration of the infrastructure that undergirds our lives. And, of course, there is the undeniable
trajectory of climate disruption. Add all that up, and ask a simple question: Where we are heading? Pick a metaphor. Are we a car running out of
gas? A train about to derail? A raft going over the waterfall? Whatever the choice, it's not a pretty picture. It's crucial we realise that
there are no technological fixes that will rescue us. We have to acknowledge that human attempts to
dominate the non-human world have failed. We are destroying the planet and in the process
destroying ourselves.

Deforestation

Deforestation occurs because of our continued exploitation for short term gains and
our focus on its benefits for our civilization instead of its own intrinsic value
Deep Ecology Hub No Date(This website is a site for all the various deep ecological writers out there,
in particular Daniel Quinn, who I resonate most strongly with. My aim is to try and encourage you to
read their work and I hope this website inspires you to do so.) No date Rainforest Deforestation
(http://www.deep-ecology-hub.com/rainforest-deforestation.html)-M.H
Rainforest deforestation is a massive problem. Every year more and more of the rainforests are being cut
down to make room for humans. We take the extra space to live, as farmland for our food, or for producs such as timber and
paper. This isn't a new problem. It is a very old problem that is reaching a critical point in our time. Deforestation is as old as
civilization. There used to be great cedar forests in the Middle East around Lebanon Syria and Turkey. But civilizations such as the
Phonecians, Greeks, Romans, Persians, Assyrians and Babylonians decimated these old forests. The same thing happened to what is now the
Sahara desert. It used to be a forest but it was decimated by hungry empires looking for expansion. As Thom Hartmann explains in "The Last
Hours of Ancient Sunlight," forests are a crucial part of the water cycle. They prevent land becoming desert by
promoting rainfall and they act as a water filter, preventing the groundwater from becoming too salty.
The increased salination from deforestation causes water to become undrinkable and the salts can make the remaining trees vulnerable to
parasitic infections. Such infections wouldn't happen in a healthy forest. Reseeded saplings that are planted in the place of destroyed forests
cannot perform the functions that rainforests can. A rainforest tree has up to 40 times more leaf surface area than
other trees, making them especially critical in recycling carbon dioxide. Reseeded saplings are also much more
vulnerable to pests because they lack the diversity of a rainforest. Now that civilization has grown to to its largets size in history it is putting
more pressure on the environment than ever before. The few remaining old forests are being plundered at an alarming extent. The Amazon
rainforest is the most famous example but there are also rainforests being destroyed in South East Asia and Africa. The total amount of
rainforest left on the planet is approximately the size of the U.S.A. Every year an area the size of Florida is destroyed forever. Rainforest
deforestation is a problem for humans and it is a problem for life on Earth as a whole. Mother culture and
shallow ecology would tell us that we need to find a way to exploit the forests in a sustainable way so
we can carry on our great civilization. They fear that rainforest deforestation will put an end to our
way of life. The only reason we need to save them is because ther are useful to us. Deep Ecology
doesn't care so much for the survival of this civilization. But it cares for the survival of the rainforests.
Forests are valuable in their own right. The trees and all the living things that exist there have as much right to live as we do. It
is not our place to take ownership of their habitat and exploit it. The rainforests are also crucial for
the health of the planet, which supports us all. A rainforest ecosystem is home to an abundance of non-human and human
life alike. They are critical to biodiversity. And they are also the lungs of the Earth. Humans have a reciprocal relationship with trees. We
breathe what they exhale and they breathe what we exhale. The Rainforests Belong to All Creation The mainstream debate around rainforest
deforestation misses this crucial point - that they are not ours to take. Human beings do not own the rainforests.
We should be grateful for all the things that they provide for us. But instead we are claiming
ownership and logging them to destruction for short term gain. This satisfies the thirst of our destructive culture to be
continually expanding but in the long run it is contributing to its downfall. People know this, but it doesn't stop the destruction of the
rainforests. We are locked into this system that must keep expanding and destroying. A society living
within the law of limited competition would have no need to destroy the rainforests. The rainforests
will not survive if this culture of maximum harm continues, despite the best effort of some governments and NGOs. Like
other environmental crises we are facing, rainforest deforestation is not the problem but a symptom of the
problem. It is our culture which is causing harm and it is our culture that needs to be changed.

Domination of Nature

Domination of nature necessitates loss of being
Michael E. Zimmerman 86 Implications of Heideggers Thought for Deep Ecology. The Modern
Tulane.)
Deep ecologists are sometimes suspicious of Heideggers claims about the uniqueness of humanitys capacity for understanding being, for
Western society has always justified its domination of nature by portraying it as inferior to what is
uniquely human: soul, rationality, spirit, language. Such suspicions are fueled by Heideggers claim
that there is something worse than the destruction of all life on Earth by nuclear war. Supposedly worse
would be material happiness (associated with Nietzsches last man), which stems from a one-dimensional,
technological disclosure of things. Presumably, in such a constricted world, entities could show so
little of themselves that they would virtually not be at all. Contented survival is worse than nuclear
annihilation because in the former condition humanity has lost its relation to being. Here, one may recall the
biblical teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose ones soul. Preserving openness for being is more
important than preserving entities, for the latter can only manifest themselves or be within that
openness. Early Heidegger once remarked: Over against the duration of the starry world of the cosmos
in general, human existence and its history are certainly only the most fleeting, only a momentbut
this fleetingness [if authentic] is nevertheless the highest mode of being. . .

Ethics Impossible

Naturalisms framing of nature suspends it from ethical assumptions making valuation
impossible
Brown 3 [Charles, Professor of Philosophy at Emporia State University, "The Real and The Good:
In what ways can an encounter, conversation, or dialogue between ecological philosophy and phenomenology be fruitful? The issues
driving ecological philosophy concern the ontological status of human and nonhuman nature, intrinsic
value and humanitys axiological relation to nature, and the boundaries and limits of the moral
community. Although such questions seem to lie beyond the methodological restrictions of
phenomenologys commitment to describe experience within an attitude of normative and ontological abstention, even
a phenomenology that remains close to Husserls has much to offer ecological philosophy. To begin to
discover the possibilities in such an encounter, we will first examine Husserls critique of naturalism. His critique
helps us to see that the modern enframing of nature results in a conception of nature consisting
entirely of extensional properties related to each other within a causal matrix. Such an enframing
leads to moral, social, and political crisis as the value-free conceptions of rationality and objectivity
supporting such naturalism dismiss the Good as subjective preference and thus remove questions of
value from rational discourse. In reducing all reality to extension and causality, naturalism separates the Good from
the Real, ultimately making moral philosophy impossible. The recognition of such an impossibility is apparent in the
early-twentieth-century move away from normative ethics to metaethics. 1

Violence
Ecopolitics is an extension of biopolitics that fall into the same traps of constructing
norms from an externalized position. Failing to acknowledge the power relations,
either through nostalgia or self-effacement is the root cause of violence. Causes the
internalization of disciplinary power.
Darier, 99 (Eric, Research Associate at the Centre for the Study of Environmental Change at
Lancaster University, England and Post-Doctoral at the Environmental Policy Unit, Queen's
University, Canada, Foucault and the Environment: An Introduction, Discourses of the Environment,
ed. Eric Darier, pg. (21-25))
There are at least three concepts emerging from the genealogical period which can be particularly helpful for an environmental critique:
'governmentality', 'biopower' and 'space'. 'Governmentality' is the broadest term, and occurs in the context of Foucaults
historical interpretation of the literature on 'reason of state' in Europe from around the sixteenth century. Foucault identifies and
qualifies the emergence of modern deployment of power in the context of three axes: institutional
centralization around governmental agencies, the emergence of new instrumental knowledge, and
the capillary diffusion of power effects across the entire social body. For Foucault, governmentality is: 1 The
ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very
specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principle form of knowledge political economy, and as its
essential technical means apparatuses of security. 2 The tendency which over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily lead
towards the pre-eminence over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline, etc.) of this type of power which may be termed government,
resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of specific governmental apparatuses, and, on the other, in the development of
a whole complex of savoirs. 3 The process, or rather the result of the process, through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages,
transformed into the administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually becomes 'governmentalized'. (Foucault
1991a: 102-3) The concept of governmentality has potential for an environmental critique, because it explicitly deals with
issues of (state) 'security', techniques of control of the population, and new forms of knowledge
(savoirs). Contrary to more traditional analyses of 'public policy', which focus narrowly on
'objectives', 'results' within an instrumental framework of linear causalities and quantifiable data,
governmentality focuses on the deeper historical context and on the broader power 'effects' of
governmental policy (Dean 1994b; Pal 1990). A certain number of studies explicitly using the concept of 'environmental
governmentality' already exist (Rutherford 1994a, 1994b; Darier 1996a). The more specific concepts of 'biopower' / 'biopolitics'
emerged initially from Foucault's archeological studies of the natural sciences and, more precisely, biology, but were
recontextualized in the framework of governmentality and power/knowledge. Biopolitics is the series of
governmental strategies centered on this new concept called 'life'. More precisely, for Foucault, biopolitics is 'the
manner by which it has been attempted, since the sixteenth century, to rationalize the problems posed to
government practices by phenomena concerning the totality of human beings constituted as a
population: health, hygiene, natality, longevity, race' (Foucault 1989d: 109, my trans.). This concern for life ('biopolitics')
identified by Foucault is largely anthropocentric, in that the prime target is the control of all aspects of human life, especially the conditions
for human biological reproduction. Current environmental concerns could be seen as an extension of
'biopolitics', broadened to all life-forms and called 'ecopolitics' (Rutherford 1993). On this scenario, the
normalizing strategy of ecopolitics is the most recent attempt to extend control ('management') to
the entire planet (Sachs 1993). In this context, the promotion of ecocentrism by deep ecology, for example,
can be seen as not only a critique of prevalent, increasing instrumental control of the natural world,
but as inserting itself very well into the new normalizing strategy of an ecopolitics. My point here should
not be interpreted as a negative evaluation of deep ecology per se. Instead, I want to illustrate the complexity of power relations and the
constant dangers - but also opportunities - lurking in the field of power. In this context, the adoption of a Manichaean
approach to environmental 'issues' by many environmental theorists fails to acknowledge that their
tactic of environmental resistance is always what de Certeau calls 'maneuver "within the enemy's
field of vision",' and cannot be positioned as a referential 'externality' (de Certeau 1984: 37). This is
why Foucault's genealogical approach is so important for an environmental critique. Foucault's approach
to 'space' is the third concept which might also be extremely relevant to an environmental critique. Foucault
explored the problematization of 'space' within a historical context (Foucault 1984e; 1989d: 99-106). According to the framework
of governmentality, the 'security' of the state is guaranteed not so much directly by the control of a
territory (space), but rather through the increasing control of the population living in that territory.
In fact, Foucault suggested that at the beginning of the seventeenth century the government of France started to 'think of its territory on
the model of the city'. According to Foucault, The city was no longer perceived as a place of privilege, as an
exception in a territory of fields, forests and roads .... Instead, the cities, with the problems that they
raised, and the particular forms that they took, served as the models for the governmental
rationality that was to apply to the whole of the territory. A state will be well organised when a system of policing as
tight and efficient as that of the cities extends over the entire territory. (Foucault 1984b: 241) Consequently, one historical
rupture which became a condition for the environmental 'crisis' was the attempt to extend the
system of social control in place in the cities to the countryside. This historical analysis of the
increasing control of the non-urban space (the more 'natural' environment) is similar to the critique of
social ecologists who might agree with Foucault that the domestication of nature was part of a
system of (urban) power relations among humans which had for its objective the maintenance of the
given social order (Bookchin 1982). As the environmental 'crisis' was one of the results of specific
power relations - such as social inequalities and political hierarchy- it would presumably have to be
addressed before - or at least at the same time as the environmental 'crisis'. Obviously, deep ecologists,
like George Sessions, would interpret this focus on human issues as the continuation of anthropocentrism which
created the environmental 'crisis' in the first place (Sessions 1995b). Locating Foucault with social ecologists against deep ecologists is not
accurate either. Foucault's studies of the emergence and rise of 'human sciences' in the context of governmentality - as a specific 'reason of
state' based on security - could also be the basis for a critique of anthropocentrism. However, unlike deep ecologists, Foucault
would not suggest replacing anthropocentrism by ecocentricism, which also presents its own set of
traps. For example, Foucault would probably agree with Timothy Luke's critique of ecocentrism (i.e. anti /
non-anthropocentrism) as being also, ultimately, a humanly constructed category which is policed by all-
too-human ecocentrists. Justifying human actions in the name of 'nature' leaves the unresolved
problem of whose (human) voice can legitimately speak for 'nature' and the inherent dangers of
such an approach. As Luke remarks admirably, deep ecology could function as a new strategy of power for
normalising new ecological subjects - human and non-human - in disciplines of self-effacing moral
consciousness. In endorsing self expression as the inherent value of all ecospheric entities, deep
ecology also could advance the modern logic of domination by retraining humans to surveil and
steer themselves as well as other beings in accord with 'Nature's dictates'. As a new philosophy of nature,
then, deep ecology provides the essential discursive grid for a few enthusiastic ecosophical mandarins
to interpret nature and impose its deep ecology dictates on the unwilling many. (Luke 1988: 85) This
longing for 'nature', either through the self-effacement of humans before 'wilderness' (deep ecology) or through
nostalgia for a simpler social order in harmony with nature (social ecology) is possible only in the context of an
'intimate distance' brought about by the 'dislocation of nature in modernity' (Phelan 1993 ). Consequently,
the 'space' that Foucault is talking about is not the unproblematized physical and material environment of the
environmentalists, but the various problematizations of 'space' raised, for example, by feminists (Lykke and
Bryld 1994). In this sense, Foucault and the environmentalists are not located in quite the same space! However, the
reconceptualization of space - for example, as 'heterotopias' (Foucault 1986) enabled Foucault to
create a break in our current 'physical' understanding(s) of space. We shall come back to the important concept
of 'heterotopias' as two of the contributors to this volume, Thomas Heyd and Peter Quigley, apply it.

Warming
The facts of global warming dont matter, its a symptom of our culture in which we
see the environment as something to be continuously exploited
Deep Ecology Hub No Date (This website is a site for all the various deep ecological writers out there,
in particular Daniel Quinn, who I resonate most strongly with. My aim is to try and encourage you to
read their work and I hope this website inspires you to do so.) No date Rainforest Deforestation
(http://www.deep-ecology-hub.com/rainforest-deforestation.html)-M.H
The global warming debate goes round in circles. One side wheels out their expert to explain conclusively that humans are
causing climate change. Then the other wheels out their expert to deny it without a shadow of a doubt. If scientists can't agree if
climate change is happening what chance does your average person have of making sense of it? Most
people seem to form their opinion based on some kind of vague political ideology. The whole global warming debate has just turned into a
political sideshow.My message is that the arguments regarding the facts on global warming distract from the real
issue. Whether global warming is fact or fiction doesn't really matter that much. Whether it is natural or man-made is not the pivotal
question. The real issue is what is driving our culture to destroy the earth? Forget about the contentious facts on
global warming. Worry about what it is that leads us to poison the oceans, destroy the topsoil, wipe out
the rainforests and (maybe) heat up the atmosphere by releasing stored carbon. Man made climate change, if it is
happening is merely a symptom of our destructive culture. The global warming debate cannot be treated in isolation.
We need to look at all of our ecological problems and ask ourselves "why?" The global warming myth is that it will be the biggest
issue of our time. It's not. The biggest issue of our time is how to mitigate the effects of our crumbling yet destructive empire and how to
develop a new way of life that will work for people and for the planet in years to come. The Mainstream Global Warming Debate Although I
have no conclusive proof for whether or not humans cause global warming I can easily understand why we would. Ever since our culture first
emerged 10,000 years ago it has been destroying the environment with no thought of the consequences. The old civilizations of the Middle East
and Northern Africa turned their forested lands into desert. This trend has continued to the present day to the point where we now have
degraded soil, shrinking biodiversity, polluted waterways and human overpopulation to add to the receding forests. It would be of no surprise if
we added altered atmosphere to the list. How To Stop Global Warming (If It's Happening) Regardless of what causes climate change carbon
offsets aren't going to save us. 6 billion people cycling to school and work isn't going to save us. Becoming vegan isn't going to save us. The
definition for global warming as it is popularly understood is the gradual increase in the earth's surface temperature due to human activity
and/or natural causes. We are generally presented with two arguments when it comes to the global warming debate: Either humans
cause global warming and that this is bad. Therefore we must do all we can to reverse this; or A human induced rise in temperatures
isn't happening. Natural causes of global warming like increased solar activity are responsible. Therefore go about
your business as per usual. Proponents of the human induced theory argue that the facts on global warming are as such: The burning of fossil
fuels release carbon into the air. The destruction of rainforests mean there are less trees to absorb the extra carbon. More carbon in the
atmosphere = trapped heat = higher temperatures. Maybe. Sounds plausible enough. But is man made climate change really happening? I
don't actually care that much. All the global warming debate focuses on is fault. The facts on global
warming aren't the issue. What I care about more is what kind of people we are if our way of life
consists of destroying the natural environment and relying on a finite fuel source to do it. The flaw is
in the belief that man owns the world and that everything is a resource to be used for man's benefit.
A culture that believes that is unsustainable. It doesn't matter what that culture does to be
environmentally friendly; if its fundamental belief is that the earth is a human resource then it will
destroy the world. This culture can argue all day long about the facts on global warming but it will get nowhere. If we don't
change our cultural belief it won't matter. Whether we will suffer due to rising temperatures, a broken ecosystem, polluted
water, famine or sheer overcrowding we will suffer one way or another. The current global warming debate must be reframed in a new light.
The only way to stop global warming is to work towards a change in culture, a change in our fundamental
beliefs. Then we won't have to suffer en masse from any of that. The motivation for our change need not come from fear. It should come
from a desire to create a better world for people. The truth about global warming (if it's human caused) is that it is a symptom of
destruction more than it is a cause of destruction. Instead of addressing the symptom and getting worked up about the
temperature we should be figuring out the cultural causes of climate change and having a serious look at our way of life. Carbon in the air isn't
the real cause of climate change. The real cause is a culture of people who can't see divinity in the earth and
treat it as something to be exploited. Even if the climate change skeptics are right and the cause of global warming is natural
then we can't just put our feet up. Let's say the burning of fossil fuels has no effect on the atmosphere. That doesn't mean that obliterating
rainforests, pollution of the waterways and destruction of biodiversity is okay. We still need to have a serious look at how we live and remedy
that.

***Neg Answers***

Framework

Ontology F/W

Ontological Reflection is Key to Analyzing the Individual World Views That Constitute
the Bulk of Independent Thought
Individual worldviews incorporate a wide-ranging and continually changing body of beliefs, attitudes,
values, and commitments. The influence of these world views in perception and the formation of belief and
attitudes and the acceptance of values can best be grasped by phenomenological analysis. The
worldview of a person is critically important in that persons thinking processes, both cognitively and
effectively. Worldviews can also be a source of errors in perception, thinking, and feeling. That is why it is
important to evaluate a personal worldview in terms of how it was developed, its inclusiveness, its having a
reasonable level of consistency, and other factors. An ontological commitment is a significant part of a worldview.
Where then does this take us? We have seen that at least a minimum metaphysical belief, an ontological commitment which
acknowledges that humans are part of the system of nature, is necessary for developing a sound
environmental ethic. This ontological commitment is not dependent on any particular biological
conceptual model. We can go along with the shifts in big pictures that it is reasonable to expect.

Ontology precedes change in ethical attitudes
Tulane.)
Deep ecologists maintain that in the long run (if there is a long run) humanity must move to a new
understanding of what humanity and nature are, an understanding that is ecocentric,
nonanthropocentric, and non-dualistic. Emphasizing the need for an ontological shift differentiates deep ecologists from
ethicists who seek to extend moral considerability to nonhuman beings. Deep ecologists argue that a change in ontology
must proceed a change in ethical attitudes. A non-dualistic, ecocentric understanding of what things
are would lead us to treat nonhuman beings with compassion and care. Such an understanding would enable us to
appreciate the differences among the various constituents of life, instead of treating everything as interchangeable raw material. Deep
ecologys non-dualism, in other words, is not equatable with an undifferentiated monism. Deep
ecologists sometimes suggest that such a nondualistic mode of under-standing may be emerging from
postmodern science, which conceives of nature as a self-differentiating, self-organizing, novelty-
seeking, evolutionary process capable of generating self-conscious forms of life. Contemporary
ecologists describe terrestrial life as a complex web of internal relationships; likewise, physicists
describe the universe as an extraordinary cosmic dance, the constituments of which are interrelated
energy events. Such views undermine the metaphysical basis for Locke and Hobbess social atomism, while promoting a view that
resembles in some ways Hegel and Marxs metaphysics of internal relations. While emphasizing scientific claims about the
interrelatedness of all things, deep ecologists insist that intellectual conclusions alone are not
sufficient to bring about a basic shift in ones attitude toward nature. Such a shift requires a change of
consciousness, an intuitive sense of identification with all things. Arne Naess argues that such intuition leads us to reject the idea that we are
in the environment, as if we were surrounded by something basically different from us. An intuitive sense of wider identification enables us
to cultivate the relational, total-field image.

Phenomenology F/W

A Phenomenological System of Moral Pluralisms Is the Only Option to Reform Flawed
Enlightenment Ontology
Traditional moral theory is also monistic in another way, as it assumes a monistic criterion for moral
considerability or inclusion within the moral community. Whether it is rationality, or the ability to suffer, or being the
subject of a life, or simply being human, the relevant criterion for moral considerability or being worthy of moral
regard is monistic, determinately specifiable, and independent of our sentiments or beliefs. If moral theory
could be freed from its objectivistic (and here monistic) assumptions, the collection of currently
competing moral theories could be reconceptualized as a collection of moral insights and moral tools. In
everyday moral experience, we intuitively find that both the consequences of our actions and respect for the
subjective integrity of the other are morally relevant, and we also find both humans and nonhumans
to be worthy of moral regard. Everyday experience resists being forced into monistic models. Monistic models of moral essence and
moral considerability have little basis in experience. A phenomenological and critical approach to moral philosophy
that begins with an attitude of respect for pretheoretical experience must also begin with an initial acceptance of the idea
that the prospect of reducing all moral phenomena to a single criterion may be hopelessly flawed. Thus
we must be open to a kind of moral pluralism in which, for example, a duty to tell the truth may be, in one case, grounded in
utility and, in another case, grounded in respect for the person with whom I am speaking. Or, from another perspective, we may find
that it is appropriate to have an attitude of moral regard and respect for some nonhuman others
because they may be able to suffer and for others because they are components of the biosphere.

The Feeling of Vast Interconnectedness With Nature Stems From All Beings and Acts as
A Foundation For Ecologically Ethical Policy
Itself 2003, Page 13-14]
It is within this context that the moral horizon emerges, within the context of the human situation, within the context of our experience. We
are biological evolvents, existing within the biotic web and self-consciously moving forward toward
our death while embracing and valuing the life we live. Our pretheoretical experience, infused with cognitive,
evaluative, and volitional moments, is not the experience of an objective world (i.e., of a devalued world consisting of
causal relations and extensional properties), but rather the actual experienced world, value laden and
meaningfully ordered by the presence of life. It is this meaningful order, provided by the presence, activities, and function
of life that provides the deep context for the emergence of moral experience. This meaningful order does not have the
status of fact. It is not a given of experience, but rather, to use a Husserlian locution, it is pregiven, or to use another phrase
popularized by subsequent phenomenologists, it is always already there. This meaningful order of life, this ecology of bios within
which we are experientially intertwined, is the experiential ground of our intuitions about holism, as
well as a condition of the possibility of moral consciousnessthat is, an axiological transcendental. This
meaningful order of purpose and value is part of the unnoticed background of experience available for
phenomenological reflection. There is every reason to believe that this meaningful background of
purpose and value has existed long before the human species, and that our specifically human goods only exist within a larger
system of good arising from the biotic and prehuman constitution of nature as good. The constitution arising
from the experience of being a part of and dependent on that order is 14 perhaps the source of age-old intuitions
that Goodness itself is beyond humanity. To the extent that we are experientially intertwined and embodied within the biotic web, the
relationship between the human organism and its environment can be phenomenologically described. Such a
phenomenology can be used in the service of an experiential grounding of ecological ethics, as I am
attempting here (as well as working toward a uniquely phenomenological conception of nature), or it can be used to rethink the foundations of
experience in general from an ecological perspective. The first option is phenomenologys contribution to ecological philosophy, and the second
is ecological philosophys contribution to phenomenology. By exposing the limits of traditional naturalism,
phenomenology makes possible a new philosophy of nature respecting the integrity of everyday
experience. At the same time phenomenologists may wish to rethink their conceptions of the foundations of experience from a point of
view that recognizes that embodied existence is primordially and unavoidably experientially embedded within the planetary biotic web. Eco-
phenomenologists will recognize that traditional phenomenological investigations into experience are
incomplete until ecological and even Darwinian perspectives are incorporated into the description and
interpretation of experience. Eco-phenomenologists will wish to investigate the ways that the
structure of experience and meaning arise from the deep ecological context of self-conscious nature.
Eco-Self-Interest F/W

By breaking ontological barriers between yourself and other living things through self-
realization, it becomes clear that natures interests are ones own
Some deep ecologists (notably, Devall, Sessions, and Fox) elaborate Leopold's holism by arguing for a breakdown
of the ontological boundaries between self and other. This breakdown is achieved through the process
of self-realization. As Fox says: "It is the idea that we can make no firm ontological divide in reality between
the human and the nonhuman realms... to the extent that we perceive boundaries, we fall short of deep
ecological consciousness" (Fox 1984, 196). The ontological boundaries of the self are extended outward,
including more and more of the lifeworld in the self. Thus, this particular formulation of metaphysical
holism can be correctly thought of as "expansionary" holism. According to expansionary holism, there is
in reality only one big Self, the lifeworld. (You might have heard someone say, "the Earth is my body.") When
ontological boundaries are overcome, one realizes nature's interests are one's own interests. Devall and
Sessions believe that "if we harm the rest of Nature then we are harming ourselves. There are no boundaries
and everything is interrelated" (Devall and Sessions 1985, 68). John Seed, an Australian environmental activist, nicely
illustrates this attitude: "'I am protecting the rain forest' develops into 'I am part of the rain forest
protecting myself.' I am that part of the rain forest recently emerged into thinking... the change is a spiritual one, thinking like a
mountain, sometimes referred to as 'deep ecology" (quoted in Devall and Sessions 1985, 199). Since the rainforest is part of him,
he has the moral obligation well-being, so its needs become Seed's needs.

Anthropocentric ethics inevitable except an Environmental ethic
Katz, 2000(Eric, Against the Inevitability of Anthropocentrism, Beneath the Surface : Critical Essays in
To what extent can an environmental ethic escape the perspective of human-centered value? Since
only humans are moral agents, and since only humans develop and discuss ethical theories and
norms, is it inevitable that moral value be understood from the standpoint of anthropocentrism? The
pervasiveness of anthropocentrism is not generally thought to be a problem for philosophical
analysis. If one considers questions in epistemology, for example, the centrality of human knowing
seems a straightforward focus of concern. Theories of knowledge concern the ways in which human beings or the human
project of science and technology organize, understand, and validate claims about the world. Aesthetics, as another example, is about the
human perception, appreciation, and validation of the beautiful here anthropocentrism is perfectly justifiable. Even in ethics, a focus
on human value, on human benefits and harms, seems highly appropriate. Most ethical discussion,
analysis, and justification concerns human agents, and the actions among human beings and human
institutions. The field of environmental ethics is, of course, a notable exception for in environmental
ethics we intentionally consider the possible value of nonhuman entities, and the effects of human
actions on nonhuman nature but here the exception proves the rule: environmental ethics may be the
only field of philosophy that even considers the possibility of moving beyond the perspective of
anthropocentrism

Land Ethic F/W

The proliferation of mankind isolates the human from nature in a drive for endless
pleasure this trades off with a liberatory environmental approach that can reduces
the impact humanity bears on the environment
Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Texas, Animal Liberation, A Triangular Affair, P334)
Leopold's prescription for the realization and implementation of the land ethic-the reappraisal of things unnatural, tame, and confined in terms
of things natural, wild, and free--does not stop, in other words, with a reappraisal of nonhuman domestic animals in terms of their wild (or
willed) counterparts; the human ones should be similarly reappraised. This means, among other things, the reappraisal of the comparatively
recent values and concerns of "civilized" Homo sapiens in terms of those of our "savage" ancestors. 46 Civilization has insulated and
alienated us from the rigors and challenges of the natural environment. The hidden agenda of the
humane ethic is the imposition of the anti-natural prophylactic ethos of comfort and soft pleasure on
an even wider scale. The land ethic, on the other hand, requires a shrinkage, if at all possible, of the domestic
sphere; it rejoices in a recrudescence of wilderness and a renaissance of tribal cultural experience
Ocean Specific F/W ev.

The kritik is a pre-requsite to determining the actions that we take in ocean policy
their failure to question the foundational ethic of the 1ac only contributes to the
harms of the status quo
http://www.ceoe.udel.edu/windpower/resources/J_Lilley_8-03_FINAL.pdf - &)
After eliciting beliefs and values, it is possible to uncover a number of mental and cultural models that
exist in society, toward both the ocean and current ocean issues. 8 Hopefully this will help in
understanding how information is used to develop ocean attitudes and perceptions. Once again, it is not possible to
extract mental models of every ocean issue and so, using techniques derived from grounded theory, this study focuses on specific models that
are drawn out of qualitative interviews. This process is explained further in Chapter 3; it will suffice to say here that models identified in the
interview phase of the project are expanded upon in the national mail survey. 3) What effect (if any) do beliefs and values have on pro-
environmental actions? It is possible to see whether the beliefs and values uncovered by the first research question have any bearing on the
actions that people take to help protect the environment and the ocean. There is an ongoing debate in philosophical circles
about the kind of environmental ethic that should be adopted one that focuses only on human
values, or one that takes into consideration intrinsic value in nature and this question asks whether there exist any
real-world differences between those who hold these different ethical positions. 4) What effect do beliefs and values have on support
for offshore energy development? Over the past few years the question of whether to develop U.S. offshore energy resources has
once again become a hotly debated issue, with both drilling and wind presenting possibilities for offshore power generation. The effects of
climate change on the environment in general, and on the ocean specifically, are becoming better understood and, given the differing
impacts that fossil fuels and wind power have on climate change, it is critical to know what people
think about both energy sources. While a number of opinion polls have enquired about support for offshore drilling, and prior
research out of the University of Delaware has been conducted into opinions regarding offshore wind, no study has yet compared the two side
by side. This 9 dissertation not only looks at support for both forms of energy development but also asks why people support or oppose each
technology. The survey data allows comparisons to be drawn between different demographics sex, age, education levels, etc. as well as
between coastal and inland residents. It should be noted from the outset that this research project was conducted in 2008, well before the
Deepwater Horizon/BP oil spill which is currently afflicting the Gulf of Mexico. As with much social science research, data are fluid and change
through time. While public opinion may have shifted since this project was carried out, the data contained within nonetheless provide a solid
basis for analysis and provide a baseline for future post-oil spill studies. Further implications of the Gulf oil spill are discussed in Chapter 6, along
with a suggestion for future research on the matter. 1.4 Dissertation Organization This dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter 2
provides background information pertinent to the research project the chapter summarizes prior surveys of ocean attitudes and provides an
introduction to both environmental ethics and mental models. Chapter 3 outlines the methods used in this study. Two methodologies were
employed: 35 qualitative interviews were first conducted before a mail survey was designed based on those interviews and then administered
to a representative sample of the U.S. population. The fourth chapter details the results of the data (both qualitative and quantitative) relating
to ocean beliefs, values, and mental models; and the fifth presents the findings of the ocean energy component of the study. Finally, the
dissertation concludes with Chapter 6 which, in addition to 1 0 summarizing the results of the study, discusses the policy and philosophical
implications of the research.

AT: Perm do both
1. Link is a test of permutation solvency cross- apply the link debate

2. Method of evaluation determines competitiveness our alternative mandates a
rejection of the anthro-utilitarian systems of calculation that view the environment as
external to humanity this is the basis for permutation solvency for the aff
Itself 2003, pp. 10-11]
From a phenomenological point of view, we find moral experience to be one of the irreducible domains of
lifeworldly experience. Within our prereflective experiences, we regularly find the world and the things within it
to be infused with value. The sun, the rain, and all manner of others are regularly experienced as good. We continually find action and
events in the world to be morally satisfying or morally frustrating. Our everyday life is filled with moral sentiments that
appear from a phenomenological perspective as instances of a prereflective axiological consciousness
that is, as an intentional and evaluative aiming at objects and states of affairs. Value experiences may be analyzed as a form
of intentional consciousness in which the phenomenon of valuing and something valued are given
together. As phenomenology is a return to the things themselves, it does not wish to break apart the primal unity of
the act of valuing and thing valued, as theory often does, but rather to simply describe that primal unity

3. Only radical environmentalism creates an ecocentric mentality the squos
destructive lifestyle. The Perm and reform cannot solve.
Langer 3, Monika [Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Victoria in British Columbia,
Canada. Nietzsche, Heidigger, and Merleau Ponty: Some of their Contributions and Limitations for
Environmentalism Eco-Phenomenology Back to The Earth Itself Page 104-106]
Environmentalism is a popular term for an inherently very diverse and fluid series of sociopolitical movements characterized by their concern
for the environment and their willingness to take measures to address environmental problems. Environmentalism may be
reformist or more radical. The former is anthropocentric and aims to ameliorate the environment
primarily for the benefit of anthropos (man). To this end, reform environmentalists employ such measures
as resource management (including resource conservation) or technological innovations, but see no need for a fundamental
change in perspective or values. A more radical environmentalism is ecocentric and seeks to improve
the life of planet Earth as a whole. Its adherents believe that nature is sentient and intrinsically valuable.
They regard environmental problems as the result of an androcentric, consumerist lifestyle, which
they reject. Instead, they seek to establish a way of living that is in harmony with, and enhances, all
forms of life. Responsive to the needs of nonhuman beings, they may work to restore habitats and native species, to
support community gardens and organic growers, to stop genetic engineering and animal experimentation, to halt clear-cut logging, and to
eliminate various sources of pollution. To counter consumerism, they practice some form of voluntary simplicity. They also attempt to integrate
theory, experience, and practice. Among these more radical environmentalists there are those who realize that the
dominant, destructive lifestyle is bound up with a profoundly flawed, dualistic ontology. Further, eco-
feminists recognize that the traditional subjugation of women is connected with the domination of nature,
and that both spring from the same dualistic and hierarchical ontology. Radical environmentalists emphasize
the need for a thorough, ongoing, transdisciplinary questioning of ourselves and of our cultures dominant worldview. Rejecting
the fact/value split, many of them (deep ecologists) stress the inextricable intertwining of all life forms and seek
self-realization in the widest and deepest identification with nature. By contrast, eco-feminists tend to caution against such
identification. They emphasize respect and care for nature understood as a community of related but distinct beings. 1

AT: Proximate cause first
Ecological crisis is not a series of unfolding events, but rather a mindset that can be
traced to be the source of those events ontological re-orientation removes the need
for excessive environmental exploitation
For the existential philosopher, the roots of the ecological crisis may be much deeper than the Radical Ecologists realize.
The humanity-nature disorder is perhaps best conceived as a manifestation of the tendency toward
alienation inherent in the human condition, one that operates prior to any particular meaning system. This tendency toward
alienation, leading to war and oppression in the past, has now been coupled with the technological
power to sustain a massive homo centrus centrus population explosion, the by-products of which are
poisoning and dismantling the Earths bio-web. There is a certain irony here as the realization of massive ecological
destruction occurs just when we had thought that our science and technology would save us from the ravages of the organic world. Instead
we find ourselves hurtling toward or perhaps through an irrevocable tear in the fabric of the planetary
biotic web (and perhaps beyond). Dreams of technological Utopia have been replaced overnight by nightmares of ecological holocaust.
The existential philosophers remind us that the replacement of one conceptual system for another is
not enough unless there occurs with it a corresponding shift or lifestyle change that actually ushers in
a new mode of being for humanity. Such thinking reinforces the claim of radicality within the projects of Radical Ecology.

AT: No alt solvency
The Alternative is a Form of Concrete Reflection That Places Any Sweeping Ontological
Claims about Peoples Relationship With Nature Under Intense Scrutiny
Environmental ethics requires an ontological commitment. Even though several different systems of metaphysics seem
to provide a suitable philosophical background for environmental ethics, and the major metaphysical schools do not seem to
entail any particular system of ethics, I am uneasy about neglecting metaphysics in the study of environmental ethics. I will
explore in more detail the nature of the ontological commitment which I believe is necessary, but the
main element in this commitment is a philosophical anthropology which holds that humans are a part
of the system of nature. It is a holistic metaphysics, but it must be a critical holism that subjects to careful
scrutiny any claims regarding the relationship between humans and the rest of the system of nature. By
referring to an ontological commitment, I do not mean to imply that this is an arbitrary acceptance of an ontology simply to undergird the
demands of environmental ethics. The holistic ontology stands in its own right. The rightness of the ontology is
a discovery, not a decision. My path to the justification of this ontology was primarily through existential phenomenology, especially
that of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 1 Even though environmental philosophy that stresses the involvement of humans in the system of nature and
produces an ethic of responsibility to nature was not well developed in their time, the existential phenomenologists found in
Edmund Husserls work an approach to human consciousness and experience that lays a groundwork
for environmental thought. It is through a phenomenological type of reflection that I was led to see that
the oneness of the human person and the rest of the system of nature is discovered, not invented. In
phenomenological reflection on the most original, most primal, and least theoretically structured
awareness of the world, what I call concrete reflection, a sharp division between the self and an
environment is not present. Instead we find a unity of self and the nonself, the so-called subject and object.

AT: No alt spillover
Deep ecology is a critique of over consumption of the rich and appeals to eastern
religions as not just a political ploy
Sessions 06 George. (retired philosophy teacher who still offers courses now and then at Sierra College
PB.pdf)-M.H
Guha cites the Devall-Sessions Deep Ecology book, but even with its faults, it contained enough information to head off
most of his misconceptions about deep ecology. If he had read the book more carefully, he would have found that
the deep ecology movement is not narrowly focused on wilderness. For instance, bioregionalism is highlighted in
the book as an ecologically sensible way of life for people throughout the world. There is a critique of inappropriate
technology. Guha also would have found criticism of over-consumption by the rich. He dismisses the
appeal to Eastern religions as a political ploy apparently without realizing, for example, that Arne
Naess is a recognized world authority on Gandhis philosophy and has incorporated Gandhi into his personal ecological
philosophy (Ecosophy T). Further, Gary Snyder trained for ten years as a Zen priest in Japan, and bases his deep ecology philosophy and practice
on Zen.35 In short, Guhas knowledge of the deep ecology movement appears to be greatly distorted. And
Guha is not the impartial or representative Third World spokesperson that many took him to be.
There are many people throughout the Third World who place a high priority on efforts to protect biodiversity and wild Nature in their
countries. Further, he is not necessarily a representative spokesperson even for India. For example, the well-known Indian
physicist/ecofeminist, Vandana Shiva, claims that deep ecologys insistence on the intrinsic value and
protection of wild species and habitat is the only way to ensure a healthy life-style for the worlds
poor in the long run.36 Despite these problems, Guha nevertheless touched a nerve: the issue of displacing indigenous people from
their homes in order to set up preserves to protect wild ecosystems, endangered species, and the continuing evolutionary flow of wild Nature.

AT: Utilitarianism
1. Util is the greatest good for the greatest number the kritik has fundamentally
shifted the impact calculus as par the valuation of all biological life as equal
anthropocentric utilitarianism shouldnt be the basis for your decision

2. Impact framing distinction biotic suffering should be the basis for making
utilitarian judgements
318)
The humane moralists, for their part, insist upon sentience (sensibility would have been a more precise word choice) as the
only relevant capacity a being need possess to enjoy full moral standing. If animals, they argue, are
conscious entities who, though deprived of reason, speech, forethought or even selfawareness (however that may be judged), are
capable of suffering, then their suffering should be as much a matter of ethical concern as that of our fellow
human beings, or strictly speaking, as our very own. What, after all, has rationality or any of the other allegedly uniquely human capacities
to do with ethical standing? Why, in other words, should beings who reason or use speech (etc.) qualify for moral status,
and those who do not fail to qualify?18 Isn't this just like saying that only persons with white skin
should be free, or that only persons who beget and not those who bear should own property? The criterion seems utterly
unrelated to the benefit for which it selects. On the other hand, the capacity to suffer is, it seems, a more relevant criterion
for moral standing because-as Bentham and Mill, notable among modern philosophers, and Epicurus, among the ancients, aver-pain is evil, and
its opposite, pleasure and freedom from pain, good. As moral agents (and this seems axiomatic), we have a duty to behave in
such a way that the effect of our actions is to promote and procure good, so far as possible, and to reduce and
minimize evil. That would amount to an obligation to produce pleasure and reduce pain. Now pain is pain wherever and by
whomever it is suffered. As a moral agent, I should not consider my pleasure and pain to be of greater consequence in determining a
course of action than that of other persons. Thus, by the same token, if animals suffer pain-and among philosophers only strict
Cartesians would deny that they do--then we are morally obliged to consider their suffering as much an evil to
be minimized by conscientious moral agents as human suffering. Certainly actions of ours which contribute to the
suffering of animals, such as hunting them, butchering and eating them, experimenting on them, etc.,
are on these assumptions morally reprehensible. Hence, a person who regards hin1self or herself as not aiming in life to live
most selfishly, conveniently, or profitably, but rightly and in accord with practical principle, if convinced by these arguments, should, among
other things, cease to eat the flesh of animals, to hunt then1, to wear fur and leather clothing and bone ornaments and other articles made
from the bodies of anials, to eat eggs and drink milk, if the animal producers of these commodities are retained under inhumane circumstances,
and to patronize zoos (as sources of psychological if not physica torment of animals). On the other hand, since certain very
simple animals are almost certainly insensible to pleasure and pain, they may and indeed should be
treated as morally inconsequential. Nor is there any moral reason why trees should be respected or
rivers or mountains or anything which is, though living or tributary to life processes, unconscious. The
humane moralists, like the moral humanists, draw a firm distinction between those beings worthy of
moral consideration and those not. They simply insist upon a different but quite definite cut-off point
on the spectrum of natural entities, and accompany their criterion with arguments to show that it is more ethically defensible (granting certain
assumptions) and more consistently applicable than that of the moral humanists

3. The elitism of human rationality is inapplicable to the kritik their ev. Relies on
human constructs of the future that create consequentially worse hitrocities to
biotic life
317)
The orthodox response of ethical humanism (as this philosophical perspective may be styled) to the suggestion
that nonhuman animals should be accorded moral standing is that such animals are not worthy of this
high perquisite. Only human beings are rational, or capable of having interests. or possess self-
awareness, or have linguistic abilities, or can represent the future. it is variously argued." These essential
attributes taken singly or in various combinations make people somehow exclusively deserving of moral
consideration. The so-called "lower animals." it is insisted. lack the crucial qualification for ethical
considerability and so may be treated (albeit humanely, according to some. so as not to brutalize man) as things or means,
not as persons or as ends." The theoreticians of the animal liberation movement ("humane moralists" as they may be called)
typically reply as follows." Not all human beings qualify as worthy of moral regard. according to the various criteria
specified. There- fore. by parity of reasoning. human persons who do not so qualify as moral patients may be treated.
as animals often are, as mere things or means (e.g., used in vivisection experiments. disposed of if their existence is
inconvenient. eaten, hunted, etc., etc.). But the ethical humanists would be morally outraged if irrational and
inarticulate infants. for example, were used in painful or lethal medical experiments, or if severely
retarded people were hunted for pleasure. Thus. the double-dealing. the hypocrisy, of ethical humanism appears to be
exposed." Ethical humanism. though claiming to discriminate between worthy and unworthy ethical patients
on the basis of objective criteria impartially applied. turns out after all, it seems, to be speciesism, a philosophically
indefensible prejudice (analogous to racial prejudice) against animals. The tails side of this argument is that some animals,
usually the "higher" lower animals (cetaceans. other primates. etc.). as ethological studies seem to indicate, may meet the criteria
specified for moral worth, although the ethical humanists. even so. are not prepared to grant them full
dignity and the rights of persons. In short. the ethical humanists' various criteria for moral standing do not include all or only
human beings. humane moralists argue, although in practice ethical humanism wishes to make the class of morally considerable beings
coextensive with the class of human beings.

3. Deep ecology recognizes the fact that real world some decision making necessitates
the killing of some life, but the acceptance of the intrinsic value of that life shows us
that sustainable ecology is key because the natures fate is our fate
Fox 84, (Warwick an Australian philosopher and ethicist. He is the author of Toward a Transpersonal
1984Deep Ecology: A New Philosophy of our Time?
In pursuing their central intuition of unity (i.e., of no boundaries in the bio spherical field), deep ecologists have possibly lost the sight of the
significance of the in process aspect of their unity in process metaphysics. Attention to this latter aspect suggests that any process
continuously produces impermanent, uneven distributions (i.e., different values) of various attributes may be money, information, complexity
of relations and so on). If this were not so then we would have no process but a perfectly uniform, homogenous and, therefore, lifeless field.
The only universe where value is spread evenly across the field is a dead universe. Recognizing this,
we should be clear that the central intuition of deep ecology does not entail the view that intrinsic
value is spread evenly across the membership of the biotic community. Moreover, in situation of genuine value
conflict, justice is better served by not subscribing to the view of ecological egalitarianism. Cows do scream louder than carrots. As Charles Birch
and John Cobb have remarked: Justice does not require equality. It does not require that we share one
anothers fate. There is, however, a shallow and a deep sense of sharing one anothers fate that shallow sense is simply that
of being subject to the same forces. It does not involve caring. The deep sense, intended by Birch and
Cobb, involves love and compassion. It involves the enlargement of onuss sphere of identification. The lesson of ecology is that
we do share on anothers fate in the shallow sense since we all share the fate of the earth. The message of deep ecology s that
we out to care as deeply and as compassionately as possible about the fate not because it affects us
but because it is us.

The Alternitive re-formulates the ontology of existence to include both human and non-human beings
Tulane.)
Like Heidegger, deep ecologists criticize the metaphysical presuppositions allegedly responsible for ecological
destruction, and also contend that a transformed awareness of what humanity and nature are would lead
spontaneously to a transformation of society. The solution to the environmental crisis, then, would involve an
ontological shift: from an anthropocentric, dualistic, and utilitarian understanding of nature to an
understanding which lets things be, i.e., which discloses things other than merely as raw material for human ends. A
nonanthropocentric humanity, having undergone what amounts to a spiritual transformation, would presumably
develop attitudes, practices, and institutions that would exhibit respect and care for all beings.

The Value Horizon Developed By Phenomenological Ethics Prevents Ethical Atrocities
Itself 2003,Page 14-15]
To the extent that we are experientially intertwined and embodied within the biotic web, the relationship between the human
organism and its environment can be phenomenologically described. Such a phenomenology can be
used in the service of an experiential grounding of ecological ethics, as I am attempting here (as well as working
toward a uniquely phenomenological conception of nature), or it can be used to rethink the foundations of experience in general from an
ecological perspective. The first option is phenomenologys contribution to ecological philosophy, and the second is ecological philosophys
contribution to phenomenology. By exposing the limits of traditional naturalism, phenomenology makes
possible a new philosophy of nature respecting the integrity of everyday experience. At the same time
phenomenologists may wish to rethink their conceptions of the foundations of experience from a
point of view that recognizes that embodied existence is primordially and unavoidably experientially embedded
within the planetary biotic web. Eco-phenomenologists will recognize that traditional phenomenological investigations into
experience are incomplete until ecological and even Darwinian perspectives are incorporated into the description and interpretation of
experience. Eco-phenomenologists will wish to investigate the ways that the structure of experience and meaning arise from the deep
ecological context of self-conscious nature. It is, of course, this meaningfully ordered and value-laden world of our direct
experience that ultimately justifies all moral claims. Why are we so sure that dishonesty, fraud, rape,
and murder are evil? Because they each, although in different ways, retard and inhibit the intrinsic purposes and
desires of life, which as we have seen, presents itself as a value for itself in our most basic and world-
constituting intuitions. Value experiences occur within a meaningfully ordered value horizon. It is this value
horizon of life that supplies the final justification of our experiences of the good. It is within this value horizon of life that
our experiences of good and evil are shown to be more than mere subjective preferences.

AT: Alt=Anthro

Deep Ecologys anti-anthropocentrism combats western human-first frame of mind
Biocentric equality is the view that all biota have equal intrinsic value, or, to put it another way, it denies differential valuation
among living things. In this sense Deep Ecology is not merely non-anthropocentric, but anti- anthropocentric; in
terms of moral considerability, human beings have absolutely no priority over nonhumans. Naess, Devall, and Sessions
have all affirmed this way of thinking. In the words of Naess, "the equal right to live and blossom is an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom"
(Naess 1973, 96). In the-words of Devall and Sessions, "all organisms and entities in the ecosphere, as parts
of the interrelated whole, are equal in intrinsic worth" (Devall and Sessions 1985, 67). Obviously, the target of
biocentric equality is Occidental anthropocentrism. In contrast to the extreme human-centerdness of
mainstream Western thought, deep ecologists contend that organisms have equal intrinsic value, with
the implication that no form of life (read: Homo sapiens) deserves more attention or carries more weight in
situations of competing interests. Sessions is unequivocal in opposing any environmental philosophy which assigns differential
intrinsic value to living things, on the grounds that value hierarchies adumbrate claims of moral priority. Quoting John Rodman, Sessions
warns that any differential axiology merely reinstates a "pecking order in this moral barnyard" (Sessions and
Devall, 1985, 23 6). In the case of Whiteheadian-inspired environmental ethics (for example, Frederick Ferr's "personalistic organicism" [Ferr,
1996]), which confers all biota intrinsic-as well as extrinsic-value, yet distributes intrinsic value on the basis of the intensitv and quality of
sentience, Sessions argues:

AT: Alt. = suffering

The eradication of pain is a self-fulfilling prophecy that only leads to the destruction of
more life a holistic understanding of the natural world is prior to an individualized
understanding of suffering
333)
The "shift of values" which results from our "reappraising things unnatural, tame, and confined in terms of things natural, wild, and free" is
especially dramatic when we reflect upon the definitions of good and evil espoused by Bentham and Mill and uncritically accepted by their
contemporary followers. Pain and pleasure seem to have nothing at all to do with good and evil if our appraisal is
taken from the vantage point of ecological biology. Pain in particular is primarily information. In animals, it informs
the central nervous system of stress, irritation, or trauma in outlying regions of the organism. A
certain level of pain under optimal organic circumstances is indeed desirable as an indicator of
exertion---of the degree of exertion needed to maintain fitness, to stay "in shape," and of a level of exertion
beyond which it would be dangerous to go. An arctic wolf in pursuit of a caribou may experience pain in her feet or ehest
because of the rigors of the chase. There is nothing bad or wrong in that. Or, consider a case of injury. Suppose that a person in the
course of a wilderness excursion sprains an ankle. Pain informs him or her of the injury and by its
intensity the amount of further stress the ankle may endure in the course of getting to safety. Would it be
better if pain were not experienced upon injury or, taking advantage of recent technology, anaesthetized? Pleasure appears to be, for the most
part (unfortunately it is not always so) a reward accompanying those activities which contribute to organic maintenance, such as the pleasures
associated with eating, drinking, grooming, and so on, or those which contribute to social solidarity like the pleasures of dancing, conversation,
teasing, etc., or those which contribute to the continuation of the species, such as the pleasures of sexual activity and of being parents. The
doctrine that life is the happier the freer it is from pain and that the happiest life conceivable is one in
which there is continuous pleasure uninterrupted by pain is biologically preposterous. A living
mammal which experienced no pain would be one which had a lethal dysfunction of the nervous
system. The idea that pain is evil and ought to be minimized or eliminated is as primitive a notion as that of a tyrant who puts to death
messengers bearing bad news on the supposition that thus his well-being and security is improved.44

AT: Alt=Vauge
The vagueness of the alternative helps overcome the system and bring about wider
acceptance
Clark 2k, Professor of Philosophy at Loyala University 2000(John, DEEP ECOLOGY AND ITS CRITICS,
Beneath the Surface : Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology, MIT Press, Beneath the Surface :
Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology Pg 5, Accessed: 7/1/14, CD)
Harold Glasser points out that in many contexts, Naess has deliberately sought to maintain a certain vagueness in
the concepts and principles of deep ecology. Glasser claims that this "methodological vagueness" is "a
sophisticated semantical device for facilitating the acceptance and agreement of statements and
notions by emphasizing the positive aspect of ambiguity that is sometimes associated with a high
level of generalization." 3 Yet he notes that this vagueness "can introduce a tension between parallel efforts designed to isolate and
clarify fundamental conflicts (deep questioning).''4 In effect, wideness is gained at the expense of depth.

AT: Transhumanism
The transhumanist Ethical Relationship Defined by Kant and Levinas Deny the Violence
Directed Towards Third Parties and Fail to Recognize the Being of Nonhumans turns
solvency
Embree 3 [Lester. William F. Dietrich Eminent Scholar in Philosophy at Florida Atlantic University, The
Possibility of a Constitutive Phenomenology of the Environment Eco-Phenomenology Back to The Earth
Itself Page 39]
If we look to Kant or Levinas for the basis of a transhuman ethics that transcends prudence we come up
against the fact that both of them restrict underivative ethical responsibility to beings that speak.
Levinas argues persuasively that ethics grounded solely in respect for a universal moral law is a violent
masquerade of ethics because it fails to respect the other human being in its singularity. An ethics in which respect is limited to
my being face to face with another would also be violent, because it is blind to the injustice it is bound
to do to the third party. So respect of both kinds, for the case and for the face, have somehow to be hybridized if an ethics that is not
glorified prudence is to be possible. In other words, a certain sort of systematicity is retained by Levinas, but it is not
one in which terms are defined by their internal relations, as in the structuralism that was all the rage
when he was writing his major works. Levinas has more than one way of maintaining the difference between terms. My
difference from another human being is established first by my restrictedly egological enjoyment within the walls of my home. This corresponds
but is not equivalent to Heideggers saying that, for Dasein, to exist is to dwell. One reason why this is not equivalent is that according to
Levinas the eksistentiality of Dasein as described by Heidegger is so preoccupied with what it is for that it cannot admit Daseins enjoyment of
what it lives from. My egological separateness and independence get accomplished and produced,
according to Levinass genealogy of ethics, when the other human being picks me out, makes me stand out as a
uniquely singular one from the impersonal one of das Man, by charging me with a responsibility unshared by anyone else. It is only
through this asymmetrical relation of relations that human sociality can be ethical.

===Aff Answers===

Perm ev.
Perm do both self interest cannot be reformed on the macro scale through individual
in round decisions political advocacy is a pre-requisite to confronting
anthropocentric conceptions of self interest
Keller 97 [Keller, David R. 1997, professor of philosophy at Utah Valley University, Gleaning Lessons
As noble as these intentions are, the project of expanding the small egoistic self to the big ecological Self is
founded on untenable assumptions. For example, in the case of activist Seed, Val Plumwood has pointed out that there is
nothing to guarantee that the needs of the rainforest should become Seed's needs: why should not
Seed's needs become the needs of the rainforest (Plumwood 1993, 178)? Or 'why should not the needs of
unemployed loggers become the needs of Seed and the forest'? Even while acknowledging the insights of scientific
ecology, the unemployed logger is likely to prioritize the need to feed and clothe his children over the
need for ecosystemic integrity and stability. There are real conflicts of interest between constituent
members of larger wholes, and expansionary holism does not adequately recognize the reality of these
conflicts. In the political arena, the expansionary holist is forced into the uncomfortable position of
implying that anyone in disagreement does not in fact understand what is for their own best interest.
Instead of approaching a conflict with the mien "I realize your interests are different from my interests, so
here we have a real conflict of interest that we need to resolve," the expansionary holist approaches the
situation, tacitly or overtly, as: "I know what your real interests are, and here we have a conflict because you
don't seem to understand what those interests are." I seriously doubt anyone concerned with ecological issues would want
to convey this attitude, but in practical terms, this is what expansionary holism implies. The upshot is that metaphysical holism,
as conceived in the process of self- realization, is an inadequate model for adjudicating conflicts of
interest.

Perm do both - Policy changes are a pre-requisite to alternative solvency absent the
aff suffering becomes a Naturalized part of reality
Gardiner 07 (Anne Barbeau, Contributing Editor of the NOR, is Professor Emerita of English at John Jay
College of the City University of New York. Deep Ecology and the Culture of Death Proceedings of the
seventeenth University Faculty for Life conference at Villanova University, 2007 / edited by Joseph W.
Koterski., D.C. : University Faculty for Life, c2008. &)
This is where politics becomes the real heart of Naesss deep ecology.14 Maskit explains that Naess wanted both personal
change and political change to occur at the same time, because persuading people to think in ecocentric terms does not
necessarily change their behavior: Policy changes are therefore needed to force even those who know better
to behave in a way commensurate with their beliefs. Note the words force and even those in the last sentence. All people are to be forced
to behave as if they believed they were merely part of nature, even those who already accept ecocentrism but whose behavior has not caught
up with their conviction. Government policies are to serve as an externalized will in place of the will that
we dont have, and thus to force us to act as we would if we were fully realized beings. Again, note the use of the word force in this
last sentence: Maskit says that policies can force everyone to conform, regardless of their interior views. What room will be left for free will?
Virtually none. The belief that we are just part of nature, this scholar concludes, can help motivate people to fight for policies
they might not otherwise support. And those policies can function, at least in part, to change behaviors in ways that we can support.15 This is
hardly democracy in action. Humans are to be simultaneously coaxed and compelled, then, to do what
nature requiresnamely, bring about a substantial decrease in their own numbers. Even so, deep ecologists worry that a
large population decrease might cause some self-congratulation and backsliding: We can well imagine human population dropping,
levels of consumption doing likewise, and so on, and this leading to an inability to continue seeing environmental problems as serious.16 So,
when will populations fall so low that deep ecologists will finally consider the environment safe from depredation and breathe a sigh of relief? It
seems that they will not be perfectly happy till our numbers reach the level of the Neolithic or upper-Paleolithic age, a time when the world was
overrun with wild animals. Little wonder they are accused of misanthropy. Mark Fellenz remarks that deep ecologists remind him of
Nietzsches famous diagnosis of man as a disease on the earths skin.17 Indeed, they not only condemn the use of animals for
food and science, but even question the domestication of animals, without which very few people on earth could be
fed. Deep ecologist Paul Shepard idealizes the late Pleistocene, when small bands of humans roamed the earth as hunter-gatherers. The
summons Back to the Pleistocene! was first heard in Gary Snyders Turtle Island,18 but while Snyder remains to this day a critic of modern
agriculture, he has since accepted small-scale, indigenous farming. Marc Fellenz likewise glorifies the Paleolithic hunter ancient and modern by
pointing to the metamorphic ecstasis that occurs in the sun-dance of the Oglala of North America as they cut and impale themselves while
dressed as various animals. Such transformations into animality, he says, beautifully collapse the boundaries between culture and nature. It
is commonplace among deep ecologists to trace the primordial fall from a foraging paradise to agriculture, or to blame the loss of biological
diversity on the domestications of the Neolithic age.19 One may well ask, how many humans could survive on this
planet if the only source of food were from hunting or from small-scale, indigenous farming? What would
happen to urban populations? Michael Zimmerman has argued persuasively that deep ecology resembles German
National Socialism of the 1930s, which was also a neo-pagan revival and a radical green movement. The Nazis, too,
castigated Christianity as nature-hating, life-despising, and otherworldly, embraced a perverted religion of nature, and
rejected the progressive political ideologies of socialism and liberalism for carrying on, albeit in secular form, the
Christian view of a divine purpose unfolding itself in history. The Nazis made the same claim that humans were merely
part of the great web of life, and their slogan Blood and Soil was a forerunner the deep ecologists bioregionalism. Zimmerman
observes that even if they used modern technology, the Nazis were premodern in their social and cultural orientation.20 Other scholars,
too, mention the Nazis green dimension, their embrace of mystical neo-paganism, and their draconian laws to
protect wildlife. Hitler, a vegetarian, believed in the intrinsic value of the natural world, castigated the destruction
of nature wrought by industry, and wanted to protect the German wilderness.21 When to this eerie similarity to the Nazis we add the deep
ecologists plan to bring about a substantial decrease in human population, it becomes clear that this
radical movement is in the vanguard of the culture of death. As John Cobb observes, deep ecologists for the most part
do not attend to the question of individual animal suffering. Their concern for the health of the biosystem leads them
to accept animal suffering as the natural course of things.... Their concern is directed chiefly to the wild and to how human
beings rightly fit into the order of the wild.22 Marc Fellenz adds that for deep ecologists the enormous mortality which removes the majority
of the newborn every year from nearly every species is simply one of the value-neutral inevitabilities in the natural world. Suffering is
of no importance from their impartial ecosystem-favoring viewpoint.23

The perm maps out power and recognizes the role of the state it has to be a
cooperative effort
The force of democratic institutions in our time in determining policies is gradually decreasing
because powerful pressure groups take over much of the influence on the decisions. Also, if we consider
the big multinational firms, we discover they can have a greater power than small states, and within
the states the department of energy, say, may have great influence and will of course tend to support
decisions to use more and more energy, whatever the actual need. In environmental conflicts, it is
therefore important to map out the power structures relevant in pushing the decisions and
determining the different stages in the conflict. Even in a small country like Norway, in one relatively minor conflict on the
development of a river, the map of power sources included more than twenty power centres. Each stage of the conflict could to
some extent be predicted through mapping out the relative strengths of all these centres. This kind of
activity, to map out power structures in a cold and detached way, neither over- nor underestimating
the strengths of the opponents themselves, is mostly uninteresting for people who are engaged in
conserving nature. So there has to be an intimate cooperation between conservationists, journalists,
people knowing political ways and means, and all those who are vitally interested in the workings of
big societies.\

Perm do both - The Negatives progressive ecological politics is inevitably re-appropriated into fascism
and used as a means of violent control though their position may seen intellectual the radical
consequences of its implementation turn the alts desirability political engagement solves this
Biehl 94( Janet, Murray Boochkin expert, Former Social Ecologist,'Ecology' and the Modernization of
Fascism in the German Ultra-right Janet Biehl published 1994
http://www.spunk.org/texts/places/germany/sp001630/janet.html)
It is an incontestable fact that the ecology crisis today is real. In a vast number of ways and places, the
biosphere of this planet is undergoing a great deal of damage. Parts of the environment have already been rendered
uninhabitable through toxic wastes and nuclear power plant disasters, while systemic pollution, ozone holes, global
warming, and other disasters are increasingly tearing the fabric on which all life depends. That such
damage is wrought overwhelmingly by corporations in a competitive international market economy has never been clearer, while the need
to replace the existing society with one such as social ecology advances has never been more urgent. 1 At a time when worsening
economic conditions and strong political disaffection occur along with ecological dislocations,
however, nationalist and even fascist ideas are gaining an increasingly high profile in Europe,
particularly, but not only, in the Federal Republic of Germany. With social tensions exacerbated, neofascist groups of
various kinds are winning electoral representation, even as their loosely linked cohorts commit acts of violence against foreigners. Such
groups, both skinhead and 'intellectual,' are part of a 'New' Right that explicitly draws its ideas from
classical fascism. They are updating the old nationalist, mystical, and misanthropic themes of the 'Old' Right, writes Jutta Ditfurth, in
a "modernization of fascism." Among other things, they are using a right-wing interpretation of
ecology "as an ideological 'hinge' for organizing the extreme-right and neofascist scene." 2 Today's
fascists have a distinct ideological legacy from their fascist forebears upon which to draw. Indeed,
'ecology' and a mystical reverence for the natural world are hardly new to German nationalism. At the
end of the nineteenth century, a cultural revolt against positivism swept much of Europe, as George L. Mosse writes, and in Germany it
became infused with both nature-mysticism and racial nationalism. This revolt Culminating in the 1920s, an
assortment of occult and pseudo-scientific ideas coalesced around the idea of a German Volk into a
romantic nationalism, romantic racism, and a mystical nature-worshipping faith. Indeed, as Mosse
observes, the German word Volk

Alt Takeouts

Static Nature
Deep Ecology fails as a consistant set of ethics nature is not stable the
environment will naturally exploit itself under natural conditions their belief in
nature as gaia and peaceful is a farce and removes alt solvency
Nelson 08 [Michael P., Ruth H. Spaniol Chair of Renewable Resources and Lead Principal Investigator
for the HJ Andrews Experimental Forest Senior Fellow with the Spring Creek Project for Ideas, Nature,
and the Written Word @ Oregon State University, Environmental Ethics and Philosophy 2nd/
7/18/2008 18:08 ,Page 208, http://www.uky.edu/OtherOrgs/AppalFor/Readings/240%20-
%20Reading%20-%20Deep%20Ecology.pdf]
&)The deep-ecological principles of biocentric egalitarianism and metaphysical holism have elicited
robust critiques. Some of the most interesting debates have centered on the normative status of Deep Ecology. Naess maintains that
Deep Ecology is essentially descriptive. For Naess unmitigated empiricism or ecophenomenology (Brown and Toadvine 2003) promotes a
direct experience of the qualities of natureits concrete contents (Naess 1985). Deep Ecology, he argues, is simply an enumeration of
general principles that command the assent of persons open to the direct apprehension of nature. Scholars have found the disclaimer that
Deep Ecology is not a normative systemand ought not be judged as suchdisingenuous. They have treated Deep Ecology as
the legitimate object of the analysis of moral philosophy. Some regard Deep Ecology as strident axiological egalitarianism that is useless in
adjudicating conflicting interests. If all organisms are of equal value, then there is no basis upon which to make
prescriptions because the kind of value distinctions necessary for evaluating the moral situations of
environmental ethics are deliberately disqualified. The principle of biocentric egalitarianism, on this view,
renders Deep Ecology impotent as an ethical theory. Environmental ethics is predicated on the possibility of a
nonegalitarian axiology. In the words of the American philosopher Bryan Norton, The 120,000th elk cannot be treated equally with one of the
last California condorsnot, at least, on a reasonable environmental ethic (1991, p. 224). Baird Callicott has surmised that
environmental ethics must manifestly not accord equal moral worth to each and every member of
the biotic community (1980, p. 327). These scholars argue, therefore, that biocentric egalitarianism must be
scrapped (Sylvan 1985). In a similar vein Fox has argued that the leveling axiology of orthodox Deep Ecology must be forsworn. If all
organisms are really of equal intrinsic worth, the deep ecological doctrinaire might just as well eat
veal as vegetables (Fox 1984). In reality, Fox predicted, deep ecologists probably tend to be vegetarians, becausein the words of
Alan Wattscows scream louder than carrots (Fox 1984, p. 198). Orthodox Deep Ecology, Fox contends, does itself a
disservice by employing a definition of anthropocentrism which is so overly exclusive that it
condemns more or less any theory of value that attempts to guide realistic praxis. . . . Unless deep
ecologists take up this challenge and employ a workable definition of anthropocentrism, they may well become known as the advocates of
Procrustean Ethics as they attempt to fit all organisms to the same dimensions of intrinsic value. (Fox 1984, pp. 19899). Not eager to be
labeled a procrustean ethicist, Fox persuasively argues for a position that abandons biocentric egalitarianism and instead asserts that all
biota have intrinsic value but are not equal in intrinsic value because the richness of experience differs (Fox 1984, p.
198). On this point Fox aligns himself with the Whiteheadian-inspired environmental ethics based on intensity of sentience(Ferre 1994) that
Sessions so adamantly opposes. To mark the difference between his sophisticated reformulation of deep ecological thinking from orthodox
Deep Ecology, Fox rechristened his theory transpersonal ecology (1995). Fox has since moved beyond Deep Ecology and has developed a more
integrated approach that encompasses interhuman ethics, the ethics of the natural environment, and the ethics of the human-constructed
environment (Fox 2006). In contrast, Sessions has reasserted the importance of deep ecologys ecological realism
as opposed to social constructivism (2006) as the philosophical foundation for a newenvironmentalismof the twenty-first
century (1995). Naess has steadfastly resisted any gradations or differentiations of intrinsic value among
organisms in light of such criticisms. Responding to Fox, Naess wrote that some intrinsic values may differ, but not the kind he
talks about. He and Fox, said Naess, probably do not speak about the same intrinsic view (Naess 1984, p. 202). Naess has reiterated his
intuition that living beings have a right, or an intrinsic or inherent value, or value in themselves, that is the same for all of them (Naess 1984,
p. 202). As Naess conceded early on (1973), brute biospherical reality entails some forms of killing, exploitation,
and suppression of other living beings; the aim is to do more good than harm, to respect on an equal basis the right of every life
form to flourish (Naess 1984). Nevertheless, some philosophers have found such a guideline essentially vacuous, like
vowing honesty until lying is warranted (Sylvan 1985a), thus undermining the very foundation of the principle itself. If any
realistic practice deals with few situations where biota may be valued equally, then the principle is empty. According to some critics, there
are irresolvable structural tensions between biocentric egalitarianism and metaphysical holism in
ecological value systems (Keller 1997). They argue that, in light of the real functions of living natural systems, it is impossible
to even come close to affirming both the ability of all individuals to flourish to old age and the
integrity and stability of ecosystems. The necessity of exterminating ungulates such as goats and pigs
for the sake of the health of fragile tropical-island ecosystems is but one example. Regard for the health of
whole ecosystems might, therefore, require treating individuals differently, because individuals of different species have unequal utility (or
disutility) for wholes; if that were the case, then viewed from the standpoint of an entire ecosystem, biocentric egalitarianism and
metaphysical holism might be mutually exclusive and inconsistent with each other to the extent that at
least one would have to be abandonedor perhaps both (Keller 1997).

Cede the Political
DA to the alternative- Need use concrete political action in order to overcome
resistance to deep ecology
Maskit 2k , Professor at Denton University in the Department of Philosophy and the Environmental
Studies Program 2000 (Jonathan, Naess and the Problem of Consumption, Beneath the Surface : Critical
Essays in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology, MIT Press, Beneath the Surface : Critical Essays in the
Philosophy of Deep Ecology Pg 226, Accessed: 7/1/14, CD)
If deep ecology is to transform the world, and to do so in a way that is joyful rather than destructive,
it must address the reality of these desires and seek to work with them. It is not sufficient simply to
claim that the desires will wither away or will fall under the control of reason. We must pursue two
avenues at once: we must address the structures of desire formation (which is part of subject
formation, after all) and we must work with the subjects we know who struggle with the desires with
which they find themselves. The great risk is that we serve to reinscribe the sorts of subjects we are
into new generations. We must address the structures of desire formation if we are to move forward
with the deep ecological program. And addressing this problem is clearly political. Individuals cannot
single-handedly face down the forces that make them who they are (although there is certainly room
for overcoming what one is to some degree). What is needed is an alteration of those forces
themselves. 29

Eco Fascism

Deep ecology is a form of ecological imperialism and is a radical trend that does not
address real environmental problems
Sessions 06. George (retired philosophy teacher who still offers courses now and then at Sierra College
PB.pdf)-M.H
The most recent phase of wilderness critiques began in 1989 with the Indian social ecologist Ramachandra Guha who, in a very
influential paper, took on the mantle of spokesman for the Third World by providing a Third World
critique.34 Calling himself a sympathetic outsider, Guha claimed that the deep ecology movement is just a
radical trend within the American wilderness preservation movement. It has little relevance to the real
environmental issues facing humanity- social justice, over-consumption by the rich, and militarization (Guha considers these
the major dangers to the integrity of the natural world). He even goes so far as to suggest that a truly radical ecology movement in the
American context ought to work toward a synthesis of the appropriate technology, alternate lifestyle, and peace movements. Guha refers to
India euphemistically as a densely populated country. By any realistic ecological measure India is grossly overpopulated and has now shot
past China as the most populated country in the world. One is astounded to see the environmental crisis characterized in this way, given the
global scientific ecological consensus. Guha is upset with the nature reserves established to protect tigers and
other endangered species in India in the 1970s by prime minister Indira Gandhi, in collaboration with
international conservation organizations. He rejects the view that intervention in nature should be
guided primarily by the need to preserve biotic integrity rather than by the needs of humans. In his
view, Indias tiger reserves (which also protect many other endangered species) are an example of elite ecological
imperialism that results in a direct transfer of resources from the poor to the rich. Guha further asserts that American
parks and wilderness Volume 22, Number 2 133 areas (as in the Third World) cater primarily to the rich as tourist
attractions. Deep ecology, he claims, runs parallel to the consumer society without seriously
questioning its ecological and socio-political basis. The ecological issues, for Guha, are primarily issues of human social
justice. Further, the deep ecology anthropocentric-biocentric distinction is largely spurious. He is upset
by deep ecological appeals to Eastern traditions such as Taoism, Hinduism, and Buddhism as a basis
for its ecocentrism, claiming this is politically motivated to provide an authentic lineage, and to present itself as a universal philosophy
(as opposed to a parochial American one).

The Negatives progressive ecological politics is inevitably re-appropriated into fascism and used as a
means of violent control though their position may seen intellectual the radical consequences of its
implementation turn the alts desirability
Biehl 94('Ecology' and the Modernization of Fascism in the German Ultra-right Janet Biehl published
1994 http://www.spunk.org/texts/places/germany/sp001630/janet.html - &)
It is an incontestable fact that the ecology crisis today is real. In a vast number of ways and places, the
biosphere of this planet is undergoing a great deal of damage. Parts of the environment have already been rendered
uninhabitable through toxic wastes and nuclear power plant disasters, while systemic pollution, ozone holes, global
warming, and other disasters are increasingly tearing the fabric on which all life depends. That such
damage is wrought overwhelmingly by corporations in a competitive international market economy has never been clearer, while the need
to replace the existing society with one such as social ecology advances has never been more urgent. 1 At a time when worsening
economic conditions and strong political disaffection occur along with ecological dislocations,
however, nationalist and even fascist ideas are gaining an increasingly high profile in Europe,
particularly, but not only, in the Federal Republic of Germany. With social tensions exacerbated, neofascist groups of
various kinds are winning electoral representation, even as their loosely linked cohorts commit acts of violence against foreigners. Such
groups, both skinhead and 'intellectual,' are part of a 'New' Right that explicitly draws its ideas from
classical fascism. They are updating the old nationalist, mystical, and misanthropic themes of the 'Old' Right, writes Jutta Ditfurth, in
a "modernization of fascism." Among other things, they are using a right-wing interpretation of
ecology "as an ideological 'hinge' for organizing the extreme-right and neofascist scene." 2 Today's
fascists have a distinct ideological legacy from their fascist forebears upon which to draw. Indeed,
'ecology' and a mystical reverence for the natural world are hardly new to German nationalism. At the
end of the nineteenth century, a cultural revolt against positivism swept much of Europe, as George L. Mosse writes, and in Germany it
became infused with both nature-mysticism and racial nationalism. This revolt Culminating in the 1920s, an
assortment of occult and pseudo-scientific ideas coalesced around the idea of a German Volk into a
romantic nationalism, romantic racism, and a mystical nature-worshipping faith. Indeed, as Mosse
observes, the German word Volk

Zimmerman Facism turn - Deep ecologis misappropriations of fascism distorts their
interconnected worldview ensuring an unsuccessful politics, damming the alt.
Plumwood 2000, professor at the University of Sydney and Australian ecofeminist intellectual and
activist (Val, Deep Ecology, Deep Pockets, and Deep Problems, Beneath the Surface : Critical Essays in
Deep Ecology Pg 73 , Accessed: 7/1/14, CD)
Luc Ferry is one of a group of recent critics of deep ecology's authoritarian potential.34 Ferry identifies
"shallow" forms of ecology with humanism and a progressive affirmation of modernism, and blackens
any deeper form of ecological thought that tries to challenge the human/nature dualism in a more
thoroughgoing way, through the alleged association of deep ecology with Romanticism,
antimodernism, antihumanism, and even Nazism. But the crudeness of such an analysis is apparent
when we consider that all these positions have multiple faces which must render all such simple
equations suspect. The analysis ignores the oppressive and problematic aspects of modernism and
humanism, especially where humanism defines itself against or in opposition to the nonhuman, and
relies on the dubious assumption that more ethical consideration for nonhumans necessarily means
less for humans.35 While it is important to note that those forms of Romanticism corrupted by the desire for unity and other oppressive
forces played a role in supporting fascism, any analysis that puts all its stress on this factor ignores the diversity and liberatory aspects of
Romanticism,36 as well as the well-documented complicity of the worst aspects of Nazism with modernism and rationalism.37 At present
the danger from deep ecology's political navet comes from quite a different direction, from capture
by the liberal right rather than the fascist right. Michael Zimmerman reaches perverse conclusions
from his interrogation of Nazi ecologism because he, too, adopts oversimplified accounts of fascism
and Nazism. Zimmerman favors the "irrationality" explanation that overlooks the ambiguity of the
Nazi relationship to modernity and casts it as the evil throwback to mindless collectivity and blood-
and-soil tribalism, the dark opposite of the White Knights of individualism, private property,
liberalism and Enlightenment rationality. However, as recent critical theorists have shown, this
portrait of Nazism as an irruption of "premodern irrationalism" obscures as much as it illuminates.
Zimmerman's binary account assumes that the Nazi form of fascism remains the chief political danger we still have to fear, and that it is in the
Nazis' critique of modernity that we should seek the primary source of their horrors. But this, too, overlooks analyses such as Zygmunt
Bauman's, which suggest that the extermination programs were in many respects an extreme expression of modernity and its rational capacity
to scapegoat, marginalize, and eliminate; both the programs and Nazi thinking in general involved strong modernist elements of human/animal
dualism, instrumental/bureaucratic order, and hyper-rationalism. 38 It was less the fledgling science of ecology, as Zimmerman claims,39 than
the very well-established modern science of biology, in which Germany led the world, that helped to supply the intellectual foundations for
Nazi racist practice and the biological rationalism that underlay the extermination programs.40 But Zimmerman's shallow analysis
also fails to note that Nazi doctrines of racial purity were in many ways an intensification of the
"normal" doctrines of white racial superiority that had accompanied the colonizing and "civilizing"
process undertaken in the Americas, in Asia, Africa, and Australiadoctrines that provided the
justification for dominant global property-formation regimes.41 Zimmerman's analysis not only
misidentifies the political problem in deep ecology and offers a mistaken analysis of where it lies, it
also uses the mistake to promote solutions for ecological problems in line with the conservative
paradigm of strengthened private property and "small government." Thus Zimmerman argues that deep ecology is
in danger of providing support for Nazism and fascism, and that environmentalism will avoid this to the extent it avoids any critical engagement
with private property and does not call for government intervention or support institutional arrangements which require it. Zimmerman's
identification of individualism, private property, and small government as the most important
bulwarks against the fascist potential he discerns in deep ecology demonstrates the narrow range of
his political focus.

DA to the alternative- Deep ecology risks ecofacism taking over society bringing about
Nazi level violence
Zimmerman 2000, Professor of Philosophy and former Director of the Center for Humanities and the
Arts at CU Boulder, (Michael E. , Possible Political Problems of Earth-Based Religiosity, Beneath the
Surface : Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology, MIT Press, Beneath the Surface : Critical
Essays in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology Pg 171 , Accessed: 7/1/14, CD)
Many modern people do not believe that terms like "the divine" and "the sacred" refer to anything. I
myself take it for granted, however, that talk about the divine is meaningful talk, and that renewing humanity's relationship with the divine
could play a significant role in resolving or at least in minimizing contemporary environmental and social problems. In this essay, however, I
voice my concern about the possible consequences of the fact that such Earth-based religiosity tends to view the divine as wholly contained in
or as immanent within the cosmos itself, rather than as transcending the cosmos as well as being somehow present in it. Most
neopagans and radical environmentalists are insufficiently aware of the potentially dark side of such
an immanentistic view of the divine. One such sinister potentiality was realized in National Socialism,
which can be understood in part as a perverted religion of nature, which rejected Jewish and Christian
otherworldliness as well as progressive political ideologies (communism, socialism, liberalism) that are indebted to Christian ideas about divine
purpose actualizing itself in history. Unhappily, National Socialism was in some respects a Green movement. 5 I
became cognizant of the Green side of the Nazi movement only a decade ago, in the process of coming
to terms with the Nazi affiliation of Martin Heidegger, whose work I had once used to inform and to
promote the deep ecology movement. Although the antimodern, anti-Enlightenment, anti-industrial, and nature-revering
rhetoric of the Nazis in the early 1930s was largely betrayed by their subsequent commitment to rearmament and industrial productivity, the
Nazi government passed environmental laws that were the most far-reaching in the developed world
at that time. In other words, Nazi reverence for and identification with nature were not merely
opportunistic. Affirming that humanity is but one strand in the great web of life, Nazi ideologues trumpeted the
now infamous slogan Blut und Boden (Blood and Soil), which may be understood as a racist version of bioregionalism. The Nazis
condemned Judaism and Christianity for being nature-hating, life-despising, and otherworldly. They
were hardly alone in exhibiting antimodernist, pro-nature, and even neopagan sentiments in the early
twentieth century. The Nazi movement's jingoist militarism, masculinist fantasies, and anti-Semitism
help explain why Nazism made such dreadful use of sentiments that were shared by people with no
sympathy at all for National Socialism. In another essay, I have described in more detail the ecofascist dimension of National
Socialism.6 Some of my friends in the environmental movement have been dismayed by my recent excursions into the topic of ecofascism.
Indeed, because environmentalism is under attack from so many angles, my examination of this topic may seem gratuitous. Obviously, I think
the issue is important. Moreover, I believe that consideration of it should come from within the ranks of people who call themselves
environmentalists, as I do. In what follows, I do not wish to say that fascist versions of environmentalism are an inevitable outcome of Earth-
oriented religions, or that people concerned about the sacred dimension of their own homelands are somehow crypto-Nazis. The loss of a
sense of place, as Wendell Berry has argued so eloquently, is one of the regrettable outcomes of modernity.7 As I noted above, ecofascism
involves militaristic and xenophobic dimensions that are not discernible in most forms of
bioregionalism, deep ecology, and ecofeminism. Indeed, because the United States is the world's most liberal democracy
and has the highest percentage of churchgoing Christians of any industrial nation, chances may seem slim that something like a neopagan
ecofascism could ever arise here.Oliver Geden has made clear in his recent work, Rechte Oekologie: Umweltschutz zwischen Emanzipation und
Faschismus (Right-Wing Ecology: Environmental Protection Between Emancipation and Fascism). 8 Furthermore, in the context of a social and
ecological crisis in the United States, I can imagine the emergence of protofascist forces that might appropriate and redefine ideas which are
currently used rather innocently and naively by some radical ecologists, neopagans, and New Agers. The writings of the neopagan, anti-
Christian Friedrich Nietzsche were put to use by the Nazis, despite Nietzsche's sharp criticism of anti-Semitic movements in his own time, a few
decades before the emergence of the Nazi Party. Anyone familiar with American political paranoia, especially after the collapse of the external
enemy of communism, must take seriously the prospect of collectivist movements thatunder the misleading banner of "Christian
individualism"would draw upon immanentistic ideas (for example, "sacred blood" that must not be contaminated) to promote draconian
solutions to environmental, political, and economic problems supposedly caused by racial mixing and immigration. In describing National
Socialism as a Green version of neopaganism armed with Panzer tanks and inflamed by anti-Semitism, my point is not to say that contemporary
deep ecologists, ecofeminists, and neopagans are protofascists. Were I to say this, I would be abetting criticisms made by such
antienvironmental groups as the Wise Use Movement, with which I have little sympathy. Moreover, contemporary radical ecologists and
neopagans are sufficiently variegated and at odds with one another, that they can be housed under one conceptual roof only by ignoring
important distinctions. My point is to remind people who do promote an immanentistic, Earth-based
religiosity that one version of such religiosity can be, and has been, put to appalling uses. Thus
informed, contemporary Earth-based religionists would be capable not only of anticipating and
deflating the criticisms of antienvironmental groups, but also of critically reexamining the adequacy of
their own views about the relationships among humankind, nature, and the divine.

Cap Turn
Turn- Alternative doesnt solve, upholds the capitalist system, supports fascism and is
unable to change institutions
In the earlier sections we noted how the theoretical possibilities associated with unity and individual consciousness change have assumed a
privileged role over the solidarity and structural analysis allied with feminist-postcolonial theory and other politically radical movements. Just
as deep ecology failed to provide alternatives to an ethical theory based on unity, so it has failed to
provide political alternatives to political theory based on unity. This pattern in the political area
provides the basis for the seduction of deep ecological political theory by a conservative paradigm
endorsing capitalism, private property, and small government, and by a notably shallow and
eliteaccommodating "deep pocket" strategy that seeks the ecological enlightenment of the Man of
Property as its main objective. 31 The unity interpretation, which has the potential to provide support
for both totalitarian and capitalist positions, once again provides the means by which this hegemonic
accommodation is constructed. Several recent theorists have pointed to the ecological history of
Nazism to argue that deep ecology has a certain potential to support Nazism and fascism. This danger
is variously attributed to deep ecology's tendency to question modernity and humanism, to display
elements of romanticism, and to undermine private property and individualism.32 I shall argue that these
arguments rest on shallow analyses of fascism and Nazism, as well as of what is politically relevant today. While it is important to
acknowledge the potential of environmentalism in general, and of deep ecology in particular, to
support undemocratic forms of politics, these arguments misidentify the ways in which this potential
arises. The main danger comes from a different direction: not so much from its alleged romanticism
and critique of humanism, or from its holistic understanding of ecology, as through the potential of
the unity interpretation to support the idea of community as a unity or fusion of interests, and the
associated idea of a pure home devoid of alien elements. 33 The unity interpretation at the institutional level involves
the attempt to seek the political, along with the ethical, inclusion of nonhuman nature in terms of the Naessian concept of unity of interests,
expressed at the level of political theory by concepts of coverture and community.

Zimmerman Link- Deep ecologies unity paradigm enables capitalism to spread (Need a
cap bad impact? )
In the present climate of stingy government, many environmental groups are obliged to find wealthy
private donors, a source of funding that is tapped with varying degrees of reluctance but is always a
potent threat to their democratic vision and political integrity. 45 Some groups with allegiance to deep
ecology have specialized very strongly in courting the "deep pocket," the wealthy individual who can
be converted to the ecological cause and whose generosity finances campaigns and protects "special"
lands from the much-praised efficiencies of the market. Reliance on this strategy has a demonstrated
potential to defuse or blunt opposition to and engagement with the general system of nature
commodification and property formation that capitalism represents, but most groups see it as a
temporary expedient justified by their sense of urgency and desire to save as much as possible within
the existing framework, rather than as an ideal situation. But a deeper and more systematic
ideological commitment to this and other elite-supporting strategies seems to be emerging in the
political theory of "evolutionary liberalism," based upon deep ecology's dominant unity interpretation
and its narrow focus on individual consciousness change. This is a commitment to defending
capitalism and refusing any critique or systematic modification of the institutions of property that
have commodified the Earth in favor of accepting the political coverture of nature and strategies
aimed at the ecological enlightenment of the Man of Property. Thus the final pages of Zimmerman's Contesting Earth's
Future reach the conclusion that the best the ecologically challenged can legitimately hope for, given the political constraints of supporting
"individuality" his argument defends, is some eventual development toward Atman consciousness on the part of a few rare and privileged
individuals (who, if they are going to be able to make a difference in the real world of ecological destruction, will need to be not only
ecologically enlightened but powerful as well). Those deep ecology theorists who employ the unity interpretation in
this way are developing an account that is in deep complicity with the system of commodification of
nature and its founding fathers. If Zimmerman explicitly deplores any casting of ecological aspersions
on the sanctity of private property and holds out as the best hope for ecological salvation the
conversion of more billionaires to deep ecology, diZerega's Green Jeffersonian model of the ecologically enlightened family
landholder is in danger of offering a Jeffersonian solution in the fullest sense. The ecologically enlightened Man of Property
seems to be envisaged on the model of Thomas Jefferson the slave master. For those familiar with Jefferson the
rhetorician of republican freedom and revolutionary equality, it is an everlasting irony that, although he may have been a better master than
most, 46 Jefferson nevertheless resisted freeing his slaves and never gave up the institutional power to abuse, despite his strictures on the
effect of such power on the slave master's character.47 In such a "Jeffersonian" model, nature would occupy a
position in the ecologically enlarged household of the Man of Property similar to the wife, the slave,
or the indentured servant. The enlightened landholder will take care of the interests of the land as
part of a sphere of familial harmony, protected, like the family, from the necessary if distasteful
drama of capitalism going on outside the boundaries of the estate. A more realistic account would
recognize that individual enlightenment and goodwill are not enough; that nature, as well as women
and slaves, requires institutional protection and guarantees which involve major modifications to the
concept, formation, and distribution of property itself.

Capitalism generates internal contradictions erupting in imperialism, nuclear war, and
ecocide
Foster 5 John Bellamy Foster, professor of sociology at the University of Oregon, "Naked Imperialism,"
Monthly Review, Vol. 57 No. 4, 2005 jss
From the longer view offered by a historical-materialist critique of capitalism, the direction that would be taken by U.S. imperialism following
the fall of the Soviet Union was never in doubt. Capitalism by its very logic is a globally expansive system. The
contradiction between its transnational economic aspirations and the fact that politically it remains
rooted in particular nation states is insurmountable for the system. Yet, ill-fated attempts by individual
states to overcome this contradiction are just as much a part of its fundamental logic. In present world
circumstances, when one capitalist state has a virtual monopoly of the means of destruction, the
temptation for that state to attempt to seize full-spectrum dominance and to transform itself into the
de facto global state governing the world economy is irresistible. As the noted Marxian philosopher Istvn Mszros
observed in Socialism or Barbarism? (2001)written, significantly, before George W. Bush became president: [W]hat is at stake
today is not the control of a particular part of the planetno matter how largeputting at a disadvantage but still
tolerating the independent actions of some rivals, but the control of its totality by one hegemonic economic and
military superpower, with all meanseven the most extreme authoritarian and, if needed, violent
military onesat its disposal. The unprecedented dangers of this new global disorder are revealed in
the twin cataclysms to which the world is heading at present: nuclear proliferation and hence
increased chances of the outbreak of nuclear war, and planetary ecological destruction. These are
symbolized by the Bush administrations refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to limit nuclear weapons development and by its
failure to sign the Kyoto Protocol as a first step in controlling global warming. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense (in the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations) Robert McNamara stated in an article entitled Apocalypse Soon in the MayJune 2005 issue of Foreign Policy: The
United States has never endorsed the policy of no first use, not during my seven years as secretary or since. We have been and remain
prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weaponsby the decision of one person, the presidentagainst either a nuclear or
nonnuclear enemy whenever we believe it is in our interest to do so. The nation with the greatest conventional military
force and the willingness to use it unilaterally to enlarge its global power is also the nation with the
greatest nuclear force and the readiness to use it whenever it sees fitsetting the whole world on
edge. The nation that contributes more to carbon dioxide emissions leading to global warming than
any other (representing approximately a quarter of the worlds total) has become the greatest obstacle to addressing
global warming and the worlds growing environmental problemsraising the possibility of the
collapse of civilization itself if present trends continue.

Convoluted
Deep ecology is an eclectic combination of too many philosophies for it to be useful
By reflecting on Deep Ecology we can cull a few lessons for environmental philosophy in general. Our first task is to characterize the subject
matter at hand, and Deep Ecology presents a problem right away, due to the eclectic diversity of its acolytes:
connections have been made between Deep Ecology and ecological science? Christianity, Eastern
religions, ecological feminism, new age mysticism, the forewarnings of Aldo Leopold and Rachel Carson,
the poetry of Robinson Jeffers, the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza and Martin Heidegger, and more.
Regrettably, this wealth of perspective proves burdensome; it is hard to see what the unique "deep
ecological" converging point is of all these various bodies of thought. As one commentator has put it,
Anyone who attempts to reconcile Heidegger's with Leopold's contributions to deep ecology finds the
going rugged" (Oelschlaeger 1991, 304).
Self Realization Fails

No real alternative to the status quo, alternative will result in violence because of
friction within the group
Taylor 2000, professor of religion and nature, environmental ethics, and environmental studies, at the
University of Florida (Bron , Deep Ecology and Its Social Philosophy, Beneath the Surface : Critical Essays
in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology, MIT Press, Beneath the Surface : Critical Essays in the Philosophy of
The failure of many deep ecology advocates to appreciate such complexity signals either social-
scientific navet or interpretive hubris. The latter is highly ironic, for in other important ways, bioregional deep ecologists
express an unusual and laudable humility. Even though it is difficult, if not impossible, to escape
anthropocentrism, 32 the effort to do so, and the claim that all life has value apart from its usefulness
to human beings, is a salutary act of moral imagination, perhaps even a spiritual insight. Such humility is
morally praiseworthy: Willingness to consider equally the interests of others (sometimes even above one's own) is widely and properly
recognized as virtuous. Individuals involved in deep ecology movements do, generally speaking, make significant sacrifices (at least as
conventionally understood) in their efforts to promote sustainability through lifestyle simplification and political action. They express a
commendable humility when they insist that ecosystems are more complex than we can know, deducing
from this a powerful rationale for precautionary principles that demand the protection of all ecosystem types as wilderness or biosphere
reserves. Yet such humility often evaporates when deep ecology advocates turn their attention to
political and economic systems. This is ironic, partly because dualistic distinctions, such as summarized in table
14.1, seem incongruent with the holistic, antidualistic metaphysics endorsed by most deep ecologists.
Given such holism, it is surprising how often deep ecology advocates articulate or otherwise express
dualistic beliefs to the effect that some such systems are "unnatural." 33 Equally ironic is that many such holistic
thinkers fail to apprehend that, because political and economic systems are embedded in ecosystems, they are also highly complex.
Complexity suggests more than a suspicion of monocausal explanations for social reality. It
underscores the difficulty of identifying the relative importance of the multiple variables contributing
to social realities and social transformations. An understanding of socioeconomic systems as aspects
of even more complex living systems clarifies why it is often difficult for scholars or activists to discern
which strategies might best effect the desired transformations. An understanding of political
complexity would lead to greater humility when making tactical and strategic recommendations, and
less antipathy towardthose with similar goals but differing political judgments about how best to
pursue them. This is not an abstract point. Those well acquainted with internal politics among
environmentalists know how common it is for strategic disagreements to devolve into
counterproductive brawls.

Bioregionalism from the alternative would lead to transition wars and violence and
rein scribe an imperial order on the world
Taylor 2000, professor of religion and nature, environmental ethics, and environmental studies, at the
University of Florida (Bron , Deep Ecology and Its Social Philosophy, Beneath the Surface : Critical Essays
in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology, MIT Press, Beneath the Surface : Critical Essays in the Philosophy of
We have already reviewed the extent to which deep ecology has fused with bioregionalism. Much
bioregional theorizing has focused on the difficulties involved in demarcating bioregions. We can see that
such difficulties are not insuperable, however, when we recognize that bioregional provinces are necessarily also cultural zones; they are social
constructions, not just ecological realities. If they are to become governance units, they must be contested and negotiated.55 Another problem
identified by political scientists is that "States in a world organized along bioregional lines would be more prone to conflicts rooted in
differences in identity and traditions."56 The explosion of violence that attended the bioregional breakup of the
Soviet Union certainly intensified this critique. It is worth noting, moreover, that "The designers of the American Constitution
were keenly aware of the [dangers of the bioregional] Europeanpattern and . . . were determined to avoid and counteract [regional conflicts by
relying on] unnatural borders." 57 It is not clear, however, that in the long run and on every continent and
during every era, violence and conflict would be greater under bioregional forms of political
organization than under political units drawn according to bioregional differences. Fear of balkanization raises
important concerns, but a universal condemnation of bioregional polity does not logically follow. Gary Snyder, for example, would likely point
to anthropologist A. L. Kroeber's work which shows that Native Americans have usually lived peacefully, largely in differing bioregional
provinces.58 A more trenchant problem is how bioregionalists (and the anarchists who influenced their
most influential theorists) often assume that people are naturally predisposed (unless corrupted by
life in unnatural, hierarchical, centralized, industrial societies) to cooperative behavior.59 This debatable
assumption appears to depend more on radical environmental faith, a kind of Paul Shepard-style mythologizing, than on ecology or
anthropology. Unfortunately for bioregional theory, evolutionary biology shows that not only cooperation promotes species survival; so also, at
times, does aggressive competitiveness.60 Based on its unduly rosy view of the potential for human altruism, it is
doubtful that bioregionalism can offer sufficient structural constraints on the exercise of power by
selfish and well-entrenched elites. It should be obvious, for example, that nation-state governments
will not voluntarily cede authority.61 Any political reorganization along bioregional lines would likely
require "widespread violence and dislocation."62 Few bioregionalists seem to recognize this likelihood,
or how devastating to nature such a transitional struggle would probably be. Moreover, making an important
but often overlooked point about political power, political theorist Daniel Deudney warns: The sizes of the bioregionally based
states would vary greatly because bioregions vary greatly. This would mean that some states would be
much more powerful than others [and] it is not inevitable that balances of power would emerge to
constrain the possible imperial pretensions of the larger and stronger states.63 Andrew Bard Schmookler, in his
critique of utopian anarchism, has raised a kindred concern. In The Parable of the Tribes: The Problem of Power in Social Evolution, he criticized
anarchists (and their relatively moderate bioregional progeny) for ignoring a specific problem of power.64 He asked: How can good
people prevent being dominated by a ruthless few, and what will prevent hierarchies from emerging if
decentralized political self-rule is ever achieved? One does not have to believe all people are bad to
recognize that not all people will be good, he argued; and unless bad people all become good, there is
no solution to violence other than some kind of government to restrain the evil few. Schmookler elsewhere
noted that those who exploit nature gather more power to themselves. How, then, can we restrain such power? There
must be a government able to control the free exercise of power, Schmookler concluded.

Generic
Deep Ecology fails, four reasons
In spite of Deep Ecology's noteworthy accomplishments, I hesitate to call myself a deep ecologist, in the orthodox sense I have
outlined, for four overlapping reasons. First, in reaction against our culture's radical anthropocentrism,
Deep Ecology goes too far the other way in denying any difference in value among biota. The result is
that the possibility of all ethical decision making is precluded. Second, while it is certain that we need ideals to aim at
(even if there is-no chance of achieving them), I think Deep Ecology's theme of holism (namely the expansionary holism of self-
realization) is overly optimistic and ignores the reality of politics. In a synthesis of all individuals to one
great ecological Self, multitudinous and disparate interests magically become unified. Unfortunately the
path to this utopia is foggy and dark, because it is dubious true interests could ever be agreed upon. In
situations where conflicts of interest arise, usually individuals or groups of individuals who claim to
represent "the true interests of the whole" are - ridiculed as egoists and self-servers by those with
opposing claims. Expansionary holism is an inadequate model for politics, and politics is an integral part
of environmental ethics. However, that political and ecological wholes are comprised of discrete entities with incompatible and
competing interests' does not mean that there necessarily must be more than one ethical system. ideally, one ethical system should handle the
moral considerability of all concerned organisms. As several ecophilosophers have pointed out, to be coherent, environmental ethics must not
be-'pluralistic. Third, in order to affirm the ontological interconnectedness of human and ' nonhuman
organisms with each other and with the nonliving environment, it is not essential to embrace the
thorough-going holism of self-realization. As Richard Sylvan notes in his caustic but brilliant critique of Deep Ecology, the
recognition that individuals are not absolutely discrete but interconnected does not entail the
conclusion that all relations are internal and in reality no individuals exist: ...it is quite unnecessary to go
the full metaphysical distance to extreme holism, to the shocker that there are no separate things in the
world, no wilderness to traverse or for Muir to save. A much less drastic holism suffices for these purposes. (1985, 10)
Fourth, Deep Ecology suffers from its concomitant yet incompatible themes of equality and holism. If holism
is to be genuinely affirmed, egalitarianism must be forsworn. This is one of the basic tenets of J. Baird Callicott's
environmental philosophy, In his words, "The land ethic manifestly does not accord equal moral worth to each and
every member of the biotic community" (Callicott 1980, 327).

Deep Ecology steps past a realistic line as an ecological theory
Third, in order to affirm the ontological interconnectedness of human and ' nonhuman organisms with each other and with the nonliving
environment, it is not essential to embrace the thorough-going holism of self-realization. As Richard Sylvan notes in his caustic but brilliant
critique of Deep Ecology, the recognition that individuals are not absolutely discrete but interconnected does
not entail the conclusion that all relations are internal and in reality no individuals exist: ...it is quite
unnecessary to go the full metaphysical distance to extreme holism, to the shocker that there are no
separate things in the world, no wilderness to traverse or for Muir to save. A much less drastic holism
suffices for these purposes. (1985, 10) Fourth, Deep Ecology suffers from its concomitant yet incompatible themes of equality
and holism. If holism is to be genuinely affirmed, egalitarianism must be forsworn. This is one of the basic tenets of J. Baird Callicott's
environmental philosophy, In his words, "The land ethic manifestly does not accord equal moral worth to each and every member of the biotic
community" (Callicott 1980, 327). To sum up, the contribution of Deep Ecology to environmental philosophy is the recognition that nonhumans
have intrinsic value. But a workable environmental ethic can be founded on neither biocentric equality nor
thoroughgoing holism. To have an ethic, we need an ontology which recognizes gradations of intrinsic
value between different organisms (most pointedly, between humans and nonhumans). In addition, we
need an ontology which recognizes that ecosystems are wholes comprised of interconnected individual
organisms with often incompatible and competing interests. The lesson is that the-ontological
foundation for environmental ethics must be nonegalitarian and polycentric.

No Alternative solvency - Deep ecology ignores difference and vital interests of other
animals and beings, some beings dont eat grass.
Nevertheless, Reed's critique of Naess points up some important problems and tensions in the use of
identity as the foundation for an environmental ethic. On first glance, Naess's account does not seem to appeal
either to fusion or to egoismsince we are supposed to defend not the self but the big Self as "the totality of our identifications." But, says
Reed, there seem to be inconsistent requirements hidden here: we are supposed to retain a sense of
our individuality as we work to save the big Self from destruction but at the same time we are
supposed to lose interest in our individuality as we cultivate our identification with the big Self. 7 We are
required to be egoists and also not egoists, to retain the intensity and defense drive of egoism, but also to abandon certain key differentiations
between ourselves and others, in order to establish that equivalence between self and other which enables a transfer of our self-regarding
motives. Naess's position, on closer inspection, ultimately is based on a kind of self-interest and upon a
form of fusion or expulsion of difference taking the form, as Naess explains in his reply, of identity of interests.
"Identification" writes Naess, is a process "through which the supposed interests of another being are spontaneously reacted to as our own
interests."8 Selves may not be fused, but interests are, and the other is included ethically to the extent that a kind of equivalence to self is
established through identification. But analysis in terms of interest identity won't enable us to dispense with
difference. We may identify in solidarity with an animal, say a wombat, expressing our solidarity by
being willing to undertake political action on its behalf (working to remove it from "vermin" status, for example), but
we do not thereby acquire identical specific interests in eating grass, for example. Although we may
(as relational selves) assume the overarching interest of the other's general well-being and react to
that as bound up with our own, it is crucial to our being able to defend that well-being that we retain
a clear sense of the other as distinct beings with different, perhaps entirely different, interests from
ours. We must attain solidarity with the other in their difference, and despite the ambiguity of the
term "identification," solidarity here cannot be interpreted as identity; solidarity and respect cannot
be understood as processes of overcoming or eliminating otherness or difference, and neither ethics
nor motivation can be derived from establishing ethical equivalence to self or from extending egoism
to a wider class of big Selves. Even though Reed goes on to develop his account of otherness in ways
that turn out to be rather problematic, he is, I think, importantly right on what I take to be his main
point: that an account based entirely on unity and identification with Self provides a problematic basis
for respect for the nonhuman world, and one particularly inadequate for those issues, such as
wilderness, where the otherness of nature is particularly salient and striking.

Deep ecology fails at spurring activism-the conflation between solidarity and unity
open it to exploitation and misuse
Naess's formulation of the basis of activism in terms of the ambiguous concept of "identification"
obscures the fact that the basic concept required for an appropriate ethic of environmental activism is
not that of identity or unity (or of its reversal in difference) but that of solidaritystanding with the
other in a supportive relationship in the political sense. But there are multiple possible bases for solidarity,
and the politics of solidarity is different from the politics of unity. Solidarity requires not just the
affirmation of difference but also sensitivity to the difference between positioning oneself with the
other and positioning oneself as the other, and this requires in turn the recognition and rejection of
oppressive concepts and projects of unity or merger. "Identification" has also made it easy for some
transpersonal ecologists to import into the concept of solidarity various problematic themes of
egoism, selfexpansion, and self-defense, along with a masculinist agenda of inferiorizing particular
emotional attachments and advocating a version of emotional detachment. 16 One of the main
difficulties with interpreting solidarity in terms of vaguely specified concepts of unity is that this
interpretation does not theoretically rule out some possibilities that ought to be ruled out. Oppressive
projects of unity abound in the human case, especially in the case of hegemonic relationships of
colonization. To the colonizing mentality, these projects of unity often appear in quite a different light
than they appear to the subordinated group; what appear to the colonizer as improvements or as
support appear as imposition and cultural destruction to the colonized. Recent Australian culture has provided
many examples, in the literary and artistic frauds perpetrated by people of settler culture pretending to be Aboriginal, of assimilating or
incorporating pro-jects of unity that deny the indigenous other's difference or transgress the other's boundaries. Some of those who
adopt these oppressive projects of unity lay claim to Aboriginal identity, culture, and knowledge on
the basis of alleged empathy, while others appear to regard indigenous culture as a free good,
available to all, and others still are clearly intent upon harm. But even where the motivation is
sympathetic, the oppressive and transgressive character of these projects of unity is fully evident to
the indigenous people concerned. Similarly, colonial history in Australia and elsewhere abounds in
projects of cultural assimilation of indigenous peoples that followed the attempt at genocide and that
had as their aim an oppressive form of unity, namely incorporation, in which the subordinated party is
produced as an inferiorized version of the dominant party or is denied any voice of its own. The
incorporative self uses unity in a hegemonic fashion to absorb the other or recreate them as a version
of the self. To the extent the colonizing project is one of self-imposition and appropriation (literally
"making self"), the incorporative self of the colonizing mind is insensitive to the other's independence
and boundaries, denying the other's right to define their own reality, name their own history, and
establish their own identity. 17 This insensitivity extends to include the other's epistemic boundaries; it
often assumes that the other is transparentthat they can be grasped and known as readily as the
selfor that they are too simple for anything to be hidden, to outrun the colonizer's knowledge. To the
incorporative self, the other can be taken (appropriated) for a benefit expressed exclusively in terms
of the self, of the one, about whose beginning and end we are encouraged to be unclear. These examples
show us that respect for the other requires recognizing their difference and boundariesnot claiming to be them or to encompass them.
Oppressive projects of unity like this can arise from the failure to distinguish unity (positioning the self as the
other) from solidarity (positioning the self with or in support of the other).Now I am not saying here, as some supporters of deep ecology
seem to think, that all deep ecologists or others who have theorized the basis of solidarity in terms of unity are selfish male chauvinist pigs, that
they all wish to incorporate nature into the self, or are all megalomaniacs aiming at control who take their own interests to be those of nature
or the universe at large18 (although in fact there are some who hold doctrines of unity who doone could argue that Walt Whitman in his later
stages was a good example, and there may be others attracted to this kind of theorization). Nor am I insisting that we must treat deep ecology
according to its worst possible interpretation, as the incorporative self. What I am saying is that assumptions of unity of interest
are especially liable to hegemonic interpretations, and that in the absence of a critical analysis of
power, they are open to co-optation by existing dominance orders and by the dominant Lockean
account and incorporative self upon which capitalism is based. And I think it can be given this
development in terms of elaborating more carefully a concept of solidarity with nature that does not
confuse solidarity with unity, the relational with the incorporative self. 19 Replacing the concept of
unity with that of solidarity would no doubt displease some deep disciples and displace some
alliances, but potential for a different set of alliances opens up as those with others are
deemphasized.20 Deep ecologists can learn much from feminist theory and anticolonial theory about how to undertake the theoretical
task of rejecting hyperseparation and elaborating a concept and ground for solidarity with nature distinct from unity, one that at the same time
allows us to affirm continuity and to respect nature's difference.

Solvency burden - Solving for the current ecological crisis requires a complete shift in
mindset from ignorance to activism
All our actions, and all our thoughts, even the most private, are politically relevant. If I use a clipped
tea leaf, some sugar, and some boiling water, and I drink the product, I am supporting the tea and
sugar prices and more indirectly I interfere in the works and capital conditions of the tea and sugar
plantations of the developing countries. In order to heat the water, I may have used wood or electricity or some other kind of
energy, and then I take part in the great controversy concerning energy use. I may use water from a private source or a public source, and in
either case I participate in a myriad of politically burning questions of water supply. I certainly have a political influence daily
in innumerable ways. If I reflect on all these things along ecological lines and make my opinions
known, I contribute to the strength of the politically conscious ecological movement. If I do nothing
instead of drinking the tea I normally drink I may contribute to the difficulties of the developing
countries because then their export becomes smaller. But perhaps not: I may think that they should not export tea but
rather produce more food and therefore I make it easier for the politicians of the developing countries to change their economic policies in the
direction of selfreliance. But to say that every action and every thought is politically relevant is not the same as to say that 'all is polities'.
Nothing is only political, and nothing is not at all political. Ecopolitics is concerned not only with
specifically ecological activity, but with every aspect of life. In principle, it is desirable that everyone in the ecological
movement engage in political activity. Many people whose vital need it is to live in Ecological movement cannot
avoid politics 131 nature, by nature, and for nature, do not make themselves felt in political life. This
is a great obstacle for those politicians who try hard to satisfy to some extent the needs of people
engaged in conservation of the planet. On the other hand there are plenty of jobs in
environmentalism which do not require any political participation beyond mere voting and similar
tasks.

Ethics DA

Deep ecology removes the need for moral systems of calculation this removes
consideration during action and eventually leads to nihilism and failure
Gardiner 07 (Anne Barbeau, Contributing Editor of the NOR, is Professor Emerita of English at John Jay
College of the City University of New York. Deep Ecology and the Culture of Death Proceedings of the
seventeenth University Faculty for Life conference at Villanova University, 2007 / edited by Joseph W.
Koterski., D.C. : University Faculty for Life, c2008. &)
Arne Naess has repeatedly said that he is not interested in ethics but rather in offering a new way of seeing the world.24 This new way is
called Self-realization, and it is the fundamental norm of deep ecology, the point around which all his ideas
coalesce. Even so, it has been left out of the eight-point platform. Self-realization means that a person identifies totally with the non-human
world. Once this identification is attained, Naess declares, it eliminates the need for a system of moral
obligation.25 Although we usually think of ourselves as experiencing the world, deep ecologists argue that the world is experiencing
itself. They claim that all things, including trees and rocks, experience each other in a web of relations. Naess sees organisms as
knots in the biospherical net or field of intrinsic relations,26 and claims that intuition is what makes us realize a world
that sees us before we see it, a world that is alive, self-aware, and full of strange presences like smiling trees, crying rocks and birds
conferring on the future of the planet.27 But what is the political purpose of Self-realization? Deep ecologists explain that
when we achieve the larger Selfwith a capital Sone that incorporates the ecosystem, we begin to defend the planet in Selfdefense, we
preserve natural processes and entities as an expression of our shared interests with the rest of creation.28 Once we realize that protecting
the ecosystem is Self-defense, there is no need for a system of morality. Our basic obligation now is to protect the natural
world spontaneously, as if we were shielding our flesh from a lethal attack. We can act spontaneously
out of a sense of urgency, because Self-defense carries within it its own moral justification. There is no
need for weighing and considering before acting, or for reflection and contrition afterwards. As a Self-
realized ecologist, Bill Devall calls it his right to defend a nature that has become part of my body.29 When traditional morality
has been subsumed into deep ecologys Self-realization and Self-defense of nature, the culture of
death will surely rule the earth. What criminal law will be able to punish infanticide if the action was
taken in so-called Self-defense of the ecosystem? Here we see how anarchic deep ecology may come to be in practice. For
should the doctrine of Self-defense be widely propagated, violent conflicts would erupt everywhere on behalf of the
ecosystem. Fanatics would claim that trees or streams were part of their own bodies. Human life would be of little value to
these zealots who even now believe that nature requires a substantial decrease in the size of our
population and who see no need for a system of morality like the Ten Commandments. According to deep
ecology, once Self-realization is achieved, the Self will do what the Self is. Ethics will follow from ontology. The Self
will no longer act because of what it believes, values, understands, or weighs in the balance of moral
and other considerations. In fact, it will no longer be possible for us to injure nature wantonly, as this would mean injuring an
integral part of ourselves.30 Note that it will be impossible for us to harm nature. How could that be without universal lobotomy or a
totalitarian regime? We contemplate the full meaning of Naesss Self-realization when we read Val Plumwoods shocking celebration of traitors
to the human race. Evidently she has already achieved Self-realization, because Plumwood has no qualms about praising those who assume
traitorous identities by identifying with non-humans against the human race: Traitorous kinds of human identity involve a revised conception
of the self and its relation to the nonhuman other, opposition to oppressive practices, and the relinquishment and critique of cultural
allegiances to the dominance of the human species and its bonding against nonhumans, in the same way that male feminism requires
abandonment and critique of male bonding as the kind of male solidarity which defines itself in opposition to the feminine or to women and of
the ideology of male supremacy.31 Plumwood honors these traitors to the human race because they do not flinch from contact with the pain
of oppressed others. She transforms the divine commandment, Love thy neighbor as thyself, into the deepecological commandment: Hate thy
neighbor as thyself for the sake of the nonhuman world.

There is a contradiction between deep ecologys holism and bio-centric equality,
species should be weighed by their utility for the ecosystem because of the potential
for humanity to restore the entire planet, the value of human lives is infinite, proving
the affs impacts have to be prioritized
Notwithstanding the intractable 'political problems posed by expansionary-type holism, holism is in fact totally inconsistent with
biocentric equality. Sadly, there is no way to realize both ideals; the distribution of equal intrinsic value
to all individual organisms is indefensible in light of real ecosystemic function. Innumerable and
irresolvable conflicts exist between the ability of individuals to flourish to old age, and the integrity and
stability of ecosystemic wholes. The welfare of the whole entails the premature death of individuals. The
problem of feral goats (Capra hircus) and feral pigs (Sus scrofa) in the Galapagos and Hawaiian Archipelagos provides clear-cut examples. The
Galapagos island of Pinta was free of introduced mammals until 1959, when a fisherman set loose three goats (one male and
two females) for the purpose of providing fresh meat on future trips. By 1970 the goat population on Pinta
was between five and ten thousand. In that short time the effects on native flora were astonishing: four species of endemic
plants were no longer found on the island (Alternanthera flavicoma, A. nudicaulis, Gossypium baradense, and Ipomoea
habeliana); five species (one endemic) were substantially reduced in abundance; six species of trees and shrubs
(four endemic) were absent in the heavily populated southernmost reaches A (Eckhardt 1972, 588). (On Espaola, ten species of plants
have disappeared since the arrival of goats [588]). Feral pigs not only damage vegetation, they dig up and eat the eggs of tortoises (Geochelone
elephantopus), marine and land iguanas (Amblyrhynchus cristatus and Conolophus cristatus), and Pacific green turtles (Chelonia mydas
aga.s'.s'izz' [Loope et al., 1988, 276]). In 1971 an eradication program began on Pinta, and by 1977 about forty
thousand goats had been killed (Hamann 1979, 219). The last goat was eliminated in 1986 (Loope et al., 1988, 275). The goats
had caused severe damage to a thick peat layer on the northern slope, soil erosion, and the permanent
disappearance of some plant species (Hamann 1979, 232). Overall, though, as a direct result of eliminating goats,
the flora of Pinta is showing clear signs of rapid regeneration (234). In Hawaii feral goals and pigs cause
similar ecological damage. Feral pigs, which weigh two hundred pounds or more, push over entire trees in order to rip
open and eat them (Burdick 1944, 55). This not only kills the trees and causes soil erosion but creates pools of standing water in which
the malarial mosquito (Culex quinquefasciatus) breeds (Loope et al., 1988, 276). In order to head off further damage,
eradication programs for feral mammals have also been instituted in Hawaii. The eradication of goats in Hawaii
Volcanoes and Haleakela National Parks includes the building of fences, organized hunts with helicopters and dogs, and releasing radio-collared
goats to help locate wild flocks (Stone and Keith 1987, 277-279). In Hawaii Volcanoes National Park, around seventy thousand goats were killed
between 1920 and 1970 (Loope et al., 1988 276). Pigs are also regularly hunted and killed (Stone and Keith 1987, 279-280; Burdick 1994, 55).
The point is that in both Galapagos and Hawaii, feral goats and pigs must be killed in order to ward off
the extinction of other species, species which are necessary for the overall integrity and stability of
these delicate tropical island ecosystems. (In North America hunting elk and deer is often cited as an ecologically beneficial
practice, because it controls overpopulation in wolf-free ranges.) In an ecosystem the flourishing of some species is
incompatible with the flourishing of other species, and the flourishing of all species is incompatible with
the health of the entire ecosystem. How is the egalitarian holist going to recognize the intrinsic value
and right to flourish of individual Capra hircus and Ipomoea habeliana, or Sus scrofa and Geochelone elephantopus? It is
impossible. In the last analysis, the principle of biocentric equality is inconsistent with metaphysical holism.
Regard for ecosystemic wholes requires treating individuals differently, since individuals of different
species have unequal ecosystemic utility (or disutility). Value differs accordingly. The inclusion of both
principles of biocentric equality and metaphysical holism in an ethical theory produces a discordant
friction. One principlpe must be abandoned.

The system of ecological egalitarianism in Deep Ecology makes judging action or ethics
impossible
Unfortunately, it is difficult to see how strident axiological egalitarianism can be of any use in situations of
conflicting interests. If the only type of value relevant: to moral dilemmas is equivalent, then on what
basis are prescriptions to be made? In the end the principle of biocentric equality renders Deep Ecology
impotent as an ethical theory, since the kind of value distinctions useful in evaluating moral situations is deliberately rebuffed. It
must be pointed out that Naess and Sessions claim not to be interested in ethical theory, because they believe the psychological realization of
metaphysical holism, which we will come to shortly, makes ethics superfluous. (Naess: "I'm not much interested in ethics or morals. Im
interested in how we experience the world. . .; Sessions: "The search. ..is not for environmental ethics but for ecological consciousness" (quoted
in Fox 1990, 219 and 225). Yet it is difficult to think Deep Ecology does not have a strong normative thrust! Unless some gradations of
value are acknowledged, as in a Callicottian, Ferran, or Rolstonian environmental ethic, the prospect for making
nonnative judgments about environmental problems seems hopelessly bleak. For this reason, not all people who
claim to advocate deep ecology embrace biocentric equality. The Australian philosopher Warwick Fox has argued that the leveling
axiology of orthodox Deep Ecology ought to be scrapped. Fox notes that if all organisms really are of
equal intrinsic worth, the deep ecological doctrine might just as well eat veal as vegetables (Fox 1984, 198).
In reality, Fox predicts, deep ecologists probably tend to be vegetarians, because-in Alan Watts's memorable words-"cows scream
louder than carrots" (Fox 1984, 198)." "Orthodox Deep Ecology, Fox declares, does itself a disservice by
employing a definition of anthropocentrism which is so overly exclusive that it condemns more or less
any theory of value that attempts to guide 'realistic praxis'... Unless deep ecologists take up this
challenge and employ a workable definition of anthropocentrism, they may well become known as the
advocates of 'Procrustean Ethics' as they attempt to fit all organisms to the same dimensions of intrinsic
value. (Fox 1984, I98-199)

All biota have intrinsic value, but treating those values as equal is a poor decision
making standard
Fox, of course, does not want to be known as a Procrustean Ethicist, and ends up arguing for a position which abandons
biocentric equality and alternatively asserts that all biota have intrinsic value, although Fox has identified himself
as a deep ecology is certainly not orthodox Deep ecology. Philosophy is closer to Ferr than Sessions. In a focused effort to avoid any vestige of
a human-oriented value Naess continues to resist any gradation or differentiation of intrinsic value among organisms. In response to Fox, Naess
says that some intrinsic values may differ, but not the kind he talks about. He and Fox, says Naess, "probably do not speak about the same
intrinsic view" (Naess 1984, 2(2). Naess reiterates his fundamental intuition that "living beings have a right, or an intrinsic or inherent value, or
value in themselves, that is the same for all of them" (202). For an environmental ethic to have any efficacy, it must
make discrimination in value between biota. In Bryan-Norton's words, "The 120,000" elk cannot be
treated equally with one of the last California condors -not, at least, on a reasonable environmental
ethic" (Norton 1991, 224). In short, the very possibility of environmental ethics predicated on the
possibility of a nonegalitarian value-theory.

Anthro turn
Turn - action taken to prevent ecological harm done by humans is the strongest form
of anthropocentrism exploitation and change are natural constructs a shift away
collapses into violence
Watson 83 -- Watson, Richard A. 1983. A Critique of Anti-Anthropocentric Biocentrism.
Environmental Ethics 5(3): 245256(Richard Watson is professor of philosophy at Washington University
in St. Louis and the author of several works in philosophy)
I do not intend to challenge the controversial naturalistic assumption that some such environmental ethic can be derived from ecological
principles and concepts. Whatever the logical problems of deriving value from fact, it is not (and probably never has been) a practical problem
for large numbers of people who base their moral convictions on factual premises. Nevertheless, it must be obvious to most careful readers
that the general position characterized in section 1 suffers from serious internal contradictions. I think they are so serious that the position
must be abandoned. In what follows I detail the problems that arise in the system, and then offer an alternative to the call for developing a new
ecosophic ethic. To go immediately to the heart of the matter, I take anti-anthropocentrism more seriously than do
any of the ecosophers I have quoted or read. If man is a part of nature, if he is a plain citizen, if he is
just on non-privileged member or a biospherical egalitarianism, then the human species should be
treated in no way different from any other species. However, the entire tone of the position outlined in section 1 is to set
man apart from nature and above all other living species. Naess says that nonhuman animals should be cared for in
part for their own good. Sessions says that humans should curb their technological enthusiasms to
preserve ecological equilibrium. Rodman says flatly that man should let nature be. Now, the posing of man against
nature in any way is anthropocentric. Man is a part of nature. Human ways-human culture-and human actions are as
natural as are the ways in which any other species of animals behaves. But if we view the state of nature or Nature as
being natural, undisturbed, and unperturbed only when human beings are not present, or only when
human beings are curbing their natural behavior, then we are assuming that human beings are apart
from, separate from, different from, removed from, or above nature. It is obvious that the ecosophy described
above is based on this position of setting man apart from or above nature. (Do I mean even sordid and perverted human behavior? Yes,
that is natural, too.) To avoid this separation of man from nature, this special treatment of human beings
as other than nature, we must stress that man's works (yes, including H-bombs and gas chambers) are
as natural as those of bower birds and beavers. But civilized man wreaks havoc on the environment.
We disrupt the ecology of the planet, cause the extinction of myriad other species of living things, and
even alter the climate of the Earth. Should we not attempt to curb out behavior to avoid these
results? Indeed we should as a matter of prudence if we want to preserve our habitat and guarantee
the survival of our species. But this is anthropocentric thinking. Only if we are thinking anthropocentrically will we set
the human species apart as the species that is to be thwarted in its natural behavior. Anti-anthropocentric biocentrists suggest that other
species are to be allowed to manifest themselves naturally. They are to be allowed to live out their evolutionary potential in interaction with
one another. But man is different. Man is too powerful, too destructive of the environment and other species,
too successful in reproducing, and so on. What a phenomenon is man! Man is so wonderfully bad that he is not to be allowed
to live out his evolutionary potential in egalitarian interaction with all other species. Why not? The only reason is
anthropocentric. We are not treating man as a plain member of the biotic community. We are not treating the human species as an
equal among other species.We think of man as being better than other animals, or worse, as the case may be,
because man is so powerful. One reason we think this is that we think in terms of an anthropocentric moral community. All
other species are viewed as morally neutral, their behavior is neither good nor bad. But we evaluate
human behavior morally.And this sets man apart. If we are to treat man as a part of nature on
egalitarian terms with other species, then man's behavior must be treated as morally neutral, too. It is
absurd, of course, to suggest the opposite alternative, that we evaluate the behavior of nonhuman
animals morally. Bluntly, if we think there is nothing morally wrong with one species taking over the habitat of another and eventually
causing the extinction of the dispossessed species-as has happened millions of times in the history of the Earth-then we should not
think that there is anything morally or ecosophically wrong with the human species dispossessing and
causing the extinction of other species. Man's nature, his role, his forte, his glory and ambition has been to propagate and
thrive at the expense of many other species and to the disruption- or, neutrally, to the change-of the planet's ecology. I do not want to
engage in speculation about the religion of preliterate peoples, or in debates about the interpretation of documented non-Judeo-Christian-
Platonic-Aristotelian religions. I am skeptical, however, of the panegyrics about pantheism and harmonious integration with sacred Nature. But
these speculations do not matter. The fact is that for about 50,000 years human beings(Homo sapiens) have been advancing like wildfire (to use
an inflammatory metaphor) to occupy more and more of the planet. A peak of low-energy technology was reached about 35,000 years ago at
which time man wiped out many species of large animals. About 10,000 years ago man domesticated plants and animals and started changing
the face of the Earth with grazing, farming, deforestation, and desertification. About 200 years ago man started burning fossil fuels with results
that will probably change the climate of the planet (at least temporarily) and that have already resulted in the extinction of many species of
living things that perhaps might otherwise have survived. In 1945 man entered an atomic age and we now have the ability to desertify large
portions of the Earth and perhaps to cause the extinction of most of the higher forms of life. Human beings do alter things. They
cause the extinction of many species, and they change the Earth's ecology. This is what humans do.
This is their destiny. If they destroy many other species and themselves in the process, they do no
more than has been done by many another species. The human species should be allowed-if any
species can be said to have a right-to live out its evolutionary potential, to its own destruction if that
is the end result. It is nature's way. This is not a popular view. But most alternative anti-anthropocentric biocentric arguments
for preserving nature are self-contradictory. The only way man will survive is if he uses his brains to save himself. One reason why we should
curb human behavior that is destructive of other species and the environment is because in the end it is destructive of the human species as
well. I hope it is human nature to survive because we are smart. But those who appeal for a new ethic or religion or ecosophy based on an
intuitive belief that they know what is right not only for other people, but also for the planet as a whole, exhibit the hubris that they themselves
say got us in such a mess in the first place. If the ecosphere is so complicated that we may never understand its workings, how is it that so many
ecosophers are so sure that they know what is right for us to do now? Beyond the issue of man's right to do whatever he can according to the
power-makes-right ecosophic ethic outlined by Naess, we may simply be wrong about what is good for the planet. Large numbers of
species have been wiped out before, e.g., at the time the dinosaurs became extinct. Perhaps wiping
out and renewal is just the way things go. Of course, a lot of genetic material is lost, but presumably all the species that ever
existed came out of the same primordial soup, and could again. In situations where genetic material was limited, as in
the Galapagos Islands or Australia, evolutionary radiation filled the niches. Even on the basis of our
present knowledge about evolution and ecology, we have little ground to worry about the
proliferation of life on Earth even if man manages to wipe out most of the species now living. Such a
clearing out might be just the thing to allow for variety and diversity. And why is it that we harp about genetic banks
today anyway? For one thing, we are worried that disease might wipe out our domesticated grain crops. Then where would man be? Another
obvious anthropocentric element in eco-sophic thinking is the predilection for ecological communities of great internal variety and complexity.
But the barren limestone plateaus that surround the Mediterranean now are just as much in
ecological balance as were the forests that grew there before man cut them down. And dead Lake
Erie is just as much in ecological balance with the life on the land that surrounds it as it was in pre-
Columbian times. The notion of a climax situation in ecology is a human invention, based on anthropocentric ideas of variety,
completion, wholeness, and balance. A preference for equilibrium rather than change, for forests over deserts, for complexity and variety over
simplicity and mono culture, all of these are matters of human economics and aesthetics. What would it be, after all, to think
like a mountain as Aldo Leopold is said to have recommended? It would be anthropocentric because
mountains do not think, but also because mountains are imagined to be thinking about which human
interests in their preservation or development they prefer. The anthropocentrism of ecosophers is
most obvious in their pronouncements about what is normal and natural. Perhaps it is not natural to
remain in equilibrium, to be in ecological balance. As far as that goes, most of the universe is apparently dead-or at least
inanimate- anyway. And as far as we know, the movement of things is toward entropy. By simplifying
things, man is on the side of the universe. And as for making a mess of things, destroying things,
disrupting and breaking down things, the best information we have about the origin of the universe is
that it is the result of an explosion. If we are going to derive an ethic from our knowledge of nature, is
it wrong to suggest that high-technology man might be doing the right thing? Naess does try to meet this
objection with his tenth principle: 10 There is nothing in human nature or essence, according to Spinoza, which can only manifest or express
itself through injury to others. That is, the striving for expression of one's nature does not inevitably imply an
attitude of hostile domination over other beings, human or non-human. Violence, in the sense of
violent activity, is not the same as violence as injury to others.14 But injury is a human moral concept. There is
no injury to others in neutral nature. Naess and Spinoza are still bound by Judeo-Christian-Platonic-Aristotelian notions of human
goodness. But to call for curbing man is like trying to make vegetarians of pet cats. I have often been puzzled about why so many
environmental philosophers insist on harking to Spinoza as a ground for environmental ethics. It is perfectly plain as Curley and Lloyed point out
that Spinoza's moral views are humanistic. They show how difficult it is to reconcile Spinoza's sense of freedom as the recognition of necessity
with any notion of autonomy of self that is required to make moral imperatives or morality itself meaningful. That is, to recognize and accept
what one is determined to do even if this recognition and acceptance were not itself determined is not the same as choosing between two
equally possible (undetermined) coursed of action. Moral action depends on free choice among undetermined alternatives.

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