CrimPro Cases - Rule 113

Rule 113 Criminal Procedure | Page 1 of 43
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 87429 August 27, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REGALADO BATI accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ildefonso B. Malveda for accused-appellant.

PARAS, J.:
Upon being informed by their civilian informer, at around 5:30 o'clock in the
afternoon of July 27, 1986, that there would be a transaction involving the buying
and selling of marijuana which would take place on that same day at the Doa
Crispina Park Subdivision in Barangay Bagong Bayan, San Pablo City, Patrolmen Jose
Luciano, Angelito Caraan, Nelson Dimatulac and Democrito Cuenca immediately
proceeded to the vicinity where the alleged transaction would take place. Cuenca
and Dimatulac were dispatched by Luciano to the Bolante Section of the public
market near the railroad tracks while Luciano himself together with Caraan riding in
a police jeepney proceeded to the Doa Crispina Park.
1

When Luciano and Caraan reached the place where the alleged transaction would
take place and while positioned at a street corner, they saw appellant Regalado Bati
and Warner Marquez by the side of the street about forty to fifty meters away from
them (the police officers). They saw Marquez giving something to Bati, who,
thereafter, handed a wrapped object to Marquez who then inserted the object
inside the front of his pants infront of his abdomen while Bati, on his part, placed
the thing given to him inside his pocket. (pp. 5-7, tsn., Luciano, Aug. 25, 1987; p. 5,
tsn., Caraan, Nov. 3, 1987; pp. 1-2, Decision, January 31, 1988)
As soon as the above observed transaction was completed, Bati and Marquez
parted ways. Luciano and Caraan in their jeepney followed Marquez who was riding
a bicycle. The police officers were able to catch up with him (Marquez) along the
circular street going toward the general direction of the national highway. Marquez
was questioned by them and, at first, denied having received anything from Bati
However, upon being asked about what he had inside the front of his pants, he
brought out an object wrapped in newspaper. Stripped of the wrappings, the object
turned out to be a pink plastic bag containing marijuana. Marquez then told the
police officers that he had bought marijuana for P190.00 from Bati. Whereupon
Marquez was arrested on the spot and was made to board the police jeep. (pp. 7-8,
tsn., Luciano, Aug. 25, 1987; p. 6, tsn., Caraan, Nov. 3, 1987; p. 2, Decision, January
31, 1988).
Luciano and Caraan on board the jeep, immediately gave chase and caught up with
Bati at the Bolante section. Luciano went down the vehicle and confronted Bati who
admitted to the police officers present that he sold the marijuana to Marquez for
P190,00. Bati then was likewise arrested and made to board the police jeep. The
money in the amount of P190.00 in Bati's possession was confiscated. Both Bati and
Marquez were brought to the Police station where, again, they admitted they were
in the buying and selling of the confiscated marijuana (pp. 8-10, tsn., Luciano, Aug.
25, 1987, pp. 6-7, tsn., Caraan, Nov. 3, 1987, p. 2, Decision, January 31, 1988).
Before the confiscated money in the amount of P190.00 was turned over to Sgt.
Bayani Yte, Chief of the Intelligence and Investigation Section of the San Pablo City
Police Station, Luciano, one of the arresting officers, affixed his initials "JBL" on the
said confiscated peso bills. The marijuana confiscated was likewise turned over to
Sgt. Yte and was personally delivered by Patrolman Nelson Dimatulac to the PC
Came Laboratory in Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. The examination
conducted by the Forensic Chemist, P/Lt. Rosalinda Royales, revealed that the
confiscated specimen was positive for marijuana. (p. 9, tsn., Royales, July 21, 1987;
pp. 10-11, tsn., Luciano, Aug. 25, 1987; pp. 3-9, tsn., Yte, Dec. 8, 1987; p. 2,
Decision, Jan. 31, 1988).
In due course, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial
Region, Branch 30, San Pablo City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 4760-SP,
charging REGALADO BATI with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, committed as follows:
That on or about July 27, 1986, in the City of San Pablo, Republic
of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully

and feloniously distribute and sell dried marijuana leaves, a
dangerous drug, without being authorized by law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (15, Rollo)
After trial, following a plea of not guilty upon arraignment, the trial court entered a
judgment of conviction, the pertinent portion reading
The accused took the witness stand denying every damaging
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. He claimed he was then
on his way to buy vegetables for his mother at the time of his
arrest at 5:30 p.m. of July 27, 1986. The accused did not impress
the Court as a well behaved individual who does marketing for his
mother and wife. If he were really such a "good boy", why did
Marquez and the police officers fabricate the charge of drug
pushing against him? There was no ill-motive shown by the
defense on the part of Marquez and the police officers. As already
mentioned elsewhere, the accused admitted that he did not have
any quarrel with them. He likewise admitted that when he signed
the waiver before and in the presence of Atty. Vivencio H. Reyes,
he knew him to be a lawyer and was acting as his lawyer when he
explained to him his constitutional rights. (Hearing of September
20, 1987) It is also a matter of record that since his arrest,
detention and up to the trial of the case, he never executed any
written statement denying the charge against him narrating
therein that he was about to do marketing when arrested by the
police officers. Clearly, his alleged marketing is a mere after
thought. The defense was not convincing when it was alleged that
he does the marketing every afternoon buying the same
vegetables and quantity since July 27, 1986 up to the present. His
mother's testimony failed to convince the Court of his innocence.
In sum the prosecution overwhelmingly adduced material
evidence beyond reasonable doubt to warrant the conviction of
the accused for unlawfully selling and distributing marijuana as
against the lame denials of the accused. His denials are only self
serving negative evidence which cannot outweigh the positive
evidence of the prosecution (People vs. Jara, G.R, Nos. 61356-57,
September 30, 1986).
As the records show that the accused had violated the terms of
his bail for which reason his arrest was effected when he failed to
honor his commitment, the Court believes that he should no
longer be granted bail for his provisional liberty as the chances for
his jumping bail are very strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders
judgment finding the accused Regalado Bati guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, RA
No. 6425 as amended, without any modifying circumstance to
consider, hereby sentences him to suffer life imprisonment, to
pay the fine of P25,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay the costs.
The bail bond for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and
the accused be immediately incarcerated. (pp. 18-19, Rollo)
From the foregoing judgment of conviction, appellant came to this
Court assigning the following errors allegedly committed by the court a quo to wit:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND
THE SEIZURE/TAKING OF THE MONEY FROM HIM BY THE POLICE
OFFICERS WAS ILLEGAL AND UNLAWFUL BEING VIOLATIVE OF
ONE'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE SECURE IN HIS PERSON AND
PROPERTY AND THERETO WHATEVER EVIDENCE OBTAINED
THEREFROM WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE NON PRESENTATION OF THE ALLEGED BUYER
WARNER MARQUEZ AND THAT OF THE CIVILIAN INFORMER
AMOUNTED TO SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE WHOSE TESTIMONIES
IF PRESENTED WOULD PRODUCE ADVERSE EFFECTS TO THE
PROSECUTION'S CAUSE.

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES WERE
REPLETE WITH CONTRADICTION AND MATERIAL
INCONSISTENCIES WITH RESPECT TO THE MARIJUANA SPECIMEN
ADMITTEDLY TAKEN FROM THE ALLEGED BUYER WARNER
MARQUEZ AND NOT FROM THE HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT
WHICH DEFINITELY WILL NOT WARRANT CONVICTION OF THE
ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (pp. 2-3, Brief for the
Plaintiff-Appellee; p. 50, Rollo)
Appellant first contends that the arrest was not valid as the requirements for a
warrantless arrest were not complied with.
This contention is without merit.
Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules in Criminal Procedure clearly provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. A peace officer or
private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(emphasis supplied)
As the court a quo correctly ruled
It is the considered view of the Court that there was no need for
Luciano and Caraan to be armed with a warrant of arrest when
they arrested Marquez and the accused since they had personal
knowledge of the actual commission of the crime viz: They were
eyewitnesses to the illegal exchange of marijuana and P190.00
between Marquez and accused who were caught in flagrante
delicto. The facts and circumstances attendant precisely fall under
Sec. 5, (a), Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The
subsequent arrest of Marquez and accused were made under the
principle of "hot pursuit". The recovery of the marijuana from
Marquez and the P190.00 from accused by the said police officers
were not violative of their constitutional rights since Marquez and
the accused voluntarily surrendered them to the police officers.
But even for the sake of argument that the recovery of the
marijuana and peso bills were against the consent of Marquez and
accused, still, the search on their persons was incidental to their
valid warrantless arrest. For, the rule that searches and seizures
must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule.
There are at least three exceptions: (1) search incidental to an
arrest, (2) search of a moving vehicle and (3) seizure of evidence
in plain view (Manipon v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267). In the
case at bar, the searches made on Marquez and accused were
incidental to their valid arrest. (pp. 8-9, Brief for the Plaintiff-
Appellee; p. 50,Rollo)
Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation, the
policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend
the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest (People vs. Paco, 170 SCRA 681,
686; People vs. Rodriguez, 172 SCRA 742). And since appellant's arrest was lawful, it
follows that the search made incidental to the arrest was also valid. (Rule 126, Sec.
12, Rules of Court; Alvero vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637; People vs. Claudio G.R. No. 72564,
April 15, 1988)
Appellant next contends that the non-presentation of the alleged buyer Warner
Marquez and that of the civilian informer, amounted to suppression of evidence.
This contention is, likewise, without merit. In the case of People vs. Andiza (164
SCRA 642, 647) this Court held
The appellant underscores the fact that Pat. Hernandez and the
civilian informer were not made to take the witness stand, and
maintains that their non-presentation rendered a fatal blow to
the prosecution's case. We do not agree. Admittedly, Pat.
Hernandez and the civilian informer would be highly competent

witnesses, being, themselves, the poseurs-buyers: however, their
testimonies are not indispensable in view of the declarations of
not only one, but two other eyewitnesses. If presented, their
testimonies would merely constitute cumulative evidence, thus,
their non-presentation as witnesses does not mean suppression
of testimony that is adverse to the prosecution. (People vs. Extra,
No. L-29205, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 199, citing People v. Sigayan,
et al., Nos. L-18523-26, April 30, 1966,16 SCRA 844; People v.
Cristobal, No. L-13062, January 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 151; and People
v. Escalona No. L-13294, March 29, 1961, 1 SCRA 891). At any
rate, the matter of presenting witnesses for the People is a
prerogative of the prosecuting fiscal. In the instant case, there
was no need to present Pat. Hernandez because the testimonies
of Sgt. Raquidan and Pat. de la Cruz, together with those of Cpl.
Romeo Consengco and the forensic chemist, Daily Panganiban,
were already clear, sufficient, and convincing. Besides the defense
could have requested the court below to issue subpoenas
requiring the said eyewitnesses to testify, but as the defense
apparently failed to do that, they cannot now argue that said
eyewitnesses testimonies would have been adverse to the
prosecution. (pp. 16-17, Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee; p.
50, Rollo)
In the case at bar, there were other prosecution witnesses who testified and
positively Identified appellant as the principal participant in the illegal transaction.
Both Patrolmen Luciano and Caraan actually witnessed the same and their
testimonies were based on their actual and personal knowledge of the events that
took place leading to appellant's arrest. They may not have been within hearing
distance, specially since conversation would expectedly be carried on in hushed
tones, but they were certainly near enough to observe the movements of the
appellant and the buyer. Moreover, these prosecution witnesses are an law
enforcers and are, therefore, presumed to have regularly performed their duties in
the absence of proof to the contrary. (People vs. Agapito, G.R. No. 73786, Oct. 12,
1987)
Furthermore, We find the testimonies of the above eyewitnesses, given during the
direct as well as in the cross-examination, to be consistent and compatible on the
material points. Both Luciano and Caraan categorically stated that they saw
Marquez who then inserted the object inside the front of his pants infront of his
abdomen while Bati, on his part, placed the thing given to him inside his pocket.
Since the testimonies of Luciano and Caraan were not actuated by "improper
motives" they are entitled to "full faith and credit." (People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA
429; People vs. de Jesus, 145 SCRA 521).
Finally, anent the alleged inconsistencies like.
(a) in the information it is alleged on one hand that he was caught
distributing and selling marijuana leavesand likewise in the latter
request sent by Sgt. Bayani Yte to the Commanding Office of
Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, it was therein mentioned
that the marijuana leaves submitted for examination were
confiscated from Marquez, on the other hand, in the Chemistry
Report No. D-112-86, the Forensic Chemist Rosalinda Royales,
allegedly mentioned that the specimen submitted to her for
examination consisted ofmarijuana fruiting tops. (p. 9, Appellant's
Brief)
(b) The "conflicting versions" of Sgt. Yte and P/Lt. Rosalinda
Royales taken during cross-examination. Sgt. Yte testified that he
placed his initials both on the pink plastic bag and on the
newspaper used as wrapper. Royales, on the other hand, testified
that there were no markings whatever on the pink plastic bag.
Suffice it to state that these cannot serve to discredit the prosecution's case
considering that the trial court has decisively found that the specimen confiscated
from Marquez and submitted to the PC laboratory for examination consisted of
marijuana leaves with fruiting tops wrapped in newspaper and placed inside a pink
plastic bag. (p. 2, Decision) And the fact remains that the specimen indorsed by Sgt.
Yte to the PC laboratory was the very same one taken from Warner Marquez and
that after examination conducted by P/Lt. Royales, was positive for marijuana.
Thus, as aptly pointed out by the trial court
The defense contended that the specimen tested by the forensic
chemist was not the same one taken in the possession of the
accused and that Marquez did not Identify it. This claim is not
worthy of belief since themarijuana leaves with fruiting tops were
inside a pink plastic bag (Exh. 5-B) when brought by Dimatulac to
the PC crime laboratory and it was the same pink plastic bag
containing 17.1 grams of marijuana that was the subject matter
of the examination conducted by Sgt. Royales from which Exh. B
came into being. (p. 2, Decision; emphasis supplied)

(pp. 26-27, Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee; p. 50, Rollo)
The Court, after a careful study of the case finds the evidence presented by the
prosecution, upon which the trial court based its judgment of conviction, to be
overwhelmingly against the pretended innocence of the appellant and has proved
to a moral certainty the latter's guilt of the crime of selling prohibited drugs.
The penalty for the sale of marijuana is life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from P20,000 to P30,000 (Sec. 4, R.A. 6425, as amended by P.D. 1675)
The law is severe because those who are caught in the strangle hold of prohibited
drugs not only slide into the ranks of the living dead, what is worse, they become a
grave menace to the safety of the law-abiding members of society. (People vs.
Lamog, 172 SCRA 342, 349). As this Court also declared in People vs. Policarpio, 158
SCRA 85, "(P)eddlers of drugs are actually agents of destruction. They deserve no
less than the maximum penalty."
In the instant case, however, the trial court erred in not applying the rule that when
the penalty imposed is higher thanprision correccional no subsidiary imprisonment
shall be imposed upon the culprit. (Art. 39 (3) Revised Penal Code; People vs.
Andiza, 164 SCRA 642, 650).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED except that there shall be
no subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
With costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.


SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 93239 March 18, 1991
vs.
EDISON SUCRO, accused-appellant.
Fidencio S. Raz for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p
Edison Sucro was charged with and convicted of violation of Section 4, Article II of
the Dangerous Drugs Act, under an Information which reads:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 1989, in the evening, in
the Poblacion, Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic
of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, acting as a pusher or broker in
the business of selling, administering, delivery, giving away to
another and/or distributing prohibited drugs, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and without authority of law
have in his possession and control nineteen (19) pieces of
marijuana cigarette sticks and four (4) tea bags of dried marijuana
leaves which were confiscated from him by the police authorities
of Kalibo, Aklan, shortly after having sold one tea bag of dried
marijuana leaves to a customer. (Rollo, p. 9)
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of
"not guilty" to the offense charged. Trial ensued and a judgment of conviction was
rendered, the pertinent portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Edison
Sucro guilty of the sale of prohibited drug under Section 4, Article
II of the Dangerous Drug Act, as amended, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and pay a fine of P20,000,
and costs. He shall be entitled to full credit in the service of his
sentence with the period for which he has undergone preventive
imprisonment to the date of promulgation of this judgment. All
the items of marijuana confiscated in this case are declared
forfeited in favor of the State. (Rollo, p. 41)
From the foregoing judgment of conviction, accused-appellant interposes this
appeal, assigning the following as errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, to
wit:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION EXHIBITS "E"-"E-4", TEA BAGS OF ALLEGED
MARIJUANA, TO BE THE CORPUS DELICTI; FURTHERMORE, THAT
THE SAME WERE TAKEN WITHOUT THE REQUIRED WARRANT OF
SEARCH AND ARREST SINCE THE ACCUSED WAS NOT IN THE ACT
OF COMMITTING ANY OFFENSE AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED EDISON
SUCRO GUILTY OF THE SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUGS UNDER
SECTION 4, ARTICLE II, OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT AND
SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER A PENALTY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT
AND TO PAY A FINE OF P 20,000.00. (Appellant's Brief, p. 1)
The antecedent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor General are as
follows:
On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP,
Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station

Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities of
appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by
Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. (p. 6, TSN, May 2,1989).
As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio
Positioned himself under the house of a certain Arlie Regalado at
C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2
meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw
appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned out
later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found
inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed
the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant
went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which
he gave to a group of persons. (pp. 6-8, 15-18, Ibid). It was at this
instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported
the activity going on. P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to
continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat.
Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later
Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant.
(pp. 18-19, Ibid)
At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and
while the police officers were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St.,
Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and
appellant. P/Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante at
the crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan
Medical Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw
something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of
marijuana. (pp. 6-8, TSN, June 19, 1989) When confronted,
Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from
appellant (Edison Sucro) in front of the chapel. (p. 6, TSN, May 24,
1989) The police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant
at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered
19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the
chapel and another teabag from Macabante, The teabags of
marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at
Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens (Exhibits "G"
to "G-18", Exhibits "E" to "E-4") were all found positive of
marijuana. (pp. 47, TSN, Sept. 4, 1989)" (Appellee's Brief, pp. 3-6)
As can be seen from the facts, the issue hinges mainly on whether or not the arrest
without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently, whether or not the
evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.
We rule in the affirmative.
The accused-appellant contends that his arrest was illegal, being a violation of his
rights granted under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He stresses that
there was sufficient time for the police officers to apply for a search and arrest
warrants considering that Fulgencio informed his Station Commander of the
activities of the accused two days before March 21, 1989, the date of his arrest.
This contention is without merit.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances
where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:
Arrest without warrant, when lawful. A peace officer or private
person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; (Emphasis supplied)
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the
meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees
the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and
proceeds at once to the scene thereof. (U.S. v. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472 [1909]; and
U.S. v. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516 [1910])
The records show that Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado's house at C. Quimpo
Street to monitor the activities of the accused who was earlier reported to be
selling marijuana at a chapel two (2) meters away from Regalado's house.
Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity.
He saw Sucro talk to some persons, go inside the chapel, and return to them and

exchange some things. These, Sucro did three times during the time that he was
being monitored. Fulgencio would then relay the on-going transaction to P/Lt.
Seraspi.
Anent the second requirement, the fact that Macabante, when intercepted by the
police, was caught throwing the marijuana stick and when confronted, readily
admitted that he bought the same from accused-appellant clearly indicates that
Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just
committed an illegal act of which the police officers had personal knowledge, being
members of the team which monitored Sucro's nefarious activity.
The court earlier indicated in the case of People v. Bati (G.R. No. 87429, August 27,
1990) that police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the
crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused. Thus, it
stated:
When Luciano and Caraan reached the place where the alleged
transaction would take place and while positioned at a street
comer, they saw appellant Regalado Bati and Warner Marquez by
the side of the street about forty to fifty meters away from them
(the public officers). They saw Marquez giving something to Bati,
who, thereafter handed a wrapped object to Marquez who then
inserted the object inside the front of his pants in front of his
abdomen while Bati, on his part, placed the thing given to him
inside his pocket. (p. 2)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Both Patrolman Luciano and Caraan actually witnessed the
same and their testimonies were based on their actual and
personal knowledge of the events that took place leading to
appellant's arrest. They may not have been within hearing
distance, specially since conversation would expectedly be carried
on in hushed tones, but they were certainly near enough to
observe the movements of the appellant and the buyer.
Moreover, these prosecution witnesses are all law enforcers and
are, therefore, presumed to have regularly performed their duties
in the absence of proof to the contrary (People v.
Bati, supra citing People v. Agapito, G.R. No. 73786, October 12,
1987)
The accused questions the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant
considering that Fulgencio himself knew of Sucro's activities even prior to the
former's joining the police force. Fulgencio reported Sucro's activities only three
days before the incident.
As the records reveal, Fulgencio and Sucro had known each other since their
childhood years and that after Fulgencio joined the police force, he told the
accused-appellant not to sell drugs in their locality. Hence, it is possible that
because of this friendship, Fulgencio hesitated to report his childhood friend and
merely advised him not to engage in such activity. However, because of reliable
information given by some informants that selling was going on everyday, he was
constrained to report the matter to the Station Commander.
On the other hand, the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from
the fact that their knowledge acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to
fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is
that probable cause existed. Thus, it has been held in the case of People v. Lo Ho
Wing, et al. (G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991):
In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual
findings of the trial court that the authorities had reasonable
ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in
contraband and transport it within the country. The belief was
based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities
on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a
member. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the
expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China. But
such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill
the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and
all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to
conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in
such a case.
As the Solicitor General has pointed out:
There are several instances when a warrantless search and seizure
can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest
provided the same is effected on the basis of probable cause (e.g.
stop and search without warrant at checkpoints). Between
warrantless searches and seizures at checkpoints and in the case
at bar the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the

former, it was effected on the basis of probable cause. Under the
circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed probable
cause for the arresting officers, to arrest appellant who was in fact
selling marijuana and to seize the contraband.
That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute
rule (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 [1986]). Among the exceptions
granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof
of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. (People v. Castiller, G.R.
No. 87783, August 6, 1990)
The accused-appellant claims that the arrest having been done without warrant, it
follows that the evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible.
As earlier discussed, there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its
compliance with the requirements of a warrantless arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained
from such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence.
Edison Sucro assails the trial court's reliance on the statement of Macabante whose
reason for testifying could be merely to escape prosecution.
We quote the trial court's finding as to the testimony of Macabante:
The non-filing of a complaint against him for possession of
marijuana may have been the reason of (sic) his willingness to
testify in court against the accused. But this does not necessarily
taint the evidence that proceeds from his lips. As explained by Lt.
Seraspi, the best sources of information against drug pushers are
usually their customers, especially if as in this case, there is no
other direct evidence of the selling except the testimony of the
buyer. We accept this observation as a realistic appraisal of a
situation in which drug users are, and should be employed by law
enforcement authorities to bolster the drive against pushers who
are the real felons in our society. We have observed the
demeanor of the witness in court, and found him to be
straightforward, unhesitating, and spontaneous in his
declarations, so that we are satisfied as to his intention and
disposition to tell the truth (Rollo, p. 40)
Time and again it has been held that the findings of the trial court are entitled to
great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial
court had overlooked certain facts of weight and importance, it being
acknowledged. that the court below, having seen and heard the witnesses during
the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies (People v. Umali, et al.,
G.R. No. 84450, February 4, 1991 citing People v. Alvarez, 163 SCRA 745 [1988];
People v. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53 [1969]; and People v. Espejo, 36 SCRA 400 [1970]).
Furthermore, the testimony of Macabante was corroborated on material points by
public officers Fulgencio and Seraspi.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the police officers were compelled by
any motive than to accomplish their mission to capture a drug pusher in the
execution of the crime, the presumption being that police officers perform their
duties regularly in the absence of any evidence to the contrary (Rule 131, Sec. 3(m),
Revised Rules on Evidence; People v. Castiller, supra citing People v. Natipravat, 145
SCRA 483 [1986]).
The prosecution evidence was further bolstered by the findings of the Forensic
Chemist that the items seized were all positive for marijuana.
In contrast to the evidence presented by the prosecution, accused-appellant's
defense is alibi which is unavailing considering that he was positively identified by
Macabante to be the person from whom he bought marijuana.
Sucro alleges that he could not have committed the crime since he was with his
uncle and cousin distributing handbills for his Auntie's candidacy. The fact,
however, remains that it does not preclude the possibility that he was present in
the vicinity as established by his admission that he moved a lot and even had the
occasion to meet Macabante on the street.
It is well-settled that mere denials cannot prevail against the positive identification
of the appellant as the seller of the prohibited substances. (People v. Khan, 161
SCRA 406 [1988]; and People v. Paco, 170 SCRA 681 [1989])
Premises considered, this Court is convinced that appellant Edison Sucro had indeed
committed the offense charged. The trial court's decision must be upheld.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.


SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was
nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The
trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away and sentenced
him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00.
1

Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the
M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were
in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what
looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The
two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the
NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him.
2
Later,
the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been
arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated.
3
Both were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
4
Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss
the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers
absolving her after a 'thorough investigation."
5
The motion was granted, and trial
proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted .
6

According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of
their informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo
City and was carrying marijuana.
7
He was Identified by name.
8
Acting on this tip,
they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he
descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him.
9
They
detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three
kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic
examiner,
10
who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and
chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding
charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his
bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants.
11
He
alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was
confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled
to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him
with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he
was still handcuffed.
12
He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like
and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes.
13
He also
argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not properly
Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the
PC headquarters.
14

The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused
that he claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two
watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00 for
fare, not to mention his other expenses.
15
Aminnudin testified that he kept the two
watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered
when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a
result of his manhandling.
16
He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00
and gave away the other, although the watches belonged not to him but to his
cousin,
17
to a friend whose full name he said did not even know.
18
The trial court
also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently
proved the injuries sustained by him.
19

There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the
trial judge who had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had
the opportunity to weigh their credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice,
meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which may reveal
the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial
judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.

The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the
accused-appellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it
later nor did he submit to a medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is
possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time under
detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was
arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's
claim that he was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana
allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill
of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor
General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin
was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on
warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the
prosecution, that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized
the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier
received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that
Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to
the time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the
arrest,
20
another two weeks
21
and a third "weeks before June 25."
22
On this
matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt.
Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:
Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the
coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible
trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this
information from that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have
already reports of the particular operation which was being participated by
Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25,
1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming
of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before
June 25, 1984, did you also receive daily report regarding the activities of
Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel
Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information,
maybe for security reason and we cannot Identify the person.
Q But you received it from your regular informer?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel
Aminnudin is coming with drugs?

A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with
marijuana was received by you many days before you received the
intelligence report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin
was coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming
but on June 23, 1984 that was the time when I received the information
that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his activities, we have
reports that he was already consummated the act of selling and shipping
marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was
mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984,
you had already gathered information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin
was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of
the subject mentioned in your intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive
result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do
not need a search warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary.
23

That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere
lieutenant of the PC. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement.
This is still a government of laws and not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a
judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause.
Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not
caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been
committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the
warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca,
24
for example. Here it was held that

vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of
the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of
the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could
have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo
on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of
its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of
a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill
of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of
the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant
was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators
of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-
handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the
narcotics agents.
25
Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of
arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just
done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9
and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances,
he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It
was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger
that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause
as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce
upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen
years of the despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will,
detained without charges and punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to
blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt its
disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very
own words suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he
is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so
declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough
to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case
of the prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never
have been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was
seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous
phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no
warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions
allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and
the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction
and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who
would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But
as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions
of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm,
including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-
handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the
rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of
liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals
should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply
not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the
law violated is the Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against
the accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and
he must therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-
appellant is ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I hold that the accused was caught in flagrante, for he was
carrying marijuana leaves in his bag at the moment of his arrest. He was not
"innocently disembarking from the vessel." The unauthorized transportation of
marijuana (Indian hemp), which is a prohibited drug, is a crime. (Sec. 4, Rep. Act No.
6425). Since he was committing a crime, his arrest could be lawfully effected
without a warrant (Sec. 6a, Rule 113, Rules of Court), and the search of his bag
(which yielded the marijuana leaves) without a search warrant was also lawful (Sec.
12, Rule 126, Rules of Court). I vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court finding
him guilty of illegally transporting marijuana.


SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 200951 September 5, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
JOSE ALMODIEL alias "DO DONG ASTROBAL," Appellant.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals,
Cagayan de Oro City, (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00632-MIN . The CA affirmed the
Decision
2
of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch 4 (RTC), in Criminal Case
No. 9840 convicting appellant Jose Almodiel alias "Dodong Astrobal" (accused) of
violation of Section 5, Article II (Sale of Dangerous Drugs)
3
of Republic Act No. 9165
(RA 9165) or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
The Information dated 16 May 2003 filed against the accused states:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses JOSE ALMODIEL alias "DODONG" ASTROBAL of the crime
of violation of Section 5, Article II of R. A. No. 9165, committed as follows:
That at or about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of March 20, 2003 at Purok 9, Brgy.
15, Langihan Road, Butuan City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, deliver two (2) sachets of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu weighing zero point
one two zero five (0.1205) grams, a dangerous drug.
That the accused has already been convicted in Criminal Case No. 7338 for Violation
of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165)
4

Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. During pre-trial, the
defense admitted all the allegations in the Information except the specific place of
the alleged incident and the allegation of the sale of dangerous drugs. Thus, trial
ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented three witnesses: (1) PO2 Saldino C. Virtudazo (PO2
Virtudazo), (2) PO3 Arnel P. Lumawag (PO3 Lumawag), and (3) PSInsp. Cramwell T.
Banogon (PSInsp. Banogon).
At 7:30 a.m. of 20 March 2003, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
Regional Office XIII in Libertad, Butuan City, received a report from a confidential
agent that a certain "Dodong" was dealing with shabu. Immediately after, Regional
Director PSupt. Glenn Dichosa Dela Torre (PSupt. Dela Torre) conducted a briefing
for a buy-bust operation and designated SPO4 Alberto Arnaldo (SPO4 Arnaldo) as
teamleader, PO2 Virtudazo as poseur-buyer, and PO3 Lumawag as back-up
operative.
At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, PO2 Virtudazo, PO3 Lumawag, and the confidential
agent proceeded to Purok 9, Brgy. 15, Langihan Road, Butuan City to conduct the
buy-bust operation. PO3 Lumawag hid and positioned himself eight meters away
from PO2 Virtudazo and the confidential agent. When the accused arrived, the
confidential agent introduced PO2 Virtudazo to the accused as customer of shabu.
PO2 Virtudazo told the accused that he wanted to buy two sachets of shabu
worth P 400.00. The accused agreed, and then left. After thirty minutes, the
accused returned bringing two sachets containing white crystalline substance,
which he handed to PO2 Virtudazo. PO2 Virtudazo testified that based on
experience, he knew that the substance in the two sachets was shabu. Thus, PO2
Virtudazo gave a pre-arranged signal to PO3 Lumawag to approach them.
PO2 Virtudazo and PO3 Lumawag introduced themselves as PDEA agents, and
arrested the accused after informing him of his constitutional rights. They took him
to the PDEA Regional Office, and seized from him other items two aluminum foils
and one lighter.
5
PO2 Virtudazo marked the two sachets with "APL-1" and "APL-2,"
the initials of PO3 Lumawag. Together with SPO3 Dindo Alota (SPO3 Alota) and PO3

Lumawag, PO2 Virtudazo brought the accused and the two sachets to the Regional
Crime Laboratory Office for drug testing. In PSInsp. Banogons Chemistry Report No.
D-061-2003,
6
the substance contained in the two sachets was found positive of
shabu.
The prosecution offered and submitted the following exhibits: (1) Exhibit "A" and
sub-markings Certificate of Inventory or Confiscation Receipt dated 20 March
2003; (2) Exhibit "B" and sub-markings written request for laboratory examination
dated 20 March 2003; (3) Exhibit "C" and sub-markings self-sealing pack
containing the actual specimen of two sachets of shabu; and (4) Exhibit "D" and
sub-markings Chemistry Report No. D-061-2003 dated 21 March 2003.
7

Version of the Defense
On the other hand, the defense also presented three witnesses: (1) the accused
himself, (2) Felix Branzuela (Felix), and (3) Max Malubay (Max), the alleged
confidential agent.
The accused denied the charges of the prosecution, and narrated that on the
morning of 20 March 2003, he and his girlfriend stayed in Cadez Lodging House,
located at Purok 9, Brgy. 15, Butuan City. At about 10 a.m., the accuseds girlfriend
left but promised to return later. While waiting, the accused and Felix played with
the slot machine. Then, Max approached the accused and requested to buy shabu
from him. The accused told Max that he was not selling shabu. Thus, Max left.
However, Felix alleged that he saw Max talking to police officers. Felix informed the
accused that Max is a police asset, but the accused ignored his remark and stated
that he had nothing to fear.
Around 1:30 p.m. of the same day, the accused decided to go home aboard his
motorcycle. While on his way, the accused was stopped by PO3 Lumawag, who
pointed a gun at the accused and arrested him. The accused noticed PO3 Lumawag
holding a sachet of shabu while searching the accuseds body. The accused
protested but PO3 Lumawag directed him to go to the PDEA office with another
police officer. Upon arrival, the accused was instructed to remove his clothes. PO3
Lumawag took the accuseds wallet and claimed to retrieve another sachet of shabu
from it. PO3 Lumawag insisted that the accused owned the shabu, but the accused
vehemently denied the same. After about thirty minutes, a representative from the
media and City Prosecutor Felixberto Guiritan (Prosecutor Guiritan) arrived. They
took pictures of the two sachets of shabu and signed the Certificate of Inventory.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision dated 17 June 2008, the RTC found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of RA 9165. The dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act 9165 (otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) and is hereby accordingly sentenced to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P 500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Accused shall serve his sentence at the Davao Prison and Penal Farm at Braulio E.
Dujali, Davao del Norte and shall be credited in the service thereof with his
preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
The sachets of shabu are ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government to be dealt with in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
8

The RTC found that the elements of the crime of illegal sale of shabu were proven
by the prosecution. On the other hand, the accused failed to present clear and
convincing evidence to prove his defense of frame-up and planting of evidence.
Hence, the RTC held that the categorical and convincing testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, supported by physical evidence, overcome the
unsubstantiated claim of ill-motive by the accused. In addition, the RTC ruled that
the arrest was lawfully made.
On 4 July 2008, the accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied
by the RTC in its Resolution
9
dated 22 July 2008. The accused filed an appeal to the
CA. The accused imputed the following errors on the RTC:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS
CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO SELLING THE SUBJECT DANGEROUS DRUGS.
II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ARREST AND THE
SEARCH OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT A WARRANT WOULD FALL UNDER
THE DOCTRINE OF WARRANTLESS SEARCH AS AN INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT SHABU IS
ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHEN
THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE ALLEGED CONFISCATED DRUGS WAS NOT
ESTABLISHED IN CONFORMITY WITH THE ESTABLISHED RULES.
V
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT WHEN HIS GUILT IS
NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
10

The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated 14 November 2011, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision against
the accused. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated June 17, 2008 finding
Jose Almodiel alias Dodong Astrobal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
11

The CA ruled that since a buy-bust operation was conducted, there was no
necessity for a warrant of arrest pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of
Court. The CA found that the defenses version of the events was not credible
considering that the accused did not object to his arrest or file any complaint
against the police officers. On the chain of custody rule, the CA held that non-
compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable
ground, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs are preserved,
as in this case.
Hence, this appeal.
12

The Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
The elements necessary for a prosecution for violation of RA 9165 or sale of
dangerous drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.
13
What is
material is the proof that the transaction actually took place, coupled with the
presentation before the court of the corpus delicti.
14

In the present case, all the elements of the crime have been sufficiently established.
PO2 Virtudazo testified that a buy-bust operation took place, to wit:
PROSECUTOR GUIRITAN:
Q: On March 20, 2003 at about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, where were you at
that time?
A: I was at Purok 9, Barangay 15, San Ignacio, Langihan Road, Butuan City.
Q: Why were you there in that place?
A: Because we were conducting an entrapment operation.
x x x x
Q: You already mentioned last time that you were already at the place at about
2:00 oclock of March 20, 2003, and you were with your back-up Lumawag and your
confidential agent. When you arrived at that place what happened actually?
A: At 2:00 oclock the accused arrived in the place and he gave me the two (2)
sachets of "shabu."
Q: How did the accused know that you will be the buyer?
A: I was introduced by our confidential agent to him.

Q: Now you said the accused handed to you "shabu", how many sachets, if you
recall?
A: Two (2) sachets, Sir.
Q: When already in possession of those two (2) sachets of "shabu", what did you
do?
A: I examined it if it is indeed "shabu."
Q: What was your findi[n]gs?
A: That it was real "shabu."
Q: How did you know that it was a "shabu"?
A: Based on my experience.
15

Upon clarificatory questioning by the court, PO2 Virtudazo testified that the
accused agreed to sell shabu to him, thus:
Q: So what did you do when the accused was already with the asset?
A: I was introduced by our asset to the accused and at that point in time I also told
the accused that I was interested to buy "shabu."
Q: And the accused what did he do to you?
A: He agreed and then left immediately.
Q: What did you agree with the accused?
A: That he will give me "shabu."
Q: Why will the accused give you "shabu"?
A: Because I was going to buy it from him.
Q: For how much?
A: Worth P 400.00.
16

PO3 Lumawag materially corroborated the testimony of PO2 Virtudazo as to the
conduct of the buy-bust operation, to wit:
Q: What happened when the accused arrived?
A: When the accused arrived they talked with each other then after more or less
two (2) minutes, the suspect left the area.
x x x x
Q: Now what happened after that?
A: After the suspect left the area, after another twenty-five (25) minutes more or
less, he came back and met Virtudazo at that area.
x x x x
Q: Now, when the accused went back, what happened next?
A: I observed that the accused approached Virtudazo and he gave something to
Virtudazo. When Virtudazo tried to inspect the items given to him, thats the time
that Virtudazo gave the pre-arranged signal by turning his cap.
Q: And, what did you do?
A: So, when PO2 Virtudazo gave the pre-arranged signal thats thetime I rushed up
and apprehended the suspect.
x x x x
Q: How many shabu was given by him to your poseur-buyer?
A: Two (2) sachets, sir.
Q: How did you come to know of that?

A: Because when I approached him, Virtudazo also showed to me that that is the
shabu given to him by the suspect.
17

Both testimonies of PO2 Virtudazo and PO3 Lumawag positively identified PO2
Virtudazo as the poseur-buyer and the accused as the seller of two sachets
containing white crystalline substance for P 400.00. The confiscated sachets were
brought to the crime laboratory for examination, where a chemical analysis on the
substance confirmed that the same was shabu. The sachets containing shabu were
positively identified by PSInsp. Banogon during the trial as the same sachets seized
from the accused.
The accused, however, contends that there was no sale since the marked money
was not delivered to the accused or presented in Court. Cruz v. People
18
is
instructive in ruling that the failure to present the buy-bust money is not fatal to the
case.
x x x The marked money used in the buy-bust operation is not indispensable but
merely corroborative in nature. In the prosecution for the sale of dangerous drugs,
the absence of marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the
prosecution as long as the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the
drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court. Neither law nor
jurisprudence requires the presentation of any money used in the buy-bust
operation.
19

It has been settled that credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police
officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner,
unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part of the
police officers.
20
In the present case, the claim of ill-motive was not substantiated
by the accused. The trial court found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
convincing, categorical and credible. Findings of the trial court, which are factual in
nature and which involve the credibility of witnesses, are accorded respect when no
glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts or speculative, arbitrary and
unsupported conclusions are made from such findings.
21
This rule finds an even
more stringent application where the findings are sustained by the Court of
Appeals, as in the present case.
22

The accused denied the charge against him, and alleged frame-up and planting of
evidence by the police officers. In Quinicot v. People,
23
we held that allegations of
frame-up by police officers are common and standard defenses in most dangerous
drugs cases. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and
convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government officials have
performed their duties in a regular and proper manner.
24
Here, the accused made a
bare allegation without presenting clear and convincing evidence to support his
claim. Felix and Max testified that they did not witness the incident between the
accused and the police officers before the arrest.
25
Against the positive testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses, the accuseds plain denial of the offense charged,
unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail.
26

Thus, in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime
against the accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall
prevail over the accuseds self-serving and uncorroborated denial.
27

Arrest During a Buy-bust Operation
The accused contends that the police officers arrested him without securing a
warrant of arrest. Consequently, his arrest was unlawful, making the sachets of
shabu allegedly seized from him inadmissible in evidence.
Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a person may be arrested
without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense."
28
The accused was caught in the act of committing an offense
during a buy-bust operation. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto
as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police officers are not only authorized but
duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.
29
An arrest made after an
entrapment operation does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a
valid "warrantless arrest."
30

The accused argues that force and intimidation attended his arrest when four police
officers arrested him and one of them pointed a gun at him. However, his
allegations were not supported by evidence. On the contrary, the CA found that the
defense neither objected to the accuseds arrest nor filed any complaint against the
police officers.
Considering that an arrest was lawfully made, the search incidental to such arrest
was also valid. A person lawfully arrested may be searched, without a search
warrant, for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense.
31
Accordingly, the two sachets of
shabu seized in the present case are admissible as evidence.
The Chain of Custody Requirement

The accused contends that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the
shabu in accordance with the requirements under RA 9165 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations.
32
The defense particularly alleges that there was no
photograph of the seized items and there was no barangay official present during
the incident.
We find the claim unmeritorious. In the prosecution of drug cases, it is of
paramount importance that the existence of the drug, the corpus delicti of the
crime, be established beyond doubt.
33
It is precisely in this regard that RA 9165,
particularly its Section 21,
34
prescribes the procedure to ensure the existence and
identity of the drug seized from the accused and submitted to the court.
The Implementing Rules of RA 9165 offer some flexibility when a proviso added that
"non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items."
35
In People v. Rosialda,
36
People v. Llamado,
37
and People
v. Rivera,
38
the Court had the occasion to apply such flexibility when it ruled that
the failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the
required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated is not fatal
and does not automatically render the arrest of the accused illegal or the items
seized from him inadmissible.
The Court consistently held that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
39
In other
words, it must be established with unwavering exactitude that the dangerous drug
presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same as that seized from
him in the first place.
40
The chain of custody requirement performs this function in
that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.
41

Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,
42
which
implements RA 9165, defines "chain of custody" as follows:
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the
identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of
safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
43

Malillin v. People
44
explained that the chain of custody rule would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time
it was offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and that there was no opportunity
for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
45

In People v. Kamad,
46
the Court ruled that the links that must be established in the
chain of custody in a buy-bust situation are: first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer
to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the
turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist
to the court.
For the first link, PO2 Virtudazo positively testified that he was in possession of the
two sachets of shabu from the time of the buy-bust operation up to the PDEA
office.
47
PO3 Lumawag corroborated his testimony.
48
Then, PO2 Virtudazo marked
the confiscated two sachets of shabu using the initials of PO3 Lumawag, "APL-1"
and "APL-2," to help him remember that PO3 Lumawag was his companion at that
time.
49
PO2 Virtudazo prepared the Certificate of Inventory, which was signed by
their team leader SPO4 Arnaldo, Prosecutor Guiritan and a media
representative.
50
PO3 Lumawag testified that barangay officials were not present
because some barangay officials were suspected of involvement in illegal drugs.
51

As to the second and third link, PO2 Virtudazo, together with SPO3 Alota and PO3
Lumawag, brought the accused and the two sachets to the crime laboratory on the
same day of the arrest.
52
For the final link, forensic chemist PSInsp. Banogon
testified that he examined the two sachets, marked with "APL-1" and "APL-2," and
submitted them on 20 March 2003 to PO1 Monton, the PNCO desk officer of the
crime laboratory.
53
In his Chemistry Report No. D-061-2003, PSInsp. Banogon found
the substance in the two sachets positive of shabu. PSInsp. Banogon took
possession of the shabu until he identified and offered the same to the
court.
54
Accordingly, the prosecution substantially complied with the requirements

under RA 9165 and sufficiently established the crucial links in the chain of custody.
The integrity and evidentiary value of the seized shabu remain unimpaired.
The accused argues that SPO4 Arnaldo, SPO3 Alota and PO1 Monton should have
testified in court.1wphi1 But in People v. Habana,
55
we held that there is no
requirement for the prosecution to present as witness in a drugs case every person
who had something to do with the arrest of the accused and the seizure of the
prohibited drugs from him. The discretion on which witness to present in every case
belongs to the prosecutor.
56
It is even possible to reach a conclusion of guilt on the
basis of the testimony of a lone witness.
57
Furthermore, as aptly ruled by the CA,
there was no need for other persons in the chain of custody to testify, since their
testimonies would only corroborate that of PO2 Virtudazo.
In fine, the evidence for the prosecution established that during a buy-bust
operation, the accused was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of selling two
sachets of shabu to a police officer, who acted as a poseur-buyer. Thus, the guilt of
the accused had been proven in the instant case beyond reasonable doubt.
Under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the crime of unauthorized sale of shabu,
regardless of the quantity and purity thereof, is punishable with life imprisonment
to death and a fine ranging from five -hundred thousand pesos (P 500,000.00) to
ten million pesos (PI 0,000,000.00). Hence, the penalty of life imprisonment and a
fine of 11500,000.00 was correctly imposed by the RTC and the CA on accused Jose
Almodiel alias "Dodong Astrobal" for illegal sale of shabu.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 14 November
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00632-MIN in toto.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 72564 April 15, 1988
vs.
ANITA CLAUDIO Y BAGTANG, accused-appellant.
Romeo C. Alinea for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City,
Branch 73 finding the accused Anita Claudio y Bagtang guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as
amended) and sentencing her to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay a
fine of P 20,000.00, and to pay the costs.
The information filed against the accused alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of July 1981, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named ACCUSED without being
lawfully authorized, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
knowingly transport 1.1 kilos of Marijuana dried leaves, which are
prohibited drugs for the purpose of selling the same from Baguio
City to Olongapo City. (Rollo, p. 13)
The lower court established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the
prosecution's evidence as follows:
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution offered the
following document and testimonial evidence as follows: Exhibit
"A" Letter request for Examination of suspected marijuana dried
leaves weighing approximately 1.1 kilos dated July 25, 1981; "B"
plastic container; "B- 1"-marijuana contained in the plastic
container; "B-1-a"another plastic container; "C"Chemistry
Report No. D-668-81;"C-1" Findings: Positive for marijuana;
"D,","D-1," "D-2"and "D-3; "E" and "E-1" photographs of accused
with Pat. Daniel Obia and Pauline Tiongco showing the
marijuana, "F"Victory Liner Ticket No. 84977;"G"Sworn
Statement of Pat. Daniel Obia, "H" Request for Field Test on
suspected marijuana from accused by P/Lt. Antonio V. Galindo;"H-
1"date of of the request; "L"Certificate of Field Test dated
July 22, 1981; "B-2" and "B-2a" additional Wrapping paper; and
the testimonies of witnesses of the prosecution, Theresa Ann
Bugayong; Pat. Daniel Obio, Cpl. Paulino Tiongco, Cpl. Ernesto
Abello and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang.
Theresa Ann Bugayong22 years old, single, Forensic Chemist
and a resident of 1150 Sampaloc, Metro Manila testified that she
received a request from the Task Force Bagong Buhay, Olongapo
City, dated July 25, 1981, on specimen marijuana submitted for
examination. The specimen consisted of 900 grams of suspected
dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a newspaper placed in
a plastic bag with a marking "MB Store" (Exh. "B").
The examination conducted by her proved to be positive for
marijuana. After her examination, she prepared Chemistry Report
No. D-668-81 dated July 29,1981 (Exhs. "C" and "C-l"). She
conducted three eliminations; microscopic examination, the
duguenoi levine test and thirdly, the confirmatory examination of
thin layer chromatographic test. The said specimen was submitted
to them by OIC Danilo Santiago, a representative of the CANU,
Olongapo City.
The second witness for the prosecution was Daniel Obia, 37
years old, married, policeman and residing at 34 Corpuz St., East
Tapinac, Olongapo City. Obia testified that he has been a
member of the INP, since 1970 up to the present. He was assigned
in June, 1972 at the Investigation Division as operative. His job
then was among other things to follow up reports in their office,

recover stolen items and apprehend suspects. On July 21,1981, he
was on Detached Service with the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit; and that
on that date, he came from Baguio City and arrived in Olongapo
City at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon having left Baguio at
about 8:30 o'clock in the morning. He took the Victory Liner in
going back to Olongapo City. His family lives in Baguio City. On
board the Victory Liner, he was seated on the second seat at the
back. While he was thus seated, suspect Anita Claudio boarded
the same bus and took the seat in front of him after putting a bag
which she was carrying at the back of the seat of Obia. The bag
placed by suspect behind his seat was a wooven buri bag made of
plastic containing some vegetables. The act of the accused putting
her bag behind Pat. Obia's seat aroused his suspicion and made
him felt (sic) nervous. With the feeling that there was some
unusual, he had the urge to search the woven plastic bag. But it
was only at San Fernando, Pampanga when he was able to go to
the bag. He inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at
the bottom of the woven bag and smelt marijuana. The plastic
woven bag appearing to contain camote tops on the top has a big
bundle of plastic of marijuana at the bottom. He could recognize
the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that time at
the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He did not, however, do anything after
he discovered that there was marijuana inside the plastic bag of
the accused until they reached Olongapo City and the accused
alighted from the bus in front of the Caltex Gasoline Station in Sta.
Rita. Right after the accused alighted from the bus, policeman
Obina intercepted her and showed her his Id Identifying himself as
a policeman and told her he will search her bag because of the
suspicion that she was carrying marijuana inside said bag. In reply,
accused told him, "Please go with me, let us settle this at home."
However, the witness did not heed her plea and instead
handcuffed her right hand and with her, boarded a tricycle right
away and brought the suspect to the police headquarters with her
bag appearing to contain vegetables.
At the police headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was
searched in the presence of Investigator Cpl. Tiongco; Pat. Obia,
the accused and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang. Inside the plastic bag was
found a big bundle of plastic containing marijuana weighing about
one kilo. Witness stated that he could detect marijuana even
before the application of chemicals because of one year and a half
assignment with the CANU. After the marijuana was taken from
the bag of the accused, photographs were taken of the accused
and the marijuana confiscated from her possession with Pat.
Obia and that of Investigator Tiongco, accused and himself
Identified photographs shown to him in open Court. (Exhs. "D,"
"D-l," "D-2" and "D-3"). Witness was likewise shown a plastic bag
of marijuana contained in a plastic container (Exhs. "B," "B-1" and
"B-1 -a") and Identified it as the one confiscated from the accused
and pointed to his initials on the newspaper wrapping which also
shows the date and time, although the wrapper at the time he
testified appeared to be soiled already. The marijuana was
allegedly still fresh when confiscated.
To prove further that the accused transported the confiscated
marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City, witness Identified
Victory Liner Ticket No. 684977 which was confiscated from the
accused and for Identification purposes, the witness presented
the body number of the bus he wrote at the back of the ticket
which is "309" (Exhs. "F" and "F-l"). Regarding himself, he did not
pay his fare from Baguio City because as a policeman, he used his
badge and a free ride.
On cross-examination, witness stated that he went to Baguio City
on July 15,1981 and underwent treatment of his heart while he
was there. He was given a furlough for medical treatment. He
stayed in Baguio City for about five days and returned to
Olongapo City on July 21, 1981. Prior to July 21, 1981, witness
never knew the accused, and the first time he saw her was in
Baguio when she boarded the same Victory Liner he took. When
the accused who was bringing with her a woven plastic bag placed
the bag right behind his seat instead of placing it in front of her or
beside her seat. Witness Obia became suspicious and his
suspicion was confirmed when they reached San Fernando,
Pampanga, after he checked the buri bag. The bus stopped at said
town to load some gasoline. Witness inserted one of his fingers
inside the buri bag and thereafter smelt marijuana. He confirmed
his testimony on direct that when witness confronted accused he
was invited to go with her in order to settle the matter to which
he refused. Accused further testified that from the time the
accused placed her bag behind his seat from Baguio City, he felt
so nervous and had to take his medicine at the Tarlac Station. It

was only after having taken his medicine that his apprehension
was contained and thus was able to insert his right hand inside
the buri bag in San Fernando, Pampanga. His fingers reached the
very bottom of the bag. He Identified his sworn statement
regarding this incident given on July 21, 1981 which is Exhibit "G."
Witness likewise Identified accused Anita Claudio in open court.
Paulino Tiongco, 52 years old, married and resident of 31 Canada
St., East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City, testified that as a policeman
on the afternoon of July 21, 1981, he was inside the Investigation
Division of the Police Station, Olongapo City. As Duty Investigator,
between 1:45 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day,
Pat. Daniel Obia arrived at the Police Station with a woman and
Identified her in the courtroom as Anita Claudio. Pat. Obia
reported to him that he apprehended Anita Claudio inside the
Victory Liner bus for possession of marijuana dried leaves. The
marijuana leaves were contained in a buri bag with some
vegetables such as camote tops, bananas and some other
vegetables. The marijuana was placed in a plastic wrapper with
the name National Book Store colored black and white. Witness
Identified the wrapper (Exh. "B-2"). The bag contained the
markings of Pat. Obia which are his initials, (Exhs. "B-2-a"), and
numbers 210781 representing the date which was placed by Pat.
Obia after Cpl. Tiongco examined the suspected marijuana.
After examining and seeing the marijuana together with the
vegetables, he interviewed apprehending officer Obia and
reduced his statements in writing. Cpl. Tiongco Identifled the
sworn statement of Obia (Exh. "G"). He also interviewed accused
Anita Claudio who was all the while inside the Investigation room
seated on a chair. After appraising her of her constitutional rights,
he asked the accused whether she was willing to give her written
statements to which the accused refused. Hence, no statements
were taken of her. However, pictures were taken inside the
investigation room. Exhs. "D" and "E," series which were already
previously Identified by Pat. Obia, Witness Identified the persons
appearing in the pictures as that of Pat. Obia and the accused
and also of himself. Thereafter, the marijuana contained in the
plastic bag were turned over to Lt. Galindo and Anita Claudio was
detained.
Ernesto Abello, 41 years old, married and residing at No. 29 Alba
Street, East Tapinac, Olongapo City, testified he was since March
1972 a policeman and was stationed at Police Station 21,
Olongapo City, Metrodiscom. However, in 1981, he was already
assigned to the CANU General Anti-NARCOTICS Unit. On July 22,
1981, he reported for work at the CANU and received from Lt.
Galindo more than a kilo of suspected marijuana dried leaves. As
requested by Lt. Galindo he conducted a field test on this
marijuana which he received from Lt. Galindo, as evidenced by a
request signed by him dated July 22,1981 (Exh. "H").
In connection with the field test conducted by him on the
specimen, he prepared a Certificate of Fleld Test dated July
22,1981 (Exhs. "I"). The Certificate of Field Test indicated the
presence of tetra-hydrocannabinol (THC), an active substance that
can be only be found in marijuana, a prohibited drug. Cpl. Abello
Identified a plastic bag of marijuana received from Lt. Galindo
which he later give to CIC Danilo Santiago, the Evidence
Custodian, for the latter to bring the specimen to the PC Crime
Laboratory.
The last witness for the prosecution was Leoncio Bagang, 40 years
old, married, residing at No. 27 Jones St., East Tapinac, Olongapo
City, a policeman of Olongapo City, assigned with Police Station
"21." He has been a policeman since 1966 up to the present. In
July, 1981, he was then assigned at the Patrol Division and his
duty was to patrol the city proper from Magsaysay Drive up to
east Bajac Bajac.
He narrated that on July 21,1981, between the hours of 1:00 and
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he was at the Caltex Gasoline
Station, East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City along Rizal Avenue. He
was then on duty patrol using a motorcycle. While he was at the
said place, he saw Pat. Obia alighted from the Victory Liner bus
ordering somebody to alight from the same bus. When he heard
Pat. Obia he approached him and asked him what was
happening. Pat. Obia told him he apprehended a certain woman
possessing dried marijuana. The woman was still then inside the
bus. Pat. Obia then brought the woman to the police
department who was bringing with her a buri bag. They boarded a
tricycle, the woman riding inside the tricycle while Pat. Obia sat

behind the driver. He then followed in his motorcycle the said
tricycle to police station. He went inside the Investigation Section
of the Police Station and he was there when Pat. Obia reported
to Cpl. Tiongco his apprehension of the woman possessing
marijuana. He saw the marijuana for the first time inside the
Investigation Section placed in a buri bag covered with
newspaper. He witnessed the taking out of the marijuana from
inside the bag by Pat. Obia in the presence of Cpl. Tiongco and
the woman or the accused in this case, and himself. Policeman
Bagang Identified the accused in open Court. When asked about
the nature of the marijuana when it was brought out from the
bag, he said that the marijuana was dried but not well dried. Aside
from the marijuana inside the buri bag, there were vegetables and
bananas, Witness Identified in open Court, the marijuana he saw
found in the buri bag of the accused. His means of Identification
was the signature of Pat. Obia, (Exh. "B-1"). He likewise
Identified a newspaper wrapping which was already torn.
While in the Investigation Division, witness Bagang heard the
accused's answer to Cpl. Tiongco's questions that she was going
to deliver the marijuana to Sta. Rita. He, however, did not linger
long at the investigation Division. After he saw the marijuana and
heard the answer of the accused to Cpl. Tiongcos question the
place of delivery of the marijuana, he left the police station.
Witness likewise Identified an initial DO-21-07-81 already marked
as Exhibit "B-2." DO which is an initial, and not a signature, stands
for Daniel Obia. After the testimony of Leoncio Bagang, the
prosecution rested its case. (Rollo, pp. 42-47)
Accused Claudio raised the following assignments of errors in this appeal:
I
CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IS IMPROPER
IF ONE OR SOME OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IS OR ARE
ABSENT.
II
CONVICTION CAN NOT BE HAD UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A.
6425 IF THE ALLEGED BUYMAN WAS NOT PRESENTED TO TESTIFY.
III
APPELLANTS CONVICTION FOR DELIVERY (SEC. 4, ART II, OF R.A.
6424) IS WRONG BECAUSE SOME MATERIAL FACTS WERE
OVERLOOKED AND NOT CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT.
(Rollo, p. 91)
The accused alleges that she is only liable, at the most, for possession under Sec. 8,
Art. II of Rep. Act No. 6425 and not for violating Sec. 4 of the same Act.
The latter section, Sec. 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand
to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away
to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a
prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the
proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
Claudio contends that there was no delivery as there was no recipient of the
prohibited drugs. Therefore, she may not be convicted under Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No.
6425.
The contention is without merit. A closer perusal of the subject provision shows
that it is not only delivery which is penalized but also the sale, administration,
distribution and transportation of probihited drugs. Claudio was caught
transporting 1.1 kilos of marijuana, thus the lower court did not err in finding her
guilty of violating Sec. 4.
The accused also alleges that before the completion of delivery, the intention of the
possessor is unknown.
This allegation is also unavailing. It is undisputed that Claudio had in her possession
1.1 kilos of marijuana. This is a considerable quantity. As held in the case of People
v. Toledo, (140 SCRA 259, 267) "the possession of such considerable quantity as

three plastic bags of marijuana leaves and seeds coupled with the fact that he is not
a user of prohibited drugs cannot indicate anything except the intention of the
accused to sell, distribute and deliver said marijuana.
The accused next contends the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension as
unlawful.
The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure.
Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides:
.. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
xxx xxx xxx
Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:
Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant. (12a)
Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obia did
not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto.
The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful.
(Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of
the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
The accused takes inconsistent positions in her appellant's brief. At first, she does
not deny having had with her marijuana at the time of her arrest. Instead, she
claims that she should just be guilty of possession. In a complete turnabout, in the
latter portion of said brief, she claims that the evidence against her were mere
fabrications and the marijuana allegedly found in her possession was only planted.
We have carefully examined the records of the case and we find no ground to alter
the trial court's findings and appreciation of the evidence presented.
Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence, more so as it consisted mainly
of testimonies of policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly
performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary (People v. De Jesus,
145 SCRA 521). We also find no reason from the records why the prosecution
witnesses should fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a
serious crime (See People v. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500).
The accused testified that she was not on that bus that came from Baguio City but
rather she was in Olongapo City all that time. She alleged that she was arrested by
Pat. Obia for no reason at all.
In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by
the accused herself (People v. De la Cruz, 148 SCRA 582).
Moreover, it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive
testimony (People v. De La Cruz, supra).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.


SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, 11
th Judicial Region, Digos, Davao del Sur convicting defendant- appellant Ruben
Burgos y Tito of The crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of
Subversion. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Ruben Burgos
sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt, of the offense
charges , pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 9, in relation to
General Order No. 6, dated September 22, 1972, and General
Order No. 7, dated September 23, 1972, in relation further to
Presidential Decree No. 885, and considering that the firearm
subject of this case was not used in the circumstances as
embraced in paragraph I thereof, applying the provision of
indeterminate sentence law, accused Ruben Burgos is hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal maximum, as minimum penalty, to reclusion
perpetua, as maximum penalty, pursuant to sub-paragraph B, of
Presidential Decree No. 9, as aforementioned, with accessory
penalties, as provided for by law.
As a result of this judgment, the subject firearm involved in this
case (Homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with
Serial No. 8.69221) is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
government, to be disposed of in accordance with law. Likewise,
the subversive documents, leaflets and/or propaganda seized are
ordered disposed of in accordance with law.
The information charged the defendant-appellant with the crime of illegal
possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion in an information which reads as
follows:
That in the afternoon of May 13, 1982 and thereabout at
Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Philippines, within the jurisdiction
of this Court, the above- named accused with intent to possess
and without the necessary license, permit or authority issued by
the proper government agencies, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously keep, possess, carry and have in his
possession, control and custody one (1) homemade revolver,
caliber .38, make Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221,
which firearm was issued to and used by the accused at Tiguman,
Digos, Davao del Sur, his area of operations by one Alias
Commander Pol for the New People's Army (NPA), a subversive
organization organized for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines through lawless
and violent means, of which the accused had knowledge, and
which firearm was used by the accused in the performance of his
subversive tasks such as the recruitment of New Members to the
NPA and collection of contributions from the members.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the decision of the lower court
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Through the testimony of Pat. Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo
Taroy, it appears that by virtue of an intelligent information
obtained by the Constabulary and INP units, stationed at Digos,
Davao del Sur, on May 12, 1982, one Cesar Masamlok personally
and voluntarily surre0ndered to the authorities at about 9:00
o'clock A.M. at Digos, Davao del Sur Constabulary Headquarters,
stating that he was forcibly recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as
member of the NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm
against his life, if he refused.

Along with his recruitment, accused was asked to contribute one
(1) chopa of rice and one peso (P1.00) per month, as his
contribution to the NPA TSN, page 5, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Immediately, upon receipt of said information, a joint team of PC-
INP units, composed of fifteen (15) members, headed by Captain
Melchesideck Bargio, (PC), on the following day, May 13, 1982,
was dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del Sur, to arrest accused
Ruben Burgos. The team left the headquarter at 1:30 P.M., and
arrived at Tiguman, at more or less 2:00 o'clock PM where
through the help of Pedro Burgos, brother of accused, the team
was able to locate accused, who was plowing his field. (TSN, pages
6-7, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Right in the house of accused, the latter was caned by the team
and Pat. Bioco asked accused about his firearm, as reported by
Cesar Masamlok. At first accused denied possession of said
firearm but later, upon question profounded by Sgt. Alejandro
Buncalan with the wife of the accused, the latter pointed to a
place below their house where a gun was buried in the ground.
(TSN, page 8, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Pat. Bioco then verified the place pointed by accused's wife and
dug the grounds, after which he recovered the firearm, Caliber .38
revolver, marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution.
After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the
team, subversive documents which he allegedly kept in a stock
pile of qqqcogon at a distance of three (3) meters apart from his
house. Then Sgt. Taroy accordingly verified beneath said cogon
grass and likewise recovered documents consisting of notebook
colored maroon with spiral bound, Exhibit "B" for the prosecution;
a pamphlet consisting of eight (8) leaves, including the front and
back covers entitled Ang Bayan, Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista
ng Pilipinas, Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo, Leninismo Kaisipang
Mao qqqZedong dated December 31, 1980, marked as Exhibit "C",
and another pamphlet Asdang Pamantalaang Masa sa Habagatang
Mindanao, March and April 1981 issue, consisting of ten (10)
pages, marked as Exhibit "D" for the prosecution.
Accused, when confronted with the firearm Exhibit "A", after its
recovery, readily admitted the same as issued to him by Nestor
Jimenez, otherwise known as a certain Alias Pedipol, allegedly
team leader of the sparrow unit of New People's Army,
responsible in the liquidation of target personalities, opposed to
NPA Ideological movement, an example was the killing of the late
Mayor Llanos and Barangay Captain of Tienda Aplaya Digos,
Davao del Sur. (TSN, pages 1-16, Hearing-October 14,1982).
To prove accused's subversive activities, Cesar Masamlok, a
former NPA convert was presented, who declared that on March
7, 1972, in his former residence at Tiguman Digos, Davao del Sur,
accused Ruben Burgos, accompanied by his companions Landrino
Burgos, Oscar Gomez and Antonio Burgos, went to his house at
about 5:00 o'clock P.M. and called him downstair. Thereupon,
accused told Masamlok, their purpose was to ask rice and one (1)
peso from him, as his contribution to their companions, the NPA
of which he is now a member. (TSN, pages 70, 71, 72, Hearing-
January 4, 1983).
Accused and his companions told Masamlok, he has to join their
group otherwise, he and his family will be killed. He was also
warned not to reveal anything with the government authorities.
Because of the threat to his life and family, Cesar Masamlok
joined the group. Accused then told him, he should attend a
seminar scheduled on April 19, 1982. Along with this invitation,
accused pulled gut from his waistline a .38 caliber revolver which
Masamlok really saw, being only about two (2) meters away from
accused, which make him easily Identified said firearm, as that
marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages 72, 73, and
74, Hearing-January 4, 1983).
On April 19, 1982, as previously invited, Masamlok, accompanied
by his father, Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides went
to the house of accused and attended the seminar, Those present
in the seminar were: accused Ruben Burgos, Antonio Burgos,
Oscar Gomez, Landrino Burgos, alias Pedipol and one alias
Jamper.
The first speaker was accused Ruben Burgos, who said very
distinctly that he is an NPA together with his companions, to

assure the unity of the civilian. That he encouraged the group to
overthrow the government, emphasizing that those who attended
the seminar were already members of the NPA, and if they reveal
to the authorities, they will be killed.
Accused, while talking, showed to the audience pamphlets and
documents, then finally shouted, the NPA will be victorious.
Masamlok likewise Identified the pamphlets as those marked as
Exh. exhibits "B", "C", and "D" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages 75,
76 and 77, Hearing-January 4, 1983)
Other speakers in said meeting were Pedipol, Jamper and Oscar
Gomez, who likewise expounded their own opinions about the
NPA. It was also announced in said seminar that a certain Tonio
Burgos, will be responsible for the collection of the contribution
from the members. (TSN, pages 78-79, Hearing- January 4, 1983)
On May 12, 1982, however, Cesar Masamlok surrendered to
Captain Bargio of the Provincial Headquarters of the Philippine
Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo Lovitos was presented t prove
that on May 19, 1982, he administered the subscription of th
extra-judicial confession of accused Ruben Burgos, marked as
Exhibit "E " for the prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages.
Appearing voluntarily in said office, for the subscription of his
confession, Fiscal Lovitos, realizing that accused was not
represented by counsel, requested the services of Atty. Anyog,
whose office is adjacent to the Fiscal's Office, to assist accused in
the subscription of his extra-judicial statement.
Atty. Anyog assisted accused in the reading of his confession from
English to Visayan language, resulting to the deletion of question
No. 19 of the document, by an inserted certification of Atty.
Anyog and signature of accused, indicating his having understood,
the allegations of his extra-judicial statement.
Fiscal Lovitos, before accused signed his statement, explained to
him his constitutional rights to remain silent, right to counsel and
right to answer any question propounded or not.
With the aid of Atty. Anyog, accused signed his confession in the
presence of Atty. Anyog and Fiscal Lovitos, without the presence
of military authorities, who escorted the accused, but were sent
outside the cubicle of Fiscal Lovitos while waiting for the accused.
(TSN, pages 36-40, nearing November 15, 1982)
Finally, in order to prove illegal possession by accused of the
subject firearm, Sgt. Epifanio Comabig in-charge of firearms and
explosives, NCO Headquarter, Philippine Constabulary, Digos,
Davao del Sur, was presented and testified, that among the lists of
firearm holders in Davao del Sur, nothing was listed in the name
of accused Ruben Burgos, neither was his name included among
the lists of persons who applied for the licensing of the firearm
under Presidential Decree No. 1745.
After the above-testimony the prosecution formally closed its
case and offered its exhibits, which were all admitted in evidence,
despite objection interposed by counsel for accused, which was
accordingly overruled.
On the other hand, the defendant-appellant's version of the case against him is
stated in the decision as follows:
From his farm, the military personnel, whom he said he cannot
recognize, brought him to the PC Barracks at Digos, Davao del Sur,
and arrived there at about 3:00 o'clock, on the same date. At
about 8:00 o'clock P.M., in the evening, he was investigated by
soldiers, whom he cannot Identify because they were wearing a
civilian attire. (TSN, page 14 1, Hearing-June 15, 1983)
The investigation was conducted in the PC barracks, where he was
detained with respect to the subject firearm, which the
investigator, wished him to admit but accused denied its
ownership. Because of his refusal accused was mauled, hitting
him on the left and right side of his body which rendered him
unconscious. Accused in an atmosphere of tersed solemnity,
crying and with emotional attachment, described in detail how he
was tortured and the ordeals he was subjected.
He said, after recovery of his consciousness, he was again
confronted with subject firearm, Exhibit "A", for him to admit and

when he repeatedly refused to accept as his own firearm, he was
subjected to further prolong (sic) torture and physical agony.
Accused said, his eyes were covered with wet black cloth with
pungent effect on his eyes. He was undressed, with only blindfold,
pungent water poured in his body and over his private parts,
making his entire body, particularly his penis and testicle, terribly
irritating with pungent pain.
All along, he was investigated to obtain his admission, The process
of beating, mauling, pain and/or ordeal was repeatedly done in
similar cycle, from May 13 and 14, 1982. intercepted only
whenever he fell unconscious and again repeated after recovery
of his senses,
Finally on May 15, 1982, after undergoing the same torture and
physical ordeal he was seriously warned, if he will still adamantly
refuse to accept ownership of the subject firearm, he will be
salvaged, and no longer able to bear any further the pain and
agony, accused admitted ownership of subject firearm.
After his admission, the mauling and torture stopped, but accused
was made to sign his affidavit marked as Exhibit "E" for the
prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages, including the certification
of the administering officer, (TSN, pages 141-148, Hearing-June
15, 1983)
In addition to how he described the torture inflicted on him,
accused, by way of explanation and commentary in details, and
going one by one, the allegations and/or contents of his alleged
extrajudicial statement, attributed his answers to those questions
involuntarily made only because of fear, threat and intimidation
of his person and family, as a result of unbearable excruciating
pain he was subjected by an investigator, who, unfortunately he
cannot Identify and was able to obtain his admission of the
subject firearm, by force and violence exerted over his person.
To support denial of accused of being involved in any subversive
activities, and also to support his denial to the truth of his alleged
extra-judicial confession, particularly questions Nos. 35, 38, 41,
42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47, along with qqqs answers to those
questions, involving Honorata Arellano ahas Inday Arellano, said
Honorata Arellano appeared and declared categorically, that the
above-questions embraced in the numbers allegedly stated in the
extrajudicial confession of accused, involving her to such NPA
personalities, as Jamper, Pol, Anthony, etc., were not true
because on the date referred on April 28, 1982, none of the
persons mentioned came to her house for treatment, neither did
she meet the accused nor able to talk with him. (TSN, pages 118-
121, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
She, however, admitted being familiar with one Oscar Gomez, and
that she was personally charged with subversion in the Office of
the Provincial Commander, Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao
del Sur, but said charge was dismissed without reaching the Court.
She likewise stated that her son, Rogelio Arellano, was likewise
charged for subversion filed in the Municipal Trial Court of Digos,
Davao del Sur, but was likewise dismissed for lack of sufficient
evidence to sustain his conviction. (TSN, pages 121-122, in
relation to her cross-examination, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
To support accused's denial of the charge against him, Barangay
Captain of Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Salvador qqqGalaraga
was presented, who declared, he was not personally aware of any
subversive activities of accused, being his neighbor and member
of his barrio. On the contrary, he can personally attest to his good
character and reputation, as a law abiding citizen of his barrio,
being a carpenter and farmer thereat. (TSl pages 128-129,
Hearing-May 18, 1983)
He however, admitted in cross-examination, that there were a lot
of arrests made by the authorities in his barrio involving
subversive activities but they were released and were not
formally charged in Court because they publicly took their oath of
allegiance with the government. (TSN, pages 133-134, in relation
to page 136, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Finally, to support accused's denial of the subject firearm, his
wife, Urbana Burgos, was presented and who testified that the
subject firearm was left in their house by Cesar Masamlok and
one Pedipol on May 10, 1982. It was night time, when the two left
the gun, alleging that it was not in order, and that they will leave
it behind, temporarily for them to claim it later. They were the

ones who buried it. She said, her husband, the accused, was not in
their house at that time and that she did not inform him about
said firearm neither did she report the matter to the authorities,
for fear of the life of her husband. (TSN, page 24, November 22,
1983)
On cross-examination, she said, even if Masamlok during the
recovery of the firearm, was wearing a mask, she can still Identify
him. (TSN, page 6, Hearing-November 22, 1983)
After the above-testimony, accused through counsel formally
rested his case in support of accused's through counsel
manifestation for the demurrer to evidence of the prosecution, or
in the alternative for violation merely of simple illegal possession
of firearm, 'under the Revised Administrative Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 4, reflected in the manifestation of counsel
for accused. (TSN, pages 113-114, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Accused-appellant Ruben Burgos now raises the following assignments of error, to
wit:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT (SIC) THE ARREST OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE SEARCH IN THE
HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR FIREARM WITHOUT VALID
WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF P.D. No.
9 IN RELATION TO GENERAL ORDERS NOS. 6 AND 7
Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were the search of his house and the
subsequent confiscation of a firearm and documents allegedly found therein
conducted in a lawful and valid manner? Does the evidence sustaining the crime
charged meet the test of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
The records of the case disclose that when the police authorities went to the house
of Ruben Burgos for the purpose of arresting him upon information given by Cesar
Masamlok that the accused allegedly recruited him to join the New People's Army
(NPA), they did not have any warrant of arrest or search warrant with them (TSN, p.
25, October 14, 1982; and TSN, p. 61, November 15, 1982).
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton and unreasonable
invasion of the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects.
This Court explained in Villanueva vs. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why this right is so
important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this
right, but it could be also looked upon as a recognition of a
constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not
necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US
293 [19661) What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative
to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of
refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of
who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants
around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such
have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in
the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his
castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by
government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of
his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life, (Cf. Schmerber
v. California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United
States, 116 US 616, 630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his
authoritative work (Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court
[1966], could fitly characterize this constitutional right as the
embodiment of a 'spiritual concept: the belief that to value the
privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional
protection against the long reach of government is no legs than to

value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed
except in case of overriding social need, and then only under
stringent procedural safeguards.' (Ibid, p. 47).
The trial court justified the arrest of the accused-appelant without any warrant as
falling under one of the instances when arrests may be validly made without a
warrant. Rule 113, Section 6 * of the Rules of Court, provides the exceptions as
follows:
a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
about to commit an offense in his presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
The Court stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact
that "the authorities received an urgent report of accused's involvement in
subversive activities from a reliable source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the
circumstances of his arrest, even without judicial warrant, is lawfully within the
ambit of Section 6-A of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and applicable jurisprudence
on the matter."
If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the
alleged subversive documents would become an incident to a lawful arrest as
provided by Rule 126, Section 12, which states:
A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense.
The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous.
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must
have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his
presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was
possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information
furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the
appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm
or subversive document. Neither was he committing any act which could be
described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and
any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or
rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly
construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a
warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We
cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its
application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe
upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving
of full protection.
The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered
lawful under Section 6(b) using the test of reasonableness. He submits that. the
information given by Cesar Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that
there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed
a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime
has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to
suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the
offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the
identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report.
Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime.
They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent
recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a
frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful, If an arrest without warrant is
unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is

discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily
also tainted.
More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the
arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first
go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had
reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There
is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge
of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the
accused were unknown,
The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made
by Masamlok who was not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There
was no compulsion for him to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal
prosecution. (TSN, p. 24, October 14, 1982). Consequently, the need to go through
the process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of arrest becomes even
more clear. The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal. The
arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure which transpired afterwards could not
likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid arrest.
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by
the accused to be searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a
waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved
had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly,
that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de
Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry
into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein
(Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case
of Pasion Vda. de Garcia V. Locsin (supra)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any
affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in
the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law. (56 C.J., pp. 1180, 1181).
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." (Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458).
That the accused-appellant was not apprised of any of his constitutional rights at
the time of his arrest is evident from the records:
A CALAMBA:
Q When you went to the area to arrest Ruben Burgos, you were not armed
with an arrest warrant?
A None Sir.
Q Neither were you armed with a search warrant?
A No Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos was not present in his house when you went
there?
A But he was twenty meters away from his house.
Q Ruben Burgos was then plowing his field?
A Yes Sir.
Q When you called for Ruben Burgos you interviewed him?
A Yes Sir.
Q And that you told him that Masamlok implicated him?
A No Sir.
Q What did you tell him?
A That we received information that you have a firearm, you surrender
that firearm, first he denied but when Sgt. Buncalan interviewed his wife,

his wife told him that it is buried, I dug the firearm which was wrapped
with a cellophane.
Q In your interview of Burgos you did not remind him of his rights under
the constitution considering that he was purposely under arrest?
A I did not.
Q As a matter of fact, he denied that he has ever a gun?
A Yes Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, the gun was not in his possession?
A It was buried down in his horse.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos did not point to where it was buried?
A Yes Sir.
(TSN, pp. 25-26, Hearing-October 14, 1982)
Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged subversive documents
were obtained in violation of the accused's constitutional rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures, it follows that they are inadmissible as
evidence.
There is another aspect of this case.
In proving ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents,
the prosecution presented the two arresting officers who testified that the accused
readily admitted ownership of the gun after qqqs wife pointed to the place where it
was buried. The officers stated that it was the accused himself who voluntarily
pointed to the place where the alleged subversive documents were hidden.
Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused was never informed
of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. So that when the accused
allegedly admitted ownership of the gun and pointed to the location of the
subversive documents after questioning, the admissions were obtained in violation
of the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec. 20 of Art. IV of the
Bill of Rights winch provides:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed
of such right.. . .
The Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of this right
is inadmissible in evidence. Consequently, the testimonies of the arresting officers
as to the admissions made by the appellant cannot be used against him.
The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial confession of the accused as
inadmissible in evidence. The court stated that the appellant's having been
exhaustively subjected to physical terror, violence, and third degree measures may
not have been supported by reliable evidence but the failure to present the
investigator who conducted the investigation gives rise to the "provocative
presumption" that indeed torture and physical violence may have been committed
as stated.
The accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by
counsel during the custodial interrogation. The lower court correctly pointed out
that the securing of counsel, Atty. Anyog, to help the accused when he subscribed
under oath to his statement at the Fiscal's Office was too late. It could have no
palliative effect. It cannot cure the absence of counsel at the time of the custodial
investigation when the extrajudicial statement was being taken.
With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive
documents inadmissible in evidence against the accused-appellant, the only
remaining proof to sustain the charge of Illegal Possession of Firearm in
Furtherance of Subversion is the testimony of Cesar Masamlok.
We find the testimony of Masamlok inadequate to convict Burgos beyond
reasonable doubt. It is true that the trial court found Masamlok's testimony
credible and convincing. However, we are not necessarily bound by the credibility
which the trial court attaches to a particular witness. As stated in People vs..
Cabrera (100 SCRA 424):
xxx xxx xxx

. . .Time and again we have stated that when it comes to question
of credibility the findings of the trial court are entitled to great
respect upon appeal for the obvious reason th+at it was able to
observe the demeanor, actuations and deportment of the
witnesses during the trial. But we have also said that this rule is
not absolute for otherwise there would be no reversals of
convictions upon appeal. We must reject the findings of the trial
court where the record discloses circumstances of weight and
substance which were not properly appreciated by the trial court.
The situation under which Cesar Masamlok testified is analogous to that found
in People vs. Capadocia (17 SCRA 98 1):
. . . The case against appellant is built on Ternura's testimony, and
the issue hinges on how much credence can be accorded to him.
The first consideration is that said testimony stands
uncorroborated. Ternura was the only witness who testified on
the mimeographing incident. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . .He was a confessed Huk under detention at the time. He knew
his fate depended upon how much he cooperated with the
authorities, who were then engaged in a vigorous anti-dissident
campaign. As in the case of Rodrigo de Jesus, whose testimony
We discounted for the same reason, that of Ternura cannot be
considered as proceeding from a totally unbiased source. . . .
In the instant case, Masamlok's testimony was totally uncorroborated. Considering
that Masamlok surrendered to the military certainly his fate depended on how
eagerly he cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged
with subversion. The trade-off appears to be his membership in the Civil Home
Defense Force. (TSN, p. 83, January 4, 1983). Masamlok may be considered as an
interested witness. It can not be said that his testimony is free from the opportunity
and temptation to be exaggerated and even fabricated for it was intended to secure
his freedom.
Despite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged NPA
seminar of April 19, 1982 i.e., Masamlok's father ,Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan
and Ayok Ides (TSN, p. 74, January 4, 1983) who could have corroborated Cesar
Masamlok's testimony that the accused used the gun in furtherance of subversive
activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the prosecution never presented
any other witness.
This Court is, therefore, constrained to rule that the evidence presented by the
prosecution is insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.
As held in the case of People vs. Baia (34 SCRA 347):
It is evident that once again, reliance can be placed on People v.
Dramayo (42 SCRA 59), where after stressing that accusation is
not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt, it
was made clear: 'Only if the judge below and the appellate
tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been
committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting
test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required
that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into
account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason;
the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.
The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be
laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he
perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is
required then is moral certainty.' (Ibid, 64. Cf. People v. Alvarez,
55 SCRA 81; People v. Joven, 64 SCRA 126; People vs. Ramirez, 69
SCRA 144; People vs. Godov 72 SCRA 69; People v. Lopez, 74 SCRA
205; People v. Poblador, 76 SCRA 634; People v. Quiazon, 78 SCRA
513; People v. Nazareno, 80 SCRA 484; People vs. Gabilan 115
SCRA 1; People v. Gabiana, 117 SCRA 260; and People vs. Ibanga
124 SCRA 697).
We are aware of the serious problems faced by the military in Davao del Sur where
there appears to be a well-organized plan to overthrow the Government through
armed struggle and replace it with an alien system based on a foreign ideology. The
open defiance against duly constituted authorities has resulted in unfortunate
levels of violence and human suffering publicized all over the country and abroad.
Even as we reiterate the need for all freedom loving citizens to assist the military
authorities in their legitimate efforts to maintain peace and national security, we
must also remember the dictum inMorales vs. Enrile (1 21 SCRA 538, 569) when this
Court stated:

While the government should continue to repel the communists,
the subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with an the means at
its command, it should always be remembered that whatever
action is taken must always be within the framework of our
Constitution and our laws.
Violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. A cavalier attitude
towards constitutional liberties and protections will only fan the increase of
subversive activities instead of containing and suppressing them.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED, on grounds of
reasonable doubt, of the crime with which he has been charged.
The subject firearm involved in this case (homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith
and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221) and the alleged subversive documents are
ordered disposed of in accordance with law.
Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.


SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191193 : November 14, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GODOFREDO MARIANO y
FELICIANO and ALLAN DORINGO y GUNAN, Accused-Appellants.
D E C I S I O N
PEREZ, J.:
Assailed in this appeal is the Decision
1
of the Court of Appeals dated 9 November
2009 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03343 affirming the 5 March 2008 Decision
2
of the
Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City, Branch 65, finding appellants Godofredo
Mariano Y Feliciano (Godofredo) guilty of the crimes of illegal sale of shabu and
illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, and Allan Doringo y Gunan
3
(Allan) guilty of
the illegal sale of shabu.
On the one hand, Godofredo was charged with the offenses of violation of Sections
5 and 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 in two (2) separate Informations, which
read:
Criminal Case No. 04-706
That on or about the 17th day of October, 2004, at around 10:45 oclock in the
morning, at Zone 2, Municipality of Bulan, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
any authority of law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell,
deliver, dispose, distribute and/or give away for value two (2) transparent plastic
sachets containing methamphetamine hydrochloride locally known as "Shabu", a
prohibited drugs (sic), containing 0.5680 gram to a poseur-buyer in exchange of
One Thousand Peso Bill.
4

Criminal Case No. 04-707
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have in his possession, custody and
control one (1) aluminum foil, one (1) aluminum tooter and one (1) lighter which
are used and intended to be used for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting,
ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body, without any authority
of law.
5

Allan, on the other hand, was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
any authority of law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, sell,
deliver, dispose, distribute and/or give away for value two (2) transparent plastic
sachets containing methamphetamine hydrochloride locally known as "Shabu", a
prohibited drugs (sic), containing 0.1996 gram to a poseur-buyer in exchange of Six
Hundred Peso Bill.
6

The facts, according to the evidence for the prosecution, follow.
Acting on an informants tip, a buy-bust team was formed composed of SPO1
Reginal Goz (SPO1 Goz), the team leader, with PO1 David Olleres, Jr. (PO1 Olleres)
as the poseur-buyer, and police back-ups, PO3 Virgilio Razo (PO3 Razo), and a
certain PO1 Pabrigas, and an unidentified member of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA).
7
SPO1 Goz produced the marked money consisting of
one (1) One Thousand Peso bill and six (6) One Hundred Peso bills. PO1 Olleres
placed his initials on the marked bills.
8
On 17 October 2004, the team conducted a
buy-bust operation in the house of a certain Gerry Angustia located at Pier Uno,
Zone 2, Bulan, Sorsogon. PO1 Olleres, PO3 Razo and the asset proceeded to the
target house and they witnessed an ongoing pot session. They looked for "Galog"
and they were introduced to Godofredo. They asked Godofredo if they can "score."
Godofredo immediately left the house and went to a street at the back of the
house. He returned carrying two (2) sachets of shabu, which he handed to PO1
Ollares. In exchange, PO1 Olleres paid him the One Thousand Peso marked bill.
Allan also offered PO3 Razo two (2) more sachets of shabu. The latter asked for the
Six Hundred Peso marked bills from PO1 Olleres and handed them to Allan as
payment for the shabu. After these exchanges, they requested appellants for an
actual test of shabu. Godofredo provided them with a tooter and aluminum foil.
While they were testing said shabu, they declared an arrest.
9
PO1 Olleres and PO3
Razo identified the appellants in open court.
10

An Affidavit of Arrest was prepared and signed by PO1 Olleres and PO3 Razo.
11
PO1
Olleres also prepared a receipt of the property seized containing his and appellants

signatures.
12
The buy-bust team marked the plastic sachets containing shabu at the
crime scene and PO1 Olleres brought the seized items to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory.
13
They also took photographs of the items
confiscated and of appellants.
In Chemistry Report No. D-174-04 dated 18 October 2004, Police Inspector
Josephine Macura Clemen, a forensic chemist, found that the specimen submitted
to her was Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu.
14

A different version of the incident was presented by the defense. Allan claimed that
on 17 October 2004 at around 10:45 a.m., he was near the fence of Jessie Angustias
house waiting for a pumpboat coming from Masbate. He heard someone from
inside the house saying "tadihan ta ini" or "lets taste it." Allan thought that there
was food being cooked so he went inside the house. He then saw shabu scattered
on the table while a certain Ludy Gubat (Ludy) was holding an aluminum foil. He
also saw Godofredo and PO1 Ollares. Allan tried to leave but Ludy poked a knife on
the left side of his stomach and held him in the collar. Ludy apparently threatened
to stab Allan if the latter did not go with him. Allan was brought by police officers to
the 509th Mobile Group where he was forced to sign a document without reading
its contents. He was eventually transferred to the PNP Station of Bulan, Sorsogon.
15

Godofredo admitted that he was a drug user and that he went to the house of
Jessie Angustia to "score" shabu. Thereat, he saw Ludy and PO1 Olleres sniffing
shabu. When Allan arrived, Ludy cursed him and held him on his shoulders. Ludy
pulled out a knife and poked it at Allan. Thereafter, PO1 Olleres arrested
Godofredo. He was boarded in a tricycle and brought to Camp Crame.
16

On 5 March 2008, the RTC rendered judgment finding appellants guilty. The
dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Godofredo Mariano y Feliciano and
Allan Doringo y Guban, having been found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Sections 5 and 12, Article II of RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002), respectively, are hereby sentenced as follows:
a) In Criminal Case No. 04-706 (Violation of Section 5, Article II, RA 9165) accused
Godofredo Mariano y Feliciano is sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00);
b) In Criminal Case No. 04-707 (Violation of Section 12, Article II, RA 9165) accused
Godofredo Mariano y Feliciano is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
Six (6) months and one (1) day to four years and a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos
(Php10,000.00);
c) In Criminal Case No. 04-708 (Violation of Section 5, Article II, RA 9165) accused
Allan Doringo y Guban is sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php500,000.00).
The dangerous drugs as well as the drug paraphernalia subject matter of the three
(3) instant cases are hereby ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government (Sec. 20, RA 9165) to be disposed in accordance with the provisions of
Section 21 of the same Act.
17

The trial court held that the prosecution was able to establish that the buy-bust
operation was successfully conducted when appellants were caught in flagrante
delicto selling drugs, resulting in their apprehension. The trial court dismissed the
defense of alibi and denial over the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals on 9 November 2009 issued the challenged
Decision denying the appeal and affirming appellants conviction.
Failing to secure a favorable decision, appellants filed a notice of appeal before this
Court.
18

On 22 March 2010, the Court required the parties to simultaneously file their
supplemental briefs.
19
In two separate manifestations, both parties expressed their
intention not to file any supplemental brief since all the issues and arguments have
already been raised in their respective Briefs.
20

Appellants maintain that the trial court erred in admitting the seized dangerous
drugs and drug paraphernalia as evidences against them. They assail the validity of
their warrantless arrest by stating that the arresting officers should have secured a
warrant because they were already in possession of pertinent information, such as
the identity of their target, upon which an application for a warrant could be based.
Thus, the alleged shabu obtained by virtue of an invalid warrantless arrest is
inadmissible. In addition, appellants question the validity of the inventory receipt in
that the signing was done without the assistance of counsel.
In its appellees brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) supports the
convictions of the appellants. It justifies the legality of the warrantless arrest of
appellants as they were caught in flagrante delicto. Moreover, the OSG avers that

appellants are estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest having raised
them only on appeal.
We deny the appeal.
Appellants were charged and convicted of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs.
Under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the elements necessary for the
prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller,
the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
21

All these elements were duly established by the prosecution. Appellants were
caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu during a buy-bust operation conducted by
the buy-bust team. The poseur-buyer, PO1 Olleres, positively testified that the sale
took place and that appellants sold the shabu, thus:
A: At about 10:30 in the morning of that day our team leader instructed me to be
with them in conducting a buy bust operation.
Q: And who was with you at that time?
A: PO3 Razo and an asset.
Q: Where is the venue of the buy bust operation?
A: In the house of a certain Gerry Angustia (sic).
Q: At what time did you proceed to said place more or less?
A: About 10:00 oclock in the morning, Maam, we proceeded to the house of Gerry
Angustia (sic). As per information of our asset, Galog was already on that house.
Q: Who is that Galog that you are referring to?
A: Godofredo Mariano.
Q: When you reached the place of Gerry Angustia (sic), what happened?
A: When we arrived at the scene there was an ongoing pot session but we did not
disturb them because the subject of our operation for the day is Godofredo
Mariano and when we arrived we asked who is Galog and he was introduced to us
and so we asked him if we can buy some items from him.
Q: The place where you proceeded to, Mr. Witness, is it a house?
A: It is just a small house and to our knowledge it was being occupied by Gerry
Angustia (sic).
Q: Mr. Witness, what happened when you were there and being introduced to
Galog?
A: We talked with him and asked him if we can score and Godofredo Mariano left
the house and went to a street at the back of the house and when he came back he
has already with him two (2) sachets of shabu.
Q: Now, what happened when he returned with two (2) sachets of shabu?
A: Upon arrival of Godofredo Mariano with those two (2) sachets of shabu, we paid
him one thousand (Php1,000.00) pesos and right then and there Allan Doringo
approached us and offered to us to buy also two (2) sachets of shabu.
Q: Did you likewise buy the shabu offered by Allan Doringo?
A: Yes, Maam, Police Officer Razo gave Allan Doringo six hundred (Php600.00)
pesos.
Q: Afterwards, what happened?
A: And right after the exchanged of items we requested the two (2) of them to have
the actual test of shabu and while they were testing the shabu we declared arrest.
Q: What do you mean when you say they were actually testing the shabu?
A: They tested the shabu by providing us the totter and aluminum foil and while we
were testing the said shabu we declared arrest.

Q: Is accused Godofredo Mariano present today in court?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: Please identify him to us?
A: (Witness pointed to a man in a blue strife sweet shirt (sic) who identified himself
as Godofredo Mariano.)
Q: What about accused Allan Doringo (sic), is he present today in court?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: If you are required to identify him, will you be able to do so?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: Please go down and identify him?
A: (Witness pointed to a man in black shirt and identified as Allan Doringo when
asked.)
22

Simply put, Godofredo produced two (2) plastic sachets containing shabu and gave
it to PO1 Olleres in exchange for P1,000.00. Also, Allan had offered and given two
(2) more sachets containing shabu to PO3 Razo, who in turn, handed him P600.00.
PO3 Razo corroborated the account of PO1 Olleres, to wit:
Q: Mr. Witness, on October 17, 2004 at more or less 10:45 in the morning do you
still recall your whereabouts?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: Will you please tell us where?
A: On October 17, 2004 at 10:45 a.m. from the camp we proceeded to the house of
Gerry Angustia (sic).
Q: And what was your purpose in going to the house of Gerry Angustia (sic)?
A: To conduct a buy bust operation.
Q: By the way, where is that house of Gerry Angustia (sic) located?
A: At pier Uno of Zone 2, Bulan, Sorsogon just in front of the Coast Guard.
Q: Okay, when you proceeded to the house of Gerry Angustia (sic) to conduct buy
bust operation, who was with you at that time?
A: PO3 David F. Olleres, Jr. and our asset.
Q: When you proceeded to the house of Gerry Angustia (sic) and when you arrived
at the house of Gerry Angustia (sic) what happened next?
A: While at the house of Gerry Angustia (sic), Godofredo Mariano offered to our
asset to taste the shabu and he also offered two (2) sachets of shabu worth
Php1,000.00 to PO3 David Olleres, Jr. while this Allan Doringo persuaded us to buy
also two (2) sachets of shabu which was offered to PO3 Olleres who gave him also
Php600.00 pesos.
Q: What did Olleres do when he was offered this shabu by Godofredo Mariano?
A: He received the two (2) sachets of shabu from Godofredo Mariano and gave
Godofredo Mariano the Php1,000.00 bill then PO3 David Olleres identified himself
to Godofredo Mariano.
Q: Now, before Olleres identified himself as a police officer, did you already buy the
shabu from Allan Doringo?
A: Godofredo Mariano sold his shabu to PO3 David Olleres while this Allan Doringo
insisted to me to buy his shabu for Php600.00 pesos.
Q: And what did you do when Allan Doringo offered you this shabu in the amount
of Php600.00.
A: I get Php600.00 from David Olleres and paid Allan Doringo the same amount
after I received from him the shabu.
Q: Then what happened afterwards?

A: Then after that we introduced ourselves as police officers and we brought them
to the camp for police investigation.
Q: Are accused Allan Doringo and Godofredo Mariano present today in court?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: If you are required to identify them, will you be able to do so?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: Please point at them?
A: (The witness pointed to a man in yellow shirt who identified himself as Allan
Doringo when asked and also the witness pointed to a man in black shirt and
identified himself as Godofredo Mariano when asked.)
23

The result of the laboratory examination confirmed the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride on the white crystalline substances inside the
four (4) plastic sachets confiscated from appellants. The marked money was
presented in evidence. Thus, the delivery of the illicit drug to PO1 Olleres and PO3
Razo and the receipt by appellants of the marked money successfully consummated
the buy-bust transaction.
Godofredo was further charged and convicted of illegal possession of drug
paraphernalia. The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12, Article II,
Republic Act No. 9165 are: (1) possession or control by the accused of any
equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking,
consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug
into the body; and (2) such possession is not authorized by law.
24

The prosecution has convincingly established that Godofredo was in possession of
drug paraphernalia such as aluminum foil, aluminum tooter and lighter, all of which
were offered in evidence.
25
The corresponding receipt and inventory of the seized
shabu and other drug paraphernalia were likewise presented in evidence.
26
Police
Superintendent Leonidas Diaz Castillo attested to the veracity of the contents of
these documents.
27

While both appellants admitted their presence in the scene of the crime, they both
denied the existence of a buy-bust operation.
The defense of denial, like alibi, has been viewed by the court with disfavor for it
can just as easily be concocted. Denial in drug cases requires strong and convincing
evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in
the regular performance of their official duties. Bare denials of appellants cannot
prevail over the positive testimonies of the three police officers. Moreover, there is
no evidence of any improper motive on the part of the police officers who
conducted the buy-bust operation to falsely testify against appellants.
28

Appellants insistence on the illegality of their warrantless arrest equally lacks merit.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court allows a warrantless arrest under any of
the following circumstances
Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In the instant case, the warrantless arrest was effected under the first mode or
aptly termed as in flagrante delicto. PO1 Olleres and PO3 Razo personally witnessed
and were in fact participants to the buy-bust operation. After laboratory
examination, the white crystalline substances placed inside the four (4) separate
plastic sachets were found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu,
a dangerous drug. Under these circumstances, it is beyond doubt that appellants
were arrested in flagrante delicto while committing a crime, in full view of the
arresting team.

Anent the absence of counsel during the execution of an inventory receipt, we
agree with the conclusion of the appellate court that notwithstanding the
inadmissibility of the inventory receipt, the prosecution has sufficiently proven the
guilt of appellants, thus:
Admittedly, it is settled that the signature of the accused in the "Receipt of Property
Seized" is inadmissible in evidence if it was obtained without the assistance of
counsel. The signature of the accused on such a receipt is a declaration against his
interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged. However, while it is true that
appellants signed receipt of the property seized unassisted by counsel, this only
renders inadmissible the receipt itself.
In fact, in the case at bar, the evidentiary value of the Receipt of Property Seized is
irrelevant in light of the ample evidence proving appellants guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The prosecution was able to prove that a valid buy-bust operation was
conducted to entrap appellants. The testimony of the poseur-buyer clearly
established that the sale of shabu by appellant was consummated. The corpus
delicti, which is the shabu, was presented in court and confirmed by the other
members of the buy-bust team. They acknowledged that they were the same drugs
placed in four (4) plastic sachets seized from appellants.
29

In fine, it has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellants
sold shabu. Under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the penalty of life
imprisonment to death and fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 shall
be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy
regardless of the quantity and purity involved. Hence, the trial court, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine
of P500,000.00. As to Godofredo who was further convicted of illegal possession of
drug paraphernalia, Section 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 imposes the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4)
years and a fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) upon any person, who unless authorized by law, shall possess or
have under his/her control any equipment, instrument, apparatus and any other
paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, or
introducing any dangerous drug into the body.
Based on the foregoing rules, we also affirm the imposition of penalties by the trial
court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 9 November 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03343 which, in turn, affirmed the Decision
dated 5 March 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Sorsogon City, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 04-706, 04-707, and 04-708, is AFFIRMED in
toto.rllbrr
SO ORDERED.

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